6728605

An Overview Study of LNG Release Prevention and Control Systems
P. J. Pelto E. C. Baker C. M. Holter T. B. Powers
March 1982
Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy under Contract DE-AC06-76RLP 1830 Pacific Northwest Laboratory Operated for the U.S. Department of Energy by Battelle Memorial Institute
DISCLAIMER
This report was prepared a an account of work sponsored by an agency of the s Unked States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor m y d their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any lcgal liability or responsibilityfor the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privatelyowned rights. r Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, o sewice by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply iti endorsement, recommendation, o favoring by the r United States Government or any agency thereof. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarilystate or rdlect thoseof the United States Government or any agency thereof.
PACIFIC NORTHWEST LABORATORY
operated by
BAl-rELLE
for the
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT O ENERGY F
under Contract DE-AC06-76RLO 1830
Printed in the United States d America Available from National Technical Information krvice United States Depaftmetwd Commerce 5285 Pon Royal Road Sprbtgfiid, Virglnk
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NTlS Price Coda Microfiche A01 Printed Copy Price C&
AN OVERVIEW STUDY OF LNG RELEASE PREVENTION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS
P. E. G. T.
J. P e l t o G. Baker M. H o l t e r B. Powers
Flarch 1982
Prepared f o r t h e U.S. Department o f Energy O f f i c e o f Environmental P r o t e c t i o n , S a f e t y and Emergency Preparedness Under C o n t r a c t DE-AC06-76RLO 1830
P a c i f i c Northwest L a b o r a t o r y Richland, Washington 99352
This report i s one of a series prepared by Pacific Northwest Laboratory ( P N L ) to communicate results of the Liquefied Gaseous Fuels ( L G F ) Safety Studies Project, being performed f o r the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Envi ronmental Protection, Safety and Emergency Preparedness ( D O E / E P ) . The DOE/EP Office of Operational Safety, Environmental and Safety Engineering Division (ESED), i s conducting the DOE Liquefied Gaseous Fuels and Safety and Environmental Control Assessment Program. The LGF Safety Studies project contributes research, technical surveillance and program development information in support of the ESED Assessment Program. This overview study of LNG release prevention and control systems benefited from the technical direction and guidance provided by Dr. Henry F. Walter and Dr. John M. Cece of the ESED. Completed e f f o r t in another task of t h i s project i s documented in a PNL report e n t i t l e d Assessment of Research and Development (R&D) Needs in Ammonia Safety and Environmental Control (PNL-4006). An assessment of research and development ( R & D ) needs in LPG safety and environmental control i s also nearing completion. Other work in progress includes more detailed studies of topics identified in t h i s LNG assessment as being worthy of further investigation. Reports of t h i s series are i n preparation on the following subjects: Import Terminal Release Prevention Analysis Peakshaving Plant Release Prevention Analysis Storage Tank Analysis Fire Prevention and Control Assessment Human Factors in LNG Operations.
PNL CONTRIBUTORS Many members of t h e PNL p r o j e c t team c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e p r e p a r a t i o n and publication o f t h i s report. The f o l l o w i n g l i s t acknowledges t h e i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f t h e p r i n c i p a l a u t h o r s and o t h e r s who a s s i s t e d t h i s e f f o r t . LGF S a f e t y S t u d i e s P r o j e c t Manager
J. G. DeSteese
LNG Release P r e v e n t i o n and C o n t r o l Study Task Leader and Coordinator P. J. P e l t o A n a l y s i s Approach P. J. P e l t o Assessment o f LNG E x p o r t Terminal E. G. Baker S. L. Weber J. D. Eklund Assessment o f LNG Marine Vessel
E. G. Baker S. L. Weber D. E. B l a h n i k
Assessment o f LNG I m p o r t Terminal
E. G. Baker
S. L. Weber
Assessment o f LNG Peakshaving F a c i l i t y

G. A. P. S. M. M. J. E.
Holter Schreiber Pelto Lyke
Assessment o f LNG Sate1 1 it e F a c i l it y

T. B. Powers C. A. Geffen
D e s c r i p t i o n s o f Reference LNG F a c i l i t i e s
E. G. Baker S. L. Weber
Technical and E d i t o r i a l Review
J. N. C. P.
G. DeSteese M. B u r l e i g h A. Counts M. D a l i n g
Word Processing and Report P r e p a r a t i o n

N. M. K. M. M. M. E. D.
Burleigh Hale Rodriguez Li-nse
CONTENTS FOREWORD
.
.
iii
PNL CONTRIBUTORS 1.0 SUMMARY 1 .1 1.2
. .
.
1-1 1-1 1-2 1-2 1-2 1-3 1-3 1-3 1-3 1-3 1-4 2-1 2-1 2-3 2-3 2-3 2-5 2-5 2-5 3-1 3-1
3-1
STUDY APPROACH STUDY RESULTS 1 .2.1 1.2.2 1.2.3 1.2.4 1.2.5 1.2.6 1.2.7
E x p o r t Terminal Marine Vessel I m p o r t Terminal
.
.
. . . . . .
.
Peakshaving F a c i l i t y Truck Tanker
. .
.
Satellite Facility I n f o r m a t i o n Needs
1.3 2.0
DIRECTION OF FUTURE STUDY
INTRODUCTION AND ANALYTICAL APPROACH 2.1
STUDY PURPOSE AND ANALYTICAL APPROACH 2.1.1 2.1.2 2.1.3 2.1.4 2.1.5 Reference F a c i l i t y D e s c r i p t i o n s Overview Study
. .
. . . . . .
.
.
. . . . .
D e t a i l e d Assessment
.
. . . .
F i r e and Vapor C o n t r o l Assessment S u p p o r t i n g Research
2.2 3.0
ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT
ASSESSMENT OF LNG EXPORT TERMINAL 3.1 SUMMARY SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 3.1.1 3.1.2 Gas Treatment Liquefaction
.
.
.
. .
3-1
3.1 - 3 3.1.4 3.1.5 3.2
Storage Loading
. . .
.
S a f e t y Systems
SYSTEM LEVEL ANALYSIS 3.2.1 3.2.2 3.2.3
Gas Treatment and L i q u e f a c t i o n Storage Loading
.
. .
3.3
COMPONENT LEVEL ANALYSIS 3.3.1 3.3.2 3.3.3 3.3.4
Gas Treatment and L i q u e f a c t i o n Storage Loading
. .
Operator I n t e r f a c e
3.4 4.0
REPRESENTATIVE RELEASE EVENTS AND INFORMATION NEEDS
ASSESSMENT OF LNG MARINE VESSEL 4.1 SUMMARY SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 4.1.1 4.1 .2 4.1.3 4.2
. . .
B a s i c Ship and P r o p u l s i o n System Cargo Storage Tanks Cargo Handling System
.
.
I Spi 11s
SYSTEM LEVEL ANALYSIS 4.2.1 4.2.2 4.2.3
. .
Cargo Hand1 ing System--Category
Cargo Storage Tanks--Category I 1 S p i l l s B a s i c Ship and P r o p u l s i o n System
4.3
COMPONENT LEVEL ANALYSIS 4.3.1 4.3.2
.
. .
Cargo Handling System Cargo Storage Tanks
4.4 5.0
REPRESENTATIVE RELEASE EVENTS
ASSESSMENT OF LNG IMPORT TERMINAL 5.1 SUMMARY SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 5.1.1 5.1.2 5.1.3 5.1.4 5.1.5 5.2
. . . .
Marine Terminal and Unloading System Storage System
.
.
Compressors and Sendout Pumps V a p o r i z a t i o n System S a f e t y Systems
. . . . . . .
.
4-11 5-1 5-1 5-1 5-1 5-3 5-3 5-4 5-5 5-5 5-7 5-7 5-8 5-9 5-9 5-12 5-16 5-16 5-23 5-23 6-1 6-1 6-1 6-1 6-2
SYSTEM LEVEL ANALYSIS 5.2.1 5.2.2 5.2.3 5.2.4
. .
.
. .
. . .
.
Compressors and Sendout Pumps V a p o r i z a t i o n System
5.3
COMPONENT LEVEL ANALYSIS 5.3.1 5.3.2 5.3.3 5.3.4 5.3.5
. .
.
Compressors and Secondary Pumps V a p o r i z a t i o n System Operator I n t e r f a c e
.
.
. . . . . . .
.
. . .
.
'5.4 6.0
ASSESSMENT OF LNG PEAKSHAVING FACILITY 6.1 SUMMARY SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 6.1.1 6.1.2 6.1.3 Gas Treatment System ~ i q u e f a c t i o nSystem Storage System
.
. .
. .
6.1.4 6.1.5 6.1.6 6.2
V a p o r i z a t i o n System
T r a n s p o r t a t i o n and T r a n s f e r System S a f e t y Systems
.
.
SYSTEM LEVEL ANALYSIS 6.2.1 6.2.2 6.2.3 6.2.4 6.2.5 6.2.6
Gas Treatment System L i q u e f a c t i o n System Storage System
.
. .
T r a n s p o r t a t i o n and T r a n s f e r System Summary
.
. . .
6.3
COMPONENT LEVEL ANALYSIS 6.3.1 6.3.2 6.3.3 6.3.4 6.3.5 6.3.6
Gas Treatment System L i q u e f a c t i o n System Storage Systeni
T r a n s p o r t a t i o n and T r a n s f e r System Operator I n t e r f a c e
6.4 7.0
REPRESENATIVE RELEASE EVENTS
.
. .
ASSESSMENT OF LNG SATELLITE FACILITY 7.1 SUMMARY SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 7.1.1 7.1.2 7.1.3 7.1.4 7.2
T r a n s p o r t a t i o n and T r a n s f e r System Storagesystem
V a p o r i z a t i o n and Sendout System S a f e t y Systems
.
.
SYSTEM LEVEL ANALYSIS
7.2.1 7.2.2 7.2.3 7.3
TransportationandTransferSystem
Storagesystem
. . .
V a p o r i z a t i o n and Sendout System
COMPONENT LEVEL ANALYSIS 7.3.1 7.3.2 7.3.3
T r a n s p o r t a t i o n and T r a n s f e r System Storage System
.
.
V a p o r i z a t i o n and Sendout System
7.4
8.0 9.0
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REFERENCES
. . . . .
.
APPENDIX A APPENDIX APPENDIX APPENDIX
B C D -
LNG INDUSTRY OVERVIEW
F A C I L I T Y DESCRIPTION OF REFERENCE LNG EXPORT TERMINAL F A C I L I T Y DESCRIPTION OF REFERENCE LNG MARINE VESSEL
F A C I L I T Y DESCRIPTION OF REFERENCE LNG IMPORT TERMINAL F A C I L I T Y DESCRIPTION OF REFERENCE LNG PEAKSHAVING PLANT F A C I L I T Y DESCRIPTION OF REFERENCE LNG SATELLITE PLANT ANALYSES OF REPRESENTATIVE RELEASE EVENTS PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM SYMBOLS
APPENDIX E APPENDIX F APPENDIX APPENDIX
G H -
FIGURES 2.1 2.2 A.l B. 1 B.2 B.3 B.4 B.5 A n a l y t i c a l Approach f o r LNG Release P r e v e n t i o n and C o n t r o l Study LNG F a c i l i t y Operations
P r i n c i p a l Operations Performed a t Various LNG F a c i l i t i e s B l o c k Flow Diagram f o r LNG E x p o r t Terminal P l o t P l a n f o r LNG E x p o r t Terminal Gas Treatment S e c t i o n
. . . . .
2-2
2-4
A-3 B-3 B-5 B-7 B-13
Process Flow Diagram
Propane Precooled Mu1t i r e f r i g e r a n t Cycle Propane R e f r i g e r a n t Heat Exchanger
. .
B.6
B.7 B.8
Main Cryogenic Coil-Wound Heat Exchanger Flow Diagram f o r Marine Terminal and Storage F a c i l i t i e s LNG Storage Tank R e s i l i e n t B l a n k ~ t ;i Tank
.
~Hi ~
B.9
T Iat- ~Space C
Retneerz W a l l s o f LNG Storage
B. 10 Lndd-Seac<rrg Xns.!'is*Sci) and Arrchor Bolts B, f 1 Storage ? a r k Four~Batinc % t a i I s
B.12 Suspended Insulation 2eck

8.13 B o i l o f f F a c i l i t i e s
B. : F 1ow Diagram fur Loid t nq c>.ystem 4
13.15 Export Ter~nir;alt.oadi;?~r F t a tf~rrn c?nd Trestle

B . 1 6 Major Equ'lprr~ent 1113 UriicradSng Deck C.1 125,003 m" L N G Transfer ;jessel
-f.:'tr LNG
'?
C *% N a v i g a t i o n a l &qi!iprni?n:
C.3
LNG Cargl;
Wrtrq::?
Transfer Vessel
I!,q '.steal;
C.4
P u r g i n g and Dryin9 o f .iti;)-age Tanks w i t h I n e r t Gas
C.5 C.6 C.7 C.8 C.9
Spray Cooling o f Cargo Tanks w i t h LNG LNG Loading Operations LNG Unloading Operations LNG B o i l o f f f o r Fuel Kvaerner-Moss Spherical Tank Assembly
. . . .
C. 10 Kvaerner-Moss Spherical Tank-Equator Ring Forging

C.ll
Insulated Skirting
. .
C. 12 I n s u l a t i o n f o r Kvaerner-Moss Spherical Tank
C.13 Cargo Tank Safety Instruments
C.14 C o l l i s i o n Resistance o f LNG Vessel D. 1 . LNG Import Terminal D.2 D.3
. .
Block Flow Diagram
P l o t Plan f o r LNG I m p o r t Terminal Marine Terminal Overview Marine Terminal E l e v a t i o n T r a n s f e r P i p i n g System Unloading P l a t f o r m
. .
D.4
D.5 D.6 D.7 D.8 D.9
P i p i n g and I n s t r u m e n t a t i o n f o r LNG T r a n s f e r and Storage LNG Storage Tank D e t a j l s
.
.
R e s i l i e n t Blanket i n Annular Space Between Walls o f LNG Storage Tank
D.10 Storage Tank Foundation D e t a i l s D . l l Compressors and Secondary Pumps D. 12 Flow Diagram o f V a p o r i z a t i o n System
. .
.
D. 13 Fa11 i n g F i l m Open-Rack Seawater Vaporizers E.l LNG Peakshaving P l a n t
- Block Flow Diagram
xiv
E.2 E.3 E.4 E.5 E.6 E.7 E.8

E.9
LNG Peakshaving P l a n t Gas Treatment S e c t i o n L i q u e f a c t i o n Section
- P l o t Plan
. . .

#
- Process Flow Diagram
Spi r a l -Wound Heat Exchanger Storage Section
. .
LNG Storage Tank D e t a i l s
.
.
R e s i l i e n t B l a n k e t i n Annular Space Between Walls o f LNG Storage Tank
LNG Storage Tank Suspended I n s u l a t i o n Deck
E.10 Load Bearing I n s u l a t i o n and Anchor B o l t s

E . l l Storage Tank Foundation D e t a i l s
E.12 V a p o r i z a t i o n S e c t i o n
E.13 Cutaway View o f Submerged Combustion Vaporizer E.14 Components o f Submerged Combustion Vaporizers E.15 Cross Section of LNG T r a i l e r
. .
E. 16 Flow Diagram f o r T r a i l e r Loading and Unloading F.l F.2 F.3 F.4 F.5 F.6 F.7 F.8 F. 9 LNG S a t e l l i t e P l a n t
Block Flow Diagram
PlotPlanforLNGSatelliteFacility
Process Flow Diagram f o r LNG Storage LNG Storage Tank
. .
R e s i l i e n t B l a n k e t i n Annular Space Between Walls o f LNG Storage Tank
Suspended I n s u l a t i o n Deck Foundation f o r LNG Storage Tank
. . .
Process Flow Diagram f o r LNG V a p o r i z a t i o n and Sendout Cutaway View o f Submerged Conibustion Vaporizer
F.10 Components o f Submerged Conibustion Vaporizers
TABLES Liquefaction Section - Inventories and Flow Rates Storage Section Loading Section
Inventories and Flow Rates Inventories and Flow Rates
Preliminary Hazards Analysis f o r the Gas Treatment and Liquefaction . System Preliminary Hazards Analysis f o r the LNG Storage Tanks and Boiloff Systems . Preliminary Hazards Analysis f o r the Loading System
. .
Representative Release Events f o r an LNG Export Terminal Selected Operating Parameters f o r the LNG Marine Vessel Preliminary Hazards Analysis of Cargo Handling System Preliminary Hazards Analysis of Cargo Storage Tanks Represenative Release Events f o r an LNG Marine Vessel System Capacities and Flow Rates
. . .
.
.
..
Preliminary Hazards Analysis f o r the Marine Terminal and Unloading System
Preliminary Hazards Analysis f o r the Storage System
Preliminary Hazards Analysis f o r the Compressors and Secondary Pumps Prel imi nary Hazards Analysis f o r the Vaporization System Representative Release Events f o r an LNG Import Terminal System Process Operation Conditions Postulated Releases from Pipe Breaks i n a Peakshaving F a c i l i t y Preliminary Hazards Analysis f o r the Gas Treatment System Prel imi nary Hazards Analysis f o r the Liquefaction System Preliminary Hazards Analysis f o r the Storage System
. .
. .
Preliminary Hazards Analysis f o r the Vaporization System
Preliminary Hazards Analysis f o r the Transportation and Transfer System . Representative Release Events f o r an LNG Peakshaving F a c i l i t y Representative Release Events f o r LNG Transportation and Transfer Operations . _ . System Process Operati ng Condi t i ons Preliminary Hazards Analysis f o r the Storage System
Prel imi nary Hazards Analysis f o r the Vaporization and Sendout System . Representative Release Events f o r an LNG S a t e l l i t e F a c i l i t y Summary of LNG F a c i l i t y Scoping Assessment
International Baseload LNG Liquefaction Facil i t i e s Gas Treatment Section Liquefaction Section Storage and Loading Sections
.
.
3
LNG Carrier
Functions of t h e Pressure Control System

LNG Tankers in U.S. Trades
Principal Characteristics of 125,000 m

LNG Cargo Handling Systems
U.S. and Canadian LNG Import Terminals

LNG Transfer and Storage Systems
Compressors and Secondary Pumps Pressure Control Settings Vaporization System
. .
U.S. LNG Peakshaving Plants Gas Treatment Section
L i q u e f a c t i o n Section Storage Section Storage Tank Connections and F i t t i n g s V a p o r i z a t i o n Section Storage System
. . . . .
Vaporization and Sendout System
Representative Release Events f o r an LNG Export Terminal Representative Release Events f o r an LNG Marine Vessel
Representative Release Events f o r an LNG Import Terminal
Representative Release Events f o r an LNG Peakshaving F a c i l i t y Representative Release Events f o r T r a n s p o r t a t i o n and Transfer Operations Representative Release Events f o r an LNG S a t e l l i t e F a c i l i t y
1.0
SUMMARY
The l i q u e f i e d n a t u r a l gas (LNG) i n d u s t r y employs a v a r i e t y o f r e l e a s e prev e n t i o n and c o n t r o l techniques t o reduce the 1ikel ihood and t h e consequences
)f a c c i d e n t a l LNG releases.
:ory
A study o f t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f these r e l e a s e
~ r e v e n t i o nand c o n t r o l systems i s being performed by P a c i f i c Northwest Labora(PNL) as p a r t o f t h e L i q u e f i e d Gaseous Fuels Safety and Environmental Assessment Program conducted by the U. S. Department o f Energy, Off i c e The o v e r a l l o b j e c t i v e s o f t h i s PNL research p r o j e c t :ontrol
~f t h e A s s i s t a n t Secretary f o r Environmental P r o t e c t i o n , Safety and Emergency

'reparedness (DOEIEP). i r e t o develop an adequate understanding o f r e l e a s e p r e v e n t i o n and c o n t r o l systems and t o i d e n t i f y f a c t o r s which may a l t e r o r n u l l i f y t h e i r usefulness.
I . 1 STUDY APPROACH
A phased approach was s e l e c t e d t o accomplish t h e study o b j e c t i v e s . First, raeference d e s c r i p t i o n s f o r t h e b a s i c types o f LNG f a c i l i t i e s were developed. \n overview study was performed i n t h e n e x t phase o f t h e study t o i d e n t i f y $ireas t h a t m e r i t subsequent and more d e t a i l e d analyses. :he study i s t o conduct these more d e t a i l e d analyses. This r e p o r t summarizes t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e f i r s t two 'steps i n t h e above ~ p p r o a c h . The s p e c i f i c o b j e c t i v e s o f t h i s e f f o r t were t o : 1) characterize ;he LNG f a c i l i t i e s o f i n t e r e s t and t h e i r r e l e a s e p r e v e n t i o n and c o n t r o l systems; The f i n a l phase of
!) i d e n t i f y p o s s i b l e weak 1i n k s and research needs; and 3) p r o v i d e an a n a l y t i c a l Framework f o r subsequent d e t a i l e d analyses. The i n f o r m a t i o n presented i n t h i s r e p o r t has provided a necessary b a s i s f o r t h e f i n a l (ongoing) phase o f t h e PNL
itudy and a l s o background i n f o r m a t i o n t o a s s i s t t h e o v e r a l l planning of tech~ i c a le f f o r t i n t h e DOE/EP Program. The LNG f a c i l i t i e s analyzed i n c l u d e a r e f e r e n c e e x p o r t t e r m i n a l , marine i'essel , i m p o r t t e r m i n a l , peakshaving f a c i l i t y , t r u c k tanker, and sate1 1 it e ''acility. ?rios. This r e p o r t i n c l u d e s a r e f e r e n c e d e s c r i p t i o n f o r these f a c i l i t i e s ,
: p r e l i m i n a r y hazards a n a l y s i s (PHA), and a 1 i s t o f r e p r e s e n t a t i v e r e l e a s e scen-
While t h e emphasis o f t h i s overview study i s on r e l e a s e prevention,
release control i s implicit in many release prevention approaches. The reference f a c i l i t y descriptions outline basic process flows, plant layouts, and safety features. The PHA identifies the important release prevention operations. Representative re1 ease scenarios provide a format f o r discussing potential i n i t i a t i n g events, effects of the release prevention and control systems, information needs, and potential design changes. These scenarios range from r e l a t i v e l y frequent b u t low consequence releases t o unlikely b u t large releases and a r e the principal basis for the next stage of analysis. 1.2
STUDY RESULTS
This overview study has identified some important release prevention features t h a t merit more detailed consideration in the next phase of the stud; These a r e summarized below f o r each of the LNG f a c i l i t i e s analyzed. 1.2.) E x ~ o r tTerminal
The storage and loading sections of the export terminal have the potentii f o r the largest LNG releases. Key storage section components include the inner and outer tank structure, the pressure control systems, the internal shutoff valves, and the 1 iquid-level indicators and alarms. Important loadin! section components include the transfer 1ine, the loading arms and coupling mechanism, and the loading emergency shutdown systems. In addition, the operator interface can have a significant e f f e c t on release prevention f o r a l ' systems i n the f a c i l i t y . 1.2.2 Marine Vessel
The largest potential s p i l l s of LNG from the marine vessel occur when one o r more of the cargo tanks rupture. Failure or faulty operation of the cargo handl i ng system general 1y resul t s i n small er spfl 1s Important cargo handling system components include the primary tank structure, the outer and inner hulls, the cargo tank level indicators, and safety valves. Important cargo handl ing system components include the 1iquid header, crossover 1ine, valves, and the emergency shutdown system. The human element is also a fact01 during tanker loading and unloading. Crewman and operator traininq and good communications between ship and terminal personnel a r e particularly important
1.2.3
Import Terminal
The storage section and the unloading sections of the import terminal have the potential for the largest LNG releases. The key storage and unloading components are the same as those of the export terminal. 1.2.4 Peakshaving Facility
The storage system and the vaporization system have the potential f o r the largest LNG releases from a peakshaving f a c i l i t y . Key storage section release prevention components include the inner and outer tank structure, the pressure control system, the tank discharge l i n e , and the storage tank pump vessel. Important vaporization system release prevention components include the vaporizer heat exchanger tubes and water bath tank, the vaporizer discharge l i n e , and the temperature controller on the discharge line. In addition, the operator interface can have a significant e f f e c t on release prevention for a l l systems i n the f a c i l i t y . 1.2.5 Truck Tanker The LNG truck tanker i s analyzed as part of the peakshaving f a c i l i t y scoping assessment. Important transportation and transfer system release prevention components include the double-shell truck tank, the operator interface, and the pressure r e l i e f devices. 1.2.6 S a t e l l i t e Facility
The storage system of the s a t e l l i t e f a c i l i t y has the potential f o r the largest LNG releases. Key storage section components include the inner and outer t a n k structure, the pressure control system, the tank discharge l i n e , the LNG recirculation l i n e , the storage tank pump vessel, and the boiloff heaters. 1.2.7 Information Needs
In performing t h i s overview study, additional information needs were identified. Some of these needs were specific to the f a c i l i t y being analyzed and are discussed i n the respective sections of t h i s report. More general information gaps and needs were identified in such areas as the structural
i n t e g r i t y o f storage tanks when s u b j e c t t o hazardous c o n d i t i o n s , t h e o p e r a t o r i n t e r f a c e and i t s e f f e c t on r e l e a s e p r e v e n t i o n and c o n t r o l , LNG equipment f a i l u r e r a t e data, and t h e e f f e c t o f thermal c y c l i n g on LNG equipment performance. 1.3 DIRECTION OF CONTINUING STUDY The r e s u l t s of t h i s study show t h a t the marine vessel, i m p o r t t e r m i n a l , and peakshaving f a c i l it y c o n t a i n t h e b a s i c r e l e a s e prevention and c o n t r o l e l e ments u t i l i z e d i n t h e LNG i n d u s t r y . B u i l d i n g upon these r e s u l t s , PNL has Marine vessel r e 1ease preveni n i t i a t e d more d e t a i l e d assessments o f LNG i m p o r t terminal and peakshaving f a c i l i t y r e l e a s e p r e v e n t i o n and c o n t r o l systems. Program ( A r t h u r D. L i t t l e , Inc. 1980). t i o n and c o n t r o l was considered i n a separate p o r t i o n o f t h e DOEIEP Assessment The o b j e c t i v e o f t h e d e t a i l e d i m p o r t t e r m i n a l and peakshaving f a c i 1 it y assessments i s t o estimate re1ease frequencies and v o l umes f o r t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e re1 ease sequences i d e n t i f i e d i n t h i s overview study. The e f f e c t o f a l t e r n a t i v e r e l e a s e p r e v e n t i o n and c o n t r o i systems and Studies a r e procedures w i l l be examined and compared on a q u a n t i t a t i v e basis.
a l s o being conducted by PNL on LNG f i r e and vapor c o n t r o l systems, LNG storage tank operations, and human f a c t o r s i n LNG r e l e a s e p r e v e n t i o n and c o n t r o l .
INTRODUCTION AND ANALYTICAL APPROACH L i q u e f i e d Natural Gas (LNG) p l a y s an important r o l e i n meeting t h e energy needs o f t h e U.S. and o t h e r countries. Since one u n i t volume o f LNG i s equivaI n t h e United States, LNG However, as i s t r u e f o r a l l Expected changes i n i n d u s t r y l e n t t o 600 u n i t volumes o f n a t u r a l gas, l a r g e volumes o f gas can be economic a l l y s t o r e d and transported i n t h e l i q u e f i e d form. has a twenty-year r e c o r d s f s a f e handling and use. accidents t h a t present r i s k s t o p r o p e r t y and 1i f e .
l a r g e - s c a l e energy r e l a t e d i n d u s t r i e s , LNG operations have some p o t e n t i a l f o r s i z e and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and t h e s c a r c i t y o f d e t a i l e d knowledge about safety r e l a t e d issues have generated t h e need f o r an i n t e g r a t e d s a f e t y and environmental c o n t r o l assessment o f LNG operations. need. The Energy Research and Development A d m i n i s t r a t i o n (ERDA) i n i t i a t e d a research program i n 1977 t o meet t h i s This program has evolved i n t o t h e L i q u e f i e d Gaseous Fuels (LGF) Safety and Environmental Control Assessment Program conducted by t h e U.S. Department of Energy, O f f ice o f Envi ronmental P r o t e c t i o n , Safety and Emergency Preparedness (DOEIEP). The p l a n f o r t h i s D E Program i s presented i n t h e f i r s t LGF Program O (U.S. Department o f Energy 1979). Status Report.
The LNG i n d u s t r y employs a v a r i e t y o f r e l e a s e prevention and c o n t r o l techniques t o reduce t h e l i k e l i h o o d and t h e consequences o f a c c i d e n t a l LNG releases. These r e l e a s e prevention and c o n t r o l systems a r e being s t u d i e d by P a c i f i c Northwest Laboratory (PNL) as p a r t o f t h e DOEIEP Assessment Program. The o v e r a l l o b j e c t i v e s o f t h e PNL study a r e t o develop an adequate understanding o f r e l e a s e prevention and c o n t r o l systems u t i l i z e d i n t h e LNG i n d u s t r y and i d e n t i f y f a c t o r s which may a l t e r o r n u l l i f y t h e i r e f f e c t i v e n e s s , This r e p o r t contains t h e r e s u l t s of t h e f i r s t two phases o f t h i s e f f o r t which t o g e t h e r p r o v i d e an overview o f r e l e a s e prevention and c o n t r o l i n LNG processing, t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and storage.
2.1
STUDY PURPOSE AND ANALYTICAL APPROACH The purpose o f t h i s study was t o p r o v i d e i n f o r m a t i o n t o a s s i s t t h e plan-
n i n g o f t h e DOE/EP Assessment Program and to. supply a b a s i s f o r decision-making by t h e v a r i o u s p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d w i t h LNG s a f e t y and environmental c o n t r o l . f u l f i l l these goals t h e s p e c i f i c o b j e c t i v e s o f t h e PNL study a r e t o : To
I d e n t i f y i m p o r t a n t f e a t u r e s and p o s s i b l e weak l i n k s o f LNG r e l e a s e p r e v e n t i o n and c o n t r o l systems I d e n t i f y d a t a needs and i n f o r m a t i o n gaps Recommend approaches f o r o b t a i n i n g t h i s necessary a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n I d e n t i f y p o t e n t i a l areas where r e l e a s e p r e v e n t i o n and c o n t r o l systems can be e f f e c t i v e l y improved
A phased a n a l y t i c a l approach was adopted t o accomplish t h e above o b j e c t i v t

The elements o f t h i s approach a r e i n d i c a t e d i n Figure 2.1 and described below.
Faci 1 i t y Description
)
This Report
Scopi ng Assessment o f Release Prevention and Control Systems o f LNG F a c i l i t i e s
Supporting Release Prevention Systems o f I n d i c a t e d Facilities
Assessment of F i r e and Vapor Control Systems o f I n d i c a t e d Facilities
t----:
F i n a l Output
FIGURE 2.1
A n a l y t i c a l Approach f o r LNG Release Prevention and Control Study
2.1 .I
Reference Facil i t y Descriptions
The basic f a c i l i t i e s for LNG processing, transportation and storage are i l l u s t r a t e d in Figure 2.2 and include the export terminal, marine vessel, import terminal, peakshaving f a c i l i t i e s , truck tanker and s a t e l l i t e f a c i l i t y . The f i r s t study phase focused on developing reference descriptions for each of these LNG f a c i l i t i e s . I t was recognized that there are many design alternatives and t h a t there are no "standard" designs f o r these f a c i l i t i e s . The reference designs developed and used i n t h i s study were based primarily on recently constructed or proposed LNG f a c i l i t i e s . The reference f a c i l i t y descriptions provide a common basis for evaluating representative release prevention and control systems.
2.1.2
Overview Study
The reference descriptions were used i n the second study phase to perform an overview, or f i r s t level analysis, to identify information needs and release prevention and control areas which may merit more detailed study. A preliminary hazards analysis (PHA) was performed in which potential hazard conditions were outlined f o r each major subsystem or component. The e f f e c t of hazardous conditions and existing prevention and control measures are described. Using the results of the PHA, a l i s t of representative release events were developed for each f a c i l i t y . These events range from relatively frequent b u t low consequence releases t o unlikely b u t large releases that are typical of the range of hazards involved in LNG operations. Possible i n i t i a t i n g events, the influence of the release prevention and control systems, additional information required for further analysis, and potential design and operational changes were assessed on a preliminary basis. The representative release events form the basis for the quantitative evaluation of the release prevention and control systems in the next phase of analysis. 2.1.3 Detailed Assessment
The t h i r d phase of the study ( t o be presented in l a t e r reports of t h i s s e r i e s ) consists of more detai 1ed analyses recommended by the overview assessment. Because many LNG processing and storage operations are similar a t different LNG faci 1i t i e s , the more detailed release prevention and control
BASELOAD OPERATIONS Export Terminal Mari ne Vessel Import Terminal
NaturalGas
Peakshaving F a c i l i t y
NaturalGas
Distribution
@ @ @
-.
Truck Tanker
- @-
Distribution
PEAKSHAVING OPERATIONS Satellite Facility
__C
Distribution
Export Terminal - a l a r g e c a p a c i t y f a c i l i t y which receives n a t u r a l gas, l i q u e f i e s i t a f t e r c l e a n i n g and s t o r e s t h e LNG u n t i l i t i s loaded on marine vessels f o r shipment t o an i m p o r t t e r m i n a l . Marine Vessel - ocean-going s h i p u t i l i z i n g e i t h e r s e l f - s u p p o r t i n g o r membrane LNG storage tanks. Import Terminal - a l a r g e c a p a c i t y f a c i l i t y which r e c e i v e s LNG from oceangoing tankers, s t o r e s i t and r e g a s i f i e s i t t o supply base-load demands. Peakshaving F a c i l i t y - a r e l a t i v e l y small c a p a c i t y gas treatment, 1iquef a c t i o n and storage u n i t w i t h a h i g h c a p a c i t y v a p o r i z e r t o supply peakshaving needs when the p i p e l i n e c a p a c i t y cannot meet peak demand. Truck Tanker - an over-the-road cryogenic t r a i l e r ( w i t h t r a c t o r ) construct e d w i t h double w a l l s and i n s u l a t i o n i n t h e annular space. S a t e l l i t e F a c i l i t y - a small f a c i l i t y s i m i l a r t o a peakshaving f a c i l i t y b u t w i t h o u t a l i q u e f a c t i o n u n i t . LNG i s supplied normally by tank t r u c k from a peakshaving f a c i l i t y . FIGURE .2.2. LNG F a e i l i t y Operations
assessments concentrate on a smaller number of f a c i l i t i e s and unit operations. For the faci 1 i t i e s of i n t e r e s t , representative re1 ease scenarios developed in the overview study are being quantified in terms of frequency of release and release quantity. Fault t r e e and event t r e e methods are being used where appropriate, and design a1 ternatives quantitatively compared on the basis of changes they e f f e c t in the frequency or quantity of LNG releases. 2.1.4 Fire and Vapor Control Assessment Fire and vapor control aspects are being considered in another phase of t h i s study. The frequencies and consequences of the representative release scenarios are to be reevaluated in terms of vapor generation and f i r e potential. Finally, siniple event trees are to be prepared and used to compare f i r e and vapor control systems design a1 ternatives. 2.1 .5 Supporting Research The overview study identified and suppl ied general information required in subsequent detailed re1 ease prevention and control assessments. The r e s u l t s of the overview phase also suggest the need for more detailed study of LNG storage tank operations and human factor effects i n LNG release prevention and control.
2.2
ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT
The balance of t h i s report provides an overview of release prevention and control systems for each of the representative LNG f a c i l i t y types considered in t h i s study. Sections 3 through 7 , respectively, provide summary assessments of the export terminal, marine vessel, import terminal, peakshaving plant and s a t e l l i t e f a c i l i t y . The truck tanker assessment i s included w i t h the assessment of the peakshaving f a c i l i t y . Each of these sections provides an independent summary overview of a particular f a c i l i t y , including 1 ) a characterization of the basic facil i t y and i t s re1 ease prevention and control systems, 2) the identification of knowledge gaps and research needs, and 3 ) an analytical framework f o r further detailed analyses.
General conclusions and recommendations resulting from this study a r e presented i n Section 8. Appendixes A through G contain an overview of the LNG industry, detailed f a c i l i t y descriptions and data sources, and analyses of representative release events. Final l y , Appendix H summarizes the process flow diagram symbols used in t h i s report.
3.0
ASSESSMENT OF LNG EXPORT TERMINAL
This s e c t i o n presents t h e overview study o f t h e r e f e r e n c e LNG e x p o r t terminal 3.1
SUMMARY SYSTEM DESCRIPTION The r e f e r e n c e f a c i l it y used f o r t h e e x p o r t t e r m i n a l overview study i s
designed t o d e l i v e r 400 MMscfd o f n a t u r a l gas from Alaska t o t h e lower f o r t y eight states. 550,000-bbl The p l a n t c o n s i s t s o f two 200-MMscfd l i q u e f a c t i o n t r a i n s ; two storage tanks; a 2,200-ft p i e r and t r e s t l e ; and a l o a d i n g p l a t f o r m t o accommodate a 130,000-m 3 (820,000-bbl ) LNG marine vessel. The major operat i o n s performed a t t h e p l a n t and t h e p l a n t s a f e t y systems a r e b r i e f l y described i n t h e f o l l o w i n g paragraphs. Appendix B. 3.1 .1 Gas Treatment The n a t u r a l gas feed t o t h e p l a n t c o n t a i n s small q u a n t i t i e s o f C02 and water which a r e s o l i d s a t t h e f i n a l l i q u e f a c t i o n temperature o f -260F. To prevent p l u g g i n g i n t h e l i q u e f a c t i o n heat exchangers, each t r a i n has an amine scrubber t o remove " a c i d gases" (C02 and H2S) and a molecular s i e v e adsorber t o separate water. equipment. Liquefaction R e f r i g e r a t i o n f o r t h e f a c i 1 it y i s provided by a propane precool ed , mixed r e f r i g e r a n t cycle. The feed gas i s f i r s t cooled t o -30' by evaporating Propane, ~ n d s then l i q u e f i e d and cooled t o -260F by heat exchange w i t h a multicompoi aent mixed r e f r i g e r a n t . The propane c y c l e a1 so c h i 11s t h e mixed r e f r i g e r a n t . I n each t r a i n , t h e r e a r e t h r e e l e v e l s o f propane c o o l i n g and one main cryogenic A f t e r treatment, t h e gas i s r o u t e d t o t h e l i q u e f a c t i o n
A d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n i s presented i n
eat exchanger where heat exchange w i t h t h e mixed r e f r i g e r a n t takes place.

Three g a s - t u r b i n e - d r i v e n compressors p r o v i d e t h e work f o r each t r a i n ' s r e f r i g ?ration cycle. Each t r a i n a l s o has a feed gas booster compressor.
3.1 . 3 Storage Liquefied natural gas leaves the main cryogenic heat exchanger a t -260F and 560 psig and, on entering one of the storage tanks, i s l e t down t o 0.9 ps Storage a t the f a c i l i t y c o n s i s t s of two 550,000-bbl, flat-bottomed, double-wa aboveground LNG s t o r a g e tanks. The inner tank i s constructed of 9% nickel s t e e l and t h e o u t e r she1 1 of A 31 carbon s t e e l . The annular space between 1 t h e walls i s i n s u l a t e d with expanded p e r l i t e . Suspended from t h e roof of t h e o u t e r tank i s a lap-welded metal deck t h a t serves a s a c e i l i n f o r t h e inner t a n k . The inner and o u t e r tank f l o o r s a r e separated by a l a y e r of foamglass, a nonflammable, load-bearing i n s u l a t i o n . The outer tank f l o o r rests on a ringwall foundation a t t h e perimeter and compacted sand i n the center. The sand 1ayer contains e l e c t r i c heating elements t o prevent " f r o s t heave." The o u t s i d e diameter of each tank i s 225 f t , and the overall height i s 146 f t . To maintain t h e tank a t -260F and 0.9 psig, boil-off vapor r e s u l t i n g f r heat leakage i n t o the tank i s removed and compressed f o r use a s p l a n t f u e l . Pressure and vacuum r e l i e f valves a r e provided t o p r o t e c t the s t o r a g e tanks from pre'ssure v a r i a t i o n s . 3.1.4 Loading
The o u t e r tank has a lap-welded, dome-shaped s t e e l roof.
There a r e f i v e LNG t r a n s f e r pumps per tank, each w i t h a capacity of 15,000 gpm. A t t h e normal loading r a t e of 55,000 gpm, 10-11 hrs a r e required t o load a 130,000-m 3 ship.
The LNG i s pumped v i a an i n s u l a t e d , 36-in. t r a n s f e r l i n e t o the loading platform located a t the end of a 2,200-ft-long p i e r . The loading platform supports four 16-in. LNG loading arms, one 16-in. vapor return arm, two vapor r e t u r n compressors, and a 48-ft-high control tower.
During loading, vapor displaced from the s h i p ' s tanks i s returned t o shore v i a the 16-in. vapor return arm, the vapor return compressors, and the 24-in. vapor return 1 ine. When a ship i s not being loaded, LNG i s c i r c u l a t e d through t h e 36-in. t r a n s f e r 1 ine and back t o the storage tanks through a 4-in recirculation line.
3.1.5
Safety Systems
Combustible gas detectors, flame detectors, and temperature sensors are located throughout the plant area. These sensors activate alarms that indicate the exact location of a s p i l l or f i r e on a graphic panel in the contol room. Various pieces of equipment in the plant are connected to the Emergency Shutdown (ESD) system. The ESD has two major c i r c u i t s : the Master Emergency Shutdown (MES) which shuts down the who1 e faci 1 i ty and the Loading Emergency Shutdown (LES) which shuts down j u s t the loading system. The ESD i s activated by certain of the sensors described above, by limits on certain process control variables, or by the plant operators. Spill containment a t the plant i s provided by dikes in various areas. Each storage tank i s encircled by a concrete dike 55 f t high and 285 f t in diameter. Each liquefaction t r a i n i s surrounded by a low-level dike, and a common impoundment area serves the three refrigerant storage tanks. Pressure r e l i e f valves are used to protect various processing equipment, tanks, and piping in the f a c i l i t y . Gas discharges from these valves, except those from the storage tanks, enter the f l a r e header system and are directed to the f l a r e stack f o r incineration. The storage tank r e l i e f valves vent to the atmosphere. Liquid discharges are collected and returned to the storage tank. A portion of the flash gas generated from cargo f i l l i n g i s vented to the atmosphere through the vapor return vent. The f i r e control system consists of a f i r e water loop with hydrants and monitor nozzles and a dry chemical system which includes fixed systems with permanent nozzles, fixed systems w i t h hoselines, and portable extinguishers. High-expansion foam systems are not used because of the cold weather a t the terminal .
3.2
The purpose of the system level analysis i s t o identify those sections of the export terminal t h a t are most c r i t i c a l with respect to release prevention and control. The evaluation of each system i s based largely on two factors:
1 ) the quantity of a potential release of hazardous material due t o e i t h e r the inventory o r the flow r a t e and 2) an estimate of the r e l a t i v e probability of a release (low, medium, high). 3.2.1 Gas Treatment and Liquefaction
Operati on of the 1 i quefaction t r a i n (and associated gas treatment system) involves the use of four hazardous materials:
1 . natural gasILN6 (98% CH4, 1 % C2H6 , 1 % N 2 ) 2.
3.
propane (gas and 1 iquid) mixed refrigerant consisting of nitrogen, methane, ethylene, and propane (gas and liquid) monoethanol aniine (MEA) scrubbing solution.
4.
The major hazards associated with the f i r s t three are the flammability of the gas and the cold temperature of the liquid. The fourth, MEA, i s both toxic and combusti bl e . Table 3.1 gives the flow r a t e , process operating conditions, and an e s t i mate of the inventory of each of the four materials. This data i s f o r each of the two liquefaction trains. There are two general modes f o r releases f r ~ m the liquefaction system: leak or rupture in pipes, vessels, valves, pumps, etc. discharge from the process re1 ief valves (either to the f l a r e stack o r back to the storage tank). Generally, one containment barrier i s provided ( i .e., a single leak*o r rupture w i 11 r e s u l t in a re1 ease). In some cases, two f a i l u r e s are required f o r a release (e.g., f a i l u r e of tubing in heat exchanger she1 1s would not r e s u l t in a release). All liquid releases from the liquefaction system are confined to the liquefaction o area by low-level dikes. N r e l i e f valves i n the liquefaction section exhaust directly t o the atmosphere. In an emergency, the MES blocks the natural gas feed l i n e and isolates the liquefaction system from the r e s t of the f a c i l i t y . This system i s activated by
TABLE 3:l.
Material LNGINatural Gas Propane MixedRefrigerant MEA S o l u t i o n
Liquefaction Section
Inventory ( g a l 1ons [ s c f ] ) 1.2x103[1.0x105] 1.0 x
Inventories and Flow Rates

Operating Conditions Pressure Temperature (psig) ( O F ) 500to600 80to-260 129 t o
Flow Rate (gpm [ s c f d l ) 1.7x103[2.0x108] 1.4 x
lo4
[3.1 x
lo5]
lo4
[6.0 x 10
1( a )
1 t o 240
-35
-30
3 . 6 x 1 0 ~ [ 1 . 7 ~ 1 0 ~5] . 8 ~ 1 0 ~ [ 4 . 0 ~ 1 0 ~ 1 6 7 t o 6 5 0 2 5 0 t o ] ( ~ ) 2 2 --1.0 x 1 0 1 .O x 10 -( a ) 480 t o 520
( a ) Because b o t h r e f r i g e r a t i o n c y c l e s and t h e MEA system a r e c l o s e d loops, t h e a c t u a l f l o w i n t o t h e system i s zero, so t h e f l o w r a t e s g i v e n a r e t h e normal c i r c u l a t i o n r a t e s .
f i r e detectors throughout the plant, by the gas detectors i n the compressor building, o r manually from several locations throughout the plant. The l a r g e s t potential release of natural gas from the system i s about 1.4 x 106 s c f , assuming the system can be isolated in 10 minutes. The probability of t h i s release i s estimated t o be low.
3.2.2
Storage
The storage section includes the two main LNG storage tanks a s well as three small r e f r i g e r a n t storage tanks. The hazardous material s stored a t the f a c i l i t y a r e LNG, propane, and ethylene. All three a r e hazardous because of t h e i r flammability, and LNG and ethylene a r e a l s o hazardous because of the cold temperatures a t which they a r e stored. Ethylene i s moderately hazardous i f inhaled. Table 3 . 2 gives the s i z e s of the storage tanks and the storage conditions f o r each material, and a l s o includes the normal flow r a t e s into and out o f the tanks. The main LNG storage tanks and the ethylene storage tank a r e low-pressure, double-wal 1ed, cyl i ndri cal storage tanks. Only the inner tank i s constructed of materials s u i t a b l e f o r cryogenic temperatures, so f a i l u r e of the inner tank would probably lead t o f a i l u r e of the outer tank. The two propane tanks a r e ful ly pressurized, sing1 e-wal led, spherical storage tanks. Besides gross f a i l u r e of the storage tanks, there a r e two other general release modes i n the storage section: leak o r rupture i n i n l e t and o u t l e t piping and f i t t i n g s discharge t o the atmosphere from the storage tank r e l i e f valves.
TABLE 3.2.
Storage Section - Inventories and Flow Rates Flow Rates In/Out ( g ~ m[scfdl) lo3 [4,0
lo8]
Storage No. of Tank Tanks

LNG 2
2
Vol ume Per Tank (gallons) 2.3 lo7 3.3
Operating Conditions Pressure Temperature (~sig) (OF) 0.9 200 0.5 -260 60 -155
Propane Ethylene
1.7 x 105 1.0 x 105
---
The MS i s o l a t e s the LNG storage tanks from the r e s t of the plant in the E event of an emergency. The MES can be activated by a high level or high or low pressure in the LNG storage tanks. The largest possible s p i l l in the storage area i s 4.6 x 107 gallons, resulting from f a i l u r e of both LNG storage tanks. The probability of t h i s release i s estimated to be low. 3.2.3 Loading,
LNG i s the only hazardous material handled in the loading section of the
plant. The loading section has two general modes by which LNG can be released from the system: leak o r rupture in pipes, f i t t i n g s , loading arms, connections, e t c .
a
discharge from the thermal re1 ief valves in the transfer 1ine (routed back t o the storage tank).
The main LNG transfer l i n e connecting the storage tank f a c i l i t i e s with the loading platform i s an insulated, low-pressure pipeline made of stainless s t e e l . Because of the length (2,200 f t . ) and diameter (36 i n . ) of the l i n e , a single leak o r break can r e s u l t i n a large s p i l l . The LES i s designed to reduce the amount of LNG released in the event of a leak or break. The inventory and flow rates in the main transfer l i n e , as well as the vapor return l i n e and liquid recirculation l i n e , are shown in Table 3 . 3 . The maximum s p i l l in the loading 5 system i s approximately 1.7 x 10 gallons i f the LES works properly. If the LES f a i l s , the s p i l l could be considerably larger - up to 7.0 x 105 gallons or more. The probability of t h i s release i s estimated t o be low.
TABLE 3 . 3 .
Loading Section
Inventory (gallons [scf])
Inventories and Flow Rates

Flow Rate (gpm [ s c f d l ) Operating Conditions Pressure Temperature (psig) ( O F )
Line 36-in. Transfer Line 2 4 - i n . Vapor Return Line 4-in. Recirculation L in.e
1.2 x
lo5
lo3
[9.6 x
12.0 x C1.2 x
-1.4 x
lo6] lo4]
lo5]
5.5 x
lo4
lo3
[6.6 x [3.2 x L1.8 x
-1.5 x
lo9] lo7] lo8]
25 5
-258 -220 -258
25
3.3
COMPONENT LEVEL ANALYSIS
The system level analysis indicates that the largest inventories and flow r a t e s of hazardous materials occur i n the storage section and the loading section. The maximum size of a s p i l l or release from these sections i s orders of magnitude larger than the largest s p i l l or release possible i n the 1 iquefaction section (including gas treatment). However, the majority of the processing equipment and plant piping i s i n the liquefaction section, so there appears to be a greater likelihood of a s p i l l or release i n t h i s section. A a r e s u l t , a s component level analysis i s presented for a l l three sections. This component level analysis consists of a prel iminary hazards analysis (PHA). The PHA's f o r the export terminal operations are given in tabular form i n the fol lowing sections. The potential hazards, e f f e c t s , and existing preventive and control measures are outlined. For active components (e. g . , pumps, control 1e r s , compressors, e l e c t r i c a l components), two or more separate f a i l u r e s are required in most cases f o r a significant release. For passive components (e.g., p i ping, process vessels) , a single f a i l u r e can r e s u l t i n a release, b u t in many cases the emergency s h u t down systems are designed t o l i m i t the release. Gas Treatment and Liquefaction The r e s u l t s of the preliminary hazards and analysis f o r the liquefaction section are shown i n Table 3.4. (Component numbers given in the table r e f e r t o designations used i n Appendix B.) Because of the complexity of the liquefaction u n i t , the l i s t i s quite long. Many of the postulated i n i t i a t i n g events are leaks
TABLE 3.4.
Component
P r e l i m i n a r y Hazards Analysis f o r t h e Gas Treatment and L i q u e f a c t i o n System

Potential Hazard Condition Rupture o r leak a ) F a i l u r e t o scrub o u t C02 b) Rupture o r l e a k Effect Release o f n a t u r a l gas a) P o t e n t i a l plugging i n cryogenic heat exchangers b ) Release o f n a t u r a l gas and amine l i q u i d a) P o t e n t i a l plugging i n cryogenic heat exchangers b ) Release o f amine 1 i q u i d Release o f amine l i q u i d
Existing Preventive & Control Measures
--
1. Gas ~ i ~ e l i n e n i s amine system

2 . Amine contactor, V-3
3. Amine s t r i p p e r . V-4
a) F a i l u r e t o scrub o u t C02 b ) Rupture o r l e a k Rupture o r leak
4. Piping, pumps, valves, e t c i n amine system

5. Gas i p e l i n e s i n moTe sieve s e c t i o n
6. Water se a r a t o r , V-6, and mofe s i e v e u n i t s . V-7
Rupture o r leak a ) F a i l u r e t o remove water b ) Rupture o r l e a k a) F a i l u r e t o regenerate mole sieves

b) Rupture o r leak
Release o f n a t u r a l gas a) P o t e n t i a l plugging i n cryogenic heat exchangers b ) Release of n a t u r a l gas a ) Water carryover i n feed gas p o t e n t i a l plugging o f cryogenic heat exchangers b ) Release of n a t u r a l gas
7. Regeneration system
8. Feed gas p i p i n g and valves UD t o Drooane exchangers, E I 23, L 122, 121
Rupture o r leak
Release o f n a t u r a l gas
9. Feed gas p i p i n g and valves from propane exchangers t o main cryogenic heat exchanger, E-102
10. keed gas t u b i n g i n
Rupture o r leak
Release o f n a t u r a l gas p l u s some 1i q u e f i e d heavy hydrocarbons
propane exchangers E-123, 122, 121 11. Feed gas t u b i n g i n main cryogenic heat exchanger, E-102 12. Mole sieve d r i e r s , V-7; f i l t e r , V-101; a i r cooler.- E-101; - - and scrub column, Y-102
Rupture o r leak
Natural gas leaks i n t o propane refrigerant Natural gas leaks i n t o mixed r e f r i g e r a n t Release of n a t u r a l gas
Rupture o r leak
Rupture o r leak
TABLE 3.4.
Potential Hazard Condition a) Trips out o r w i l l not s t a r t b j Rupture o r l e a k
(contd)
Effect a) Liquefaction t r a i n shut down b ) Release o f n a t u r a l gas i n compressor b u i l d i n g a ) L i q u e f a c t i o n t r a i n must be shut down b ) S p i l l o f heavy hydrocarbons and n a t u r a l gas S p i l l o f heavy hydrocarbon l i q u i d and some vapor Gas d e t e c t o r s i n compressor building activate ventilating fan and c o n t r o l b u i l d i n g openings Level o f l i q u i d w i l l b u i l d up i f pump stops; l e v e l i n d i c a t o r alarm w i l l warn o p e r a t o r Existing P r e v e n t i v e & Control Measures
Component 13. Feed gas booster compressor
14. Scrub column, V-102, l i q u i d o u t l e t and pump, P-102
a) Pump w i l l n o t s t a r t o r stops d u r i n g o p e r a t i o n b ) Rupture o r l e a k Rupture o r l e a k
15. L i q u i d l i n e s and valves i n r e f r i g e r a t i o n preparatjon u n i t , V-141, 142, 143 16. Vapor l i n e s i n r e f r i g e r a n t prep u n i t , V-141, 142, 143 17. LNG product 1i n e t o storage (including product valve ) 18. LNG c o n t r o l system
Rupture o r l e a k
Release o f heavy hydrocarbon vapors and some l i q u i d a ) S p i l l s LNG b ) Excess vapor f l a s h i n g i n tank Pressure i n t h e tank increases - if LNG goes t o storage a t -240F, t h e tank w i l l reach 1.8 p s i g i n 16-40 minutes depending on how many b o i l o f f compressors a r e running a ) Re1ease o f r e f r i g e r a n t High pressure would open t h e vent v a l v e a t 1.8 p s i g and a c t i v a t e t h e ESD system. R e l i e f valves would open a t 2.0 p s i g
a Rupture o r l e a k b l Heat l e a k Equipment f a i l u r e o r improper s e t p o i n t r e s u l t s i n product t o storage being t o o warm
19. R e f r i g e r a n t expansion v a l ve
a b
Rupture o r l e a k F a i l u r e t o operate p r o p e r l y 1. W i l l n o t open
2. W i l l n o t c l o s e
1. Prevents o p e r a t i o n o f r e f r i g e r a n t system, n a t u r a l gas feed must be stopped 2. Main cryogenic h e a t exchanger does n o t operate proper1y
LNG product v a l v e w i l l reduce production r a t e i f s u f f i c i e n t cooling i s not available; t h i s prevents warm product from e n t e r i n g the storage tank
TABLE 3.4.
Potential Hazard Condition Rupture o r l e a k
(contd)
Effect Spills refrigerant liquid Existing Preventive & Control tleasures
Component 20. R e f r i g e r a n t l i q u i d l i n e from separator V-112, t o main c r y o genic heat exchanger, E-102 21. R e f r i g e r a n t l i q u i d / vapor t u b i n g i n E-102 22. R e f r i g e r a n t vapor l i n e from separator, V-112 t o E-102 23. Main cryogenic heat exchanger, E-102
Rupture o r l e a k
R e f r i g e r a n t l i q u i d / v a p o r leaks i n t o r e f r i g e r a n t vapor, process upset Releases r e f r i g e r a n t vapor
Rupture o r leak
a) Rupture o r leak i n exchanger shel 1 b ) Large heat l e a k r e s u l t i n g from from i n s u l a t i o n f a i l u r e , e t c
Release o f r e f r i g e r a n t vapor b ) Reduction i n LNG produced o r pressure b u i l d u p i n LNG t u b i n g and p o s s i b l e pressure b u i l d u p i n main heat exchanger shel 1 Release o f r e f r i g e r a n t vapor
W I
I
24. R e f r i g e r a n t 1 i n e from E-102 t o compressor C-111 25. F i r s t stage r e f r i g e r a n t compressor, C-111
Rupture o r l e a k
a) Rupture o r l e a k b) Trips out o r w i l l not s t a r t
a ) Release o f r e f r i g e r a n t vapor b ) R e f r i g e r a n t f l o w stops and LNG p r o d u c t i o n stops, 2nd stage compressor may overheat i f n o t shut down quickly Same as 1 s t stage except t h a t 1 s t stage may overheat i f n o t shut down q u i c k l y Release o f r e f r i g e r a n t vapor
26. Second stage refrigerant compressor, C-112 27. P i p i n g and valves from 2nd stage compressor, C-112 t o propane exchangers, E-123 (including a i r cooler C-112)
Same as 1 s t stage
Rupture o r l e a k
TABLE 3.4.
Potential Hazard Condition Rupture o r l e a k
(contd)
Existing Effect Mixed r e f r i g e r a n t leaks i n t o propane Release o f r e f r i g e r a n t vapor and l i q u i d Preventive & Control Measures
Component 28. R e f r i g e r a n t tubes i n propane exchangers, E-123, 122, 121

29. P i p i n g and valves from propane heat exchangers t o h i g h pressure separator, v-112
Rupture o r l e a k
30. L i n e s c a r r y i n g l i q u i d propane t o propane exchangers, E-123, 122, 121 31. L i n e s c a r r y i n g propane vapor back t o compress o r s , C-121, 122, 123 32. Propane compressor s u c t i o n drums, V-121. 122, 123 33. Propane compressors, C-121, 122, 123
Rupture o r l e a k
Re1ease o f 1i q u i d propane
Rupture o r l e a k
Release o f propane vapor
Rupture o r l e a k
Re1ease o f propane vapor
a ) Rupture o r l e a k b ) l r i p s o u t and w i l l n o t s t a r t
a ) Release o r propane vapor b ) Shutdown o f l i q u e f a c t i o n train Compressor begins s u r g i n g and c o u l d e v e n t u a l l y f a i l and r e l e a s e mixed r e f r i g e r a n t
Feed gas f l o w w i l l s t o p autom a t i c a l l y and r e f r i g e r a n t cycles w i l l go t o t o t a l r e c y c l e Compressor has shutdown switches f o r pressure ( h i g h and low), temperature ( h i g h and low), and v i b r a t i o n ; i n the case o f surging, v i b r a t i o n s w i t c h would probably shut down compressor
34. Flow c o n t r o l l e r on mi xed r e f r i g e r a n t compressor, C-1 11 ,
Flow i s reduced below minimum compressor c a p a c i t y by f l o w c o n t r o l l e r f a i l u r e o r operator error
35. Mixed r e f r i g e r a n t compressor, C-117 112 36. Propane compressors C-121, 122, 123 37. Main cryogenic heat exchanger, E-102
Loss o f feed gas t o t h e 1i q u e f a c t i o n t r a i n Loss of feed gas t o l i q u e f a c tion train Low feed gas r a t e t o l i q u e f a c tion train
Expansion valves wi 11 c l o s e automatical l y and compressors w i l l be on t o t a l r e c y c l e Control system p u t s compressor i n t o t o t a l recycle Poor heat t r a n s f e r due t o poor mixed r e f r i g e r a n t l i q u i d distribution
TABLE 3 . 4 .
Component 38. Propane compressor C-121, 122, 123
39. M xed r e f r i g e r a n t i compressor, C-121, 122, 123
(contd)
--
Potential Hazard Condition Improper control s e t t i n g s o r controller failure Trips out and will not start
Effect
Existing Preventive & Control Measures Compressor shutdown, e i t h e r manually o r from high vibration switches LNG flow c o n t r o l l e r would c l o s e due t o high o u t l e t temperature; propane compressor would go i n t o t o t a l recycle automati cal l y Product temperature c o n t r o l l e r will s t o p feed gas flow and r e f r i g e r a n t systems will go t o t o t a l recycle; i f not s h u t down, the system pressure w i l l r i s e quickly and a c t i v a t e the r e l i e f valves
Compressor surges and could eventually f a i l Loss of cooling t o main heat exchanger
40. Liquefaction t r a i n
Loss of a i r coolers i n r e f r i g e r a n t systems, E-111, 112, 124, 125
Refrigerant systems and feed gas will begin t o heat up
41. Level c o n t r o l l e r i n propane f l a s h drums
a ) Controller f a i l s and f l a s h drums f i l l s with l i q u i d
b) Controller f a i l s and f l a s h drum loses liquid level 42. Compressor shutdown switches a ) Mixed r e f r i g e r a n t compressors b ) Propane compressor c ) Feed gas compressor Fail t o operate properly
a ) Liquid propane could reach compressor s u c t i o n , possible f a i l u r e of propane compressors, C-121, 122, 123 b) I n s u f f i c i e n t cooling of t h e feed gas and mixed r e f r i g erant Compressors a r e not s h u t down i n t h e event of high vibraa t i o n , over temperature, e t c . This could lead to f a i l u r e of t h e compressor
Same a s 40 (above) Compressors can be shut down manual l y
o r ruptures i n pipes, valves, vessel and similar components. Key components i n the liquefaction unit, as indicated by the PHA, are l i s t e d below:
Process Control System. Control of the liquefaction t r a i n i s quite complicated. Often two o r three process variables are multiplied together t o get a signal f o r a control valve. Improper control point settings or f a i l u r e of the control loop can r e s u l t in insufficient cooling of the feed gas and excess vapor in the storage tank, surging of the refrigeration compressors (and possible f a i l u r e of the compressor o r the i n l e t and o u t l e t p i ping) , 1iquid carryover to the compressor suction, and numerous other potential l y hazardous conditions. The probabi 1 i ty of these types of failures i s estimated to be medium. Refrigerant Compressors. These 1arge, gas- turbi ne-driven, centrifugal compressors can f a i l from changes i n the operating conditions of the o refrigerant cycle. L w flow rates can cause surging, and changes in the suction conditions (temperature and pressure) can cause liquid to condense in the compressor. Proper operation of the shutdown switches f o r h i g h pressure, temperature, vibration, e t c . , i s necessary to prevent f a i l u r e of these compressors. The a b i l i t y of the control system to prevent upsets and to p u t the refrigerant cycles into total recycle i n emergency situations i s c r i t i c a l t o safe operation of the compressors. The probability of a compressor f a i l u r e i s estimated to be medium.
3 . 3 . 2 Storage
The preliminary hazards analysis f o r the storage section is presented i n Table 3.5. Important components i n the LNG storage section, as identified by the PHA, are l i s t e d below. Pressure Control System. T h i s includes the boiloff compressors, the pressure indicators and controllers, and the tank r e l i e f valves. The probability of f a i l u r e for these types of components i s estimated to be medium.
TABLE 3.5.
Preliminary Hazards Analysis f o r the LNG Storage Tanks and Boiloff Systems
P o t e n t i a1 Hazard Condition 202 a) Leak o r r u p t u r e i n i n n e r cryogenic barrier b ) Leak o r r u p t u r e o f o u t e r tank from 1. Overpressure Effect a) S p i l l s LNG i n t o space between tanks, c o u l d cause f a i l u r e o f o u t e r tank and c o l l a p s e o f tank 1. W i l l l i k e l y f a i l a t r o o f she1 1 j o i n t and depressure t h e tank 2. Collapse o f o u t e r tank c o u l d cause f a i l u r e o f i n n e r tank 3. Same as b2 above Depressures t h e tank a ) Depressures t h e tank Same as b2 above Same as b2 above High pressure would a c t i v a t e a l a r m and would open c o n t r o l v a l v e t o vent @ 1.8 p s i g ; pressure r e l i e f valves would r e l i e v e @ 2.0 p s i g . Same as b2 above Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n o f r e 1 i e f v a l ves Existing Preventive & Control Measures I n n e r tank c o n s t r u c t e d o f 9% N i s t e e l which has good cryogenic properties P r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t overpressure i s provided by a vent v a l v e which opens @ 1.8 p s i g and 12 r e l i e f valves which open @ 2.0 psig. Low pressure would a c t i v a t e emergency gas supply t o tank @ 0.2 psig; vacuum r e l i e f valves would open @ 0.03 p s i g
Component 1 . Storage tank, T-201,
2. Underpressure
3. Other causes 2. Vapor l i n e s i n t o and o u t o f tank Leak o r r u p t u r e a) Leak o r r u p t u r e b ) F a i l s t o operate p r o p e r l y 1. W i l l n o t r u n
3. B o i l o f f compressor and c o n t r o l l e r , C-221, 222
1. Pressure i n tank r i s e s
4. Pressure re1 i e f v a l v e ( s )
2. Runs a t f u l l speed o n l y F a i l s t o operate p r o p e r l y a ) Opens below s e t pressure b ) F a i l s t o open on demand o r opens above s e t pressure
2. Pressure i n tank f a l l s a ) Tank depressures u n t i l v a l v e closes b ) Pressure i n t h e tank cont i n u e s t o r i s e and tank c o u l d f a i l from over pressure a. Tank depressures t o atmospheric pressure b ) Pressure i n tank continues t o f a l l and tank c o u l d f a i l from underpressure
5. Vacuum r e l i e f v a l v e ( s )
F a i l s t o operate p r o p e r l y a) Opens above s e t pressure b ) F a i l s t o open on demand o r opens below s e t p o i n t
Same as 4 above
TABLE 3.5.
Component 6. LNG f i l l l i n e s and o t h e r l i q u i d l i n e s entering t h e t o p o f t h e tank Leak o r r u p t u r e Potential Hazard Condition
(contd)
Effect
Existing Preventive & Control Measures Low temperature d e t e c t i o n i n tank d i k e would a c t i v a t e M S E Same as above
a) I f l i n e s are i n operation LNG s p i l l s i n t o d i k e d area o r onto tank b) I f the l i n e s are n o t i n o p e r a t i o n and t h e break occurs b e f o r e t h e f i r s t blocked valve, t h e tanks w i l l be depressured See l o a d i n g system PHA
7. LNG withdrawal l i n e s from t h e bottom o f t h e tank 8. I n s u l a t i o n between i n n e r and o u t e r tank w a l l s
Leak o r r u p t u r e b e f o r e f i r s t b l o c k valve Ineffective
Heat l e a k r e s u l t s i n increased b o i l o f f and p o t e n t i a l overpressure o f t h e tank; c o u l d a l s o r e s u l t i n c o l d spot on o u t e r tank w a l l and p o t e n t i a l f a i l u r e o f o u t e r tank S p i l l s LNG i n t o annular space between tanks; c o u l d cause f a i 1u r e o f o u t e r tank
I f pressure i n tank r i s e s , same as 3 above
9. Storage tank
Overftll
A t 95% o f f u l l capacity, alarm i s a c t i v a t e d ; a t 98% o f f u l l c a p a c i t y , 2nd a l a r m i s sounded and a l l l i q u i d i n l e t and o u t l e t l i n e s a r e closed a u t o m a t i c a l l y Tank has t o p and bottom f i l l nozz l e s t o mix d i f f e r e n t d e n s i t i e s o f LNG; tank has thermocouples which can i n d i c a t e s t r a t i f i c a t i o n and p o t e n t i a l r o l l o v e r ; tank can be r e c i r c u l a t e d from t o p t o bottom and v i c e versa I f r o l l o v e r does occur and pressure i n tank r i s e s , same as 3 above
10. Storage tank
Rol l o v e r
Excessive vapor produced; c o u l d cause pressure increase i n tank
11. Foundation heater
F a i l s t o operate
Ground under foundation freezes and t h e r e s u l t i ng f r o s t heave c o u l d cause storage tank t o f a i l
TABLE 3.5.
Potential Hazard Condition F a i l u r e o f tank s h e l l o r i n l e t and o u t l e t nozzles and f i t t i n g s
(contd)
Effect Existing Preventive & Control Measures
Component 12. Propane storage tanks
a) I f break i s above l i q u i d 1eve1 , propane vapor i s released b ) I f break i s below l i q u i d l e v e l , propane l i q u i d i s re1eased a ) Release o f e t h y l e n e vapor b) Liquid ethlene s p i l l s i s o u t e r tank and o u t e r tank could f a i l , releasing ethylene c ) E n t i r e contents o f t h e tank would be released Terminal systems a r e n o t shut down and i s o l a t e d automatic a l l y i n an emergency A l l f u n c t i o n s o f t h e M S can be E performed manually
13. Ethylene storage tank
a ) F a i l u r e o f o u t e r tank s h e l l b ) F a i l u r e o f i n n e r tank s h e l l
c ) F a i l u r e o f l i q u i d o u t l e t nozzles before t h e f i r s t b l o c k v a l v e 14. Master Emer ency Shutdown (MEs? a) detectors b) transmitters c ) c o n t r o l 1e r s d ) i s o l a t i o n valves e ) s h u t o f f switches Fai 1s t o operate p r o p e r l y
Internal Shutoff Yalves. If the l i q u i d o u t l e t l i n e s from the tank rupture before the f i r s t block valve, these internal shutoff valves can be closed t o prevent t h e e n t i r e tank contents from s p i l l i n g . The probability of an internal shutoff valve f a i l u r e i s estimated t o be medium. Storage Tank Level Indicators and Alarms. These alarm i n the control room and a c t i v a t e t h e M S t o prevent o v e r f i l l i n g the inner storage tank. The E f a i l u r e of level indicators and alarms i s estimated t o have a medium probability. Storage Tank Insulation. Improper i n s t a l l a t i o n of insulation o r subsequent l o s s of effectiveness can cause cold spots on the carbon s t e e l outer shell and possible f a i l u r e of e n t i r e tank. The l o s s of insulation effectiveness is estimated t o have a low probability. Outer Tank. This protects the insulation from exposure t o the elements and protects the inner tank from external events such as f i r e s and explosions in the plant, sabotage, and severe storms. The probability of a f a i l u r e of the outer tank i s estimated t o be low. Inner Tank. Built of 9% nickel s t e e l , t h i s shell i s exposed t o temperatures ranging from -260F t o ambient (when out of s e r v i c e ) . A leak o r crack in t h i s shell could eventually lead t o f a i l u r e of the e n t i r e tank. The probability of such a f a i l u r e i s estimated t o be low. While not nearly a s large a s the LNG storage tanks, the r e f r i g e r a n t storage tanks a l s o pose a potential hazard. Several f a i l u r e s of t h i s s i z e and type of tank have been reported, and t h e proximity of these tanks t o the LNG storage tanks makes t h e m even more important.
3.3.3
Loading
Operation of the loading section i s not complicated. However, f o r release prevention and control purposes, the loading section may be the most c r i t i c a l portion of the export terminal because of the high flow r a t e s , t h e long length of the t r a n s f e r l i n e s , and the large diameter valves and f i t t i n g s . The preliminary hazards analysis f o r the loading section i s shown in Table 3.6. The PHA shows the following components t o be most important with respect t o release prevention and control.
TABLE 3.6.
P r e l i m i n a r y Hazards Analysis f o r t h e Loading System

