E N G I NE P R O G R A M O F F I C E

SATURN HISTORY DOCUMENT

University of Alebema Research I n s t i t u t e

Hiet~ry Science G. Technology Groilp of:

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DEVELOPMENT OF LOX-YYDROGEN ENGI NES FOR THE SATURN APOLLO LAUNCH VEHICLES

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

DEVELOPMENT O F LOX-HYDROGEN ENGINES FOR T H E SATURN APOLLO LAUNCH VEHICLES A. J. 'Burks, A s s i s t a n t Manager Engine P r o g r a m Office National Aeronautics & Space Administration M a r s h a l l S p a c e Flight C e n t e r , Alabama 35812 Abstract During the development of the R L - 1 0 and 5-2 engines, many problems w e r e encountered. Solutions to the significant p r o b l e m s a r e contained. A d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e s e LOX-Hydrogen engines. outlining the unique f e a t u r e s of each w i l l b e given. P e r f o r m a n c e p a r a m e t e r s f o r both engine s y s t e m s a r e tabulated. Specific applications to various s t a g e s a r e shown. S t a r t a n d r e s t a r t conditions a t altitude a r e a v e r y i m p o r t a n t adjunct t o the engine development and a r e p r e s e n t e d in the paper. T e s t ing a n enqine designed to o p e r a t e a t altitude a t ambient s e a l e v e l conditions presented s o m e i n t e r esting p r o b l e m s and r e q u i r e d peculiar t e s t equipment. T h e solution to the.se problems and a d e s cription of the t e s t equipment will b e covered. Flight data revealed s o m e anomalies that w e r e l a t e r v e r i f i e d a t the altitude t e s t facility a t Arnold Engineering Development C e n t e r , Tullahoma, Tennessee. A description of the anomalies and verification testing will be made. Introduction T h e n a t u r e of propulsion s y s t e m development is s u c h that i t becomes the pacing i t e m i n a new vehicle p r o g r a m . This h a s been t r u e i n a i r c r a f t a s well a s m i s s i l e programs. The extensive t e s t ing, design, redesign, and r e t e s t have shourn that propulsion s y s t e m s g e n e r a l l y m u s t l e a d by s e v e r a l y e a r s i n the development cycle. T h i s n e c e s s i t a t e s the initiation of an engine development p r o g r a m p r i o r t o t h e detail design of the vehicle. This p r e s e n t s the obvious problems of i n t e r f a c e , power r e q u i r e m e n t definition, control s y s t e m relations h i p s , etc. which must be again evaluated a s the vehicl_e design i s finalized. Engine redesign o r c o m p r o m i s e s usually r e s u l t f r o m t h e s e iterations. T h i s :'common engine" approach allows the c o n t r a c t o r t o concentrate on one design, ' r e s u l t s in higher reliability due to repetitive testing of a single configuration, and reduces production c o s t s s i n c e the engines can be bought in l a r g e r quantities. A common engine configuration a l s o simplifies the s p a r e p a r t s and field support r e q u i r e m e n t s . and p e r m i t s interchangeability of basic components. Thus new engine development p r o g r a m s a r e optimized by a m e l d of the practical u s e of the b e s t technology available within the cohstraints involved and a vigorous trade-off of the performance p a r a m e t e r s . T h e choice of expansion ratio, for example, was one not only of performance, but of t h e e c o nomics involved in building the t e s t facilities r e quired f o r engine development. The RL-10, being a s m a l l e r engine,. could u s e a higher expansion r a t i o (and thus t a k e advantage of the higher specific impulse) because i t was practical to build s t e a m e j e c t o r s and d i f f u s e r s f o r engines i n this s i z e range. Such a choice f o r the J - 2 engine would have been prohibitive f r o m the stancipoint of c o s t due t o the s i z e of the facilities involved. Hence, one of the r e a s o n s a 27. 5/1 expansion ratio, was chosen f o r the 5 - 2 engine was to accommodate testing a t s e a level 1 conditions. The guiding philosophy of the NASA-Marshall Space Flight Center in developing engines i s to folschedule a detailed component test lo-ved by an in-depth engine t e s t p r o g r a m to f e r r e t out a s many latent hardware defects a s possible b e f o r e flight testing. A vigorous production support p r o g r a m i s maintained concurrent with the development phase and H e improvenlents a r e incorporated into the embryonic design a s soon a s practioal. This plan h a s worked successfully b c c a u s e i t continues to challenge the best technical minds to reach out "over the horizon" for b e t t e r i d e a s which have resulted in continual payload i n c r e a s e s for NASA's launch vehicles. This p r o duction support effort h a s been the backbone f o r resolving t h e problems resulting f r o m engine- s t a g e integration and testing. This process continues a s long a s vehicles using the engines a r e flying. The feedback of production and flight problems into the engine p r o g r a m s i s an essential element in deriving a reliable s y s t e m , and also s e r v e s the cofunction of allowing the engine design, testing, and manufacturing procedures to catch up with the s t a t e of the a r t .

Once the technical need h a s been established f o r the developinent of a new propulsion s y s t e m and the economics of the s y s t e m have been evalu.. a t -e d , then tge design trade-offs begin. Vehicle rcquirelllents w l ~ i c h include such b a s i c f a c t o r s a s staging, payload u~eight,mission flexibility? and ' reliability must be fed Sack into the b a s i c engine : design as the s y s t e m evolves. Wherever possible, engines a r e designed to be utilized i n m o r e than o n e stage. Following this philosophy the RL-10 engine found u s e on two different vehicles and the J-2 engine i s utilized on t h r e e s t a g e s of two vehicles. .

