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 REPORT ON AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, SEPTEMBER 2011During his March 27, 2009, speech announcing our strategy forAfghanistan and Pakistan, President Obama said “going forward,we will not blindly stay the course. Instead, we will set clearmetrics to measure progress and hold ourselves accountable.”This report outlines the process underway to fulfill thatdirective and provides the Administration’s most recentassessments. These assessments are to highlight both positiveand negative trends in the implementation of our Afghanistan andPakistan strategy and identify issues that may call for policyadjustments over time.BackgroundAt the President’s request and following his March 27, 2009,announcement of a new policy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, theNational Security Staff (NSS) and departments and agenciesdeveloped a strategic implementation plan and a set ofperformance measures, or metrics, to track progress in meetingthe President’s goals and objectives. These metrics weredeveloped with input from both congressional and academicexperts.The Administration presented its first formal metricsdocument to the Congress on September 24, 2009, in accordancewith Public Law 111-32, section 1117a. That document providedthe Congress with a statement outlining the objectives of theU.S. policy for Afghanistan and Pakistan and the metrics used toassess progress toward achieving these objectives.Public Law 111-32 also includes a reporting requirement toprovide an assessment of our strategy to the Congress startingMarch 30, 2010 and in 180-day intervals thereafter concludingwith September 30, 2011. This report is the fourth semi-annualreport. As metrics collection in the field occurs quarterly,the assessments of each objective are divided into two separatereporting periods, January 1 – March 31, 2011, and April 1 -June 30, 2011. For each objective, a third post-reportingperiod is also provided as an interim assessment for the June 30– August 31, 2011 time period.Goal and objectivesFollowing the August 2009 national election in Afghanistan,President Obama led a strategic review of the overall U.S.
 
2policy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. On December 1, 2009, in aspeech at West Point, New York, the President reaffirmed hisgoal in Afghanistan and Pakistan to disrupt, dismantle, anddefeat al-Qa’ida and its extremist allies and prevent theirreturn to either country. In December 2010, the NSS completedan annual review of our progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan,the findings of which were included as the first part of theMarch 2011 metrics assessment. On June 22, 2011, PresidentObama announced a drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, citingprogress in the campaign against al-Qa’ida, the growth of AfghanNational Security Forces, and the killing of Usama bin Laden inPakistan on May 2, 2011. At President Obama’s direction, theU.S. troop presence in Afghanistan will decrease by 33,000before the end of summer 2012, returning the U.S. troop presenceto pre-surge levels.In support of our overarching goal, eight objectives form theframework for our quarterly assessments. The objectives, alongwith the lead responsible departments, are to:
1.
 
Disrupt terrorist networks in Afghanistan, and especiallyPakistan, to degrade any ability they have to plan andlaunch international terrorist attacks. (Director ofNational Intelligence (DNI)) (Tab C)
2.
 
Please see the classified annex for details concerning thisobjective.
3.
 
Assist efforts to enhance civilian control and stableconstitutional government in Pakistan. (Department ofState (State))
4.
 
Develop Pakistan’s counterinsurgency (COIN) capabilities;continue to support Pakistan’s efforts to defeat terroristand insurgent groups. (Department of Defense (DOD))
5.
 
Involve the international community more actively to forgean international consensus to stabilize Pakistan. (State)
6.
 
In Afghanistan, reverse the Taliban’s momentum and buildthe capacity of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) sothat we can begin to transition responsibility for securityto the Afghan government and decrease our troop presence byJuly 2011. (DOD)
7.
 
Strategically build the capacity of the Afghan government,which enables Afghans to assume responsibility in thefour-step process of clear-hold-build-transfer. (State)
8.
 
Involve the international community more actively to forgean international consensus to stabilize Afghanistan.(State)
 
3Classified AnnexDetails concerning progress in our first objective to “disruptterrorist networks in Afghanistan and especially Pakistan todegrade any ability they have to plan and launch internationalterrorist attacks” are included within the classified annex.Objective 2 is classified entirely and fully discussed in theclassified annex.
Semi-Annual Assessment of Progress Against the Eight Objectives,September, 30, 2011Objective 1: Disrupt terrorist networks in Afghanistan andespecially Pakistan to degrade any ability they have to plan andlaunch international terrorist attacks.
(DNI)
 
During this reporting period, with continued assistance fromPakistan, the United States had significant success against al-Qa’ida. As the President noted, our counterterrorism (CT)cooperation with Pakistan helped lead us to bin Laden and thecompound where he was hiding. Indeed, bin Laden had declaredwar against Pakistan as well, and ordered attacks against thePakistani people. Together with the Pakistanis, we have takenout more than half of al-Qa’ida’s leadership.Further details of progress on this objective can be found inthe classified annex.
Objective 2:
Details on this objective can be found in theclassified annex. (State)
Objective 3: Assist efforts to enhance civilian control andstable constitutional government in Pakistan.
(State)January 1 – March 31, 2011, Reporting Period: Overall,indicators and metrics against this objective remained staticduring this reporting period.During this quarter, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)leadership dissolved the federal cabinet of ministers and weekslater reconstituted a smaller cabinet, reducing the number ofministerial-rank officials by 50 to 60 percent. This action wastaken as part of the devolution of authority to the provinciallevel under the 18th Amendment.The 7-week detention by Pakistani authorities of a U.S. officialundermined the United States-Pakistan relationship, slowing
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