Potential Hazard Condition Existing Preventive & Control Measures Low temperature d e t e c t o r i n s p i l l basin, gas d e t e c t o r on dock, o r low pressure i n t r a n s f e r l i n e w i l l w i l l a c t i v a t e LES Low pressure w i l l a u t o m a t i c a l l y a c t i v a t e LES High pressure w i l l a u t o m a t i c a l l y a c t i v a t e LES; l i n e s a r e equipped w i t h thermal r e l i e f valves I f on dock, same as 1 above I f on t r e s t l e , same as 2 above
Component 1. 36" t r a n s f e r 1i n e on 1oadi ng dock Rupture o r l e a k
Effect S p i l l s LNG i n t o b a s i n under dock
2 . 36" t r a n s f e r l i n e
and 4" r e c i r c u l a t i o n l i n e between dock and t h e shore 3. Valves i n t r a n s f e r l i n e s from l o a d i n g pumps, P-201, 202, t o s h i p coup1 ing
a) Rupture o r leak b ) Large heat leak ( i n s u l a t i o n f a i l ure, etc.) a ) Rupture b ) F a i l u r e t o operate p r o p e r l y 1. W i l l n o t open
a ) S p i l l s LNG on t r e s t l e and i n water b ) Possible overpressure o f 1i n e S p i l l LNG 1. Can n o t l o a d s h i p o r recirculate 2. No major e f f e c t on l o a d i n g may n o t be a b l e t o r e c i r culate 3. F l u i d hamner and p o s s i b l e p i p e r u p t u r e and s p i l l o f LNG a ) S p i l l s LNG i n t o b a s i n under dock 1. Can n o t d r a i n l o a d i n g arms 2. S p i l l s LNG i n t o dock d r a i n a ) S p i l l s LNG i n t o b a s i n under dock o r i n t o water b ) S p i l l s LNG i n t o water c ) Ruptures l o a d i n g arm and s p i l l s LNG
2. W i l l n o t c l o s e
3. Close too f a s t
LES i s programmed so t h a t b l o c k valve closing rates w i l l n o t cause f 1u i d hamner Same as 1 above Same as 1 above Same as 1 above Each l o a d i n g arm has motion sensors which a u t o m a t i c a l l y a c t i vate t h e LES; i f t h e LNG s p i l l e d , i t would d r a i n i n t o s p i l l basin; low temperature d e t e c t o r would a c t i v a t e LES i f i t had n o t a1 ready been activated
4. Valves i n dock d r a i n lines
a) Rupture o r leak b ) F a i l u r e t o operate p r o p e r l y 1. W i l l n o t open 2. W i l l n o t close a ) Rupture b ) Bad connection w i t h s h i p ' s f l a n g e c ) Excessive s h i p movement
5. Loading arm
TABLE 3.6.
Potential Hazard Condition a ) Rupture o r leak b) Heat leak ( i n s u l a t i o n f a i l u r e , etc) a ) Fail to s t a r t b) Leak o r rupture i n pump o r piping
(Contd)
Existing Preventive & Control Measures Gas o r low temperature d e t e c t o r a t pump building would a c t i v a t e MS E
Component
6 . Transfer l i n e s from
Effect a ) S p i l l LNG i n t o diked area b) Possible overpressure of of l i n e a ) Reduces loading r a t e b) S p i l l s LNG i n t o diked area a ) S p i l l s LNG i n t o diked area 1 . Reduces loading r a t e 2. N e f f e c t o S p i l l s LNG i n t o diked area
shore valve t o loading pump, P-201, 202, dl scharge valves 7 . Sendout pumps
8. Suction and discharge
Gas o r low temperature d e t e c t o r a t pump building would a c t i v a t e the MS E Same a s 1 above
1 . Will not open 2. Will not c l o s e 9. Common pump suction l i n e Rupture o r leak before f i r s t block valve 10. Valves i n common suction a ) Leak o.r rupture b) Fail t o operate properly line 1 Will not open 2. Will not c l o s e Fai 1s t o operate properly 11. Block valve in tank a ) Will not open b) Will not c l o s e 12. Suction l i n e between Rupture or leak inner tank wall and o u t e r tank wall
valves
Same as 1 above Block valve i n tank makes i t possible t o s t o p flow out of tank
C3
I
4
a ) S p i l l s LNG i n t o diked area 1 . Can not load s h i p 2. N e f f e c t o a ) Can not load s h i p b) See 9 above S p i l l of LNG between tanks, could cause f a i l u r e of o u t e r tank and possibly inner tank Pressure i n t h e tank decreases - tank will reach 0.2 psig i n 10-15 minutes a t normal loading r a t e s The loading system i s not shut down and i s o l a t e d automatic a l l y i n an emergency
cD
13. Vapor r e t u r n compressors Vapor i s not returned t o s h i p during and vapor r e t u r n l i n e s h i p loading
14. Loading Emergency Shutdown (LES) a detectors b transmitters c ) control 1e r s d) i s o l a t i o n valves e ) shutoff switches
Fails t o operate properly
Low temperature d e t e c t o r i n i n s u l a t i o n would a c t i v a t e M S E Block valve in tank makes i t possible t o s t o p flow out of tank Low pressure would a c t i v a t e emergency gas supply D 0.2 psig and shutdown loading system. Re1 i e f valves woul a open D 0.03 psig All functions of t h e LES can be performed manually
36-in. Transfer Line. This includes the 36-in. valves, expansion j o i n t s , and other f i t t i n g s . The l i n e i s approximately 2,200 f t long, and a leak or rupture i n any section could r e s u l t in a large s p i l l . The probability of a t r a n s f e r l i n e rupture i s estimated t o be low. Loading Arms and Ship Coupling Mechanism. These components must be able t o handle the cold temperature of t h e LNG and the movement of the ship. Proper operation of the swivel j o i n t s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y important. The probability of a loading arm f a i l u r e i s estimated t o be low. Loading Emergency Shutdown System. If t h i s system operates a s intended, i t will prevent o r l i m i t the s i z e of many s p i l l s in the loading section. O primary importance i s the proper operation of detectors and sensors f t h a t a c t i v a t e the system, the a b i l i t y of the 36-in. valves t o function s a t i s f a c t o r i l y i n the event of an emergency shutdown, and the performance of the ship coupling mechanism i n an emergency. 3.3.4 Operator Interface
Although the plant operators a r e not t r a d i t i o n a l l y viewed a s plant components, they a r e essential t o the proper operation of the plant. The i n t e r f a c e between operator actions and plant operations i s therefore a c r i t i c a l f a c t o r r e l a t i n g t o release prevention and control. Operators perform a number of diverse tasks a t t h e export terminal, most of which r e l a t e t o release prevention and control e i t h e r d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y . During normal plant operations, the operators r u n the plant within s e t l i m i t s and standards t o prevent conditions t h a t may lead t o releases. During o f f standard conditions, the operators must respond appropriately t o alarms, indicators, and other signals t o prevent releases from occurring o r t o l i m i t releases in progress. Plant inspection and maintenance i s a l s o important t o i d e n t i f y and remedy conditions t h a t may lead t o subsequent releases. Because of the number of operator tasks performed a t the probability of operator e r r o r i s judged t o be medium t o high. of LNG o r natural gas releases resulting from operator e r r o r s high probability of a small release t o a low probability of a f a c i l i t y , the The probability varies from a maximum release.
3.4
REPRESENTATIVE RELEASE EVENTS AND INFORMATION NEEDS Using t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e system l e v e l and t h e component l e v e l analyses, a
l i s t o f p o t e n t i a l r e l e a s e events considered t o be r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e e x p o r t t e r m i n a l was developed. Table 3.7. o f Appendix G. The r e p r e s e n t a t i v e r e 1ease events a r e 1 is t e d i n P r e l i m i n a r y analyses f o r these events a r e presented i n Section G . l The r e p r e s e n t a t i v e r e l e a s e events range from r e l a t i v e l y f r e They form
quent b u t 1ow consequence r e 1eases t o u n l ik e l y b u t 1arge r e 1eases. systems i n t h e n e x t phase o f a n a l y s i s . TABLE 3.7. 1
t h e b a s i s f o r t h e q u a n t i t a t i v e e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e r e l e a s e p r e v e n t i o n and c o n t r o l
Representative Release Events f o r an LNG Export Terminal
Rupture o f t h e 36-in. main t r a n s f e r 1 i n e between t h e l o a d i n g pumps and t h e dock. Rupture o f t h e 24-in. l i q u i d o u t l e t l i n e between t h e storage tank and t h e f i r s t b l o c k valve. Rupture o f a 16-in. l o a d i n g arm. Storage tank pressure r e l i e f valves open. Storage tank vacuum r e l i e f valves open. I n n e r tank i s o v e r f i l l e d w i t h LNG. Complete f a i l u r e o f storage tank. Rupture o f 18-in. feed gas l i n e i n l i q u e f a c t i o n t r a i n . Rupture o f 23-in. mixed r e f r i g e r a n t l i q u i d p i p i n g between h i g h pressure separator and main cryogenic heat exchanger. Rupture o f 10-in. nozzle t o propane/mixed r e f r i g e r a n t exchanger. F a i l u r e o f a r e f r i g e r a n t compressor (propane o r mixed r e f r i g e r a n t ) . Rupture o f 12-in. t r a n s f e r l i n e from l i q u e f a c t i o n area t o t h e storage tanks. Rupture of o u t l e t nozzle o r p i p i n g on r e f r i g e r a n t storage tanks (propane, e t h y l ene)
2. 3. 4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10. 11. 12. 13.
I n performing t h e overview study, several areas r e q u i r i n g a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r mation were i d e n t i f i e d . Some o f these a r e o u t l i n e d below.
Emergency Shutdown (ESD) System.
O f p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t are the location
and number o f d e t e c t o r s t h a t a c t i v a t e t h e ESD, how q u i c k l y t h e shutdown occurs, e x a c t l y what equipment i s s h u t down and what valves a r e closed, and d e t a i l s on t h e i n s p e c t i o n , t e s t i n g , and maintenance o f t h e system.
P l a n t P i p i n g Network.
D e t a i l s , such as diameter, l e n g t h , w a l l t h i c k n e s s ,
and m a t e r i a l s o f c o n s t r u c t i o n a r e needed f o r t h e p i p i n g , vessels, valves, l o a d i n g arms, expansion j o i n t s , e t c . , t h a t make up t h e p l a n t p i p i n g . S t r u c t u r a l Mechanics o f Storage Tanks. tank.
A key f a c t o r i n t h i s area i s t h e
e f f e c t o f v a r i o u s hazard c o n d i t i o n s on t h e s t r u c t u r a l i n t e g r i t y o f t h e Such c o n d i t i o n s i n c l u d e overpressure, o v e r f i l l i n g t h e i n n e r tank, The e f f e c t of and a f i r e o r e x p l o s i o n i n another area o f t h e p l a n t .
heatup and cooldown on t h e tank, t h e p o t e n t i a l problems encountered d u r i n g these t r a n s i t i o n s , and t h e c o r r e c t heatup and cooldown procedures a r e necessary f o r more d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s . L i q u e f a c t i o n P l a n t Process C o n t r o l . Important factors include the
d e t a i l s o f t h e c o n t r o l scheme, p o t e n t i a l hazard c o n d i t i o n s t h a t can r e s u l t f r o m improper c o n t r o l , and s t a r t u p and shutdown procedures. F a i l u r e Rate Data. The overview s t u d y o f t h e e x p o r t t e r m i n a l considered
t h e p o t e n t i a l r e l e a s e frequency i n a q u a l i t a t i v e manner.
A more d e t a i l e d
s t u d y o f t h e e x p o r t t e r m i n a l r e l e a s e p r e v e n t i o n , d e t e c t i o n , and c o n t r o l systems must c a r e f u l l y c o n s i d e r t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f t h e r e l e a s e i n i t i a t i n g event and t h e r e l i a b i l i t y o f t h e r e l e a s e d e t e c t o r s and c o n t r o l systems. Due t o t h e l a c k o f o p e r a t i n g experience o f LNG f a c i l i t i e s , 1 i t t l e d a t a i s a v a i l a b l e f o r LNG equipment f a i l u r e r a t e s . Operator I n t e r f a c e . R e l i a b i l i t y i n f o r m a t i o n on o p e r a t o r t a s k s performed
a t t h e f a c i l i t y i s needed.
4.0
ASSESSMENT OF LNG MARINE VESSEL
The overview s t u d y o f t h e r e f e r e n c e LNG marine vessel i s presented i n t h i s section. 4.1 SUMMARY SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The t a n k e r used as a b a s i s f o r t h e LNG marine vessel scoping assessment 3 i s a 125,000-m vessel w i t h f i v e Kvaerner Moss-t,ype s p h e r i c a l tanks. The t a n k e r i s designed t o operate 345 days p e r y e a r , w i t h 20 days a l l o w e d f o r miscellaneous delays and r e p a i r s . t h e s t o r a g e tanks used as f u e l . The approximate cargo d e l i v e r a b i l i t y o f t h e The s h i p has a d e s i g n speed o f 20 knots, and The b a s i c s h i p vessel i s 90% o f cargo c a p a c i t y on a t y p i c a l voyage, w i t h b o i l o f f vapors from takes 10-15 hours t o l o a d o r unload under normal c o n d i t i o n s . system a r e b r i e f l y d e s c r i b e d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g paragraphs. t i o n i s presented i n Appendix C. 4.1 .I B a s i c Ship and P r o p u l s i o n System The vessel i s designed t o meet r i g i d requirements f o r b o t h impact and damaged s t a b i l i t y . Wing s i d e b a l l a s t tanks and a double h u l l t h r o u g h o u t t h e Each s p h e r i c a l cargo t a n k i s supported by a v e r t i c a l Only over a small vessel reduce t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f damage t o t h e cargo tanks i n t h e event o f c o l l i s i o n o r grounding. cyl inder. The t o p o f t h e c y l inder i s we1 ded t o t h e equator o f t h e cargo tank,
and i t s p r o p u l s i o n system, t h e cargo s t o r a g e tanks, and t h e cargo hand1 i n g
A detailed descrip-
and t h e bottom i s welded t o t h e s h i p ' s h u l l s t r u c t u r e . t o the h u l l .
p o r t i o n o f t h e h o l d l e n g t h and depth do t h e s p h e r i c a l s t o r a g e tanks come c l o s e A t l o c a t i o n s o t h e r t h a n midtank, t h e s h i p can w i t h s t a n d g r e a t e r p e n e t r a t i o n and g r e a t e r impact v e l o c i t y . The ship, which i s 926 f t l o n g and has a deadweight o f 63,600 l o n g tons, Steam
i s powered by a heavy-duty marine steam t u r b i n e r a t e d a t 43,000 shp. gas and bunker f u e l .
f o r t h e t u r b i n e i s generated i n two high-pressure b o i l e r s by b u r n i n g b o i l o f f I n a d d i t i o n t o standard n a v i g a t i o n a l equipment, t h e vessel has s e v e r a l s a f e t y f e a t u r e s t o improve m a n u e v e r a b i l i t y and p r e v e n t s o l l i s i o n s ; these include:
bow t h r u s t e r s f o r improved maneuverabil it y l o r a n p r e c i s i o n posi t i o n - f i x i n g equipment b r i d g e c o n t r o l o f main engine c o l l i s i o n avoidance system. 4.1.2 Cargo Storage Tanks Each cargo storage tank i s 120 f t i n diameter and i s c o n s t r u c t e d o f 5083-0 aluminum a l l o y . The tanks a r e i n s u l a t e d w i t h polyurethane foam a p p l i e l Normal b o i l o f f from t h e tanks i s 0.15% c t The tanks are hydropneumatically t e s t e d
t l
t o t h e o u t e r s u r f a c e o f the sheres. 0.25% o f f u l l tank volume p e r day.
31 p s i g and equipped w i t h r e 1 i e f valves t o p r o t e c t t h e tanks from overpressur' The cargo tanks a r e designed on a " l e a k - b e f o r e - f a i l u r e " basis, and no
secondary b a r r i e r o r emergency containment system i s provided. provided beneath each tank. 4.1.3 Cargo Handling System
A leak
d e t e c t i o n system c o n s i s t i n g o f a d r i p pan w i t K a l i q u i d - t i g h t cover i s
The s h i p ' s cargo handl i n g system c o n s i s t s o f t h e 1i q u i d cargo handl i n g system, t h e vapor h a n d l i n g system, and t h e r e c i r c u l a t i o n and purging systems. The l i q u i d cargo handling system i n c l u d e s t h e main l i q u i d header, t h e crossover l i n e and valves f o r l o a d i n g and unloading from e i t h e r s i d e unloading l i n e s a t each tank, and t h e unloading pumps i n each tank. The main vapor header, a vapor l i n e t o each tank, t h e crossover l i n e and valves f o r accepting o r r e t u r n i n g vapor from both sides o f t h e ship, b o i l o f f compressors and heaters, and t h e gas supply t o t h e b o i l e r s make up t h e vapor h a n d l i n g system. The r e c i r c u l a t i o n system c o n s i s t s o f a spray header, a small spray pump i n each tank, and a spray nozzle i n each tank. This system i s used t o cool The p u r g i n g down t h e tanks and t o keep t h e tanks c o l d on b a l l a s t voyages. a warmup heater, and an LNG v a p o r i z e r .
3f
the
vessel, t h e i s o l a t i o n l i n e connecting t h e header and crossover, l o a d i n g and
system i n c l u d e s a small l i q u i d n i t r o g e n storage tank, an i n e r t gas generator,
The emergency shutdown (ESD) system i s incorportated i n the cargo hand1 ing system so t h a t any cargo !landling operation can be stopped quickly. of the E D causes t h e :allowing actions: S 1. Valves i n these l i n e s a r e closed: Activation
l i q u i d crossover; vapor crossover; liquid/vapor header i s o l a t i o n l i n e s ; the unloading, loading, and vapor
l i n e s of each tank; and t h e b o i l e r feed gas l i n e .

2.
The following equipment i s shut down:
the submerged cargo pumps, the boiloff compressor, and the b o i l e r feedgas heater.
In most instances, the E D i s activated manually i n response t o an emergency S condition. The E D i s automatically activated by the high-high level i n d i c a t o r s S i n the cargo storage tanks and by excessive ship movement during loading. I t i s a l s o activated in the event of a f i r e by several thermal fuses located throughout t h e ship. S The ship personnel a l s o have the c a p a b i l i t y t o a c t i v a t e t h e terminal E D system. Terminal operators can close the ships loading/unloading valves a s p a r t of the terminal shutdown procedure.
4.2
SYSTEM LEVEL ANALYSIS The purpose of the system level analysis i s t o i d e n t i f y those sections of
t h e marine vessel t h a t a r e most c r i t i c a l with respect t o r e l e a s e prevention and control. The evaluation of each system i s based l a r g e l y on two f a c t o r s : 1 ) the quantity of a potential r e l e a s e of hazardous material due t o e i t h e r t h e inventory or the flow r a t e and 2 ) an estimate of t h e r e l a t i v e probability of a r e l e a s e (low, medium, high). S p i l l s from LNG tankers can be divided i n t o two broad c l a s s e s : s p i l l s r e s u l t i n g from equipment f a i l u r e s o r misuse of equipment during normal operat i o n (Category I ) and s p i l l s r e s u l t i n g from external forces (Category 11). Category I s p i l l s a r e most l i k e l y while the vessel i s loading o r unloading. The cargo handling system of the ship i s most important with respect t o Category I s p i l l s . Collisions, groundings, and severe storms a r e examples of The cargo storage tanks external forces which could cause Category I1 s p i l l s .
a r e the portion of the s h i p most l i k e l y affected by external forces. s p i l l s a r e most l i k e l y while the ship i s i n t r a n s i t .
Category I 1
Table 4.1 shows the inventories, flow r a t e s , and operating conditions f o r t h e various p a r t s of the vessel.
TABLE 4.1.
Selected Operating Parameters f o r the LNG Marine Vessel

Normal Operating Conditions P r e s s u r e ( p s i g ) Ternperture("F) 1 to 2 1 t o 100 1 to 2 50 10 -260 -260
Component Cargo S t o r a g e Tanks ( 5 ) L i q u i d Header and Crossover Vapor Header and Crossover Gas Supply L i n e to Boilers Spray Header Liquid Nitrogen S t o r a g e Tank
Material LNG LNG N a t u r a l Gas N a t u r a l Gas LNG
Inventory 6 6 . 6 ~ 1 0 g a l ea 1 . 7 ~ 1 0 gal 2.3x10"cf 7 .Ox10 2 scf
Typical Flow Rate 10,000 gpm 50,000 gpm 7.0 t o 22.0 MMscf d 7.0 MMscfd 200 gpm
2 2 . 0 ~ 1 0 gal e 6.6x10"al
---
---
4.2.1
Cargo Handling System--Category I S p i l l s
A s p i l l o r r e l e a s e of LNG o r natural gas from the cargo handling system i s hazardous because: 1 ) the vapor i s flammable and a serious f i r e and/or explosion i s possible, and 2) the cold liquid could cause serious s t r u c t u r a l damage t o the s h i p .
There a r e three general modes by which LNG o r natural gas can be released from the cargo handling system: leak o r rupture i n pipes, f i t t i n g s , valves, e t c . discharge of r e l i e f valves t o the atmosphere misoperation of valves in the system. The l a r g e s t possible s p i l l from the cargo handling system i s on the order of 67,000 gallons (a rupture of the 1iquid header during loading o r unloading) assuming the emergency s i t u a t i o n i s recognized, the emergency shutdown (ESD) system operates a s designed, and the s p i l l causes no serious s t r u c t u r a l damage
t o the ship. The ESD shuts down alld i s o l a t e s the loading/unloading system w i t h i n about 1 minute a f t e r i t i s activated. I t is activated automatically i n the event of a f i r e , excessive ship movement a t the dock, o r o v e r f i l l i n g of a cargo tank. The system can be activated manual l y a t the bridge, the cargo cont r o l room, and the deck. A f a i l u r e of the ESD would r e s u l t i n a s i g n i f i c a n t l y l a r g e r s p i l l , up t o about 520,000 gallons, because of the high flow r a t e s . The probability of this r e l e a s e i s estimated t o be low. 4.2.2 Cargo Storage Tanks--Category I1 S p i l l s
Grouping s p i l l s from cargo storage tanks and Category I1 s p i l l s together does not imply t h a t s p i l l s from the cargo storage tanks cannot r e s u l t from f a i l u r e o r misoperation of ship equipment. However, i t i s assumed t h a t external causes pose the most s i g n i f i c a n t hazard t o the s h i p ' s cargo tanks. The most l i k e l y cause of a release from the cargo storage tanks i s penetration of the tanks by another ship during a c o l l i s i o n . I f the e n t i r e contents of one tank a r e s p i l l e d , the release would be 6 . 6 x 106 gallons (25,000 m'), a s shown i n Table 4.1. The maximum s p i l l ( i f a l l f i v e tanks a r e l o s t ) i s 3.3 x lo7 gallons (125,000 m3). These a r e very large releases, but i t should be noted t h a t the probability of these releases being instantaneous i s low. The release would most 1i kely spread out over hours o r even days. The s h i p has a double hull thoroughout t h a t protects the storage tanks i n a c o l l i s i o n o r grounding. The ship a l s o has various navigational equipment t o help prevent c o l l i s i o n s and groundings. Basic Ship and Propulsion System Failures o r misoperation i n the r e s t of the s h i p can i n d i r e c t l y r e s u l t i n a release of LNG o r natural gas. Events of t h i s nature can generally be grouped i n t o three broad c l a s s e s : 1.
2.
defects and f a i l u r e s i n the s h i p ' s s t r u c t u r e t h a t a f f e c t the cargo tanks o r cargo hand1 i ng sys tem f a i l u r e of navigation equipment o r navigational e r r o r t h a t r e s u l t s i n a ramming o r grounding
3.
f a i l u r e of the propulsion system, i n which case the boiloff gas must be vented.
Maximum s i z e of the release i s 6.6 x 106 gallons (25,000 m 3 ) i f one tank ruptures and 3.3 x 107 gallons (125,000 m3 ) i f a l l tanks a r e l o s t . The probability of t h i s release is estimated t o be low. 4.3
The system level analysis indicates t h a t the l a r g e s t potential s p i l l s of LNG occur when one o r more of the cargo tanks rupture. Failures o r misoperation of the cargo handling system generally r e s u l t in smaller s p i l l s . However, because there i s more equipment involved and because the human element plays a large r o l e , s p i l l s a r e much more probable i n the cargo handl ing system. Failure in other portions of the ship can i n d i r e c t l y r e s u l t i n a s p i l l o r release from the cargo handl ing system o r the cargo tanks, and a r e included i n those sections f o r t h i s analysis. For passive components (e. g . , pi ping and cargo tanks), general l y only one f a i 1ure (e. g. , a pipe break) i s required f o r a release. The emergency shutdown system i s designed t o l i m i t the s i z e of these releases. For a c t i v e components ( e . g . , motors, compressors, valves, control 1e r s ) , usually two f a i 1ures a r e required t o i n i t i a t e a release. In many cases, one of the f a i l u r e s i s f a i l u r e on the p a r t of the crewmen t o recognize and respond c o r r e c t l y t o s i t u a t i o n . The emergency shutdown system i s , in some cases, automatically activated when a component f a i l s . 4.3.1 Cargo Handling System
The r e s u l t s of a preliminary hazards analysis (PHA) f o r the cargo handlinq system a r e shown in Table 4.2. Based on t h i s analysis, t h e following components c a r e i d e n t i f i e d a s being t h e m ~ s t r i t i c a l w i t h respect t o release prevention and control : Liquid header, crossover l i n e , and valves. Because of t h e high flow r a t e s , a leak o r rupture can r e s u l t i n a large s p i l l . I t i s a l s o possible f o r crewmen t o loisvalve the system and cause a large s p i l l . Maximum s p i l l
TABLE 4.2.
- Component
Preliminary Hazards Analysis of Cargo Handling System

P - ---- o t e n t i a l Hazard---- Condi_t+_ .
-
t' feet _ _ _
__
E x i s t L n g P r e v e n t i v e a n d C o n t r o l flea<!?r_es_ D r i p pans a r e l o c a t e d where l e a k s a r e expected (flange:, v a l v e s , e t c ) . Crewnlan w o t ~ l da c t i v a t e ESD t o i s o l a t e t h e sys t?rn Crewnran would a c t i v a t e ESD t o i s o l d t e sys tern. Satne as No. 1 e x c e p t t h a t l o a d i n y a r e a has qas d e t e c t o r t o p r o v i d e e a r l y warning of spill.
1 . L i y i d header and c r o s s o v e r 1i n e
Rupture o r l e a k
S p i l l s LNG on deck p l a t e
2. Tank v a l v e s ( l i q u i d
lines)
Rupture o r 1eak 1 . R!III~,II~+!o r l e a k
S p i l l s LNG on deck p l a t e and l a r q e tank 1 . s p i l l s IN(; nn $deck p l d i e
3. L i q u i d c r o s s o v e r
valves (loddittg valves)
2. F a i l s open o r i s l e f t
open by o p e r a t o r e r r o r
3. r a i l s closed o r i s closed by o p e r a t o r e r r o r
2. s p i l l s I N S i n t o w a t e r i f l o a d i n q / u n l o a d i n g 1s t a k i n q p l a c e on t h e other i i d r n f thp ship 3. p r ~ v e n t sl o c ~ t l i n g / u n l o a d i n g From t h a t s i d e o f the ship. I T valve c l o i ~ st o o f a s t , c o u l d cause f l u i d hammer and f a i l u r e o f 1i q t ~ i d header
Releases n a t u r a l gas 1. Relea5es n a t , t ~ r a l qas
4 . Vapor header and crossover l i n e
R u p t t ~ r eo r l e a k 1 . Rupture o r l e a k 2. F a i l s c l o s e d o r i s l e f t c l o s e d by o p e r a t o r e r r o r
5. Tank v a l v e (vapor
l i n e t o vapor header)
2 . Pressure i n tank w i l l
i n c r e a s e ds no vapor i s r~nloved 3. Tank cannot be i s o l a t e d i n cttlerqency 1 . Releases n a t u r a l gas 2. R e l e a s r i n a l u r a l gas i f loading/unloading i s t a k i n g p l a c e on t h e other side o f the ship 3. h a d i n g - - p r e v e n t s vapor f r o m b e i n g r q t l ~ r n e dt o shore wliich c o u l d cause o v e r p r e s s u r e o f cargo tank and u n d e r p r e s s u r e st o f t e r ~ l ~ i n a l orage tank U n l o a d i n g - - p r e v e n t s vapor from hf?inq r e t u r n e d f r o m shore which cotrld cause u n d c r p r e s s ~ l t - eo f c a r g o tank S p i l l < LNG on deck p l a t e same as 140. 1 above S p i l l s L N G on deck p l a t e s a w as No. 1 above S p i l l s LNG on t h e deck and i n the water 1. R e l e a w s ndtul-nl qns 2. Cargo tank p r e s s t ~ r e increasc!s 3 . Cargo tank p r e s s l l r e rle~rca~es Tanks cannot he c o o l e d down o r k r p t c o l d wlien pmpty
S a f e t y v a l v e s p r e v e n t t a n k from f a i l u r e due t o o v e r p r e s s u r e
3. F a i l s open o r i s l e f t
open h y o p e r a t o r e r r o r
6. Vapor c r o s s o v e r valves (loading va 1ves)
1. Rupture o r l e a k 2. F a i l s open o r i s l e f t open by o p e r a t o r e r r o r
Gas d e t e c t o r p r o v i d e s e a r l y w a r n i n g
3. F a i l s c l o s e d o r i s l e f t c l o s e d by o p e r a t o r
B o t h c a r g o t a n k s and t e r m i n a l tanks a r e p r o t e c t e d by s a f e t y valves t o prevent f a i l u r e f r o m o v e r p r e s s u r e and underpressure
7 . Spray header
Ruoture o r l e a k Rupture o r l e a k
S a w as 140. 1 above Sane as Yo. 1 above
8. Tank v a l v e s ( l i q u i d
1i n e t o spray header)
9. C o u p l i n g s t o l o a d i n g
arms 10. B o i l o f f cottipressors and vapor r e t u r n compressors
Disconnected wh i 1e 1o a d i n g o r unloading i s s t i l l i n progress 1. Rupture o r l e a k 2. T a i l t o o p e r a t e 3. Run a t f u l l speed o n l y
Tanks a r e p r o t e c t e d by s a r e t y valve; t o p r e v e n t f a i l u r e front o v e r p r e s s l l r e and underpressure
11. ?pray pumps and nozzles
F a i l t o operate properly
TABLE 4.2.
Component Gas supply l i n e t o boilers P o t e n t i a l Hazard Condition Rupture o r l e a k
(contd)
Effect E x i s t i n g Preventive and Control Measures Gas supply l i n e t o t h e propulsion equipment i s a double p i p e w i t h the gas being c a r r i e d i n the inner pipe. The annular space i s purged w i t h N2 and t h e gas analyzed f o r CHd. Redundant heaters
13. B o i l o f f heaters
Fai 1 t o operate
Cold gas would e n t e r gas supply l i n e t o b o i l e r s . This could cause f a i l u r e o f carbon s t e e l p i p i n g o r equipment. Cargo handling system i s n o t i s o l a t e d and shut down i n an emergency s i t u a t i o n
14. Emergency Shutdown System a. detectors and process i n s t r u ments b. t r a n s m i t t e r s c. c o n t r o l l e r s d. valves and switches 15. L i q u i d N storage tank an8 associated p i p i n g up t o i n e r t gas generator 16. R e l i e f valves on vapor header (gas main) 17. Valve t o forward vent riser 18. Propulsion p l a n t o r boilers
F a i l t o operate p r o p e r l y
System can be a c t i v a t e d manually i f detectors o r t r a n s m i t t e r s f a i l . Valves can be closed and equipment shutdown manually i f c o n t r o l l e r s , valves, o r switches f a i l .
Rupture o r l e a k
S p i l l s N on deck. Could cause dgck p l a t e s t o crack. A l l purging on the s h i p would be stopped Pressure i n vapor header continues t o r i s e and vapor header o r o t h e r equipment connected t o i t could f a i l . Natural gas o r LNG i s released o u t t h e r i s e r Ship cannot move under i t s own power. A l l b o i l o f f gas has t o be vented. Valves a r e inspected and tested p e r i o d i cally
F a i l t o open on demand
F a i l s open o r i s l e t open by operator F a i l t o operate
s i z e would be around 67,000 gallons i f the E D works properly. The S probability of f a i l u r e f o r these types of components is estimated t o be low. Emergency Shutdown (ESD) system. If this system f a i l s t o operate in an emergency, a very large s p i l l could r e s u l t . In the case of a rupture of the liquid header, the s p i l l could be as large as 520,000 gallons. Proper interconnection of the terminal and ship E D systems i s important t o ensure S a f a s t , complete, and safe shutdown in emergencies. Tanker loading and unloading, including operation of the cargo hand1 ing system and the terminal equipment, i s the segment of LNG baseload operations i n which the human element plays i t s biggest r o l e w i t h respect t o release prevention and control. "Human considerations" p a r t i c u l a r l y important in preventing sp.ills during tanker loading and unloading a r e : crewman and operator training--particularly f o r emergency s i t u a t i o n s good communications between ship and terminal personnel. 4.3.2 Cargo Storage Tanks
Table 4.3 presents the preliminary hazards analysis (PHA) of the LNG storage portion of the vessel. Components t h a t a r e most important w i t h respect t o release prevention and control are: Primary b a r r i e r . A rupture o r leak i n the spherical aluminum tanks can r e s u l t in a large s p i l l (up t o 6.6 x 106 g a l l o n s ) . The probability of tank f a i l u r e i s estimated t o be low. Outer and inner hulls. These protect the primary b a r r i e r from a c o l l i s i o n . They a l s o contain b a l l a s t water t h a t , i f i t leaks o u t , could ruin tank insulation and freeze on the cargo tanks. The probability of such a f a i l u r e is estimated t o be low. Cargo tank liquid-level indicators. I f these f a i l , the tank can be o v e r f i l l e d . Liquid will overflow out the vapor l i n e s and could cause s i g n i f i c a n t damage i n other portions of the ship. The probability of a level indicator f a i l u r e i s estimated t o be medium.
TABLE 4.3.
Col~~ponen t 1 . Cargo tank
Preliminary Hazards Analysis of Cargo Storage Tanks

tiazard C o n d i t i o n
-lotential
E . -f f e c t -. .-- . .
The cargo tanks a r e designed t o " l e a k " b e f o r e they " f a i l " . A d r i p Pan i s l o c a t e d beneath the tank t o c a t c h s r ~ i a l l l e a k s . A gas d e t e c t o r i n t h i s area provides e a r l y warnings i n case o f l e a k s . Tanks have s a f e t y valves s e t a t 3.5 p s i g t o p r o t e c t a g a i n s t f a i l u r e fro111overpressure
Rupture o r l e a k
S p i l l s LNG on t h e deck or i n t o d r i p pdil below.tank.
Rollover
Pressure
i11
tank increases
2. E q u d t o r i a l r i n g and
and support
F a i l s t o support the tank
Tank would f d l l i n t o h o l d area and c o u l d f a i l and s p i l l e n t i r e contellts. Cargo tank i s o v e r f i l l e d and Each tank has two independent l i q u i d l i q u i d flows o u t t h e vapor level indicators l i n e and i n t o the vapor header. From rhere i t can go t o the compressors, the compressor 1 ines, o r the vent l i n e s , o r the vent riser. Pressure i n tank colrtilluc5 Safety valves open a t 3.5 p s i g and tank t o r i s e and tank c o u l d can w i t h s t a n d a t l e a s t 31 p s i g i n vapor overpres5ure spdce. Each tank has two s a f e t y valves. Valves are inspected and t e s t e d p e r i o d i cally. Releases n a t u r a l gab t o Valves are inspected and t e s t e d p e r i o d i vapor header ur~necessdri y l cally Pressure i n the tank continues t o f a l l . N i s admitted t o the t a r ~ k innecessarily Increase i n h o i l o f f which 111ay have t o be vented. Could cause Increase i n tank prebsure. Increase o r decredse i n tdnk pressure Cargo tarlk5 may be ruptured. B a l l a s t water i s released and \\ray r u i n the i n s u l a t i o l l and freeze on the tarik. The s h i p c o n t a i n s the f o l l o w i n g s a f e t y f e a t u r e s t o improve nuneuverabi 1 it y and prevent c o l l i s i o n s : 1 ) bow t h r u s t e r 2) l o r a n p r e c i s i o n p o s i t i o n f i x i n g equipment 3) b r i d g e c o n t r o l o f main engine 4 ) c o l l i s i o n avoidance system Valves are inspected and t e s t e d p e r i o d i cdlly Valves are i n s p e c l e d and t e s t e d p e r i o d i cal l y
3. Cargo tank .lq u i d i level indicators
Give i n c o r r e c t readings o r f a i l t o a c t i v a t e ESD system
4. Safety valves on cargo tank (pressure re1 i e f )
Do n o t ope11 on demand
Open a t lower pressure than design
5 . Safety valves on carg, tanks (vacuum re1 i e f )

6 . Cargo tank i n s u l a t i o n
Do n o t open on demand Open a t higher- pressure than desiyn Ineffective
7. Car o tank pressure

i n % i c a t o r / c o n t r o ll e r 8. Outer and i n n e r h u l l
Gives i n c o r r e c t readings o r f d i l s t o operate Outer and i n n e r h u l l are penetrated i n a c o l l i s i o n o r yroundi ny
Safety valves on cargo tanks, hold areas, and vapor line. These protect the storage tanks from overpressure and underpressure. The f a i l u r e of a safety valve i s estimated to have a low probability. Navigational safety equipment. This equipment (1 isted previously) aids ship personnel in avoiding collisions and groundings. The probability of navigational safety equipment f a i l u r e i s estimated t o be medium. Collisions or groundings pose the most significant threat to the cargo storage tanks. Therefore, the a b i l i t y of the ship to avoid collisions (by special navigational equipment) and the collision resistance of the hulls and the primary barrier are of utmost importance in preventing s p i l l s from the cargo storage tanks. The collision resistance of several LNG vessels has been calculated based on the Minorsky equation. The Minorsky method i s a semianalytical approach based on data f o r 50 actual collisions. With t h i s method, the velocity of a striking ship required for penetration of the cargo tanks of the LNG vessel can be calculated. Appendix C of t h i s study contains further discussion pertaining t o the collision resistance of LNG vessels. Included in t h i s discussion i s a plot of the c r i t i c a l velocity versus displacement of the striking ship. 4.4 REPRESENTATIVE RELEASE EVENTS
Based on the results of the preceding system and component level analyses, a l i s t of potential release events considered to be representative of the marine vessel was developed. These representative release events appear in Table 4.4. Section 6 . 2 of Appendix G includes preliminary analyses of these events. The representative re1 ease events range from re1 a t i vely frequent b u t low consequence releases to unl i kely b u t large releases. They form the basis f o r the quantitative evaluation of the release prevention and control systems in the next phase of analysis. In performing the overview study, several areas requiring additional information were identified. Some of these are outlined below.
TABLE 4.4.
Representative Release Events f o r an LNG Marine Yessel
1.
2.
3. 4. 5. 6.
Rupture o r leak i n one of the LNG cargo tanks Cargo tank i s o v e r f i l l e d Pressure safety valves r e l i e v e t o the atmosphere Rupture o r leak i n the liquid cargo handling system Rupture o r leak i n the vapor handl ing system Release of LNG o r natural gas from ship due t o misoperation of the cargo handl ing system.
Coll i sion Probabi 1i t y . Several analytical methods have been appl ied t o Coast Guard c o l l i s i o n data t o determine the probability of an LNG vessel being involved in a c o l l i s i o n . These methods usually include a s a f e t y f a c t o r f o r LNG vessels t o account f o r the additional navigation and safety equipment on board and the special navigational procedures used. Additional research and analysis i s needed t o develop a standard method f o r calculating these probabi 1 i t i es. Effects of a Collision on an LNG Vessel. While the c r i t i c a l velocity f o r penetration of the storage tanks has been calculated, l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n has been given t o the e f f e c t s of a c o l l i s i o n on other portions of the ship such as the cargo handling system and the propulsion system. Cargo Handling System. A complete piping and instrument drawing of the cargo handl i ng system i s needed. Effects of S p i l l , Fires, and Explosions. The e f f e c t of these events on the s t r u c t u r a l i n t e g r i t y of the ship, on the cargo handling system, and the cargo tanks needs t o be determined. Failure Rate Data. The overview study of the marine vessel considered r e l e a s e frequency i n a q u a l i t a t i v e manner. A more detailed study of the marine vessel ' s re1 ease prevention, detection, and control systems must c a r e f u l l y consider the likelihood of the release i n i t i a t i n g event and the re1 i a b i l i t y of t h e release detection and control systems. Due t o the lack of operating experience of LNG f a c i l i t i e s , l i t t l e data i s a v a i l able f o r LNG equipment f a i l u r e r a t e s .
Operator I n t e r f a c e .
Re1 i a b i 1it y i n f o r m a t i o n on o p e r a t o r t a s k s performed
i n s h i p p i n g and cargo handling operations i s needed.
5.0
ASSESSMENT OF LNG IMPORT TERMINAL
This section presents the overview study of the reference LNG import terminal . 5.1 S M A Y SYSTEM DESCRIPTION U MR
The reference LNG import terminal consists of a marine terminal f o r tanker unloading, two 550,000-bbl storage tanks f o r LNG storage, compressors and sendout pumps, and a vaporization system including both falling-film, open-rack, seawater vaporizers and gas-fired, submerged combustion vaporizers. The major operations performed a t the plant a r e b r i e f l y described i n the following paragraphs. The plant s a f e t y systems a r e a l s o described. A detailed description i s presented i n Appendix D. 5.1 . I Marine Terminal and Unloading System
The marsine terminal f o r the LNG import f a c i l i t y c o n s i s t s of a dock and a 6,000-ft t r e s t l e supporting a roadway and f l u i d t r a n s f e r l i n e s . The four major t r a n s f e r l i n e s include a 42-in. main LNG t r a n s f e r l i n e from the t r e s t l e t o tne LNG storage f a c i l i t y , a 16-in. vapor return l i n e t o maintain adequate pressure i n the s h i p ' s storage tanks during unloading, a 4-in. LNG r e c i r c u l a t i o n l i n e t o keep the LNG unloading 1ines cold when not unloading a vessel, and a 10-in. Bunker "C" fuel o i l l i n e . Four 16-in.-diameter a r t i c u l a t e d LNG loading arms a r e located on the dock a t the terminal. The loading arms connect w i t h a 24-in. t r a n s f e r l i n e . Two s e t s of four 24-in. l i n e s connect t o a 42-in. header which t i e s i n t o the 42-in. t r a n s f e r 1 ine. The marine terminal includes berths t o accommodate two vessels, one on each s i d e of the t r e s t l e . However, only one ship can unload a t a time. A control tower over1 ooks the ship unloading operations. 5.1.2 Storage System
LNG storage a t the f a c i l i t y c o n s i s t s of two flat-bottom, double-wal l e d ,
aboveground LNG storage tanks w i t h a capacity of 550,000 bbl each.
The inner
tank i s constructed of 9% n i c k e l - s t e e l , which possesses e x c e l l e n t low temperature ductility. The outer tank i s constructed of carbon s t e e l , which possesse The dimensions of the tank a r e : 215 f t 225 f t a very poor low temperature d u c t i l i t y . i nner diameter : outer diameter: inner shell height: outer tank she1 1 height: overall tank height :
88 f t 98 f t 146 f t .
The high l i q u i d level of LNG in t h e tank i s approximately 87 f t , 9 i n . Expanded p e r l i t e , a nonflammable material, i n s u l a t e s t h e annular space between t h e inner and outer s h e l l s . A r e s i l i e n t f i b e r g l a s s blanket i s wrappec around the outside of the inner shell t o a l l e v i a t e pressures r e s u l t i n g from movement of the inner shell due t o thermal cycling. Foamglass blocks, a loadbearing i n s u l a t i o n , a r e used t o i n s u l a t e the tank bottom.
A 4-ft-thick reinforced concrete s l a b supports each tank. An e l e c t r i c a l : heated sandbed i s located beneath t h e tank. This prevents the s o i l beneath t t tank from freezing and causing frostheave. Engineered f i l l i s located d i r e c t ' beneath the s l a b .
The tanks a r e designed t o withstand instantaneous wind gusts u p t,o 104 mph, earthquakes up t o 7 on the Richter s c a l e , and a maximum horizontal accele r a t i o n of 0.21 g. All piping t o the inner tank e n t e r s through t h e roof of t h e storage tank. A concrete dike wall surrounds each storage tank. Each dike will hold approximately 133% of the capacity of one storage tank. The i n s i d e of t h e dike wall i s lined w i t h i n s u l a t i n g material t o reduce the evaporation r a t e of any s p i l l e d LNG.
A weather s h i e l d extending from the top of the concrete dike t o the oute tank roof keeps p r e c i p i t a t i o n from f a l l i n g i n t o the annular space.
Normal tank boiloff and vapors from LNG tanker unloading a r e handled by vent gas compressor system. Storage tank pressure is maintained by returning
vapors from t h e v e n t gas compressor. mission pipeline. 5.1 .3 Compressors and Sendout Pumps
Excess vapors a r e compressed by f u e l gas
and p i p e l i n e compressors t o be used as f u e l o r f o r d e l i v e r y t o t h e gas t r a n s -
T h i s s e c t i o n o f t h e p l a n t includes a l l o f t h e equipment o p e r a t i n g a t h i g h pressure (up t o 1300 p s i g ) . There a r e t e n major compressors a t t h e f a c i l i t y : r e c i p r o c a t i n g f u e l gas compressors f o u r c e n t r i f u g a l b o i l o f f compressors t h a t take s u c t i o n on t h e storage tanks and boost t h e gas t o 10 psig; t h r e e two-stage, and t h r e e two-stage, t o 1300 p s i g . t h a t take gas from the b o i l o f f compressors and increase t h e pressure t o 150 p s i g ; r e c i p r o c a t i n g pipe1 i n e compressors t h a t compress t h e gas Only t h e b o i l o f f compressors r u n cold.
A f u e l gas preheater
heats t h e b o i l o f f before i t enters t h e f u e l gas compressors. Each storage tank contains two submerged, primary sendout pumps t h a t boost t h e LNG t o 60 psig. up t o 1300 p s i g . 5.1.4 V a p o r i z a t i o n System The v a p o r i z a t i o n system f o r t h e i m p o r t terminal includes two major types o f LNG vaporizers: falling-film, open-rack, seawater vaporizers, and g a s - f i r e d submerged combustion vaporizers. These vaporizers p r o v i d e the p l a n t w i t h a These a r e f o l l o w e d by 10 secondary pumps. The secondary pumps a r e submersi b l e, pot-mounted, 15-stage u n i t s t h a t r a i s e t h e LNG pressure
t o t a l o u t p u t c a p a c i t y o f 1 b i l l i o n s c f d o f gas. Baseload v a p o r i z a t i o n occurs i n f i v e f a 1 1 i n g - f i l m , open-rack, seawater vaporizers w i t h a t o t a l c a p a c i t y o f 550 MMscfd. LNG i s introduced through manif o l d s a t t h e bottom o f banks o f v e r t i c a l panels constructed o f s p e c i a l extruded fins. The LNG passes upward i n s i d e the panels, where i t i s heated by t h e seaNatural gas emerges water t h a t f a l l s as a f i l m over t h e o u t s i d e o f t h e panels.
a t t h e top, where i t i s c o l l e c t e d i n a m a n i f o l d and r o u t e d t o the p i p e l i n e . The f a l l i n g water f i l m used i n t h i s design gives extremely h i g h heat t r a n s f e r c o e f f i c i e n t s , which reduces t h e amount o f i c e formed, thus m a i n t a i n i n g h i g h performance. With t h i s open type o f system, the l i m i t e d amount o f i c e t h a t
forms does n o t i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e f l o w o f water. i t s s t r e n g t h a t low temperature.
The panels o f f i n n e d tubes
and a l l p a r t s i n c o n t a c t w i t h t h e LNG are made o f aluminum a l l o y , which maintains
For standby o r peaking vaporization, f o u r submerged g a s - f i r e d vaporizers having a t o t a l c a p a c i t y o f 450 MMscfd a r e used. used approximately 800 hours per year. The g a s - f i r e d vaporizers a r e designed so t h a t burners exhaust h o t combustion gases downward through a downcomer and i n t o a water bath below t h e 1 i q u i d surface. The exhaust forms bubbles i n the water, causing turbulence, mixing, and T h i s f o r c e s t h e water up a t a h i g h v e l o c i t y through an The water f l o w s over t h e a "1 i f t i n g " a c t i o n . The g a s - f i r e d vaporizers a r e
annular space created by a w e i r around t h e downcomer. t o p o f t h e w e i r and i n t o t h e more quiescent tank. where i t i s scrubbed by t h e warm gas-water mixture.
A heat exchanger tube c o i l

T h i s t r a n s f e r s t h e heat t o
f o r t h e LNG i s l o c a t e d i n t h e annular space between t h e w e i r and t h e downcomer, t h e LNG and vaporizes i t . The vaporizers consume f u e l gas e q u i v a l e n t t o 1.5 t o 2% o f t h e LNG vaporized. The i n l e t piping, a l l p i p i n g i n s i d e t h e vaporizers t h a t comes i n c o n t a c t w i t h t h e LNG, and t h e o u t l e t p i p i n g t o t h e f i r s t f l a n g e a r e a l l s t a i n l e s s s t e e l c o n s t r u c t i o n on both t h e seawater and t h e g a s - f i r e d vaporizers. r e l e a s e t h a t might occur. 5.1.5 Safety Systems An independent containment d i k e i s included i n t h e seawater vapori.zer area t o c o n t a i n any LNG
The p l a n t Emergency Shutdown (ESD) sys tern has t h r e e separate c i r c u i t s : t h e Master Emergency Shutdown (MES) , t h e Vaporizer Emergency Shutdown (VES) , and t h e Offshore Emergency Shutdown (OES) These systems automati c a l l y shut down
and i s o l a t e p o r t i o n s o f t h e f a c i l i t y or, i n the case o f t h e MES, t h e whole f a c i l i t y .

I t takes about 30 seconds t o shut down t h e p l a n t , once t h e ESD i s a c t i v a t e d .
The
shutdown systems a r e a c t i v a t e d by detectors l o c a t e d throughout t h e p l a n t , by 1 i m i t s on c e r t a i n process c o n t r o l variables, o r by the p l a n t operators. Combus t i b l e gas detectors, UV f 1ame detectors, and temperature sensors a r e l o c a t e d throughout t h e p l a n t area. c o n t r o l room. These detectors a c t i v a t e alarms t h a t i n d i c a t e t h e exact l o c a t i o n o f a s p i l l o r f i r e on a graphic panel i n t h e
The f i r e control system consists of fixed and portable dry chemical extinguishers, high-expansion foam systems, and a f i r e water system. 5.2
SYSTEbI LEVEL ANALYSIS
The purpose of the system level analysis i s t o identify those sections of the import terminal t h a t a r e most c r i t i c a l w i t h respect t o release prevention and control. The evaluation of each system i s based largely on two f a c t o r s : 1 ) the quantity of a potential release of hazardous material due t o e i t h e r the inventory o r the flow r a t e and 2 ) an estimate of the r e l a t i v e probability of a release (low, medium, high). Process operation conditions f o r a l l sections of the import terminal, i ncl udi ng flow r a t e s , temperatures, pressures, and p i pel i ne s i z e s , a r e presented in Table 5.1. 5.2.1 Marine Ternii nal and Unloading Sys tem
The primary hazards involved i n hand1 i n g LNG a t a marine terminal a r e the flammability of the gas and the cold temperature of the liquid. There a r e two primary methods by which LNG or natural gas can be released from the unloading system: 1eak or rupture in valves, pipes, f i t t i n g s , loading and t r a n s f e r arms, etc. pressure re1 ief valve discharges from t r a n s f e r 1ines.
A containment system i s located under the unloading platform t o c o l l e c t a l l s p i l l s from the loading arms. Drain valves a r e included i n the t r a n s f e r 1 ine so i t can be drained into the containment system under the dock. Any release of LNG between the terminal and shore would f a l l into the ocean. A containment b a r r i e r follows the ship unloading 1 ine from shore t o the storage tanks. Because of the s i z e of the t r a n s f e r l i n e and the associated h i g h flow r a t e s , a single leak o r break can r e s u l t i n a large s p i l l . The maximum r e l e a s e in the marine terminal area i s approximately 960,000 gallons f o r a large rupture of the 42-in. t r a n s f e r l i n e . The probability of this release is estimated t o be low.
TABLE 5.1
System Marine Terminal and Unloading System Component 42-in. LNG Transfer L i n e 4 - i n . LNG R e c i r c u l a t i o n Line 16-in. Vapor Return L i n e Storage Sendout Pumps Storage Tank Primary In-Tank Pumps 20-in. Tank O u t l e t L i n e Secondary Pumps 24- i n Secondary Pump Sendout L i n e Vaporization System Seawater Vaporizers Submerged Combustion Vaporizers Compressors B o i l o f f Compressor Fuel Gas Compressor P i p e l i n e Compressor
-
System C a p a c i t i e s and Flow Rates

Flow Rate In 53,000 gpm 1,500 gpm 16 ~ M s c f d ' ~ ) 53,000 gpm 4,000 gpm 4,000 gpm 8,550 gpnl 8,550 gpm 4,700 gpm 3,850 gpm Out-53,000 gpm 1,500 gpm 16 ~ M s c f d ' ~ ) 4,000 gpm 4,000 gpm 4,000 gpm 8,550 gpm 8,550 gpm 550 MMscfd 450 MMscfd
Number o f Components 1 1 1 2 2/Tank l/Tank 10 1 5 4
-Operang-Condi t i o n s Pressure $ & Temperature

100 60 10 0.8 60 60 1,280 1,280 1,300 1,300 -258 -258 -152 -258 -258 -258 -252 -252 -252 t o 30 -252 t o 30
( F : I
( a ) Flow r a t e d u r i n g unloading operations.
5.2,2
Storage System
LNG i s the only hazardous material stored a t the terminal.
LNG i s hazar-
dous because of the cryogenic storage temperatures and the flarnmabil i ty of the vapor. There a r e three primary methods of release i n the storage area: storage tank f a i l u r e leak o r rupture from i n l e t o r o u t l e t p i p i n g , flanges, valves, f i t t i n g s , etc. atmospheric discharge from a r e l i e f valve. The inner container of the LNG storage tanks i s constructed of 9% nickel s t e e l , s u i t a b l e f o r operating a t cryogenic temperatures. The outer tank i s constructed of carbon s t e e l and i s susceptible t o f r a c t u r e i f contacted with any LNG or cold vapors. Thus, f a i l u r e of the inner tank would probably lead t o f a i l u r e of the outer tank. Each LNG storage tank i s surrounded by an insulated concrete dike wall t o contain any s p i l l s of LNG from the tank. Each tank has pressure and vacuum r e l i e f valves t o protect against tank overpressure .and underpressure. An auxiliary gas supply system a l s o protects t h e tanks from underpressure. Activation of the Master Emergency Shutdown (MES) automatically stops a l l flows i n t o and out of the tanks and i s o l a t e s them from the r e s t of the plant. The probability of a gross f a i l u r e of a storage tank i s estimated t o be low. 5.2.3 Compressors and Sendout Pumps
The hazards involved with operation of t h i s equipment a r e the cold temperat u r e of LNG, the flammability of the LNG vapor, and the high pressure a t which some of the components operate. There a r e two general means by which LNG o r vapor can be released from these systems: f a i l u r e of piping, valves, f i t t i n g s , e t c . f a i l u r e of the compressors or pumps.
E i t h e r t h e Master Emergency Shutdown (MES) o r t h e Vapor Emergency Shutdown (VES), when a c t i v a t e d , s t o p s t h e LNG sendout pun~ps and i s o l a t e s them f r o m t h e s t o r a g e t a n k and t h e v a p o r i z e r s . sys tem. The secondary pumps a r e l o c a t e d i n t h e i r own d i k e d area which has a d r y chemical f i r e extinguishment system and a high-expansion foam system. The maximum s p i l l i n t h i s area o f t h e p l a n t i s approximately 23,000 g a l l o n s , assuming t h e MES i s a c t i v a t e d p r o m p t l y and f u n c t i o n s as designed.
i t y o f t h i s r e l e a s e i s e s t i m a t e d t c be low t o medium.
The MES a l s o shuts down and i s o l a t e s t h e compressor
The p r o b a b i l - .
The s p i l l c o u l d be as
l a r g e as 100,000 g a l l o n s i f t h e system has t o be s h u t down manually.
5.2.4
V a p o r i z a t i o n System V a p o r - i z a t i o n occurs i n two types o f v a p o r i z e r s : falling-film, open-rack, The gas-
seawater v a p o r i z e r s and g a s - f i r e d , submerged combustion v a p o r i z e r s . f i r e d peaking v a p o r i z e r s o p e r a t e approximately 30 days/yr. Primary methods f o r LNG and vapor r e l e a s e i n c l u d e :
l e a k o r r u p t u r e f r o m i n l e t and o u t l e t p i p i n g , valves, f l a n g e s , f i t t i n g s , etc.