P a r t I: Development of the RL-10 Engine The Apollo P r o g r a m was conceived with the idea that a design evolution would be r e q u i r e d bef o r e the l a r g e vehicle s u i t a b l e f o r manned l u n a r landing could become a r e a l i t y . The planned evolution w a s f r o m the S a t u r n I to the S a t u r n IB, and finally to the Saturn V . S i n c e the liquid oxygen (LOX)-liquid hydrogen (LH2) RL-10 engine w a s a l r e a d y io development on the C e n t a u r p r o g r a m when the S a t u r n 1p r o g r a m w a s s t a r t e d , a n upr a t e d v e r s i o n (LR-11T) w a s chosen f o r the high p e r f o r m a n c e u p p e r s t a g e propulsion. The optim i s t i c development p r o g r a m f o r the LR-119 i a i l e d to m a t e r i a l i z e and coupled wit!, m a j o r difficulties in the RL-10 development p r o g r a m r e s u l t e d in a p r o g r a m r e d i r e c t i o n . A c o m m o n v e r s i o n of the R L - 1 0 engine was defined to m e e t the r e q u i r e m e n t s of both the C e n t a u r and S a t u r n I p r o g r a m s and ~ l l o w e d the c o n t r a c t o r to c o n c e n t r a t e on one development program.

F i g u r e 2.

Saturn I Engineis-1V Stage Application

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An a l l cryogenic p r o p e l l a n t s y s t e m of liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen w a s chosen b e c a u s e of r the high specific i m p u l s e a t t a i n a b l e . ~ a j A b r e a k throughs i n liquid hydrogen technology m a d e both p r o p e l l a n t s r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e and r e l a t i v e l y inexpensive. In addition t h e s e p r o p e l l a n t s a r e nontoxic and give s t a b l e combustion. The R L - 10 engine w a s s u c c e s s f u l l y used on the S u r v e y o r P r o g r a m in a n A t l a s - C e n t a u r vehicle ( F i g u r e 1 ) to boost the payload to a l u n a r landing. I t was a l s o u s e d in the S a t u r n I vehicle ( F i g u r e 2 ) , to p l a c e t h r e e P e g a s u s m e t e o r o i d technology s a t e l l i t e s into o r b i t .

Description - T h e RL-10 engine utilizes a r e g e n e r a t i v e l y cooled t h r u s t chamber and a turbopu.mp-fed propell a n t flow s y s t e m . Due to i t s high h e a t capacity, the liquid hydrogen v e r y effectivcly cools the thrust c h a m b e r . While passing through the t h r u s t chamb e r tubes, the hydrogen picks up heat and i s expanded in a two-stage turbine to d r i v e a single g e a r c d turbopump. The fuel i s then injected into the combustion c h a m b e r . This "topping" cycle p r o v i d e s a p e r f o r m a n c e gain of approximately 112 - . to 1 p e r c e n t over that of a conventional g a s g e n e r a t o r type cycle. Oxidizer i s pumped d i r e c t l y to the p r o p e l l a n t injector through the mixture r a t i o cont r o l valve. Thrust. control i s achicved by r e g u lating the amount of fuel bypassed around the t u r bine a s a function of combustion c h a m b e r p r e s s u r e in o r d e r to v a r y turbopump speed and thereby cont r o l engine thrust. Ignition i s accomplished by m e a n s of an e l e c t r i c s p a r k - t o r c h igniter r e c e s s e d in the propellant injector face. S t a r t i n g and stopping a r e controlled by pneumatic valves which r e c e i v e t h e i r supply of helium through e l e c t r i c a l l y operated valves. Major p a r a m e t e r s of the R L - 10 engine a r e depicted in F i g u r e 3 .

F i g u r e 1.

Atlas Centaur Enginelstage ~ ~ ~ l i c a t i o n

In the S a t u r n 1 p r o g r a m the RL- 1D engine bec a m e a n _excellent test-bed f o r Apollo h a r d w a r e development. The S-IV stage-of the S a t u r n I was a f o r e r u n n e r of the S-IVB s t a g e in the S a t u r n IB and V vehicles. L i k e w i s e , e x p e r i e n c e gained in developing the S-IV and C e n t a u r s t a g e s was util i z e d in designing the S a t u r n V S-I1 s t a g e .

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RL-10 Engine Major P a r a m c t c r s

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A functional description of t h e engine is shown i n Fi y r e 4.

Testing under simulated Centaur s t a g e conditions on a dual-position v e r t i c a l t e s t stand contributed significantly to the lack of engine p r o b l e m s once vehicle ground and flight testing commenced. Vehicle components such a s the hydraulic power pack, propellant utilization drive m o t o r , r e c i r c u l ation ducts and diffusers, vehicle boost pumps, and retromaneuver discharge ducts w e r e t e s t e d on the dual-engine stand under conditions closely approximating those found on the actual s t a g e in flight. This not only allowed interactions on the engines to be identified, but permitted a c c u r a t e simulation data f o r purposes of developing the s t a g e components. Production support effort was initiated t o m i n i m i z e the impact of production problems and continually improve s y s t e m reliability and flight . worthiness. This included establishment of vehic l e starting sequences and limits, optimization of prelaunch chilldown and boost pump settings, and investigation of flight problems. Basic technology was developed in special t e s t facilities, hydrogen i n j e c t o r s , ignitidn s y s t e m s , idling and throttling, reduced net positive suction head (NPSH) operation, the u s e of cryogenics f o r a bearing and gear coolant and the feasibility f o r a "zero chilldo\vn time" engine. The RL-10 has not only been a reliable engine s y s t e m for the Saturn and Centaur p r o g r a m s , but h a s s e r v e d a s a "test-bed" for other a r e a s of technology. The use of fluorine a s a11,oxidizer was proven on modified engines of an ea;G_vintage t o provide one of the f i r s t "flight w e i- h t " ~ fluorine prototjrpe engines. This was arcolnplislled by mod-. ifying the pump s e a l s in the oxidizer s y s t e m to p r o vide fluorine compatibility and by changing the engine "trim".
A modified RL-10 engine has run successfully in the throttling mode down to one percent of the r a t e d engine thrust. The feed s y s t e m was s t a b l e a t a l l t h r u s t levels in this range. F u r t h e r , a modified RL-10 h a s operated in the low-idle mode, in which the turbopump does not rotate but the engine o p e r a t e s on tank p r e s s u r e with gaseous, liquid. o r mixed-phase

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F i g u r e 4.

