T E R R O R I S M W AT C H
HOMELAND DEFENSE INFO KIT
PAR T 3: RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
By Robert Adams
(Ed. This is the third in a four-part
series by defense analyst Robert
Adams. Taken together, the four
articles make up a basic primer on
chemical, biological and radiological
weapons. It should be remembered,
however, that information obtained on
these weapons will vary from source to
source. This series is a compilation of
data from multiple Open Source
INTelligence (OSINT) sources. Thus,
there may be minor disparities
between these articles and other
sources of information. The author has
attempted to be as accurate as
possible in the information presented.
No information contained in these
articles violates national security
interests. Resources are listed at the
end of each article. Throughout this
article, military designations are used
to abbreviate chemical names.)
A
s we begin our discussion of
radiological weapons, it’s
important that we distinguish
between nuclear and radiological
weapons. A nuclear weapon is one
NATIONAL
Alpha particles: Form of ionizing radiation consisting
of positively charged particles.
Attenuation: Reduction in intensity of radiation as it
passes through a substance.
Beta particles: Form of ionizing radiation consisting of
negatively charged particles; a high-speed electron.
Decay: A decrease in the level of radioactivity as
fragments decompose to a more stable state.
Dose: The total amount of ionizing radiation that is
absorbed by an object over a specified interval of
time.
Dose rate: The rate at which a radiological dose is
received (also referred to as intensity).
External hazard: Radiation from a source outside the
body that can penetrate the body and pose a risk to
internal organs.
Fission: A nuclear reaction in which the nucleus of an
atom splits into the nuclei of lighter elements,
releasing tremendous amounts of energy.
Reprinted from National Fire & Rescue
capable of achieving supercritical
mass (i.e., nuclear detonation). A
radiological weapon, on the other
hand, is one that’s capable of
disseminating radioactive materials by
means of a conventional explosive.
Throughout this article, radiological
weapons will be referred to as
radiological dispersal devices
(abbreviated as RDDs). The media has
been putting out a fair amount of
recent information on RDDs
(popularly called “dirty bombs”), but
not much has been discussed
concerning nuclear weapons
themselves.
NUCLEAR MATERIAL
A discussion on nuclear material is
necessary in order to better understand
the construction of nuclear weapons
and RDDs.
Uranium and plutonium are the
most common elements used in the
construction of nuclear weapons.
Uranium occurs naturally, but the ore
that is mined is typically around only
7 percent uranium. For uranium to
sustain a nuclear reaction (as in a
reactor) it must be “enriched” to at
least a 10 percent level.
GLOSSARY OF TERMS: RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
Fusion: A nuclear reaction in which the nuclei of
lighter elements are combined with the nucleus
of an atom of a heavier element, releasing
tremendous amounts of energy (thermonuclear
weapons).
Gamma radiation: A type of radiation in the
form of electromagnetic energy, similar to
X-rays.
Half-Life: The amount of time it takes for the
level of radiation from a specified amount of a
radioactive material to decrease by one-half.
Initial radiation: The radiation released during
approximately the first minute after a nuclear
detonation.
Ion: An atom or molecule that has either gained
or lost an electron.
Kiloton: Nuclear weapon yield equivalent to the
explosive energy released by 1,000 tons of TNT
(abbreviated as Kt).
© 2002 SpecComm International
Enrichment is a highly technical
and expensive process. At 10 percent
enrichment, the amount of uranium
needed to produce a nuclear explosion
is prohibitively large, requiring several
tons. Uranium enriched to a 20 percent
level (or greater) is called “highly
enriched uranium” (or HEU). This we
will refer to as “weapons-grade.” Most
nuclear weapons use weapons-grade
uranium, which is enriched to 90
percent (or higher). At this level of
enrichment, only 15 kilograms of HEU
would be required to produce a
nuclear detonation.
Conversely, plutonium does not
occur naturally; it has to be
manufactured in a reactor. The amount
of plutonium (specifically, the
plutonium called “Pu-239”) required
to achieve a nuclear detonation has
been estimated by the Department of
Energy to be a mere 1 kilogram. The
Fat Man weapon detonated over
Nagasaki in April 1945 contained only
6.2 kilograms of plutonium, and had a
yield of 21 kilotons.1
Radiological dispersal devices,
however, are a different matter
altogether. Developing and building
RDDs requires neither the same cost
Megaton: Nuclear weapon yield equivalent to the
explosive energy released by 1 million tons of TNT
(abbreviated as Mt).