e
1 eaks f r o m v a p o r i z e r h e a t t r a n s f e r t u b i n g o r c o i l s .
A containment d i k e surrounds t h e v a p o r i z e r area t o c o n t a i n any s p i l l s t h a t

m i g h t occur t h e r e . Both t h e seawater v a p o r i z e r s and t h e submerged combustion v a p o r i z e r s a r e connected t o t h e V a p o r i z e r Emergency Shutdown (VES) c i r c u i t . When a c t i v a t e d , t h i s system shuts down t h e f e e d pumps t o t h e v a p o r i z e r s , i s o l a t e s t h e v a p o r i z e r s from t h e r e s t o f t h e p l a n t , and v e n t s a l l gas hand1 i n g equipment t o t h e v e n t header. flow, The VES i s a u t o m a t i c a l l y a c t i v a t e d by t h e l o s s o f seawater I t can a l s o be a c t i v a t e d manually f r o m t h e v a p o r i z e r A c t i v a t i o n o f t h e MES a u t o m a t i c a l l y a c t i v a t e s t h e by h i g h w a t e r temperature, by low o u t l e t gas temperature, and by UV f l a m e
d e t e c t o r s i n t h e area. VES.
area and t h e c o n t r o l room.
The maximum r e l e a s e i n t h i s area would probably r e s u l t f r o m a f a i l u r e o f t h e 24-in. 1 i q u i d t r a n s f e r 1 i n e f r o m t h e secondary pumps t o t h e v a p o r i z e r s .
r e l e a s e o f 100,000 g a l o f LNG i s e s t i m a t e d as t h e maximum s p i l l s i z e t h a t can
occur from this area. T h i s assumes the YES i s not activated o r f a i l s t o function properly. If the VES operates a s designed, the s p i l l would be 1imi ted t o 23,000 gallons. The probability of t h i s release is estimated t o be low t o medium. In the event of l o s s of seawater o r fuel gas, f a i l u r e of t h e V S can E a l s o r e s u l t i n f a i l u r e of the vaporizer o u t l e t l i n e s . (The cold LNG could contact the carbon steel o u t l e t 1ines and cause them t o crack.) 5.3 COMPONENT LEVEL ANALYSIS The system level analysis indicates t h a t , a1 though the l a r g e s t potential releases are from the unloading and storage systems, s i g n i f i c a n t releases could s come from any of the four systems a t the import terminal. A a r e s u l t , a component level analysis i s presented f o r a l l four systems. The component level analysis consists of a preliminary hazards analysis (PHA). The PHAs f o r the major components i n each of the import terminal systems a r e presented in tabular form i n the following subsections. Each PHA includes potential hazards, e f f e c t s , and e x i s t i n g preventive and control measures. I t i s important to note t h a t some of the releases presented i n t h i s section require f a i l u r e of more than one component. For example, a l i n e rupture could occur from a heat leak resulting i n a pressure buildup and a r e l i e f valve f a i l u r e . 5.3.1 Marine Terminal and Unloading System
The unloading system may be the most c r i t i c a l system a t the terminal. Extremely high flow r a t e s , combined w i t h natural forces such a s large waves, winds, earthquakes, e t c . , make t h i s system a major concern. The PHA f o r t h e unloading system is given i n Table 5.2. The following components a r e judged t o be the most important w i t h respect t o release prevention and control:
a
This l i n e includes various valves, expansion j o i n t s , and other f i t t i n g s . A leak o r rupture i n this l i n e could r e s u l t i n a large s p i l l . The probability of a t r a n s f e r l i n e rupture is estimated t o be low.
The 42-in. Main Transfer Line.
TABLE 5.2. Preliminary Hazards Analysis for the Marine Terminal and Unl oadi ng Sys tern
Component 16-in. loading arni P o t e n t i a1 Hazard C o n d i t i o n F i s s u r e o r break Effect
LNG r e l e a s e
Existing Preventive and C o n t r o l Measures A s p i l l containment system i s p r o v i d e d under t l i e l o a d i n g arms C l o s i n g o f a p p r o p r i a t e 1oading arm b l o c k v a l v e LNG remaining i n l i n e i s d r a i n e d
24-in. p i p e p r i o r t o air-operated valve
LNG surge
Possible increase i n pressure LNG r e l e a s e
R e g u l a t i o n o f s h i p ' s pumps, r e l e a s e through pressure r e l i e f valve i n 24-in. l i n e A s p i l l containment system i s prov i d e d under t h e l o a d i n g arms Closing o f appropriate loading arm b l o c k v a l v e LNG'remaining i n l i n e i s d r a i n e d
F i s s u r e o r break
16-in. l o a d i n g arm 24-in. p i p e directly after a i r-operated valve 42-in. l i q u i d header Air-operated valve
Bad f l a n g e connection with ship F i s s u r e o r break
LNG r e l e a s e i n t o water LNG r e l e a s e
Shutdown o f pumps A c t i v a t i o n o f OES system unless t h e r e a r e v a l v e s i n t h e 1i q u i d header t o i s o l a t e each 2 4 - i n . l i n e from each o t h e r Drainage o f LNG remaining i n t h e lines OES system a c t i v a t e d Drainage o f LNG remaining i n t h e lines A c t i v a t i o n o f OES system Closing o f appropriate valves t o i s o l a t e problem i f n o t i n main l i q u i d header Pressure b u i l d u p re1 eased through pressure s a f e t y v a l v e Drainage o f LNG i n 1 i n e
F i s s u r e o r break F a i l u r e t o c l o s e i f break occurs i n t h e l i n e
LNG r e l e a s e LNG r e l e a s e and unable t o i s o l a t e 24-in. l i n e and l o a d i n g arms LNG r e l e a s e LNG f l o w i s backed up o r stopped
Rupture Unloading 1 i n e s Blockage o r r e s t r i c t i o n of line
42-in. l i q u i d t r a n s f e r 1 ine 16-in. vapor r e t u r n 1i n e
F i s s u r e o r break F i s s u r e o r break d u r i n g r e c y c l e t o cool down 1 .ines F i s s u r e o r break d u r i n g vapor r e t u r n Increased vapor r e t u r n flow rate
LNG r e l e a s e LNG r e l e a s e
A c t i v a t i o n o f OES system Remaining LNG i s d r a i n e d OES system i s a c t i v a t e d , d r a i n LNG I s o l a t i o n o f damage by c l o s i n g appropriate block valves A c t i v a t e OES system A c t i v a t i o n o f t h e i n l i n e pressure safety valve A c t i v a t i o n o f OES system Release o f l o a d i n g arms from s h i p A c t i v a t i o n o f OES system
LNG vapor r e l e a s e
Pressure b u i l d u p No vapor r e t u r n t o s h i p
Vent gas compressor LNG t a n k e r
F a i l u r e t o operate(al1) Any hazardous c o n d i t i o n
Marine t r e s t l e
Large winds o r earthquake
Possible collapse o f trestle
A c t i v a t i o n o f MES system
TABLE 5.2.
Component 4-in. recirculation line during r e c i rculation Potential Hazard C o n d i t i o n F i s s u r e o r break
(Contd)
Effect Existing Preventive and C o n t r o l Measures I s o l a t i o n o f damage by c l o s i n g appropriate valves
LNG r e l e a s e
Shutdown o f p r i m a r y pumos Drainage o f LNG i n l i n e s Valves i n dock d r a i n 1i n e s Rupture o r l e a k F a i l u r e t o open Failure t o close
9% n i c k e l s t e e l inner barrier
LNG r e l e a s e t o dock d r a i n C a n ' t d r a i n l o a d i n g arms LNG r e l e a s e t o dock d r a i n LNG leakage i n t o annular space Possible collapse o f exterior barrier
A c t i v a t i o n o f OES system
A c t i v a t i o n o f OES system A c t i v a t i o n o f MES system LNG s p i l l can be c o n t a i n e d by an i n s u l a t e d concrete d i k e capable o f h o l d i n g 133% o f tank c a p a c i t y B o i l o f f compressors hand1e s m a l l e r amounts o f pressure buildup B u i l d u p i n b o i l o f f l i n e can be handled by t h e v e n t s t a c k header Pressure r e l i e f valves d i s charge vapor t o t h e atmosphere i n t h e case o f an excessive pressure b u i l d u p
Insulation
Excessive h e a t l e a k
Pressure b u i l d u p
Carbon s t e e l outer barrier
Heat l e a k c o u l d c r a c k and c o l l a p s e t h e tank Pressure g r a d i e n t from i n n e r tank t o annulus due t o vapor r e l e a s e o f annulus
LNG s p i l l contained by i n s u l a t e d concrete d i k e Pressure g r a d i e n t e q u i l i b r a t e d by t h e vapor r e t u r n l i n e
E l e c t r i c a l heater f o r s t o r a g e tank
F a i l u r e t o operate
Possible s o i l freezing resulting i n frost heaving, s t o r a g e tank c o l l a p s e , LNG s p i l l , possible dike collapse Unable t o r e t u r n vapor t o t h e s t o r a g e tank, p o s s i b l e underpressurization
Vent gas compressor F a i l u r e t o operate ( a l l o f them, no backup a v a i l a b l e )
I f t h e pressure drops below 0.15 p s i g , a backup gas system s u p p l i e s n a t u r a l gas f r o m t h e transmission p i p e l i n e t o the s t o r a g e tank I f t h e pressure reaches 0.031 psig, t h r e e 1 2 - i n . vacuum r e l i e f v a l v e s open t o t h e atmosphere
Fails t o turn o f f
Overpressurization
I f pressure reaches 1.5 psig, t h r e e 12-in. presure valves open t o t h e atmosphere
Pressure and vacuum s a f e t y v a l v e s a r e f r e q u e n t l y checked t o ensure operation Storage tank and dike O f f s h o r e Emergency Shutdown Large earthquake ( 7 on R i c h t e r s c a l e ) F a i l s t o a c t i v a t e upon demand Large LNG s p i l l The unloading system would Operator d e t e c t s m a l f u n c t i o n n o t s h u t down automatiand responds c a l l y ~ n an emergency
Loading Arms and Ship Coupling Mechanism. The a b i l i t y of the loading arms t o maintain t h e i r mobi 1 i ty i s a primary concern. Redundant sensing devices on each arm detect excessive motion and automatically a c t i v a t e the Offshore Emergency Shutdown (OES) system. The thermal s t r e s s e s the arms undergo as they a r e repeatedly warmed and cooled are of major concern. A good arm-to-ship connection i s a1 so important. The probabil i t y of a loading arm f a i l u r e i s estimated t o be low. The Offshore Emergency Shutdown (OES) System. When operating properly, t h i s system can l i m i t and control the amount of release t h a t can occur. However, i f t h i s system does not operate properly and a manual shutdown i s necessary, the amount of LNG released can increase s i g n i f i c a n t l y .
5.3.2
Storage System Components of primary
Table 5.3 shows the PHA f o r the storage system. concern, as i d e n t i f i e d by the PHA, are:
Pressure Control System. This system includes the boiloff compressors, the pressure/vacuum re1 i ef val ves, and pressure control 1e r s and indicators on i n l e t and o u t l e t 1ines. The probability of f a i l u r e f o r these types of components i s estimated to be medium. These components sound an alarm in the control room and a c t i v a t e the Master Emergency Shutdown system t o prevent o v e r f i l l i n g the storage tank. The f a i l u r e of level indicators and alarms i s estimated t o have a medium probability.
e
LNG Level Indicators and Alarms.
Outer She1 1 . This carbon s t e e l shel 1 protects the inner. shel 1 and i nsul ation from the environment and surroundings. The probability of a f a i l u r e of the outer shell i s estimated t o be low. Annular Space Insulation. This prevents excessive boiloff of LNG vapors. The insulation a l s o protects the carbon steel outer tank from being exposed t o the cryogenic temperature of t h e LNG. The l o s s of insulation e f f e c t i v e ness i s estimated t o have a low p,robabi 1i t y . Inner Shell. This 9% nickel-steel i s continually exposed t o cryogenic temperatures. Thus, any f a i l u r e of t h i s tank could r e s u l t i n a complete
TABLE 5.3.
Component Roof-shell j o i n t Primary sendout Pump
P r e l i m i n a r y Hazards A n a l y s i s f o r t h e Storqge System

Potenti a1 Hazard Condition Effect Large vapor release Unable t o t r a n s f e r LNG t o vaporizers Unable t o t r a n s f e r LNG t o vaporizers Operations are continued a t a slower r a t e u n t i l a second pump can be a c t i v a t e d A1 1 1oadi ng operations stopped Shutdown o f applicable pump and a c t i v a t i o n o f standby pump A c t i v a t i o n o f backup pump E x i s t i n g Preventive and Control Measures
F a i l u r e from overpressurization or fatigue F a i l u r e t o operate (one)
Leak o r rupture Suction and d i s charge valves i n primary pumps 30-i n. vapor r e t u r n li n e Rupture
Decreases the discharge rate Decrease i n sendout r a t e o f LNG
Fissure o r break
Release o f r e t u r n vapor t o storage tank
I s o l a t i o n o f the l i n e by c l o s i n g in-1 i n e block valves Shutdown o f vent gas compressor Shutdown o f peaking vaporizers , i f i n operation
Regulation f a i l u r e o f vent gas compressor
Pressure bui ldup
Excess vapors t o vent stack header A c t i v a t e standby vent gas compressor A c t i v a t i o n o f MES system I s o l a t i o n o f the l i n e by shutdown o f primary pump and c l o s i n g o f o u t l e t l i n e block valve
36-in. b o i l o f f 1i n e Outlet l i n e o f storage tank prior to failsafe operated val ve
Fissure o r break Fissure o r break
LNG vapor release LNG release
Restriction i n the l i n e o r heat leak
Pressure buildup
Shutdown o f LNG pump Excess vapors o r LNG from pressure buildup vented t o atmosphere v i a pressure r e l i e f valve I s o l a t i o n o f the l i n e by c l o s i n g f a i l - s a f e valve i n o u t l e t l i n e
Upper o u t l e t 1i n e directly after f a i l -safe operat e d valves Lower o u t l e t l i n e directly after f a i l - s a f e operated valves
Fissure o r b r e a ~
LNG release
I s o l a t e l i n e by s h u t t i n g down appropriate pump and c l o s i n g approp r i a t e val ves I s o l a t e l i n e by s h u t t i n g down appropriate pump and c l o s i n g appropriate valves
Fissure o r break
LNG release
TABLE Component Upper o r lower outlet lines after initial fail-safe operated valves Potential Hazard Condition Line r e s t r i c t i o n or heat leak
5.3 (Contd)
Effect Existing Preventive and Control Measures Shutdown of appropriate pump Isolation of l i n e by closing appropriate valves Excess vapors or LNG to atmosphere via pressure re1 ief valve Isolate 1ine by closing appropriate valves Shutdown of primary pumps f o r appropriate tank Isolate l i n e by closing appropriate valves Shutdown of primary pumps f o r appropriate tank Excess vapors o r LNG to atmosphere via pressure re1 ief valve Activation of MS system E Activation of MS system E Excess vapors or LNG to atmosvia pressure r e l i e f valve Activation of MS system E Isolation of damage by closing appropriate block valves Activation of MS system E Excess vapor o r liquid to a t m s phere Isolation of recirculation 1ine by closing appropriate block valves Isolation of l i n e by closing appropriate block valves Excess liquid to drain
Pressure buildup
Storage tank main outlet line
Fissure or break
LNG release
Restriction o r heat leak
Pressure bui 1dup
20-in. sendout l i n e Fissure o r break LNG r e s t r i c t i o n or heat leak
LNG release Pressure buildup
4-in. recirc. l i n e Fissure or break prior to f a i l safe operated valve Line restriction o r heat leak 4-in. recirc. l i n e Fissure or break after fail-safe valve Line r e s t r i c t i o n o r heat leak Outlet and sendout lines f a i l safe control valves
LNG release
Pressure bui 1dup
LNG release
Pressure buildup
Failure of valves to operate Open Unable to pump out LNG Unable to pump out LNG Unable to pump out LNG Shutdown of appropriate pump, operations a r e slowed down until malfunction i s rectified Shutdown of pumps unless recirculating the LNG in the tank o r transferring i t to another tank
TABLE 5.3.
Component Pressure c o n t r o l v a l v e s i n vapor r e t u r n 1i n e s Storage t a n k 1o a d i ng v a l ves Loading 1 ine between 1oading v a l v e s and t a n k inlet Potential Hazard C o n d i t i o n F a i l u r e t o open
(Contdl
Effect Existing Preventive and C o n t r o l Measures
Unable t o r e t u r n vapor Vapor f r o m gas p i p e 1 i n e f r o m t h e v e n t gas compres- r e t u r n e d t o s t o r a g e t a n k sor Unable t o t r a n s f e r LNG t o the storage tank from the ship LNG s p i l l o r p r e s s u r e b u i 1dup A c t i v a t i o n o f OES system
F a i l u r e t o open
F i s s u r e , break, o r heat leak
Closing o f loading valves A c t i v a t i o n o f OES system Excessive p r e s s u r e b u i l d u p i n t a n k due t o h e a t l e a k handled by b o i l o f f o r p r e s s u r e safety valve
Pressure o r vacuum F a i l u r e t o open a t safety valves appropriate pressures R e l i e f valve vent nozzle F a i l u r e t o open d u r i n g purging
Pressure b u i l d u p o r vacuum Possible tank f a i l u r e Pressure b u i l d u p f r o m incoming N2 gas A c t i v a t e s YES system Can be r e l e a s e d f r o m b o i l o f f 1i n e Close b l o c k v a l v e t o v e n t gas compressor Vent gas t o v e n t s t a c k header
36-in. vapor o u t l e t F i s s u r e o r break line T r a i l e r unloading 1i n e Emergency Shutdown Systenl F i s s u r e o r break F a i 1u r e t o a c t i v a t e upon demand
LNG vapor r e l e a s e
D i s c o n t i n u e f l o w o f heated gas Vent vapor t o v e n t s t a c k header
N2 purge gas l e a k Flows i n t o and o u t o f t h e t a n k s would n o t be stopped a u t o m a t i c a l 1y i n an emergency
I s o l a t i o n o f damaged s i t e by closing appropriate block valves Operator d e t e c t s m a l f u n c t i o n and responds
storage system f a i l u r e and the release of large q u a n t i t i e s of LNG and natural gas. The probabil-it; of such a f a i l u r e i s estimated t o be low.
5.3.3
Compressors and Secondary Pumps
The r e s u l t s of the preliminary hazards analysis of the pumps and compressors a r e presented i n Table 5.4. Because of the high pressures and large flow r a t e s , a pipe f a i l u r e in these areas can r e s u l t in a large release and could spray cold liquid o r vapor, resulting in f a i l u r e of carbon s t e e l components in the area. Components of primary concern with respect t o release prevention and control a r e : Emergency Shutdown System. Proper operation of the ESD system can prevent o r s i g n i f i c a n t l y reduce the s i z e of releases in the vaporizer area. Secondary Pumps and 24-in. Sendout Line t o Vaporizers. This system not only accommodates a large LNG flow r a t e , b u t operates a t a very h i g h pressure (1280 p s i g ) . A 1eak could spray LNG and possibly cause f a i l u r e of some other component. The probabil i ty of a rupture of the sendout l i n e i s estimated t o be low. Fuel Gas Preheater. Failure of the fuel gas preheater o r temperature cont r o l l e r s could allow cold LNG o r vapors t o reach carbon-steel components, resulting in the release of LNG o r vapor. The probability of a preheater f a i l i n g i s estimated t o be medium.
5.3.4
Vaporization System
Table 5.5 presents the PHA f o r the vaporization system. Primary components of concern related t o release prevention and control include: Temperature Controllers and Alarms. These a r e probably the most important components related t o release prevention and control i n this system. The temperature c o n t r o l l e r s monitor the vaporized LNG temperature and a d j u s t the incoming LNG flow r a t e s , the seawater i n l e t r a t e i n the seawater vapori z e r s , and the a i r l f u e l r a t e s and r a t i o s in the gas-fired vaporizers. Any malfunction of these c o n t r o l l e r s could r e s u l t in a hazardous s i t u a t i o n , poss i b l y causing the release of s i g n i f i c a n t q u a n t i t i e s of LNG o r LNG vapor. The probabi 1i t y of a temperature control 1e r f a i l i n g i s estimated t o be medi um.
TABLE 5.4.
P r e l i m i n a r y Hazards A n a l y s i s f o r t h e Compressors and Secondary Pumps

Potential Hazard Condition Fissure, break, o r heat leak Effect LNG l e a k o r pressure buildup E x i s t i n g Preventive and Control Measures A c t i v a t i o n o f VES system Excessive pressure- can be re1 ieved t o the atmosphere through pressure r e 1 i e f valves S p i l l contained by concrete dike A c t i v a t i o n o f backup pump I s o l a t e pumps and associated l i n e s by c l o s i n g appropriate valves A c t i v a t i o n o f backup pump A c t i v a t i o n o f VES system I s o l a t i o n o f pump and assoclated p i p i n g by c l o s i n g approp r i a t e valves A c t i v a t i o n o f standby pump S p i l l contained by concrete d i k e I s o l a t i o n o f pump and associated l i n e s by c l o s i n g approp r i a t e block valves I s o l a t i o n o f pump by c l o s i n g appropriate block valves S p i l l contained by concrete d i k e A c t i v a t i o n o f standby pump Excessive pressure buildup can be r e 1 ieved t o atmosphere through a pressure re1 i e f valve A c t i v a t i o n o f VES system Excessive pressure buildup can be r e l i e v e d t o atmosphere v i a a pressure re1 i e f valve S p i l l contained by concrete d i k e A c t i v a t i o n o f standby pump Shutdown o f appropriate pump by c l o s i n g o f block valves t o and from pump Regulate primary pumps from storage tank Closing o f appropriate i n l e t and out1 e t pump block valves A c t i v a t i o n o f standby pump
Component 36-in. secondary Pump
Secondary pump
F a i l u r e t o operate (one) More than one
Rate o f LNG sendout i s decreased Rate o f LNG sendout i s decreased
A l l o f them Leak o r r u p t u r e i n pump
LNG sendout i s stopped completely Reduces LNG f l o w r a t e
Suction and d i s charge valves
Leak, rupture, o r f a i l u r e t o operate prop e r l y (won't open o r close) Fissure, break, o r heat leak
Reduces loading r a t e LNG release
L i ne between b l o c k v a l v e and Pump
LNG s p i l l o r pressure buildup due t o heat leak
L i n e between block valve and 36-in. feed 1 i n e
Fissure, break, o r heat leak
LNG s p i l l o r pressure buildup due t o heat l e a k
O u t l e t valve from Pump
F a i l t o open (1 o f 9)
Unable t o send o u t LNG from pump
(more than one)
LNG sendout r a t e i s decreased
TABLE 5.4.
Potential Hazard C o n d i t i o n
I f a l l valves f a i l t o open
(Contd)
Effect E x i s t i n g Preventive and Control Measures A c t i v a t i o n o f VES system Excessive pressure b u l l dup can be r e l i e v e d t o atmosphere v i a pressure r e l i e f valve
Co~~~l~onent
Complete blockage o f LNG f l o w t o vaport zers
Liquid return valves from secondary pumps
F a i l t o open ( a l l valves)
Unable t o r e t u r n LNG t o storage tanks Unable t o r e t u r n LNG t o storage tanks Unable t o r e t u r n LNG t o storage tanks LNG r e l e a s e
R e c i r c u l a t e LNG t o tank v i a o u t l e t l i n e s from tank o r from one tank t o t h e o t h e r i f needed A c t i v a t e backup pump and can r e c i r c u l a t e LNG from o u t l e t l i n e i f needed Shutdown o f t h a t pump, a c t i v a t e backup pump A c t i v a t i o n o f VES system S p i l l contained by concrete dike
(More than one)
One Secondary o u t l e t l i n e #13 F i s s u r e o r break
LNG pumpout surge
Pressure b u i l d u p
Excessive pressure can be r e l i e v e d t o atmosphere v i a pressure re1 i e f v a l v e Regulation o f l i q u i d r e t u r n by PIC valve i n LNG sendout l i n e 113 t o re1 i e v e excessive f l o w rates
Heat l e a k
Pressure b u i i d u p
A c t i v a t i o n o f VES system Excessive pressures can be r e l i e v e d v i a t h e pressure r e l i e f valve
Ir~let valve t o secondary pumps on 20-in. sendout 1 i n e 4-in. c i r c u l a t i o n 1i n e
F a i 1u r e t o open
Unable t o pump LNG through m i n sendout line LNG r e c i r c u l a t i o n f l o w too great
Primary sendout pumps r e g u l a t e d t o maximize f l o w t o t h e secondary pumps v i a t h e 4 - i n . c i r c u l a t i o n 1i n e Flow r e g u l a t o r c o n t r o l l e r a d j u s t s v a l v e on 20-in. sendout l i n e t o increase t h e f l o w i n t h e sendout 1 i n e r e s u l t i n g i n a decreased f l o w i n the circulation l i n e Block valves from a l l pump o u t l e t s t o l i q u i d r e t u r n l i n e a r e closed Block valves from l i q u i d r e t u r n l i n e s t o storage tanks a r e c l o s e d LNG can be r e c i r c u l a t e d from one t a n k o r t h e o t h e r i f need be S p i l l contained by concrete d i k e
LNG surge
Liquid return l i n e #2
Fissure, break o r heat
1eak
LNG r e l e a s e o r pressure buildup
TABLE 5.4.
Component Vapor r e t u r n l i n e from secondary pumps t o main vapor r e t u r n l i n e #6 Potential Hazard Condition Fissure, break, o r heat leak
(Contd)
Effect E x i s t i n g Preventive and Control Measures Closing o f block valves from secondary pumps
Ifa pressure b u i l d u p e x i s t s , vapor can be vented v i a t h e r e l i e f vent stack header
LNG vapor release, o r pressure bui 1dup
Shutdown o f cooldown process Vapor Line #8 between vent compressor and pneumatic valve Fissure o r break LNG release Shutdown o f vent gas compressor Closing o f pressure c o n t r o l valve i n l i n e Shutdown o f a l l f u e l gas compressors and f u e l gas preheatcr Closing o f vapor r e t u r n block valves I s o l a t i o n o f vapor r e t u r n t o storage tank by c l o s i n g approp r i a t e val ves Vapor surge Pressure bui 1dup Shutdown o f compressors i f extreme pressure buildup and vapors t o vent stack header Excess vapors t o vent stack header only, i f pressure b u i l d up i s n o t too severe Vapor l i n e #8 between pneumatic valve and f u e l gas preheater Fissure o r break LNG vapor release I s o l a t i o n o f damage by c l o s i n g pneumatic valve and other approp r i a t e val ves Shutdown o f f u e l gas compressors and f u e l gas preheater Excess vapors t o vent stack header Vapor surge Extreme pressure bui 1dup S l i g h t pressure increase E-201 f u e l gas preheater F a i l u r e t o operate Unable t o heat vapor from vent gas compressor Excess vapors t o vent stack header Excess vapors t o vent stack header Shutdown o f f u e l gas compressors I s o l a t i o n o f f u e l gas compressor system by c l o s i n g appropriate valves Vent gas compressor r e g u l a t i o n f o r vapor r e t u r n o n l y C-202 f u e l gas com- F a i l u r e t o operate (one) pressor Unable t o compress LNG vapors Unable t o compress LNG vapors A c t i v a t i o n o f backup compressor without l o s s o f flow A c t i v a t i o n o f backup compressor Vent gas compressor i s regulated so as n o t t o pass more vapor than the system can handle
TABLE 5.4.
Component Potential Hazard Condition (three)
(Contd)
Effect E x i s t i n g Preventive and Control Measures I s o l a t i o n o f f u e l gas compressor and p i p e l i n e compressor system by c l o s i n g appropriate v a l v e Shutdown o f pipe1 i n e gas compressors and f u e l gas preheater Excess vapor e x i t s vent stack header
Unable t o compress LNG vapors
Vapor l i n e s 9, 10, and 11
Fissure o r break
LNG vapor o r re1 ease
I s o l a t i o n o f f u e l gas and pipe1i n e gas compressors by c l o s i n g a p p r o p r i a t e b l o c k valves Regulation o f vent gas compressors t o accommodate vapor r e t u r n header Excess b o i l o f f t o vent stack header
C- 203 p i pel ine compressors
F a i l u r e t o operate (one)
Unable t o compress vapors t o p i pel ine pressure Unable t o compress vapors t o pipe1 i n e pressure
A c t i v a t i o n o f backup compressor without loss o f flow A c t i v a t i o n o f backup compressor Regulation o f valves and vent gas compressor t o accomnodate f o r t h e decrease i n flow r a t e Excess gas vented v i a the vent stack header
( two
(three)
Unable t o compress vapors t o p i pel ine pressure
I s o l a t i o n o f f u e l gas t o pipe1 i n e gas compressor system by c l o s i n g a p p r o p r i a t e valves Shutdown o f f u e l gas compressors and preheater Regulation o f valves and vent gas compressor t o accommodate f o r vapor return only
Vapor 1 i n e #12
Fissure o r break
LNG vapor release
Vent gas t o vent stack header I s o l a t i o n o f f u e l gas and p i p e l i n e compressor system Shutdown o f f u e l gas compressor, p i p e l i n e compressor, and f u e l gas preheater Vent gas compressor accomnodates vapor r e t u r n o n l y Excess gas t o v e n t stack header
TABLE 5 - 5 .
Component LNG l i n e 13 f r o m secondary pumps Flow c o n t r o l box
P r e l i m i n a r y Hazards A n a l y s i s f o r t h e Y a p o r i z a t i o n System
Potential Hazard C o n d i t i o n Effect LNG s p i l l Unable t o c o n t r o l i n l e t f l o w o f LNG Unable t o know how much LNG i n l e t f l o w r a t e i s required Unable t o c o n t r o l seawater and LNG i n l e t flow rates Other f i n s w i l l c a r r y a faster load Water i n l e t r a t e slowed o r stopped E x i s t i n g Preventive and Control Measures A c t i v a t i o n o f MES and VES systems Automatic r e g u l a t i o n o f seawater inlet Shutdown and i s o l a t i o n o f approp r i a t e v a p o r i z e r by c l o s i n g b l o c k valves on i n l e t and o u t l e t LNG and seawater t r a n s f e r 1 i n e s C l o s i n g o f b l o c k valves t o prev e n t LNG and seawater i n l e t f l o w s t o i s o l a t e the vaporizer S?ow down LNG f l o w r a t e t o a1 1ow f o r the plug Is01 a t i o n o f v a p o r i z e r by c l o s i n g i n l e t and o u t l e t b l o c k v a l v e s
I f a pressure b u i l d u p occurs due t o i s o l a t i o n , pressure r e 1 i e f valves a r e a c t i v a t e d t o t h e v e n t s t a c k header i n t h e e x i t l i n e from the vaporizers Shutdown o f seawater v a p o r i z e r system I s o l a t i o n o f break by c l o s i n g a p p r o p r i a t e b l o c k valves
F i s s u r e o r break F a i l s t o r e g u l a t e LNG i n l e t valve F a i l s t o r e g i s t e r seawater i n l e t f l o w
F a i ls t o operate
Falling f i l m vaporizer f i n Seawater i n l e t line
Plugs F i s s u r e o r break
Seawater v a p o r i F i s s u r e o r break z e r i n l e t l i n e 13
LNG r e l e a s e
A c t i v a t e standby v a p o r i z e r s i f n o t a c t i v a t e d a1 ready Flow r a t e i s r e g u l a t e d t o accommodate t h e standby v a p o r i z e r s Shutdown o f peaking o r standby v a p o r i z e r system I s o l a t i o n o f break by c l o s i n g appropriate block valves Flow r a t e i s r e g u l a t e d t o accommodate f o r seawater o n l y LNG i n l e t l i n e 13 Increased o r r e s t r i c ted flow rate Compl e t e f a i 1u r e t o operate Pressure i n c r e a s e LNG can be r e l e a s e d t o t h e atmosphere i f excessive pressure occurs Flow r a t e s a r e r e g u l a t e d Is01a t i o n o f v a p o r j z e r Vapors vented t o v e n t s t a c k header i f needed d u r i n g i s o l a t i o n I s o l a t i o n o f v a p o r i z e r by c l o s i n g appropriate block valves
Peaking v a p o r i z e r i n l e t l i n e 13 d u r i n g peaking operations o r any t i m e i n use
LNG r e l e a s e
Master f l o w c o n t r o l box on peaking vaporiz e r LNG vapor e x i t 1i n e
Unable t o c o n t r o l f l o w r a t e s and temperatures
Vapor r e l e a s e and ternp e r a t u r e readings would drop
TABLE 5.5.
Component Air flow entrance 1ine Fuel gas entrance 1ine Potenti a1 Hazard Condition Fissure o r break Fissure o r break Fissure or break between valves Seawater i n l e t l i n e Fissure o r break Vapor l i n e prior Fissure o r break to check valve
(Contd)
Effect Existing Preventive and Control Measures Isolation of vaporizer by closing aporooriate block valves Isolation of vaporizer by closing appropriate block valves Isolation of damage by closing appropriate valves and u t i l i z i n g bypass 1ine via hand-operated valves Vaporizer is01 ation procedures Isolation of a l l open rack seawater vaporizers by closing appropriate block valves Excess vapors vented to vent stack header Activation of MES and V S systems E Activation of MS and V S systems E E Isolation of vaporizer by closing i n l e t and o u t l e t block valves Activation of MS and V S systems E E
Air needed for combustion would escane Fuel needed for combustion would esczpe Fuel needed for combustion would escape Drop in bath water 1eve1 LNG vapor discharge
30-in. l i n e a f t e r peaking vapori zers Odorant injection 1 ine Seawater return l i n e 16 Inlet l i n e to peaking vaporizer a f t e r air-operated valves Inlet 1ine to peaking vapori zer prior to val ves Air pump
Fissure o r break Fissure o r break Fissure o r break Fissure o r break
LNG vapor release
Unable to odori ze v a ~ o r i z e dgas Temperature gradient in return seawater LNG release
Fissure o r break
LNG release
Isolation of vaporizer by closing appropriate block valves Closing of seawater 1 i nes
Failure t o operate Fai 1ure t o operate
TRC in o u t l e t vapor 1 ine
Temperature recor- Failure to operate der in vaporizer outlet line Water.bath pump in peaking Failure to operate
Unable to obtain the combus t i bl e mixture of gases needed Unable to control flow of i n l e t a i r and fuel gas to regulate temperature of o u t l e t Unable to control gas outl e t temperature by seawater i n l e t flowrate Unable to cool burner
Regulation of i n l e t flow by a p ~ r o p r i a t evalve Shutdown of baseload vaporizer system by closing appropriate block valves to discontinue i n l e t and o u t l e t flow r a t e of LNG and seawater Shutdown of vaporizer Isolation of damaged vaporizer by closing appropriate valves
Vaporizer I n l e t Lines, A leak o r rupture i n any vaporizer i n l e t l i n e , releasing cold LNG, could possibly cause f a i l u r e of other components in the system t h a t a r e not designed t o withstand the extreme cold. Operator Interface Although the plant operators a r e n o t t r a d i t i o n a l l y viewed as plant components, they a r e essential t o t h e proper operation of the plant. The interface between operator actions and plant operations i s therefore a c r i t i c a l f a c t o r r e l a t i n g t o release prevention and control. Operators perform a number of diverse tasks a t the import terminal, most of which r e l a t e t o release prevention and control e i t h e r d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y . D u r i n g normal plant operations, the operators r u n the plant within s e t 1imi t s and standards t o prevent conditions t h a t may lead t o releases. During o f f standard conditions, the operators must respond appropriately t o alarms, indicators, and other signals t o prevent releases from occurring or t o l i m i t releases i n progress. Plant inspection and maintenance i s a l s o important t o identify and remedy conditions t h a t may lead t o subsequent releases. Because of the number of operator tasks performed a t the probability of operator e r r o r i s judged t o be medium t o high. of LNG or natural gas releases r e s u l t i n g from operator e r r o r s high probability of a small release t o a low probability of a
5.4
f a c i l i t y , the The probability varies from a maximum release.
Using the r e s u l t s of the analyses presented in Sections 5.2 and 5.3, a l i s t of potential release events considered t o be representative of the import terminal was developed. These representative release events a r e l i s t e d i n Table 5.6. Preliminary analyses of these events a r e presented i n Section G.3 of Appendix G. The representative release events range from r e l a t i v e l y f r e quent b u t low consequence releases t o unlikely b u t large releases. They form the basis f o r the q u a n t i t a t i v e evaluation of the release prevention and control systems i n the next phase of analysis. In performing t h e overview study, several areas requiring additional information were identified. Some of these a r e outlined below.
TABLE 5.6.
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Release Events f o r an LNG I m p o r t Terminal
F a i l u r e o f 9% n i c k e l - s t e e l i n n e r s t o r a g e t a n k . F a i l u r e o f carbon-steel o u t e r b a r r i e r f o r LNG s t o r a g e tank. LNG r e l e a s e from 1 6 - i n . l o a d i n g arms. F a i l u r e o f 4 2 - i n . l i q u i d t r a n s f e r l i n e f r o m u n l o a d i n g dock t o shore. F a i l u r e o f 42-in. l i q u i d t r a n s f e r l i n e from shore t o s t o r a g e .
F a i l u r e o f 20-in. LNG t r a n s f e r l i n e f r o m s t o r a g e t o t h e secondary pumps. F a i l u r e o f 24-in. LNG t r a n s f e r 1i n e from secondary pumps t o v a p o r i z e r s . Seawater v a p o r i z e r f a i l u r e . Submerged combustion v a p o r i z e r f a i l u r e . F a i 1u r e o f v a p o r i z e r e x i t 1 ines. F a i l u r e o f f u e l gas compressor s u c t i o n l i n e . Failure o f 4-in. LNG r e c i r c u l a t i o n l i n e .
F a i l u r e o f 1 6 - i n . vapor r e t u r n 1 i n e t o s h i p ' s tanks. F a i l u r e o f 3 0 - i n . vapor l i n e from p i p e l i n e compressors t o gas t r a n s m i s s i o n p i p e l ine.
Component Stresses from Thermal Cycl ing. Many components, such as the storage tanks, valves, unloading arms, and t r a n s f e r l i n e s , undergo a number of thermal cycles. Exactly how many cycles each component i s designed t o w i thstand needs t o be determined.
e
Terminal Piping Network. Details such as diameter, length, wall thickness, and materials of construction a r e needed f o r the components t h a t make up t h e terminal piping. Structural Mechanics of the Storage Tank. The e f f e c t of hazardous cond i t i o n s on the s t r u c t u r a l i n t e g r i t y of the tank i s of major importance. Such conditions include overpressure, o v e r f i l l i n g , and f i r e o r explosion i n the tank o r nearby. A more detailed description of the heatup and cooldown procedures i s necessary f o r a complete analysis t o be made.
More d e t a i l s on the temperature and flow control 1e r s a r e needed. Potential hazards and re1 ease prevention d e t a i l s r e l a t i v e t o these controls a r e also needed. Additional d e t a i l s on the s t a r t u p and shutdown procedures a r e required t o complete the analysis i n t h i s area. Failure Rate Data. The overview study of the import terminal considered release frequency i n a q u a l i t a t i v e manner. A more detailed study of the import terminal release prevention, detection, and control systems must c a r e f u l l y consider the 1 i kel i hood of the re1 ease i n i t i a t i n g event and the r e l i a b i l i t y of the r e l e a s e detection and control systems. Due t o the lack of operating experience a t LNG f a c i l i t i e s , l i t t l e data i s available f o r LNG equipment f a i l u r e r a t e s . Operator Interface. Re1 iabi 1i t y .information on operator tasks performed a t the f a c i l i t y i s needed.
LNG Vaporizer Process Control.
6.0
ASSESSMENT OF LNG PEAKSHAVING FACILITY
The overview s t u d y o f t h e r e f e r e n c e LNG peakshaving f a c i l i t y i s presented i n t h i s section. 6.1 SUMMARY SYSTEM DESCRIPTION The peakshaving f a c i l i i y overview study i s based on a r e f e r e n c e f a c i l it y designed t o d e l i v e r up t o 225 MMscfd o f gas t o t h e p i p e l i n e d u r i n g peak-demand periods. The p l a n t c o n s i s t s o f a 12.3-MMscfd gas t r e a t m e n t system, a 6.3-MMscfd s t o r a g e tank, a 225-MMscfd v a p o r i z a t i o n l i q u e f a c t i o n s e c t i o n , a 348,000-bbl
system, and a t r u c k t e r m i n a l capable o f s h i p p i n g o r r e c e i v i n g 350 gpm o f LNG. The major o p e r a t i o n s and t h e s a f e t y systems f o r t h e p l a n t a r e b r i e f l y d e s c r i b e d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g paragraphs. Gas Treatment System N a t u r a l gas f r o m t h e p i p e l i n e f i r s t e n t e r s a f i l t e r s e p a r a t o r t o remove any f r e e l i q u i d s . The 500-psia gas then passes through one o f two m o l e c u l a r Each adsorber i s capable A f t e r passing through t h e adsorber, The r e s t o f t h e gas i s used t o s i e v e adsorbers where m o i s t u r e and C02 a r e removed. o f h a n d l i n g up t o about 12 MMscfd o f gas. t h e gas i s f i l t e r e d t o remove d u s t . r e g e n e r a t e t h e o f f - l i n e adsorber. adsorber. i s r o u t e d as f e e d t o t h e l i q u e f a c t i o n u n i t . A d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n i s presented i n Appendix E.
About h a l f t h e t r e a t e d gas, $6 MMscfd, The r e g e n e r a t i o n gas i s f i r s t heated t o about
550F i n a g a s - f i r e d s a l t b a t h h e a t e r and i s then passed through t h e o f f - l i n e

Next, t h e r e g e n e r a t i o n gas i s f i l t e r e d t o remove dust, cooled i n a The gas i s f a n c o o l e r , and passed through a s e p a r a t o r t o remove f r e e l i q u i d s . c o o l e r t o under 120F, and then r e i n t r o d u c e d i n t o t h e p i p e l i n e . 6.1.2 L i q u e f a c t i o n System A f t e r treatment, t h e n a t u r a l gas i s cooled and l i q u e f i e d i n a mixed r e f r i g e r a n t c y c l e t o p r o v i d e LNG f o r storage. The l i q u e f a c t i o n u n i t i s comprised o f The a c o l d box, r e f r i g e r a n t compressor and c o o l e r s , and r e f r i g e r a n t storage. and i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n a l l enclosed i n an i n s u l a t e d s h e l l .
t h e n compressed back t o l i n e pressure (about 870 p s i a ) , cooled i n another f a n
c o l d box cons is t s o f heat exchangers, s e p a r a t o r vessel s , and a s s o c i a t e d p i p i n g
A l l c o l d box equipment
i s constructed o f s t a i n l e s s s t e e l , except f o r the heat exchanger t u b i n g which i s aluminum. The n a t u r a l gas feed e n t e r s the c o l d box a t about 500 p s i a and The l i q u e f i e d gas leaves t h e c o l d box a t about -260F passed through a s e r i e s of s i x heat exchangers where i t i s p r o g r e s s i v e l y cool1 until it i s liquefied. and about 475 p s i a . I t i s expanded t o s l i g h t l y above atmospheric pressure ( ~ ~ s i g )as i t i s introduced i n t o t h e storage tank. 1 The mixed r e f r i g e r a n t , which i s made up o f n i t r o g e n , methane, ethylene, propane, butane, and pentane, i s cooled and condensed i n stages and then expa ded t o p r o v i d e c o o l i n g i n t h e cold-box heat exchangers. f o r heat r e j e c t i o n . The r e f r i g e r a n t i s then recompressed by a two-stage compressor w i t h i n t e r and a f t e r f a n c o o l e r s The b o i l o f f gases from the LNG storage tank a l s o p r o v i d e c o o l i n g f o r t h e r e f r i g e r a n t i n t h r e e cold-box heat exchangers. 6.1.3 Storage System The LNG from t h e l i q u e f a c t i o n system i s s t o r e d i n a flat-bottomed, doubl
walled, aboveground storage tank w i t h a c a p a c i t y o f about 350,000 bbl ( ~ 1 4 . 6 m i l l i o n g a l l o n s ) . The i n n e r s h e l l o f t h e tank i s constructed o f an aluminummagnesium a l l o y t h a t has e x c e l l e n t low temperature d u c t i l i t y . o f t h e tank i s made o f carbon s t e e l . The tank dimensions are: 164 f t 173 f t 97 f t
134 f t .
The o u t e r she1
i n n e r tank diameter: o u t e r tank diameter: i n n e r tank h e i g h t : o u t e r tank h e i g h t :
The annular space between t h e i n n e r and o u t e r tank w a l l s i s f i l l e d w i t h expanded p e r l i t e i n s u l a t i o n , w i t h a r e s i l i e n t f i b e r g l a s s b l a n k e t a d j a c e n t t o t h e i n n e r w a l l t o p r o t e c t t h e p e r l i t e from excessive pressure due t o expansio and c o n t r a c t i o n o f t h e i n n e r tank w a l l . The c e i l i n g o f t h e i n n e r tank i s a metal deck suspended from t h e r o o f o f the o u t e r tank. spread evenly over t h e deck. dry. Perlite insulation i s Open p i p e vents a r e i n s t a l l e d i n t h e deck so
product vapor can c i r c u l a t e f r e e l y i n t h e i n s u l a t i o n space t o keep t h e i n s u l a The o u t e r tank r e s t s on a concrete r i n g w a l l foundation w h i l e t h e i n n e r r e s t s on load-bearing i n s u l a t i o n placed on t h e foundation s o i l
Electric res
tance h e a t i n g c o i l s prevent t h e s o i l underneath t h e tank from f r e e z i n g .
The storage tank i s designed t o operate a t 1.0 psig, w i t h a maximum design pressure of 2.0 psig. The maximum external design pressure is 1 oz gauge. Tank pressure i s controlled by adjusting the boiloff compressor recycle r a t e . The tank i s equipped with two pressure r e l i e f valves venting t o the atmosphere. In the event of an underpressure, gas from pipeline i s brought back i n t o the tank and, i f underpressure l i m i t s a r e s t i l l exceeded, two vacuum r e l i e f valves admit a i r t o the tank. In the event of an emergency, the tank is isolated by internal blockvalves on the i n l e t and o u t l e t liquid l i n e s . The liquid level i n t h e storage tank i s monitored by a servo-powered, di spl acer-type 1iquid 1eve1 device and a d i f f e r e n t i a l pressure gauge. Boiloff gases from the storage tank a r e heated, compressed t o pipeline pressure by one of two compressors, and cooled prior t o discharge t o the pipel i n e . Each compressor i s capable of handling 1.2 MMscfd of gas. The boiloff gas design r a t e i s about 0.6 MMscfd, w i t h an additional 0.3 MMscfd of f l a s h gas during liquefaction. During liquefaction, the boiloff and f l a s h gases a r e routed to the coldbox t o provide extra cooling, as described previously. 6.1.4 Va~orization Svstem
LNG i s pumped from the storage tank t o the vaporizers by three v e r t i c a l
submerged, pot-mounted pumps. W i t h one pump a s a spare, the t o t a l rated sendout capacity f o r two pumps i s about 150 MMscfd (1245 gpm) a t a discharge pressure of about 900 psia. The LNG i s vaporized in tube bundles submerged i n a heated water bath, a f t e r which the vaporized natural gas i s reintroduced i n t o the pipeline. The vaporizers, rated a t 75 MMscfd each, burn natural gas and bubble the r e s u l t i n g combustio? gases through a water bath t o heat the tube bundles and thus vaporize the LNG. With three vaporizers i n service and one held as a spare, t o t a l vaporization capacity of the plant i s 225 MMscfd. All vaporization equipment normal l y carrying LNG i s constructed of cryogenic materials, t o the f i r s t flange on the vaporizer o u t l e t . 6.1.5 rransportation and Transfer System
Specially designed truck t r a i l e r s can be used t o transport LNG both t o and from peakshaving f a c i l i t i e s . Truck transport i s mainly used t o supply LNG e i t h e r t o sate1 1i t e f a c i l i t i e s without 1iquefaction capabil i ty o r t o temporarily isolated
sections of pipeline. A peakshaving f a c i l i t y would l i k e l y receive LNG only when i t s liquefaction u n i t i s inoperative f o r an extended period of time. The type of truck t r a i l e r used f o r LNG transport c o n s i s t s of an inner vess e l of 5083 aluminum and an outer vessel of carbon s t e e l . The annular space i s f i l l e d with p e r l i t e and maintained a t a pressure of 50 microns t o i n s u l a t e the inner vessel. The inner vessel i s designed f o r a maximum working pressure of 70 psig b u t t y p i c a l l y operates a t only s l i g h t l y above atmospheric pressure. The numerous pressure re1 i e f valves on the 1iquid and vapor piping a1 1 exhaust t o a conmon elevated vent stack. Remotely operated shutoff valves a r e i n s t a l led i n the liquid l i n e s . The t r a i l e r has a capacity of about 10,500 gallons and weighs about 60,000 l b s when f u l l . The trucking terminal a t the peakshaving plant i s diked and trenched f o r spi 11 retention. Trucks a r e loaded and unloaded through 3-inch-diameter f l e x i ble metal hoses which connect d i r e c t l y t o s t a i n l e s s s t e e l pipes a t the terminal. The hoses a r e drained a f t e r each loadinglunloading prior t o disconnection. Small LNG sendout pumps a r e used t o load the t r a i l e r s ; pump capacity i s 350 gpm yielding a f i l l i n g time of about 112 hour. Boiloff vapors from loading the t r a i l e r a r e returned to the storage tank through a 2-inch vapor return l i n e . Weight scales and two overflow trycock valves indicate the l i q u i d level i n the trailer. Trucks can be unloaded by pumping b u t a r e more often emptied by using t h e vapor pressure above the l i q u i d . I f the vapor pressure i s i n s u f f i c i e n t f o r good t r a n s f e r , a small amount of LNG i s vaporized i n the pressure buildup c o i l and routed t o the top of t h e tank t o provide s u f f i c i e n t pressure. 6.1 .6 Safety Systems Combustible gas detectors, UV flame detectors, and temperature sensors a r e located throughout the plant area. In the event of off-standard conditions, these detectors a c t i v a t e alarms i n the control room. They can a l s o be s e t t o automatically a c t i v a t e the emergency shutdown system o r the f i r e control sys tern.
The emergency shutdown system has two c i r c u i t s : the Master Emergency S h u t down (MES) and the Vaporizer Emergency Shutdown (VES). The systems can be activated e i t h e r automatically by detector alarms or manually by the plant operators, and they take about 30 seconds to shut down the plant. Upon a c t i vation, the MES: de-energizes normal plant electrical c i r c u i t s , whi 1e leaving essential plant electrical equipment energized closes valves a t the plant boundaries to i s o l a t e the plant from the pipe1 ine isolates the LNG tank and dike area from the r e s t o f the plant s e t s a l l control valves in t h e i r f a i l s a f e positions vents gas from a l l gas-handling equipment and lines via the r e l i e f header t o the vent stack. The VES, when activated, shuts down the vaporizers and the LNG sendout pumps, isolates the vaporizers from both the pumps and the pipeline and also isolates the pumps from the LNG storage tank, and vents gas from a l l equipment and 1 ines to the vent stack. Both the MES and VES are energized by separate "Uninterruptable Power Supplies" which t r i p the shutdown systems i f they f a i l . The f i r e control system consists of fixed and portable dry chemical f i r e extinguishers, high-expansion foam systems, Halon f i r e extinguishing systems, and a fire-water system. Automatic venting and isolation systems help to prevent accumulations of flammable gas mixtures i n enclosed areas and f a c i l i t a t e extinguishment of any f i r e s . The LNG storage tank and sendout pumps share a s p i l l basin that drains into a diked impoundment basin. The dike walls average 17 f t in height. The impoundment basin i s capable of holding about 480,000 b b l , or 1.37 times the capacity of the storage tank. High-expansion foam generation systems installed in the s p i l l basin can be activated e i t h e r manually o r automatically. The trucking terminal i s diked and trenched and i s equipped with several dry chemical extinguishers. The s p i l l basin capacity i s greater than t h a t of a tank t r a i 1e r pl us the 1oadi ng/unl oadi ng transfer 1i nes .
6.2
The purpose of the system level analysis i s t o identify those sections of the peakshaving f a c i l i t y t h a t a r e the most c r i t i c a l with respect t o release prevention and control. The evaluation of each system i s based largely on two f a c t o r s : 1 ) the quantity of a potential release of hazardous material due t o e i t h e r the inventory or the flow r a t e and 2 ) an estimate of the r e l a t i v e probability of a release (low, medium, high). Process operating conditions, including capacities, f l o b ~r a t e s , temperat u r e s , and pressures, a r e presented in Table 6.1 f o r major components of the gas treatment, liquefaction, storage, vaporization, and transportation and t r a n s f e r systems.
TABLE 6.1 . System Process Operation Conditions
System Gas Treatment Liquefaction Storage Major Components Adsorbers Cold Box Storage Tank Sendout Pumps Boi l o f f Compressors Submerged Combustion Vaporizers Truck T r a i l e r Number o f Component Components Capacities 2 1 1 3 2 4 17,000 s c f Flow Rates In 12.3 MMscfd 6.3 W s c f d 6.3 MMscfd (50 gpm) 150 MMscfd (1245 gpin) 0.9 MMscfd 225 MMscfd (1810 gpm) 42 MMscfd (350 gpm) Out 12.3 MMscfd Operating Conditions Pressure Temperature 500 p s i a 485 p s i a 15.8 p s i a 900 p s i a 870 p s i a 900 p s i a 15 p s i a 68F -257 t o 106F -257OF -257F 120F -257 t o 70F -257F
-348,000 bbl
---10,500 gal
Vaporization Transportation and Transfer
6.3 MMscfd (50 g w ) 200 MMscfd (1660 gpm) 150 Mflscfd (1245 gpm) 0.9 MMscfd 225 MMscfd
42 m s c f d
6.2.1
Gas Treatment System
The primary hazard associated with the gas treatment system i s the flammability of the natural gas being handled. There a r e three primary methods of natural gas release from the system: adsorber vessel f a i l u r e leak or rupture in i n l e t or o u t l e t piping, flanges, valves, e t c . tube f a i l u r e in the regeneration gas heater. When activated, the Master Emergency Shutdown (MES) system i s o l a t e s the gas treatment system from both the pipeline and the r e s t of the plant (except
the liquefaction system), a f t e r which gas contained i n the system i s vented via the r e l i e f header t o the vent stack. However, assuming the MES f a i l s , i t could take u p t o about 10 minutes t o i s o l a t e the gas treatment system. Normal system flow during t h i s time would r e s u l t i n a release of 85,000 scf of gas. This coupled w i t h a system holdup of about 34,000 scf gives a maximum r e l e a s e of 119,000 scf of natural gas. The probability of t h i s r e l e a s e i s estimated t o be low t o medium.
6.2.2
Liquefaction System
The liquefaction system contains both natural gas and LNG. Besides the flammability hazard, there i s a l s o the hazard associated w i t h the cryogenic temperature of the LNG. The liquefaction system a l s o contains a mixed r e f r i g e r a n t w i t h hazards similar t o those of the LNG. The primary method by which LNG o r natural gas can be released from the system i s a leak o r rupture i n piping, flanges, valves, f i t t i n g s , e t c . The primary methods of r e f r i g e r a n t release are: leak o r rupture i n piping, flanges, valves, f i t t i n g s , e t c . f a i l u r e of separator vessel o r r e f r i g e r a n t compressor. When activated, the M S is01 a t e s the 1iquefaction system from the r e s t E of the plant except the gas treatment system. Thus, the maximum release of natural gas and LNG from the liquefaction system i s the same a s t h a t from the gas treatment system, 119,000 s c f . The probability of this r e l e a s e i s e s t i mated t o be low t o medium. The maximum r e l e a s e of r e f r i g e r a n t i n the system i s 3,000 gallons, which i s the cycle f l u i d storage capacity i n the system. T h e l a r g e s t r e f r i g e r a n t storage tank i s 10,000 gal lons.
6.2.3
Storage System There a r e three principal methods of release i n the storage area: storage tank f a i l u r e leak o r rupture in i n l e t o r o u t l e t piping, flanges, valves, f i t t i n g s , pumps, e t c . atmospheric discharge from a re1 i e f valve.
The i n n e r s h e l l of t h e LNG storage tank i s constructed o f an aluminummagnesium a l l o y t h a t can w i t h s t a n d cryogenic temperatures. any LNG o r c o l d vapors. The o u t e r tank i s constructed o f carbon s t e e l and i s s u s c e p t i b l e t o f r a c t u r e i f contacted w i t h Thus, f a i l u r e o f t h e i n n e r tank would probably l e a d t o f a i l u r e o f t h e o u t e r tank. A c t i v a t i o n o f t h e MES system stops any f l o w s i n t o and o u t o f t h e tank and i s o l a t e s t h e tank from t h e r e s t o f t h e f a c i l i t y . The maximum r e l e a s e from t h e storage system i s t h e t o t a l c a p a c i t y o f t h e tank, which i s 348,000 bbl o f LNG. A p i p e break i n a 12-in. o u t l e t l i n e which leaks f o r 10 minutes b e f o r e t h e b l o c k v a l v e i s closed would r e s u l t i n a l e a k o f about 23 MMscf (280,000 g a l ) . p r o b a b i l i t y o f these releases i s estimated t o be low. 6.2.4 Vaporization System V a p o r i z a t i o n takes p l a c e in f o u r g a s - f i r e d operation. Primary methods f o r LNG o r LNG vapor r e 1ease from t h e v a p o r i z a t i o n system are:
8
The
,.submerged
combustion vaporizers.
The vaporizers have t h e c a p a c i t y t o empty t h e storage tank i n about 15 days o f
l e a k o r r u p t u r e i n i n l e t o r o u t l e t p i p i n g , flanges, valves, f i t t i n g s , etc. f a i l u r e o f v a p o r i z e r heat t r a n s f e r tubes. The Vaporizer Emergency Shutdown (VES) system, when a c t i v a t e d , shuts down
t h e vaporizers and t h e LNG sendout pumps, i s o l a t e s t h e v a p o r i z e r s from t h e r e s t o f t h e p l a n t , and vents a l l gas-handling equipment and l i n e s t o t h e v e n t stack. The maximum r e l e a s e from t h e v a p o r i z a t i o n system would occur i f t h e VES f a i l e d and t h e system had t o be shut down manually, t a k i n g up t o 10 minutes. 1.6 MMscf o f LNG and LNG vapor. t o be medium. Normal f l o w through t h e system d u r i n g t h i s time could r e s u l t i n a r e l e a s e o f up t o The p r o b a b i l i t y o f t h i s r e l e a s e i s estimated
6.2.5
Transportation and Transfer System
LNG releases i n the transportation and t r a n s f e r system may occur a t the truck terminal or during transport on public roads. Primary methods f o r LNG
release a t the terminal a r e : leak o r rupture i n i n l e t o r o u t l e t piping, flanges, valves, f i t t i n g s , etc. f a i l u r e of the double-shell tank t r a i l e r .
A f a i l u r e of the t r a i l e r (due, f o r instance, t o overpressurization) would r e s u l t in a maximum release of 10,500 gallons of LNG. The probability of such
a release i s low. The probability of a leak in a t r a n s f e r 1ine i s medium due t o the operator interface. Such a leak continuing f o r ten minutes a t the normal loading r a t e would release 3,500 gal of LNG. The primary method f o r release i n transport i s f a i l u r e of the t r a i l e r due t o c o l l i s i o n or overturning. Overturning accidents f o r LNG t r a i l e r s a r e relat i v e l y frequent because of t h e i r high center of gravity. However, the probabil i t y of a release i s low because of the structural i n t e g r i t y of the doubleshell t r a i l e r construction. 6.2.6 Summary
The l a r g e s t release t h a t could occur from the LNG peakshaving f a c i l i t y would r e s u l t from complete f a i l u r e of the storage tank. Significant releases could also occur from pipe breaks in the various systems. Postulated releases from pipe breaks, assuming t h a t the leaks continue f o r 10 minutes before t h e systems a r e shut down, a r e presented in Table 6.2. Based on t h i s system level analysis, the two systems with the potential f o r the l a r g e s t releases a r e the storage and vaporization systems. 6.3
The purpose of the component level analysis i s t o identify those components t h a t a r e most c r i t i c a l with respect t o release prevention and control f o r each of the systems. The system level analysis indicates t h a t a s i g n i f i c a n t release could come from any of the f i v e systems. The l a r g e s t releases could come from the storage and vaporization systems.
6-9
TABLE 6.2.
P o s t u l a t e d Releases from Pipe Breaks i n a Peakshaving Faci 1 it y Conti nuous Leak Rate (scfm) 8 . 5 ~ 1 0 ~ 8.5 2.3 x 1 .O T o t a l 10-Mi n u t e Re1 ease ( s c f ) 5(a) 1.2 x 10 5(a) 1.2 x 10
L o c a t i o n o f Break GasTreatmentSystemOutlet (100% vapor, 485 p s i a ) L i q u e f a c t i o n System Out1 e t (0% vapor, 470 p s i a ) L i q u i d O u t l e t f r o m Tank (0% vapor, 15.8 p s i a ) LNG Pump O u t l e t Header (0% vaPor,- 900 p s i a ) , V a p o r i z e r O u t l e t Header (100% vapor, 870 p s i a ) T r a i 1e r Loading L i ne (0% vapor, 30 p s i a )
lo3
-
lob lo5
2.3 x 10' 6(a) 1.3 x 10 1.6 x 2.9 x
5 1.6 x 10 2.9
lo6
lo5
lo4
( a ) I n c l u d e s r e l e a s e c o n t r i b u t i o n o f holdup i n system. A p r e l i m i n a r y hazards a n a l y s i s (PHA) has been completed f o r each system. The PHA d e a l s w i t h t h e m a j o r components o f each system and t h e r e l a t e d p o t e n t i a l hazard c o n d i t i o n s , e f f e c t s , and e x i s t i n g p r e v e n t i v e and c o n t r o l measures. PHA i s presented i n t a b u l a r form.
I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e t h a t some o f t h e r e l e a s e s presented i n t h i s s e c t i o n
Each
r e q u i r e f a i l u r e o f more t h a n one component. failure. 6.3.1 Gas Treatment System
For example, a l i n e r u p t u r e c o u l d
occur f r o m a h e a t l e a k ( r e s u l t i n g i n a pressure b u i l d u p ) and a r e 1 i e f v a l v e
The gas t r e a t m e n t system i s one o f t h e l e s s c r i t i c a l systems i n t h e peakshaving f a c i l it y w i t h r e g a r d t o r e l e a s e p r e v e n t i o n and c o n t r o l . as compared t o o t h e r systems i n t h e f a c i l i t y . system i s presented i n Table 6.3. The f o l l o w i n g components o f t h e system a r e judged t o be t h e most i m p o r t a n t w i t h r e s p e c t t o r e l e a s e p r e v e n t i o n and c o n t r o l ; T h i s i s because o f t h e r e l a t i v e l y low f l o w r a t e s and t h e r e l a t i v e l y small holdup i n t h i s system The PHA f o r t h e gas t r e a t m e n t
TABLE 6.3.
Subsystem o r Component Startup-Shutdown Operations 1. Regeneration Gas Heater Adsorbers, F i l t e r s , Regeneration Heater
P r e l i m i n a r y Hazards A n a l y s i s f o r t h e Gas T r e a t m e n t System

Effect E x i s t i n g Preventive and Control Measures
P o t e n t i a l Hazard C o n d i t i o n
Improper Valving o f Gas t o Heater Rapid P r e s s u r i z a t i o n on S t a r t u p
Possible explosion, release o f gas, ' f i r e Possible vessel f a i l u r e and r e l e a s e o f gas
S t a r t u p procedures/operator e x p e r t i s e Combustible gas and U f i r e detectors V S t a r t u p procedures/operator e x p e r t i s e P instrumentation/operation a t t e n t i o n MES s h u t o f f valves
2.
Steady S t a t e Operation 1. Gas Feed Valve t o F i l t e r Separator F a i l s Open F a i l s Closed Rupture o r Leaks Possible o v e r p r e s s u r i z a t i o n o f f i l t e r separator None Release o f n a t u r a l gas Release o f n a t u r a l gas and p o s s i b l e r e l e a s e o f liquids Possible o v e r p r e s s u r i z a t i o n o f downstream components Notie Release o f n a t u r a l gas Possible o v e r p r e s s u r i z a t i o n o f adsorbers o r r e l e a s e o f feed gas t o regeneration gas l i n e None Release o f n a t u r a l gas Release o f n a t u r a l gas (heated o r unheated) and p o s s i b l e r e l e a s e o f absorbent m a t e r i a l Possible o v e r p r e s s u r i z a t i o n o f components o r r e l e a s e o f unheated gas t o t h e absorber being regenerated None Release o f n a t u r a l gas Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n
-Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n P instrumentation/operator a t t e n t i o n MES s h u t o f f valves Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n MES s h u t o f f valves
2.
F i l t e r Separator
Ruptures o r Leaks
3.
Gas Feed Valve A f t e r F a i l s Open F i l t e r Separator F a i l s Closed Ruptures o r Leaks
-Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n MES s h u t o f f valves Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n
4.
Gas Feed Valves t o Adsorbers
F a i l Open
F a i l Closed Rupture o r Leak
-Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n MES s h u t o f f valves Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n MES s h u t o f f valves Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n T instrumentation/operator a t t e n t i o n
5. 6.
Molecular Sieve Adsorbers Gas Feed Valves A f t e r t h e Adsorbers
Rupture o r Leak F a i l Open
F a i l Closed Rupture o r Leak
-Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n MES s h u t o f f valves
TABLE 6 . 3 .
Subsystem o r Component Steady S t a t e Operation P o t e n t i a l Hazard Condition
(Contd)
7.
Gas Feed Valve t o Dust F i l t e r
F a i l s Open F a l l s Closed
Possible o v e r p r e s s u r i z a t i o n o f d u s t f i 1t e r None Releases o f n a t u r a l gas and p o s s i b l e release o f dust Possible overpressuri r a t i o n downstream i n system None Release o f n a t u r a l gas Possible o v e r p r e s s u r i z a t i o n downstream No regeneration, excess feed gas t o c o l d box Release o f n a t u r a l gas Possible backflow o f heated gas No regeneration, excess feed gas t o c o l d box Release o f n a t u r a l gas ( c o o l ) o r heated Release o f n a t u r a l gas and p o s s i b l e f i r e due t o burners c l o s e a t hand
Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n
8.
Dust F i l t e r
Ruptures o r Leaks
Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n P instrumentation/operator a t t e n t i o n MES s h u t o f f valves Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n
9.
Gas Feed Valve A f t e r Dust F i l t e r
F a l l s Open F a i l s Closed Ruptures o r Leaks
Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n MES s h u t o f f valves Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n P c o n t r o l and f l o w instrumention/ operation attention MES s h u t o f f valves Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n
10. Gas Feed Valves i n Regeneration Gas L i n e
F a i l Open F a i l Closed Rupture o r Leak
11.CheckValvePrlor t o Regeneration Gas Heater
Failsopen F a i l s Closed Ruptures o r Leaks
Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n MES s h u t o f f valves Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n U flame d e t e c t o r and d r y chemical V f i r e extinguishers MES s h u t o f f valves Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n P instrumentation/operator attention MES s h u t o f f valves Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n MES s h u t o f f valves Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n MES s h u t o f f valves Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n MES s h u t o f f valves
12. Regeneration Gas Heater
Ruptures o r Leaks
13. Dust F i l t e r
Ruptures or Leaks
Release of n a t u r a l gas and p o s s i b l e release o f dust
14. Fan Cooler 15. Regeneration Gas Separator 16. Regeneration Compressor
Ruptures o r Leaks Ruptures o r Leaks Ruptures 6 r Leaks
Release o f n a t u r a l gas Release o f n a t u r a l gas Release o f n a t u r a l gas a t l i n e pressure
Regeneration Gas Heater. T h i s component contains heat exchanger tubes that carry natural gas. If a tube ruptures or leaks, natural gas i s released i n close proximity to the u n i t ' s gas-fired burner, and a subsequent f i r e or explosion i s possible. The probability of such a tube f a i l u r e i s judged to be medium. Molecular Sieve Adsorbers. These are large vessels (about 20 f t high by 5.5 f t in diameter) t h a t contain gas under pressure (about 500 p s i a ) . Thus, the gas holdup in these vessels i s significant. If a vessel ruptures or leaks, t h i s holdup gas would be released along w i t h any additional gas flowing into the system before the feed lines are closed. The probability of adsorber vessel f a i l u r e i s judged to be low because of design and maintenance considerations. Master Emergency Shutdown (MES) System. When operating properly, t h i s system limits the size of a release. However, i f the system does not operate properly and a manual shutdown i s necessary, the amount of natural gas released can be significantly increased.
6.3.2
Liquefaction System
The 1 iquefaction system i s another of the l e s s c r i t i c a l systems i n the peakshaving facil i ty because of i t s relatively low flow rates and re1 atively small holdup. The PHA for the liquefaction system i s presented i n Table 6.4. System components of primary concern regarding release prevention and control are as follows: Temperature and Liquid Level Instrumentation and Controls. These a r e probably the most important components related to release prevention and control in t h i s system. The temperature controller i n the LNG o u t l e t l i n e ensures that the LNG i s sufficiently cold before i t i s sent to the storage tank. If the controller f a i l s and warmer LNG or natural gas is introduced into the storage tank, excessive flashing will occur in the storage tank resulting in increased tank pressure. If t h i s increased pressure cannot be controlled by the boiloff system, the pressure r e l i e f valves will open and release LNG vapors. In the refrigerant system, temperature and liquid
TABLE 6 '4.
Subsystem o r Component Startup-Shutdown Operations 1. 2. R e f r i g e r a n t Cycle I n v e n t o r y Makeup
Prel iminary Hazards Analysis f o r t h e Liquefaction System

