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Obligations and Contracts A2010page 1Prof. Labitag
; 8, 1942
Petition for review on certiorari
- from CA, holding Fausto Barredo liable for damages for death pf Faustino Garciacaused by negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by Fausto Barredo- May 3, 1936 – in road between Malabon and Navotas, head-on collision betweentaxi of Malate Taxicab and carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis thereby causingoverturning of the carretela and the eventual death of Garcia, 16-yo boy and one of the passengers- Fontanilla convicted in CFI and affirmed by CA and separate civil action is reserved- Parents of Garcia filed action against Barredo as sole proprietor of Malate Taxicabas employer of Fontanilla- CFI and CA awarded damages bec Fontanilla’s negligence apparent as he wasdriving on the wrong side of the road and at a high speed> no proof he exercised diligence of a good father of the family as Barredo iscareless in employing (selection and supervision) Fontanilla who had been caughtseveral times for violation of Automobile Law and speeding> CA applied A1903CC that makes inapplicable civil liability arising from crime becthis is under obligations arising from wrongful act or negligent acts or omissionspunishable by law- Barredo’s defense is that his liability rests on RPC TF liability only subsidiary andbec no civil action against Fontanilla TF he too cannot be held responsible
WON parents of Garcia may bring separate civil action against Barredo making himprimarily liable and directly responsible under A1903CC as employer of Fontanilla
 There are two actions available for parents of Garcia. One is under theA100RPC wherein the employer is only subsidiarily liable for the damages arisingfrom the crime thereby first exhausting the properties of Fontanilla. The otheraction is under A1903CC (quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana) wherein as the negligentemployer of Fontanilla, Barredo is held primarily liable subject to proving that heexercising diligence of a good father of the family. The parents simply took theaction under the Civil Code as it is more practical to get damages from theemployer bec he has more money to give than Fontanilla who is yet to serve hissentence.
Difference bet Crime and Quasi-delict1) crimes – public interest; quasi-delict – only private interest2) Penal code punishes or corrects criminal acts; Civil Code by means of indemnification merely repairs the damage3) delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts; crimes are only punished if there is apenal law; quasi-delicts include any kind of fault or negligence intervenesNOTE: not all violations of penal law produce civil responsibilitye.g. contravention of ordinances, violation of game laws, infraction of rules of trafficwhen nobody is hurt4) crime – guilt beyond reasonable doubt; civil – mere preponderance of evidence- Presumptions:1) injury is caused by servant or employee, there instantly arises presumption of negligence of master or employer in selection, in supervision or both2) presumption is
 juris tantum
 juris et de jure
TF may be rebutted by provingexercise of diligence of a good father of the family- basis of civil law liability: not respondent superior bu the relationship of paterfamilias- motor accidents – need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of ownersof motor vehicles
-; 29, 1979
Petition for review on Certiorari of the Orders of CFI Manila dismissing petitioner’sComplaint for Damages based on quasi-delict
- Three-way vehicular accident occurred along Mac-Arthur Highway, Marilao,Bulacan involving (1) Mercedes Benz, owned and driven by petitioner MENDOZA; (2)private jeep owned and driven by respondent SALAZAR; (3) gravel and sand truckowned by respondent TIBOL and driven by MONTOYA.- Mendoza’s and Montoya’s version: After jeep driver overtook the truck, it swervedto the left going towards Marilao, and hit car which was bound for Manila. Beforeimpact, Salazar jumped from the jeep, Mendoza unaware that jeep was bumpedfrom behind by truck- Salazar’s version: After overtaking truck, he flashed a signal indicating hisintention to turn left towards Marilao but was stopped at intersection by apoliceman directing traffic. While at stop position, his jeep was bumped at rear bytruck causing him to be thrown out of jeep. Jeep then swerved to left and hit thecar.- Oct. 22, 1969. In CFI Bulacan, two separate informations for Reckless ImprudenceCausing Damage to Proprety were filed against SALAZAR (damage to Mendoza) andMONTOYA (damage to Salazar)- Salazar was acquitted; Motoya found guilty beyond reasonable doubt- Aug. 22, 1970. In CFI Manila, Mendoza filed a civil case against Salazar and Timboleither in alternative or in solidum.- Timbol filed Motion to Dismiss on grounds that complaint is barred by prior judgement; CFI Manila dismissed Complaint against Timbol- Salazar filed Motion to Dismiss; CFI Mla also dismissed Complaint against him ongrounds that New Rules of Court rewuires an express reservation of civil action tobe made in the criminal action 
1. WON Mendoza can file an independent civil case against Timbola) Is the civil suit barred by prior judgment in the criminal case?b) Is the civil suit barred by failure to make a reservation in the criminal action of right to file an independent civil action (as required in Sec.2 of Rule 111)?