RL-10 Enginc

Developxnent P r o g r a m F i g u r e 5 shows the~developm'enfc y c l e for the R L - 1 0 engine v..llich f a l l s within the typical 5-7 y e a r span r e q u i r e d f o r propulsion s y s t e m s .

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F i g u r e 5.

RL-10 P r o j e c t Milestones

T h e f i r s t C e n t a u r flight utilizing a n RL-10 engine o c c u r r e d fix-e y e a r s a f t e r p r o g r a m initiation. Approxilnately $240 million d o l l a r s was spent on the R L - 1 0 engine p r o g r a m of whicll about seventy p e r c e n t \-:as s p e n t on the developnlent phase.

Other areas., such a s hypergolic ignition through the u s e of a small percentage of trioxygen difluoride in the oxidizer and instant-start o r z e r o cooldown t i m e accomplished by insulating the fuel pump i n t e r n a l s u r f a c e s , w e r e investigated using t h e RL-10 as a l ~ t e s t - b c d ~ l were pro,7en feasible. and
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T h e engine, in i t s various v e r s i o n s h a s completed 01 e r one nill lion seconds of total firings; and h a s been flown on 15 Centaur flights and s i x Saturn flrghts. A total of 66 engines have been flo\i.n with n o malfunction which affected the m i s sion.

Problems The RL- 10 engine encountered-a wide galnut of problems during development. Some of the m a j o r pro6lem a r e a s a r e l i s t e d below. .' (1) t h r u s t over shoot ( 2 ) gimbal block lubrication ( 3 ) s p a r k igniter deficiency

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T h r u s t Overshoot. The C e n t a u r vehicle w a s unable to a c c e p t m o r e than 1 5 p e r c e n t t h r u s t overshoot. T h r u s t exceeding the specified l i m i t occ u r r e d b e c a u s e the engine t h r u s t c o n t r o l valve ( F i g u r e 6) w a s s e t t o maintain a c h a m b e r p r e s s u r e of 300 p s i and did n o t by-pass any turbine d r i v e g a s until t h e nominal t h r u s t l e v e l was reached. T h e s y s t e m momentum w a s not r e t a r d e d e a r l y enough t o p r e v e n t the overshoot. Adjustments in s p r i n g p r e s s u r e on the t h r u s t c o n t r o l piston p r e vented e x c e s s i v e t h r u s t overshoot, but c a u s e d the s y s t e m to s t a b i l i z e below the nominal t h r u s t level. The p r o b l e m w a s s o l v e d by the incorporation of a "pneumatic r e s e t " on the t h r u s t control. The t h r u s t c o n t r o l by-pass w a s s e t to open a t a lower c h a m b e r p r e s s u r e (approximately 270 p s i ) , and the d e s i r e d nominal 300 p s i c h a m b e r p r e s s u r e w a s r e e s t a b l i s h e d by u s e of the pneumatic r e s e t s y s t e m . The r e f e r e n c e p r e s s u r e on the back s i d e of the t h r u s t c o n t r o l by-pass piston i s a t m o s p h e r i c p r e s s u r e which is e s s e n t i a l l y z e r o p s i a t the engine o p e r a t i n g altitude. When the t h r u s t c o n t r o l l e r byp a s s i s actuated a t the l o w e r c h a m b e r p r e s s u r e l e v e l , hydrogen i s vented into the t h r u s t control body. By orificing the t h r u s t c o n t r o l valve body vent, the body p r e s s u r e and piston r e f e r e n c e p r e s s u r e a r e i n c r e a s e d approximately 30 p s i which r e s e t s the by-pass relief p r e s s u r e to obtain the nom- - , . , i n a l 300 p s i c h a m b e r p r e s s u r e . ,By this method the r'esei p r e s s u r e l a g s the body dur'ing engine a c c e l e r a t i o n \vhich allows the t h r u s t control valvd to reLurn to a nominal position before thc des i r e d 300 p s i chatnber p r e s s u r e i s reached. Development of a backup e l e c t r o 3 i c t h r u s t cont r o l l e r w a s initiated in the productioh s u p p o r t p r o g r a m and the design had p r o g r e s s e d to the point w h e r e a d e c i s i o n could have been m a d e to use it when the modified pneumatic c o n t r o l l e r proved s,atisfactory..
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Gimbal Block Lubrication. The gimbal a s s e m bly is the componen.t with the highest unit loading aid is the only loaded component that i s exposed t o high vacuum during engine operation. Space vacuum effect on m a t e r i a l s i s significant in two re~~ects.

(1) evaporation of solids (2) vaporization of s u r f a c e g a s l a y e r s

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Evaporation of m a t e r i a l i s not a significknt prob l e m because of t1le r a t e of m a t e r i a l l o s s i s negligible a t t e m p e r a t u r e s below 300F and the engine s u r f a c e t e m p e r a t u r e s r e m a i n continuously below this c r i t i c a l range. Vaporization of s u r f a c e gas . l a y e r s of engine components i s a significant prob l e m because of the associated phenomenon of "cold welding. " Degassing a m e t a l surface r e m o v e s the oxide coating that i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y p r e s e n t within the atmosphere of the earth and p r o t e c t s the m e t a l s u r f a c e against ~ n o l e c u l a r t t r a c t i o n of s i m i a l a r c l e a n m a t e r i a l s . A l s o the friction behveen the rubbing m e t a l s i n c r e a s e s proportionately to the extent that the s u r f a c e s a r e degassed. A d r y f i l m l u b r i c a n t (molybdenum disulphide) was developed f o r the gimbal block to reduce the increased torque encountered under space conditions to a tolerable l e v e l well within the s t r u c t u r a l capability of the engine and the vehicle.