P o t e n t i a l Hazard Condition
Too much o f low b o i l i n g components
Overpressure on shutdown and warmup, r u p t u r e o f r e f r i g e r a n t containment L i q u i d r e f r i g e r a n t f l o o d s V-205, b r i t t l e f a i l u r e i n compressor s u c t i o n l i n e , r e f r i g e r a n t r e 1ease Excessive f l a s h i n g upon letdown t o tank pressure, tank b o i l o f f c a p a c i t y exceeded
R e l i e f valve and v e n t stack High P alarm on compressor o u t l e t Capacity o f V-205 L i m i t e d r e f r i g e r a n t inventory Range o f c o n t r o l l e r might be l i m i t e d Re1i e f valves on LNG tank P and T instrumentation on tank
F I C Settings, Sepa- Opened too f a r r a t o r Liquid Outlets

LNG TRC Set t o o h i g h
3.
Steady S t a t e Operation 1. Natural Gas Supp l y Line Break o r other i n t e r r u p t i o n Release o f pressurized gas Excess c o o l i n g , 1i q u i d carryover t o V-205. p o s s i b l e carryover o f l i q u i d t o carbon s t e e l compressor s u c t i o n I c e plugs LNG 1 ine; See Above Low P gas release w i t h p o s s i b l e f i r e , reduced cooling capacity P r e s s u r i z a t i o n o f s h e l l , p o s s i b l e r u p t u r e and release t o c o l d box, l i q u i d could f a i l c o l d box w a l l P r e s s u r i z a t i o n o f exchanger s h e l l , she1 1 should hold, unknown upset due t o LNG i n refrigerant Possible f l a s h i n g o f l a r g e amount o f r e f r i g erant, carryover o f l i q u i d t o V-205, b r i t t l e f a i l u r e I f l i q u i d passes V-205 Pressurized gas release t o c o l d box, p o s s i b l e rupture Release o f r e f r i g e r a n t t o c o l d box, p o s s i b l e rupture
w
w
0.
Master emergency shutdown (MES) Capacity o f V-205 Low T alarm High H20 a n a l y t i c a l alarm Combustible gas/UV d e t e c t o r s Bypass a t tank Combustible gas d e t e c t o r L i m i t e d inventory o f r e f r i g e r a n t MES valve upstream o f gas treatment system Capacity o f V-205 Low T alarm Combustible gas d e t e c t o r R e l i e f v a l v e r e q u i r e d on c o l d box Combustible gas d e t e c t o r L i m i t e d inventory o f r e f r i g e r a n t / capacity o f separator Low L alarm Limited inventory o f refrigerant Capacity o f separators
Water I n gas supply 2. B o i l o f f Line B o i l o f f Exchangers E-211 t o 213 Liquefaction Exchangers E-201 t o 206 Break o r i n t e r r u p t i o n R e f r i g e r a n t tube r u p t u r e
.3.
4.
LNG tube r u p t u r e
R e f r i g e r a n t tube r u p t u r e
Shell f a i l u r e 5. Vapor L i q u i d Separator, Cold Box, V-201 t o 204 Rupture
L i q u i d carryover Flow stop age i n vapor o u t l e t , p l u g (ice! o r inadvertent valve closure
L i q u i d t o V-205, passes V-205
brittle failure if liquid failing to eventually c o o l i n g power no release.
I n l t i a l response might be l i q u i d vaporize b e f o r e reaching V-205, s u c t i o n pressure w i l l r i s e and w i l l drop o f f . Process upset,
TABLE 6.4.
Subsystem o r Component Steady S t a t e Operation 6. Vapor L i q u i d Sepa- Rupture rators. Interstage and Af t e r c o o l ers, v-2221, 222 Backflow from c o l d box d u r i n g startup Vapor L i q u i d Separ a t o r Low Pressure R e f r i g e r a n t V-205 Rupture P o t e n t i a l Hazard Condition
(Contd)
Release o f pressurized r e f r i g e r a n t
B r i t t l e f a i l u r e , release as above
Combustible gas d e t e c t o r L i m i t e d inventory o f r e f r i g e r a n t Low L alarm Check valve r e q u i r e d i n l i q u i d o u t l e t High L alarm Combustible gas d e t e c t o r L i m i t e d inventory Combustible gas d e t e c t o r Low L alarm Capacity o f separator High L alarm Low T alarm High T alarm
7.
Release o f r e f r i g e r a n t
L i q u i d carryover
B r i t t l e f a i l u r e downstream, release as above High T i n second stage o f compressor, l o s t c o o l i n g capacity, system a d j u s t s automatically Release o f pressurized r e f r i g e r a n t , possible f i r e
8.
I n t e r s t a g e and A f t e r Coolers E:221, 222
Fan f a i l u r e
Rupture
Combustible gas/UV f i r e detector a t c o l d box, detectors required a t coolers L i m i t e d inventory Operator a t t e n t i o n Conlbustible gas d e t e c t o r Limited inventory F i r e detectors-automatic MES I n t e r l o c k U flame d e t e c t o r V Combustible gas detectors required near r e f r i g e r a t i o n tanks
9.
Compressor. C-221 and 222
Motor f a i l u r e Rupture
Suction pressure r i s e s , r a p i d l o s s o f c o o l i n g capacity, 1i q u e f a c t i o n stops L i q u e f a c t i o n stops (see above), release o f pressurized r e f r i g e r a n t vapor F i r e possible, i n v o l v i n g o t h e r tanks, vapor cloud t r a v e l i n g t o o t h e r i g n i t i o n source and l a r g e r release
10.
R e f r i g e r a n t Storage Tank r u p t u r e Cycle F l u i d , L i q u i d N , Ethylene, Propine, Isobutane. Pentane E l e c t r i c i t y Supply Failure
11.
Compressor and c o o l i n g fans stop, no apparent consequence except LNG f l o w stop Valves t o s a f e p o s i t i o n , LNG f l o w stops Pressure d r i v e s gas t o storage tank
Operator a t t e n t i o n
12. 13.
A i r Supply LNG Flow Control Valve
Failure F a i l s open
Operator a t t e n t i o n Venting c a p a c i t y o f tank Design o f p i p i n g t o minimize oversize f l o w MES shutdown o f gas feed High P alarm Overdesign o f equipment Automatic s h u t o f f
14.
Compressor Discharge Pressure Control Valve
F a i l s open
Overpressure, p o s s i b l e downstream ruptures. separators carryover l i q u i d Compressor "Runs Away." overheats
F a i l s closed
l e v e l i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n p r o t e c t s a g a i n s t carryover o f l i q u i d r e f r i g e r a n t t o t h e carbon s t e e l compressor s u c t i o n p i p i n g .
I f carryover occurs, b r i t t l e
f a i l u r e o f t h e p i p i n g accompanied by r e l e a s e o f r e f r i g e r a n t i s l i k e l y . Minor malfunctions o f i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n and c o n t r o l s are h i g h l y probable b u t , because o f design considerations, t h e probabi 1it y o f ma1f u n c t i o n s r e s u l t i n g i n t h e aforementioned releases i s judged t o be medium. Heat Exchangers and Vapor-Liquid Separator Vessels. box and p o s s i b l y t o t h e environment. Leaks o r r u p t u r e s
i n these vessels would r e s u l t i n t h e r e l e a s e o f r e f r i g e r a n t t o t h e c o l d The p r o b a b i l i t y o f vessel f a i l u r e i s judged t o be low because o f design and maintenance considerations. MES System. When a c t i v a t e d , t h i s system l i m i t s t h e s i z e o f a release.
However, i f the system f a i l s and a manual shutdown i s required, a much l a r g e r r e l e a s e can occur.
6.3.3
Storage System The storage system i s probably t h e most c r i t i c a l i n t h e peakshaving f a c i l i t y
w i t h regard t o r e l e a s e p r e v e n t i o n and c o n t r o l . i n v e n t o r y i n t h i s system.
This i s due t o t h e l a r g e LNG
Table 6.5 presents t h e PHA f o r t h e storage system.
Storage system components o f primary concern w i t h r e s p e c t t o r e l e a s e prev e n t i on and c o n t r o l in c l ude t h e f o l l owing: I n n e r Tank She1 1
F a i l u r e o f t h i s component would cause t h e maximum The p r o b a b i l it y
r e l e a s e o f LNG o r LNG vapor (up t o 348,000 bbl o f LNG). considerations. Annular Space I n s u l a t i o n .
o f a f a i l u r e o f t h e i n n e r tank s h e l l i s judged t o be low because o f design
This component i s important because i t pre-
vents excessive b o i l o f f o f LNG vapor and p r o t e c t s t h e carboh s t e e l o u t e r s h e l l from cryogenic temperatures and subsequent f a i 1ure. The l o s s o f i n s u l a t i o n e f f e c t i v e n e s s i s judged t o have a low p r o b a b i l i t y due t o design and o p e r a t i o n a l f a c t o r s . Outer Tank S h e l l . This carbon s t e e l s h e l l provides a v a p o r - t i g h t seal
and p r o t e c t s t h e i n n e r s h e l l and annular i n s u l a t i o n from t h e environment.
TABLE 6.5.
Subsystem o r Component Startup-Shutdown Operations 1. Storage Tank
Preliminary Hazards Analysis f o r t h e Storage System

Effect Existing Preventive and Control Measure
Potential Hazard Condition-
Inadequate nitrogen purge Fails closed during purging process Cooldown monitoring system f a i l s or i s inaccurate Disperses LNG unevenly
Possible explosive mixture when f i l l i n g with LNG Overpressurization and possible f a i l u r e of outer tank, possible flammable gas mixture between she1 1s Tank f i l l s too f a s t , resulting in rapid cooldown with possible f a i l u r e of inner tank and release of LNG Nonuniform cooldown of inner tank resulting in possible tank f a i l u r e and release of natural gas o r possible s t r a t i f i c a t i o n and rollover Overpressurization and possible f a i l u r e of tank with release of natural gas Thermal shock f a i l s inner tank, LNG released t o outer tank which subsequently f a i l s and releases LNG
Startup procedure Operator expertise High P alarm on tank P re1 ief valves Startup procedure Operator expertise Spill basin Cooldown monitoring instrumentation Operator a t t e n t i o n Spill basin Tank monitoring instrumentation P r e l i e f valves Heatup procedure/operator expertise Tank monitoring instrumentation Heatup procedure/operator expertise Spill basin Purging procedure Operator expertise Maintenance and inspection
2. Purge Ring
3. Inner Tank
4. Downcomer
5. Storage Tank
Heatup with hot natural gas too rapid
6. Combustible Gas Detector Sys tem
Fails, results in inadequate nitrogen purge
Possible explosive mixture when a i r admitted t o tank
Steady S t a t e Condition 1. Liquid Discharge Line Line ruptures o r leaks
LNG released
2. Sendout Pumps
Pump ruptures o r leaks
Pump leaks t o pump vessel, no release
Block valves in outlet MES/VES Maintenance and L w discharge P o MES/VES Maintenance and
l i n e and in tank inspection alarms on pumps, inspection
3. Sendout Pump Vessel
Vessel ruptures or leaks
LNG released (sever1ty greatly increased i f pump f a i l s in conjunction)
Vessel i n t e g r i t y Block valves in l i n e and in tank outlet Combustible gas detector alarm MES/VES Spill basin Piping i n t e g r i t y Combustible gas detector alarm MES/VES
4. Vapor Return Line from Pumps
Line ruptures o r leaks
Natural gas released
TABLE 6.5.
m s v s t e m o r Component Steady S t a t e Condition P o t e n t i a l Hazard Condition
(Contd)
5.
Tank Foundation
S e t t l e s nonunifonnly
Outer tank f a i l s , i n n e r tank cannot support l o a d and f a i l s , LNG released F r o s t heaving f a i l s tank, LNG released
I n t e g r i t y of foundation Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n a S p i l l basin

a
a
Heating c o i l system f a i l s
T instrumentation/operator a t t e n t i o n Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n S p i l l basin
6.
LNG F i l l L I n e
L i n e ruptures o r leaks
LNG o r n a t u r a l gas released
Piping i n t e g r i t y Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n S p i l l basin a Combustible gas d e t e c t o r alarm

a
7.
High Level L i q u i d Alann System
F a i l s , and operator does n o t n o t i c e dangerous c o n d i t i o n on l i q u i d l e v e l gauge Leaks o r ruptures due t o s t r u c t u r a l f a i l u r e o r earthquake Inner she1 1 moves o f f - c e n t e r
LNG overflows and leaks t o o u t e r tank, which i s f a i l e d by c o l d and releases LNG
Operator e x p e r t i s e / a t t e n t i o n Temperature instrumentation would i n d i c a t e unusual c o n d i t i o n a S p i l l basin

a
a a
8.
Inner Tank S h e l l
LNG leaks t o o u t e r tank, which i s f a i l e d by c o l d and releases LNG Forces due t o p e r l i t e compaction f a i l tank, LNG released Loss o f i n s u l a t i o n , heating o f LNG and release o f n a t u r a l gas Possible r u p t u r e o f tank w i t h release o f LNG and/or n a t u r a l gas and probable f i r e Probable r u p t u r e o f tank w i t h release o f LNG and/or n a t u r a l gas and probable f i r e
a
a
Construction standards Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n S p i l l basin L i n e a r movement i n d i c a t o r s S t r a i n gauges S p i l l basin P and T instrumentation on tank S p i l l basin F i r e c o n t r o l systems S e c u r i t y measures S p i l l basin F i r e c o n t r o l systems
a a a
a
9.
Outer Tank S h e l l
S h e l l f a i l s o r leaks Plane crashes i n t o tank Sabotage, bomb explodes
Rollover
Inner s h e l l f a i l s
Rapid increase i n v a p o r i z a t i o n and overp r e s s u r i z a t i o n , p o s s i b l e f a i l u r e o f tank dome and release o f n a t u r a l gas LNG leaks t o o u t e r tank, which f a i l s due t o c o l d and releases LNG Extreme c o l d f a i l s o u t e r tank dome and n a t u r a l gas i s released, d e b r i s may f o u l out1 e t valves Cold f a i l s carbon s t e e l l i n e s and n a t u r a l gas i s released
a
a
P and T instrumentation Tank l o a d i n g and m i x i n g procedures

Construction standards Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n S p i l l basin S t r u c t u r a l i n t e g r i t y o f deck Operator a t t e n t i o n Low T alarm/operator a t t e n t i o n Combustible gas detector alarm Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n
a
a
10.
Suspended I n s u l a t e d Deck B o i l o f f Heat Exchanger
F a i l s and f a l l s i n t o tank along with insulation Fail
11.
TABLE 6.5.
Subsystem o r ComponentSteady S t a t e Condition 12. B o i 1o f f Compressors Compressor ruptures o r 1eaks P o t e n t i a l Hazard C o ~ d i t i o n
(Contd)
Effect Exi --s t i n g Preventive and Control Measures
Block valves e i t h e r s i d e o f compressor Con~bustiblegas d e t e c t o r alarm Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n Adequate compressor design Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n High P alarm on tank P r e l i e f valves on tank Block valves e i t h e r s i d e o f a f t e r cooler Combustible gas detector alarm Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n Adequate a f t e r c o o l e r design Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n High P alarm on tank P r e l i e f valves on tank Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n Tank P instrumentationloperator attention Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n High P alarm on tank B o i l o f f system can h e l p reduce P Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n Tank P instrumentationloperator attention Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n Tank P instrumentation/operator attention Low P s w i t c h l n a t u r a l gas i n l e t valve i n t e r l o c k Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n Piping i n t e g r i t y PumpIMES i n t e r l o c k S p i l l basin Combustible gas d e t e c t o r alarm Combustible gas d e t e c t o r alarm Pump/MES i n t e r l o c k Piping i n t e g r i t y S p i l l basin Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n Operator attentionlmanual shutdown
Cannot handle b o i l o f f yases f a s t enough
Pressure b u i l d u p i n storage tank, p o s s i b l e r u p t u r e o f tank and release o f n a t u r a l gas
13.
Compressor A f t e r cooler
Leaks o r ruptures
o
F a i l s t o adequately cool t h e compressed b o i l o f f gases
Shutdown o f b o i l o f f compressors, leading t o pressure b u i l d u p i n tank and p o s s i b l e rupture Release o f n a t u r a l gas, p o s s i b l e explosive m i x t u r e i f a i r enters tank Pressure b u i l d u p i n tank, p o s s i b l e f a i l u r e o f tank dome and release o f n a t u r a l gas Possible release o f n a t u r a l gas, p o s s i b l e explosive m i x t u r e as a i r enters tank Possible o u t e r tank f a i l u r e due t o vacuum, w i t h release o f n a t u r a l gas
14.
Tank Pressure Re1i e f Valve
F a i l s open
F a i l s closed
15.
Tank Vacuum Re3 i e f Valve
F a i l s open
F a i l s closed
16.
Purge Ring
F a i l s open
Natural gas released through r o o f deck, perl i t e i n s u l a t i o n , and purge r i n g Release o f LNG
17.
R e c i r c u l a t i o n L i n e Ruptures o r leaks from Pump t o Storage Tank Vapor Return L i n e Ruptures o r leaks from Pump t o Storage Tank Tank O u t l e t Valve F a i l s open and o u t l e t l i n e f a i l s before secondary valve F a i l s on demand
18.
19. 20.
Release o f tank contents Flows n o t stopped a u t o m a t i c a l l y i n an emergency
MES
Failure of the outer tank she1 1 would r e s u l t in large vapor releases and could possibly result in the f a i l u r e of the inner s h e l l . The probabil i ty of such a f a i l ure i s judged to be low. Tank Discharge Line to Pumps. Failure of t h i s l i n e could r e s u l t in the maximum release for t h i s system i f no valves functioned t o shut off tank flow. The probability of the 1 ine f a i l i n g i s judged to be low because of the types of f a i l u r e mechanisms considered. Storage Tank Pump Vessel. If the pump vessel were to f a i l and the feed valves to the vessel were open, a large LNG release (14,000 gal ) could occur. The probability of the pump vessel f a i l i n g i s judged t o be low. Pressure Control System. This system includes the boiloff compressor and heat exchangers, the pressure/vacuum r e l i e f valves, and pressure controllers and indicators on i n l e t and o u t l e t l i n e s . Failure of t h i s system could r e s u l t i n over or underpressure in the storage tank which could lead t o tank f a i l u r e and the subsequent release of a t l e a s t part of the tank contents. Failure of individual components (e.g., re1 ief valves f a i l i n g open) could r e s u l t in the uncontrolled release of LNG vapors. Failures of individual components are judged to have low to medium probabilities; the probabil i ty of system f a i l u r e resulting in the f a i l u r e of the storage tank i s low. 6.3.4 Vaporization System
Because of the relatively h i g h flow rates through t h i s system, i t i s one of the more c r i t i c a l systems in the f a c i l i t y with respect to release prevention and control. The PHA for the vaporization system i s given in Table 6.6. The PHA i d e n t i f i e s the following system components as being most important in terms of release prevention and control: Vaporizers. These components contain a number of heat exchanger tubes. If one o r more of these tubes f a i l , LNG i s released t o the vaporizer and a subsequent f i r e or explosion i s possible. The probability of a heat exchanger tube f a i l u r e i s judged to be medium.
TABLE 6.6.
Subsystem o r Component Startup-Shutdown Operations 1. LNG Pump Discharge Pressure S e t t i n g High
Preliminary Hazards Analysis for the Vaporization System

P o t e n t i a l Hazard Condition
Vapor f l o w c o n t r o l v a l v e t h r o t t l e s , no hazard i f p i p i n g design adequate f o r maximum pump pressure Low f l o w through vaporizer, o u t l e t temperat u r e increase, burner f i r i n g r a t e goes t o mi n
Integrity o f piping Adequate design f o r P Adequate thermal capacity o f bath t o allow f o r flow variations T instrumentation on o u t l e t P instrumentation on pump o u t l e t
Low
2. O u t l e t Temperature Controller Setting

Low LNG n o t vaporized, p o s s i b l e cryogenic f a i l u r e downstream LNG n o t vaporized, p o s s i b l e cryogenic f a i l u r e downstream Possible tube bundle f a i l u r e from thermal shock Low o u t l e t T/VES i n t e r l o c k Low o u t l e t T/VES i n t e r l o c k Combustible gas d e t e c t o r and/or U V Halon f i r e f i r e d e t e c t o r alarm extinguisher
3. Throughput Flow Setting
High o r turned up too r a p i d l y
4. Block Valve Closing, Various Locations

Steady S t a t e Operation 1. LNG Sendout Pumps Suction L i n e
LNG trapped between valves
Warms t o ambient T, p i p e b u r s t s
R e l i e f valves between every p a i r o f block
Break Body f a i l u r e from T-shock o r e x t e r n a l cause Deadheaded (valve f a i l u r e , clog, o r blunder)
Release r a t e depends on break, d r i v e n by h y d r a u l i c head i n storage tank Leak forced by head i n storage tank, r a t e depends on crack s i z e LNG vaporized i n pump Release r a t e depends on break, d r i v e n by .pumps Reduced heat t r a n s f e r . LNG n o t vaporized, cryogenic embrittlement, f a i l u r e downstream, d i r e c t f i r i n g o f tube bundle leading t o failure P o t e n t i a l explosive m i x t u r e i n tank P o t e n t i a l explosive m i x t u r e i n tank LNG n o t vaporized, p o t e n t i a l cryogenic f a i l u r e downstream
Low T alarm i n s p i l l basin, MESIVES I n t e r n a l b l o c k valve i n tank o u t l e t Low T alarm i n s p i l l basin, MESIVES I n t e r n a l b l o c k valve i n tank o u t l e t Vapor v e n t l i n e Low discharge P alarms on pumps, MES/ YES Liquid level controller - a l a n Low product T/VES i n t e r l o c k See tube bundle Combustible gas d e t e c t o r alarm, Halon f i r e e x t i n g u i s h e r Burner U flame d e t e c t o r alarm V Thermal storage i n water bath A u x i l i a r y e l e c t r i c heater Low o u t l e t T/VES i n t e r l o c k
2. LNG Sendout Pumps
3. Transfer L i n e t o Vaporizers 4. Tank and Weir
Break Failure, complete o r p a r t i a l l o s s o f water
5. Tube Bundle
F a i l u r e o r leak from thermal shock c o r r o s i o n o r e x t e r n a l cause
6. Burner and Downcomers Flameout
TABLE 6.6.
Subsystem o r Component Steady S t a t e Operation P o t e n t i a l Hazard Condt t i o n
(Contd)
7. Burner Jacket Water Pump

8. Burner Gas o r A i r Supply 9. E l e c t r i c a l Power 10. Water Supply
F a i l u r e t o operate F a i l u r e r e s u l t i n g i n flameout F a i l u r e , blower and burner j a c k e t Pump stop Pressure l o s s
Possible thermal s t r e s s f a i l u r e o f burner See burner and downcomers Flameout Loss o f heat t r a n s f e r , LNG n o t vaporized D i r e c t f i r i n g o f tubes leads t o tube bundle failure
Low discharge P s w i t c h on burner Jacket pump opens water supply Low P alarm on m a n i f o l d A u x i l i a r y power supply See burner and downcomers Low l e v e l alarm Vapor o u t l e t T/VES i n t e r l o c k High T alarm i n tank stack See tank and w e i r f a i l u r e
Low vapor T/VES i n t e r l o c k closes surrounding valves
11. Overflow D r a i n
12. LNG Flow Control
Back pressure F a i l s open (normally closed)
Tank overflows, p o t e n t i a l tank r u p t u r e See tank and w e i r f a i l u r e LNG n o t completely vaporized LNG overheated, problem i f water supply inadequate Flameout, LNG n o t vaporized Vapor r e l e a s e (small break) Depressurization causing LNG surge through vaporizer ( l a r g e break), p o s s i b l e cryogenic f a i l u r e
Valve F a i l s open (normally closed) 13. Burner Gas and A i r Control Valves (Vapor Outlet T Controller) F a i l s closed 14. Vapor O u t l e t L i n e Break
High T alarm i n tank stack O u t l e t T/VES i n t e r l o c k See burner and downcomers MES/VES manually a c t i v a t e d Low vapor o u t l e t T/VES i n t e r l o c k Low discharge P on sendout pumps. MES/VES
( , 3
N N
N a t u r a l Gas Discharge L i n e f r o m V a p o r i z e r .
If t h i s carbon s t e e l l i n e f a i l s
( p o s s i b l y f r o m c o l d LNG o r vapors), LNG vapors o r LNG w i 11 be r e 1eased. The p r o b a b i l i t y o f t h i s l i n e f a i l i n g i s judged t o be low c o n s i d e r i n g t h e temperature c o n t r o l shutdown subsystem. Vaporizer Water Bath Tank.
I f the tank f a i l s , the loss o f water could
r e s u l t i n e i t h e r h e a t exchanger tube f a i l u r e o r d i s c h a r g e l i n e f a i l u r e . The p r o b a b i l i t y o f t h e t a n k f a i l i n g i s judged t o be low. Temperature C o n t r o l l e r on Discharge L i n e . discharge l i n e could f a i l . judged t o be medium. 6.3.5 T r a n s p o r t a t i o n and T r a n s f e r System The t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and t r a n s f e r system i s one o f t h e l e s s c r i t i c a l systems i n t h e peakshaving f a c i l i t y . p r e v e n t i o n and c o n t r o l : Double S h e l l Truck Tank. F a i l u r e o f t h i s component causes t h e maximum Furthermore, t h e r e l e a s e The probabi 1 it y The PHA, presented i n Table 6.7, i d e n t i f i e s the f o l l o w i n g system components judged t o be most i m p o r t a n t w i t h r e s p e c t t o r e l e a s e
If t h i s c o n t r o l l e r f a i l s , the
The p r o b a b i l i t y o f t h e c o n t r o l l e r f a i l i n g i s
r e l e a s e o f LNG f o r t h i s system (10,500 gal ) .
may occur on p u b l i c roads where few o r no r e l e a s e c o n t r o l measures a r e a v a i 1 a b l e and numerous sources o f i g n i t i o n a r e present. o f a f a i l u r e i s l o w because of t h e ruggedness o f t h e d o u b l e - s h e l l tank. Truck Pressure R e l i e f Devices. tank. These components a r e i m p o r t a n t because
t h e i r f a i 1u r e i n an overpressure s i t u a t i o n c o u l d 1ead t o f a i l u r e o f t h e The p r o b a b i l i t y o f simultaneous f a i l u r e o f these components i s l o w because o f t h e redundancy o f devices. V a l v i n g and Valve C o n t r o l s . F a i l u r e o f these devices due t o rear-end
c o l l i s i o n would c o m p l e t e l y s t y m i e emergency response measures, p o s s i b l y l e a d i n g t o a slow b u t t o t a l release. The probabi 1 it y O f such a f a i l u r e i s l o w because o f j u d i c i o u s v a l v e placement.
6.3.6
Operator I n t e r f a c e A1 though t h e p l a n t o p e r a t o r s a r e n o t t r a d i t i o n a l l y viewed as p l a n t compo-
nents, t h e y a r e e s s e n t i a l t o t h e p r o p e r o p e r a t i o n o f t h e p l a n t .
The i n t e r f a c e .
TABLE 6.7.
Subsystem or Component Normal Transportation 1. Inner Tank Shell
Preliminary Hazards Analysis for the Transportation and Transfer System

Potential Hazard Condition Effect Existing Preventive and Control Measures
Metal fatigue from cooldown/heatup cycles resul t i ng in weakened/ cracked t a n k Use for an incompatible comnodi ty, resulting in tank corrosion and possible cracking
Release of LNG
Inspection Use of appropriate metal T o 6" flatplate safety valves w Outer shell slows release
DOT regulations Inspection Shipper license Unique connectors on f i 11 line T o 6" flatplate safety valves w Outer shell slows release
Release of LNG
Tank explosion Release of LNG
DOT regulations Inspection Shipper 1icense Unique connectors on f i l l 1ine T o 6" flatplate safety valves w Outer shell slows release Relief valves Vent system
Rollover (of LNG)
Rapid increase in vaporization of LNG. Possible failure of inner tank. Lowered failure threshold. Potential heat 1eaks. Loss of insulation. Increase in vaporization of LNG. Possible failure of inner tank. Line failure due to loss of structural rigidity. Re1 ease of LNG
0
2.
Outer Tank Shell
Defective (corroded) Fails
T o 6" flatplate safety valves w Inspection Re1 ief valves Vent system
3.
Main Liquid Line (3") Failure of line
Manual shut-off valve (3") Emergency shut-off valve (normal l y closed) Manual shut-off valve Emergency shut-off valve Emergency shut-off valve Manual shut-off valve Line i ntact Manual shut-off valve (2") Automatic shut-off valve Automatic shut-off valve Manual shut-off valve closed Line intact
4. 5.
Hose Connector (Main liquid line)
Defective (loose seat)
Release of LNG Release of LNG Release of LNG
Manual Shut-off Valve Defective (loose seat) (Main liquid line) Emergency Shut-off Valve (Main liquid 1ine) Pressure Build Line
(2")
6.
Defective (loose seat)
7.
8.
Failure of line
Release of LNG Release of LNG Release of LNG
9.
Manual Shut-off Valve Defective (loose seat) Automatic Shut-off Defective (loose seat) Valve (Pressure build 1i ne)
TABLE 6.7.
Subsystem o r Component Normal Transportation 10. Automatic Pressure B u i l d Regulator F a i l s open, w h i l e i s o l a t i o n valve open F a i l s closed, w h i l e i s o l a t i o n valve open P o t e n t i a l Hazard Condition
(Contd)
Pressure increases i n tank and overpressures system Pressure drop i n tank n o t compensated f o r . LNG heats up. Possible f a i l u r e o f i n n e r tank. Release o f LNG Release o f LNG
R e l i e f valves Vent system Insulation F r o n t pressure gauge
11. 12.
Vent l i n e ( 3 " ) Main Safety Valve (3" POP-type) Burst Disc Safety Valve and Manual Bl owdown Valve
F a i l u r e o f 1i n e F a i l s (70 p s i g l i m i t ) , tank overpressured and fails. F a i l , when main s a f e t y v a l v e f a i l s , overpressure o f tank
Inspection procedures Burst d i s c s a f e t y valve (3", 105 p s i g l i m i t )

e e
13.
Inner tank f a i l s Release o f LNG Release o f LNG Release o f n a t u r a l gas o r a i r admitted t o t r a i 1e r
Outer tank vent system Outer tank s h e l l slows release
14. 15.
Shut-off Valve Fails (Gas r e t u r n 1i n e ) ( 2 " ) Burst Disc Fai 1s prematurely
Periodic inspection and rep1acement
Transportation Accident 1 . Outer Tank Shell
Overturn i n accident, f a i l u r e o f both tanks Impact f a i l s shell,. loss o f insulation. Puncture f a i l s s h e l l , f a i l u r e o f both tanks. Fire f a i l s shell F i r e overpressures s h e l l
Release o f LNG LNG heats up, p o s s i b l e f a i l u r e o f i n n e r tank Release o f LNG LNG heats up, possible f a i l u r e o f i n n e r tank Release o f LNG Release o f LNG Release o f LNG
e
Double-walled tank r e s i s tant to failure R e l i e f valves Vent system Double-wal l e d tank r e s i s tant to failure I n s u l a t i o n lends g r e a t heat resistance Re1i e f valveslvent system Excellent insulation Double-walled tank r e s i s t a n t to failure Re1i e f valveslvent system On-board f i r e c o n t r o l system Re1i e f valveslvent system
2.
Inner Tank Shell
Impact s u f f i c i e n t t o f a i l both s h e l l s Outer tank f a i l s by impact. Loss o f insulation, f i r e f a i l s i n n e r she1 1 Outer tank f a i l s by impact. Loss o f insulation. Untrained (unaware o f high g r a v i t y center) mishandles and overturns t r u c k
LNG heats up, overpressures i n n e r tank Possible tank f a i l u r e and release o f LNG
3.
Driver
Training requirements (company and DOT)
4.
Valve Controls
Rear impact damages valve Emergency response, controls measures stymied, poss i b l e release o f LNG.
Control box
TABLE 6.7.
Subsystem o r Component Truck Loadinp 1. LNG L i n e from Storage Tank t o Truck Loading Station Ruptures o r leaks w h i l e l o a d i n g trucks P o t e n t i a l Hazard Condition
(Contd)
Release o f LNG
Piping standards/operator
2. Vapor Return L i n e to Ruptures o r leaks w h i l e Storage Tank from loading trucks Truck Loading S t a t i o n 3. Truck Loading S t a t i o n Ruptures o r leaks F i l l Valve
L e f t open a f t e r l a s t load out
Release o f natural gas
Piping standards/operator inspection ESD, vapor r e t u r n l i n e s Valve maintenance and inspection/upstream va ESD, LAVB and C,IYJ We. MI4 Preloading inspection/upstream valve, ESD, LAVB and C, WC, WM High-pressure hose standards Preloading inspection/loading valve ESD. LAVB and C, W , WM C Wheels chocked, i n t e r l o c k s , operator a t t e n t i o n ESD, LAVB and C, WC, W Preloading ' n p e c t i o n *WC,W,EXTg
Release o f LNG
Release o f LNG when upstream valve i s opened Release o f LNG o r natural gas Release o f LNG o r natur a l gas Possible s t a t i c spark. possibleexplosionand fire Possible s t a t i c spark, possible explosion and fire Possible explosive mixture, p o s s i b l e explosion and f i r e
4. F l e x i b l e Loading Hoses
Rupture o r leak
Truck moves w i t h hose attached
5. Ground Cables
Bad condi t i o n
13
F a i l u r e t o hook up cables
Preloading i n s p e c t i o n W , WM, EXT C Preloading i n s p e c t i o n
6. Tank Atmosphere
Oxygen present
WC, WM, EXT

F i t t i n g s incompatible w i t h oxygen s e r v i c e T r a i l e r k e p t above atmosp h e r i c pressure Loading procedures/loading valves ESD, LAVB and C, W , W C Postloading procedures Pressure gage Loading procedures Scale readings o r 1 i q u i d l e v e l gage Loading procedures Operator a t t e n t i o n Dike, LAVB and C Valve maintenance and inspection ESD Loading procedures ESD, LAVB and C, WC, WM
7. T r a i l e r Road Safety
Valve
F a i l u r e t o c l o s e before loading F a i l u r e t o open before release o f t r u c k a f t e r loading
Possible release o f s a f e t y valve and LNG o r n a t u r a l gas Possible overpressurizat i o n o f t r u c k tank, poss i b l e rupture o r leak Possible o v e r f illi n g o f tank Release o f LNG
8. F i l l Trycock Valves
F a i l u r e t o open as i n d i c a t o r s w h i l e loading Open empty trycock i n s t e a d o f 87% o r 90% trycock
9. Vapor Return Valve on Truck
Ruptures o r leaks
Release o f natural gas
L e f t closed d u r i n g loading
Pressurization o f t r u c k tank, possible l e a k o r rupture
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
Dike Diked impoundment area LAVB - Loading Area Vapor B a r r i e r W C Water Curtain W M Water Monitors ESD Emergency Shutdown System LAVE and C Loading Area Vapor B a r r i e r and Channels EXT F i r e extinguishers
TABLE 6.7.
Subsystem o r Component Truck L o a d i n g 10. Vaoor Return Valve a t ' Loading S t a t i o n R u ~ t u r e so r leaks P o t e n t i a l Hazard Condition
(Contd)
Effect E x i s t i n g P r e v e n t i v e and C o n t r o l Measures
Valve maintenance and inspection ESD
L e f t closed d u r i n g 1 oadi ng 11. F i l l Yalve on Truck quptures o r l e j k s
Pressurization o f t r u c k tank, p o s s i b l e l e a k o r rupture Pelease o f LNG
Loading procedures ESD, LAVB and C, UC, W M
o Valve naintenance an0
inspection Truck l o a d i n g s t a c i o n f i l l valve ESD, LAVB and C, VC, WM F a i l s t o c l o s e completely Leak o f LNG when f l e x i b l e hose i s removed Vaive maintenance and inspection Sump d r a i n s Oike, LAVB and C Valve maintenance and inspection Loading valves ESD, LAVB and C, W , W C M Preloading i n s p e c t i o n Loading valves ESD, LAVB and C, W , WM C Maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n LAVB and C, W , W C 4 t I n s p e c t i o n and t e s t i n g Loading valves aurst disc ESO, LAVE and C Loading procedures Pressure gage LAVE and C, ESO, WC, WM
12. D r a i n Valves on F l e x i b l e Hoses
Rupture o r l e a k
Release of LNG o r n a t u r a l gas
L e f t open a f t e r l a s t 1 oading
Release o f L,VG o r n a t u r a l gas when l o a d i n g Felease o f LNG o r n a t u r a l gas
l a . R e l i e f Valves
F a i l t o r e l i e v e p r e s s ~ r e O v e r p r e s i u r i z a t i o n , poss i b l e rupture o r leak

0
? 5. Zperator
F i l l s warm t r u c k through bottom f i l l l i n e
Thermal shock o f i n n e r shell, possible rupture o r leak
Truck Unl oadi n p

1 . Unloading Valve on
Rupture o r leaks
Truck
Release o f LNG o r natur a l gas Release o f LNG o r natur a l gas
Valve maintenance and i n s p e c t i o n WM, Oike High-pressure hose standards Preunl oading i n s p e c t i o n / unloading v a l v e #El, Dike Valve maintenance and inspection Truck unloading v a l v e
W M
2. F l e x i b l e Unloading
Hoses
Ruptures o r leaks
3 . S t a t i o n unloading 'la 1ve
Ruptures o r leaks
Re1 ease o f LNG o r n a t u r a l gas
4. Grounding Cables
Bad c o n d i t i o n
P o s s i b l e s t a t i c spark, p o s s i b l e e x p l o s i o n and fire Possible s t a t i c spark, p o s s i b l e e x p l o s i o n and fire
Preunloading i n s p e c t i o n EXT, WM, EXT Preunloading i n s p e c t i o n EXT, WM, EXT
F a i l u r e t o hook up cab1 es
TABLE 6.7.
Subsystem o r Component Truck Unloading 5. Pressure Buildup C o i l Rupture o r leak P o t e n t i a l Hazard Condition
(Contd)
Release o f LNG o r n a t u r a l gas Overpressuri zation, possible r u p t u r e o r l e a k
Pressure b u i l d u p system shutoff valve Dike Inspection and t e s t i n g S t a r t storage tank pump f o r suction Burst disc Preunloading inspection Dike Postunloading procedures Pressure gage Valve maintenance and inspection Unloading valves Dike Preunloading inspection Unloading valves Dike Piping standards Operator i n s p e c t i o n Dike, ESD
6. R e l i e f Valves
F a i l u r e t o r e 1i e v e pressure
7. T r a i l e r Road Safety Valve
F a i l u r e t o close before unloading F a i l u r e t o open before release o f t r u c k a f t e r unloading
Possible release o f s a f e t y valve and LNG o r n a t u r a l gas Possible overpressurizat i o n o f t r u c k tank, possible rupture o r leak Release o f LNG o r n a t u r a l gas Release o f LNG o r n a t u r a l gas when unloading s t a r t s Release o f LNG o r n a t u r a l gas
8. Drain Valves on F l e x i b l e Hoses
Rupture o r leak
L e f t open a f t e r l a s t unloading
9. LNG Line from Truck

Unloading S t a t i o n to Storage Tank
Ruptures o r leaks w h i l e unloading trucks
between operator actions and plant operations is therefore a c r i t i c a l f a c t o r re1 a t i ng t o re1 ease prevention and control. Operators perform a number of diverse tasks a t the peakshaving f a c i l i t y , most of which r e l a t e t o release prevention and control e i t h e r d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y . During normal plant operations, the operators run the plant within s e t 1 imits and standards t o prevent conditions t h a t may lead t o releases. During off-standard conditions, the operators must respond appropriately to alarms, indicators, and other signals t o prevent releases from occurring o r to 1imit releases in progress. Plant inspection and maintenance i s a l s o important t o i d e n t i f y and remedy conditions t h a t may lead t o subsequent releases. Because of the number of operator tasks performed a t the probability of operator e r r o r i s judged t o be medium t o high. of LNG o r natural gas releases resulting from operator e r r o r s high probability of a small release t o a low probability of a 6.4 REPRESENTATIVE RELEASE EVENTS f a c i l i t y , the The probability varies from a maximum release.
Potential release events considered t o be representative of the peakshaving plant were identified based on the system level and the component level analyses. The release events f o r the main f a c i l i t y operations (gas treatment, 1iquefaction, storage, and vaporization) a r e l i s t e d in Table 6.8, and those f o r transportation and t r a n s f e r a r e l i s t e d in Table 6.9. Preliminary analyses of these events a r e presented in Section 6.4 of Appendix G. The representative release events range from r e l a t i v e l y frequent b u t low consequence releases t o unlikely b u t large releases. They form the basis f o r the q u a n t i t a t i v e evalaution of the release prevention and control systems i n the next phase of analysis. In performing the overview study, several areas requiring additional information were identified. Some of these a r e outlined below. Component Stresses from Thermal Cycl i ng. Many p1 a n t components ( i ncl udi ng the storage tank, piping, valves, and heat exchanger tubes) undergo thermal cycles d u r i n g operation. These cycles produce s t r e s s e s t h a t can r e s u l t i n eventual component f a i l u r e . Information i s needed on the number of thermal cycles these various con~ponentscan withstand prior t o f a i l u r e .
TABLE 6.8. 1. 2.
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Release Events f o r an LNG Peakshaving Faci 1 it y
Gas supply l i n e f r o m p i p e l i n e f a i l s .
M o l e c u l a r s i e v e adsorber vessel f a i l s . Heat exchanger tube i n r e g e n e r a t i o n gas h e a t e r f a i l s . R e f r i g e r a n t compressor s u c t i o n l i n e f a i l s . Refrigerant storage tank f a i l s . LNG s t o r a g e tank f a i l s . LNG o u t l e t l i n e f r o m s t o r a g e t a n k f a i l s . LNG vapor vented through r e l i e f valves a f t e r overpress u r i z a t i o n o f storage tank. Sendout pump vessel f a i l s . LNG supply 1 i n e t o v a p o r i z e r s f a i l s . V a p o r i z e r h e a t exchanger t u b e f a i l s . N a t u r a l gas l i n e from v a p o r i z e r s f a i l s . Representative Release Events f o r LNG T r a n s p o r t a t i o n and T r a n s f e r Operations
3.
4. LNG p i p i n g i n c o l d box f a i l s .
5.
6.
7.
8.
9. 10. 11. 12. 13.
TABLE 6.9. 1. 2.
L i q u i d l i n e from storage t o the t r u c k loading s t a t i o n f a i l s . F l e x i b l e 1o a d i ng/unl o a d i ng hoses f a i 1
.
the storage
3.
Vapor r e t u r n l i n e from t h e t r u c k l o a d i n g s t a t i o n t o s t o r a g e fails. tank f a i l s .
4. L i q u i d l i n e f r o m t h e t r u c k u n l o a d i n g s t a t i o n t o
5.
6. Truck LNG t a n k f a i l s . T r a i l e r pressure buildup c o i l f a i l s .
P l a n t and Component C o n s t r u c t i o n D e t a i l s . more complete and d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s . equipment c o n f i g u r a t i o n s . S t r u c t u a l Mechanics o f t h e Storage Tank.
A d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n concern-
i n g t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e p l a n t and i t s i n d i v i d u a l components would a l l o w Needed d e t a i l s i n c l u d e such t h i n g s as c o n s t r u c t i o n m a t e r i a l s , thicknesses, dimensions, v a l v e placement, and
The e f f e c t s o f hazardous condi-
t i o n s on t h e s t r u c t u r a l i n t e g r i t y o f t h e t a n k a r e o f major importance.
Such conditions include overpressure, overfilling, and f i r e or explosion in the tank or nearby. A more detailed description of the heatup and cooldown procedures i s necessary f o r a complete analysis to be accomplished. Failure Rate Data. The peakshaving f a c i l i t y overview study considered release frequency in a qualitative manner. A more detailed study of the release prevention and control systems must carefully consider the likelihood of the release i n i t i a t i n g event and the r e l i a b i l i t y of the release detection and control systems. Due to the lack o f operating experience a t LNG f a c i l i t i e s , l i t t l e data i s available f o r LNG equipment f a i l u r e rates. Operator Interface. Reliability information on operator tasks performed a t the f a c i l i t y i s needed.
7.0
ASSESSMENT OF L N G SATELLITE FACILITY
This section presents the overview study of the reference LNG s a t e l l i t e facility. 7.1
SUMMARY SYSTEM DESCRIPTION -
The reference f a c i l i t y f o r the s a t e l l i t e plant overview study receives L N G by truck from a plant with liquefaction c a p a b i l i t y , s t o r e s i t u n t i l needed in a 37,000-bb1 tank, and vaporizes i t a t r a t e s of u p t o 12 MMscfd. The major operat i o n s performed a t the p l a n t , as well as the plant s a f e t y systems, a r e described b r i e f l y in the following paragraphs. Appendix F. 7.1.1 Transportation and Transfer System Specially designed truck t r a i l e r s a r e used t o t r a n s p o r t L N G t o the s a t e l l i t e f a c i l i t y from another f a c i l i t y having l i q u e f a c t i o n c a p a b i l i t y . Each truck t r a i l e r includes an inner vessel of 5083 aluminum and an outer vessel of carbon s t e e l . The annular space i s f i l l e d with p e r l i t e and a moderate vacuum of 50 microns i s established t o i n s u l a t e the inner vessel. The inner vessel i s designed f o r a maximum working pressure of 70 psig. Several pressure r e l i e f valves a r e i n s t a l l e d in the l i q u i d and vapor piping on the truck t r a i l e r and they a l l exhaust t o a common elevated vent stack. Remotely operated shutoff valves a r e i n s t a l l e d in the l i q u i d l i n e s . The t r a i l e r has a gross capacity of 11,550 gal and a net capacity of 10,700 g a l , and i t weighs about 60,000 l b when f u l l y loaded. The truck t r a i l e r i s loaded by t r a n s f e r r i n g LNG from a storage tank t o the t r a i l e r using the LNG sendout pumps. The L N G i s pumped through 3-in. Boiloff vapors from loading a r e returned t o the storage tank through a 2-in. vapor return l i n e . Weight s c a l e s provide the primary indication of a f u l l t r a i l e r load. Two overflow trycock valves serve as backup l i q u i d level i n d i c a t o r s . Both the l i q u i d f i l l and the vapor return hoses a r e drained p r i o r t o disconnection from the t r a i l e r . f l e x i b l e , high-pressure metal hose t o the t r a i l e r .
A d e t a i l e d description i s presented in
The t r u c k t r a i l e r i s unloaded a t t h e s a t e l l i t e f a c i l i t y t h r o u g h a 3 - i n .
fl x i b l e, high-pressure metal hose c o n n e c t i ng t h e t r a i 1e r t o t h e u n l o a d i n g e

station. The LNG i s f o r c e d from t h e t r a i l e r i n t o t h e s a t e l l i t e s t o r a g e t a n k
I f t h e vapor p r e s s u r e i s
by t h e vapor pressure above t h e LNG i n t h e t r a i l e r .
t o o low, a l i t t l e LNG can be v a p o r i z e d i n t h e pressure b u i l d u p c o i l and r o u t e d t o t h e t o p o f t h e t a n k t o i n c r e a s e t h e vapor pressure. 7.1.2 Storage System
A t t h e s a t e l l i t e f a c i l i t y , LNG i s s t o r e d i n a f l a t - b o t t o m e d ,
aboveground s t o r a g e t a n k capable o f h o l d i n g 37,000 b b l . l e n t l o w temperature d u c t i l i t y . o f A131 carbon s t e e l .
double-wall
The i n n e r w a l l o f
t h e t a n k i s c o n s t r u c t e d o f aluminum-magnesium a l l o y AA5083, which has e x c e l The o u t e r w a l l o f t h e t a n k i s c o n s t r u c t e d The dimensions o f t h e tank a r e :

69 f t
i n n e r w a l l diameter: o u t e r w a l l diameter: inner wall height: outer shell height:
72 f t 63 f t 73ft.
A r e s i l i e n t f i b e r g l a s s blanket i s attached t o the outside o f the inner wall. The remainder o f t h e a n n u l a r space between t h e i n n e r and o u t e r w a l l s The f i b e r g l a s s b l a n k e t p r o t e c t s i s f i l l e d w i t h expanded p e r l i t e i n s u l a t i o n . walls.
t h e p e r l i t e from excess pressure due t o expansion and c o n t r a c t i o n o f t h e t a n k The bottom o f t h e o u t e r t a n k s h e l l s i t s on a r e i n f o r c e d c o n c r e t e p i l e The p i l e cap i s aboveground, and a i r cap t h a t r e s t s on p i l e s i n t h e ground. system.
passage under t h e t a n k bottom e l i m i n a t e s t h e need f o r a f o u n d a t i o n h e a t i n g B o i l o f f gases from t h e s t o r a g e t a n k a r e heated by e l e c t r i c heaters, Each b o i l o f f compressor i s capable o f d i s The s t o r a g e t a n k i s designed The maxiThe t a n k i s equipped w i t h two compressed by one o f two r e c i p r o c a t i n g b o i l o f f compressors, and c o o l e d p r i o r t o discharge i n t o the pipeline. c h a r g i n g 0.15 MMscfd o f gas t o t h e p i p e l i n e . mum e x t e r n a l design p r e s s u r e i s 1 oz. gauge.
t o o p e r a t e a t 1.0 p s i g w i t h a maximum design pressure o f 2.0 p s i g .
pressure r e l i e f v a l v e s t h a t v e n t t o t h e atmosphere a t 2.0 p s i g and two vacuum r e l i e f v a l v e s t h a t a d m i t a i r t o t h e t a n k a t a p r e s s u r e o f 0.031 p s i g . The l i q u i d l e v e l i n t h e s t o r a g e t a n k i s m o n i t o r e d by a servo-powered, f l o a t - t y p e l i q u i d l e v e l d e v i c e and a d i f f e r e n t i a l p r e s s u r e gauge.
Two v e r t i c a l , submerged, pot-mounted pumps serve t o recirculate the storage tank and to pump LNG to the vaporizers. Each pump has a capacity of 6 MMscfd of gas f o r a total rated pumping capacity of 12 The pumps operate a t a design temperature and pressure of -260F and respectively. 7.1.3 Vaporization and Sendout System
LNG in
design MMscfd. 130 psig,
Two submerged combustion vaporizers, each rated a t 6 MMscfd of gas, are used to vaporize LNG a t the s a t e l l i t e f a c i l i t y . The LNG i s pumped from the storage tank to the vaporizers a t up t o the total rated design capacity of 12 MMscfd. The vaporizers burn natural gas and bubble the hot combustion gases through a water bath surrounding the LNG heat exchanger tube bundles. The warm gas-water mixture heats the tube bundles and vaporizes the LNG. The vaporized natural gas i s then introduced into the pipe1 ine. The i n l e t piping, a l l piping that comes i n contact with the LNG feed stream inside the vaporizers, and o u t l e t piping to the f i r s t flange are a l l stainless steel construction. 7.1.4 Safety Systems
Various detectors, alarms, and f i r e protection equipment are located throughout the sate1 1i t e faci 1i ty: combustible gas detectors
0
low temperature detectors w i t h alarms in control room Halon f i r e extinguishing system

UV f i r e detectors t h a t automatically activate the Halon system and/or
e e
the Master Emergency Shutdown system

20# dry chemical f i r e extinguishers
f i r e hydrants. There are two emergency shutdown systems: the Vaporizer Emergency Shutdown (VES) and the Master Emergency Shutdown (MES). The VES, when activated, automatically shuts down the vaporizers and the LNG sendout pumps and isolates the pumps from both the vaporizers and the LNG storage t a n k . The V S can be E activated manually a t the vaporizers, the control room, or the e x i t gates.
The VES i s normally activated automatically by a temperature sensor i n t h e gas o u t l e t l i n e , a UV burner flame monitor, o r the water bath level indicator on t h e vaporizer tank. Upon a c t i v a t i o n , t h e M S automatically i n i t i a t e s the E fol lowing actions: Normal plant e l e c t r i c a l c i r c u i t s a r e de-energized; essential plant el ect r i c a l equipment remains energized. : The plant i s isolated from the natural gas system. The LNG tank and dike area i s i s o l a t e d from the remainder of the plant. A 1 control valves go t o f a i l s a f e positions w i t h l o s s of instrument a i r . 1 Gas from a l l gas handling equipment and l i n e s i s vented via the r e l i e f header t o the vent stack. There i s an impoundment area surrounding the LNG storage tank and sendout pumps, with earthen dike walls averaging 10 f t i n height. The dike area i s capable of holding 44,000 bbl, o r 1.19 times the capacity of the storage tank. High-expansion foam generation systems a r e i n s t a l l e d i n the impoundment area and can be activated e i t h e r manually o r automatically by low temperature detectors o r by UV f i r e detectors located i n the impoundment sump. SYSTEM LEVEL ANALYSIS The purpose of the system level analysis is t o identify those sections of the s a t e l l i t e f a c i l i t y t h a t a r e the most c r i t i c a l w i t h respect t o release prevention and control. The evaluation of each system i s based largely on two f a c t o r s : 1 ) the quantity of a potential release due t o e i t h e r the inventory o r the flow r a t e and 2 ) an estimate of the r e l a t i v e probability of a release (low, medium, high). Process operating conditions, including capacities, flow r a t e s , and pressures, a r e presented i n Table 7.1 f o r major components of the transport and t r a n s f e r , storage, and vaporization and sendout systems.
TABLE 7.1.
Major Components Truck T r a i l e r Storage Tank Pumps Vaporization and Sendout Submerged Combustion Vaporizers
System Process Operating Conditions

Component Capacity 11,000 gal 37,000 bb1 (1.55 x 10 2 Flow Rates Out 350 gpm 100 gpm 100 gpm 12 MMscfd 130 120 Operating Pressure (psig) 0-25
Sy s tem Transportation and T r a n s f e r Storage
No. o f Components 1
In
350 gpm 350 gpm gal) 100 gpm 100 gpm
--
7.2.1
Transportation and Transfer System
The maximum release of LNG or LNG vapor expected in the transportation and transfer system i s about 11,000 gal of LNG. This maximum release would r e s u l t from loss of LNG from a f u l l y loaded truck t r a i l e r . The primary causes of a maximum release from a truck t r a i l e r are transportation accidents or explosions. The probability of a maximum release is judged to be low. Other lesser releases are possible i n t h i s system, and the primary causes of a 1 esser re1 ease are overpressurization and operator errors. The probabi 1i t y of lesser releases i s judged to be medium because of the operator interface and potential operator errors. Re1 ease control in the transportation and transfer system i s dependent on where the release occurs. For example, i f the maximum release were to occur in the loading or unloading area, the LEG would be contained onsite by the dikes, channels, and ground contours. However, i f the maximum release were to occur during transport between the loading f a c i l i t y and the s a t e l l i t e faci.lity, the release of LNG would most likely not be confined and would spread out according to the contour of the land. The low probability of a maximum release i s based on the double-wall construction of the LNG truck t r a i l e r and the good accident record of LNG trucks.
7.2.2
Storage System
The maximum release of LNG or LNG vapor expected in the storage system i s about 37,000 bbl (1.55 x 1 o6 gal ) of LNG. This maximum release could r e s u l t from e i t h e r a complete f a i l u r e of the inner tank shell or a complete break of the o u t l e t l i n e from the tank (assuming f a i l u r e of internal or upstream valves). The primary causes of inner tank shell f a i l u r e are internal overpressurization, explosions , or external pressure forces. The primary cause of an o u t l e t l i n e break i s internal overpressurization. The probability of a maximum release i s judged to be low. Other lesser releases are possible in t h i s system, and the primary cause of a lesser release i s internal overpressurization. These 1esser re1 eases woul d most 1i kely be LNG vapor re1 eases. The probabil i ty of 1esser re1 eases i s judged to be medium due t o the number of i n i t i a t i n g events t h a t could cause overpressurization. Release control in the storage system consists mainly of a large impoundment area capable of holding the e n t i r e contents of the storage tank. 7.2.3 Vaporization and Sendout System
The maximum release of LNG or natural gas expected in the vaporization and sendout system i s estimated to be 700 to 1,000 gal of LNG. This maximum release could r e s u l t from e i t h e r f a i l u r e of heat exchanger tubes in the vaporizers (700 gal of LNG) or f a i l u r e of the natural gas discharge l i n e from the vaporizers (about 1,000 gal of LNG or 83,000 scf of natural gas). The primary causes of a f a i l u r e of the heat exchanger tubes are thermal cyclic stresses or thermal shock. The primary cause of a f a i l u r e of the natural gas discharge 1 ine i s the possibility of thermal shock. The probability of a maximum release i s judged t o be medium. Other lesser releases are possible i n t h i s system, and the primary cause of a lesser release i s corrosion of heat exchanger tubes. Release control in the vaporization and sendout system i s limited to containment of the LNG release from the heat exchanger tubes within e i t h e r the vapori zer area or the sate1 1i t e facil i ty boundaries.
7.3
The purpose of the component level analysis i s t o identify those components t h a t are the most c r i t i c a l with respect t o release prevention and cont r o l . The system level analysis indicates that a significant release could come from any of the three systems a t the s a t e l l i t e plant. The largest release could come from the storage system.
A preliminary hazards analysis (PHA) has been completed f o r each system
previously discussed. The PHA for each system deals with the major components of t h a t system and the related potential hazard conditions, e f f e c t s , and existing preventive and control measures. Some of the releases in t h i s section require the f a i l u r e of more than one component. For example, a l i n e f a i l u r e could occur from internal overpressurization and r e l i e f valve f a i l u r e . 7.3.1 Transportation and Transfer System
The PHA for the transportation and transfer system i s presented in Section 6.3.5 f o r the peak shaving plant and i s not repeated here. The following components are judged to be the most important w i t h respect to release prevention and control: Double Shell Truck Tank. This component i s important because i t s f a i l u r e causes the maximum re1 ease of LNG or LNG vapor (11,000 gal of LNG) for t h i s system. The probability of both shells completely f a i l i n g i s judged t o be low considering the low probability of accident, explosive, or overpressurization causes for a complete f a i l u r e . Operator Interface. Although t h i s i s not a mechanical coniponent, the probability of operator errors i s judged to be medium based on the number of operator tasks performed in t h i s system. The probability of LNG o r LNG vapor releases due to operator error varies from a high probability of a small release to a low probability of a maximum release. Truck Pressure Re1 i ef Devi ces. These components are important because t h e i r f a i l u r e in an overpressure situation could cause a complete f a i l u r e of the double shell truck tank. The probability of these components simultaneous f a i l u r e i s judged to be low because of the redundancy of r e l i e f devices.
7.3.2
Storage System The PHA r e s u l t s f o r t h e storage system a r e presented i n Table 7.2. The
f o l l o w i n g components a r e judged t o be t h e most important w i t h r e s p e c t t o r e l e a s e p r e v e n t i o n and c o n t r o l : I n n e r Tank S h e l l . system. F a i l u r e o f t h i s component would cause t h e maximum
r e l e a s e of LNG o r LNG vapor (37,000 b b l o r 1.55 x 10 low because o f design considerations. Annular Space I n s u l a t i o n . tank s h e l l f a i l u r e .
6 gal o f LNG) f o r t h i s
The p r o b a b i l i t y o f a f a i l u r e o f t h e i n n e r tank s h e l l i s judged t o be
Thi s component i s important because i t prevents
excessive b o i l o f f o f t h e LNG vapor, which c o u l d be a major cause o f t h e i n n e r The i n s u l a t i o n a l s o p r o t e c t s t h e carbon s t e e l o u t e r s h e l l The l o s s o f i n s u l a t i o n from cryogenic temperatures and subsequent f a i l u r e . i s dependent on t h e o u t e r tank s h e l l f a i l i n g f i r s t . Outer Tank S h e l l . T h i s carbon s t e e l s h e l l p r o t e c t s t h e i n n e r s h e l l and F a i l u r e o f t h e o u t e r tank s h e l l c o u l d The p r o b a b i l i t y o f t h i s
annular i n s u l a t i o n from t h e environment. f a i l u r e sequence i s judged t o be low. Tank Discharge L i n e t o Pumps. shut o f f tank f l o w t o t h e pumps.
p o s s i b l y r e s u l t i n t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e i n n e r tank s h e l l .
F a i l u r e o f t h i s l i n e could possibly r e s u l t I n a d d i t i o n , i f the f a i l u r e i s between t h e
i n t h e maximum r e l e a s e f o r t h i s system i f no valves e x i s t e d o r f u n c t i o n e d t o i n n e r and o u t e r t a n k shel l s , t h e released LNG c o u l d f a i l t h e o u t e r tank shel 1. The p r o b a b i l i t y o f t h e discharge l i n e f a i l i n g i s judged t o be low because o f t h e types o f f a i l u r e mechanisms considered. LNG R e c i r c u l a t i o n L i n e from Pumps t o Tank. The f a i l u r e o f t h i s component The
would r e l e a s e LNG t h a t c o u l d spray on t h e o u t e r tank s h e l l and f a i l i t .
p r o b a b i l i t y o f t h e l i n e f a i l i n g i s judged t o be low, b u t t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f a r e l e a s e from t h e l i n e causing t h e o u t e r s h e l l t o f a i l i s judged t o be medium.