Neutron: A subatomic particle that is essentially
neutral.
Rad: A unit of absorbed radiation dose (from
Radiation Absorbed Dose).
Radiac: Device used for measuring radioactivity (from
Radiation Detection Indication And Computation).
Residual radiation: Radiation released after a nuclear
explosion (also called fallout).
Roentgen: A unit of exposure to gamma or X-ray
radiation.
Weathering: The removal of radiological
contamination by the natural action of the
environment.
(Source: Naval Ship’s Technical Manual 070 Rev. 2,
Naval Sea Systems Command, July 30, 1998.)
 ACUTE RADIATION EXPOSURE
PHASE FEATURE SUBCLINICAL RANGE SUBLETHAL RANGE LETHAL RANGE

INITIAL or TOTAL 0-100 R 100-200 R 200-600 R 600-800 R 800-3000 R >3000 R

prodromal DOSE
Nausea, None 5-50% 50-100% 75-100% 90-100% 100%
vomiting
Time of onset 3-6 hours 2-4 hours 1-2 hours <1 hour Minutes
Duration <24 hours <24 hours <48 hours <48 hours N/A
CNS function No effect No effect Routine task Simple and Rapid incapacitation
(central and cognitive routine task may have a lucid interval
nervous impairment and cognitive of several hours
system) for 6-20 impairment
hours for >24 hours
LATENT Absence >2 weeks 7-15 days 0-7 days 0-2 days None
of features
MANIFEST Signs/ None Moderate white Severe white cell decrease; Diarrhea, Convulsion, loss
ILLNESS symptoms cell decrease pneumonia, hair loss after fever, of muscle
(POST-LATENT 300 R electrolyte coordination
PERIOD) imbalance tremors, lethargy
Time of onset >2 weeks 2 days – 2 weeks 0-3 days
Critical period None 4-6 weeks 5-14 days 0-48 hours
Organ system None Blood cell forming GI tract, Central
and respiratory (mucosal) mucosal nervous
systems system
HOSPITALIZATION % Exposed 0 <5% 90% 100% 100%
personnel
Duration 45-60 days 60-90 days 90+ days Weeks Days
to months to weeks
MORTALITY None Minimal Low with High Very high, significant
aggressive neurological symptoms
therapy indicate lethal dose

nor the same technical expertise as
developing and building nuclear
weapons. Radioactive materials
such as those used by industry or the
medical field, if obtained in sufficient
quantities, could be used in an RDD. The
typical smoke detector contains some
radioactive materials, although it would
take an unprecedented number of them to
construct an RDD. The main concern
with the RDD threat would not
necessarily involve death and destruction,
but rather area denial due to
contamination. Radiological
contamination in a major industrial,
commercial or residential area would
greatly injure the health and economy of
that area, with national repercussions
possible.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The most difficult part of constructing a
nuclear weapon is obtaining the
plutonium or highly enriched uranium.
From there, it’s all downhill. The
technical hurdles in constructing the
actual device are not that difficult to
overcome.
There are two different designs for a
nuclear warhead: the “gun” type (used in
the construction of early nuclear
Reprinted from National Fire & Rescue
weapons) and the “implosion” type. The
implosion type requires extensive
knowledge of metallurgy, electronics and
explosives, whereas the gun type is fairly
simple and straightforward. South Africa
developed, from scratch, either six or
seven (reports vary) gun-type nuclear
warheads, as well as the needed HEU and
the enrichment technology and facilities,
for an estimated $200 million. It’s clear
that a terrorist already in possession of
HEU or plutonium could develop a gun-
type device for a small portion of that
cost.2
But what about the availability of
complete weapons? Since the fall of the
Soviet Union, the security of nuclear
warheads (as well as the associated
technology involved) has been a major
concern for the United States. As of
February 2001, the Department of Energy
had spent around $600 million installing
systems to protect weapons and weapon
materials in the former Soviet Union. As
of that time, these systems and programs
were protecting only 192 of the 603
metric tons of nuclear material identified
as being at risk of theft.3 Russia’s
notorious Black Market is a real and
viable means for smuggling stolen
“nukes” and materials out of the country.