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S p a r k Igniter Deficiency. The f i r s t s t a t i c t e s t s t a n d s ' t h a t were buiIi f o r the R L - 10 development n p r o g r a m positioned the engines i a horizontal attitude f o r firing into a long diffuser. The d i f f u s e r s w e r e used to c r e a t e a vacuum around the engine p r i o r to s t a r t . L a t e r a dual engine t e s t stand was 'built in.wh?eh.the engines w e r e positioned vertically and f i r e d downward into diffusers f r o m an elevated facility. The f i r s t attempt to f i r e an RL-10 engine vertically resulted in an explosion that extensively d lmaged the engine and t e s t facilities. .The ensuing investigation proved that LOX was introduced intd the t h r u s t chamber in s u c h a way that i t bypassed the igniter. During the s t a r t of a horizontal engine f i r i n g , the LOX f o r m e d a pool inside the t h r u s t chamber. Boil-off f r o m this pool mixed with the hydrogen to f o r m a combustible mixture f o r ignition. When the engine wafi f i r e d vertically, the LOX droppsd to-the bottom of. the diffuser tubes, and the ignition o c c u r r e d a t that point. The explosion p r o g r e s s e d up through the d i f f u s e r s to the engines and test facility. The cngine injector was modified s o that both oxygen and fuel w e r e routed p a s t a r e c e s s e d s p a r k - t o r c h ignit e r during s t a r t and solved the problem. Upra ti'ng

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T h e r e has been a sustained spectacular payload i n c r e a s e over thc y e a r s attributed to engine improvement. A s s h o v ~ n d F i g u r e 7, a n i n c r e a s e of i a l m o s t 800 'Ibs.of payload has resulted f r o m engine improvements made over a s i x ycar period: E s s e n tially a l l of these a m e l i o r a t i o n s resulted f r o m itnprovements i:l efficiency with the ISP progressing

- s t e p - w i s e f r o m t h e o r i g i n a l design specification l i m i t of 412 lb. s e c i l b t o a deliwered n o ~ n i n a l 442 l b s e c l l b . of

Design flexibility had to be maintained s i n c e the J - 2 engine was t o be used in the second stage of the Saturn I B and the second and third s t a g e s of the Saturn '7, a s shown i n Figures 8 and 9.

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F i g u r e 7.

RL-10 Engine Contribution to Centaur Payload Increase F i g u r e 8. Saturn IB-V, Engineis-IVB Stage Application

Accomplishments . S o m e of the accomplishments of t h e RL-10 engine p r o g r a m a r e l i s t e d below: (1) First LH2/LOX engine (2) Developed LH2 techfiology (3) Combustion Stability (4) Multiple s t a r t capability (5) Idling and throttling capability (6) Test-bed f o r o t h e r a r e a s of technology T h e RL-10 engine h a s b e c o m e a w o r k - h o r s e i n t e pr.op1sion field. In addition to b e i n g a n exh c e l l e n t experimental tool it a l s o was the f o r e r u n n e r of t h e J - 2 and M-1 engines. P a r t 1 : Development of t h e J - 2 Engine 1 Design ~ h i l o s o ~ 1 1 ~ \ T h e J - 2 engine i s the second m a j o r propulsion s y s t e m developed using liquid hydrogen a s t h e fuel. Development of the 5-2 engine w a s undertaken to 5atisfy t h e need f o r a high-thrust, high-perforlPna n c e upper stage engine which would be capable of , r e $ & r t i w in, space. P r d p e l l a n t utirization and rg t h r u s t ~ r o g r a m ~ n i n e q u i r e d an additional flexibility f o r the engine system., Much of the e x p e r i e c c e and technology gained on the RL-10 P r o g r a m w a s d i r e c t l y applicable t o t h e J - 2 engine. Since t h e J - 2 w a s to be u s e d on a manned vehicle. conside r a b l e attention h a d t o b e given to achieving a high r e l i a b i l i t y through extensive component and engine s y s t e m s ground testing to r e s o l v e ariy potential p r o b l e m s before flight testing. In t h e design of the 5-2, atteation h a s been focused on potential f a i l u r e 111odes and inhere?t design c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which could preyent t h e s e f a i l u r e s ; - Welded joints a r e u s e d throughout the engine to prevent leaks. bleeds, a r e u s e d Dual s e a l s , with i ~ l t e r m e d i a t e - a t a l l hot g a s and propellant s e p a r a b l e connections.

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F i g u r e 9.

Saturn V, Engine/S-LT Stage .Application

I t was decided in the e a r l y stages of the Apollo P r o g r a m that the engines for the second and t h i r d stages would be completely interchangeable. The J-2 engine r e q u i r e s only minor changes to p e r m i t application i n the second and t h i r d stages. Changes i n the insulation, orificing, and h e a t exchanger connections a r e required, and provisions m u s t be made f o r refilling the hydrogen s t a r t bottle fpr the S-IVB r e s t a r t . Description T h e J - 2 rocket engine, shown i n F i g u r e 10, i s a 230,000-pound t h r u s t , m u l t i p l e - r e s t a r t , gimballed engine utilizing liquid hydrogen and

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l i q u i d o x y g e n a s p r o p e l l a n t s a n d is d e s i g n e d t o be used singularly o r clustered. The engine h a s a regcneratively cooled thrust chamber, .separate LHZ a n d LOX p u m p s d r i v e n by a g a s g e n e r a t o r c o ~ e c t e dn s e r i e s t o t u r b i n e s p o w e r i n g e a c h i pump, gaseous hydrogen f o r engine s t a r t , and a n integral helium control bottle f o r pneumatic valve o p e r a t i o n . A n e l e c t r i c a l c o n t r o l a s s e m b l y (ECA) p a c k a g e c o n t r o l s the e d g i n e s e q u e n c i n g a n d p r o vides the high voltage t r a n s f o r m e r s f o r the s p a r k ignition s y s t e m . T h e m a j o r p a r a m e t e r s a r e shown in F i g u r e 11.