I f t h e pump vessel were t o f a i l and t h e feed valves t o the vessel were open, a l a r g e LNG r e l e a s e (14,000 gal ) c o u l d occur.
Storage Tsnk Pump Vessel.
The p r o b a b i l i t y o f the pump vessel f a i l i n g i s judged t o be low.
TABLE 7.2.
Preliminary Hazards Analysis for the Storage System

Potential Hazard Condition Effect Existing Preventive and Control Measures Startup check1 i s t , operator expertise, combustion gas sensor system. Maintenance and inspection/ bol l o f f compressors can lower pressure i n the tank, reopen re1i e f valve vent l i n e valve, stop purge. Maintenance and inspection/ dike.
Subsystem o r Component Startup Operations 1. Storage Tank
Inadequate nitrogen purge o f tank. Purge r i n g f a i l s closed during the purging process.
2.
Purge r i n g
Possible explosive mixture occurs when the tank i s f i l l e d w i t h LNG. Pressure b u i l d up i n the outer shell with possible f a i l u r e o f the outer shell. Tank f i l l s too fast. Thermal contraction and thermal stress o r shock f a i l the inner shell w i t h a release o f LNG, f a i l u r e o f the outer shell, and release o f natural gas and/or LNG. Inner shell undergoes nonuniform cooldown.
3.
Tank inner shell
Storage tank thermocouple monitoring system f a i l s o r gives inaccurate readings on cooldorm.
4.
Downcomer
Downcomer does not disperse 1i q u i d properly.
5.
Operator
Lack o f operator awareness (e.g., unconsciousness) during cooldown.
Lack o f control over the b o i l o f f tr'eatment system a1 lows pressure t o rise. Uncontrolled cooldown with possible f a i l u r e o f the inner shel 1.
Storage tank thermocouple monitoring system, operator attention/cessation o f cool down. Second operator i n control room/alarms
Second operator i n control room/al arms.
Shutdown Operations 1. Tank inner shell
Heatup o f LN6 w i t h hot natural gas i s too rapid.
Lack o f operator awareness (e. g., unconsciousness) during heatup.
Possible overpressurization with possible f a i l u r e o f inner tank and release o f LNG. Inner shell may become off-centered and forces due t o perl i e compact t i o n may f a i l the inner shel 1. Then LNG would be released between inner and outer shel ls, with the carbon steel outer shell f a i l i n g due t o cold and a release o f L G and natural gas. N Possible explosive mixture when the tank i s opened t o the a i r . LNG o r natural gas i s released. LNG o r natural gas i s released.
Hea tup procedures, instrumentation o f heatup effects/ operator attention, re1i e f valves , dike
Second operator i n control room, inner shell movement indicators, s t r a i n gauges monitor stresses due t o compaction o f perl ite/dike.
2.
Storage tank
Combustible gas sensor system f a i l s during purging. Line ruptures o r leaks.
Purging procedure, operator expertise.
Steady State Conditions 1. Liquid f i l l l i n e
Line broken by vehicular damage.
Piping Standards/operator inspection, truck u 1 ading Station valve, ESD,?~? dike. Operator and/or d r i v e r attentlon/truck unloading station valve, ESD, dike.
(a) ESD designates the Emergency Shutdown System, which includes both the Master Emergenc.! Shutdown (MES) and the Vaporizer Emergency Shutdown (VES).
TABLE 7.2.
Subsystem or Component Potential Hazard Condition System f a i l s and operator does not notice dangerous condition on liquid level gauges ( f l o a t type and d i f f e r e n t i a l pressure type). Operator does not hear when alarm sounds due to lack of awareness (e.g., unconsciousness). Earthquake f a i l s the inner shell.
(contd)
Effect
LNG overflows the inner s h e l l . L N G f a i l s the outer s h e l l . Natural gas and/or LNG i s released. LNG overflows the inner s h e l l . LNG f a i l s the outer shel 1 . N a t ~ ~ r a l gas and/or LNG i s re1 eased.
Existing Preventive and Control Measures Operator attention, temperature readings would indicate an unusual condition/ dike. Second operator in the control roomjdike.
2.
High level liquid alarm system
3.
Tank inner she1 1
Plane crashes into tank
Planted bomb explodes (sabotage)
Rollover occurs.
4.
Tank outer shell
Earthquake f a i l s the outer shell.
Planted bomb explodes (sabotage).
Tank shell standardsldike. Natural gas and/or LNG i s released. If outer shell has not failed due to the earthquake, then i t f a i l s due to the cold. Possible rupture of Dike. inner shell with release of natural gas and/or LNG and probable fire. Probable rupture of Security measuresldi ke. outer and inner s h e l l s with re1 ease of natural gas and/or LNG and probable f i r e . LNG vaporization rapBottom loading of tank with idly increases. Possiadequate mixing, adequately ble f a i l u r e of inner designed boiloff system/ tank due to overpresr e l i e f valves, vent system. surization resulting in release of LNG between inner and outer s h e l l s , carbon steel outer shell f a i l s due to cold, and LNG and natural gas are released. Possible f a i l u r e of the Tank shell standardsldike. inner shell due to the possibility of the outer shell collapsing with subsequent release of natural gas and/or LNG. Possible f a i l u r e of the Tank shell standards, inner shell due to loss r e l i e f valves/dike. of insulation, increase in vaporization, possible overpressurization with subsequent release of natural gas and/or LNG. Outer shell f a i l s . Pos- Security wasures/dike. sible f a i l u r e of inner shell due to the possibil i t y of the outer shell collapsing i f the inner shell has not already f a i l e d from the explosion, with subsequent release of natural gas and/or LNG with roba able f i r e .
TABLE 7.2.
Subsystem or Component Potential Hazard Condition
(contd)
Effect Possible failure of the inner shell due to loss of insulation, etc., as for 4 (earthquake), 2nd Effect above. Outer shell f a i l s . Possible failure of inner shell due to the possibility of the outer shell collapsing i f the inner shel 1 has not already failed from the plane crash, with subsequent release of natural gas and/or LNG with probable f i r e . Possible failure of the inner shel 1 due to the loss of insulation, etc., as for 4 (earthquake) 2nd Effect above. Cold boiloff gases f a i l the carbon steel 1ines a t the exit of the heaters. Natural gas i s released. Natural gas released. Existing Preventive and Control Measures Re1 ief valves/dike.
Plane crashes into tank.
Dike.
Relief valves/diked.
5.
Boiloff heaters (E-201, A or B)
Both heaters f a i l due to power outage.
6.
Boiloff compressors (C-201, A or B)
Compressor ruptures or leaks.
7.
Compressor af tercooler
8.
Pressure relief valve
Pressure in storage tank rises. Possible overpressurization of the storage tank and subsequent failure of the outer shell, loss of insulation, increase in vaporization of LNG, possible failure of inner tank, and release of LNG. Aftercooler f a i l s to adeHot gases are discharged Maintenance and inspection/ quately cool the compressed into the pipeline. cmpressors are shut down. boiloff gases. Maintenance and inspection/ Compressors are shut down and pressure rises relief valves on tank. in the storage tank because boiloff gases can't be treated. See 6, boi loff compressor effect above. (1 of 2 ) valves f a i l to Natural gas 4 s released Annual tests. operate. from the tank. Both valves f a i l to O ke. i Same as for 6. Boiloff operate. compressor effect above.
Boil off gases can't be treated f a s t enough.
Emergency power, mai ntenance and inspection/low temperature indicator cont r o l l e r closes heater outl e t valves should the temperature get too low. Compressor specifications , preventive maintenance/ operator inspection, block valves on each side of compressor. Adequate compressor design/ pressure relief valves ( 2 ) on tank, dike.
TABLE 7.2.
Subsystem o r Component 9. Vacuum re1 i e f valve Potential Hazard Condition (1 o f 2) valves f a i l t o operate. Both valves f a i l t o operate.
(contd)
Effect Existing Preventive and Control Measures Annual tests/ni trogen purge. Dike.
Possible explosive atmosphere i n tank. Possible explosion. Possible f a i l u r e o f outer shell due t o high vacuum and subsequent loss o f insulation, increase i n vaporizat i o n o f LNG, possible f a i l u r e o f inner tank, and release o f LNG. Outer shell f a i l s due t cold and pressure o forces, releasing L G N and natural gas. Inner tank may f a i l due t o the possible collapse o f the outer shell, releasing more LNG. Natural gas and/or LNC are released.
10.
Liquid discharge l i n e prior to pumps
Line ruptures o r leaks between inner and outer shells.
Piping standards/ESD, dike.
Line ruptures o r leaks a f t e r the outer she11
Sendout pumps (P-201. A o r B) Sendout pump vessel
Pump ruptures o r leaks. Vessel ruptures o r leaks.
None (pump i s submerged i n LNG). LNG I s released t o the impoundment area (releases much greater when pump f a l l s i n conjunction). Natural gas i s released.
Pi ping standards/operator inspection, ESD, dike. block valves between each o f the 2 pumps and the discharge l i n e and between the d i s charge l i n e and vaporizers. Maintenance and inspection. Vessel specification, maintenance and inspection/ESD, dike.
Vapor return l i n e from pumps Recirculation 1ine from pump t o storage tank Foundation p i 1 ings
Line ruptures o r leaks.
Line ruptures o r leaks.
LNG and/or natural gas i s released. Possible cracking and f a i l u r e o f p i l i n g cap. Possible f a i l u r e o f inner and/or outer tank shell w i t h subsequent release o f natural gas and/or LNG. Extreme cold f a i l s the carbon steel outer tank roof and natural gas i s released. Pressure f a i l s the tank w i t h possible release o f natural gas and/or LNG. Natural gas i s released through the deck, perli te, and the purge ring.
Pi ping standards/operator inspection, shutoff valves near the pumps, ESD, dike. Piping standards/operator inspection, shutoff valves near the pumps, ESD, dike. Proper ground t e s t i n g and preparation, proper i n s t a l lation o f pilings. Proper construction o f p i 1 i n g cap/dike.
Pi1ings don't s e t t l e uniformly.
Pi1i n g cap
Cap f a i l s .
Suspended insulated deck R e l i e f valve l i n e valves
Deck f a i l s and f a l l s i n t o the inner tank along w i t h insulation. Line valves are closed when re1 i e f valve release. Purge r f n g f a i l s open.
Foam generation onto surface o f LNG.
Pressure can be lowered using boi l o f f gas compressors.
Purge r i n g
Maintenance and inspection.
B o i l o f f lleaters. open.
I f these f a i l ,
c o l d b o i l o f f gases w i l l e i t h e r f a i l t h e
carbon s t e e l e x i t l i n e s o r cause t h e storage tank pressure r e l i e f valves t o I n e i t h e r case, LNG vapor (about 6,000 s c f p e r hour) w i l l be released The p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t both e l e c t r i c heaters power outage) i s judged t o be low t o medium. Proper o p e r a t i o n o f these valves u n t i l t h e heaters can be fixed. c o u l d f a i l (e.g.,
Storage Tank Pressure R e l i e f Valves. t h e t o p o f t h e tank.
d u r i n g p r e s s u r i z a t i o n o f t h e tank would a1 low LNG vapor t o be released from F a i l u r e of t h e valves t o operate c o u l d a1 low o v e r p r e s s u r i z a The p r o b a b i l i t y o f b o t h pressure r e l i e f valves t i o n t o f a i l t h e storage tank.
f a i l i n g t o operate i s judged t o be low. 7.3.3 V a p o r i z a t i o n and Sendout System The PHA r e s u l t s f o r t h e v a p o r i z a t i o n and sendout system a r e presented i n Table 7.3. The f o l l o w i n g components a r e judged t o be t h e most i m p o r t a n t w i t h r e s p e c t t o r e l e a s e p r e v e n t i o n and c o n t r o l : Vaporizer Heat Exchanger Tubes.
I f one o r more o f these tubes f a i l ,
LNG
i s released t o t h e v a p o r i z e r and a subsequent f i r e o r e x p l o s i o n i s p o s s i b l e . An estimated maximum r e l e a s e from t h i s type o f f a i l u r e i s about 700 g a l o f LNG. The p r o b a b i l i t y o f a h e a t exchanger tube f a i l u r e i s judged t o be medium. Natural Gas Discharge L i n e from Vaporizer. LNG o f 1,000 gal (83,000 s c f ) i s p o s s i b l e . subsystem. Vaporizer Water Bath Tank.
I f t h i s carbon s t e e l l i n e
f a i l s ( p o s s i b l y from c o l d LNG vapors), an estimated r e l e a s e o f LNG vapor o r The p r o b a b i l i t y o f t h i s l i n e f a i l i n g i s judged t o be low c o n s i d e r i n g t h e temperature c o n t r o l shutdown
I f t h e tank f a i l s , t h e l o s s o f water c o u l d
The
r e s u l t i n e i t h e r heat exchanger tube f a i l u r e o r discharge l i n e f a i l u r e . p r o b a b i l i t y o f t h e tank f a i l i n g i s judged t o be low. Temperature C o n t r o l l e r on t h e Vaporizer Discharge L i n e . f a i 1s , t h e discharge 1 i n e c o u l d f a i 1 i s judged t o be medium.
If this controller
The probabi 1i y o f t h e c o n t r o l 1e r f a i l i n g t
TABLE 7.3.
Subsystem o r Component S t a r t u p and Shutdown Operations 1. LNG pump discharge pressure
P r e l i m i nary Hazards Analysis f o r t h e V a p o r i z a t i o n and Sendout System

P o t e n t i a l Hazard C o n d i t i o n Effect E x i s t i n g Preventive and C o n t r o l Measures
Discharge pressure i s s e t too high.
Vapor f l o w through the flow control valve i s t h r o t t l e d (no hazard i f p i p i n g design i s adequate f o r the maximum pump p r e s s u r e ) . LNG m y n o t be t o t a l i y vaporized w i t h p o s s i b l e cryogenic f a i l u r e o f carbon s t e e l p i p i n g downstream. LNG m y n o t be t o t a l l y vaporized (see 2, Effect).
P i p i n g design.
2.
Vaporizer bath temoerature
Bath temperature i s j e t t o o low.
E S ~ (i n t e r l o c k e d w i t h ~ ) the low vapor o u t l e t temperature.
3.
Japor f l o w controller
Flow c o n t r o l l e r s e t t i n g i s t o o h i g h o r turned up too rapidly.
Steady S t a t e Conditions
1.
LNG t r a n s f e r l i n e t o vaporizers
L i n e r u p t u r e s o r leaks.
LNG i s released. (The s i z e o f release i s dependent on whether the pumps are running. ) LNG i s released t o the v a p o r i z e r tank w a t e r . Potential explosive gas m i x t u r e i n the tank w i t h p o s s i b l e f i r e due t o burners .close a t hand. LNG i s n o t completely vaporized. Probable thermal shock f a i l u r e o f the carbon s t e e l l i n e s a t the o u t l e t o f the v a p o r i z e r w i t h a subsequent r e l e a s e o f LNG and n a t u r a l gas. N a t u r a l gas i s released. I f there i s a l a r g e break, the d e p r e s s u r i z a t i o n may cause LNG to surge through the vapori z e r , r e l e a s i n g b o t h LNG and n a t u r a l gas. P a r t i a l o r complete l o s s o f water o r l o w e r i n g o f water l e v e l which r e s u l t s i n reduced h e a t t r a n s f e r , LNG n o t t o t a l l y vaporized, 20si i b l e f a i l u r e o f carbon s t e e l p i p i n g downstream due t o thermal shock, and p o s s i b l e f a i l u r e o f tubes due co thermal s t r e s s o r shock. Potential explosive m i x t u r e i n downcomer and tank. LNG n o t t o t a l l y vaporized w i t h p o s s i b l e cryogenic f a i 1u r e o f carbon s t e e l l i n e s downstream.
P i p i n g standaras/ESD,
dike.
2.
Tube bundle
Tubes r u p t u r e o r l e a k due t o e i t h e r thermal shock, corrosion o r exrernal cause.
Tube design and standards/ LNG i n l e t s h u t o f f valves, ESD, comoustible gas detect i o n alarm, Halon f i r e e x t i n g u i s h i n g systefi.
3.
LNG fl,ow c o n t r o l valve
Valve f a i l s open ( n o r m a l l y f a i l s closed).
~Wiinrenanceand i n s p e c t i o n , thermal c a p a c i t y o f Nater i n vaporizer t a n k / s h u t o i i valve a f t e r the f l o w cont r o l v a l v e , ESD, d i k e .
4.
N a t u r a l gas l i n e from v a p o r i z e r s t o the p i p e l i n e
L i n e r u p t u r e s o r leaks.
Pi p i n g standards/iSD, d i k e .
5.
Tank and w e i r
Tank and/or w e i r r u p t u r e o r leak.
Tank and w e i r design/low l e v e l alarm and f i l l system, ESD i n t e r l o c k e d t o low vapor product temperature, d l ke.
6.
aurner and downcomer
Burner ceases b u r n i n g
Adequate gas and a i r supp l y , thermal c a p a c i t y o f water i n t h e v a p o r i z e r tank/UV flame d e t e c t o r alarm, a u x i l i a r y e l e c t r i c water b a t h heater, ESD i n t e r l o c k e d t o low vapor product temperature.
TABLE 7 . 3 .
Subsystem or Component 7. Burner jacket water p m up Potential Hazard Condition P m f a i l s to operate. up
(contd)
Effect Possible thermal stress failure of burner. Possible ignition source i f LNG were released to the tank water. Burner ceases burning (see 6, Effect). Burner ceases burni ng (see 6, Effect). Blower and burner jacket pump stop. Burner ceases burning (see 6, Effect). LNG i s overheated especially i f water level i s inadequate.
LNG i s not totally vaporized with possible cryogenic failure of carbon steel lines downstream. Water level may f a l l slowly or rapidly, depending on other circumstances. Drop in water level will mean possible loss f n heat transfer and possibly LNG i s not totally vaporized with possible cryogenic failure of carbon steel lines downstream. Tank m y overflow, with a possible tank rupture (see 5 , Effect).
Existing Preventive and Control Measures Maintenance and inspection, shutdown of burner.
8.
Burner gas supply Burner a i r supply Electrical power
Gas supply i s stopped or cut off. Air supply i s stopped or cut off. Electrical power failure.
9.
10.
Pressure and flow indicators on the gas supply line (see 6). Pressure and flow indicators on the a i r supply line (see 6 ) . Auxiliary power supply (see 6 ) . Maintenance and inspection/ ESD, gas supply valve. Maintenance and inspection1 auxiliary electric water bath heater, ESD, U V flame detector. High temperature a1a n in tank stack, low level alarm, ED interlocked to S low vapor product temperature.
11. Burner gas and a i r control (vapor outl e t temperature controller)
Control f a i l s open (normally f a i l s closed). Control f a i l s closed.
12. Water supply
Water pressure i s lost.
13. Drain system
Back pressure existing in drain system.
(See 5. )
( a ) ED designates the Emergency Shutdown System, which includes both the bhster Emergency Shutdown (MES) and S the Vaporizer Emergency Shutdown (VES)
7.4
REPRESENTATIVE RELEASE EVENTS Using t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e system l e v e l and t h e component l e v e l analyses,
a l i s t o f p o t e n t i a l r e l e a s e events considered t o be r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e s a t e l 1 it e f a c i 1 it y was developed. i n Table 7.4. of Appendix G. These r e p r e s e n t a t i v e r e 1ease events a r e 1 is t e d P r e l i m i n a r y analyses f o r these events a r e presented i n Section 6.5 Release events f o r t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and t r a n s f e r operations a r e The representa-
introduced i n Table 6.9 o f Section 6 and a r e n o t included here. t o u n l i k e l y b u t l a r g e releases. analysis. TABLE 7.4.
t i v e r e l e a s e events range from r e l a t i v e l y frequent b u t low consequence releases They form the basis f o r t h e q u a n t i t a t i v e evalua t i o n o f t h e r e l e a s e p r e v e n t i o n and c o n t r o l systems i n the n e x t phase o f
Representative Re1ease Events f o r an LNG Sate1 1 it e F a c i l it y

.
S a t e l l i t e storage tank f a i l s . E x i t gas l i n e from t h e b o i l o f f heaters f a i l s . pumps f a i l s . Sendout pump vessel f a i l s . L i q u i d r e c i r c u l a t - i o n l i n e f o r t h e sendout pumps f a i l s . Vapor r e t u r n l i n e from t h e sendout pumps f a i q s . L i q u i d l i n e t o the vaporizers f a i l s . Vaporizer heat exchanger tubes f a i l . Natural gas l i n e from t h e vaporizers f a i l s . I n performing t h e overview study, several areas r e q u i r i n g a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r mation were i d e n t i f i e d . Some o f these a r e o u t l i n e d below. I n f o r m a t i o n i s needed on t h e number o f thermal L i q u i d discharge 1 i n e from t h e s a t e l l i t e storage tank p r i o r t o t h e sendout
Thermal C y c l i n g Stresses. prior t o failure. Operator I n t e r f a c e .
c y c l e s t h e storage tank and v a r i o u s s i z e s o f pipes o r t u b i n g can t a k e
R e l i a b i l i t y i n f o r m a t i o n on operator tasks r e l a t e d t o
1oadi ng , t r a n s p o r t , and unloading i s needed. LNG L i n e R e l i e f Valves. R e l i a b i l i t y i n f o r m a t i o n f o r o p e r a t i o n o f LNG
1 ine r e 1 i e f valves is needed.
Boiloff System. Additional information concerning the entire boiloff system, such as construction materials, valve placement, and temperature controllers, is needed. Storage Tank. Information concerning discharge valving for the tank is needed. Vaporizers. Information concerning the vaporizer internals, such as diameter of tubes, number of tubes, tube configuration, and flowrates, is needed. Information concerned with vaporizer tube corrosion probl ems is also needed. Failure Rate Data. The satellite facility overview study considered release frequency in a qualitative manner. A more detailed study of the re1 ease prevention and control systems must careful ly consider the 1 i kelihood of the release initiating event and the reliability of the release detection and control systems. Due to the lack of operating experience at LNG facilities, little data is available for LNG equipment failure rates .
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS T h i s o v e r v i e w s t u d y has c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e b a s i c types o f LNG o p e r a t i o n s , i d e n t i f i e d i n f o r m a t i o n needs r e l a t i n g t o LNG r e l e a s e p r e v e n t i o n and c o n t r o l and p r o v i d e d an a n a l y t i c a l framework f o r a d d i t i o n a l d e t a i l e d analyses. summarizes t h e f i n d i n g s o f t h i s study. ongoing r e l e a s e p r e v e n t i o n and c o n t r o l s t u d i e s a t PNL. Table 8.1 This information provides the basis f o r Table 8.1 i s organized
i n s e c t i o n s t o show t h e u n i t s o p e r a t i o n s , key components, r e p r e s e n t a t i v e r e l e a s e events and i n f o r m a t i o n needs o f r e p r e s e n t a t i v e LNG f a c i l i t i e s . Gas treatment, l i q u e f a c t i o n , storage, v a p o r i z a t i o n , t r a n s f e r , and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n a r e t h e b a s i c u n i t o p e r a t i o n s encountered i n LNG f a c i l i t i e s . LNG r e l e a s e s . The s t o r a g e and t r a n s f e r o p e r a t i o n s t y p i c a l l y have t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r t h e l a r g e s t The r e s u l t s o f t h i s study show t h a t t h e marine vessel, i m p o r t More d e t a i l e d r e l e a s e p r e v e n t i o n t e r m i n a l , and peakshaving f a c i l i t y c o n t a i n t h e b a s i c r e l e a s e p r e v e n t i o n and c o n t r o l elements u t i l i z e d i n t h e LNG i n d u s t r y . and c o n t r o l analyses a r e recommended w i t h emphasis on these f a c i l i t i e s . ( a
>
Components such as s t o r a g e tanks, t r a n s f e r l i n e s , emergency shutdown, pressure/ vacuum r e l i e f valves, l i q u i d l e v e l i n d i c a t o r s a r e common t o s e v e r a l o f t h e facilities. The r e l i a b i l i t y o f these types o f components should be c a r e f u l l y considered i n any d e t a i l e d assessment. Representative r e l e a s e events a r e summarized i n Table 8.1 f o r each f a c i l i t y . These r e l e a s e s a r e t y p i c a l l y p o s t u l a t e d f o r each u n i t o p e r a t i o n and a r e based upon t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e p r e l i m i n a r y hazards a n a l y s i s . (e.g., These r e p r e s e n t a t i v e r e l e a s e u n i t s range f r o m r e l a t i v e l y f r e q u e n t b u t l o w consequence r e l e a s e s v a p o r i z e r f a i l u r e ) t o u n l i k e l y b u t h i g h consequence r e l e a s e s (e.g., These r e l e a s e events a r e f e l t t o be t y p i c a l o f t h e As seen from t h e storage tank f a i l u r e ) .
range o f hazards i n v o l v e d i n t h e LNG f a c i l i t y o p e r a t i o n s . r u p t u r e s i n pipes, and process equipment f a i l u r e s . t h e n e x t phase o f a n a l y s i s .
summary t a b l e , most o f t h e r e l e a s e s i n v o l v e s t o r a g e t a n k f a i l u r e s , l e a k s o r
I t i s recommended t h a t
these r e p r e s e n t a t i v e r e l e a s e events be s u b j e c t t o q u a n t i t a t i v e e v a l u a t i o n d u r i n g
( a ) Marine vessel r e l e a s e p r e v e n t i o n and c o n t r o l was considered i n a separate p o r t i o n o f t h e DOE Program (A. D. L i t t l e 1980).
The overview s t u d y i d e n t i f i e d i n f o r m a t i o n needs i n two b a s i c areas. t i o n d e t a i l a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e more d e t a i l e d assessment phase.
First
those s p e c i f i c t o t h e f a c i l i t y b e i n g analyzed and t h e amount o f system d e s c r i p As shown i n t h e summary t a b l e , these types o f i n f o r m a t i o n needs i n c l u d e such areas as emergency shutdown system s p e c i f i c s , p i p i n g network design c r i t e r i a , and LNG v a p o r i z e r process c o n t r o l . Secondly, more general i n f o r m a t i o n gaps and needs were ident i f i e d i n such areas as t h e s t r u c t u r a l i n t e g r i t y o f s t o r a g e tanks when s u b j e c t t o hazardous c o n d i t i o n s , t h e o p e r a t o r i n t e r f a c e and i t s e f f e c t on r e l e a s e p r e v e n t i o n and c o n t r o l , LNG equipment f a i l u r e r a t e data, and t h e e f f e c t o f thermal c y c l i n g on LNG equipment performance.
I t i s recommended t h a t these
areas be considered i n t h e more d e t a i l e d phase o f a n a l y s i s . B u i l d i n g upon t h i s study, PNL has i n i t i a t e d more d e t a i l e d assessments o f LNG i m p o r t t e r m i n a l and peakshaving f a c i l i t y r e l e a s e p r e v e n t i o n and c o n t r o l systems. The o b j e c t i v e o f t h e d e t a i l e d i m p o r t t e r m i n a l and peakshaving f a c i l i t : The e f f e c t o f a l t e r n a t i v e assessments i s t o e s t i m a t e r e l e a s e frequency and volume f o r t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e r e l e a s e sequences i d e n t i f i e d i n t h i s assessment. compared on a q u a n t i t a t i v e basis. c o n t r o l sys tenis. r e l e a s e p r e v e n t i o n and c o n t r o l systems and procedures w i l l be examined and S t u d i e s have a l s o been i n i t i a t e d on human f a c t o r s i n LNG o p e r a t i o n s , LNG s t o r a g e t a n k o p e r a t i o n s , and LNG f i r e and vapor
TABLE 8.1.
Summary of LNG Facility Scoping Assessment

Key Components W i t h Respect t o R f l p a s e PreventionIControl R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Re1 ease Events Areas R e q u i r i n g More I n ti - f o r m a-o n
Representative F a c i 1 it y E x p o r t Terminal
Unit Operations
Gas t r e a t m e n t Liquefaction Storage Loading
- L i q u e f a c t i o n process c o n t r o l s y s t e v - R e f r i g e r e n t compressors - P r e s s u r e c o n t r o l system - I n t e r n a l s h u t o f f valves - LNG l e v e l i n d i c a t o r s and alarms - Storage tank i n s u l a t i o n - Onunt e rr tt a n kk w a ll ll e a wa -I n - 3 6 - i n . t r a n s f e r 1i n e - Loading arm and s h i p c o u p l i n g
-
mechani sm Loading emergency shutdown system Operator I n t e r f a c e
1 . Ruptured 3 6 - i n . main t r a n s f e r l i n e between l o a d i n g p u ~ i ~ pand dock. s 2. Ruptured 2 4 - i n . l i q u i d o u t l e t l i n e between s t o r a g e t a n k and f i r s t b l o c k valve. 3. Ruptured 1 6 - i n . l o a d i n g arm 4. Storage t a n k p r e s s u r e o r vacuum r e 1 l e f v a l v e s open. 5. I n n e r tank o v e r f i l l e d w i t h LNG. 6. Complete f a i l u r e o f s t o r a g e t a n k . 7 . Ruptured 1 8 - i n . gas f e e d l i n e i n liquefaction train. 8. Ruptured 2 0 - i n . mixed r e f r i g e r a n t l i q u i d p i p i n g between h i g h p r e s s u r e s e p a r a t o r and m a i n c r y o g e n i c h e a t exchanger. 9. Ruptured 1 0 - i n . n o z z l e t o propanelmixed r e f r i g e r a n t exchanger. 10. F a i l u r e o f r e f r i g e r a n t compressor. 1 1 . Ruptured 1 2 - i n . t r a n s f e r l i n e f r o m l i q u e f a c t i o n area t o the storage tanks. 12. Ruptured o u t l e t n o z z l e o r p i p i n g o n r e f r i g e r a n t storage tanks.
Emergency shutdown system P l a n t p i p i n g network S t r u c t u r a l mechanics o f s t o r a g e tanks S t r u c t u r a l mechanics Liquefaction plant process c o n t r o l Failure r a t e data Operator i n t e r f a c e w i t h systems and components
M a r i n e Vessel
B a s i c s h i p operat i n g and p r o p u l s i o n systems Cargo s t o r a g e Cargo h a n d l i n g
L i q u i d header, c r o s s o v e r l i n e and and v a l v e s Emergency shutdown system Primary b a r r i e r Outer and i n n e r h u l l s Cargo t a n k l i q u i d - l e v e l i n d i c a t o r s Pressure/vacuum r e 1 i e f v a l v e s N a v i g a t i o n equipment Operator i n t e r f a c e Main t r a n s f e r l i n e Loading arms and s h i p c o u p l i n g mechanism O f f s h o r e emergency shutdown system P r e s s u r e c o n t r o l system LNG l e v e l i n d i c a t o r s and alarms Storage tank outer s h e l l Annular space i n s u l a t i o n Storage tank i n n e r s h e l l Emergency shutdown system Secondary pumps and sendout l i n e t o vaporizers Fuel gas p r e h e a t e r Temperature c o n t r o l l e r s and alarms Vaporizer i n l e t l i n e s Operator i n t e r f a c e
1. 2. 3. 4.
Ruptured LNG c a r g o t a n k . O v e r f i l l e d cargo tank. Pressure r e l i e f v a l v e s r e l e a s e . Rupture o r l e a k i n c d r g o h a n d l i n g . system. 5. Rupture o r l e a k i n vapor h a n d l i n g system. 6. M i s o p e r a t i o n o f c a r g o h a n d l i n g systern r e s u l t s i n LIJG/vapor r e l e a s e . 1. 2. 3. 4.
Collision probability Effects o f collision on LNG vessel Cargo h a n d l i n g system design Effects o f s p i l l s , f i r e s , and e x p l o s i o n s F a i l u r e r a t e data Operator i n t e r f a c e Component s t r e s s e s f r o m thermal c y c l i n g Terminal p i p i n g n e t work d e s i g n c r i t e r i a S t r u c t u r a l mechanics o f t h e s t o r a g e tanks LNG v a p o r i z e r process control Failure r a t e data Operator interface
I m p o r t Terminal
Marine terminal and u n l o a d i n g system Storage Va~orization
5.
6.
7.
8. 9.
10. 11. 12. 13. 14.
F a i l u r e o f i n n e r storage tank. F a i l u r e o f storage tank outer b a r r i e r . Release o f LNG f r o m l o a d i n g arms. F a i l u r e o f LNG t r a n s f e r l i n e f r o m u n l o a d i n g dock t o shore. F a i l u r e o f LNG t r a n s f e r l i n e f r o m shore t o s t o r a g e . F a i l u r e o f LNG t r a n s f e r l i n e f r o m s t o r a g e t o secondary pump. F a i l u r e o f LNG t r a n s f e r l i n e f r o m secondary pumps t o v a p o r i z e r s . F a i 1u r e o f seawater-type v a p o r i z e r . F a i l u r e o f submerged combustion-type vaporizer. Failure o f vaporizer e x i t lines. F a i l u r e o f f u e l gas compressor s u c t i o n line. F a i l u r e o f LllG r e c i r c u l a t i o n l i n e . F a i l u r e o f vapor r e t u r n l i n e t o s h i p ' s tanks. F a i l u r e o f vapor 1 i n e f r o m p i p e 1 i n e comp r e s s o r s t o gas t r a n s m i s s i o n p i p e l i n e .
Peakshaving F a c i l i t y
Gas t r e a t m e n t Liquefaction Storaqe Vaporization Truck t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and t r a n s f e r
R e g e n e r a t i o n gas h e a t e r I4olecular sieve adsorbers Emergency shutdown system Temperature and l i q u i d l e v e l i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n and c o n t r o l s Heat exchangers and v a p o r - l i q u i d separator vessels Storage t a n k i n n e r s h e l l Annular space i n s u l a t i o n S t o r a g e tank o u t e r s h e l l Tank d i s c h a r g e l i n e t o pumps S t o r a g e tank pump v e s s e l Vaporizers Vaporizer discharge l i n e Vaporizer water bath Double s h e l l tank t r u c k Truck p r e s s u r e r e l i e f d e v i c e s Truck v a l v i n g and c o n t r o l s Opera t o r i n t e r f a c e
1 . F a i l u r e o f n a t u r a l gas s u p p l y l i n e . - Component s t r e s s e s 2. F a i l u r e o f m o l e c u l a r s i e v e a d s o r b e r f r o m thermal c y c l i n g vessel. - P l a n t and component 3. F a i l u r e o f r e g e n e r a t i o n gas h e a t e r design d e t a i l s - S t r u c t u r a l mechanics h e a t exchange t u b e 4 . F a i l u r e o f LPlG p i p i n g i n t h e c o l d box. o f s t o r a g e tanks 5. F a i l u r e i n r e f r i g e r a n t compressor sec- - F a i l u r e r a t e d a t a tion line. - Operator i n t e r f a c e 6. F a i l u r e o f r e f r i g e r a n t s t o r a g e t a n k . 7. F a i l u r e o f LNG s t o r a g e t a n k . 8. F a i l u r e o f LNG s t o r a g e tank o u t l e t . 9. V e n t i n g o f n a t u r a l gas t h r o u g h p r e s sure r e l i e f values. 10. F a i l u r e o f sendout pump v e s s e l 11. F a i l u r e o f LNG s u p p l y 1 i n e t o v a p o r i z e r s . 12. F a i l u r e o f v a p o r i z e r h e a t exchanger t u b e . 13. F a i l u r e o f n a t u r a l gas l i n e f r o m v a p o r i z e r s . 14. F a i l u r e o f t r a n s f e r l i n e f r o m s t o r a g e t o truck loading. 1 5 . F a i l u r e o f f l e x i b l e l o a d i n g l u n l o a d i n g hoses. 16. F a i l u r e o f t r u c k l o a d i n g t o s t o r a g e vapor return line. 17. F a i l u r e o f t r u c k LIiG t a n k . 10. F a i l u r e o f t r a i l e r n r e s s u r e b u i l d u p c o i l .
Satellite F a c i l i t l
Truck t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and t r a n s fer Storage Vaporization
Double s h e l l t a n k t r u c k Operator i n t e r f a c e Truck p r e s s u r e r e l i e f d e v i c e s Storage tank i n n e r s h e l l A n n u l a r space i n s u l a t i o n S t o r a g e tank o u t e r s h e l l Storage t a n k d i s c h a r g e l i n e t o Pumps LNG r e c i r c u l a t i o n l i n e f r o m pumps t o tank S t o r a g e tank pump v e s s e l B o i l o f f heaters V a p o r i z e r h e a t exchanger tubes N a t u r a l gas d i s c h a r g e l i n e f r o m vaporizer Vaporizer water bath Temperature c o n t r o l l e r o n v a p o r i z e r d i s c h a r g e 1i n e
1. F a i l u r e o f t h e s t o r a g e t a n k . 2. F a i l u r e o f e x i t gas l i n e f r o m b o i l o f f heaters. 3. F a i l u r e o f l i q u i d d i s c h a r g e l i n e f r o m t h e s a t e l l i t e s t o r a g e tank p r i o r t o t h e sendout pumps. 4 . F a i l u r e o f sendout pump v e s s e l . 5. F a i l u r e o f l i q u i d r e c i r c u l a t i o n l i n e f o r t h e sendout pumps. 6. F a i l u r e o f v a p o r r e t u r n l i n e s f r o m t h e sendout pumps. 7. F a i l u r e o f t h e l i q u i d l i n e s t o t h e vaporizers. 8. F a i l u r e o f t h e v a p o r i z e r h e a t exchanger tubes. 9. F a i l u r e o f t h e n a t u r a l gas l i n e f r o m t h e vaporizers.
Thermal c y c l i n g stresses LNG 1 i n e r e 1 i e f valves B o i l o f f system d e s i g n and c o n s t r u c t i o n Storage t a n k d e s i g n and c o n s t r u c t i o n Vaporization design and c o n s t r u c t i o n Failure r a t e data Operator i n t e r f a c e
9.0
REFERENCES
Arthur D. L i t t l e , I n c . 1980. The F e a s i b i l i t y o f Methods and Systems f o r Reducing LNG Tanker F i r e Hazards. DOE/EV/04734-TI, Department o f Energy, Washington, D.C. I.S. Department o f Energy. 1979. L i q u e f i e d Gaseous Fuels Safety and Environ:;lental Control Assessment Programs: A Status Report. DOE/EV-0036, Department Energy, Washington, D. C.
APPENDIX A
LNG INOUSTRY OVERVIEW
APPENOIX A
LNG INDUSTRY O E VE VR IW
To provide f o r continuing a v a i l a b i l i t y of natural gas, particularly to high-priority customers, the natural gas industry has pursued various methods of supplementing i t s supplies of natural gas both on an annual basis and during periods of peak demand. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) i s one source of such supplemental gas suppl ies. This appendix briefly describes the various types of LNG f a c i l i t i e s and the principal operations carried out a t these f a c i l i t i e s . Vapor dispersion and f i r e control systems are also discussed briefly. The reference LNG f a c i l i t i e s considered in t h i s study are discussed in detail in Appendices B through F. This appendix i s based largely on information presented in a U.S. Department of Energy report (1978). Further, more detailed information on LNG f a c i l i t i e s and components can be found in two reports by the American Gas Association (1973a and 1973b). Discussions of safety practices and requirements, design c r i t e r i a , and codes and standards f o r LNG f a c i l i t i e s are also available in the l i t e r a t u r e (British Cryogenics Council 1970, Allan e t a l . 1974, Ball 1973, Ball 1976). A.l
LNG FACILITIES
LNG f a c i l i t i e s extend natural gas supplies to meet two basic types of demand: 1 ) base-load, year-round demand and 2 ) seasonal peak-use demand. Briefly, LNG f a c i l i t i e s f a l l into the following categories:
Export Terminal s are 1arge-capaci ty (185 t o 1500 MMscfd 1iquefaction capaci ty) faci 1i t i e s that receive, clean, and 1i quefy natural gas and store the resulting LNG unti 1 i t i s loaded on ocean-going tankers f o r shipment t o base-load import terminals. The reference export terminal f o r t h i s study i s described in detail in Appendix B.
LNG Marine Vessels (Tankers) are ocean-going ships and barges t h a t trans-
port LNG from export terminals to import terminals. The on-board LNG storage tanks are of e i t h e r the self-supporting or the membrane design. Basically, a self-supporting tank i s structurally independent of the
s h i p ' s h u l l , whereas a membrane t a n k ' s s t r u c t u r a l s u p p o r t i s p r o v i d e d by the ship's h u l l . Vessels on o r d e r o r i n o p e r a t i o n f o r U.S. t r a d e s range 3 3 i n s i z e f r o m 40,000 t o 130,000 m , b u t vessels o f up t o 165,000 m a r e A d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e r e f e r e n c e marine
under c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
vessel i s presented i n Appendix C o f t h i s study. I m p o r t Terminal s (Base-Load Faci 1 it i e s ) a r e 1arge-capaci t y ( 1 50 t o 1000 MMscfd) f a c i 1 it i e s r e c e i v i n g nonconti n e n t a l LNG f r o m ocean-going t a n k e r s , s t o r i n g i t , and r e g a s i f y i n g i t t o supply base-load demands on t h e i m p o r t i n g company. t o 3,000,000 b b l o f LNG. Storage c a p a c i t i e s g e n e r a l l y range from 200,000 Appendix D presents a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e
reference import terminal f o r t h i s study. Peakshaving F a c i l i t i e s have gas t r e a t m e n t , l i q u e f a c t i o n , and s t o r a g e u n i t s o f r e l a t i v e l y small c a p a c i t y coupled w i t h h i g h - c a p a c i t y v a p o r i z e r s t o s u p p l y e x t r a gas when t h e normal p i p e l i n e c a p a c i t y cannot meet peak demands. Storage c a p a c i t i e s range from 45,000 t o 630,000 b b l o f LNG. The r e f e r e n c e peakshaving f a c i l i t y D u r i n g warm weather and o t h e r p e r i o d s o f low demand, s u r p l u s gas i s l i q u e f i e d and s t o r e d f o r l a t e r use. i s discussed i n Appendix E o f t h i s study. Sate1 1 it e F a c i l i t i e s a r e small f a c i l i t i e s s i m i l a r t o peakshaving p l a n t s but without liquefaction capability. LNG i s s u p p l i e d n o r m a l l y by t a n k t r u c k s ( b u t c o u l d a l s o be s u p p l i e d by barge, p i p e l i n e , o r r a i l t a n k e r s ) . The l a r g e r s a t e l 1 i t e p l a n t s ( o v e r about 5000 b b l o f LNG s t o r a g e c a p a c i t y ) a r e f i e l d erected, whereas s m a l l e r u n i t s g e n e r a l l y use s h o p - b u i l t c r y o g e n i c t a n k s f o r storage.
A d e t a i l e d description o f the reference
s a t e l l i t e p l a n t f o r t h i s s t u d y i s presented i n Appendix F. Tank Trucks a r e over-the-road c r y o g e n i c t r a i 1e r s ( p u l l e d by t r a c t o r s ) c o n s t r u c t e d w i t h d o u b l e - s h e l l tanks i n s u l a t e d i n t h e a n n u l a r space. t a n k e r s ' c a p a c i t i e s a r e on t h e o r d e r o f 10,000 g a l l o n s . t o g e t h e r w i t h peakshaving o p e r a t i o n s . and o p e r a t i o n s used f o r t r u c k t r a n s p o r t a r e discussed i n Appendix E, The The equipment
A.2
PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS AT LNG FACILITIES I n t h e course o f LNG production and u t i l i z a t i o n , f o u r p r i n c i p a l u n i t
operations a r e t y p i c a l l y involved: gas treatment 1i q u e f a c t i o n storage vaporization. As p r e v i o u s l y discussed, these operations a r e n o t a1 1 performed a t each type o f facility. Figure A . l shows which operations r e l a t e t o each type o f f a c i l i t y . Transport between f a c i l i t i e s , by e i t h e r s h i p o r t r u c k , may a l s o be involved. Each o f t h e major operations a r e b r i e f l y discussed i n t h e f o l l o w i n g subsections. More d e t a i l e d discussions a r e i n c l u d e d i n t h e a p p r o p r i a t e f a c i l i t y d e s c r i p t i o n s (Appendices B through F ) .
GAS TREATMENT
LIQUEFACTION
STORAGE
VAPORIZATION EXPORT TERM lNAL

FIGURE A. I .
MAR lNE VESSEL
IMPORT TERM lNAL
PEAKSHAVING PLANT
SATELLITE PLANT
P r i n c i p a l Operations Performed a t Various LNG F a c i l i t i e s
A.2.1
Gas Treatment Since 1 i q u e f a c t i o n o f n a t u r a l gas r e q u i r e s temperatures as low as -260F,
any c o n s t i t u e n t s i n t h e gas t h a t might s o l i d i f y a t cryogenic temperatures must be removed ( o r reduced t o s u f f i c i e n t l y low concentrations) t o prevent plugging o f p i p i n g o r valves and f o u l i n g of heat exchangers. I n a d d i t i o n , heavy hydrocarbons (e .g., Two such cons t i t u e n t s found i n a l l n a t u r a l gas feedstock a r e water and carbon d i o x i d e . hexane, benzene, 1u b r i c a t i n g o i l s ) , The processes dust, and s u l f u r compounds used as odorants must be removed. o t h e r gas processing operations. Water i s u s u a l l y removed u s i n g molecular sieves ( s y n t h e t i c z e o l i t e absorbants) , though a c t i v a t e d alumina, a c t i v a t e d bauxite, and s i l i c a gel have been used as s o l i d desiccants. Most p l a n t s have t h r e e d r y i n g towers: the f i r s t i n s e r v i c e f o r d r y i n g t h e gas, t h e second being regenerated by c o u n t e r f l o w i n g heated d r y gas, and t h e t h i r d c o o l i n g . Dehydration u s i n g g l y c o l s o l u t i o n s has a l s o been used, b u t t h i s process alone does n o t remove enough water and thus i s g e n e r a l l y u t i l i z e d as a f i r s t - s t a g e dehydration system f o l l o w e d by a f i n a l d r y desiccant step. For carbon d i o x i d e and s u l f u r compound removal, both wet and d r y processes a r e used; t h e amine process and t h e molecular sieve process a r e most w i d e l y used. The amine process i n v o l v e s a chemical r e a c t i o n between t h e gas contaminate and t h e amine s o l u t i o n i n a c o u n t e r f l o w column. heat which reverses t h e chemical r e a c t i o n . The molecular s i e v e process f o r C02 removal has been used e x t e n s i v e l y i n peakshaving p l a n t s i n r e c e n t years. a single unit. One advantage t o t h i s process i s t h a t t h e molecular s i e v e may simultaneously remove b o t h water and carbon d i o x i d e i n Molecular sieves a r e s y n t h e t i c z e o l i t e compounds t h a t selecAs i n o t h e r processes t i v e l y adsorb gases and l i q u i d s from process streams. The amine s o l u t i o n i s then s t r i p p e d o f t h e C02 and H2S gases i n a d i s t i l l a t i o n column by t h e a d d i t i o n o f
and equipment used a r e r e l a t i v e l y conventional and have been adapted from
f o r c o n s t i t u e n t removal, a regeneration step i s necessary i n which t h e sieve i s warmed and purged t o r e l e a s e t h e adsorbed contaminates.
The R e c t i s o l process u t i l i z i n g an organic solvent, u s u a l l y methanol, i s a1 so used i n some instances f o r removal o f C02 and H20. The type of process and equipment used a t a p a r t i c u l a r p l a n t i s determined by t h e p l a n t designers based on normal engineering and c o s t f a c t o r s . A.2.2 Liauefaction The l i q u e f a c t i o n s e c t i o n o f an LNG p l a n t provides f o r the removal o f s e n s i b l e and l a t e n t heat from t h e incoming n a t u r a l gas t o convert i t t o a l i q u i d a t atmospheric pressure. L i q u e f a c t i o n p l a n t s can be designed i n several d i f f e r e n t ways depending on engineering and c o s t requirements, so o n l y a b r i e f general discussion o f t h e processes i s provided here. The two b a s i c means o f l i q u e f a c t i o n a r e t h e cascade c y c l e and t h e expander cycle. These a r e both standard r e f r i g e r a t i o n cycles, d e t a i l s o f which a r e widely available i n the l i t e r a t u r e . The cascade c y c l e uses t h e f o l l o w i n g major equipment components: compressor u n i t o r u n i t s heat exchangers c o o l i n g tower i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n and c o n t r o l system. The c y c l e u t i l i z e s a s e r i e s o f r e f r i g e r a n t s t o s e q u e n t i a l l y o b t a i n a lower temperature i n each step. sures. The r e f r i g e r a n t s used p r o v i d e o v e r l a p i n t h e i r condensation and v a p o r i z a t i o n temperatures w i t h o u t r e q u i r i n g extensive pres-
A m o d i f i e d v e r s i o n o f t h e cascade c y c l e uses a blend o f r e f r i g e r a n t s
i n a s i n g l e r e f r i g e r a n t c i r c u i t and thus r e q u i r e s o n l y a s i n g l e compressor. The expander c y c l e u t i l i z e s t h e Joule-Thomson e f f e c t t o provide d i r e c t c o o l i n g as t h e compressed gas expands i s e n t r o p i c a l l y through an engine o r t u r b i n e , producing work. o u t l e t pressures. pressures (e.g., The amount o f r e f r i g e r a t i o n produced i s re1a t e d d i r e c t l y t o both t h e amount o f gas and t h e r a t i o o f t h e expander i n l e t and I n n a t u r a l gas l i q u e f a c t i o n , t h e expander c y c l e i s from high-pressure transmission systems). The major equipu t i l i z e d p r i m a r i l y where l a r g e q u a n t i t i e s o f gas a r e a v a i l a b l e a t h i g h ment components i n t h e expander c y c l e i n c l u d e an expansion t u r b i n e , heat
exchanger u n i t , compressor u n i t f o r recompression, and i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n and control. A.2.3 Storage Storage systems f o r LNG i n v o l v e a b a s i c c o n t a i n e r f o r t h e l i q u i d ; an i n s u l a t i o n system t o c o n t r o l heat t r a n s f e r t o t h e l i q u i d ; p i p i n g , valves, pumps, etc., f o r t r a n s f e r o f l i q u i d i n t o and o u t o f storage; a vapor c o n t r o l system; and v a r i o u s i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n f o r determining t h e s t a t u s o f t h e tank and i t s contents. Large LNG storage tanks a r e designed t o s t o r e t h e b o i l i n g l i q u i d a t vapor-space pressures u s u a l l y i n t h e range 0.5 t o 2 p s i above atmospheric pressure.
A t these pressures t h e l i q u i d i s a t temperatures near -260F.

L i q u i d l o s s r a t e s by b o i l i n g The vapor space pressure
(Some small tanks, p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u c k tanks, a r e designed f o r o p e r a t i o n a t somewhat h i g h e r temperatures and pressures.) a r e h e l d a t 1ow values, t y p i c a l l y 0.1 percent per day o r l e s s , by means o f i n s u l a t i o n t h a t l i m i t s heat i n f l u x t o t h e l i q u i d . i s maintained above atmospheric pressure i n o r d e r t o preclude leakage o f a i r i n t o t h e vapor space; t h e r e a r e upper and lower l i m i t s f o r t h e vapor space pressure f o r each tank design based on s t r u c t u r a l i n t e g r i t y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Maintenance o f t h e tank pressure w i t h i n these l i m i t s r e q u i r e s pressure sensors and c o n t r o l o f t h e r a t e o f withdrawal o f l i q u i d and vapor, p l u s pressure and vacuum vents f o r p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t over-or under-pressure due t o unusual c i rcumstances
.
Care must be taken i n design-
Most LNG tanks a r e c y l i n d r i c a l , w i t h f l a t bottoms r e s t i n g on t h e ground o r on a s t r u c t u r a l p l a t f o r m above t h e ground. i n g tanks t o be b u i l t on t h e ground t o consider t h e e f f e c t s o f heat conduct i o n from t h e e a r t h i n t o t h e tank, e s p e c i a l l y t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f f r o s t heave o f t h e s o i 1. T y p i c a l l y , cryogenic storage tanks a r e b u i 1t w i t h two w a l l s. The o u t e r tank i s n o t designed I n most tanks t h e two w a l l s a r e The i n n e r tank i s constructed o f a p p r o p r i a t e m a t e r i a l s t o w i t h s t a n d t h e cryogenic temperatures associated w i t h the LNG. and a v a p o r - t i g h t seal around t h e i n n e r tank. inner wall t o contain the l i q u i d . t o h o l d LNG, b u t provides both weather p r o t e c t i o n f o r t h e tank i n s u l a t i o n both metal, 'but some tanks have been constructed w i t h a prestressed concrete One tank has been b u i l t w i t h a concrete
o u t e r w a l l , t h e l i q u i d containment c o n s i s t i n g o f a mylar-aluminum laminate supported a g a i n s t p l a s t i c foam i n s u l a t i o n by a metal l a t t i c e framework. The i n n e r tank i n most cases does n o t have a v a p o r - t i g h t top; i n s u l a t i o n i s supp o r t e d on a l i g h t framework over t h e t o p o f t h e tank, and vapor d i f f u s e s i n t o t h e whole i n s u l a t i o n space. T h i s type o f design makes adequate purging o f a Special plumbing i s tank i n t o o r o u t o f s e r v i c e somewhat more d i f f i c u l t .
t h e r e f o r e provided t o f a c i l i t a t e purging t h e i n s u l a t i o n . I n l e t and o u t l e t p i p i n g f o r LNG penetrates t h e tank e i t h e r through t h e w a l l near t h e bottom o r d i r e c t l y through t h e bottom, o r enters t h e tank through the roof. the floor. I n t h e l a t t e r case, sendout pumps a r e mounted i n t h e l i q u i d on Designs i n which p i p i n g does n o t penetrate t h e bottom o r the w a l l However, i n c l u s i o n o f an i n t e r n a l
below t h e l i q u i d surface a r e p r e f e r r e d because o f t h e reduced 1i.kelihood o f s p i l l i n g t h e e n t i r e contents o f t h e tank. v a l v e a t t h e opening i n t h e tank reduces t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f such s p i l l a g e . I n l e t p i p i n g i s designed t o a v o i d s t r a t i f i c a t i o n o f LNG by p r o v i d i n g f o r adequate m i x i n g o f new LNG w i t h o l d LNG. nozzles t o promote mixing. M a t e r i a l s f o r i n n e r tanks, p i p i n g , and o t h e r components s u b j e c t t o temperatures ranging from ambient t o cryogenic must r e t a i n s t r e n g t h and d u c t i l i t y throughout t h a t range. T h i s can be done i n p a r t by i n j e c t i n g heavier LNG a t t h e top, and v i c e versa, and by a p p r o p r i a t e design o f t h e
A l a r g e amount o f research has e s t a b l i s h e d c e r t a i n
metals, e s p e c i a l l y 9 percent n i c k e l s t e e l , s t a i n l e s s s t e e l s , and c e r t a i n aluminum a l l o y s , as having a p p r o p r i a t e s t r e n g t h and d u c t i l i t y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , i n both base metal and welds, f o r t h i s service. The 9 percent n i c k e l s t e e l and 5083 aluminum a l l o y s a r e g e n e r a l l y used f o r metal i n n e r tanks o f l a r g e containers, whereas s t a i n l e s s s t e e l s a r e used f o r p i p i n g , components, and some s m a l l e r storage tanks. e.g., These m a t e r i a l s a r e recognized i n standards, API 620 (1971 ) , as being s u i t a b l e cryogenic m a t e r i a l s f o r LNG service.
Concrete a1 so i s recognized i n NFPA 59A (1975) and o t h e r codes and standards by reference as an acceptable m a t e r i a l f o r containers s u b j e c t t o LNG temperat u r e s ; t h e standards s p e c i f y requirements f o r measuring, mixing, p l a c i n g , t e s t i n g , etc., i n o r d e r t o o b t a i n concrete w i t h d e s i r a b l e p r o p e r t i e s f o r low
temperature s e r v i c e .
The safety and r e l i a b i l i t y of LNG storage tanks and associated piping and components depends on many aspects of design, construction, testing, operat i o n , and maintenance, a l l of which are covered i n considerable detail i n the applicable codes and standards. A f i r s t step i n the planning of a f a c i l i t y i s the choice of a s i t e , and an important factor in the s i t e selection i s the s u i t a b i l i t y of the s o i l f o r a tank foundation. Detailed designs of the tank and accessories w i l l , of course, include complete specifications f o r a l l materials t o be used, f o r methods of assembly, f o r testing and inspection of c r i t i c a l materials, welds, e t c . , and f o r proof testing of the vessel when completed. Among the many factors which must be considered during design are: seismic loads, including the possibility of liquid sloshing out of the inner tank into the insulation space; secondary loads including wind, snow, etc.; requirements f o r p u r g i n g ; requirements f o r mixing and f o r instrumentation t o minimize possible s t r a t i f i c a t i o n and i t s e f f e c t s ; cool down requirements; and pressure and vacuum control. All above-ground LNG tanks are surrounded with dikes to contain spilled material and t o limit the hazards resulting from the s p i l l . Most dikes f o r large tanks are earthen, and generally are low in profile, i . e . , the height i s small compared t o the horizontal dimensions. A few f a c i l i t i e s have high dikes made of concrete; some of these additionally have insulation applied to the floor and lower walls of the impoundment t o reduce vapor generation i n case of a s p i l l . I n order for a dike to serve the intended purpose, i t i s necessary t h a t the drainage of surface water be provided f o r , without a t the sa.me time providing a pathway through the dike wall f o r LNG. The dike should be relatively impervious t o LNG and should be r e s i s t a n t to damage by forces such as earthquakes, floods, e t c . Various codes, standards, and guidelines require o r suggest the volumes of dikes, the positions of tanks within dikes, distances from dikes t o property l i n e s , e t c . For example, NFPA 59A (1975) specifies t h a t a dike have a volume equal t o t h a t of the f u l l container i f there i s only one container within the dike or, i f more than one, t h a t a s p i l l of one tank will not damage another by exposure t o f i r e or t o low temperatures. Some codes provide f o r dike volumes greater than 100 percent of tank volume. These requirements are
based on t h e a n t i c i p a t e d need f o r e x t r a allowance f o r f r o t h i n g o f s p i l l e d LNG, allowance f o r vapor storage d u r i n g t h e e a r l y moments o f t h e s p i l l t o reduce t h e d i s p e r s i o n hazard, and t o reduce t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f l i q u i d s l o s h i n g over t h e t o p o f t h e d i k e . Although i n t h e p a s t most dikes have been b u i l t w i t h s o i l , i n c r e a s i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s being given t o m a t e r i a l s w i t h more favorable heat t r a n s f e r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , such as i n s u l a t i n g concrete. To minimize t h e p o t e n t i a l hazards ( p r i m a r i l y t o p l a n t personnel and t o p l a n t equipment) from r e l a t i v e l y small s p i l l s , t h e area enclosed by t h e d i k e i s graded around processing and 1i q u e f a c t i o n equipment, vaporizers, pumps, p i p i n g , etc., so t h a t LNG s p i l l e d i n these areas w i l l d r a i n away from t h e equipment i n t o a sump i n a remote corner o f t h e impoundment area. A.2.4 Vaporization Vaporization ( o r r e g a s i f i c a t i o n ) i s accompl i s h e d u s i n g re1 a t i v e l y standard and we1 1-proven equipment. The f i r s t step o f r e g a s i f i c a t i o n r e q u i r e s t h e pumping o f t h e LNG t o a s u f f i c i e n t pressure so t h a t t h e n a t u r a l gas can e n t e r t h e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n system, e i t h e r a t d i s t r i b u t i o n o r transmission system pressures. These are: v e r t i c a l mu1t i staged deep-we1 1 t u r b i n e pumps mu1 ti staged submersi b l e pumps m u l t i s t a g e d h o r i z o n t a l pumps. The type o f pump used i s dependent upon engineering f a c t o r s (such as discharge pressure, volume, and f l e x i b i l it y needed) as we1 1 as economics. The LNG i s vaporized by t h e t r a n s f e r o f heat t o a l i q u i d which then heats t h e LNG t o i t s bubble p o i n t , vaporizes it, and superheats t h e vapor t o d i s charge temperature. t i o n is f e a s i b l e . integral f i r e d remote f i r e d ambient heated process heated. Here again, a number o f f a c t o r s , such as whether t h e Vaporizers a r e categorized as : f a c i l i t y i s baseload o r peakshaving, w i l l determine which method o f vaporizaThree types o f standard pumps a r e being used a t t h e present time.
I n t h e i n t e g r a l - h e a t e d vaporizers, t h e tubes through which t h e LNG flows can be heated by d i r e c t impingement o f a flame, by r a d i a t i o n , by convection of h o t combustion gases, o r by a h e a t - t r a n s f e r medium such as water between t h e flame and t u b i n g c a r r y i n g t h e LNG. combustion v a p o r i z e r . f l u i d i s used. The l a t t e r i s a1 so c a l l e d a submerged I n remote-heated vaporizers, t h e primary heat source
i s remote from t h e v a p o r i z i n g exchanger and an i n t e r m e d i a t e h e a t - t r a n s f e r The f l u i d i s heated i n a b o i l e r o r f i r e d heater and then pumped t o t h e v a p o r i z e r where i t vaporizes t h e LNG and warms t h e n a t u r a l gas. Ambient heated vaporizers a r e used i n small LNG i n s t a l l a t i o n s and u t i l i z e atmospheric a i r , sea water, o r geothermal waters as t h e i r heat source. Process heated v a p o r i z e r s e x t r a c t t h e i r heat from another thermodynamic o r chemical process o r operate i n such a manner as t o u t i l i z e the r e f r i g e r a t i o n e f f e c t a v a i l a b l e from t h e LNG.
A r e l i a b l e c o n t r o l system i s e s s e n t i a l t o any o f these vaporizers t o

ensure t h a t gas i s a v a i l a b l e a t t h e o u t l e t a t t h e r e q u i r e d pressure, temperat u r e , and f l o w r a t e and t o p r o v i d e p r o t e c t i o n f o r t h e f a c i l i t y by l i m i t i n g pressure and temperature. response.
I f the temperature and/or pressure l i m i t s a r e
exceeded, t h e c o n t r o l system must p r o v i d e f o r shut-down o r o t h e r p r o t e c t i v e I n a d d i t i o n , normal purge and flame s a f e t y c o n t r o l s a r e employed i n I c e formation on v a p o r i z e r tubes can a l s o t h e o p e r a t i o n o f f i r e d vaporizers. a r e provided. A.3
VAPOR DISPERSION AND FIRE CONTROL SYSTEMS
be a problem, and t h e r e f o r e means o f d e t e c t i n g and p r e v e n t i n g such formation
LNG f a c i l i t i e s a r e designed w i t h f e a t u r e s and equipment t o l i m i t o r cont r o l t h e hazards o f vapor d i s p e r s i o n and o f f i r e . a c t i v e sys terns a r e in c l uded. Basic l i m i t a t i o n o f both t h e d i s p e r s i o n and t h e r a d i a t i o n hazard i s determined by s e l e c t i o n o f s i t e s , distances from p r o p e r t y l i n e s t o t h e i n s i d e surface o f t h e dike, and l o c a t i o n o f t h e tank ( o r tanks) and o t h e r equipment w i t h i n the dike. I n a d d i t i o n t o these considerations, s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r s i n c o n t r o l 1 ing t h e vapor d i s p e r s i o n hazard i n c l u d e 1i m i t a t i o n o f t h e b o i 1 i n g r a t e o f s p i l l e d LNG by choice o f dike-face m a t e r i a l s , l i m i t a t i o n o f t o t a l Both passive f e a t u r e s and
vaporization r a t e by configuration of the dike floor, and design of the dike to have vapor holding capacity, e i t h e r by oversizing the dike i t s e l f or by adding a t i g h t vapor fence on the top of the dike. Other techniques f o r control of the dispersion hazard have been considered, such as open vapor fences, water sprays, high-expansion foams, blowers to increase mixing with a i r , e t c . Some faci 1i t i e s are equipped with automatic foam equipment actuated by signals from low temperature detectors in the sump floor, so t h a t foam can be produced and del ivered in %I5 seconds (Drake and Wesson 1976). Fire hazard control begins with careful planning of the f a c i l i t y to limit exposure of parts of the plant to f i r e s in other parts, as suggested above. Passive techniques of f i r e control also include the use of f i r e r e s i s t a n t construction, such as concrete and ablative, subliming, and intumescent coatings. Many such materials have been tested under radiation and flame impingement conditions and the results have been summarized (Drake and Wesson 1976). Active protective techniques include systen~sf o r spraying water directly on tanks and other structures near f i r e s f o r temperature control. The designs of such systems are covered in various codes and standards (Drake and Wesson 1976). Water curtains are also used between potential s p i l l areas and vulnerable equipment a t some f a c i l i t i e s . A indicated above, some f a c i l i t i e s have s installed foam systems f o r rapid placement of foam blankets; t h i s serves two purposes, reduction of vapor generation r a t e and radiation reduction in case of f i r e . Finally, systems f o r application of dry chemicals f o r extinguishment of LNG f i r e s are in general use.
REFERENCES Allan, D. e t a l . 1974 Technology and Current P r a c t i c e s f o r Processing, T r a n s f e r r i n g and S t o r i n g L i q u e f i e d Natural Gas. A. D. L i t t l e , Inc., Report t o the Department o f Transportation, PB-241048. American Gas Association. 1973a. LNG I n f o r m a t i o n Book, 1973. mation Task Group o f LNG Committee. LNG I n f o r -
American Gas Association. 1973b. I n t r o d u c t i o n t o LNG f o r Personnel Safety Accident Prevention Committee o f t h e Operating Section.
A P I Standard 620, Low Pressure Storage Tanks f o r L i q u e f i e d N a t u r a l Gas. June 1971.
B a l l , W. L. 1973. and Standards."
"Current Status o f National, State, and Local LNG Codes Pipe1 i n e and Gas Journal, pp. 46, 49, 59, 60, 62, 64.
B a l l , W. L., 1976. "NFPA-59A Storage and Handling of L i q u e f i e d Natural Gas-1975, A Review o f Recent Changes." Presented a t A.G.A. Transmission Conference, Operation Section Proc., T-169 t o T-171. B r i t i s h Cryogenics Council. 1970. Cryogenics Safety Manual, A Guide t o Good P r a c t i c e . Safety Panel, London, S.W. 1, 1970. Drake, E. M. and H. R. lesson. 1976. "Review o f LNG S p i l l Vapor D i s p e r s i o n and F i r e Hazard E s t i m a t i o n and Control Methods." Paper presented a t A.G.A. Transmission Conference, A.G.A. Operating Section Proc., T-172 t o T-188. NFPA No. 59A-1975, Standard f o r t h e Storage and Handling o f L i q u e f i e d Natural Gas (LNG). National F i r e P r o t e c t i o n Association, Boston, Massachusetts, ( p r i o r e d i t i o n s adopted i n 1967, 1971, and 1972).
U.S. Department o f Energy. 1978. An Approach t o L i q u e f i e d Natural Gas (LNG) Safety and Environmental Control Research. DOE/EV-0002, Washington, D.C.
APPENDIX B
F A C I L I T Y DESCRIPTION OF REFERENCE LNG EXPORT TERMINAL
APPENDIX B FACILITY DESCRIPTION OF REFERENCE LNG EXPORT TERMINAL Export terminals, both planned and operating, a r e 1i s t e d i n Table B.l together w i t h p e r t i n e n t d e t a i l s . Export terminals a r e located i n Algeria, Specially designed 3 t r a n s p o r t the Alaska, Borneo, Abu Dhabi, Indonesia, Chile, I r a n , and Libya. cryogenic tankers ranging in capacity from 50,000 t o 130,000 m
LNG from t h e export terminals t o the import terminals located in Japan, Europe, and t h e United S t a t e s . By 1985, these export f a c i l i t i e s a r e projected t o
increase the t o t a l United S t a t e s natural gas supply by about 7000 MMscfd, o r about 12% of expected U.S. gas supplies. Baselpad operations i n t h e United S t a t e s began in 1969 with the AlaskaJapan p r o j e c t t h a t exports 135 MMscfd of gas. Two additional baseload liquef a c t i o n f a c i l i t i e s a r e planned f o r operation i n Alaska; one with an expected liquefaction capacity of 400 MMscfd and the o t h e r with a l i q u e f a c t i o n capacity of 3375 MMscfd. B.1 BASIC PROCESS FLOW
A block flow diagram f o r an LNG export terminal i s shown i n Figure B.1. The description o f the LNG export terminal was developed using information from the sources l i s t e d i n Section B.5. The major u n i t operations involved a r e gas treatment, l i q u e f a c t i o n , s t o r a g e , and marine vessel loading.
Natural gas i s supplied t o the terminal through about 50 miles of offshore and 240 miles of onshore pipeline with a maxin~umallowable operating pressure of 1000 psig. A t o t a l of about 440 MMscfd of gas i s received by the p l a n t . About 40 MMscfd of t h i s i s used t o meet plant fuel requirements, and t h e MMscfd) i s 1 iquefied and s e n t t o storage. Allowing remainder of t h e gas ( ~ 4 0 0 f o r storage tank l o s s e s through b o i l o f f , estimated t o be about 44 m 3 of LNG per day, about 4.8 days a r e required t o f i l l one of the two 550,000-bbl storage tanks.
TABLE B. 1
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Base1 oad LNG L i q u e f a c t i o n F a c i l it i e s

Liquefaction P l a n t Capacity ~IINSC~~) 200.0 S t o r a e Ca a c i t 1 ~ c ~ y 7 R + , 1,840 210 ( 3 x 70) 1,890 ( 3 x 630) 2,880 I(A 630 ( 2 x 315) 700 ( 2 x 350) 350 880 ( 2 x 440) 1,131 ( 3 x 377) Type o f S t o r a g e Container !ear Aboveground (2-aluminum 1-9% n i c k e l ) Aboveground 98 n i c k e l Aboveground Aboveground Aboveground 9% n i c k e l Aboveground 9% n i c k e l Aboveground 9% n i c k e l Aboveground 9% n i c k e l Aboveground 9% n i c k e l Aboveground a1 unlinum Aboveground 9% n i c k e l Aboveground 98 n i c k e l Aboveground 9% n i c k e l Aboveground 9% n i c k e l NA Abovey round 9Z n i c k e l Aboveground
Company and P l a n t S i t e Cantel, Arzew, A l g e r i a
Type o f c y c l e Cascade
o f ope*
1963 e t seq LNG f o r export t o England, France 1976 1979 1979 1970 1972 - E x p o r t t o France 1977 1978 1973 1969 1977 1978 1977 1978 1980 - Planned 1980 - Planned 1983 - Planned
-
Sonatrach (LNG-1 ) , Arzew. A l g e r i a Sonatrach (LNG-?), Arzew, A l g e r i a S o n a t r d ~ h(LNG-3), Arzew, A l g e r i a Esso L i b y a , Marsa e l Brega, L i b y a Sonatrach - Phase 1, Skikda, A l g e r i a Sonatrach Algeria Sonatrach Algeria
1100.0 1000 1500 385.0 430.0 (3 t r a i n s ) 170.0 (1 t r a i n ) 350.0 (2 t r a i n s ) 750.0 185.0 350.0 400.0 1200 550 250 3375 (8 trains) 1200
APCI -MCR APCI-MCR NA APCI-MCR TEALARC PRICO PRICO APCI-MCR Cascade APCI-HCR APCI -E1CR APCI-IiCR APCI-MCR APCI -HCR "Optimized" Cascade NA
7,000 10,500
NA
2,100 2,500 1,250 3,500 4,050
Phase 11, Skikda, Phase 111, Skikda,
B r u n e i LNG, Lumut, B r u n e i , Borneo P h i l 1 i p s - M a r a t h o n , Kenai, Alaska Abu Dhabi Gas L i q u e f a c t i o n Co. L t d . . Das I s l a n d . Abu Dhabi P a c i f i c A l a s k a LNG Co., Cook I n l e t , Alaska P e r t a n ~ i n a / M o b i l Arun. N. Sumatra. Indonesia Pertamina/Huffco, Badak E. K a l i mantan, I n d o n e s i a Elnpresa N a c i o n a l De P e t r o l e o (ENAP), Cabo Negro, Chde E l Paso Alaska, vina. Alaska Kangan LNG Co., Gulf) Inc., P o i n t Gra-
Planned
I r a n (on Persian
FEED GAS IN
500 psig 400 MMcfd 600~