© 2002 SpecComm International
Russian government officials have
already been implicated in authorizing
the sale and release of materials under the
control of nonproliferation treaties.4
In 1997, Aleksander Lebed, former
Russian national security adviser, claimed
that the Russian military had lost track of
around 100 “suitcase bombs.” These
bombs, actually called “nuclear
demolitions,” are portable nuclear
weapons, usually weighing no more than
60 pounds, each possessing a yield of
between 1 and 10 kilotons. Although this
is not a large yield in comparison with
strategic nuclear weapons, a 1- to 10-
kiloton burst in a small rural town could
effectively remove it from the map, and
cause an unprecedented nationwide panic
that would overshadow even the fear
created by the dreadful events of 9/11.
More details on suitcase bombs will be
offered in the fourth and final article of
this series (slated to appear in the
November/December 2002 National Fire
& Rescue).
RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL
DEVICES (RDDs)
An RDD is a conventional explosive
device surrounded (or shielded) by
radioactive material. The technology
behind these devices is about as
difficult as building a pipe bomb—
which is to say, not very difficult at
all. The radioactive material doesn’t
even have to be that dangerous for the
RDD to prove effective. Even the mere
suggestion of radioactivity is enough
to cause panic and disorder—even
when the types of materials in
question are not especially lethal (or
there’s not enough of a certain
material to make the RDD lethal).
The material in the common
household smoke detector carries the
traditional “tri-flor” icon (the symbol
for radioactivity, depicted as a
magenta circle surrounded by three
black pie slices on a yellow
background) due to the small amount
of americium (or other radioactive
isotope) that the detector utilizes.
The detonation of an RDD’s
conventional explosive material does
not necessarily have to cover a
widespread area in order to cause great
damage. The intent of the explosion is
simply to disseminate radioactive
material. Though most military powers
have experimented with RDDs as a
military weapon and found it
ineffective for military purposes,
RDDs are an ideal weapon for
terrorists. As with the use of chemical
or biological weapons, the
psychological and economic impact of
an RDD incident would most likely be
devastating.
The material used in an RDD
determines the type of radiological
contamination that occurs. As will be
discussed further in the next section
of this article, gamma radiation would
probably be the most damaging type.
The news media has claimed that
gamma emitters would not likely
be used, because the handling
requirements to prevent exposure and
the cooling requirements of the
material (they generate a great amount
of heat) would preclude them from a
terrorist’s arsenal. On the other hand,
terrorists have shown that they are
more than willing to strap bombs to
their bodies and fly aircraft into
buildings, sacrificing their own lives
to turn those aircraft into massive
missiles. Given all that, why would
terrorists care about radiation
poisoning? I do agree with some of
those news reports, particularly those
Reprinted from National Fire & Rescue
claiming that alpha and beta
contamination would most likely be
our primary concerns.
RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINANTS
There are four primary types of
radioactive contamination: alpha, beta,
gamma and neutron. Neutron and
gamma radiation are pure energy;
much like X-rays, they have great
penetrating ability, and their main
damage to humans involves triggering
cell mutation. They are commonly
referred to as forms of ionizing
radiation. Neutron radiation is found
only in true nuclear detonations, and
would, therefore, not be associated
with the use of an RDD. Hydrogenous
materials, such as water (of which the
human body is 80 percent) block
neutron radiation (or rather, absorb it).
Neutron radiation has the ability to
render other materials radioactive,
much like rubbing a needle with a
magnet causes the needle to act
magnetized for a time.
Gamma radiation, as we’ve stated,
is much like X-ray radiation. Its pure
energy, like X-rays, can be blocked or
attenuated by solid materials. The
denser and thicker the blocking
material, the better the attenuation
(referred to as its transmission factor).
In contrast to the pure energy of
gamma and neutron radiation, alpha
and beta radiation are actually
particle-based. Alpha particles are not
very “energetic” and can travel only 3
to 5 inches in still air. They pose no
serious external exposure hazard.
These particles can be effectively
blocked by a person’s clothing, not to
mention the layers of dead skin on a
person’s body. However, alpha and
© 2002 SpecComm International
beta particles do pose an internal
threat; inhalation, ingestion or open
wounds contaminated by alpha
particles can pose a health hazard to
the individual involved.