f o r f l i g h t engines. Both the f i r s t f l i g h t c o n f i g u r a tion a n d !he u p r a t e d configuration e n g i n e s h a v e been qualified. T h e f l i g h t t e s t p r o g r a m t o c s t a b l i s h o v e r a l l vehicle p e r f o r m a n q e h a s v e r i f i e d the e n g i n e ' s flight c a p a b i l i t i e s . The 5 - 2 e n g i n e h a s been under development f o r almost eight y e a r s . Extensive component and s y s t e m tcsting have d e m o n s t r a t e d a r e l i a b i l i t y of 0.9950 a t a 50 p c r c c n t c o n f i d e n c e level. T h e r e h a v e been 3 , 1 8 3 s i n g l c e n g i n e t e s t s w i t h a n a c c u m u l a t e d t e s t t i m e of 3 0 9 , 1 4 0 s e c o n d s . T h e r e h a v e been 57 c l u s t e r f i r ing t e s t s , c o n s i s t i n g of the full five-engine c l u s t e r e d configuration c o n d u c t e d f o r 1 0 , 1 1 3 s e c o n d s of f i r i n g t i m e . T h e J - 2 engine h a s m a d e f o u r S a t b r n IB f l i g h t s a n d two f l i g h t s in the S a t u r n V vehicle.

~ k u r e 12. F i g u r e 10.
3-2 E n g i n e
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P r o b l c l n s (Non-Flight). The c o u r s e of the J - 2 d e v c l o p m e n t h a s not been without incidents. The f i r s t engine t e s ~ s exhibited s i d e l o a d s d u r i n g s t a r t a t s e a l e v e l conditions; however, t h e r e h a v e been n o s i d e load p r o b l e m s while tcstirig a t a l t i t u d e . T h e s i d e l o a d s w e r e due t o g a s flow s e p a r a t i o n s i n s i d e thc t h r u s t c h a m b e r . Since the g i m b a l a c t u a t o r s w e r e d e s i g n e d to t a k e the n o r m a l t h r u s t l o a d , m e a n s had to b e found to contain t h e s e s i d e l o a d s . T h i s w a s a c c o m p l i s h e d bv m o d i f y i n g the w i t h the 'addition of s i d e Load r e s t r a i n ing a r m s to p h y s i c a l l y hold the engine d ~ r i n g n c gine start. Fuel pump stall was a development p r o b l e m e a r l y in the p r o g r a n i , T h e . fuel p u m p 'flow e n t e r e d . the r e g e n e r a t i v e l y cooled j a c k e t b e f o r e p a s s i n g 'into the i n j e c t o r . A s the f u c l pump d e l i v e r e d t h e f i r s t f u e l t o the r e l a t i v e l y warn-, c h a m b e r , a c o n s i d e r a b l e v o l u m e of h y d r o g e n g a s w a s c r e a t e d . T h e g a s could not p a s s t h r o u g h the i n j e c t o r a t a r a t e suffi,cient to k e c p up w i t h the flow. T h c soluLion w a s t o p r e c h i l l the pump and c h a r n b c r .irith l i q u i d h y d r o gcn t o l i m i t the t e n l p e r a t u r e c o n d i t i o n s u n d r r which a s t a r t w0u.l-d be a t t e m p t e d .
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F i g u r e 11.

D e \ e l o p ~ n e nP r o g r a m t S i g n l i t c a n t d e v e l o p m e n t s with,in t h e 3-2 p r o g r a i n a r e s h o w n in F i g u r e 12. T h e d e v e l o p m e n t . t c s t p r o g r a m has three distinct facets: Camponent testing, engine systcnls testing, and ilight t e s t i n g . T h e c o m p o n e n t t e s tine, c o n s i s t s of quali-. f y i n g a l l m a j o r co1nponer;ts a n d v e r i f i c a t i o n t e s t i n g

Another problem involved sequencing of the main liquid oxygen valve opening, allowing a n excessive amount of liquid oxygen t o be passed on to t h e gas generator. T h i s caused excessive gas t e m p e r a t u r e and p r e s s u r e spikes i n the gas generator. The problem was c o r r e c t e d by changing the sequencing of the main liquid oxygen valve to a i d in regulating the flow of liquid oxygen t o the gas generator. T h i s h a s a l s o helped t o alleviate the previously discussed fuel pump Stall problem T h r e e s e r i o u s component problems which o c c b r r e d during the development of the J-2 engine w e r e ECA solder joints f a i l u r e s , LOX turbine wheel c r a c k s , and ECA t i m e r failures.

BASE

EYELET

PRINTED CIRCUIT ECA Solder Joint F a i l u r e s . Spurious engine CONDUCTOR cutoff signals w e r e encountered during checkout of a vehicle a t Cape Kennedy. The signals w e r e t r a c e d to cracked solder joints in the engine ECA F i g u r e 14. Typical Solder Joint F a i l u r e pacKage. The e l e c t r i c a l control assembly, whish i s the n e r v e center of the engine, sequences the Since this had been recognized a s a potential probengine operations throughout the complete cycle. l e m a r e a , a substitute shown in F i g u r e 15 was i being developed in the production support program. As shov..n in F i g u r e 13, the c r a c k o c c u r r e d in The t e r m i n a l solid pin acts a s a heat sink and r e a joint w h e r e a component was soldered into a s u l t s i n a vastly improved joint in which microscopic printed c i r c u i t board. Subsequent t e m p e r a t u r e c r a c k s that a r e no deterrent to good continuity a r e s t r e s s i n g caused the joint to fail a s shown in Figoccasionally encountered. u r e 14.