~
560 psig 400 MMcfd
KNOCKOUT DRUM AND FILTER
PROPANE REFRIGERATION
MULTICOMPONCNT REFRIGERATION
560 psig 400 MMcfd 6@F
LNG STORAGE
2 - 550,000 BBL
DOUBLE -WALLED ABOVEGROUND
CLEAN-U P < 50 ppm
DRYING H20 < 1ppm LNG TO 95,0gp,n 25 psig -2600~
FIGURE B.1.
Block Flow Diagram f o r LNG Export Terminal The gas e n t e r s a t approxi-
Normal gas e n t e r i n g t h e p l a n t i s 99+% methane. p i p e l i n e scale and d i r t .
mately 500 p s i g and 60F, and passes through a knockout drum and f i l t e r t o remove From t h e f i l t e r , t h e gas passes through an MEA scrubThe gas i s then ber t o remove a l l t r a c e s o f C02 and H2S t h a t might be present. a t 500 p s i g .
d r i e d i n a molecular sieve desiccant dehydrator t o a dew p o i n t o f about -100F Two p a r a l l e l beds a r e used i n t h e d r y i n g cycle, a l l o w i n g on-stream o p e r a t i o n f o r twelve hours f o r each bed w h i l e t h e o t h e r bed i s being regenerated. The t w o - t r a i n l i q u e f a c t i o n system i s r a t e d a t 400 MMscfd. f o r d e f r o s t i n g and maintenance. The p l a n t operates
i n t h e l i q u e f a c t i o n mode 345 days p e r year, w i t h t h e remaining 20 days a l l o c a t e d This p l a n t i n c o r p o r a t e s a propane precooled The propane-MCR mu1ti r e f r i g e r a n t c y c l e (MCR) f o r 1 i q u e f a c t i o n o f n a t u r a l gas. methane, ethylene, and propane.
design uses propane and a mixed r e f r i g e r a n t system c o n s i s t i n g o f n i t r o g e n , Gas being l i q u e f i e d f l o w s through t h r e e stages The of propane c o o l i n g followed by two stages o f mixed r e f r i g e r a n t c o o l i n g .
LNG produced e x i t s a t approximately -260F and 15 p s i g , and i s pumped t o two
550,000-bbl,
double-walled, f l a t - b o t t o m e d , aboveground s t o r a g e tanks o f Normal b o i l o f f , which i s about 0.05% o f t o t a l t a n k
standard d e s i g n f o r LNG.
volume p e r day, i s compressed and used t o supplement p l a n t f u e l requirements. Three pumps s e r v i c e each s t o r a g e tank, w i t h two n o r m a l l y used f o r sendout o p e r a t i o n s and t h e t h i r d on standby as a spare; however, o n l y one s t o r a g e t a n k can be emptied a t a time. Loading o f an ocean-going LNG t a n k e r r e q u i r e s about During loading, the 10 t o 12 hours a t a l o a d i n g r a t e o f 50,000 t o 60,000 gpm.
s h i p discharges about 20,000 gpm o f b a l l a s t water i n t o t h e sea. 6.2 PLANT LAYOUT A p l o t p l a n f o r t h e LNG e x p o r t t e r m i n a l i s shown i n F i g u r e 8.2. f a c i l i t i e s and f i r e s a f e t y components a r e shown. t h i s p l o t plan include: minimum d i s t a n c e f r o m s t o r a g e t a n k t o p l a n t boundary--130 f t
a
A l l major
Key d i s t a n c e s t o n o t e f r o m
d i s t a n c e f r o m s t o r a g e t a n k t o p l a n t area--800 f t d i s t a n c e f r o m s h i p l o a d i n g dock t o shore--2000 f t minimum d i s t a n c e f r o m main equipment ( l i q u e f a c t i o n t r a i n s ) t o p l a n t boundary--1 30 f t minimum d i s t a n c e from s t o r a g e t a n k t o main equipment ( c o l d box)--420 f t .
The s a f e t y f e a t u r e s shown i n t h e f i g u r e w i l l be discussed w i t h t h e v a r i o u s p r o cesses t o which t h e y a r e r e l a t e d . B.3 PROCESS DESCRIPTION The b a s i c processes i n v o l v e d i n t h e e x p o r t t e r m i n a l a r e d e s c r i b e d i n d e t a i l i n t h e f o l l o w i n g subsections. B.3.1 Gas Treatment L i q u e f a c t i o n o f n a t u r a l gas r e q u i r e s process temperatures as low as -260F. Any c o n s t i t u e n t s o f t h e i n l e t gas stream t h a t may become s o l i d a t these temperat u r e s must be removed t o e l i m i n a t e f o u l i n g o r p l u g g i n g problems i n t h e l i q u e faction unit. The two c o n s t i t u t e n t s found i n a l l n a t u r a l gas streams t h a t must
FIGURE B.2.
Plot Plan f o r LNG Export Terminal
REGENERATION COMPRESSOR
TOIFROM E-123 KNOCKOUT v-7 AIB
MOLEIEVE
DEHYDRATORS
SEPARATOR
FROMPIPELINE
NATURAL GAS TO FILTER FILTER
V-3 CONTACTOR
EXCHANGER
V - 1 KNOCKOUT DRUM
AM1 N SYSTEM FOR C02 REMOVAL E
FIGURE 8.3.
Gas Treatment Section Process Fl ow Diagram
be removed a r e w a t e r (H20) and carbon d i o x i d e (Cop).
I n a d d i t i o n , heavy s t r a i g h t -
c h a i n hydrocarbons (such as hexanes) , c y c l i c hydrocarbons (such as benzene), 1ube o i l s , dust, hydrogen s u l f i d e (H2S), and odorant mercaptan s u l f u r must be removed i f present. The process f l o w diagram f o r t h e gas t r e a t m e n t s e c t i o n i s shown i n F i g u r e B.3. (Flow diagram symbols a r e d e f i n e d i n Appendix H. ) a r e g i v e n i n Table 8.2. TABLE B. 2. Stream D e s c r i p t i o n N a t u r a l Gas Feed From P i p e l ine N a t u r a l Gas Feed From C02 Removal U n i t t o High L e v e l Propane Chiller N a t u r a l Gas Feed From Treatment S e c t i o n t o Liquefaction Section Regeneration Gas Fuel Gas Make-up Gas Treatment S e c t i o n (one t r a i n ) Pressure (psig) 500 560 Temp. (OF) 60 100 400 Flowrate per T r a i n (~~scfd) A s s o c i a t e d process c o n d i t i o n s
5 60
60
200
500 500
~ 6 0 60
200
P r i o r t o l i q u e f a c t i o n , t h e incoming n a t u r a l gas passes through a knockout drum and a s e r i e s of f i l t e r s t o remove p i p e l i n e s c a l e and d i r t . gas feed l i n e t h e n passes on t o t h e C02 and w a t e r removal u n i t s . 8.3.1.1 The n a t u r a l
E Removal 2
The carbon d i o x i d e c o n t e n t o f t h e f e e d gas i s a p p r o x i The amine process used f o r C02 removal
Carbon d i o x i d e i n i t s f r e e s t a t e forms a s o l i d a t -lOgF and i t s s o l u b i l i t y i n LNG i s about 250 ppm. m a t e l y 800 ppm a t 500 p s i g and 60F and, thus, must be reduced t o p r e v e n t p l u g g i n g i n t h e h e a t exchangers downstream. reduces t h e carbon d i o x i d e c o n t e n t t o about 50 ppm.
The amine process absorbs " a c i d gases" (C02 and H2S s i m u l t a n e o u s l y ) w i t h a l e a n aqueous organic-amine s o l u t i o n , monoethanolamine (MEA) c o u n t e r c u r r e n t t o MEA s o l u t i o n i n a packed tower.
Feed gas f l o w s
The a b s o r p t i o n process i s The r i c h amine s o l u t i o n
a chemical r e a c t i o n between t h e a c i d gases, water, and amine i n which amine carbonates, bicarbonates, and h y d r o s u l f i d e s a r e formed. i s s t r i p p e d o f t h e " a c i d " gases i n a d i s t i l l a t i o n column by t h e a d d i t i o n o f heat, as stea.m, which r e v e r s e s t h e chemical r e a c t i o n and desorbs t h e " a c i d " gases from t h e s o l u t i o n . The " a c i d " gases a r e t h e n disposed of.
Carbon d i o x i d e removal r a t e s o f 0.12 t o 0.20 s c f p e r g a l l o n f o r each 1 wt% MEA i n s o l u t i o n a r e common. i n water. MEA s o l u t i o n c o n c e n t r a t i o n s range from 15 t o 25 wt% A general r u l e f o r A c i d - r i c h amine s o l u t i o n s have an upper s a f e l i m i t o f a c i d gas conI n h i b i t o r s a r e added t o t h e MEA
t e n t beyond which t h e s o l u t i o n becomes s e v e r e l y c o r r o s i v e . t h i s upper l i m i t i s 0.45 moles C02/mole MEA. s o l u t i o n t o reduce c o r r o s i o n and hydrocarbon foaming.
Steaming requirements f o r r e g e n e r a t i n g t h e LO2-rich MEA s o l u t i o n a r e 1.0 t o 1.4 pounds o f steam p e r g a l l o n o f f l o w i n g s o l u t i o n . Under-designed equipment may sometimes be o p e r a t e d a t h i g h e r throughputs, b u t o n l y a t t h e r i s k o f tower f l o o d i n g , i n c r e a s e d c o r r o s i o n r a t e s , incomplete s t r i p p i n g , and (most i m p o r t a n t l y ) down-stream freeze-ups. B.3.1.2 Water Removal Tempera-
A l i t t l e w a t e r can cause b i g problems i n c r y o g e n i c LNG processing. networks o f s m a l l - b o r e heat-exchange t u b i n g . b l o c k i n g gas f l o w . Water removal i s accomplished i n two steps. B.3.2.1) e a s i l y separated o u t . a t 500 p s i g . 1 PPm.
t u r e s go as low as -260F. The l i q u e f a c t i o n h e a t exchangers have s o p h i s t i c a t e d F r o s t o r " r i m e " can f o r m on t h e s u r f a c e s o f t h e t u b i n g , adding i n t o l e r a b l e r e s i s t a n c e t o heat t r a n s f e r and
Evaporating propane ( S e c t i o n
c o o l s t h e gas t o 60F, and 70% o f t h e w a t e r vapor condenses and i s F i n a l d e h y d r a t i o n i s e f f e c t e d by passing t h e gas through t o a dew p o i n t of about -100F
m o l e c u l a r s i e v e d e s s i c a n t s , D-201 and D-202,
The m o l e c u l a r s i e v e d r y e r s reduce t h e w a t e r c o n t e n t t o l e s s t h a n
Molecular sieves are synthetic zeolite crystals t h a t can perform precise separation of different molecules. They can separate molecules selectively because of t h e i r physical structure: a myriad of tiny, precisely controlled pore openings and interconnected cavities within a crystal matrix. The crystals are activated f o r adsorption by removing t h e i r water of hydration. Because l i t t l e o r no change in the remaining crystal structure occurs during t h i s dehydration, highly porous adsorbents are formed t h a t have an exceptionally strong selective a f f i n i t y for water. As a r e s u l t of t h i s selective action, coadsorption of hydrocarbons i s minimized and maximum water adsorption capacity i s achieved. The dehydration system i s composed of a dual-bed installation a t each of the liquefaction t r a i n s , allowing on-stream operation of each bed for twelve hours while the other bed i s being regenerated. When the molecular sieves in the f i r s t tower approach saturation, the i n l e t stream i s switched to the second tower. Heated natural gas, flowing i n the opposite direction of the stream t h a t was being dried, desorbs the entrapped water from the saturated molecular sieves in the f i r s t tower. After leaving the tower, the warm, moisture-laden regeneration gas i s cooled and compressed, and the water i s condensed, separated, and removed from the stream. The regeneration gas then mixes with wet i n l e t gas prior to the C02 removal unit (closed-cycle operation). The strength and integrity of the crystalline structure enables molecular sieves to withstand repeated adsorption-desorption cycles. Once dry, the regenerated tower i s cooled by a flow of cool dry gas coming from the f i r s t dehydrating tower before being placed back in service. Switching from one tower t o the other i s accomplished by an operator-initated automatic-control valve system.
B.3.2
Liquefaction
A t the export terminal, natural gas i s cooled and liquefied in two stages in a propane precooled mixed refrigerant cycle. A propane refrigerant cycle, similar to the f i r s t stage of a cascade liquefaction cycle, provides about 25% of the feed cooling required. The propane cycle reduces the temperature of the feed gas to -30F and condenses out the heavy hydrocarbons present.
The c h i l l e d f e e d gas t h e n f l o w s t o t h e main c r y o g e n i c heat exchanger where
a mixed r e f r i g e r a n t l i q u e f i e s t h e gas and subcools i t t o -260F.

LNG i s t h e n t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e s t o r a g e tanks.
The p r o d u c t
Table B.3 and F i g u r e B.4 show t h e d e t a i l s o f a l i q u e f a c t i o n t r a i n .
The
p l a n t has two i d e n t i c a l l i q u e f a c t i o n t r a i n s , each w i t h a c a p a c i t y o f 200 MMscfd. TABLE B.3. Stream D e s c r i p t i o n LNG f r o m L i q u e f a c t i o n S e c t i o n t o Storage Tank Mixed R e f r i g e r a n t f r o m Low-Pressure Compressor Mi xed R e f r i g e r a n t f r o m High-Pressure Compressor Mixed R e f r i g e r a n t Vapor t o Main Cryogenic Heat Exchanger Mixed R e f r i g e r a n t L i q u i d s t o Main Cryog e n i c Heat Exchanger Mixed R e f r i g e r a n t Vapor t o Low-Pressure Stage 1 Compressor Mixed R e f r i g e r a n t f r o m Main Cryogenic Heat Exchanger t o LowPressure Compressor Propane t o F i r s t Stage Compressor Propane t o Second Stage Compressor Propane t o T h i r d Stage Compressor Liquefaction Section Pressure (psig) 560 167 Temp.
(OF)
Flowrate (MMscfd) 200 398
-260 120
6 00
250
39 8
5 80
-30
195
580
-30
195
50
-30
20
PROPANE CYCLT
MIXED R E f R I G f R A K I C Y C E
F I G U R E 8.4.
Propane Precooled- Yul t i r e f r i g e r a n t Cycle - Process Flow D i a g r a m
6.3.2.1
Propane Refrigerant Cycle
The propane refrigerant cycle cools both the feed gas and the high-pressure mixed refrigerant t o -30F. Propane evaporating a t three d i f f e r e n t pressures provides three d i f f e r e n t levels of cooling. High-level cooling takes place in E-123. Propane a t 100 psia evaporates
a t around 55F and cools the feed gas and mixed refrigerant t o around 60F. After water i s removed from the feed gas, both streams enter the medium-level exchanger, E-122. Here, evaporating propane a t approximately 40 psia and 5F cools the warm streams t o 10F. The heavy hydrocarbons in the natural gas condense a t t h i s temperature and a r e separated in the scrub column V-102. Vapors from the scrub column and the mixed refrigerant go t o the low level propane exchanger, E-121, where t h e i r temperature i s reduced t o -30F. Propane vaporizes a t -35OF and 16 psia in
E-121.
Propane vapor from E-121, E-122, and E-123 i s compressed in a three-stage centrifugal compressor, C-121, C-122, and C-123, and then cooled and condensed by cooling water. plete the cycle. Control of the cycle i s quite complex. Basically, the propane vapor recycle The heat removed from the natural gas i s rejected t o the cooling water and the liquid propane returns t o E-121, E-122, and E-123 t o com-
i s used t o control the suction pressure of the f i r s t stage compressor. Because centrifugal compressors are e s s e n t i a l l y constant head machines, t h i s also cont r o l s the suction pressure of thc seccnd and third stage machines. Flow through the compressors i s kept constant by adjusting the r e l a t i v e flow rates through the exchangers and through the recycle loop according t o the quantity of cooling required. The control system can handle a 60% step reduction in cooling load without adjusting the compressor speed. 6.3.2.2 Mixed Refrigerant Cycle
A multiconiponent mixed refrigerant cycle liquefies and cools the feed gas t o -260F. Nitrogen, methane, ethylsene, and propane make up the mixed r e f r i g erant. Pure nitrogen gas comes from an a i r fractionation plant on s i t e . Methane,
e t h y l e n e , and propane f o r makeup a r e separated f r o m t h e f e e d gas i n t h e r e f r i g erant preparation u n i t . The mixed r e f r i g e r a n t i s cooled i n t h e f i r s t two propane exchangers, E-123 and E-122, and t h e n p a r t i a l l y condensed i n E-121. From E-121, t h e mixed r e f r i g The l i q u i d e r a n t e n t e r s V-112 and i s separated i n t o l i q u i d and vapor streams.
f r o m V-112 i s subcooled i n t h e f i r s t stage o f t h e main c r y o g e n i c h e a t exchanger, E-102, and t h e n expanded i n t o t h e s h e l l s i d e o f t h e f i r s t stage o f E-102 t o p r o vide cooling. Vapor f r o m V-112 i s cooled and condensed as i t passes through t h e t u b e s i d e of b o t h stages of E-102 and t h e n i s expanded i n t o t h e s h e l l s i d e o f t h e second stage t o p r o v i d e c o o l i n g . Low-pressure ( 3 0 t o 50 p s i g ) , mixed r e f r i g e r a n t vapor leaves t h e f i r s t stage o f E-102 and i s compressed t o 600 p s i g by two c e n t r i f u g a l compressors. The high-pressure vapor i s cooled i n two c o o l i n g - w a t e r h e a t exchangers b e f o r e going t o t h e propane h e a t exchangers and c o m p l e t i n g t h e c y c l e . Primary c o n t r o l o f t h e mixed r e f r i g e r a n t c y c l e i s t h e two l i q u i d expansion v a l v e s on E-102. C o n t r o l o f each v a l v e i s f l o w ; however, t h e s e t p o i n t f o r S i g n a l s p r o p o r t i o n a l t o temperature each c o n t r o l l e r can be r e s e t a u t o m a t i c a l l y . c o n t r o l l e r f o r t h e f i r s t stage. pressure.
d i f f e r e n c e a t t h e warm end o f E-102 and C-11 s u c t i o n p r e s s u r e can r e s e t t h e f l o w The f l o w c o n t r o l l e r f o r t h e second s t a g e can be r e s e t by s i g n a l s p r o p o r t i o n a l t o cold-end temperature d i f f e r e n c e and C-11 s u c t i o n D e t a i l s o f t h e c o n t r o l system were shown p r e v i o u s l y i n F i g u r e B.4.
The f e e d gas t o be l i q u e f i e d leaves E-213 i n t h e propane c y c l e and e n t e r s t h e main c r y o g e n i c exchanger E-102. exchange w i t h t h e mixed r e f r i g e r a n t . The gas i s l i q u e f i e d and subcooled by h e a t
A c o n t r o l v a l v e a t t h e o u t l e t o f E-102 l e t s
t h e gas down t o s t o r a g e t a n k p r e s s u r e and c o n t r o l s t h e amount of LNG produced. The s e t p o i n t f o r t h i s c o n t r o l l e r i s t h e p r e s e l e c t e d LNG f l o w r a t e . However, i f t h e r e i s i n s u f f i c e n t c o o l i n g a v a i l a b l e t o meet t h i s p r o d u c t i o n r a t e , t h e s e t p o i n t may be r e s e t a u t o m a t i c a l l y a t a l o w e r l e v e l by s i g n a l s p r o p o r t i o n a l t o t h e
LNG o u t l e t temperature and t h e mixed r e f r i g e r a n t compressor s u c t i o n pressure.
B.3.2.3
Liquefaction Equipment
The propane refrigerant cycle uses standard horizontal, kettle-type, shell and tube heat exchangers as shown in Figure B.5. These exchangers are constructed of carbon steel and the tubes have extended surfaces to increase the heat transf e r area.
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.
NATURAL GAS OR MIXED REFRIGERANT INLET NOZZLE NATURAL GAS OR MIXED REFRIGERANT OUTLET NOZZLE LIQUID PROPANE INLET NOZZLE PROPANE VAPOR OUTLET NOZZLE TUBES SHELL WEIR TUBESHEETS FLOATING HEAD STATIONARY HEAD CHANNEL COVER ADDITIONAL NOZZLES
FIGURE B.5.
Propane Refrigerant Heat Exchanger
The main cryogenic heat exchanger, E-102, i s a spiral wound exchanger. I t has thousands of f e e t of small -bore a1 uminum tubing arranged in two coil wound bundles, one for the cold (or upper) section of the exchanger and the other f o r the warm ( o r lower) section. There are three tube sheets a t each end of the lower section for the mixed refrigerant liquid, mixed refrigerant vapor, a n d f o r the feed gas. Figure 6.6 i l l u s t r a t e s how the tubing i s wound around a center mandrel and connected t o the tube sheets. Each liquefaction train f o r the export terminal includes four compressors having a total of 101,260 h . p . The two MCR compressors and the propane cornpressor are each driven by gas turbines rated a t 37,600 h . p . (28 megawatts). The fourth compressor, the feed gas booster compressor, i s driven by a smaller gas turbine (375 h .p10.28 megawatts) .
SHEU IN
TUBE PASS NO. 2 OUT
TUBE PASS NO. 1 OUT
I
TUBE PASS NO. 2 IN
TUBESHEET
- TUBE IN 7 1PASS NO.

SHEU OUT
FIGURE B.6.
Main Cryogenic Coil-Wound Heat Exchanger
Materials of construction f o r the refrigeration compressors are: fine-grain carbon s t e e l o r 2% nickel s t e e l case material f o r the propane r e f r i g e r a t i o n cycle DM Ni Resist casings and 9% nickel s t e e l rotors f o r MCR cycle. 2
All four compressors a r e located i n the compressor building (see Figure B . 2 ) . Each compressor has the following alarms and t r i p s :
1. 2. 3. 4.
5.
high discharge pressure alarm suction and discharge h i g h temperature alarm and t r i p various alarms and shutdowns f o r seal o i l and lube o i l systems high bearing temperature alarm and t r i p excess vibration alarm and t r i p . B.3.2.4 Procedures To begin the cooldown process, the propane and MCR
Startup and Cooldown.
systems a r e charged with propane and natural gas respectively. The compressors a r e operated on t o t a l recycle t o check out the controls and instrumentation.
A t t h i s point, the feed gas portion of the liquefaction t r a i n i s pressurized up to the LNG product valve a t the o u t l e t of E-102. The pressure control valve in the feed gas l i n e i s placed on automatic a t the design pressure of around 600 psig. Next, the propane heat exchangers and the main cryogenic exchangers are pressurized with refrigerant gas. Refrigerant flow i s then increased to maximum. As additional sections of the liquefaction t r a i n are pressurized, makeup refrigerant must bt added t o the system.
As the refrigeraht gas cools and becomes more operated manually, are p a r t i a l l y closed. When the expansion across the LNG product value reaches i t s valve i s cracked open to s t a r t a small flow of LNG tank must also be cooled down, the procedure to be given in Section B.3.3.
dense, the expansion valves, LNG temperature before design value of -250F, the t o storage. If the storage followed a t t h i s point i s
Assuming the tank i s already cooled down, the next step i s addition of the other components: ethylene, propane, and nitrogen. The refrigerants are pumped from t h e i r storage tanks and added to the refrigerant a t the suction side of the compressor. As the heavier components are added t o the cycle gas, the r a t e of cooling and the power consumption of the compressor increase. When LNG production reaches approximately 50% of design r a t e , the controls and instrumentation have been checked out completely, and refrigerant i s a t design composition, control of the system i s switched t o automatic and production i s increased t o design rate. Shutdown. To shut down the liquefaction systenl, the flow of feed gas t o the system i s stopped and the compressors are e i t h e r stopped or p u t on total recycle. If the shutdown i s going t o be short or i s unscheduled, the compressors are usually l e f t on total recycle. If the compressors are stopped and the system heats u p , some refrigerant i s vented e i t h e r through vent valves or r e l i e f valves. B.3.2.5 Release Prevention and Control Features
The following detectors, alarms, and f i r e protection equipment are located in the liquefaction area:
combustible gas d e t e c t o r s w i t h alarms i n t h e c o n t r o l room low temperature detectors w i t h alarms i n the c o n t r o l room
UV f i r e d e t e c t o r s t h a t a u t o m a t i c a l l y a c t i v a t e t h e ESD and alarm i n c o n t r o l

room d r y chemical f i r e e x t i n g u i s h i n g system f i r e water l i n e s and hydrant.
A d i k e surrounds each l i q u e f a c t i o n t r a i n t o c o n t a i n s p i l l s o f r e f r i g e r a n t
o r LNG. The surface beneath each l i q u e f a c t i o n t r a i n i s sloped t o d r a i n s p i l l s Drains away from t h e equipment and i n t o t h e corners o f t h e containment area. LNG s p i l l s t o t h e LNG storage tank containment area.
l o c a t e d a t t h e corners o f t h e impoundment area c a r r y both r a i n w a t e r r u n o f f and The m a t e r i a l s f o r the d r a i n s a r e selected t o w i t h s t a n d cryogenic temperatures. Compressor b u i l d i n g s i n c l u d e a two-stage v e n t i l a t i o n system. t i o n reaches 25% o f t h e LFL o f methane. The high-
speed v e n t i l a t i o n r a p i d l y evacuates gas from t h e b u i l d i n g i f t h e gas concentra-
A second l e v e l alarm, o c c u r r i n g a t a
h i g h e r gas concentration, a u t o m a t i c a l l y shuts down t h e compressor equipment. Gas sensors and flame d e t e c t o r s a r e l o c a t e d above t h e compressors and i n s i d e t h e compressor b u i l d i n g . V i s i b l e and a u d i b l e alarms are a c t i v a t e d i f gas conc e n t r a t i o n s reach 25% o f LFL o r i f f i r e i s detected.
I f a f i r e i s detected by
a U d e t e c t o r , i t a u t o m a t i c a l l y a c t i v a t e s t h e Master Emergency Shutdown system. V

B.3.3
LNG Storage The LNG produced by t h e l i q u e f a c t i o n system i s s t o r e d a t t h e f a c i l i t y
u n t i l i t can be loaded on marine vessels f o r export. r e l a t e d equipment a r e described here.
The storage system and
The process f l o w diagram f o r t h e storage s e c t i o n (and f o r t h e marine t e r m i n a l which i s described i n Section B.3.4) i s shown i n Figure B.7. Associated process c o n d i t i o n s a r e l i s t e d i n Table B.4.
+ TO CARGO
LOAD l NG VENT STACK FLASH VAPORS FROM C-211 FUEL GAS FROM l NDEPENDENT SUPPLY
+TO C-202 SUCTION
VENT TO ATMOSPHERE
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ - - - - _ - _ _ - b
A h l 1 Y
--r--I
I
I-----------
--------- TO C-201
SPEED CONTROL
Ak
-- -1
tb
I I I
BO ILOFF TO .c-201
I
1 I I 1
I
,-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I I
I I
I
_-v
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1--- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I
I I
VAPORIRETURN
I I
I
L
T-201 STORAGE TANK p-201 A/B/C TO OTHER LOAD ING PUMPS LOAD ING PUMPS
------ -TO OTHER LOADING PUMPS LOAD ING PUMPS
*
LNG FROM L I QUEFACTION TRA lNS LNG REC I RCULATION LNG TO S H I P
b .
*
*r
SHORE BLOCK VALVES
FIGURE 8.7.
Flow Diagram f o r Marine Termin a l and Storage i*'i t i es 7i
TABLE B.4.
Storage and Loading S e c t i o n s Pressure Temp. (OF) F l o w r a t e (psig)
Stream D e s c r i p t i o n Independent Fuel Gas Supply L i n e LNG Main T r a n s f e r L i n e LNG R e c i r c u l a t i o n L i n e Vapor Return from S h i p Normal B o i l o f f from two Storage Tanks B.3.3.1 Storage Tanks
-25 25 5 1
--258 -258 -220 -220
-50,000 gpni 1 ,500 gpni 32.1 MMscfd 2.0 MMscfd
Storage f o r t h e p l a n t c o n s i s t s o f two f l a t - b o t t o m e d , F i g u r e B.8.
double-walled,
above-
ground LNG s t o r a g e tanks, each w i t h a c a p a c i t y o f 550,000 b a r r e l s , as shown i n The i n n e r t a n k i s c o n s t r u c t e d o f 9% n i c k e l s t e e l , an a l l o y t h a t The The t a n k has an i n n e r d i a The s h e l l h e i g h t i s 98 ft, w i t h r e t a i n s i t s s t r e n g t h and d u c t i l i t y t h r o u g h o u t t h e LNG temperature range. o u t e r s h e l l i s c o n s t r u c t e d o f A131 carbon s t e e l . meter o f 215 f t and an o u t e r d i a m t e r o f 225 ft. an o v e r a l l t a n k h e i g h t o f 146 ft. The annulus between t h e i n n e r and o u t e r t a n k w a l l s i s f i l l e d w i t h expanded p e r l i t e , an i n o r g a n i c , non-flammable, special rock. about 2000F ( 1 100C). l a t i o n space w h i l e h o t . l i g h t w e i g h t i n s u l a t i o n produced from The r o c k o r e i s f i n e l y ground and then expanded i n furnaces a t The per1 i t e i s expanded on s i t e and p l a c e d i n t h e i n s u A r e s i l i e n t f i b e r g l a s s b l a n k e t i s wrapped around t h e
o u t s i d e o f t h e i n n e r s h e l l t o a l l e v i a t e t h e problem o f p e r l i t e conipaction t h a t o t h e r w i s e occurs w i t h thermal c y c l i n g and movement o f t h e i n n e r she1 1 (see The thermal c o n d u c t i v i t y of p e r l i t e i n a methane atniosphere i s 2 0.25 BTU-in./hr f t OF. The space between t h e i n n e r and o u t e r t a n k f l o o r s i s i n s u l a t e d w i t h a 25-in. l a y e r o f foamglass, a nonflammable load-bearing i n s u l a t i o n . and on a compacted sand f o u n d a t i o n i n t h e middle. F i g u r e B.9).
The l o a d - b e a r i n g
i n s u l a t i o n r e s t s on a c o n c r e t e r i n g w a l l f o u n d a t i o n around t h e t a n k p e r i m e t e r A 1 - f t l a y e r o f compacted sand l o c a t e d beneath t h e o u t e r t a n k f l o o r c o n t a i n s e l e c t r i c a l h e a t i n g elements
SAFETY VALVES 8 P I PING CONNECTIONS
EXPANDED PERLl
D I N N S IONS: INNER TANK DIAMETER OUTER TANK DIAMETER
- 215' 225'
RESILIENT BLANKET
INNER TANK HEIGHT OUTER TANK HEIGHT
- 98'
146'
CAPACITY
- 550, KIl BBL DESIGN PRESSLIRE INTERNAL - 2 p i g 0 .

EXTERNAL - 2" Hz0
BOTTOM INSULATION MATERIALS: LIQUID CONTAINER - WNICKEL STEEL INSULATION SUPPORT DECK - 9% NICKEL STEEL OUTER TANK DECK INSULATION
DESIGN KMPERATURE - INTERNAL -266'F WIND LOAD 104 mph EARTHQUAKE
- RICHTER 7
- API 620
SPECIFICATIONS
- A131 CARBON STEEL - ROCK WOOL BOTTOM INSULATION - FOAM GLASS SHELL INSULATION - PI-40 PERLITEAND FIBERGLASS
FIGURE B.8.
LNG Storage Tank
OUTER TANK
RESILIENT BLANKET
II
WARM POSITION COLD POSITION
FIGURE B.9.
R e s i l i e n t Blanket i n Annular Space Between Walls o f LNG Storage Tank
t o prevent f r e e z i n g o f m o i s t u r e i n t h e s u b s o i l and p o s s i b l e "heaving". i n n e r tank w a l l , r e s p e c t i v e l y .
Two
s e t s o f anchor b o l t s i n t h e r i n g w a l l a r e connected t o t h e o u t e r tank w a l l and These b o l t s h o l d down the tank a g a i n s t l i f t i n g f o r c e s r e s u l t i n g from i n t e r n a l pressures (see Figures B. 10 and 6.11 )
LOAD-BEARING
VAPOR BARRIER
FIGURE B. 10.
Load-Bearing I n s u l a t i o n and Anchor Bol t s
HEATING COILS
COURSE
FIGURE 6.11.
Storage Tank Foundation Detai 1s
The o u t e r tank has a lap-welded, dome-shaped, s t e e l r o o f . a c e i l i n g f o r t h e i n n e r tank, as shown i n F i g u r e B.12.
Suspended from
t h e r o o f framing o f t h e o u t e r tank i s a lap-welded metal deck t h a t serves as Mineral wool i n s u l a t i o n i s spread evenly over t h e deck, and open p i p e vents i n s t a l l e d i n t h e deck a l l o w product vapor t o c i r c u l a t e f r e e l y i n t h e i n s u l a t i o n space t o keep t h e i n s u l a t i o n dry.
LAP-WELDED
FIGURE B.12.
Suspended I n s u l a t i o n Deck
A l l p i p i n g t o t h e i n n e r tank e n t e r s through t h e r o o f o f t h e storage tank, w i t h t h e exception o f t h e unloading l i n e s . through two 24-in.-diameter s i d e o f t h e l o a d i n g pumps. k e p t open. fail. LNG i s withdrawn from t h e tank These o u t l e t nozzles on t h e i n n e r tank f l o o r .
p i p e l i n e s pass through t h e s i d e w a l l o f t h e o u t e r tank and connect t o t h e s u c t i o n The valves have pneumatic c o n t r o l s and a r e normally The valves c l o s e a u t o m a t i c a l l y by g r a v i t y if t h e pneumatic c o n t r o l s
Independent s t r u c t u r e s support a l l p i p i n g e x t e r n a l t o t h e tank t o prevent
t h e transmission o f s t a t i c and dynamic p i p e loads t o t h e storage tank w a l l s .
Two 20-in.-diameter
i n l e t p i p e l i n e s e n t e r each t a n k through t h e o u t e r t a n k One
w a l l and pass t h r o u g h t h e suspended deck r o o f t o separate f i l l nozzles, perm i t t i n g e i t h e r t o p o r bottom f i l l i n g t o p r o v i d e m i x i n g o f incoming LNG. o f the tank. p i p e t e r m i n a t e s a t a n o z z l e j u s t below t h e suspended deck t o a l l o w t o p - f i l l i n g The second p i p e discharges LNG i n t o t h e t o p o f a 60-in.-diameter s t a n d p i p e e x t e n d i n g from above t h e h i g h l i q u i d l e v e l t o t h e bottom o f t h e tank. The s t a n d p i p e p r o v i d e s b o t t o m - f i l l i n g o f t h e t a n k through e v e n l y spaced p e r f o r a t i o n s near t h e bottom o f t h e pipe. as t h e l i q u i d w i t h i n t h e tank. T h i s arrangement p e r m i t s LNG t o be added t o t h e bottom o f t h e s t o r a g e t a n k a t t h e same pressure and temperature Other m a j o r connections a r e t h e vapor o u t l e t and pressure r e l i e f connections a t t h e t o p o f t h e i n n e r tank and t h e r e l i e f v e n t a t t h e t o p o f t h e o u t e r tank. The tanks a r e designed t o w i t h s t a n d instantaneous wind gusts up t o 104 mph, earthquakes up t o V I I I on t h e m o d i f i e d M e r c a l l i scale, and a maximum snow l o a d o f 60 pounds p e r square f o o t . Both s t o r a g e tanks a r e t e s t e d p r i o r t o use. The LNG s t o r a g e tanks a l s o meet t h e requirements o f t h e American Petroleum I n s t i t u t e standard 620, Appendix Q, which governs m a t e r i a l s s e l e c t i o n , t a n k design, cons t r u c t i o n , and t e s t i n g procedures. D u r i n g c o n s t r u c t i o n , t h e welds on a l l v e r t i c a l Welds n o t 100 p e r c e n t x - r a y i n s p e c t e d Inner seams a r e 100 p e r c e n t x - r a y inspected.
a r e checked by t h e l i q u i d p e n e t r a n t method, as a r e a l l attachment welds. and s o l u t i o n f i l m t e s t methods. vapor pressure.
t a n k welds a r e checked by a combination o f x-ray, dye penetrant, vacuum box, H y d r o s t a t i c and p r e s s u r e t e s t s s u b j e c t each t a n k t o 125% o f t h e maximum p r o d u c t w e i g h t and 1 2 5 h f t h e maximum design The h y d r o s t a t i c t e s t s u t i l i z e 14 t o 15 m i l l i o n g a l l o n s o f A f t e r completion o f t h e t e s t s , t h e w e l l w a t e r i s w e l l w a t e r f o r each tank. r e l e a s e d i n t o t h e ocean.
B.3.3.2
Pressure C o n t r o l System
The s t o r a g e t a n k has maximum and minimum design pressures o f 2.0 p s i g and 0 psig, respectively. Gauge p r e s s u r e c o n t r o l i s used and t h e normal t a n k Normal b o i l o f f gas f r o m t h e s t o r a g e tanks, o p e r a t i n g p r e s s u r e i s 0.9 p s i g . stage compressor system.
approximately 0.05% o f two f u l l t a n k volunies p e r day, i s handled by a twoThe f i r s t - s t a g e b o i l o f f compressors a r e c e n t r i f u g a l
3 machines, each w i t h a c a p a c i t y o f 1.3 x 10 ICFMl5.0 MMscfd. o f t h e f i r s t - s t a g e compressor.
Storage t a n k pres-
s u r e i s m a i n t a i n e d a t 0.9 p s i g by a pressure c o n t r o l l e r t h a t a d j u s t s t h e speed The second-stage compressors ( 2 ) a r e r e c i p r o c a t i n g compressors, each w i t h a c a p a c i t y o f 5.0 MMscfd.
I f t h e s t o r a g e t a n k pressure r i s e s above t h e c o n t r o l pressure, t h e tanks

have a v e n t v a l v e t h a t a u t o m a t i c a l l y opens t o t h e v e n t header t o r e e s t a b l i s h t h e normal o p e r a t i n g p r e s s u r e l e v e l .
I f t h e p r e s s u r e c o n t i n u e s t o r i s e , each
t a n k i s equipped w i t h s i x conibination pressure/vacuum r e l i e f v a l v e s and s i x pressure-only v a l v e s t h a t open and v e n t a maximum o f 792,000 poundslhr o f LNG t o t h e atmosphere. Gas f r o m an independent supply i s i n j e c t e d i n t o t h e tanks i f t h e i r p r e s s u r e f a l l s below t h e normal o p e r a t i n g l e v e l .
I f t h e pressure c o n t i n u e s t o f a l l , t h e
T a b l e 8.5
s i x pressure/vacuum r e l i e f v a l v e s open t o admit a i r t o t h e tank. shows t h e v a r i o u s f u n c t i o n s o f t h e pressure c o n t r o l system. TABLE B.5. Pressure ( p s i g ) F u n c t i o n s o f t h e Pressure C o n t r o l System Function Full relief High-pressure alarnl, v e n t v a l v e i s opened
2 .O
1.8 0.9
Normal o p e r a t i n g pressure, m a i n t a i n e d by a d j u s t i n g t h e speed o f t h e f i r s t stage boiloff compressor Low-pressure alarm, gas f r o m independent s u p p l y i s i n j e c t e d i n t o tanks Vacuum r e l i e f
0.2 0.03
F l a s h gas f r o m cargo l o a d i n g o p e r a t i o n s i s r e t u r n e d through t h e 24-in. vapor r e t u r n l i n e t o t h e s t o r a g e t a n k t o m a i n t a i n pressure o r i s vented t o t h e atmosphere t h r o u g h a 14-in.-diameter, vented. The p l a n t b o i l o f f f a c i l i t i e s a r e shown i n F i g u r e B.13. 7 5 - f t - t a l l stack a t the p l a n t s i t e . Approxim a t e l y 26 MMscfd i s r e t u r n e d t o t h e t a n k b e i n g unloaded, w h i l e 6 MMscfd i s
TO EMERGENCY STORAGE TANK PRESSURE CONTROL
KEGENERATION HEATER, AND OTHER USES FUEL-GAS MAKEUP FROM V- 102
STORAGE TANK , , - , , PRESSURE CONTROL
--
BOILOFF FROM T - M I . T-202
w
Boiloff Facilities
I
C-221 BOIUIFF COMPRESSOR
STEAM
C-222 FUEL GAS COMPRESSOR
FIGURE B.13. B.3.3.3
A d d i t i o n a l C o n t r o l s and I n s t r u m e n t a t i o n
Each storage tank c o n t a i n s a movable, v e r t i c a l temperature probe t o m o n i t o r t h e temperature o f t h e LNG a t any depth. l e v e l i n t h e tank. s t r a t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e LNG. The probe can a l s o m o n i t o r t h e l i q u i d Temperature d i f f e r e n c e s between any l e v e l s would i n d i c a t e The l o a d i n g pumps can then c i r c u l a t e t o t h e t o p
f i l l nozzle and m i x t h e LNG i n t h e tank, reducing t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f r o l l o v e r .

Therniocouples a r e a l s o provided i n t h e f l o o r and i n n e r s h e l l t o m o n i t o r c o o l down.
A thermocouple placed i n t h e e l e c t r i c a l l y heated f o u n d a t i o n s o i l moni-
t o r s and c o n t r o l s t h e temperature i n t h i s area. The l i q u i d l e v e l i n t h e tank i s monitored by one displacement f l o a t gauge, which can be replaced w h i l e t h e tank i s s t i l l i n s e r v i c e .
A l i q u i d level
s w i t c h sounds an alarm a t t h e h i g h - l i q u i d l e v e l , which i s 95% o f f u l l c a p a c i t y .
A continued r i s e o f l i q u i d a c t i v a t e s t h e hig.h-high l i q u i d l e v e l alarm and closes
the liquid i n l e t lines t o the LNG storage tank. The storage tank i s isolated from other equipment by block valves on the i n l e t and o u t l e t liquid l i n e s ; these valves are activated by the ESD system. B.3.3.4 Release Prevention and Control Features
Each storage tank i s surrounded by a concrete dike 55 f t high, 1.5 f t thick, and 285 f t i n diameter. In the event of a storage tank f a i l u r e , the dike would hold in excess of 620,000 barrels of LNG ( ~ 1 1 3 % total storage tank of capacity) The inner dike walls are insulated to reduce the r a t e of vapor generation from s p i l l e d LNG.
The following detectors, alarms, and f i r e protection systems are incorporated in the storage and pumpout areas: low temperature detectors with alarms i n the control room t h a t automatically shut down pumps and loading l i n e valves during loading operations u l t r a v i o l e t flame detectors located a t the storage tank r e l i e f valves t h a t automatically activate dry chemical extinguishers u l t r a v i o l e t flame detectors t h a t activate the ESD system and alarm i n control room gas detectors with alarms i n the control room f i r e hydrants located a t various selected locations in the area dry chemical extinguisher a t the loading pumps. The storage tanks have water deluge systems t o protect them against radiant heat from f i r e s inside the plant. The system consists of a series of weirs encircling the tank roof a t several locations. The system i s designed t o prot e c t the dome-shaped roof froni radiation damage and provide uniform distribution of water on the tank's outer s h e l l . The water i s supplied from the main loop a t a r a t e of about 2,600 gpm. I t i s estimated t h a t t h i s flow r a t e i s s u f f i c i e n t t o protect one tank, since partial radiation shielding i s provided by the 55-ft-high concrete dike wall.
B.3.3.5
Procedures The f i r s t s t e p i n cooldown o f t h e storage tank i s
Purging and Cooldown.
t o purge t h e tank w i t h n i t r o g e n t o p r e v e n t an e x p l o s i v e gas m i x t u r e from forming. N i t r o g e n gas f o r p u r g i n g requirements and r e f r i g e r a n t makeup i s l i q u e f i e d by an o n s i t e a i r separation u n i t and s t o r e d i n a 240-bbl, tank. i n s u l a t e d , double-walled The i n n e r tank i s purged by a d m i t t i n g n i t r o g e n i n t o the bottom o f t h e
tank and passing i t through t h e suspended deck vents i n t o t h e vapor space i n t h e dome. To purge t h e l i q u i d container, t h e n i t r o g e n i s exhausted through the r e l i e f vent. vent. The purging o f t h e annular space i s accomplished by opening t h e purge r i n g exhaust nozzles a t t h e bottom o f t h e annular space and c l o s i n g t h e dome vent and t h e r e l i e f vent. A f t e r t h e purge, LNG from t h e l i q u e f a c t i o n u n i t i s s l o w l y admitted through t h e t o p f i l l p e n e t r a t i o n where i t i s d e f l e c t e d and sprayed over t h e f l o o r area. The f o l l o w i n g instruments m o n i t o r t h e e f f e c t s o f cooldown on the tank: 1 i n e a r movement i n d i c a t o r s t h a t measure r e 1a t i v e movement between t h e i n n e r and o u t e r tank w a l l s storage tank thermocouples To purge t h e dome, t h e n i t r o g e n i s exhausted through t h e dome
The temperatures i n t h e tank a r e c a r e f u l l y monitored t o ensure t h a t t h e s p e c i f i e d maximum temperature g r a d i e n t s a r e n o t exceeded, and t o a s c e r t a i n t h a t t h e i n n e r vessel i s r e t u r n i n g t o i t s a p p r o p r i a t e p o s i t i o n .
by these temperatures gradients.
The LNG f l o w r a t e i s l i m i t e d
The cooldown procedures a r e f o l l o w e d u n t i l
t h e tank i s s u f f i c i e n t l y cooled down and t h e LNG l e v e l i n the tank i s approximately one f o o t .

A t t h i s p o i n t , t h e LNG f l o w r a t e from t h e l i q u e f a c t i o n u n i t
i s increased t o t h e normal r a t e . atmosphere from t h e i n n e r vessel.
The cooldown w i t h LNG purges t h e n i t r o g e n
Heatup and Entry.
P r i o r t o heatup o f t h e tank, t h e LNG l e v e l i s lowered The
u n t i l t h e r e i s approximately one f o o t o f l i q u i d remaining i n t h e tank. mately 275"F, i n t o t h e storage tank through t h e bottom p e n e t r a t i o n .
remaining l i q u i d i s then removed by i n j e c t i n g heated n a t u r a l gas, a t approxiThe n a t u r a l gas then r i s e s , due t o i t s temperature buoyancy, t o t h e t o p o f t h e vessel and leaves through t h e vapor o u t l e t l i n e . b o i l o f f compressor and s e n t t o t h e f u e l l i n e . f u n c t i o n s as i t would d u r i n g normal operation. The gas i s compressed by t h e The tank pressure c o n t r o l system
The i n l e t gas f l o w i s maintained 6 a t approximately t h e normal b o i l o f f r a t e , 1.0 x 10 scfd. A t t h i s r a t e i t takes
approximately 20 days t o warm t h e tank from -260F t o +60F. I n s t r u m e n t a t i o n systems monitored t o determine the e f f e c t o f warmup on t h e tank are: l i n e a r movement i n d i c a t o r s t h a t measure r e l a t i v e movement between t h e i n n e r and o u t e r tank w a l l s storage tank thermocouples s t r a i n gauges i n s t a l l e d around t h e p e r i p h e r y o f t h e e x t e r i o r tank t o m o n i t o r any stresses developed by expansion o f the i n n e r vessel and subsequent compaction o f t h e p e r l i t e . The storage tank must be purged t o a 98+% n i t r o g e n atmosphere b e f o r e personnel e n t r y . The o f f gas i s removed from t h e tank by t h e b o i l o f f compressor
As t h e purging nears completion, how-
and used as t h e b o i l o f f gas normally i s .
ever, t h e n i t r o g e n c o n t e n t o f t h e o f f gas r i s e s r a p i d l y , and t h e l a s t p o r t i o n o f t h e o f f gas i s vented through t h e v e n t gas header. from t h e vent. Combustible gas d e t e c t o r s a r e l o c a t e d around t h e tank t o detemine i f any combustible gases a r e descending E s t a b l i s h e d weather c r i t e r i a d e f i n e acceptable atmospheric condi t i o n s f o r venting. A f t e r t h e purge, two o p t i o n s e x i s t : t o displace the nitrogen. 1 ) personnel can e n t e r t h e tank u s i n g
l i f e - s u p p o r t systems o r 2) t h e p u r g i n g procedure can be repeated u s i n g a i r
B.3.4
Marine Terminal and Sendout System
The LNG stored a t the terminal i s loaded onto marine vessels f o r export through the marine terminal and sendout system. The flow diagram f o r the marine terminal was shown previously in Figure B.7. The loading system i s shown in Figure B.14. B. 3.4.1 Marine Terminal
The marine terminal i s designed t o the same earthquake c r i t e r i a as the 1 iquefaction and storage f a c i l i t i e s , VIII in the Mercall i scale. However, additional features are incorporated into the design of the dock and t r e s t l e support structures t o withstand the ice and tidal currents of the region. Ice and strong currents could also endanger tankers during docking and loading operations. Therefore, the design of the loading dock and dolphins f a c i l i t a t e s rapid undocking of a tanker in an emergency.
16" VAPOR RETURN ARM
24" VAPOR RETURN LINE
FLASH VAPORS TO T- 201. T-202, AND C-202
.--aC-211 VAPOR RETCRN COMPRESSOR

A
TO DRAIN
LNG RECIRCULATION
LNG TO SHIP
16' LIQUID LOADING ARMS
TO DRAIN
FIGURE B.14.
Flow Diagram f o r Loading System
The loading platform, the approach t r e s t l e , and the berthing and n~ooring dolphins are supported by piles driven and jetted into the sea bottom. The number of structural members located in the ice zone are minimized to l i m i t the ice forces on the structure. Vertical piles receiving ice forces are tapered t o minimize the bending moments from ice. They are also designed t o break u p the ice sheet as i t moves past the pile. The t r e s t l e supports a 36-in.-diameter insulated LNG transfer l i n e , a 24-in.-diameter insulated vapor return l i n e , a 4-in. nitrogen purge and LNG recirculation l i n e , an 8-in. fire-control water l i n e , an insulated and heated sanitary waste discharge l i n e , and a concrete roadway 12 f t wide. A 100-ft by 130-ft loading platform, located a t the end of the 2200-ft t r e s t l e , i s 50 f t above mean lower 1ine water (MLLW) and i s located a t a bottom depth of 48 f t below MLLW. The platform supports four 16-in. LNG loading arms, one 16-in. vapor return arm, a nitrogen surge drum, a 48-ft-high control tower, and a compressor building housing two vapor return compressors. The platform i s shown in Figure B.15. The control tower i s located in an elevated "pulpit" in order t o give the operator an unimpaired view of the ship, as shown in Figure B.16. The pulpits are patterned a f t e r the control towers a t small airports and are reached by
LOADING ARMS TOP OF DOCK EL 50.0' HIGH WATER + 27.0' MLLW EL 0.0'
-
- 7 1 -
-6.0' LOW WATER APPROX EL
!I
DATUM: MLLW 0.0' EL - ELEVATION MLLW - MEAN LOWER LOW WATER MD -MOORING DOLPHIN
FIGURE B. 15.
Export Terminal Loading Platform and Trestle
FIGURE B.16.
Major Equipment on Loading Deck Each p u l p i t has a water-
s p i r a l s t a i r s i n s i d e a 72-in. s t e e l support c y l i n d e r .
spray system, and t h e support c y l i n d e r s a r e h e a v i l y i n s u l a t e d f o r f i r e p r o t e c t i o n . The e n t i r e s t r u c t u r e i s a i r - c o n d i t i o n e d and heated by a heat pump and i s press u r i z e d w i t h a supply o f f r e s h a i r from a p o i n t near t h e o f f i c e and s e r v i c e compl ex. The p u l p i t i s manned as l o n g as any o f t h e cryogenic arms are connected t o a ship, and t h e p u l p i t o p e r a t o r has, a t h i s f i n g e r t i p s , t h e c o n t r o l s f o r t h e 1oading arms, t h e LNG booster pumps, t h e vapor r e t u r n system, the two f i r e - w a t e r pumps, t h e dual d r y chemical f i r e p r o t e c t i o n system, and a l l t h e o f f s h o r e valves. For communications, he has a d i r e c t l i n e t o t h e s h i p ' s cargo c o n t r o l o f f i c e , a d i r e c t l i n e t o t h e t e r m i n a l main c o n t r o l room, r a d i o , normal telephone, and a
two-way loudspeaker system. The loading arms extend and rotate to accomodate normal movement of the tanker during loading operations. Each arm i s equipped w i t h a shutoff valve designed to prevent LNG spillage during an emergency and a check valve t o prevent backflow. The arms, which are not insulated, are constructed of 300-series stainless steel to withstand thermal stresses caused by extreme temperature changes. The loading arms are connected to the tanker by quick-release hydraulic couplers. The couplers are activated by one man from the master control panel in the control tower and can be disconnected i n about 1 or 2 minutes. Each arm i s equipped with twc s e t s of redundant sensing devices t h a t i n i t i a t e audible alarms and activate the ESD. Provisions are also made f o r emergency shutdown of the transfer systems. This can be accomplished e i t h e r by isolating specific systems or areas f o r shutdown or by shutting down the e n t i r e operation. The emergency shutdown system i s activated a t the operator's direction o r , in c r i t i c a l areas, by lowtemperature sensors that detect spilled LNG. Before a tanker can make an emergency departure, the loading arms are f i r s t drained, a procedure requiring less than 5 minutes, and then they are disconnected. Six mooring dolphins and four berthing dolphins are equipped with quick-release mooring hooks and powered capstans. There are currently no plans f o r shielding t o protect the ship from s p i l l s a t the dock.
6.3.4.2
Shiploading Procedures
When a l l preparations are completed on the vessel f o r loading, terminal personnel extend both the loading and vapor return arms to a position such that persons on the working platform can remove the blinds. After t h a t , and before the blinds are removed, the following steps are followed: Terminal personnel open vent valves to depressurize the arms, which have been maintained in a nitrogen atmosphere. After venting, they advise the flanging crew that the blinds may be removed and connection made t o the s h i p ' s manifold. When connections have been properly made, the s h i p ' s cargo o f f i c e r advises the terminal that the vessel i s ready t o receive cargo. Terminal personnel notify other shore f a c i l i t i e s .
The s h i p ' s storage tanks a r e then cooled a t a reduced l o a d i n g r a t e . o f 55,000 gpm, which enables a tanker t o be loaded i n 10-12 hours. toward t h e top. the l i n e s .
When
c o o l i n g i s completed, LNG i s introduced i n t o t h e tanks a t a t o t a l combined r a t e As LNG f i l l s t h e tank space, vapors remaining from t h e s h i p ' s cooldown o p e r a t i o n a r e f o r c e d Vapors a r e a l s o produced continuously d u r i n g l o a d i n g by energy added through t h e t r a n s f e r pumps, heat leakage, and l a t e n t heat removed from These vapors must be pumped o u t a t a r a t e s u f f i c i e n t t o prevent presTherefore, t h e vapors a r e continuously The vapors a r e then sure from b u i l d i n g up i n t h e ships tanks.
pumped back t o shore u s i n g t h e s h i p ' s b o i l o f f compressors. they a r e used as a fuel gas o r f l a r e d . Cargo t r a n s f e r i s c a r e f u l l y documented. tions.
e i t h e r r e t u r n e d t o t h e storage tanks t o d i s p l a c e t h e l i q u i d being pumped out, o r
A continuous watch i s kept both
i n t h e s h i p ' s c o n t r o l room and on deck, and a l o g i s maintained on a l l operaD r a i n pans a r e placed beneath f i t t i n g s t o c o l l e c t small leakages o f An o p t i o n t o t h i s i s t o LNG and prevent l o c a l i z e d thermal shock t o t h e deck.
r u n seawater over t h e decks d u r i n g l o a d i n g and discharging. Approximately 40 minutes p r i o r t o reaching t h e f i l l l e v e l o f the tanks, o r a t some predetermined l e v e l , t h e cargo o f f i c e r n o t i f i e s t e r m i n a l personnel t o reduce t h e l o a d i n g r a t e . T h i s i s done by c u t t i n g o u t a l l b u t one shore pump. When t h e tank reaches proper l e v e l , 98% f u l l , t h e operator closes t h e v e n t v a l v e on t o p o f t h e tank. Each tank i s equipped w i t h an automatic system t h a t senses l i q u i d l e v e l and a u t o m a t i c a l l y closes a valve a t each cargo tank dome i f t h e tank reaches 99% f u l l . s h i p and l o a d i n g dock. As an added precaution, an Emergency Shutdown System t h a t can be a c t i v a t e d manually o r a u t o m a t i c a l l y i s provided on t h e F i n a l l y , t h e cargo o f f i c e r can manually c l o s e t h e dome v a l v e on t h e a f f e c t e d tank i f b o t h shutdown systems f a i l . When t h e proper l e v e l i s reached i n a l l o f t h e s h i p ' s tanks, t h e cargo o f f i c e r n o t i f i e s t h e t e r m i n a l o p e r a t o r t o s t o p l o a d i n g and orders t h e s h i p ' s compressors shut down. 1 i n e a r e closed. A l l compressor valves and valves i n the compressor
The disconnecting operation requires that the liquid header and loading arm f i r s t be drained. They are drained into the ship's tank t h a t was l a s t f i l l e d . This involves the following procedures: Using the portable console, the s h i p ' s personnel close the shore block valves. The terminal operator then closes the vapor manifold valve ashore and notifies the cargo o f f i c e r t o close the vapor manifold valve and stop the compressors. The terminal operator opens a drain l i n e on each loading arm and leaves i t open f o r a t l e a s t three minutes. The liquid drains into the liquid header aboard the vessel, and the drain valves ashore are then closed. The ship's manifold loading valves are closed. cracked t o the crossover lines. The vapor header i s then
The terminal operator opens the nitrogen block valve t o each arm and pressurizes i t .
A t t h i s point, the terminal operator requests the cargo o f f i c e r t o open the s h i p ' s liquid and vapor manifold valves s l i g h t l y f o r depressurizing into the ship's lines. This operation i s repeated a t l e a s t three times by reclosing and reopening the liquid and vapor manifold valves. The final position of the valves are closed.
The terminal operator opens wide the atmospheric vent valve on each arm. When the arms are depressurized and the flanges are a t a temperature that can be handled ( s a l t water may be used to warm u p the flanges), the loading arms are disconnected and the blind flanges replaced on manifold and loading arms. After the arms are retracted, the terminal operator closes the atmospheric vent valves and repressures the loading arms with nitrogen until the next 1 oadi ng . When a l l of the foregoing operations are complete, a l l valves used f o r loading are closed. Draining of the s h i p ' s lines i s f a c i l i t a t e d by a s l i g h t trim a t the stern of the vessel.
B. 3.4.3
Re1 ease Prevention and Control Features
Some of the precautions taken f o r safety consideration a t the terminal are: avoidance of any unnecessary flames or f i r e sources i n the terminal area by the prohibition of smoking, open flames, welding, and unsafe e l e c t r i c a l equipment systems such as lighting and heating installed in accordance with existing safety regulations (National Electric Code NFPA #70) a s u f f i c i e n t safety factor (with regard t o pressure and temperature capabi 1it i e s ) designed into the transfer piping, hoses, compressors, pumps, and connections periodic and complete inspection of a1 1 terminal f a c i l i t i e s provision of suitable markings on pipes and hoses, when more than one product i s handled a t l e a s t one person in constant attendance while loading i s taking place, trained i n the transfer and emergency procedures and fami 1i a r with the equ i pmen t 1ayout a good system of communication between the cargo o f f i c e r on board ship and the persons on shore a l l gauges checked prior t o t r ~ n s f e rt o ensure against overfill provision made f o r drainage of the transfer lines prior t o disconnection a sufficient number of f i r e control units available a t s t r a t e g i c locations. The loading platform i s equipped w i t h the following fire-fighting systems: fixed dry chemical units f i r e hydrant equipment cooling capacity sprinkler system on the roof of the marine control room dry chemical f i r e extinguishers a t the marine control tower and the f i r e hydrant station
a water fire-fighting system consisting of hydrants and water spray monitors t o be used primarily f o r cooling structures during any nearby f i r e water-screen nozzles between the loading arms and the ship t o protect the arms from a f i r e aboard ship a fireboat t i e - i n installed on the f i r e water level a t a point leading t o the 1oadi ng platform. High-expansion foam systems are not used a t the s i t e because i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o s t o r e foam concentrate a t subfreezing temperatures. Both remote and local manual activation of the f i r e systems are possible i n the marine terminal. The f i r e control water pipe1 ine along the t r e s t l e t o the dock i s kept empty; therefore, heat tracing of insulation i s not required. The following detectors are located a t the marine dock: Gas Detectors ( G D ) UV Fire Detectors ( U V ) Each of these i s connected t o an alarm in the main control room and the marine control room and i s identified by location and type.
A containment system i s located under the loading platform to contain a l l
s p i l l s from the loading arms. Low temperature detectors in t h i s area indicate when a s p i l l occurs. N containment i s provided f o r the LNG transfer l i n e s , o e i t h e r on the t r e s t l e o r on shore. Each transfer arm i s equipped w i t h two s e t s of redundant sensing devices t h a t i n i t i a t e alarms in both control rooms and automatically activate the marine terminal emergency shutdown system when excessive motion i s sensed. Each transf e r arm a1 so includes a f a i 1 safe-cl osed-type, ai r-operated valve t h a t closes autonlatical ly when the E D i s activated. S Excessive ship movements are detected by high rotation or extension of the loading arms, activating the f i r s t level alarm. Greater ship movement causes the loading operation t o stop. Additionally, a cable connecting the tanker t o the dock also senses excessive movements and terminates loading operations.
B.3.4.4
LNG Sendout Pumps
There a r e f i v e v e r t i c a l submerged, pot-mounted LNG pumps f o r each s t o r a g e tank, one o f which i s considered a standby. extended s h a f t and t h e a s s o c i a t e d seal. The pumps and m o t o r d r i v e s a r e This eliminates the h e r m e t i c a l l y sealed i n a vessel and submerged i n LNG. r i c h i n LNG and w i l l n o t support combustion.
The pump and motor surroundings a r e 100% The pumps a r e mounted i n a s u c t i o n
p o t below grade t o p r o v i d e s u f f i c e n t s u c t i o n head f o r o p e r a t i o n . Each pump has a c a p a c i t y o f 15,000 gpm, o r a p p r o x i m a t e l y 2,000 MMscfd, f o r a t o t a l sendout c a p a c i t y o f 55,000 gpni and a 10 t o 12 hour l o a d i n g time, e x c l u d i n g t h e spare. The d i s c h a r g e c o n d i t i o n s a r e -260F and 25 p s i g . insulated
The LNG t o be loaded on t h e s h i p i s pumped v i a a 36-in.-diameter p i e r and t r e s t l e . B.4 GENERAL PLANT INFORMATION
LNG t r a n s f e r l i n e t o t h e l o a d i n g p l a t f o r m l o c a t e d a t t h e end o f a 2,200-ft-long
General i n f o r m a t i o n r e l a t i n g t o t h e p l a n t , p a r t i c u l a r l y t o t h e s a f e t y aspects o f p l a n t o p e r a t i o n , i s presented here. B. 4.1 Emergency Shutdown System The p l a n t emergency shutdown system c o n s i s t s o f two m a j o r systems, t h e Master Emergency Shutdown (MES) and t h e Loading Emergency Shutdown (LES) a c t i v a t e d , t h e MES a u t o m a t i c a l l y i n i t i a t e s t h e f o l l o w i n g a c t i o n s : 1. E l e c t r i c a l s u p p l i e s t o a l l normal p l a n t c i r c u i t s a r e de-energized; e s s e n t i a l p l a n t e l e c t r i c a l equipment (e.g., f i r e pumps, f i r e and gas d e t e c t o r s , f i r e system v a l v e o p e r a t o r s ) remains energized.
2.
When
A l l compressors a r e blocked a u t o m a t i c a l l y and i s o l a t e d from t h e l i q u e faction unit.
3.
A 2,500-kW,
g e n e r a t i on.
e n g i n e - d r i v e n g e n e r a t o r i s a v a i l a b l e f o r emergency power
4.
The n a t u r a l gas f e e d l i n e i s b l o c k e d a t t h e p l a n t boundary t o i s o l a t e t h e p l a n t f r o m t h e n a t u r a l gas p i p e l i n e system.
5.
The LNG tank and d i k e area i s i s o l a t e d from the remainder o f t h e p l a n t by t h e f o l l o w i n g a c t i o n s : v a l v e on l i q u i d i n l e t l i n e from t h e l i q u e f a c t i o n u n i t i s closed LNG pump motors a r e shut down valves on t h e LNG pump s u c t i o n and on the l i q u i d withdrawal l i n e s a r e closed. The second shutdown system, t h e LES, a l l o w s t h e r a p i d shutdown and i s o l a -
t i o n o f a l l LNG sendout t o ships and vapor r e t u r n from t h e ships. s h i p by: 1. c l o s i n g b l o c k valves i n t h e l o a d i n g arms c l o s i n g cargo crossover valves on t h e s h i p c l o s i n g b l o c k valves i n t h e vapor r e t u r n l i n e - f r o m t h e s h i p s h u t t i n g down t h e LNG t r a n s f e r pumps.
When a c t i -
vated, t h e LES i n i t i a t e s t h e shutdown o f LNG and vapor f l o w t o and from t h e
2.
3. 4.
The c l o s i n g sequence and r a t e s o f t h e b l o c k valves a r e programmed t o keep f l u i d hammer w i t h i n design l i m i t s and t o prevent any LNG from being trapped between valves. The MES can be a c t i v a t e d manually a t t h e c o n t r o l room and a t t h e two e x i t gates, o r i t can be a c t i v a t e d a u t o m a t i c a l l y by UV flame d e t e c t o r s l o c a t e d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g areas: 1. compressor b u i l d i n g throughout t h e l i q u e f a c t i o n area r e f r i g e r a n t storage LNG storage p i p i n g on o r adjacent t o p i p e racks n e x t t o the compressor b u i l d i n g
2.
3.
4. 5.
6.
C02 removal u n i t
water removal u n i t l o a d i n g dock area.
7.
8.
The MES i s a l s o a c t i v a t e d by t h e high-high l e v e l alarm f o r e i t h e r o f t h e storage tanks and by t h e gas d e t e c t o r s i n t h e compressor b u i l d i n g .
The LES system may be a c t i v a t e d manually f r o m s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t l o c a t i o n s i n t h e l o a d i n g area, i n c l u d i n g t h e main t e r m i n a l c o n t r o l room, t h e l o a d i n g p l a t f o r m c o n t r o l room, and t h e s h i p ' s b r i d g e . t i c a l l y by: 1. 2. c o m b u s t i b l e gas d e t e c t o r s on t h e dock power and a i r supply f a i l u r e h i g h o r low p r e s s u r e i n t h e t r a n s f e r l i n e s excessive flowrates t a n k e r movements o u t s i d e t h e e s t a b l i s h e d o p e r a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s l o w temperature d e t e c t o r i n t h e dock s p i l l b a s i n l o w temperature d e t e c t o r a t t h e l o a d i n g pumps l o w s t o r a g e t a n k pressure (0.2 p s i g ) low storage tank l e v e l . General P l a n t S a f e t y Features As p a r t o f t h e p l a n t ' s a c t i v e defenses, combustible gas d e t e c t o r s , flame d e t e c t o r s , and temperature sensors a r e l o c a t e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e p l a n t and process equipment. The a c t i v a t i o n o f a sensor sounds an a l a r m and i d e n t i f i e s t h e e x a c t I n the event l o c a t i o n o f t h e s p i l l o r f i r e on a g r a p h i c panel i n t h e main c o n t r o l room and, i n some cases, a u t o m a t i c a l l y shuts down t h e a f f e c t e d equipment. of a f i r e , t h e p l a n t ' s f i r e p r o t e c t i o n systems, c o n s i s t i n g o f a f i r e - c o n t r o l w a t e r system, d r y chemical u n i t s , and two f i r e t r u c k s , a r e then employed. Gas sensors a t t h e i n l e t s t o v e n t i l a t e d b u i l d i n g s a c t i v a t e b o t h v i s i b l e and a u d i b l e alarms i f t h e gas c o n c e n t r a t i o n reaches 25% o f t h e LFL f o r methane. A t t h i s time, a high-speed v e n t i l a t i n g f a n i s a c t i v a t e d . s h u t down a u t o m a t i c a l l y . U l t r a v i o l e t sensors a r e l o c a t e d i n s i d e b u i l d i n g s and t h r o u g h o u t t h e p l a n t f o r f i r e detection. Each zone i s covered by a t l e a s t two sensors. The a c t i v a t i o n o f flame d e t e c t o r s causes t h e automatic shutdown o f l o c a l equipment. P r e s s u r e - r e l i e f valves, l o c a t e d throughout t h e process equipment, a r e designed t o r e l i e v e h i g h pressures b e f o r e t h e design pressures o f t h e equipment a r e reached. Gas discharges f r o m these v a l v e s e n t e r t h e f l a r e header system The LES can a l s o be a c t i v a t e d automa-
3.
4. 5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
B.4.2
I f the concentration
reaches 60% o f LFL, a n o t h e r a l a r m i s sounded and t h e a f f e c t e d equipment may be
and a r e d i r e c t e d t o t h e f l a r e stack f o r i n c i n e r a t i o n . multi-component r e f r i g e r a n t compressor. r e l i e f system.
The main header, 40 inches
i n diameter, i s s i z e d t o handle t h e maximum discharge r a t e o f the f i r s t - s t a g e , The f l a r e stack, 300 f e e t h i g h and 50 inches i n diameter, contains a f l u i d i c seal t o prevent a i r from e n t e r i n g t h e The stack i s l o c a t e d a t t h e northwest corner o f t h e p l a n t s i t e so t h a t releases do n o t pose a hazard t o t h e s t a f f o r p l a n t equipment. Sections o f LNG l i n e s t h a t can be i s o l a t e d a r e provided w i t h thermal r e l i e f valves t o p r o t e c t t h e l i n e s from overpressure due t o thermal expansion. r e l i e f s a r e piped back t o t h e storage tanks. The f i r e - c o n t r o l water system i s designed t o p r o v i d e f i r e - e x p o s u r e prot e c t i o n and damage c o n t r o l .
I t a l s o helps e x t i n g u i s h f i r e s which m i g h t o r i g i n a t e
These
i n t h e area adjacent t o t h e p l a n t . The f i r e - c o n t r o l water system i n c l u d e s a main water l o o p surrounding t h e p l a n t , w i t h f i r e hydrants and water m o n i t o r nozzles connected a t v a r i o u s i n t e r vals. The main l o o p c o n s i s t s p r i m a r i l y o f 8- and 10-in.-diameter p i p e l i n e , and An 8-in.-diameter p i p e l i n e runs along the t r e s t l e t o water monitors i s connected t o t h e f i r e - c o n t r o l water pumps by a segment o f 14-in.-diameter pipeline. on t h e dock. Branch l i n e s a r e a l s o provided t o the l i q u e f a c t i o n t r a i n s and
p l a n t b u i 1d'i ngs . The main water l o o p i s s u p p l i e d by a 125,000-gallon freshwater storage tank and i s c o n t i n u o u s l y maintained a t 75 p s i g pressure by t h r e e c i r c u l a t i o n pumps. sys tem. The environmental c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e p l a n t l o c a t i o n r e q u i r e precautionary measures t o prevent f r e e z i n g i n t h e f i r e - c o n t r o l system. line. The f i r e - c o n t r o l water l o o p i s b u r i e d a t a depth o f 21 f e e t below grade i n o r d e r t o be under t h e f r o s t The water l i n e s from t h e main l i n e t o c o n t r o l valves a r e heat-traced and The f i r e - c o n t r o l water p i p e l i n e along t h e t r e s t l e t o t h e The normally kept dry. The storage tank i s s u p p l i e d by two o n s i t e w e l l s . A 3,500-gpm seawater pump and 10-in.-diameter p i p e l i n e p r o v i d e a backup f o r the primary f i r e - w a t e r
dock i s k e p t empty; t h e r e f o r e , heat t r a c i n g o r i n s u l a t i o n i s n o t required.
f i r e - c o n t r o l - w a t e r storage tank i s a l s o n o t i n s u l a t e d ; however, heated water i s c i r c u l a t e d i n t h e t a n k t o prevent freezeups.
The d r y chemical f i r e e x t i n g u i s h i n g systems i n c l u d e f i x e d systems w i t h permanent nozzles, f i x e d systems w i t h hoselines, m o n i t o r nozzles, and p o r t a b l e extinguishers. The compressor b u i l d i n g s use f i x e d u n i t s w i t h hose l i n e s . The t r a n s f e r pump area has a f i x e d system designed t o cover t h e pump area w i t h d r y chemical i n t h e event o f a f i r e . The d r y chemical systems i n the l i q u e f a c t i o n t r a i n s i n c l u d e hoselines and m o n i t o r nozzles.
A d r y chemical u n i t a t the dock
has both m o n i t o r nozzles and bicarbonate o r potassium carbonate. Two f i r e t r u c k s p r o v i d e backup f i r e p r o t e c t i o n f o r a l l p l a n t areas and primary f i r e p r o t e c t i o n f o r areas n o t otherwise covered. o f t h e f i x e d d r y chemical systems f o r backup. capabi 1it y . B.5 SOURCES OF INFORMATION The d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e LNG e x p o r t t e r m i n a l was developed u s i n g i n f o r m a t i o n from t h e sources l i s t e d below. The t r u c k contains a d r y chemical system w i t h hose l i n e s and a monitor, and i t can a t t a c h t o any The t r u c k a l s o has water-pumping
1.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission f i l e s o f a p p l i c a t i o n s concerning LNG facilities: FPC Docket No. CP75-140, P a c i f i c Alaska LNG Associates, October 31, 1978.
2.
LNG Equipment Venders: Chicago Bridge and I r o n Chicago Bridge and I r o n Chicago Bridge and I r o n
Cryogenic Storage, B u l l e t i n No. 8600, Cryogenic Systems, B u l l e t i n No. 8650, USA Standards f o r Design and Construction o f LNG I n s t a l l a t i o n , B u l l i e t i n No. 831,
Pittsburg-Des Moines S t e e l Company American A i r L i q u i d e A l l i s o n Control, Inc. American A i r L i q u i d e
LNG Storage Tanks, B u l l e t i n No. 303,
Teal L i q u e f a c t i o n Process B u l l e t i n , F i r e D e t e c t i o n and Extinguishment Control Systems, (various materials), Turnkey L i q u e f i e d N a t u r a l Gas P l a n t s B u l l e t i n , Exchangers, N a t u r a l Gas L i q u e f a c t i o n , P&GJ, June 1975,
A i r Products and Chemicals, I n c . - Process Design and Cryogenic Heat
Union Carbide Corp.
Linde Molecular Sieves, Gas Dehydration, P&GJy June 1975.
3.
Open L i t e r a t u r e :
R. I. Shaheen and M. K. Vora, "Worldwide LNG Survey C i t e s E x i s t i n g , Planned P r o j e c t s . " O i l and Gas Journal, pp. 59-71, June 20, 1977.
R. F. Stebbing and J. V . O'Brien, "Core Exchangers Update Peak Shaving." O i l and Gas Journal, pp. 46-49, December 22, 1975.
L. Devanna and G. Doulames, "Planning i s t h e Key t o LNG Tank Purging, E n t r y and I n s p e c t i o n . " O i l and Gas Journal, pp. 74-82, September 8, 1975.
F. P. Schulz, " S a f e t y a t an LNG Peakshaving F a c i l i t y . " Paper presented a t t h e ASME Winter Annual Meeting, New York, NY, November 17-22, 1974. Hanke, C. C., LaFare, I.V. and L i t z i n g e r , L. F., Purging LNG Tanks I n t o and Out o f Service Considerations and Experiences." Paper presented a t t h e AGA D i s t r i b u t i o n Conference, Minneapolis, Minnesota, May 6-8, 1974.
V. A. Warner, " L i q u i f i e d Natural Gas F i r e Control." Paper presented a t t h e AGA Transmission Conference, Las Vegas, NV, May 3-5, 1976.
N. H. Brock and R. M. Howard, "Upgrading LNG P l a n t Safety." Paper presented a t t h e AGA Transmission Conference, Bal Harbour, F L Y May 19-21, 1975.
H. R. Wesson, "Consideration R e l a t i n g t o F i r e P r o t e c t i o n Requirements f o r LNG P l a n t s . " Paper presented a t t h e AGA Transmission Conference, Bal Harbour, FLY May 19-21, 1975.
B. M. Vinson, "Basic S a f e t y as Respects Storage, Movement, and Combustion o f Gas and O i 1 Fuel s. " proceedings o f t h e ~ m e r i c a nPower Conference, Vol 34, pp. 591-609, 1972.
R. G. S c h l a t e r and C. J. Noel, "Good A x i a l Compressor C o n t r o l Aids LNG P l a n t s . " O i l and Gas Journal, pp. 52-57, January 15, 1973.
Gas Processing Handbook Issue. A p r i l 1973.
Hydrocarbon Processing, pp. 132-138,
LNG I n f o r m a t i o n Book, prepared by t h e LNG I n f o r m a t i o n Book Task Group o f t h e L i q u i f i e d N a t u r a l Gas Committee, American Gas Association, 1973.
D. B. Crawford and G. P. Eschenbrenner, "Heat T r a n s f e r Equipment f o r LNG P r o j e c t s . " Chemical Engineering Progress, pp. 62-70, September 1972.
A. E. Uhl, L. A. Amoroso and R. H. S e i t e r , " S a f e t y and R e l i a b i l i t y o f