Obligations and Contracts A2010page 2Prof. Labitag
2. WON Mendoza can file an independent civil case against Salazar
1. Yes.a) No, not all requisites of Res Judicata are present.
 There is no identity of cause of action between the dismissed criminal caseand the new civil case.
In the criminal case, cause of action was enforcement of civil liabilityarising from criminal negligence. In the civil case, it was quasi-delict. The twofactors a cause of action must consist of are: (1) plaintiff’s primary right – Mendozaas owner of the car; (2) defendant’s delict or wrongful act or omission whichviolated the primary right – negligence or lack of skill, either of Salazar or of Montoya.b) No, right to file an independent civil action need not be reserved.
Sec. 2 of Rule 111, Rules of Court is inoperative because it is anunauthorized amendment of substantive law, and it cannot stand because of itsinconsistency with Art.2177.
Art.2176 and 2177 of Civil Code create a civil liability distinct anddifferent from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the RPC.2. No.
Civil action had extinguished because “the fact from which civil liabilitymight arise did not exist.” (Sec 3c, Rule 111, Rules of Court) Under the facts of thecase, Salazar cannot be held liable.
 The offended party has an option between action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa CRIMINAL (RPC, Art.100) or action for recovery of damages based on culpa AQUILIANA (CC, Art.2177). First option was deemedsimultaneously instituted with the criminal action unless expressly waived orreserved of separate application. It can be concluded that Mendoza opted to basehis cause of action on culpa criminal, as evidenced by his active participation in theprosecution of criminal suit against Salazar.
Order dismissing Civil Case against Timbol is set aside and trial court to proceedwith hearing on merits; orders dismissing complaint in Civil Case against Salazar areupheld.
; 4, 1992
Petition to review the decision of Court of Appeals.
- A stabbing incident on August 30, 1985 which caused the death of CarlitosBautista on the premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA)prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in the Manila RTC. It wasestablished that his assailants were not members of the school’s academiccommunity but were outsiders.- The suit impleaded PSBA, its President, VP, Treasure, Chief of Security andAssistant Chief of Security. It sought to adjudge them liable for the victim’s deathdue to their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions.- Defendants (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed alleging that sincethey are presumably sued under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states nocause of action against them since academic institutions, like PSBA, are beyond theambit of that rule.- Respondent Trial court denied the motion to dismiss. And the MFR was similarlydealt with. Petitioners the assailed the trial court’s dispositions before therespondent appellate court which affirmed the trial court’s ruling.
 WON respondent court is correct in denying dismissal of the case.
Although a school may not be liable under Art. 2180 on quasi-delicts, it maystill be liable under the law on contracts.
 The case should be tried on its merits. But respondent court’s premiseis incorrect. It is expressly mentioned in Art. 2180 that the liability arises from actsdone by pupils or students of the institution. In this sense, PSBA is not liable. Butwhen an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, the school makesitself responsible in providing their students with an atmosphere that is conducivefor learning. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or explorethe realm of arts when bullets are flying or where there looms around the schoolpremises a constant threat to life and limb.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition isDENIED. The Court of origin is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistentwit this ruling of the Court. Costs against the petitioners.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.
; 15, 1988
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of Court of Appeals.
- A few days before high school graduation, while in the auditorium of his school(Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos), a classmate, Pablito Daffon, fired a gun thatmortally hit and killed Alfredo Amadora.- The victim’s parents filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the CivilCode against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector, the high school principal,the dean of boys, and the physics teacher (the victim was in school to finish hisphysics experiment –a prerequisite to graduation), together with Daffon and twoother students, through their respective parents.- The pertinent provision reads:“Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liablefor damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as theyremain in their custody.”
Obligations and Contracts A2010page 3Prof. Labitag
WON respondents are liable under Art. 2180
 Those liable under the related provision of Art. 2180 shall be taken to meanas teacher(s)-in-charge for academic institutions and heads for schools of arts andtrades.