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SOLDER JOI,

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F i g u r e 13.

ECA Solder Joint Crack

F i g u r e 15.

Improved Solder Joint Design

LOX Turbine Wheel Cracks. Cracking was detected during a routine inspection of the second stage L O X turbine wheel (Figure 16).

FAILED TRANSISTOR Q 2 (CK65) FROM J2084 TIMER (IMMEDIATE TIME O U T )

VIEW LOOKING F R O M BOTTOM OF TRANSISTOR CASE-HEADER 8 CHIP REMOVED.

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F i g u r e 16.

LOX Turbine Wheel

RAYTHEON CK65 TRANSISTOR (Actual Size)

TIN/Si02 WHISKER i2:oo P'OSITION APPROX DIA. -< 001 APPROX LENGTH -.010

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As shown in Figure 17 the wheel hub was c r a c k e d around the entire periphery. Since this wheel F i g u r e 18. Failed ECA T i m e r T r a n s i s t o r operated a t about 8,000 r p m , the potential energy available could cause catastrophic r e s u l t s i n c a s e This whisker growth is a c h a r a c t e r of failure. I t was discovered that in going through istic of noble base metals such as tin, indium, the mixture ratio excursion on the J-2 engine, a read and silver. The growth i s known to b e a c c e l standing wave was generated in the turbine wheel e r a t e d by (x-ray), moisture, electrica~cpoten2nwhich continued to flex the metal a t the hub a r e a i a l difference, and the presence of silica. Since until fatigue occurred. BY changing the web thick- ' the t r a n s i s t o r has a tin plated c a s e , contains silica n e s s and the stiffening characteristics of the wheel gel desiccant is assembled in an uncontrolled huthe destructive standing wave vibration was e l i m miditxen3,ironment, has a poor hermetic seal, and -.-- .- . ---p.p Enat&-- -i s exposed t o an electrical potential difference i t - . makes an excellent test-bed for whisker growth. T h e r e was concern over replacing a qualified com- - 7 -2 -------, \w-7 - r -- ponent which had 2296 engine hot f i r e t e s t s f o r a ... 'I demonstrated reliability of 0.9999 a t a 50 percent fir-< _-- . > ;' confidence level and 50,000 exposures i n no=-hot -/ --- , ,. ./,-- - . ~ . . x f i r e t e s t s for a reliability of 0. 9998 a t a 50 p e r .-.L:---'- 1 . cent confidence level. T h i s is another example of the A p a l o program pushing the state of the a r t . The t r a n s i s t o r s w e r e the b e s t available i n the industry a t the time they w e r e chosen for the application. However, t h e long lead t i m e involved in manufacturing a n i t e m a s complicated a s the Saturn V vehicle resulted in long storage t i m e f o r numerous sub-components. This t i m e period was sufficiently long enough to allow the whisker to grow to the extent that i t caused a short between the t r a n s i s t o r element and the case. The t r a n s i s t o r s w e r e replaced with a high reliability improved unit made under m o r e rigid manufacturing s p e c ifications and with a c a s e m a t e r i a l which did not Figure 17. LOX Turbine Wheel Hub C r a c k support whisker growth.
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ECA T i m e r F a i l u r e s . An e l e c t r i c a l control a s s e n ~ b l y i m e r failure o c c u r r e d during checkout t a t Cape Kennedy. Throughout the history of the t i m e r development encompassing about eight y e a r s only 'eleven failures w e r e noted. Of t h e s e f a i l u r e s six w e r e attributed to t r a n s i s t o r s in the amer c i r cuit. A thorough investigation of the p r o b j 6 ~ a t i tributed t h e cause to be whisker growth wiF1Gn the c a s e enclosing it CI< 65 t r a n s i s t o r w&+ i s a n ' integral p a r t of the timer. The urhisFer &.r?wth .. i s shown in Figure 18.

Problems ( F l i g x . AS-203 hot c r o s s o v e r duct. Flight data f r o m AS-203 indicated that the c r o s s o v e r duct (See F i g u r e 10) which connects the fuel turbine to'the oxidizer turbine did not cool a s rapidly a s anticipated and the additional energy in the system influenced the engine s t a r t transient.

Due to excellent heat t r a n s f e r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s in a s e a level environment, the duct had always cooled quickly before a r e s t a r t t e s t was initiated. T e s t s w e r e conducted a t the Arnold Engineering Development Center in a n environmental t e s t c e l l in which the e n t i r e Saturn S-IVB stage c a n be maintained a t a simulated altitude of 100,000 f e e t during engine s t a r t t r a n s i e n t and steady s t a t e operation. These t e s t s verified that the J-2 engine would s t a r t and r e s t a r t satisfactorily under l a r g e t e m p e r a t u r e e x t r e m e s by s t a r t i n g with the propellant utilization valve wide open. This o p e r ation i n s u r e d minimum energy in the s y s t e m a t s t a r t u p s i n c e the engine would be p r o g r a m m e d f o r a n initial fuel r i c h mixture r a t i o which would put l e s s heat into the gas g e n e r a t o r turbine exhaust g a s e s that p a s s through the c r o s s o v e r duct. In addition the c r o s s o v e r duct was painted black to enhance the t r a n s f e r of heat out of the s y s t e m . AS-502 Flight. Anomalies w e r e encountered in both thc S-II and S-IVB s t a g e s during flight. The S-I1 anomalies included environmental changes, indicated yaw actuator malfunction, p e r formance shifts, and p r e m a t u r e cutoff. Environmental Changes. The 502 flight w a s norlnal by 501 s t a n d a r d s until 225 seconds a f t e r llitoff. At that time t e m p e r a t u r e began to d r o p rapidly in sclected engine a r e a s a s shown in F i g u r e s 19, 20, and 21. Engine 2 cutoff was p r e ceded 0 . 3 seconds by indications of hot g a s impingement a s depicted in F i g u r e s 22 and 2 3 .

