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Table Of Contents

2.4.1 Playing games through strategies
2.4.2 From the extensive form to the strategic or normal form
2.4.3 Mixed and Behavior Strategies
Solution concepts for noncooperative games
3.1 introduction
3.2 Matrix Games
3.2.1 Saddle-Points
3.2.2 Mixed strategies
3.2.3 Algorithms for the Computation of Saddle-Points
3.3 Bimatrix Games
3.3.1 Nash Equilibria
3.3.2 Shortcommings of the Nash equilibrium concept
3.4 Concave m-Person Games
3.4.1 Existence of Coupled Equilibria
3.4.2 Normalized Equilibria
3.4.3 Uniqueness of Equilibrium
3.4.4 A numerical technique
3.4.5 A variational inequality formulation
3.5 Cournot equilibrium
3.5.1 The static Cournot model
3.5.3 Computing the solution of a classical Cournot model
3.6 Correlated equilibria
3.6.1 Example of a game with correlated equlibria
3.6.2 A general definition of correlated equilibria
3.7 Bayesian equilibrium with incomplete information
3.7.1 Example of a game with unknown type for a player
3.7.2 Reformulation as a game with imperfect information
3.7.3 A general definition of Bayesian equilibria
3.8 Appendix on Kakutani Fixed-point theorem
Repeated and sequential Games
Repeated games and memory strategies
4.1 Repeating a game in normal form
4.1.1 Repeated bimatrix games
4.1.2 Repeated concave games
4.2 Folk theorem
4.2.1 Repeated games played by automata
4.2.2 Minimax point
4.2.3 Set of outcomes dominating the minimax point
4.3. COLLUSIVE EQUILIBRIUM IN A REPEATED COURNOT GAME 77
4.3 Collusive equilibrium in a repeated Cournot game
4.3.1 Finite vs infinite horizon
4.4 Exercises
5.1 Process and rewards dynamics
5.2 Information structure and strategies
5.2.2 Strategies
6.1.2 Markov strategies
6.2 Sequential Games on Borel Spaces
6.3. APPLICATION TO A STOCHASTIC DUOPOLOY MODEL 93
6.3 Application to a Stochastic Duopoloy Model
6.3.1 A stochastic repeated duopoly
6.3.2 A class of trigger strategies based on a monitoring device
6.3.3 Interpretation as a communication device
Differential games
7.1 A capital accumulation process
7.5 A model of optimal capital accumulation
7.6. THE OPTIMAL CONTROL PARADIGM 105
7.6 The optimal control paradigm
7.7 The Euler equations and the Maximum principle
7.9. SYNTHESIS OF THE OPTIMAL CONTROL 109
7.9 Synthesis of the optimal control
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An Introduction to Dynamic Games Lctn - A. Haurie

An Introduction to Dynamic Games Lctn - A. Haurie

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Published by: lojban on Oct 04, 2011
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05/24/2012

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