Beta particles are a little more
energetic, able to travel 6 to 10 feet
through still air. Though clothing will
effectively block most beta particles,
exposed skin is subject to skin burns.
As with alpha particles, beta particles
pose an internal hazard, although it’s
much more extreme.
Most detection equipment registers
only the presence of alpha and beta
particles, but will detect and measure
gamma radiation. There are specific
instruments to measure alpha and beta
particles, but the intensity of these
particles is normally measured in
counts per minute, which is the
number of particles hitting the
measuring probe per minute. Gamma
radiation, on the other hand, is
measured in roentgen or milli-roentgen
(1/1,000th roentgen). Their symbols
are R and MR, respectively.
There are two broad categories of
detection equipment: Radiacs
(Radiation Detection Indication And
Computation), which measure the dose
rate, or intensity of a radioactive field;
and dosimeters, which measure the
accumulated dose of radiation. The
film badges you see X-ray technicians
using are a type of dosimeter. Both
types of instruments are necessary—
not only for identifying contaminated
areas, but also for calculating safe-stay
times for response or decontamination
personnel. Calculating safe-stay times
does not require access to any
sensitive military information; the
process is unclassified.
RADIOLOGICAL EFFECTS
In dealing with radiological effects on
humans, you may be introduced to the
phrase “acute whole body dose.” What
this refers to is the radiation dose
that’s been received within a 24-hour
period by a person’s torso (and
including the eyes—the shortest route
to the brain). Different terms such as
rad (radiation absorbed dose) and rem
(radiation effects on mammals) do
contain slight differences in their
meanings, but because we’re not
discussing nuclear medicine, those
differences are irrelevant. The chart on
page 37 outlines the typical effects of
acute radiation exposure at increasing
intensity levels.
There are treatments for personnel
with symptoms of radiation sickness,
but discussing them is beyond the
scope of this installment in our series.
DECONTAMINATION
One major difference that exists
between radioactive contamination and
contamination by chemical or
biological weapons involves
decontamination. With a biological or
chemical weapon, different
decontamination agents can actually
kill or chemically alter the agents,
rendering them less dangerous, but not
necessarily neutral. With radiological
contamination, there is only one
effective decontamination process:
removal. Using HTH (calcium
hypochlorite) or other decontaminating
solutions for a radiological incident is
neither necessary nor recommended.
(Note: A wetting agent or soapy
solution, such as laundry detergent,
may be used to break up grease, oils or
Reprinted from National Fire & Rescue
similar substances from surfaces
contaminated with radioactive
materials.)
An additional problem occurs with a
nuclear detonation. The induced
radioactivity resulting from neutron
bombardment cannot be removed; it
must decay. Having a structure or
source that is emitting its own
radiation is a problem that needs to be
addressed immediately. Such a
situation would not normally be
associated with an RDD.
SPECIALIZED TRAINING?
A serious problem exists in the manner
in which departments are being trained
to respond to chemical, biological and
radiological incidents. It’s the same
problem the U.S. Navy experienced
until the disaster aboard the USS
Forrestal [Editor’s note: 134 crew
members were killed during a massive
fire aboard the aircraft carrier in July
1967]. That problem is training a
specific group of individuals to be the
response team, with a possible second
team held in reserve. Within minutes of
© 2002 SpecComm International
the initial explosions on the Forrestal,
both of those teams virtually ceased to
exist, leaving an untrained and
unqualified crew to handle the
casualties and make several glaring
mistakes. Since that time, though,
every naval crew member must qualify
in firefighting and damage control on
each vessel they’re assigned to serve.
It is the author’s opinion that each
and every person who has the potential
of having to respond to a radiological
incident should receive more than just
a passing knowledge of what needs to
be done and how to do it. What would
happen to your community if your
HazMat team takes catastrophic
casualties, or your region suffers more
exposure than your HazMat
capabilities? How long will it take
county, state or federal agencies to
respond to the scene? And finally, how
many civilians or inadequately
trained/qualified responders will be
harmed as they try to help? The
answers can be elusive, but these are
just some of the questions we each
need to ask ourselves. NF&R