LNG F a c i l i t i e s . " Paper presented a t t h e ASME Petroleum Mechanical Engineering and Pressure Vessel and P i p i n g Conference, New Orleans, LA, September 17-21 , 1972.
P. J. Anderson and E. J. Daniels, "The LNG I n d u s t r y : Past, Present, and Future." Prepared by I n s t i t u t e o f Gas Technology f o r US ERDA under cont r a c t No. EE-77-C-02-4234.
I.L. W i s s m i l l e r and E. 0. Mattocks, "How t o Use LNG Safely." and Gas Journal, March 1972.
Pipeline
S. Seroka and R. J. Bolan, " S a f e t y Considerations i n t h e I n s t a l l a t i o n o f an LNG Tank." Cryogenics and I n d u s t r i a l Gases, pp. 22-28, September/October 1970. L. R. Smith, "Submerged Pumps f o r LNG Sendout." D i s t r i b u t i o n Conference, 1968. Paper presented a t AGA
P. J. Anderson and W. W. Bodle, " S a f e t y Considerations i n t h e Design and Operation o f LNG Terminals." Paper presented a t t h e 4 t h I n t e r n a t i o n a l Conference, A1 g i e r s , A1 g e r i a , June 24-27, 1974.
A. E l i N i s e n f e l d , Roger Miyasaki, Tom Liem, J. M. Eskes, "For E a s i e r Comp r e s s o r Control." Hydrocarbon Processing, pp. 153-156, A p r i l 1975. D. C. Hullock, R. M. Farber and C. E. Davis, "Compressors and D r i v e r s f o r LNG Plants." Chemical Engineering Progress, pp. 77-82, September 1972.
Jack L. Peterson, "Gas Turbines vs. Steam Turbines as D r i v e r s f o r Baseload LNG P l a n t s . " P i p e l i n e and Gas Journal, pp. 32-38, January 1974.
M. M. Levy, "Cove P o i n t Terminal Near Completion." Journal, pp. 35-40, June 1976.
P i p e l i n e and Gas
P h i l i p J. Anderson and W i l l i a m W. Bodle, " S a f e t y Considerations i n t h e Design and Operation o f LNG Terminals." Session V, Paper 4, IGT, pp. 1-16.
R. F. Parker and L. L. Phannensteil, "Extensive Indonesian LNG Program Results i n Two Large L i q u e f a c t i o n Plants." ASME Paper 74-WA/PID-14, pp. 2-8, f o r meeting Nov. 17-22, 1974.
Dean, Hal e, "Brunei LNG P r o j e c t T r u l y An I n t e r n a t i o n a l Undertaking. l i n e and Gas Journal, pp.29-38, June 1973. Luino D e l l Osso, J r . , " A l g e r i a I 1 LNG P r o j e c t Plans D e t a i l e d . " Gas Journal, pp. 65-68, May 29, 1978.
I'
Pipe-
O i l and
A i r Products and Chemicals Inc., sing, p. 130, A p r i l 1973.
"MCR L i q u e f a c t i o n . "
Hydrocarbon Proces-
E a r l Seaton, " I n d o n e s i a ' s Arun LNG P l a n t Nears Completion." Journal, March 13, 1978.
O i l and Gas
John L. Kennedy, "Kalimantan's Badak LNG P l a n t Goes on Stream i n Record Time." O i l and Gas Journal, pp. 51-56, May 29, 1978.
C . E. Feierabend, "Design Considerations f o r LNG Production F a c i l i t i e s i n A r c t i c Regions." AGA Transmission Conference, Montreal Canada, 11 pp. May 8-10, 1978.
World Wide LNG Market, p u b l i s h e d by F r o s t & S u l l i v a n , Inc., New York, NY, June 1977.
G. E. Thompson, and H. R. Sharp, "Kenai LNG P l a n t Design." Paper presented a t ASME conference i n Tulsa, Oklahoma, September 21-25, 1969.
L. K n i e l , "Energy Systems f o r LNG P l a n t s . " pp. 77-84, October 1973.
Chemical Engineering Progress,
R. M. M i l t o n and C. F. Gottzman, "High E f f i c i e n c y R e b o i l e r s and Condensers." Chemical Engineering Progress, pp. 56-61, September 1972.
G. E. K i n a r d and L. S. Gaumer, "Mixed R e f r i g e r a n t Cascade Cycles f o r LNG. " Chemical Engineering Progress, pp. 56-61, January 1973.
APPENDIX C F A C I L I T Y DESCRIPTION OF REFERENCE LNG MARINE VESSEL
APPENDIX C FACILITY DESCRIPTION OF REFERENCE LNG MARINE VESSEL The e a r l i e s t s i g n i f i c a n t development in the marine transportation of lique-
A man named William ~JoodPrince of the Union Stockyard and T r a n s i t Company ("Chicago Stockyards") Aeveloped the idea t h a t i t might be economically f e a s i b l e t o l i q u i f y natural j a s , then a byproduct disposed of by burning o r " f l a r i n g , " and t o t r a n s p o r t i t 9y barge t o an a r e a , such as Chicago, where i t ~iiightbe sold as a f u e l . The idea was f u r t h e r developed, and ultimately a j o i n t venture was agreed upon by the Chicago Stockyards and the Continental Oil Company. They formed a new :ompany, Constock Liquid Methane Corporation, and in 1952 made the f i r s t s e r i o u s 2 f f o r t a t marine t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of L N G , from Louisiana u p the Mississippi River to Chicago. Their e f f o r t resulted i n the METHANE, a r i v e r barge whose carry3 i n g capacity of about 6,000 m consisted of f i v e c y l i n d r i c a l , carbon s t e e l tanks 50 f e e t in diameter and 24 f e e t deep. The METHANE never developed t o t h e ~ o i n t being an economic success. However, the i n t e r e s t i n g and s i g n i f i c a n t of l s p e c t of the METHANE was the construction of i t s tanks, f o r t h i s provided the ? a s i s f o r f u r t h e r development in tank construction.
f i e d natural gas took place in the United S t a t e s in 1951. The M E T H A N E ' S tanks were lined i n t e r n a l l y with balsa wood, which was t o 'unction as an i n s u l a t o r in d i r e c t contact with L N G . Balsa wood proved t o be
i n e x c e l l e n t i n s u l a t o r , except t h a t a g r e a t deal of surface damage was noted ~ f t e r s e r i e s of f i l l i n g and emptying cycles. Some penetration of the balsa a
~y the LNG was expected; however, upon warmup, trapped LNG v o l a t i l i z e d , expandi n g so rapidly from a l i q u i d t o a gaseous s t a t e t h a t i t caused the balsa l i n i n g LO d e t e r i o r a t e a t the inner surfaces. Even though i t f e l l s h o r t of commerical success, the METHANE venture showed :hat marine t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of LNG was within the c a p a b i l i t i e s of current engi~ e e rng technology. i During the middle 19501s, i n t e r e s t changed from r i v e r t o ocean t r a n s p o r t ~f LNG. In 1957, the North Thanles Gas Board joined Constock in a commerical
v e n t u r e t o prove t h e f e a s i b i l i t y o f l a r g e - s c a l e ocean t r a n s p o r t o f LNG. c a p a c i t y i n i t s r e c t a n g u l a r , aluminum a1 l o y (5083-0) s t o r a g e t a n k ( s ) a t t h e head o f t h e Thames E s t u r a r y .
Their
e
e f f o r t s produced t h e METHANE PIONEER, a converted d r y cargo s h i p w i t h 5,000-m'
I n 1955
she c a r r i e d t h e f i r s t cargo o f LNG f r o m Lake Charles, L o u i s i a n a , t o Canvey I s 1 A l t o g e t h e r , seven cargoes were s u c c e s s f u l t r a n s p o r t e d b e f o r e t h e experiment was t e r m i n a t e d i n 1961. I n 1961, Conch I n t e r n a t i o n a l Methane, L t d . , c o n t r a c t e d t o have two s h i p s 3 o f 27,400-m c a p a c i t y c o n s t r u c t e d t o d e l i v e r LNG from Arzew, A l g e r i a , t o Canve I s l a n d on a l o n g - t e r m b a s i s . These ships, t h e METHANE PRINCESS and t h e METHAF They a r e c u r r e r PROGRESS, began t h e i r s e r v i c e i n 1964 and 1965, r e s p e c t i v e l y .
s t i l l i n s e r v i c e , as i s t h e METHANE PIONEER, now renamed t h e ARISTOTLE. D u r i n g t h e t i m e t h e Constock experiment was underway, Gaz de France begar s t u d y i n g t h e p o s s i b i l it y o f t r a n s p o r t i n g n a t u r a l gas f o r m t h e Sahara t o France T h i s s t u d y l e d t o t h e conversion o f a l i b e r t y s h i p t o t h e t a n k e r BEAUVAIS. Tests w i t h t h e BEAUVAIS began i n 1962 and r a n f o r f i v e months, a f t e r which
i t was decided a c y l i n d r i c a l t a n k system would be t h e most d e s i r a b l e . As a 3 consequence, a new 25,500-m - c a p a c i t y vessel, JULES VERNE, was c o n s t r u c t e d . I t e n t e r e d i n t o s e r v i c e i n March 1965, c a r r y i n g LNG f r o m Arzew, A l g e r i a , t o
Le Harve. With t h e e x c e p t i o n o f t h e barge METHANE, a l l t h e v e s s e l s used what i s d e s c r i b e d as a f r e e - s t a n d i n g tank, a t a n k n o t dependent on t h e s h i p ' s h u l l f o r structural integrity. was f i r s t considered. lation. I n t h e e a r l y 19601s, t h e concept o f a membrane tank T h i s i s a t a n k made o f a t h i n l i n i n g o f non-load-bearir
m a t e r i a l f i t t e d i n t o a t a n k composed o f t h e s h i p ' s h u l l and l o a d b e a r i n g i n s u The d e s i g n was o r i g i n a t e d by O i v i n d Lorentzen & Company o f Norway. 3 was l a t e r a c q u i r e d and m o d i f i e d by Technigaz and i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t h e 630-n~ s h i p PYTHAGORE. ethylene, a l t h o u g h i t i s capable o f c a r r y i n g methane and has done so. Other membrane designs were developed d u r i n g t h e same p e r i o d by Conch, Worms and Cie, and Gaz de France, t h e l a t t e r two o p e r a t i n g as Gaz-Transport. The Gaz-Transprot design was f i r s t t e s t e d on an LPG ship, t h e HYPOLITE WORMS; however, t h e f i r s t LNG s h i p s t o employ t h i s design were t h e POLAR ALASKA and ARCTIC TOKYO, b u i l t f o r Marthon and P h i l l i p s . The s h i p s were completed i n 1969 and e n t e r e d s e r v i c e between Alaska and Japan.
T h i s s h i p has been used by Gazocean p r i m a r i l y as a c a r r i e r 01
Meanwhile, in other parts of the world, other interested parties were attempting t o develop t h e i r own LNG capabilities. Esso entered the LNG f i e l d in the early 1960's by undertaking the development of a natural gas market f i r s t in I t a l y , then in Spain. Their e f f o r t s resulted in four 40,000-m 3 ships with free-standing aluminum tanks.
A t the beginning of 1978, the world LNG c a r r i e r f l e e t totaled 42 ships. F a c i l i t i e s f o r liquefaction and regasification coming on stream within the next f i v e years will require an additional 30 vessels t o be b u i l t .
Anticipated U. S. base-load import projects will require a f l e e t of 58 ocean-going LNG vessels. To date, only 25 of the vessels required are e i t h e r in operation or on order. In addition t o these vessels, four LNG tankers have made spot deliveries of LNG t o the Everett, Massachusetts, import receiving terminal. Pertinent data describing these 29 vessels are l i s t e d in Table C.1. Of these 29 vessels, 11 have independent cargo tanks while 18 have membrane cargo containment systems. These vessels range in size from 40,000 t o 130,000 m 3 . However, vessels of up to 165,000 m 3 are under consideration f o r a t l e a s t one LNG import project. Approximately half of the vessels that will be b u i l t t o serve United States LNG trades are to be constructed by U.S. shipbuilders. C.l GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF LNG M RN VESSEL AIE
The f a c i l i t i e s and structure of a typical 125,000-m 3 LNG marine vessel are described here. A diagram of the vessel i s shown in Figure C.1. The principal characteristics of the tanker are given in Table C.2. The description of the LNG marine vessel was developed using information from the sources l i s t e d in Section C.6. C.l .'I Ship F a c i l i t i e s
The tanker has an operating time of 345 days/yr, with 20 days allowed f o r miscellaneous delays and repairs. The approximate cargo deliverability of the vessel i s 90 t o 92% of the cargo capacity. The cargo boiloff i s approximately 0.25 vol%/day (317 m3/day). N boiloff vapors are vented to the atmosphere; o
TABLE C.1.
S h i p Nanie and/ o r Hul - l Number Descartes Dimensions Ex tended Breadth - 104 f t 6 i n
LNG Tankers i n U.S.

Tanks
. -
Trades
Propulsion Rating Type S h a f t Hp 17,000 Speed (Nautical mph) 17 Fuel
LOA
Draft 27 f t 7 i n
-TypeTechnigaz Membrane Gaz T r a n s p o r t Membrane Technlgaz Membrane Gaz T r a n s p o r t Membrane Gaz T r a n s p o r t Membrane Gaz T r a n s p o r t Menlbrane Gaz T r a n s p o r t Membrane Prismatic, Insulated. Stainless Steel Prismatic, Insulated. Stainless Steel Prismatic. Insulated Stainless Steel Rectangular, Insulated, Aluminum Rectangular, Insulated Aluminum Rectangular Insulated A1 umi num Spherical. Insulated Nickel Steel Spherical, Insulated Nickel Steel
No.
12
Unloadi n g m p s Capacity Type (1,000 g a l / h r ] Deepwell 1014 a t 304 f t 88 125 a t 492 f t
. -
( tonslday 1
105
721 f t 10 i n
Steam Turbine S t a l Lava1 Steam Turbine Steam Turbine
Hassi R'Mel Charles Tellier Kenai M u l t i n a E l Paso Sona t r a c h E l Paso Consolidated Edouard L o u i s Dreyfus E l Paso Southern
0
656 f t 646 f t 651 f t 4 i n 920 f t 5-1/8 i n 920 f t 5-1/8 i n 872 f t 9 i n 948 f t 6 i n
96 f t 11 i n 95 f t 11 i n 87 f t 136 f t 6 i n 136 f t 6 i n 136 f t 6 i n 135 f t
12 4
Submerged Submerged
16,250 16,800 23,000
10 10
Subnterged Submerged
3045 a t 75 p s i g 3045 a t 75 p s i g
Steani Turbine Steam Turbine Turbine
44,000 44,000 45,000 40,000
10
Submerged
3552 a t 75 p s i g 3552 a t 75 p s i g 3552 a t 75 p s i g 3180 a t 75 p s i g 3180 a t 75 p s i g 3180 a t 75 p s i g
Stea111 Turbine Steam Turbine Steam Turbine Steam Turbine Steam Turbine Steani Turbine Steam Turbine Stean~ Turbine
1 ,
EI paso Arzew
948 f t 6 i n
135 f t
10
Submerged
40,000
El Paso Howard Boyd 1 Paso Columbia E l Paso Savannah E l Paso Cove P o i n t
948 f t 6 i n
135 f t
10
Submerged
40,000
931 f t 6 i n
140 f t 6 i n
10
Submerged
41,000
931 f t 6 i n
140 f t 6 i n
10
Submerged
41,000
931 f t 6 i n
140 f t 6 i n
10
Submerged
41,000
10
Submerged
43,000
10
Submerged
43,000
TABLE C . 1 . -Ship Name and/ o r Hul - l Number 936 f t LOA Dinlensions _ Extended Breadth 143 f t 6 i n 36 f t Tanks Draft
-
(contd)
- Unloading Pumps Capacity No. - Type (1 ,000 g a l / h r )
E L
5
-a~-Spherical, Insulated. Nickel Steel Technigaz Membrane Gaz T r a n s p o r t Membrane 10 10
Propulsion Rating Type S h a f t Hp Steam Turbine 43,000
Speed (Nautical
mph)
20
Fuel (tonslday )
Subn~erged
Mostefa Ben Boulaid Gastor Nestor
35 f t 35 f t 35 f t
Submerged Submerged
211 92
Steam Turbine Steam Turbine Steam Turbine S t a l Lava1
45,000 32.000 32,000
19 19 19 Fuel O i l N a t u r a l Gas Fuel O i l N a t u r a l Gas
Gaz T r a n s p o r t Membrane Technigaz Membrane Insulated, GT-EICO 30 Insulated, GT-MCO 30 10 2 Submerged Submerged 211 92
Ben F r a n k l i n 671 672 53
31 f t
Steam Turbine Steam Turbine Steam Turbine
45,000 50,000 50.000 43,000
19 23 23 20
Insulated, Spherical. A1 umi num Insulated, Spherical, A1 umi num Gaz T r a n s p o r t Membrane
10
Submerged
Steam Turbine Steam Turbine Steam Turbine
10
Submerged
43,000
20
A r c t i c Tokyo
20.000
18.25
Fuel O i l as a Complement t o Evaporated Gas Fuel O i l as a Complement t o Evaporated Gas
P o l a r Alaska
Gaz T r a n s p o r t Membrane
Steam Turbine
20.000
17
626 L26 Chiani Bachis
Gaz T r a n s p o r t Membrane Gaz T r a n s p o r t Membrane Gaz T r a n s p o r t Membrane
Steam Turbine Steam Turbine Steam
45,000 45,000 36,000
20 20
19.4
CHOR WINDLASS1
BOW LOOKOUT
0
FEET
METERS r o
- - -I0
Irn
o ,
FIGURE C. 1 .
125,000-m'
LNG Transfer Vessel
TABLE C.2. Length O v e r a l l
P r i n c i p a l C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f 125,000-m 926'0" 897'0" 143'6" 82'0" 36'0"
3 LNG C a r r i e r
285.3 m 273.4 m 43.7 m 25.0 m 11.0 m 64,620 M.T. 96,614 M.T. 19,500 km 43,600 M.
Length between P e r p e n d i c u l a r s Breadth, Molded Depth, Molded t o Upper Deck a t Side, Amidships D r a f t , Design W a t e r l i n e T o t a l Deadweight Displacement
63,600 L. Tons 95,088 L. Tons 10,500 N. M i l e s 43,000 20.4 0.477 1b/shp-hr
C r u i s i n g Radius B u r n i n g O i l Only (Approx.) S h a f t Horsepower, Max, Continuous Design Speed, T r a i l C o n d i t i o n s , Knots S p e c i f i c Fuel Consumption Rate (Approx. )
t h e y a r e removed from t h e t a n k s by t h e b o i l o f f compressors and used t o s u p p l y a p p r o x i m a t e l y 70% o f t h e s h i p ' s f u e l d u r i n g t r a n s i t . The s h i p has a range ( o i l f u e l o n l y ) o f approximately 10,500 n a u t i c a l miles.
I t has a t o t a l f u e l o i l c a p a c i t y o f 6660 l o n g tons, a f r e s h w a t e r
c a p a c i t y o f 470 l o n g tons, and a d i e s e l o i l c a p a c i t y o f 185 l o n g tons. The cargo system o f t h e s h i p i n c l u d e s f i v e s p h e r i c a l aluminum tanks w i t h 3 a t o t a l t a n k volume o f 126,750 m a t 100% f u l l and -265F. Two u n l o a d i n g 3 pumps, each w i t h a c a p a c i t y o f 1130 m / h r , a r e i n c l u d e d i n each tank. Spray pumps a r e a l s o i n c l u d e d w i t h each s t o r a g e t a n k f o r t h e purpose o f s t o r a g e t a n k 3 cooldown. The t o t a l spray pump c a p a c i t y i s 68 m / h r . The vessel has a n i t r o gen system f o r p u r g i n g t h e t a n k s i n t o and o u t o f s e r v i c e . The n i t r o g e n system 3 i n c l u d e s 25 m o f l i q u i d s t o r a g e and a v a p o r i z e r . An i n e r t gas g e n e r a t o r w i t h 3 a c a p a c i t y o f 184 m /min i s a1 so i n c l u d e d . N a v i g a t i o n a l and e l e c t r o n i c equipment f o r t h e vessel i n c l u d e s : s h o r t - and long-range r a d a r systems p o s i t i o n e d f o r e and a f t o f t h e vessel
@
a depth r e c o r d e r a Loran p o s i t i o n f i x A/C r e c e i v e r h i g h - and medium-frequency r a d i o communications VHF s h i p - t o - s h i p r a d i o - t e l e p h o n e a 6 0 - l i n e a u t o m a t i c - d i a l telephone system
a radio direction finder g y r o p i l o t s t e e r i n g - c o n t r o l system a g y r o compass a magnetic compass 1000-watt SSB r a d i o - t e l e p h o n e an underwater l o g system d i g i t a l r e a d o u t depth sounder echo depth sounder two depth i n d i c a t o r s . Some o f t h i s n a v i g a t i o n a l equipment i s d e p i c t e d i n F i g u r e C.2. c o n t r o l room.
RADAR (LONG RANGE).
A l l o f the
n a v i g a t i o n a l s a f e t y equipment i s connected t o alarms l o c a t e d on t h e b r i d g e and
GYRO-COMPASS GYRO-PILOT
RADAR (CLOSE RANGE)
WHISTLE OLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEM SHALLOW DEPTH ALARM VHF RADIO BRIDGE TO BRIDGE
4
L-4
LOG
(DIG ITAL READOUT)
DEPM INDICATORS (2)
FIGURE C.2.
N a v i g a t i o n a l Equipment f o r LNG Transfer Vessel
The s h i p i s powered by a heavy-duty marine steam t u r b i n e r a t e d a t 43,000 shp. Steam f o r t h e t u r b i n e i s generated i n two high-pressure (850 p s i g , 950F) Steam i s a l s o used t o d r i v e t h e b o i l e r s t h a t b u r n b o i l o f f gas and bunker f u e l .
b o i l o f f compressors and generate e l e c t r i c i t y f o r t h e s h i p . I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e f e a t u r e s p r e v i o u s l y mentioned, t h e s h i p i n c l u d e s t h e following: s i n g l e s i x - b l a d e d p r o p e l l e r r a t e d a t 103 rpm two t u r b o g e n e r a t o r s f o r e l e c t r i c i t y r a t e d a t 1250 k each W a 1500-kW standby d i e s e l g e n e r a t o r a 250-kW d i e s e l emergency e l e c t r i c a l p l a n t two d i s t i l l i n g p l a n t s w i t h a t o t a l c a p a c i t y of 16,000 gal/day two a i r - c o n d i t i o n i n g p l a n t s w i t h a t o t a l c a p a c i t y o f 60 t o n s
a 2200-hp bow thruster two bow anchors a t 27,900 1 b each a 12,000-gal sewage holding ta,nk.
C.1.2
Ship Structure
The LNG c a r r i e r has two principal parts, the basic ship comprising the hull and propulsion plant, and the cryogenic section consisting of containment tanks and cargo handling systems. The cryogenic section i s described i n detail in l a t e r sections of t h i s appendix. The LNG tanker i s designed t o meet rigid requirements of both impact and damaged s t a b i l i t y . The beam of the ship, along with i t s large freeboard a t f u l l load, i s designed t o give i t exceptional s t a b i l i t y . Wing side tanks and a double-hull system throughout the vessel reduce the possibility of damage t o the cargo tanks and adjacent inner hull structure in the event of a c o l l i sion. They also reduce the r i s k of damage to the- storage tanks and tank supports in the event of the ship grounding. The geometry of the LNG tank system and the structural strength of the hull provide excellent resistance t o side and bottom damage due t o collision or grounding. The hull of the c a r r i e r i s constructed from a combination of different grades of mild s t e e l , the highest grades being used in the more c r i t i c a l zones. Lloyds Register Grade "A" i s generally considered suitable f o r a minimum temperature of OC, Grade "D" f o r -5C o r -10C depending on where used in the ship's structure, and Grade " E " f o r somewhat lower temperatures. Grades "DM and "E" are impact tested a t the minimum temperature f o r which they are required. The large thermal capacity of the cargo hold structure makes i t unlikely t h a t the hull steel will be as cold as the predicted steady-state temperature when exposed to the cold ambient conditions f o r short periods of time. The large scantlings; high strength of the deck s t r i n g e r , sheer strake, and attached longitudinals; and the multitude of structure below the platform supporting the tank provide good resistance t o collision penetration. Only over a small portion of the hold length and depth do the spherical boundaries come close t o the hull. A t locations other than midtank, the ship can withstand greater penetration and consequently greater impact velocity.
C.2.
CARGO HANDLING The systems and procedures used f o r cargo h a n d l i n g on t h e LNG vessel a r e
d e s c r i b e d here.
The LNG cargo h a n d l i n g systems a r e shown i n F i g u r e C.3, w i t h (Flow diagram
corresponding equipment i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s g i v e n i n T a b l e C .3. syn~bol a r e d e f i n e d i n Appendix H ) s TABLE C.3.
LNG Cargo Handling Systems Description Compressor I n e r t Gas Generator B o i l o f f Heaters Warmup Heater Spray Nozzles Main Cargo Pumps Spray Pumps LNG Storage Tanks LNG V a p o r i z e r
Equipment Identification
C.2.1
L i q u i d Cargo System The l i q u i d cargo system i n c l u d e s t h e pipes, f i t t i n g s , and machinery used
t o l o a d o r d i s c h a r g e LNG from t h e vessel.
The system c o n s i s t s o f t h e f o l l o w i n g :
f o r e and a f t p i p e main ( 1 i q u i d header i n F i g u r e C.3) m a n i f o l d s on p i p e main f o r l o a d i n g o r d i s c h a r g i n g f r o m e i t h e r s i d e o f t h e vessel 1oading 1 ines a t each t a n k dome two pump d i s c h a r g e l i n e s , one f r o m p o r t and one f r o m s t a r b o a r d s i d e o f each t a n k two submerged, e l e c t r i c a l l y d r i v e n pumps i n each cargo tank.
VAPOR SHORE CONNECTION LIQUID LIQUID
SPRAY HEADER VAPOR HEADER LIQUID HEADER To T- 101
STORAGE TANK INERT GAS GENERATOR
STORAGE TANK CROSSOVER LINES FORWARD VENT RISER
* SPECIAL C W A Y VALVE
VAPOR COMPRESSORS E - 100VAPORIZER H - 101, BOl LOFF HEATERS H - 201 WARM UP HEATERS
FIGUFiE C . 3 .
LNG Cargo Handling Systems
The f i v e cargo tanks i n t h e s h i p each c o n t a i n two f u l l y submerged, v e r t i c a l s h a f t , e l e c t r i c a l l y - d r i v e n cryogenic c e n t r i f u g a l pumps t o t r a n s f e r LNG from t h e storage tanks o f t h e s h i p t o t h e t e r m i n a l storage tanks. Each pump has a capa3 c i t y o f 1130 m / h r (5,000 gpm) w i t h a discharge pressure o f 100 psig, and t h i s provides f o r an unloading time f o r t h e vessel o f approximately 12 hours. The pumps used i n t h i s system o f f e r the f o l l o w i n g i m p o r t a n t engineering advantages: No mechanical seal o r packing gland i s required, s i n c e the pump i s compl e t e l y exposed t o an LNG environment. No l i n e s h a f t o r l i n e s h a f t bearing i s necessary. Each pump has a g r e a t e r horsepower-to-weight r a t i o , since fewer p a r t s a r e required. Each pump can pump e f f e c t i v e l y w i t h a v e r y low pressure a t i t s s u c t i o n side. C e n t r i f u g a l pumps pumping l i q u i d s near t h e i r s a t u r a t i o n p o i n t o f t e n a r e plagued by c a v i t a t i o n problems due t o i n s u f f i c i e n t NPSH ( n e t p o s i t i v e s u c t i o n head). By p l a c i n g t h e pump i n s i d e t h e tank, t h e pressure drop normally associThis a t e d w i t h t h e t r a n s f e r p i p i n g from t h e tank t o t h e pumps i s e l i m i n a t e d . problems.
provides a d d i t i o n a l NPSH f o r t h e pump and, as a r e s u l t , reduces c a v i t a t i o n
A f u r t h e r advantage i s t h e LNG surrounding the moving p a r t s o f t h e pumps.

The LNG a c t s as a c o o l a n t t o these systems. t o t h e s u c t i o n s i d e o f t h e pump. efficiency. The major drawback o f t h i s type o f pump l i e s i n t h e f a c t t h a t i t r e q u i r e s c u r r e n t - c a r r y i n g w i r e s i n a cargo tank. C.2.2 L i q u i d R e c i r c u l a t i o n System T h i s system i s used t o cool down t h e . c a r g o tanks and t o keep them c o l d d u r i n g b a l l a s t voyages.
I t c o n s i s t s of a 1 i n e (spray header i n F i g u r e C.3) t o
L u b r i c a t i o n t o t h e pump i s s u p p l i e d
by the LNG as i t f l o w s over t h e b a l l bearings and then through the motor casing I n a d d i t i o n , the low temperature environment reduces t h e e l e c t r i c a l r e s i s t a n c e o f the copper windings and thus increases motor
supply LNG t o the tank cooldown system when the ship i s a t sea, a small spray pump i n each tank, and a spray nozzle in each tank.
C.2.3
Gas Main
The gas main 1 ine (vapor header in Figure C.3) serves the following p u r poses on an LNG vessel: to provide a second leg f o r the closed cargo load/unload cycle t o supply the gas compressors with boiloff during a voyage t o supply high-pressure warm methane gas t o the warmup system. In addition, three boiloff compressors draw gas from the gas main t o supply the boilers via the gas supply line. The boi loff compressors are d i r e c t steam-turbine-driven, centrifugal units. These are generally used f o r a l l ships larger than 65,000 m 3 . Since there i s s u f f i c i e n t steam on board, superheated steam is-used t o drive the steam turbine t h a t i s mounted directly on the shaft of the boiloff compressor. The compressor i s from a solid forging; titanium i s used f o r the highduty compressor due t o tip-speed considerations and aluminum forgings f o r the lower tip-speed, low-duty compressor. Each compressor i s enclosed i n a stainless steel housing with proper flow i n l e t and discharge volute casing. An insulation system i s provided adjacent t o the back disc of the compressor impeller. In combination with the seal gas and bearing lube subsystem operation, the insulation achieves essentially room temperature conditions on the bearing housing. The bearing housing contains in-line board positions f o r the rugged pivoted shoe bearing together w i t h the seal cartridges. These contain a s e r i e s of controlled a i r gap, floating carbon r i n g seals w i t h regulated seal gas feed. Surge control i s provided by measuring the pressure differential across the compressor i n l e t o r i f i c e plate. The differential a t which surge occurs i s used as the s e t point on a pneumatic controller. The measured d i f f e r e n t i a l i s then compared t o the s e t point. The surge control bypass valve i s modulated t o maintain the compressor outside the surge 1 imits.
The main c o n t r o l system provides speed c o n t r o l f o r the compressor by regul a t i n g t h e compressor i n l e t pressure ( t a n k o u t l e t pressure) t o p r e s e t values ( u s u a l l y 1.0 p s i g ) t o modulate t h e steam f l o w r a t e . The s h a f t speed o f t h e A t t h i s upper compressor i s allowed t o v a r y f r e e l y up t o a s p e c i f i e d l i m i t .
l i m i t , t h e speed c o n t r o l l e r , being cascaded w i t h t h e pressure c o n t r o l , c o n t r o l s

t h e steam f l o w r a t e as necessary t o m a i n t a i n constant speed, t h e speed measurement being made by a mechanical-to-pneumatic transducer. The a d d i t i o n a l p o r t i o n o f t h e c o n t r o l system c o n s i s t s p r i n c i p a l l y o f compressor s t a r t u p and stop buttons i n both l o c a l and remote l o c a t i o n s and t h e s e r i e s o f s a f e t y switches t h a t shut t h e system down by c l o s i n g a steam shuto f f v a l v e i n m e d i a t e l y upstream o f t h e steam c o n t r o l valve. The s a f e t y system i s completely independent o f t h e c o n t r o l system and i s f a i l s a f e i n operation. The s a f e t y system m o n i t o r s t h e pneumatic o u t p u t s i g n a l s from t h e f i v e s a f e t y switches, which m o n i t o r l u b e o i l pressure, lube o i l temperature, compressor speed, speed s i g n a l o r underspeed, and seal gas pressure. i n t h e unsafe c o n d i t i o n , t h e o u t p u t f a l l s t o 0 psig. steam s a f e t y valve. When these switches When a r e i n the s a f e c o n d i t i o n , t h e pneumatic o u t p u t i s approximately 20 p s i g .
Through s e r i e s arrange-
ments o f low pressure s e l e c t o r s , t h e lowest o f these f i v e s i g n a l s i s f e d t o t h e Thus, i f any s a f e t y switches a r e i n t h e unsafe c o n d i t i o n , The t h e v a l v e r e c e i v e s t h e l o w e s t o f t h e f i v e s i g n a l s and t h e r e f o r e closes. s a f e c o n d i t i o n , by a l a t c h i n g c i r c u i t . Blocked LiquidIGas Re1 i e f System T h i s i s a s a f e t y system c o n s i s t i n g o f r e l i e f valves and p i p i n g t h a t l e a d t o t h e gas main.
A l l those sections o f p i p i n g t h a t a r e closed o f f t o t h e
s a f e t y v a l v e i s prevented from reopening, i f t h e s a f e t y s w i t c h r e t u r n s t o t h e
vapor a r e provided w i t h r e l i e f valves.
I f excessive pressure b u i l d s up as LNG

I n addition,
vaporizes, t h e r e l i e f valves d i r e c t excess vapor t o t h e gas main.
t h e r e i s a r e l i e f v a l v e amidship on t h e gas main t o prevent overpressurizing. C.2.5 P i p i n g and F i t t i n g s Piping, valves, and o t h e r f i t t i n g s a r e o f t h e same b a s i c design as those used f o r cargoes a t normal temperatures. r i a l s used f o r t h e i r f a b r i c a t i o n . The b a s i c d i f f e r e n c e i s i n t h e mate-
Aluminum o r aluminum a l l o y i s the most
desirable material from the point of view of low temperature properties. However, ships are made of steel and are in a sea environment; hence, an aluminumsteel connection forms a galvanic cell ( i . e . , a wet battery). The r e s u l t i s a rapid corrosion of the aluminum. The possibility of inserting an electrical barrier into the junction has not been considered practical f o r t h i s service. Therefore, 9% nickel steel i s used f o r a l l piping and f i t t i n g s in cryogenic service. Most of the valving i s made of stainless s t e e l . Double piping, one inside the other with the internal pipe carrying the gas, i s used f o r the gas supply lines t o the main propulsion machinery. The control of an L N G f a c i l i t y can be accomplished by controlling flow rates of liquid, gas, o r heat. Flow rates are most effectively controlled by valving , a1 though they can sometimes be regulated by adjusting machinery speed, as in the case of the boiloff compressors. Valves can be adjusted manually o r automatically. During normal steady operations, automatic control i s achieved. For startup and shutdown procedures, manual control i s used. Automatic control valves are actuated by a i r pressure. C.2.6 Loading The
L N G i s loaded onto the vessel by the pumps a t the export terminal. procedures used prior t o and during loading are described below.
C.2.6.1
Preparations f o r Loading
The following procedures are followed prior t o loading: The ship i s moored with ship and shore manifolds in compatible relative positions. The deck area around the cargo tanks i s cleared of unnecessary personnel and gear. The vessel i s properly trimmed so the LNG will flow evenly into the liquid header and cargo tanks. Upon a r r i v a l , cargo tanks are gauged. This involves three people: an o f f i c e r of the vessel, a terminal representative, and a government authori t y . (The same procedure i s carried out upon completion of loading.)
An accurate log of a l l phases of the loading operation i s kept. This log includes gauging information, s t a r t s , stops, changes in loading r a t e s , and corresponding times and reasons. The operation of the s h i p ' s f i l l valves, sequence of tank f i l l i n g , and time of s t a r t and stop of loading i s the responsibility of the person on deck who represents the s h i p ' s master.
Several systems are kept in operation during loading and should be checked f o r proper operation. These include: nitrogen system and a1 arms actuating a i r supply ( f o r valves, alarms, e t c . ) instrument a i r supply tankslvapor pressure gauges gas analyzer tank temperature recorders hull temperature monitoring system motor operated valves cargo mimic panel in the cargo control room liquid-level measuring systems.
C.2.6.2
Loading Procedures
Loading LNG into an empty aerated tank i s an operation t h a t includes three major steps: purging and drying, cooldown, and loading. Before LNG i s carried through any s h i p ' s piping or introduced into the tanks, these areas, together with the space between the cargo tanks and the inner hull, are purged with an i n e r t gas t o exclude oxygen. The ship carries nitrogen f o r t h i s purpose. The nitrogen i s f i r s t warmed t o s l i g h t l y above tank temperature and introduced through the vapor piping a t the top of the tank. As i t moves through the tank, a i r i s purged out through the liquid pipes a t the bottom of the tank and e x i t s through the forward vent r i s e r . During the purge, samples of removed gases are tested f o r t h e i r oxygen content. When the oxygen content i s reduced t o below 6% by volume, purging may be stopped. One advantage of using nitrogen i s t h a t i t also effectively dries the tank space and i t s associated piping during the same process. A visual process description and flowsheet f o r the purging operation i s given in Figure C.4.
VAPOR SHORE CONNECTION LIQUID SHORE CONNECTION\,

T T
--SHORE
T
LIQUID CONNECT ION
SPRAY HEADER VAPOR HEADER LIQU ID HEADER
l NERT
HEATED BOIL-OFF GAS TO BOILERS
E-100VAPORIZER H 101, BOILOR HEATERS H - 201 WARM UP HEATERS
'
C.4.
.- A -H
A IR EQUIPMENT I N OPERATION
FIGURE
Purging and Drying of S t o r a g e Tanks with I n e r t Gas
When a1 1 preparations f o r l o a d i n g are completed on t h e vessel t h a t persons on t h e working p l a t f o r m can remove the b l i n d s .
, terminal
personnel extend both t h e l o a d i n g and vapor r e t u r n arms t o a p o s i t i o n such After positioning, and b e f o r e t h e b l i n d s a r e removed, t h e f o l l o w i n g steps take place: Terminal personnel open vent v a l ves , depressuri z i ng t h e 1oadi ng arms, which have been maintained i n a n i t r o g e n atmosphere. A f t e r venting, they advise t h e f l a n g i n g crew t h a t t h e b l i n d s may be removed and connection made t o t h e s h i p ' s manifold. coup1 ings. When connections have been p r o p e r l y made, t h e s h i p ' s cargo o f f i c e r advises t h e t e r m i n a l t h a t t h e vessel i s ready t o r e c e i v e cargo. n o t i f y o t h e r shore f a c i l i t i e s .
a a
These connections
a r e made w i t h h y d r a u l i c a l l y operated, p o s i t i v e - l o c k i n g , quick-disconnect
Terminal personnel
Terminal personnel then request readiness o f t h e s h i p ' s vapor compressor. Terminal personnel s l i g h t l y open the bypass valves t o cool down t h e loadi n g arm. Cool down l a s t s some 30 t o 40 minutes, w i t h LNG being c i r c u l a t e d through t h e s h i p ' s p i p i n g b u t n o t i n t o tanks. When l o a d i n g arms cooldown i s completed, t h e l o a d i n g v a l v e c o n t r o l console i s checked and placed on board. s h i p ' s tank. The storage tanks a r e cooled down, a t a r e l a t i v e l y slow r a t e t o a v o i d Various shore valves a r e then opened s l i g h t l y and then closed t o ensure t h a t LNG w i l l be d i r e c t e d t o t h e c o r r e c t
c r a c k i n g o f t h e tank w a l l s , t o a temperature c l o s e t o t h a t o f LNG. done by spraying LNG i n t o t h e tank. LNG vaporizes, c o o l i n g t h e tank. plant.
This i s
When i t h i t s the tank w a l l s , some o f t h e
The f l a s h e d vapors a r e r e c y c l e d t o t h e shore
The spray c o o l i n g process continues u n t i l temperature probes i n d i c a t e I n t h i s cooldown operation, t h e tank bottom approaches LNG tempera-
t h a t t h e t a n k l i n i n g and i n s u l a t i o n a r e c l o s e t o t h e LNG temperature (-250" t o
-260F).
t u r e s f i r s t , due t o t h e f a c t t h a t nonvaporized spray accumulates a t the bottom. When t h e bottom tank temperature i s near LNG temperature and t h e temperature a t t h e t o p o f t h e tank i s n o t t o o d i f f e r e n t , cooldown stops and l o a d i n g begins. v i s u a l process f l o w diagram f o r cooldown i s given i n F i g u r e C.5. A
VAPOR SHORE CONNECTION
SPRAY HEADER VAPOR HEADER LIQUID HEADER
INERT
HEATED BOIL-OFF GAS TO BOILERS
E-100VAWRIZER H 101, BOILOFF HEATERS H - 201 WARM UP HEATERS
'
FIGURE C.5.
-*
BOI L-OFF VAPOR (GNG)
EQU IPMENT I N OPERATION
Spray Cooling of Cargo Tanks w i t h LNG
During normal loading, LNG i s introduced i n t o the tanks a t a t o t a l comb i n e d r a t e o f 53,000 gpm. As LNG f i l l s t h e tank space, vapors remaining from These vapors must be pumped Therefore, t h e vapors t h e cooldown o p e r a t i o n a r e f o r c e d toward t h e top.
o u t t o prevent pressure from b u i l d i n g up i n t h e tanks.
a r e c o n t i n o u s l y being pumped back t o shore u s i n g the s h i p ' s b o i l o f f compressors.
A v i s u a l process f l o w diagram f o r l o a d i n g operations i s shown i n F i g u r e C.6.

Cargo t r a n s f e r i s - c a r e f u l l y documented. Continuous watch i s kept both i n Drain
t h e c o n t r o l room and on deck, and a l o g i s maintained on a l l operations. from l o c a l i z e d thermal shock.
pans a r e placed beneath f i t t i n g s t o c o l l e c t LNG leakage and p r o t e c t t h e deck
An o p t i o n t o t h i s i s t o r u n seawater over t h e
decks d u r i n g l o a d i n g and discharging. Approximately 40 minutes p r i o r t o reaching t h e f i l l e d l e v e l o f t h e tanks, o r a t some predetermined l e v e l , t h e cargo o f f i c e r n o t i f i e s t e r m i n a l personnel t o reduce t h e l o a d i n g r a t e . T h i s i s done by c u t t i n g o u t a l l b u t one shore pump. When t h e t a n k reaches proper l e v e l , 98% f u l l , the operator closes t h e dome v e n t v a l v e on t o p o f t h e tank. I f t h e tank l e v e l reaches 99%, a s i g n a l from a second l e v e l i n d i c a t o r a c t i v a t e s t h e emergency shutdown system. When t h e proper l e v e l i s reached on a l l tanks, t h e cargo o f f i c e r n o t i f i e s t h e t e r m i n a l o p e r a t o r t o s t o p l o a d i n g and orders t h e s h i p ' s compressors s h u t down. vapor. A l l compressor valves and valves i n t h e compressor l i n e a r e closed. The tank i s u s u a l l y f i l l e d t o 98% o f i t s c a p a c i t y t o a l l o w space f o r t h e b o i l o f f
I f t h e s h i p i s t o t a k e on LNG cargo when i t already has some LNG i n i t s

tanks, i n e r t i n g and cooldown a r e n o t necessary. For t h i s reason, a f t e r unloadThe LNG i s u s u a l l y i n g , t h e s h i p o f t e n r e t a i n s a small amount o f LNG i n i t s tanks (about 5% by volume) so a new cargo may be d i r e c t l y taken on board. and spray nozzles. k e p t i n one t a n k and sprayed i n t o t h e o t h e r f o u r tanks u s i n g t h e spray pumps One disadvantage t o t h i s method o f cooldown i s t h a t i f LNG The vapors produced from t h e o f a d i f f e r e n t composition i s loaded, a s u b s t a n t i a l heat r e l e a s e may r e s u l t due t o p h y s i c a l m i x i n g o f t h e d i f f e r e n t cargoes. pressure b u i l d u p i n t h e tank. released heat must be pumped back t o shore a t a r a t e s u f f i c i e n t t o prevent
VAPOR SHORE CONNECTION LlWlD SHORE CONNECT ION\-
--SHORE
LIQUID CONNECTION
HEATED BOIL-(WFGAS TO B O I E R S
E 100VAPORIZER H 101, BOILOR HEATERS H - 201 WARM U P HEATERS
VAPOR COMPRESSORS
--=- LlQUlFlED NATURALGAS ~~~'~ BOIL-OFF VAPOR (GNG)

EQUIPMENT I N OPERATION
FIGURE C.6.
LNG Loading Operations
The disconnecting operation f i r s t requires draining of the liquid header and loading arms. They are drained into the l a s t tank f i l l e d . This involves the following: Using the portable console, the ship's personnel close the shore block valves. The terminal operator then closes the vapor manifold valve ashore and n o t i f i e s the cargo o f f i c e r t o close the vapor manifold valve and stop the compressors. The terminal operator opens a drain l i n e on each loading arm and leaves i t open f o r a t l e a s t three minutes. The liquid drains into the liquid header aboard the vessel. The drain valves ashore are then closed. The s h i p ' s manifold loading valves are closed. cracked t o the crossover lines. The vapor header i s then
The terminal operator opens the nitrogen block valve to each arm and pressurizes i t . A t t h i s point, the terminal operator requests the cargo o f f i c e r t o open the s h i p ' s liquid and vapor manifold valves s l i g h t l y f o r depressurizing into the s h i p ' s lines. This operation i s repeated a t l e a s t three times by reclosing and reopening the liquid and vapor manifold valves. The f i n a l position of the valves i s closed. The terminal operator opens wide the atmospheric vent valve on ea'ch arm. When the arms are depressurized and the flanges are a t a temperature t h a t can be handled ( s a l t water may be used t o warm up the flanges), the loading arms are disconnected and the blind flanges replaced on manifold and loading arms. After the arms are retracted, the terminal operator closes the atmospheric vent valves and repressurizes the loading arms with nitrogen. When a l l of the foregoing operations are complete, a l l valves used f o r loading are closed. A s l i g h t trim a t the stern of the vessel f a c i l i t a t e s the draining of onboard lines.
Unloading Unloading procedures are, in many respects, the reverse of loading. There are two submerged pumps per tank on the ship, plus an alternate discharging system. Maximum discharge r a t e i s about the same as t h a t f o r loading. Shore compressors return vapor displaced from shore tanks t o the ship's tanks. Operations f o r discharging include: cooldown of liquid lines draining of liquid lines back into cargo tanks gauging of tanks connection of ship's manifold to shore liquid and vapor lines cooldown of shore liquid and vapor discharge lines discharge of cargo drainage of lines and disconnection gauging tanks and determi nation of the quantity of cargo discharged. C.2.7.1 Preparation f o r Unloading
In preparing f o r discharge, one of the f i r s t steps i s t o trim and heel the vessel in accordance w i t h the s h i p ' s operating instructions t o f a c i l i t a t e drainage operations. Further, the following systems are checked: nitrogen system and a1 arms actuating a i r supply instrument a i r supply vapor l i n e pressure switch and alarm vapor header pressure gages gas analyzer data logger liquid level alarms and shutdown cargo pump emergency stops cargo valve actuators liquid and vapor manifold valves and emergency closures. Preliminary procedures include the opening and closing of certain valves and the shutdown of certain equipment. For example:
compressors a r e shut down vapor header t o compressor v a l v e i s closed v a l v e from gas t o l i q u i d header over t h e compressor room i s closed. A number o f o t h e r valves a r e opened o r closed on the cargo dome. When t h e vessel i s f u l l y prepared f o r discharge operations, t h e cargo o f f i c e r g i v e s n o t i c e t o s h i p and t e r m i n a l crews t h a t t h e l i q u i d and vapor arms a r e ready f o r connection. can be e a s i l y removed. The t e r m i n a l operator l o c a t e s t h e arms so t h a t b l i n d s F o l l o w i n g t h i s , he depressurizes t h e arms. On h i s end, t h e t e r m i n a l operator has t o purge t h e arms
o f methane vapors w i t h n i t r o g e n gas. flanges attached l o o s e l y . are tightened.
When f i n i s h e d , he n o t i f i e s t h e cargo o f f i c e r who orders the b l i n d s removed and
A second n i t r o g e n purge f o l l o w s , and then the flanges
Now cooldown o f p i p i n g begins. LNG used f o r cooldown
During cooldown, t h e s h i p ' s cargo pumps a r e used.
i s c i r c u l a t e d through t h e l i q u i d header, i n t o t h e l i q u i d crossover l i n e , and through each l o a d i n g arm and r e t u r n e d t o t h e s h i p ' s cargo tanks v i a the vapor l o a d i n g arm, t h e vapor crossover l i n e , and t h e vapor header. by s l i g h t l y opening vapor and l i q u i d m a n i f o l d valves. l o a d i n g arms. Cooldown begins LNG then f l o w s t o b o t h
A small amount o f LNG i s pumped through t h e p i p i n g system, t h e

During t h i s operation, some LNG
purpose being t o cool down t h e connecting l i n e s a t a r a t e somewhat slower than t h a t which occurs w i t h f u l l scale pumping. vaporizes. t h e t o p of t h e cargo tank. cargo t r a n s f e r prodeeds. t h e event o f an emergency. T h i s i s separated from t h e l i q u i d when i t i s r e c i r c u l a t e d back t o As cooldown progresses, a f r o s t l i n e g r a d u a l l y When a l l arms have s u f f i c i e n t l y cooled,
b u i l d s up along t h e discharge arm.
A t t h i s p o i n t , s h i p ' s personnel r e c e i v e from the

When a l l i s ready and the r e c i r c u l a t i o n i s shut
t e r m i n a l a p o r t a b l e console which can c l o s e shore valves and stop motors i n down, unloading operations can begin. C.2.7.2 Unloading Procedures
When a l l connections a r e made, cooldown completed, and dome l i q u i d and vapor valves opened, t h e procedure f o r unloading i s as f o l l o w s :
Determine from the terminal that they are ready t o receive LNG and t h a t return gas pressure i s available. One main cargo pump i s started so as to p u t maximum pressure on the ship's sys tem.
An inspection i s made t o locate any leaks.
If leaks are found, the pump i s stopped, the liquid i s drained, and repair i s undertaken. I f no leaks are found, one of the s h i p ' s manifold liquid valves i s opened in coordination with shore requirements. The other main cargo pumps are then started and the other liquid valves are opened in coordination with shore requirements. After a short period of time, the LNG originally f i l l i n g the main LNG transfer l i n e t o the storage tanks i s displac-ed. During t h i s time no return vapor from the shore i s being pumped. Some vaporization of the s h i p ' s cargo may have to be carried out so t h a t i t can be pumped into the top of the tank as liquid i s pumped out through the bottom. When the shore tank pressure increases t o the desired level, the terminal advises the cargo o f f i c e r and arranges to s t a r t the vapor return blower. This directs the return vapor via the vapor crossover l i n e through a regulator valve s e t f o r about 2 psig. The tanks do not require vapor until t h e i r pressure drops below t h i s point. The reason for t h i s operation i s t h a t , as liquid i s pumped out through the bottom, a suction i s created a t the top. This could cause a massive evaporation of tank liquid and also require greater work from the pumps. I t could also cause pump damage or even s t a l l . To avoid these problems, vapor i s pumped into the tank so that tank pressure i s maintained. When a l l compartments are operating properly and the terminal indicates readiness, the cargo o f f i c e r increases the flow r a t e by s t a r t i n g one cargo pump a t a time. Then, each cargo pump discharge valve i s opened wide. Cargo operations a t t h i s point are then monitored from the cargo control room.
A v i s u a l process flow diagram f o r unloading cargo i s shown i n F i g u r e C.7.