 The difference between academic and arts and trades institutions lie inhistory. Back in the times of artisan guilds, heads of academic institutions werealready focused on administrative work and it is only the teachers who interactclosely with students. Heads of schools of arts and trades, on the other hand,because of the technical nature of their craft, interact directly with the appentices.Although the same may not be said for schools of arts and trades at present, it iswhat is written. And only a re-writing of the law can abolish the intended difference.In the case at bar, none of the respondents were liable. The school is not liableunder Art. 2180; the rector, the principal and the dean of boys only exercisedgeneral authority; the mere fact that Amadora was in school to finish his physicsexperiment did not make the physics teacher in-charge; and even if he were in-charge, there was no showing that it was his negligence in disciplining Daffon thatmade Daffon shoot Amadora; and the other respondents didn’t have custody of theoffender.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncements asto costs.
 Yap, Narvasa, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes andGrino-Aquino, JJ., concur. Teehankee, C.J., did not participate in deliberations.Fernan and Padilla, JJ., no part, formerly counsel for Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos.Gutierrez, Jr., J., concur but please see additional statement.Herrera, J., with separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
& . - .
; 16, 1925
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
Plaintiff presented a complaint with two causes of action for breach of contractagainst the defendant in which judgment was asked for P70,369.50, with legalinterest and cost. In an amended answer and cross-complaint, the defendant set upthe special defense that since the plaintiff had defaulted in the payment formolasses delivered to it by the defendant under the contract between the parties,the latter was compelled to cancel and rescind the contract. The case wassubmitted for decision on a stipulation of facts and exhibits. The judgment of thetrial court condemned the defendant to pay to the plaintiff a total of P35,317.93with legal interest from the date of the presentation of the complaint, and withcosts.
 The written contract between the parties provided for the delivery by theHawaiian-Philippine Co. to Song Fo & Co. of 300,000 gallons of molasses. Thelanguage used in another exhibit with reference to the additional 100,000 gallonswas not a definite promise. Still less did it constitute an obligation.- The terms of contract fixed by the parties are controlling. The time of paymentstipulated for in the contract should be treated as of the essence of the contract.Hawaiian-Philippine Co. had no legal right to rescind the contract of sale because of the failure of Song Fo & Co. to pay for the molasses within the time agreed upon bythe parties. The general rule is that the rescission will not be permitted for a slightor casual breach of the contract, but only for such breaches are as so substantialand fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties in making the agreement. Adelay in payment for a small quantity of molasses for some 20 days is not such aviolation of an essential condition of the contracts as warrants rescission fornonperformance.- The measure of damages for breach of contract in this case is as follows: Song Fo& Co. is allowed P3,000 on account of the greater expense to which it was put inbeing compelled to secure molasses in the open market. It is allowed nothing forlost profits on account of the breach of the contract, because of failure of proof.
; 11, 2001
- David Raymundo (private respondent) is the absolute and registered owner of aparcel of land, together with the house and other improvements.- Gorge Raymundo, David’s father, negotiated with Avelina and Mariano Velarde(plaintiffs) for the sale of David’s property, which was under lease.- Aug 8, 1986, a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage was executed by DavidRaymundo in favor of Avelina Velarde. It states that David Raymundo sells, cedes,transfers conveys and delivers the property to Avelina Velarde for P800,000 andthat Avelina Velarde assumes to pay the mortgage obligations on the property inthe amount of P1,800,000 in favor of BPI.- On the same date, Avelina, with the consent of husband Mariano, executed anUndertaking, parts of which as follows:1.that Avelina Velarde paid David Raymundo P800,000, and assumes themortgage obligations on the property with BPI in the amount of P1.8M.2.while Avelina’s application for the assumption of the mortgage obligations onthe property is not yet approved by BPI, Avelina agreed to pay the mortgageobligations on the property, including interest and charges for late payment.3.Avelina binds and obligates herself to strictly and faithfully comply with the ff terms and conditions:a.until such time that assumption of mortgage obligations on the property isapproved by BPI, Avelina shall continue to pay said loan in accordance withits terms and conditions.b.In the event Avelina violates any of the terms and conditions, herdownpayment of P800,000 plus all payments made with BPI on themortgage loan shall be forfeited in favor of David Raymundo, and thatDavid shall resume total and complete possession and ownership of theproperty, and the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage shall bedeemed automatically cancelled.

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