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Developing a mechanism which enables the transport layer security server to resume sessions and avoid keeping per client session state. The TLS server encapsulates the session state into a ticket which is forwarded to the client for it to resume the session.
Here we would define a TLS session without requiring a session specific
state at the TLS server. As it\u2019s the establishment of connection a
primary criteria, we make use of TLS cipher suites and we implement
TLS connections with a TLS message type.
A \u2018TICKET\u2019 is defined as a cryptographically protected data
structure that is created by a server and consumed by it to rebuild
As the word suggests, it is the set of rules which would
specify the mechanism of distribution of encrypted session state
information in the form of a ticket (as defined above).
The ticket is created by the TLS server and sent to the
TLS client, when the TLS client wants to resume a session it presents
the ticket to the TLS server. The ticket is distributed to the client using
the \u201cNewSessionTicket\u201d TLS handshake message, this message is sent
during the TLS handshake before the \u201cChangeCipherSpec\u201d message,
after the server has successfully verified the client's Finished message.
If the server wants to use this mechanism, it stores its session state (such as cipher suite and master secret) to a ticket that is encrypted and integrity-protected by a key known only to the server.
When the client sends the ticket to the server it includes the
SessionTicket extension with its message, then the server decrypts the
received ticket and verifies the tickets validity, retrieves the current
session state and resumes the client session.
Now, if the server verifies the client\u2019s ticket successfully then it may
renew the ticket by the \u201cNewSessionTicket\u201d Handshake message. It
may also be possible that the server does not want to issue a session
ticket to the client at that point of time, in this case it just finishes the
handshake without issuing a session ticket or a new session ticket.
If the client possesses a ticket that it wants to use to resume a
session, then it includes the ticket in the SessionTicket extension in the
ClientHello. If the client does not have a ticket and is prepared to
receive one in the NewSessionTicket handshake message, then it MUST
include a zero-length ticket in the SessionTicket extension. If the client
is not prepared to receive a ticket in the NewSessionTicket handshake
message then it MUST NOT include a SessionTicket extension unless it
is sending a non-empty ticket it received through some other means
from the server.
If the server fails to verify the ticket, then it falls back to performing a
full handshake. If the ticket is accepted by the server but the
handshake fails, the client SHOULD delete the ticket.
The \u201cticket_lifetime_hint\u201d field contains a hint from the server about
how long the ticket should be stored. The value indicates the lifetime
in seconds as a 32-bit unsigned integer in network byte order. A value
of zero is reserved to indicate that the lifetime of the ticket is
unspecified. A client SHOULD delete the ticket and associated state
when the time expires.
is because the TLS handshake uses a non-reversible function to
derive keys for a session so information about one session does
not provide an advantage to attack the master secret or a
different session. If a session invalidation scheme is used, the
implementation should verify the integrity of the ticket before
using the contents to invalidate a session to ensure that an
attacker cannot invalidate a chosen session.
An eavesdropper or man-in-the-middle may obtain
the ticket and attempt to use the ticket to establish a session with
the server; however, since the ticket is encrypted and the attacker
does not know the secret key, a stolen ticket does not help an
attacker resume a session. A TLS server MUST use strong
encryption and integrity protection for the ticket to prevent an
attacker from using a brute force mechanism to obtain the ticket's
A full description of the management of the keys used to protect the ticket is beyond the scope of this document. A list of RECOMMENDED practices is given below.
It can be done using a single system where we can open multiple
CHILDS (clients) and using the connection program we can restrict one
of the child\u2019s from accessing the server and then we can resume the
connection using our mechanism.
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