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.

F i g u r e 20.

Bottom View of Area Cooled P r i o r to Engine Number 2 Cutoff

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F i g u r e 21.

Side View.of A r e a Cooled P r i o r to Engine Number 2 Cutoff .

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Figure 19. Cooling Trends P r i o r to Engine Number 2 Cutoff Cooling t r e n d s w e r e established b y 2S0 seconds a f t e r liftoff and w e r e a c c e l e r a t e d a t 320 seconds. Eoth t i m e inter\.als c o r r e s p o n d closely with t h r u s t shiits. J u s t p r i o r to engine number 2 cutoff the engine and t h r u s t cone a r e a indicated hot g a s impingcment. Following engine n u k b e r 2 cutoff t h e r e w a s a cooling trend $11 the engine 2 - 5 quadrant i n l dicating a cryogenic line rupture. F i g u r e 22.

Bottom View of A r e a IIeatcd and Cooled a t Engine Number 2 Cutoif

F i g u r e 23.

S i d e V i e w of A r e a s H e a t e d a n d C o o l e d a t E n g i n e hTumber 2 Cutoff

F i g u r e 25.

L o w e r end of ASI F u e l L i n e

T h e m o s t p r o b a b l e s u s p e c t s f o r c a u s i n g this t y p e of a n o m a l y i s a l e a k i n t h e a u g n l e n t e d s p a r k i g n i t e r (ASI) f u e l o r o x i d i z e r l i n e w i t h t h e f u e l l i n e t h e p r i r n e c a n d i d a t e . ( F i g u r e s 24, 25, 2 6 , and 2 7 .

F i g u r e 26.

U p p e r end of AS1 F u e l L i n e

F i g u r e 24.

5 - 2 E n g i n e Ignition S y s t e m

It h a s b e e n p o s t u l a t e d t h a t a slmall leal< o c c u r r e d i n t h e l i n e 2 n d contlnucd t o n i a n i f e s t i t s e l f until t h e r e c r a s a c o i n p l e t e r u p t u r e . At t h i s point hot g a s e s f r o m t h e coinbustioil c h a m b e r would backflo\v t h r o u g h o n e l e g of t h e r u p t u r e d l i n e i n t h e v i c i n i t y of t h e AS1 p o r t a n d r e s u l t i n h o t g a s s p e w i n g out o n e p a r t of t h e b r e a k a n d r a v c r y o g e n i c p r o p e l l a ~ tc o m i n g out of t h e o t h e r s e \ - e r e d end. T h i s p h e n o m e n a h a s not b e e n c o n l p l e t e l y d d p l i c a t e d unclcr c o n t r o l l e d c o l i d i t i o ~ l sa t tile t i m e t h i s p a p e r was written.
F i g u r e 27.
AS1 L O X Line

Indicated Yaw Actuator Malfunction. A s shown i n F i g u r e 28, coincident with a s h a r p i n c r e a s e i n cooling, t h e yaw a c t u a t o r A P began t o i n c r e a s e rapidly and r e a c h e d a m a x i m u m point c o r r e s p o n d ing to t h e second t h r u s t shift exhibited by t h e engine. I t w a s postulated that the indicated malfunction w a s t h e r e s u l t of a cryogenic p r o p e l l a n t l e a k i n t h e vicinity of t h e actuator.

An a c t u a t o r p r e s s u r e t r a n s d u c e r w a s subjected t o a s t r e a m of liquid nitrogen to s i m u l a t e a liquid hydrogen l e a k impingement. The p r e s s u r e t r a n s d u c e r ( F i g u r e 2 9 ) i s composed of two c o n c e n t ~ i c helix bourdon p r e s s u r e tubes with one a t t a c h e d t o t h e d a s h pot wall and the o t h e r fastened t o a s l i d ing rod. A s the o u t e r helix tube cooled r a p i d l y i t c o n t r a c t e d f a s t e r than the i n n e r tube a n d gave a n indication of a differential p r e s s u r e . A s t h e i n n e r helix tube approached t h e t e m p e r a t u r e of t h e outer one, the t r a n s d u c e r indicated a null position. When t h e cryogenic s o u r c e w a s re&&ed, t h e p r o c e s s wab r e v e r s e d with t h e o u t e r tube h e a t ing u p f a s t e r , expanding, and giving a n e r r o n e o u s differential p r e s s u r e . A s t h e inner tube t e m p e r a t u r e approached the outer one a null position w a s again initiated. I t i s believed that the cryogenic s p r a y of t h e a c t u a t o r A P t r a n s d u c e r a n d / o r a n engine p e r f o r m a n c e shift could explain a l l t h e indicated yaw a c t u a t o r anomalies.

F i g u r e 29.

P i c t o r i a l Schematic of A P T r a n s d u c e r

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F i g u r e 28.

Yaw Actuator A P

- P e r i o r m a n c e Shifts. T h r e e pej-forlmallce s h i f t s o c c u r r e d during t h e S-I1 burn. The f i r s t shift v,ras g r a d u a l s t a r t i n g a t 260 s e c o n d s a f t e r liftoff and continuing f o r about 60 seconds t o a m a x i m u m of 6 psi drop, A sudden 20 psi deckease in cllalllber p r e s s u r e o c c u r r e d approximately 319'seconds after l i f t o f f , and a 10 psi drop occurrofi 0,5 seconds bef o r e cutoff of the number 2 engillei A s shown in a F i g u r e 30, a l l p a r a m e t e r s i n d i c q ~ d d r o p i n t h r u s t a t the 319 second data sli$Su.hich w a s c l o s e Stage) AS-502 Anornalics (S-IVD -- - A n o l ~ ~ x l i e s l y si~nulatecl the math model when p r o g r a i n m e d by which o c c u r r e d on t h e AS-502 flight i n the S - I V B f o r a l a i g e fuel leak. A preliminary'conclusion is that a leal\ in t h e ASI f u e lline caused tile anolnaly. s t a g e include p e r f o r m a n c e shift rlurirlg f i r s t burn, changes i n environmental conditions during f i r s t A,, extensive test progral,l i s still in progress .to completely v e r i f y the c a u s e of t h e malfunction.
b

P r e m a t u r e engine cutoff. Engine number 2 cutoff a t 412. 8 seconds a n d e n g i n e number 3 cutoff a t 414. 28 seconds a f t e r liftoff which was s h o r t of the r e q u i r e d m i s s i o n burn t i m e by 107 seconds and 105. 5 seconds respectively. The r e a s o n for the number Z engine cutoff was activation of Lhr m a i n s t a g e t h r u s t 0. K. p r e s s u r e switch which had decayed t o the cutoff l e v e l a s a r e s u l t of the m a l function(s). Eilgine 3 was cutoff a s a r e s u l t of a human e r r o r i n the s t a g e assembly. IIThen solenoid switches w e r e cllallged out of the s t a g e the L O X prevalve control colnmand cable on the number 2 "lgine was e r r o n e o u s l y connected to the number 3 engine solenoid and t h e cutoff signal initiated i n t h e nulnber 2 engine prevalve control c i r c u i t shutdovm engine number 3 .

burn, hydraulic s y s t e m f a i l u r e , and f a i l u r e of the engine to r e s t a r t on second burn. T h e f i r s t b u r n of the 5 - 2 engine w a s n o r m a l up

, - /

engtne. A s a r e s u l t of an intensive simplifica'tion p r o g r a m , the J - 2 engine i s programmed for a demonstration of design'in a n uprated version in t h e 1970 time f r a m e .

to 695 seconds a f t e r liftoff. A t that t i m e t h e r e was a n engine p e r f o r m a n c e shift and a disturbance i n environmental conditions. T h e c h a m b e r p r e s s u r e dropped, fuel pump d i s c h a r g e p r e s s u r e i n c r e a s e d , both t h e f u e l and LOX i n j e c t o r p r e s s u r e d e c r e a s e d , t h e f u e l injector.temperature r o s e , amd the f u e l pump s p e e d went t o z e r o r p m . F i g u r e 31 indicates t h a t both heating a n d cooling o c c u r r e d e x t e r n a l t o t h e engine during a 15 second t i m e interval. A s h a r p drop i n the cylinder oil t e m p e r a t u r e of t h e yaw actuator was r e c o r d e d a t 695 seconds t o c o r r e s p o n d with the previously mentioned environmental changes.

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P x nt n : n r ~ l c

.&I'D 01 EEI or A S S I ~ 10 c h r ! Ir r 1 ~ 7 1L n C?LhlCb l S1LXi;IED tVGI1:t I W . 2 1970.

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F i g u r e 32.

J - 2 Engine Contribution .to Saturn V Payload I n c r e a s e Summary

T h e J - 2 engine development pro,c r a m h a s encountered problems typical of a new p r o p u l s i o ~ l unit. T o date no problem h a s approached the techn i c a l complexity of the combustion instability phenomena found in the LOX-RP-1 engines. T h e p r e s e n c e of two cryogenics m a k e s the dynamic balance of t h e propulsion s y s t e m under a wide operating band a v e r y difficult problem especially during the s t a r t t r a n s i e n t phase. T h e basic engine design h a s beell thoroughly evaluated and tested.
t

F i g u r e 31.

S u m m a r y of Environlllelltal Condition Changes

F u t u r e Outloolr . T h e development of liquid oxygen-liquid hydrogen engines is but another tick m a r k in the lnilestones of propulsion, The past t r e n d h a s been to l a r g e r engines but now a plateau s e e m s to be forming. F o r the n e a r future, developments will probably evolve along m o r e v e r s a t i l i t y i n the s y s t e m , higher i m p u l s e , and m o r e reliability. One of the m o s t p r o m i s i n g fields i s the low cost booster utilizing e i t h e r packaged s t o r a b l e s o r solid propellants. Acknowledgements T h e a s s i s t a n c e of the many people who c o n t r i buted to the preparation of this paper i s a p p r e c i ated. T h e author would particularly-like to thank p e r s o n n e l in the Propulsion and Vehicle E n g i n e e r ing L a b o r a t o r y and other l a b o r a t o r i e s a t the M a r s h a l l Space Flight Center and the many Saturn c o n t r a c t o r s wl-?p contributed data and analyses for t h e p r e l i m i n a r y conclusions drawn i n the flight prablern area.

All precollditionillg r e q u i r e m e n t s w e r e s a t i s factory for the second b u r n and a l l v a l v e s cycled p r o p e r l y . T h e s t a r t t r a n s i e n t was n o r m a l until the beginning of mainstage except f o r chamber p r e s s u r e which failed to r i s e t o t h e d e s i r e d level indicating n o ignition i n the main chamber. The m o s t probable c a u s e f o r t h e f i r s t burn anorrlalies and t t e Cailure to r e s t a c t i n t h e second burn i s a n AS1 fuel line failure. Math s models produce s i m i l a r ~ e r f o r l n a n c e h i f t s f o r failed AS1 fuel lines; however, a l l malfunctions have not 1-et been s a t i s f a c t o r i l y explained. T e s t p r o g r a m s a r e underway t o d e m o n s t r a t e flight f a i l u r e modes. Uprating Consistent wit11 t h e p a t t e r n of t h e o t h e r l a r g e liquid engines developed by NASA, the J - 2 engine h a s been steadily i ~ n p r o v e ds i n c e i t s conreption and contributed marlied1)- t o vehicle payload i n c r e a s e s a s shown i n F i g u r e 3 2 . Payload capability in the Satqrn V vehicle h a s been i n c r e a s e d a l m o s t 7000 l b s . ihrough improvexnents i n the 3 - 2

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