U s u a l l y , one tank i s discharged b e f o r e t h e o t h e r s and so on, so t h a t t h e r e i s a gradual decrease i n cargo discharge r a t e . cargo o f f i c e r n o t i f i e s t h e t e r m i n a l . T h i s discharge r a t e i s c a r e f u l l y monitored and, about one hour p r i o r t o estimated completion, the J u s t b e f o r e stopping t h e l a s t cargo pump, several events occur i n sequence: The cargo o f f i c e r n o t i f i e s t h e on-shore c o n t r o l room o f h i s i n t e n t i o n . The cargo o f f i c e r cracks open t h e adjacent f i l l i n g l i n e f o r the l a s t tank. The t e r m i n a l o p e r a t o r closes t h e shore b l o c k valve, and cargo c i r c u l a t e s back t o t h e tank. The pump i s then shut down, and t h e adjacent f i l l i n g ' l i n e i s closed. Some LNG i s u s u a l l y l e f t t o keep t h e tanks cool and t o p r o v i d e f u e l , from t h e b o i l o f f , f o r the return t r i p . There i s an a l t e r n a t e means f o r c a r r y i n g o u t the discharge o f cargo tanks, should t h e main cargo pumps f a i l . LNG cargo. With the s p h e r i c a l tanks, t h i s i s done by p r e s s u r i z i n g t h e tank w i t h an i n e r t gas, such as n i t r o g e n , and "blowing o u t " t h e
C.2.8
Loaded Voyages The major concern d u r i n g a loaded voyage i s the vapor pressure i n t h e
cargo tanks.
I f t h e pressure i s t o o low, b o i l o f f occurs a t a h i g h e r than nor-
mal r a t e ; i f i t i s t o o high, r e l i e f valves may be actuated and b o i l o f f vented. The concern here i s t h e p r a c t i c a l means o f m a i n t a i n i n g t h e b o i l o f f pressure i n t h e tanks a t a maximum o f 1 psig. (The 1 p s i g maximum i s a s a f e t y f i g u r e t h a t helps t o ensure t h a t v e n t i n g does n o t take p l a c e w i t h i n p o r t l i m i t s . ) To o b t a i n t h e d e s i r e d b o i l o f f pressure, a s e r i e s o f steps may be taken: Keeping i n mind any f u e l gas must be odorized, s t a r t t h e gas f u e l system as soon as p o s s i b l e a f t e r l e a v i n g t h e l o a d i n g p o r t . Cargo tank b o i l o f f pressure may be c o n t r o l l e d by c o n t r o l 1 i n g t h e gas compressor speed u n t i l tank pressure drops t o the d e s i r e d l e v e l .
VAPOR SHORE C O M C T I O N LIQUID SHORE CONNECTION\,
--SHORE
LIQUID CONNECT ION
SPRAY HEADER VAPOR HEADER LlQU I D HEADER TO T- 104, 105
SPRAY NOZZLE
INERT G CROSSOVER LINES FORWARD VENT RISER HEATED BOIL-OFF GAS TO BOILERS
* SPECIAL C W A Y VALVE
VAPOR COMPRESSORS E-100VAPORIZER / H 101, BOILOR HEATERS H - 201 WARM U P HEATERS
---1
LlQUlF IED NATURAL GAS BOIL-OFF VAPOR (GNG) EQUIPMENT I N OPERATION
FIGURE C.7.
LNG Unloading Operations
Tank pressure and compressor speed a r e monitored d u r i n g steady underway operations. fuel F i g u r e C.8 i s a v i s u a l process f l o w d e s c r i p t i o n f o r u s i n g b o i l o f f as a
.
When t h e vessel approaches t h e t e r m i n a l , t h e gas compressor i s shut down, T h i s causes a s l i g h t increase i n tank T h i s pressure drops r a p i d l y as discharge begins.
s i n c e maneuvering w i l l be t a k i n g place. pressure.
I n t h e event t h e LNG b e r t h i s occupied and the vessel must anchor, t h e compressor can be s t a r t e d up again t o c o n t r o l tank pressure. causes excess steam t o be generated i n the b o i l e r s . s h i p ' s condensors. This, i n t u r n , Consequently, a design i s
i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t h e s h i p ' s power p l a n t t o d i v e r t excess steam d i r e c t l y t o t h e When t h e s h i p i s ordered t o proceed t o t h e t e r m i n a l , t h e compressor i s shut down again. There a r e times, however, when t h e s h i p must go through some extended peri o d o f maneuvering o r i t f i n d s i t s e l f i n some s i t u a t i o n where v e n t i n g o r dualf u e l operation i s prohibited. surface o f t h e l i q u i d . I n t h i s case, b o i l o f f pressure can be c o n t r o l l e d by pumping l i q u i d from t h e tank bottoms v e r y s l o w l y and discharging i t onto t h e T h i s procedure lowers the temperature a t t h e s u r f a c e so T h i s method works w e l l when t h e s h i p i s a t r e s t , l e s s b o i l o f f takes place.
s i n c e s h i p motions would o r d i n a r i l y produce s u f f i c i e n t m i x i n g t o disperse t h e 1ow temperature s u r f a c e 1ayer. P r e p a r a t i o n f o r Tank E n t r y and I n s p e c t i o n The f i r s t o p e r a t i o n t h a t must be c a r r i e d o u t before tank e n t r y and inspect i o n i s t o vaporize t h e LNG heel remaining i n t h e tank and warm up t h e tank.
i t through t h e b o i l o f f compressor and b o i l o f f heaters, and then sending i t
This
i s done by t a k i n g b o i l o f f from t h e tanks o u t through the l i q u i d header, passing back t o t h e tanks through t h e vapor header i n a continuous r e c i r c u l a t i o n process. The gas i s i n j e c t e d i n t o t h e tanks through s p h e r i c a l p e r f o r a t e d As t h e tanks a r e warmed, When t h e tank reaches The purging procedure except headers l o c a t e d a t s t r a t e g i c p o i n t s i n s i d e t h e tanks. pressure r i s e s , and gas must be p e r i o d i c a l l y vented. approximately 40F, t h e purging Drocess may be s t a r t e d .
i s t h e same as f o r an a i r - f i l l e d tank, described i n Section C.2.6.2,
t h a t t h e n i t r o g e n i s passed through t h e l i q u i d header and e n t e r s t h e b o t t o m . o f
VAPOR SHORE CONKCTION SHORE CONNECTION
SPRAY NOZZLE
INERT' GAS GENERATOR CROSSOVER LINES FORWARD VENT RISER HEATED BOIL-OFF GAS TO BOILERS
E 100 VAPORIZER H - 101, BOILOFF HEATERS H - 201WARM UP HEATERS
/
FIGURE C.8.
LNG Boiloff for Fuel
SPEC IAL &WAY VALVE
BOIL-OFF VAPOR (GNG)
EQUIPMENT I N OPERATION
t h e tank, and t h e l i g h t e r methane gas i s drawn o f f a t the t o p i n t o t h e vapor header. The methane i s compressed i n t h e b o i l o f f compressors and vented o u t To achieve t h e q u i c k e s t p o s s i b l e purge, t h e i n e r t i n g Gas When t h i s i s w e l l t h e forward v e n t r i s e r .
gas i s l e t i n s l o w l y t o p r e v e n t m i x i n g w i t h t h e l i g h t e r methane gas. drawn o f f a t t h e t o p i s t e s t e d f o r i t s methane content. with air.
below combustible 1 i m i t s , purging i s stopped and the tanks a r e then f i l l e d The i n e r t gas generator i s used t o pump a i r through t h e warmup N i t r o g e n i s drawn o u t o f During t h i s operation, h e a t e r and i n t o t h e tank through the vapor header. The gases a r e vented o u t t h e forward vent r i s e r .
t h e bottom o f t h e t a n k and through the l i q u i d header by t h e s h i p ' s compressors. samples o f gas a r e taken from t h e t a n k and t e s t e d f o r t h e i r oxygen content. When oxygen c o n t e n t i s near 21% by volume, a e r a t i o n i s stopped and t h e tank may be entered. C.3 LNG STORAGE The tanks used f o r LNG storage on t h e vessel, as w e l l as t h e instruments and c o n t r o l s f o r LNG storage, a r e described here. C.3.1 LNG Storage Tanks Storage f o r t h e vessel c o n s i s t s o f f i v e Kvaerner-Moss s p h e r i c a l tanks, each w i t h a c a p a c i t y o f 25,000 m
3 . Some o f t h e advantages and disadvantages
o f t h e s p h e r i c a l tanks, as opposed t o t h e o t h e r types, are: The tanks can be p r e s s u r i z e d f o r emergency discharge o f LNG o r as an a1 t e r n a t e t o pumping. They p r o t r u d e through t h e deck and cause a v i s i b i l i t y problem from t h e bridge. They have a h i g h e r b o i l o f f r a t e due t o heat leakage from the tank s k i r t i n g and support system (0.25% o f f u l l tank volume/day). They a r e l e s s s u s c e p t i b l e t o damage from sloshing. They a r e l e s s 1 i k e l y t o r u p t u r e d u r i n g a c o l l i s i o n . They r e q u i r e 1ess p r i m a r y - b a r r i e r maintenance.
They have a l o n g e r warmup t i m e (depending on t h e amount o f 1 i q u i d remain-
ing a f t e r discharge).
Because o f t h e i r shape, these tanks can be designed according t o accepted engineering codes f o r pressure vessels. F i g u r e C.9 shows a t y p i c a l assembly f o r t h i s type o f tank.
,PROTECTIVE STEEL DOME
CARGO TANK
DR l P TRAY INSULATION
'WATER
BALLAST
FIGURE C.9.
Kvaerner-Moss Spherical Tank Assembly
The tanks a r e constructed o f 5083-0 aluminum, which possesses excel l e n t low temperature d u c t i l i t y . sphere i s s e l f-supported, Each tank has an i n s i d e diameter o f 120 f e e t . Each c o n t i n u o u s l y and i n t e g r a l l y connected t o a v e r t i c a l The bottom end c i r c l e o f t h e c y l i n d e r i s F i g u r e C.10 shows how t h e
c y c l i n d e r a t i t s equator, so t h a t t h e sphers's equator c i r c l e and the upper end c i r c l e o f t h e c y l i n d e r coincide. welded i n t e g r a l l y i n t o t h e s h i p ' s h u l l s t r u c t u r e . by welds.
support s k i r t and tank p l a t i n g f i t t o g e t h e r w i t h f o r g e d s t e e l interconnected A l l gas boundary welds a r e b u t t welds and r e c e i v e f u l l v i s u a l and The tanks a r e hydropneumatically t e s t e d t o 31 p s i g . radiographic inspections.
I n s u l a t i o n f o r t h e tank c o n s i s t s o f polyurethane foam a p p l i e d t o t h e e n t i r e o u t e r surface o f t h e sphere, and a l s o t o a p o r t i o n o f t h e s k i r t t o
-WELD
FORGING
SKIRT PLATING-
%,
+ '\ '
FIGURE C.lO.
Kvaerner-Moss Spherical Tank-Equator Ring Forging
control thermal s t r e s s and t o l i m i t heat leak into the tank through t h i s plating (see Figures C . 11 and C . 12). Those sections of the ship and the transverse bulkheads t h a t a r e not covered by insulation are f i t t e d w i t h plywood panels t h a t a c t as spray shields t o protect the hull structural material from excess cooling i n the case of a leak i n the cargo tank. The cargo tank spaces are f i t t e d w i t h a bilge arrangement capable of handling both LNG and water. The spaces around the cargo tank are inerted w i t h nitrogen gas. This gas i s cons t a n t l y monitored t o detect any buildup of combustible gases from leakage. Access t o the tanks i s through a dome a t the upper pole through which a l l piping, cables, and other equipment are led. Above deck, the tanks are protected by a self-supporting structure. Each cargo tank i s f i t t e d with two submerged, e l e c t r i c a l l y driven cargo pumps as well as two spray nozzle cooldown systems. One cooldown system i s situated i n the upper part of the tank t o give a general cooldown prior t o arrival a t the loading port. The second s e t of nozzles i s used t o a l l e v i a t e any unacceptable thermal s t r e s s t h a t might a r i s e d u r i n g loading; these nozzles are situated around the equatorial ring of the tank.
POLYURETHANE FOAM
FIGURE C.ll.
Insulated Skirting
EXPANSION JOINT STOMERIC VAPOR BARRIER LUMINUM FOIL SPLAS H BARRIER
FIGURE C.12.
Insulation f o r KvaernerMoss Spherical Tank
In principle, no secondary barrier or emergency containment system i s required. However, a unique feature i s the leak protection system external t o the tank, consisting of an insulated drip pan w i t h a liquid t i g h t cover situated atop the inner hull. Several splash shields a t the sides are included in t h i s design, shown previously in Figure C.9. C.3.2 Instruments and Controls They
Instruments and controls f o r LNG storage are shown i n Figure C.13. include:
CARGO PUMP D l SCHARGE PRESSURE (2)
RELIEF VALVES (2) PLAT I NUM RESISTANCE TEMPERATURE DETECTORS
CONTROL ROOM
FIGURE C.13.
Cargo Tank Safety Instruments
two pressure r e l i e f valves on each storage tank two pressure r e l i e f valves located in the secondary space between the tank and the inner hull of the ship cargo tank vapor pressure controls t h a t can automatically stop pumps and close liquid and shore valves monitors on the LNG cargo pump discharge pressures and the spray pump discharge pressures t h a t can automatically s h u t the pumps down a 0-100% liquid level indicator i n the storage tank and a backup level indicator t o shut down cargo pumps when unloading or cargo system when 1oadi ng platinum resistance temperature sensors attached t o the cargo tank structure a t various levels t o monitor r a t e of cooldown and warmup platinum resistance temperature sensors on the inner hull to detect insulation f a i 1ure liquid temperature sensors installed in four submerged locations
a a
s p e c i f i c g r a v i t y i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n on each tank, d i s p l a y e d on cargo console t h r e e methane samplers l o c a t e d between t h e tank and i n n e r h u l l which supply samples t o an automatic i n f r a r e d analyses system f o r m o n i t o r i n g t h e atmosphere around t h e tank
a seawater b i l g e i n d i c a t o r l o c a t e d a t t h e bottom o f t h e i n n e r h u l l . RELEASE PREVENTION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS The r e l e a s e p r e v e n t i o n and c o n t r o l systems on t h e vessel i n c l u d e t h e f i r e
C.4
p r o t e c t i o n systems, vessel instrumentation, and t h e Emergency Shutdown (ESD) sys tem. 3.4.1 FireProtectionSystems The LNG cargo vessel i s f i t t e d w i t h two types o f f i r e p r o t e c t i o n systems: d e t e c t i o n l a l a r m systems and e x t i n g u i s h i n g systems. C.4.1.1 Detection/Alarm Systems
Depending on t h e type o f space being protected, various types o f sensors a r e used i n t h e marine vessel f o r f i r e d e t e c t i o n . detectors. Sensors used i n c l u d e combustib l e gas, u l t r a v i o l e t (UV) flame, h i g h temperature, and temperature r a t e - o f - r i s e Smoke d e t e c t o r s a r e a l s o used where o t h e r sensors a r e n o t s u i t a b l e .
The f o l l o w i n g p o r t a b l e instruments, w i t h c a l i b r a t i o n k i t s and s e l f - c o n t a i n e d b a t t e r i e s , a r e s u p p l i e d f o r cargo access, l e a k t e s t i n g , and o t h e r operations: two c o n ~ b u s t i b l egas d e t e c t o r s w i t h extended sampling l i n e s two oxygen detectors, w i t h extended sampling 1 ines, t h a t can be combined w i t h t h e combustible gas instruments
a
two e l e c t r o n i c dew p o i n t t e s t e r s a halogen detector, w i t h spare b o t t l e o f freon, f o r t e s t i n g t i g h t n e s s o f t h e complete gas f u e l system i n t h e engine room
a p o r t a b l e pressure gauge.
Combustible gas d e t e c t o r s a r e l o c a t e d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g areas o f t h e v e s s e l : b o i l e r hoods gas p i p e annulus foam d i s c h a r g e areas
LNG d i s c h a r g e l i n e s and t h r o u g h o u t t h e discharge area.

To m o n i t o r t h e atmosphere surrounding t h e LNG tankage and i n a d j a c e n t enclosed spaces where leaked methane m i g h t accumulate, an automatic, s e l f c o n t a i n e d sampling and a n a l y s i s system i s used. The spaces i n v o l v e d i n c l u d e compressor rooms, i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n rooms, a i r d u c t s s u r r o u n d i n g gas p i p i n g , areas o f t h e engine room a d j a c e n t t o t h e gas p i p i n g and burners, t h e space between t h e p r i m a r y b a r r i e r and t h e i n n e r h u l l o f each tank, and t h e cargo h o l d area. L o c a t i o n o f a sampling p o i n t i n t h e b o i l e r uptakes i s d i f f i c u l t The automatic gas a n a l y z e r due t o t h e e f f e c t o f f l u e gas on t h e analyzer. percentage o f t h e l o w e r e x p l o s i v e l i m i t .
a c t i v a t e s an a l a r m if i t d e t e c t s a methane c o n c e n t r a t i o n g r e a t e r t h a n a s e t T h i s t y p e o f a n a l y z e r i s l i m i t e d by The t h e need t o measure methane c o n c e n t r a t i o n s i n b o t h a i r and i n e r t gas. vice. The UV f l a m e d e t e c t o r s , temperature r i s e sensors, and smoke d e t e c t o r s a r e l o c a t e d i n v a r i o u s areas t h r o u g h o u t t h e s h i p . A l l o f t h e s e d e t e c t i o n l a l a r m systems a r e t i e d i n t o v i s u a l a l a r m and p o i n t
i n f r a - r e d t y p e meets t h i s requirement s a t i s f a c t o r i l y and i s r e l i a b l e i n s e r -
If the ship's service e l e c t r i c a l power f a i l s , t h e systems a r e powered f r o m t h e emergency power c i r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n p a n e l s i n t h e b r i d g e and c o n t r o l room. cuits. A d d i t i o n a l standby and b a t t e r y power can keep t h e systems a c t i v a t e d f o r a t l e a s t 12 hours. C.4.1.2 E x t i n g u i s h i n g Systems
F i r e e x t i n g u i s h i n g systems a r e d i v i d e d i n t o t h e f o l l o w i n g types: w a t e r systems
C o p systems
d r y powder systems steam-smotheri ng systems foam f i r e system.
Water i s never used t o t r y t o p u t o u t an LNG f i r e because i t s t i r s up t h e LNG and i n c r e a s e s t h e r a t e o f evaporation, causing t h e f i r e t o become more intense. However, w a t e r i s used t o wash s p i l l e d LNG f r o m t h e decks, t o c o o l The w a t e r i s a l s o used f o r c o o l i n g once a f i r e i s e x t i n g u i s h e d The w a t e r system i s s u p p l i e d down p a r t s o f t h e s h i p , and t o p r o t e c t personnel who a r e exposed t o t h e heat o f the f i r e . t o keep t h e f i r e f r o m r e i g n i t i n g on h o t surfaces. backed up by an emergency f i r e pump.
w i t h sea w a t e r t h r o u g h two f i r e pumps l o c a t e d i n t h e s h i p ' s engine room and P r e s s u r i z e d w a t e r and p o r t a b l e f i r e e x t i n g u i s h e r s a r e a l s o p l a c e d a t v a r i o u s l o c a t i o n s on t h e s h i p . The LNG c a r r i e r has d r y powder systems a t s e v e r a l l o c a t i o n s on t h e s h i p so t h e y can reach most o f t h e deck area and t h e crossover p i p i n g where s p i l l s a r e most l i k e l y t o occur. The p r o j e c t o r s w i l l p u t o u t about 400 I b o f
a d r y powThese p r o Each hose
dered chemical i n about 40 seconds.
Each p r o j e c t o r has a range o f about 80
y a r d s i n a f i x e d p o s i t i o n and 40 y a r d s when sweeping a l a r g e area. j e c t o r s can a l s o be used w i t h hoses f o r p u t t i n g o u t small f i r e s . i s capable o f d i s c h a r g i n g about 8 1b o f chemical p e r second.
When prepara-
t i o n s a r e b e i n g made f o r l o a d i n g o r u n l o a d i n g LNG, t h e n e a r e s t d r y powder p r o j e c t o r s a r e aimed toward t h e l o a d i n g connections and l o c k e d i n t o p l a c e so t h e y can be used immediately on any f i r e s t h a t m i g h t s t a r t because o f l e a k s a t t h e loading manifold. manual r e l e a s e s . T h i s t y p e o f p r o j e c t o r can be operated manually o r by remote
A number o f p o r t a b l e d r y powder e x t i n g u i s h e r s a r e f i t t e d i n
areas t h a t p r o j e c t o r s do n o t reach and where small f i r e s m i g h t occur.
C o p systems a r e l o c a t e d around t h e e l e c t r i c a l systems, machinery spaces

i n s t o r e rooms, and i n o t h e r areas where a general purpose e x t i n g u i s h i n g agent i s useful. These systems a r e arranged so t h e COq can be a u t o m a t i c a l l y r e l e a s e d I n these cases, t h e y a r e t i e d t o an a l a r m which by t h e f i r e d e t e c t i o n system. r e 1eased. Another f i r e system on t h e s h i p i s t h e steam-smothering system, which i s s u p p l i e d f r o m a deck steam m a n i f o l d t o c o n t r o l o r e x t i n g u i s h f i r e s i n spaces c o n t a i n i n g flammable m a t e r i a l , such as p a i n t l o c k e r s , o i l tanks, and storerooms. Release v a l v e s a r e l o c a t e d t o g e t h e r on t h e main deck.
g i v e s warning t o t h e crew t o evacuate t h e compartment j u s t b e f o r e t h e C02 i s
High expansion foams a r e used t o prevent spread and r a d i a t i o n o f f i r e s i n these major areas: v a p o r i z e r area a l l along t h e discharge 1 ines compressor area.
C.4.2
Instrumentation The s h i p ' s i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n can be subdivided i n t o t h r e e general categories:
1 ) t h e m o n i t o r i n g o f pressure, temperature, and any o t h e r p h y s i c a l o r chemical parameters r e l a t e d t o t h e s a f e o p e r a t i o n o f the ship; 2) t h e c o l l e c t i o n , t r a n s mission, and d i s p l a y o f measured information r e l a t e d t o o p e r a t i o n o f s h i p ' s equipment and f u e l custody t r a n s f e r ; and 3) the i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n i n v o l v e d i n t h e remote o p e r a t i o n o f t h e ship. These v a r i o u s sytenis are e x t e n s i v e l y connected by i n t e r l o c k s , alarm f u n c t i o n s , and c o n t r o l loops. Instruments used t o m o n i t o r t h e gas detectors, thermometers, pressure gauges, and o t h e r alarm a c t i v a t i o n devices use scanning techniques embodying v a r y i n g degrees o f s o p h i s t i c a t i o n . I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e b a s i c scanning, these instruments i n c l u d e r e c o r d i n g o f data on tape o r by o t h e r means. Alarm panels o r consoles f o r s a f e t y m o n i t o r i n g equipment and s t a t u s d i s plays, which i n c l u d e o p e r a t i o n a l data and cargo measurement readouts, a r e l o c a t e d i n t h e c e n t r a l i z e d cargo c o n t r o l room ( o r gas c o n t r o l room). cal signals. c o n t r o l room. Signals a r e t r a n s m i t t e d t o them f o r d i s p l a y by pneumatic o r i n t r i n s i c a l l y s a f e e l e c t r i Alarm l i m i t s on pressures, temperatures, and l i q u i d l e v e l s a r e Repeater panels d i s p l a y i n g a l l o r p a r t s o f t h e same data a r e b u i l t i n t o t h e transmission c i r c u i t s and d i s p l a y v i s u a l l y and a u d i b l y i n t h e l o c a t e d i n t h e engine room, and a r e p e a t e r alarm panel i s provided on the b r i d g e s i n c e t h e c e n t r a l c o n t r o l room may n o t be manned a t a l l times w h i l e the vessel i s a t sea. General I n s t r u m e n t a t i o n Some o f t h e general i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n t h a t i s included i n t h i s c a r r i e r design i s as f o l l o w s :
ballasting pressure temperature instrumentation integrated d i g i t a l cargo instrumentation system. Ballasting. Instrumentation f o r readout of a l l ballast tank levels, and f o r programmed ballasting and deballasting where applicable, i s provided on the cargo console. Fore and a f t d r a f t indicators and an inclinometer reading in degrees and minutes are also provided on the console. Pressure. Several pressure readings are available from the cargo console computer (analog or digital with 1% accuracy), including:
1.
2.
liquid/vapor crossover pressure

LNG pump discharge pressures, with low-limit alarm and automatic stopping t o prevent running dry
3.
cargo-tank vapor-space pressure where tanks are manifolded together, with accuracy of 0.25% of f u l l scale f o r custody transfer insulated and void space pressure, with automatic under- and over-pressure control i n e r t gas system pressures with c r i t i c a l overpressure alarm and control compressor discharge pressures atmospheric pressure liquid nitrogen tank pressures compressed-air system pressures heating system pressures.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Temperature Instrumentation. Temperature sensors f o r cargo and hull services are platinum resistance thermometers with five-digi t display on the cargo console. The number and location of these sensors are sufficient t o provide adequate coverage of the structure and c r i t i c a l attachments. These include:
Cargo tank temperature sensors, with readout accuracy of 1.5"C, are attached t o the tank structure a t various levels to monitor r a t e of cooldown and warmup. Inner hull temperature sensors are provided, with readout accuracy of 1.5"C, f o r detecting insulation failure. Alarms a t c r i t i c a l points on steel temperature s e t l i m i t s , including tank keys and key supports, are installed. Logging i s also provided. Nitrogen system temperatures are measured in each liquid nitrogen tank, with readout accuracy of 1.5"C. Liquid temperature sensors are installed in four submerged locations, f o r measurement f o r custody transfer purposes a t an accuracy of 0.25"C. Integrated Digital Cargo Instrumentation System. A programmed system i s provided in connection with the cargo control room console. This system serves the following purposes:
1. 2.
alarm scanning and annunciation data acquisition, with logging of hull number, date, time pressures, levels, temperatures and other specified variables automatic ballasting and deballasting hull-stress calculations malfunction monitor f o r alarm on f a i l u r e of any designated valve o r pump t o respond t o a remote command sequential controls f o r motor or valve control
LNG mass calculations f o r custody transfer.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
C.4.2.2
Alarm System
The alarm system used on the ship i s a 100-point alarm panel that gives a visual and audio signal when selected measurements of operational or functional condi t i ons exceed predetermined val ues . When an a1 arm condi t i on i s reached on
any reading, a red 1 ight flashes, and a siren sounds in the gas control room where the panel i s located and also in the e l e c t r i c motor room. Certain c r i t i cal alarm points are repeated in the wheelhouse, b u t the l i g h t stays on until these alarm conditions are corrected. Provided on the panel are switches f o r changing the flashing l i g h t t o a steady l i g h t and f o r blocking certain alarms used only f o r special functions (such as loading or unloading operations). Reset buttons on the panel are used t o turn off c i r c u i t s t h a t give an alarm when not actually in an alarm condition. The panel also has a " t e s t " button which i s used t o t e s t the l i g h t and logic c i r c u i t s of the panel. When the " t e s t " button i s pushed, a t e s t i s made of a l l alarm points except those t h a t are temporarily bl ocked. The following i s a description of some of the alarm points including, in some cases, what they indicate and general corrective measures. 1. Low Differental Pressure Between Tank and Primary Insulated Space An indication t h a t the pressure i n the cargo tank and the pressure i n the space between the cargo tank and the drip pan have equalized - accompanied by automatic emergency shutdown of the cargo handling system - 6 alarm points. Cargo Pumps Stopped Indicates t h a t the cargo pumps have stopped - these may be planned stops or due t o emergency shutdown, low liquid level, low power, low LNG vapor header pressure, o r pump f a i l u r e - 12 alarm points. Inner-Hull L w Temperature o Indicates the inner-hull temperature has dropped below normal. This indication may be caused by e i t h e r a leak in the primary barrier o r water in the insulated spaces. If a leak i s detected, steps must be taken t o i s o l a t e the barrier and tank - 6 alarm points activated from a number of thermocouples and temperature switches.
2.
3.
4.
Water i n Insulated Space An indication of water i n the space between the cargo tank and the d r i p pan r e s u l t s from a leak i n the inner h u l l , and alarm i s activated by a water detector. The b a l l a s t tanks surrounding the affected cargo tanks a r e deballasted and a dewatering pump i n s t a l l e d - 6 alarm points. Very High Level Caused by o v e r f i l l of cargo tank; t h i s occurs when LNG l i q u i d level reaches 99.2% of tank capacity. Activated by h i g h level probe and accompanied by automatic emergency shutdown of the cargo system - 6 alarm points. High Level points.
5.
Indicates liquid level 98.1% of tank capacity - 6 alarm
6.
Desired Remaining Liquid Level Indicates tank has been pumped out t o the volume t o be l e f t i n the tanks f o r spraying t h e other tanks t o keep them cool and t o provide b o i l e r fuel on the b a l l a s t t r i p - 1 alarm point. Forward Pumproom Bilge Alarm Excessive accumulation of bilge water i n the forward pumproom - requires inspection and pumping out - 1 alarm point.
7.
8 . . Deck Winches, Hydraulic Oil - Low Level Indicates low o i l level in e i t h e r the forward or a f t gravity tanks of the 1 alarm point. hydraulic deck machinery
9.
B a l l a s t Valves, Hydraulic Oil - Low Level Indicates low level i n a sump tank of b a l l a s t valve hydraulic o i l actuating sys teni. Fire i n E l e c t r i c Motor Room o r Gas Compressor Room Alarm actuation by thermocouples i n the e l e c t r i c motor room o r the smoke d e t e c t o r system from t h e gas compressor room. bJhen alarm i s a c t i v a t e d , alarms sound i n affected compartments a s well as in gas control room and engine room; the v e n t i l a t i n g fans in the midship house automatically s t o p , and, a f t e r a s h o r t delay, f i v e b o t t l e s of C02 a r e automatically released
10.
into the affected room. Action which ensues includes actuating the emergency shutdown system and the general f i r e alarm, cutting off electrical power to the gas control switchboard, starting of f i r e pumps, personnel evacuation of gas control room, isolation of certain LNG vapor valves, activation of the water curtain systems, and the carrying out of genera1 f i r e fighting instructions. TanksActivated bv a drop in vapor header pressure. High Differential Temperature, Gas Compressor (Figure C .3, C-101 through 103)
High Suction Temperature to Compressor
L w Suction Temperature to Compressor o High Compressor Discharge Temperature Compressor Stopped Gas Pipe Duct Fan or Engine Room Vent Fan Stopped Inert Gas System Failure (Figure C.3, 6-101) Methane Exhaust Heater L w Drain Temperature o N trogen Excess Fl o i w L w Flow Gas Analyzer o Vaporizer S t a r t s (Figure C.3, E-100) i Vaporizer O u t 1 e t H gh-Low Temperature Nitrogen High-Low Pressure
H i gh-Low Level , Nitrogen Tanks
N -2 from Methane Vaporizer, (Fiqure C.3, E-100) High-Low Temperatures These alarms monitor the temperature of the nitrogen gas from the LNG
vapori zer . Fresh Water Pumps Stopped Indication of mechanical or electrical f a i l u r e i n pumps.
28. 29.
High Temperature Methane Heater Outlet Gas Alarm Actuated by analyzers t h a t monitor the insulated spaces, w t i h alarm given when t h e methane concentration reaches 36% of LFL (1.8%). The analyzers, which monitor the various rooms and passageways, sound an alarni a t 36% of LFL. After t h e alarm sounds, i t i s necessary t o check the gas analyzer panel t o determine which sample point gave the alarm. 20 psig Control - Low Air Pressure Venting Methane t o Mast Low N, Header Pressure
L
30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.
Atmospheric Nitrogen Heater Outlet Low Temperture (Figure C.3, H-201) Odorizing Pump Stopped Low Temperature Methane Heater Outlet (Figure C.3, H-101 A/B) Fresh Water Pumps, High Suction Temperature Gas Detector Failure Indicates power f a i l u r e t o the gas detector. Impulse Air Low Pressure Emergency Shutdown. Emergency Shutdown System and Procedures
37.
38. 39. C.4.3
The emergency shutdown (ESD) system provides protection f o r the vessel and crew by automated, f a s t shutdown during emergency conditions. I t a l s o reduces the amount of LNG and natural gas released during emergencies by greatly reducS ing the time needed t o shut down and i s o l a t e leaking components. The E D system and associated procedures are described here. C.4.3.1 Emergency Shutdown System
The emergency cargo t r a n s f e r shutdown system, when activated, automatically i n i t i a t e s t h e following actions: The cargo crossover val ves (1 oadi ng/unl oadi ng val ves) a r e closed
the vapor and liquid header isolation valves are closed the gas supply valve to the boilers i s closed boiler feed gas heaters are shut down the cargo tank valves are closed a l l cargo punips are shut down a l l vapor compressors are shut down.
The ESD i s activated automatically in the event of a f i r e , excess ship movement a t the dock, and overfill ing of a cargo tank. The system i s manually activated in the event of a s p i l l o r other emergency. From the time i t i s activated, the ESD takes approximately 30 seconds to shut down and i s o l a t e the cargo handling system. The ESD shuts down only equipment on the ship; however the captain of the ship has the capability t o activate the terminal shutdown system also. In the event of leakage during LNG loading, the shore loading valves are closed f i r s t t o permit LNG s t i l l i n the loading arms t o drain back into the s h i p ' s tanks, and then the ship's loading valves are closed before the ESD i s activated. As soon as the ESD i s activated, the general alarm sounds t o a l e r t a l l crew members and get them t o t h e i r emergency stations. All ventilation i s shut off and weather deck doors are shut.
C.4.3.2
Procedures
Because pipe leaks in e i t h e r the 1iquid nitrogen or liquid LNG system could crack the decks or r e s u l t in f i r e hazards, special care i s taken t o ensure t h a t the possibility of leaks i s minimized. All valves in the liquid lines are welded t o the piping, and expansion and contraction are taken care of by expansion loops i n the p i p i n g configuration rather than by using expansion bellows. Expansion bellows are used in gas piping since i t does not operate a t as high a pressure and because the possibility of deck cracks from gas leaks i s small. Drip pans are provided a t s t r a t e g i c points t o catch possible s p i l l s and prevent spilled LNG from contact with the deck o r structure. If a s p i l l occurs, crew members near the s p i l l , using firehoses, immediately s t a r t washing the spilled LNG overboard. When the source of leakage
i s i s o l a t e d and t h e s p i l l e d LNG i s washed overboard, t h e r e i s no f u r t h e r irnmedia t e danger o f f i r e .
C.5
GENERAL INFORMATION The f o l l o w i n g subsections p r o v i d e general i n f o r m a t i o n on v a r i o u s aspects
o f t h e vessel and i t s o p e r a t i o n . Venting Each cargo s t o r a g e t a n k i s equipped w i t h two 6-inch r e l i e f v a l v e s . v a l v e opens a t 3.25 p s i g and t h e o t h e r opens a t 3.5 p s i g . gas main (vapor header). t h e tanks a r e f u l l o f LNG. Each t a n k has one 6 - i n c h r e l i e f v a l v e connected t o t h e space between t h e p r i m a r y b a r r i e r and t h e i n n e r h u l l . t h e gas main. opens a t 1.0 p s i g . A l l l i q u i d and gas l i n e s i n t h e cargo h a n d l i n g system have p r e s s u r e r e l i e f v a l v e s t h a t v e n t t o t h e gas main. pressors. D u r i n g normal o p e r a t i o n s , t h e p r e s s u r e i n t h e gas main i s m a i n t a i n e d a t 1 p s i g by c o n t r o l l i n g t h e speed o f t h e b o i l o f f comShould t h e gas main o v e r p r e s s u r i z e , a r e 1 i e f v a l v e (which opens a t
3.5 p s i g ) would depressure t h e main t h r o u g h t h e v e n t s t a c k on t h e mast.
One
Both v e n t i n t o t h e
These cargo t a n k r e 1 i e f valves a r e s i z e d t o handle
gas f l o w f r o m t h e t a n k r e s u l t i n g f r o m an e x t e n s i v e f i r e o u t s i d e t h e s h i p when
T h i s v a l v e opens a t 3.5 p s i g and vents i n t o
The h o l d space around each tank a l s o c o n t a i n s a r e 1 i e f v a l v e which
C.5.2
Leak P r o t e c t i o n Each s t o r a g e t a n k has a d r i p pan beneath i t , between t h e p r i m a r y b a r r i e r
and t h e i n n e r h u l l .
Besides p r o t e c t i n g t h e i n n e r h u l l and i n s u l a t i o n , t h i s The space between t h e p r i m a r y S u i t a b l e d r i p pans a r e valves, f l a n g e d conShould a s p i l l o c c u r
d r i p pan p r o v i d e s e a r l y warning o f leakage.
b a r r i e r and t h e d r i p pan i s f i l l e d w i t h n i t r o g e n , and each o f t h e f i v e tanks has a s a m p l e . i n l e t f o r t h e methane d e t e c t i o n system. n e c t i o n s ) t o p r o t e c t t h e carbon s t e e l s h i p s t r u c t u r e . a1 so p l a c e d under areas o f p o s s i b l e cargo leakage (e.g.,
on t h e deck, i t i s washed down w i t h w a t e r as soon as i t i s discovered.
C.5.3
I n e r t Gas System N i t r o g e n i s used on t h e s h i p as an i n e r t gas.
It i s s t o r e d i n l i q u i d 3 The i n e r t gas generator form i n two tanks w i t h a t o t a l l i q u i d c a p a c i t y o f 25 m
(G-101 i n F i g u r e C.3) takes l i q u i d n i t r o g e n from t h e storage tanks, vaporizes and heats i t , and then pumps i t t o v a r i o u s p o r t i o n s o f t h e ship. N i t r o g e n i s used t o prevent underpressure i n t h e cargo storage tanks. If
t h e pressure i n a tank f a l l s below 0.1 psig, an o n / o f f c o n t r o l v a l v e opens and n i t r o g e n from the i n e r t gas generator i s admitted t o t h e tank u n t i l t h e pressure increases t o 0.4 p s i g . The v a l v e then closes.
The cargo h o l d space i s maintained a t a s l i g h t l y p o s i t i v e pressure (0.6 t o

0.75 p s i g ) w i t h nitrogen.
N i t r o g e n from t h e i n e r t gas generator goes through
an o n l o f f c o n t r o l v a l v e (which maintains t h e h o l d pressure i n the d e s i r e d range) and then t o the hold. N i t r o g e n i s used a t v a r i o u s times t o purge t h e cargo storage tanks. d e t a i l e d procedures, see Section C.2.6.) (For
To do t h i s , n i t r o g e n from t h e i n e r t
gas generator f l o w s through the warmup heater, H-201, i n t o t h e vapor crossover l i n e , and then i n t o e i t h e r t h e vapor o r l i q u i d header depending on t h e procedure t o be followed. C o l l i s i o n Resistance The LNG vessel can w i t h s t a n d a c e r t a i n amount o f damage caused by c o l l i s i o n w i t h another s h i p w i t h o u t l o s s o f containment o f t h e LNG cargo. of the s t r i k i n g ship. assumed. F i g u r e C.14 shows t h e v e l o c i t y r e q u i r e d f o r p e n e t r a t i o n as a f u n c t i o n o f t h e displacement C o l l i s i o n a t a r i g h t angle t o t h e v e s s e l ' s a x i s i s 1 ) a t t h e c e n t e r l i n e of Curves a r e shown f o r two c o l l i s i o n p o i n t s :
a cargo tank and 2) a t a t r a n v e r s e bulkhead midway between two adjacent tanks. C.6 SOURCES O INFORMATION F The d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e LNG marine vessel was developed u s i n g i n f o r m a t i o n from t h e sources 1 i s t e d below. 1. Environmental Impact Statements: P a c i f i c - I n d o n e s i a , Western LNG Terminal Co., CP75-83-3, West Deptford, FPC Bureau o f N a t u r a l Gas, Dec. 76, CP-76-16.
COLLl S IONS AT SEA BEAM-ON l MPACT ASSUMED
I I I I I
D l SPLACEMENT OF STRIKING S H I P (tons)
FIGURE C. 14. 2. Open L i t e r a t u r e :
Coll i s i o n Resistance of LNG Vessel
Anderson, P h i l i p J . , Daniels, Edward J . , "The LNG Industry: P a s t , P r e s e n t and Future," Prepared by I n s t i t u t e of Gas Technology, P r o j e c t 8988. Final r e p o r t prepared f o r ERDA, Contract #EE-77-C-02-4234, J u l y 1977, pp. 66-70. B a r t e l , M. R . , Geddes, F . , Loveday, W . , Ruber, P . , "Can Offshore A r c t i c Gas be Produced Economically", Morld O i l , Nov. 1977. Cashman, Margaret D., "LNG C a r r i e r s on Order and Under Construction," Ocean Industry, Oct. 1977. Curt, Robert P . , e t a l . , Marine T r a n s p o r t a t i o n of L i q u i f i e d Natural Gas, National blari time Research Center, Kings P o i n t , Nw York, 1973 Dist. by e National Technical Information S e r v i c e , U.S. Dept. of Commerce, PB-249014. Drake, El i s a b e t h , Reid, Robert C. , "The Importation of L i q u i f i e d Natural Gas", S c i e n t i f i c American, Vol. 236 No. 4, April 1977. Fawcett, H. H . , e t a l . , Conference Proceedings on LNG ( L i q u i f i e d Natural Gas) Importation and Terminal S a f e t y , Held i n Boston, MA, June 13-14 1972 National Academy of Sciences, Prepared f o r Coast Guard, June 1972. F r o s t and S u l l i v a n Inc., Woldwide LNG Market, Vol. 1 and 2, June 1977, No. E209.
General Dynamics, LNG Ships (Advertisement) Geremia, John O.,
Marine T r a n s p o r t a t i o n o f L i q u i f i e d Natural Gas, 1973.
Gondouin, M., Murat, F., " T r a n s p o r t a t i o n and Storage o f LNG", American Technigaz Inc., New York, NY. L i n h a r d t , Hans D., LNG Boiloff-Compressors, A i r c o Inc., I r v i n e , C A Y pp. 6-10. A i r c o Cryogenics, Div. of
Smith, L. R., "Submerged Pumps f o r LNG Sendout", Paper presented AGA D i s t r i b u t i o n Conference, 1968. Marine T r a n s p o r t a t i o n o f LNG, Vol 1, " H i s t o r y o f Development and Design", by Technigaz, Stingmaster and Breyer Inc., D i s t r i g a s Corp., Feb. 1971. M a r i t i m e LNG Manual, U.S. Dept. o f Commerce, N a t i o n a l Technical Informat i o n Service, COM-75-10136, T r i d e n t Engineering Association, J u l y 1974. N i l son, J. J., "Cryogenics", Vol
. 14,
No. 3, U.S. Naval Academy, March 1974.
Sckwendtler, A. H., "LNG Tanker Developments", P i p e l i n e and Gas Journal, pp. 38-40, June 1977. Smith, J. M. S., Mathew, R. C. and Crook, J. A. F., "The S a f e t y o f Gas C a r r i e r s w i t h P a r t i c u l a r Reference t o t h e I.C.S. Tanker S a f e t y Guide ( L i q u e f i e d Gas)", Paper presented a t Gastech 75 LNG and LPG Technology Congress, Paris, September/October 1975.
APPENDIX D F A C I L I T Y DESCRIPTION OF REFERENCE LNG IMPORT TERMINAL
APPENDIX D FACILITY DESCRIPTION OF REFERENCE LNG IMPORT TERMINAL Table D . l presents d e t a i l s on U.S. and Canadian LNG i m p o r t t e r m i n a l s b o t h planned and i n operation. F i v e t e r m i n a l s have been b u i l t i n t h e U.S. t o date, b u t o n l y t h r e e o f these a r e c u r r e n t l y i m p o r t i n g gas: Columbia LNG Corp. a t
Cove P o i n t , Maryland and Southern Energy Co. a t Elba I s l a n d , Georgia r e c e i v e gas from Sonatrach a t Arzew, A l g e r i a ; and D i s t r i g a s Corporation a t E v e r e t t , Massachusetts imports gas from Sonatrach a t Skikda, A l g e r i a . The o t h e r f i v e t e r m i n a l s l i s t e d i n t h e t a b l e a r e i n v a r i o u s stages o f planning. D. 1 BASIC PROCESS
FLOW
A b l o c k f l o w diagram f o r an LNG i m p o r t t e r m i n a l i s shown i n F i g u r e D.1.

The d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e LNG i m p o r t t e r m i n a l was developed u s i n g i n f o r m a t i o n from t h e sources l i s t e d i n Section D.5. The major u n i t operations i n v o l v e d a r e marine vessel unloading, storage, and v a p o r i z a t i o n . A f l e e t o f n i n e 125,000-m
LNG s h i p s makes a t o t a l o f approximately 75 A f t e r a s h i p i s berthed a t one o f transfer l i n e a t the
d e l i v e r i e s a n n u a l l y t o supply t h e t e r m i n a l .
t h e two b e r t h i n g f a c i l i t i e s , t h e LNG i s pumped, u s i n g pumps onboard s h i p , through f o u r 16-in. marine l o a d i n g arms t h a t connect t o a 42-in. unloading p l a t f o r m . and then t o t h e storage tanks. The t r a n s f e r l i n e c a r r i e s t h e LNG along a t r e s t l e t o shore Normal t r a n s f e r r a t e i s 53,000 gpm.
A t this
r a t e , tankers a r e unloaded i n about 12 hours. The storage tanks a r e two 550,000-bbl, double-walled, dome-roofed, f l a t Normal
bottomed, aboveground, metal storage tanks o f standard design f o r LNG.
b o i l o f f ' f r o m t h e storage tanks i s compressed e i t h e r t o f u e l gas pressure and used t o f i r e t h e submerged combustion v a p o r i z e r s d u r i n g peaking operations o r compressed t o p i p e l i n e pressure and p u t i n t o t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n system. Normal 6 b o i l o f f i s about 2 x 10 scfd. B o i l o f f and f l a s h gas r a t e s from t h e s h i p unloading v a r y depending on t h e t r a n s f e r r a t e , t h e t a n k e r and storage tank
TABLE D.1.
U.S.
Storage Type o f Container Pressured concrete Aboveground, 9% n i c k e l Aboveground, a 1umi num Aboveground, 9% n i c k e l Aboveground Aboveground, 9% n i c k e l Aboveground, a1umi num Aboveground, 9% n i c k e l Aboveground, 9% n i c k e l Aboveground
and Canadian LNG I m p o r t Terminals

Regasification Contractor Preload/ Wal sh CBI
Company and P l a n t S i t e ENERGY TERMINAL SERVICES CO. Staten Island, New York ALGONQUIN LNG INC. Providence, Rhode I s l a n d COLUMBIA LNG CORP. & CONSOLIDATED SYSTEM LNG CO., Cove P o i n t , Maryland DISTRIGAS CORP. Everett, Massachusetts EL PAS0 LNG TERMINAL CO. P o r t O'Connor, Texas NATURAL GAS PIPELINE CO.'OF AMERICA (Peoples Gas) I n g l e s i d e , Texas SOUTHERN ENERGY CO. Elba I s l a n d , Georgia TRUNKLINE LNG CD. Lake Charles, Louisiana WESTERN LNG TERMINAL CO. P o i n t Conception, C a l i f o r n i a LORNETERM LNG LTO. St. John, N.B. Canada
-1
Ca a c i t 6000 1800 (2 x 900) 6000 1800 (3 x 600) 5000 1500 (4 x 375)
+f(
Ca a c i t Runs 360 4 a t 90 Type Direct Fired Direct Fluid Seawater Submerged, Interned. Fluid Submerged Seawater N.A. Systems Contractor Ralph M. Parsons Co. Year o f Operation 1973-1 975 former D i s t r i g a s o f N.Y. f a c i l i t y 1973-1st tank, 1975-2 a d d ' l tanks planned 1977-Base Load Plant
CBI
PM O
Pullman Kellogg & Raymond Technical CBI N.A.
3250 974 (1 x 374 + 1 x 600) 4168 1890 (3 x 630) 5500 1650 (3 x 550) 4000 1200 ( 3 x 400) 6000 1800
CBI N.A. N.A.
Seawater N.A. Submerged Submerged Suhnerged Bechtel Inc. and Raymond Technical Pullman Kel logg Co. and Raymond Technical Fluor N.A. 1978-Base load p l a n t 1980-Planned
CBI PDM
5775 1650 (3 x 550) 8420 2400 (4 x 600)
N.A. N.A. N.A.
Direct seawater N.A.
42 nanths a f t e r approva 1
LNG iRO111 TANKER
VAPOR RETURN TO TANKER
t
6-2000 H P RECl PROCATINC
BLOWERS
GAS TO D15TR1BUTION SYSlElt\
I
I
1. 53, m GPhl 2. O G P M 3. O C P M
4250 8HP CENTR 1F UGAL
1. 0 SCFD
VAPOR1 ZATI ON 55EAWATER VAPCRIZERS 4-SUBMERGED CCfdBUSTICN
I1
I
1. 52x106 SCFO 2. 2 x 1 0 ~SCFD 3. 2 1 1 0 ~SCFD

FUEL GkS FOR PE4KINC 'iAPORIZERS L D SCFD 2. 0 SCFD 3. 6 x 1 0 ~ SCFD FROM PIPELINE
STORAGE
2 -550. K O BE1 DOUBLED WALLED DOUBLE ROOF, ABOVE GlOUND METAL

STORAGE TANKS
SENDOUT
1. TANKER UNLOAD l NC
2. NORMAL OPERATING CONDITI ON5

3. PEAKING OPERATIONS. NO TANKERS UNLOADING
FIGURE D.1.
LNG I m p o r t Terminal
B l o c k Flow Diagram
pressures, and t h e c o m p o s i t i o n o f t h e LNG. A t y p i c a l r a t e f o r t h e f a c i l i t y i s 6 6 52 x 10 s c f d , o f which about 16 x 10 s c f d i s r e t u r n e d t o t h e s h i p ' s cargo t a n k s t o m a i n t a i n pressure. The r e s t o f t h e b o i l o f f and f l a s h gas i s handled i n t h e same manner as t h e normal b o i l o f f . D u r i n g peaking o p e r a t i o n s , submersible i n - t a n k pumps r a i s e t h e LNG t o 60 p s i g and t r a n s f e r i t t o t h e secondary pumps. The 10 submersible secondary pumps r a i s e t h e LNG t o 1,300 p s i g and pump i t t o t h e v a p o r i z e r s . The f a c i l i t y has a t o t a l of n i n e v a p o r i z e r s . F i v e o f these a r e seawater 6 heated w i t h a t o t a l c a p a c i t y o f 550 x 10 scfd; t h e s e a r e used f o r normal operations. The o t h e r f o u r a r e submerged combustion v a p o r i z e r s w i t h a t o t a l c a p a c i t y scfd. These a r e used as spares and f o r peaking o p e r a t i o n s . A t o t a l 6 of 1,000 x 10 s c f d o f v a p o r i z a t i o n c a p a c i t y i s a v a i l a b l e . Gas l e a v e s t h e o f 450 x v a p o r i z e r s and e n t e r s t h e p i p e l i n e a t 1,250 p s i g and 50F.
lo6
D.2
PLANT LAYOUT
Figure D.2 shows a plot plan f o r the LNG import terminal. The locations of major pieces of equipment and the major components of the f i r e safety system are shown. Some key distances on the figure are: ocean t o plant boundary ocean t o nearest storage tank storage tanks t o plant boundary (south) control room t o nearest storage tank control room t o vaporizers control room t o compressor building D.3 PROCESS DESCRIPTION $500 f t $1,400 f t $550 f t $200 f t 1~60 t f $100 f t .
The basic processes involved in the import terminal are described in detail in the following subsections. D.3.1 Marine Terminal
The marine terminal, discussed here, receives incoming LNG from ocean-going tankers and transfers i t to the storage tanks. D.3.1.1 Marine Terminal Equipment
The marine terminal f o r the LNG import f a c i l i t y i s shown in Figures D.3 and D.4. The terminal consists of a dock and a 6,000-ft t r e s t l e supporting a roadway and four transfer lines: a 42-in. main transfer l i n e , a 16-in. vapor return l i n e , a 4-in. liquid recirculation l i n e , and a 10-in. Bunker "C" fuel o i l line. The structure i s 40 f t above the mean lower l i n e water level. A flow diagram f o r the transfer piping system i s shown in Figure D.5. (Flow diagram symbols are defined in Appendix H . ) The t r e s t l e i s constructed of precast-prestressed concrete girders and supported by cylindrical piles a t intervals of about 133 f t . The height of the t r e s t l e varies with a uniform slope of 1 in. per 100 f t .
-1
3750'
-N
GO UV
GAS FUME
LTD LOW TEMPERATURE TRS TEMPERATURE RISE FIRE PROTICTION HEF HIGH-EXPANSION FOAM DCS DRY CHEMICAL SYSTIM
- - - - -- - - - - - - - - - ------------------
SCALE OF FEET
IMARY PLANT ENTRANCE
I I
//
//
//
// //
LNG SHIP
//
I U I " t a d
LHj SHIP
FIGURE D.2.
P l o t Plan f o r LNG Import Terminal
SERV ICE 'FORM
UNLOAD l NG PLATFORM
P I PE SUPPORTS
I l l
FIGURE D. 3.
Marine Terminal Overview
/
EL. 42'
CONTROL TOWER ,LOAD ING
PRESTRESSED CONCRETE G I RDERS

I
PEWAY
PRESTRESSED CONCRETE/
CYLINDER PILES (TYP.)
FIGURE D.4.
Marine Terminal Elevation
v -9
PSV f7
BERTH 1 TO TRANSFER LlNE DRAIN
TO THREE OTHER ( TRANSFER ARMS v-2 V-41 PSV qJ
4 RETURN LlNE
4 b
16-INCH VAPOR
1
TO TRANSFER LINE DRAIN BERTH 2 TO THREE OTHER TRANSFER ARMS
4-INCH LNG REC IRCULATI ON LlNE 42-INCH LNG TRANSFER LlNE
5
5
V-1
PSV TO TRANSFER LlNE DRAIN
pg.
g
-
TO TRANSFER LINE DRAIN
ADDITIONAL VAPOR TRANSRR ARM
FIGURE D.5.
T r a n s f e r P i p i n g System
There a r e b e r t h s f o r two s h i p s , one on each s i d e o f t h e t r e s t l e .
Two Each
s h i p s can be b e r t h e d a t one t i m e , b u t o n l y one s h i p can u n l o a d a t a t i m e . o f the tanker.
b e r t h i s equipped w i t h f o u r main b e r t h i n g d o l p h i n s t o absorb t h e b e r t h i n g energy Each b e r t h i n g d o l p h i n i s equipped w i t h a powered c a p s t a n and I n a d d i t i o n , f i v e mooring d o l p h i n s a r e i n s t a l l e d a t each q u i c k r e l e a s e hooks.
berth.
The mooring d o l p h i n s i n c l u d e powered capstans and q u i c k - r e l e a s e hooks The d o l p h i n design a l l o w s a t a n k e r t o remain
s i m i l a r t o the berthing dolphins.
Witho u t t a n k e r s a t b e r t h , t h e marine t r e s t l e and b e r t h s can w i t h s t a n d 96-knot wind g u s t s and 71-knot winds f o r 1-minute d u r a t i o n . a 2 7 - f t wave w i t h a 12-second p e r i o d . Two p l a t f o r m s extend o u t from t h e t r e s t l e t o each s h i p . p l a t f o r m and t h e o t h e r i s t h e main u n l o a d i n g p l a t f o r m . access t o t h e vessel. operation. One i s t h e s e r v i c e The t r e s t l e and b e r t h s can handle
a t b e r t h d u r i n g wind g u s t s o f up t o 60 knots, depending on sea c o n d i t i o n s .
The s e r v i c e p l a t f o r m
c o n t a i n s a f i x e d crane f o r u n l o a d i n g s h i p ' s s t o r e s and a gangway f o r personnel The main deck of t h e u n l o a d i n g p l a t f o r m supports t h e p i ping, valves, manifolds, equipment, and c o n t r o l s r e q u i r e d f o r t h e u n l o a d i n g
A second deck supports f o u r 16-in.-diameter a r t i c u l a t e d LNG l o a d i n g

vapor r e t u r n arm, and a 10-in.-diameter arm f o r Bunker
arms, one 16-in.-diameter
"C" f u e l o i l .
A 1 5 - f t - s q u a r e by 4 0 - f t - h i g h c o n t r o l tower p r o v i d e s an unobstrucThe u n l o a d i n g p l a t f o r m i s shown i n F i g u r e D.6.
t e d view o f u n l o a d i n g o p e r a t i o n s .
The c o n t r o l room i s manned as l o n g as any o f t h e c r y o g e n i c arms a r e connected t o a ship. shore v a l v e s . The o p e r a t o r has c o n t r o l s f o r t h e arms, t h e vapor r e t u r n system, f i r e w a t e r pumps, t h e d r y chemical f i r e p r o t e c t i o n system, and a l l o f f For communications, he has a d i r e c t l i n e t o t h e s h i p ' s cargo cont r o l o f f i c e r and another d i r e c t l i n e t o t h e t e r m i n a l main c o n t r o l room, as w e l l as r a d i o , normal telephone, and a two-way loudspeaker system. The towers a r e p a t t e r n e d a f t e r c o n t r o l towers a t small a i r p o r t s and a r e reached by s p i r a l s t a i r s i n s i d e a 7 2 - i n . s t e e l support c y l i n d e r . f i r e protection. Each p u l p i t has a water-spray system, and t h e s u p p o r t c y l i n d e r s a r e h e a v i l y i n s u l a t e d f o r The e n t i r e s t r u c t u r e i s p r e s s u r i z e d w i t h a supply o f f r e s h a i r and i s a i r - c o n d i t i o n e d and heated by a h e a t pump. The l o a d i n g arms a r e equipped w i t h s p e c i a l s w i v e l j o i n t s t o compensate f o r s h i p movement i n t h r e e d i r e c t i o n s . The arms and t r a n s f e r l i n e s a r e conThe arms a r e s u p p l i e d w i t h They can s t r u c t e d o f 300-series s t a i n l e s s s t e e l t o w i t h s t a n d thermal s t r e s s e s caused by extreme temperature changes and a r e n o t i n s u l a t e d . h y d r a u l i c power t o c o n t r o l inboard, outboard, and s l e w i n g motion.
be operated by one man f r o m t h e master c o n t r o l panel i n t h e c o n t r o l tower o r
CONTROL TOWER
/
FIGURE D. 6.
Unloading P l a t f o r m Each arm i s equipped w i t h two s e t s o f
by a p o r t a b l e remote-control u n i t .
redundant sensing devices, which i n i t i a t e a u d i b l e alarms and a c t i v a t e t h e emergency shutdown system whenever excessive motion i s sensed. .Each o f t h e f o u r LNG t r a n s f e r arms connect t o a 24-in. f a i l s a f e - c l o s e d - t y p e valve. t h e q u i c k d r a i n system. shutdown systems. ) pipe containing a
The p o s i t i o n o f t h e v a l v e can be c o n t r o l l e d l o c a l l y ,
from t h e c o n t r o l tower, by t h e Offshore Emergency Shutdown (OES) system, o r by (See Section D.4.2 f o r a d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e emergency
Each 24-in. p i p e has two connections between a check v a l v e and an a i r operated valve. The f i r s t connection i s f o r pressure r e l i e f , t h e second i s The d r a i n l i n e contains a f a i l s a f e - c l o s e d v a l v e t h a t f o r t h e d r a i n system.
can be c o n t r o l l e d l o c a l l y , from t h e c o n t r o l tower, o r by the q u i c k d r a i n system. The two s e t s o f f o u r 24-in. i n t o t h e 42-in. l i n e s connect t o a 42-in. header which t i e s This
t r a n s f e r l i n e t h a t runs ashore t o the storage tanks. The 42-in.
l i n e contains several corrugated-metal expansion j o i n t s t o accommodate thermal c o n t r a c t i o n a t cryogenic temperatures. urethane, mechanical type i n s u l a t i o n . The 16-in. vapor r e t u r n l i n e i s connected t o a 16-in. p i p e c o n t a i n i n g t h e same v a l v i n g as t h e 24-in. l i n e s . blower. steel. The 16-in. l i n e then runs ashore t o t h e c o l d a minimum o f f l a n g e d conA1 1 p i p i n g and valves i n t h e system a r e made o f 300-series s t a i n l e s s Most p i p i n g connections a r e welded ( i .e., A l l i n s u l a t e d pipes a r e f r e e t o s l i d e w i t h i n t h e i r i n s u l The major percentage o f valves l i n e i s insulated w i t h poly-
n e c t i o n s a r e used). a t i n g cover.
Pipe guides support t h e p i p e and a l l o w l o n g i t u d i n a l movement
w h i l e c o n t r o l l i n g l a t e r a l and v e r t i c a l movement. i n t h i s type o f s e r v i c e . Unl oadi ng Procedure
used i n t h i s p l a n t a r e globe valves because they l e a k l e s s than most o t h e r valves
When t h e LNG t a n k e r i s f u l l y prepared f o r discharge operations, t h e cargo o f f i c e r gives n o t i c e t o s h i p and t e r m i n a l crews t h a t t h e l i q u i d and vapor arms a r e ready f o r connection. The t e r m i n a l operator l o c a t e s t h e arms so t h a t t h e FolHe then n o t i f i e s t h e cargo o f f i c e r b l i n d s may be e a s i l y removed and then purges t h e arms w i t h n i t r o g e n gas. l o w i n g t h i s , he depressurizes t h e arms. who orders t h e b l i n d s removed and t h e flanges attached l o o s e l y . n i t r o g e n purge f o l l o w s , and then t h e flanges a r e tightened. l o a d i n g arms i s then begun. respond t o numbers shown p r e v i o u s l y i n F i g u r e D.5.
A second
Cooldown o f t h e
For t h e f o l l o w i n g discussion, v a l v e numbers c o r -
Between s h i p unloadings, t h e 42-in. through t h e 4 2 - i n . l i n e t o shore.
t r a n s f e r l i n e i s k e p t c o l d by c i r c u l a -
t i n g a small stream of LNG o u t through t h e 4 - i n . r e c i r c u l a t i o n l i n e and back To s t a r t t h e unloading, t h e r e c i r c u l a t i o n Next, v a l v e s V-1, V-2, e t c . on each i s stopped by c l o s i n g V-31 and V-21.
LNG l o a d i n g arm a r e opened and t h e s h i p ' s r e c i r c u l a t i n g pumps a r e s t a r t e d t o c i r c u l a t e a small f l o w o f LNG through each arm i n t o t h e main l i q u i d header, through a jumper (V-41) t o t h e 16-in. vapor r e t u r n l i n e , and t h e n back t o t h e ship. When a l l arms a r e s u f f i c i e n t l y cool, t h e r e c i r c u l a t i n g pump and valves a r e s h u t down and u n l o a d i n g can proceed. The f o l l o w i n g step-by-step procedure i s used f o r unloading: Determine from t e r m i n a l t h a t t h e y a r e ready t o r e c e i v e LNG and t h a t t h e vapor r e t u r n blower i s operable.
0
W i t h s h i p ' s 1 i q u i d and gas m a n i f o l d valves closed, s t a r t one main cargo pump t o p u t maximuni p r e s s u r e on t h e s h i p ' s system. I n s p e c t f o r leaks; i f any a r e found, s t o p pump, d r a i n l i q u i d , and make necessary r e p a i r s .
I f no l e a k s a r e found, open one o f t h e s h i p ' s m a n i f o l d l i q u i d v a l v e s and
gas m a n i f o l d v a l v e s and commence discharge. V-2, e t c . ,
(Loading arm v a l v e s V-1
should a1 ready be open from r e c i r c u l a t i o n procedure. )
S t a r t o t h e r main cargo pumps and open o t h e r l i q u i d valves i n c o o r d i n a t i o n w i t h shore requirements. A f t e r about 20 minutes, t h e LNG o r i g i n a l l y f i l l i n g t h e 42-in. t r a n s f e r l i n e i s displaced. During t h i s i n i t i a l p e r i o d , no r e t u r n vapor i s b e i n g pumped. The vapor When shore t a n k p r e s s u r e has i n c r e a s e d t o t h e d e s i r e d l e v e l , t h e t e r m i n a l advises t h e cargo o f f i c e r and s t a r t s t h e vapor r e t u r n blower. i s r o u t e d through t h e vapor l o a d i n g arm (V-9) and through t h e s h i p ' s manif o l d valve, which d i r e c t s t h e vapor through a r e g u l a t o r v a l v e s e t f o r 2 psig. The s h i p ' s tanks do n o t r e q u i r e vapor u n t i l t h e i r pressure has dropped t o t h i s p o i n t .
When a l l compartments a r e o p e r a t i n g p r o p e r l y and t h e t e r m i n a l o f f i c e r i n d i c a t e s readiness, t h e cargo o f f i c e r increases t h e f l o w r a t e by s t a r t i n g one cargo pump a t a time. opened wide. Each s h i p has some p r e s c r i b e d t a n k l e v e l a t which cargo pumps a r e secured. I n most a l l cases, one t a n k w i l l complete d i s c h a r g e b e f o r e t h e o t h e r s and so on, so t h a t t h e r e w i l l be a gradual decrease i n cargo d i s c h a r g e r a t e . o f f i c e r n o t i f i e s the terminal. This r a t e i s c a r e f u l l y monitored, and about 1 hour p r i o r t o e s t i m a t e d c o m p l e t i o n t h e cargo J u s t b e f o r e s t o p p i n g t h e l a s t cargo pump, s e v e r a l events occur i n sequence:
e
Then each cargo pump d i s c h a r g e v a l v e i s
The cargo o f f i c e r n o t i f i e s t h e shore c o n t r o l room o f h i s i n t e n t i o n . The cargo o f f i c e r t h e n cracks t h e a d j a c e n t f i l l i n g l i n e f o r t h e l a s t t a n k . The t e r m i n a l o p e r a t o r t h e n c l o s e s t h e shore b l o c k v a l v e (V-21) and cargo c i r c u l a t e s back t o t h e s h i p ' s tank. adjacent f i l l i n g l i n e closed. The t e r m i n a l o p e r a t o r t h e n d r a i n s a l l t h e l o a d i n g arms and c l o s e s t h e l o a d i n g arm v a l v e s V-1, V-2, e t c . , i n c l u d i n g t h e vapor r e t u r n arm V-9. The cargo pump i s s h u t down and t h e
Valves V-31 and V-21 a r e then opened and c i r c u l a t i o n through t h e 42-in. t r a n s f e r 1 i n e i s resumed. D.3.1.3 Release P r e v e n t i o n and Control Features the following detectors are located a t
As shown p r e v i o u s l y i n F i g u r e 0.2, t h e marine dock: gas d e t e c t o r s l o w temperature d e t e c t o r s UV f i r e d e t e c t o r s .
Each o f t h e s e a r e connected t o an a l a r m and i d e n t i f i e d by l o c a t i o n and t y p e i n b o t h t h e main c o n t r o l room and t h e marine c o n t r o l room.
The f i r e extinguishment system a t t h e marine t e r m i n a l c o n s i s t s o f t h e f o l l owing: high-expansion foam system f i x e d d r y chemical u n i t s one f i r e h y d r a n t f o u r d r y chemical f i r e e x t i n g u i s h e r s , two each a t t h e marine c o n t r o l tower and t h e f i r e h y d r a n t s t a t i o n s p r i n k l i n g system on t h e r o o f o f t h e marine c o n t r o l room. None o f t h e f i r e e x t i n g u i s h i n g equipment a t t h e marine t e r m i n a l i s a c t i v a t e d automatically.
I t can be a c t i v a t e d manually e i t h e r l o c a l l y o r r e m o t e l y from
t h e marine c o n t r o l tower o r t h e main c o n t r o l room.
A containment system i s l o c a t e d under t h e p l a t f o r m area t o h o l d a l l s p i l l s

from t h e l o a d i n g arms. The low temperature d e t e c t o r s a r e l o c a t e d i n t h i s s p i l l Containment f o r LNG t r a n s f e r l i n e s a t The t r a n s f e r system i n c l u d e s welded p i p e area t o i n d i c a t e when a s p i l l occurs. t h e beach and p l a n t area i s i n c l u d e d .
connections r a t h e r t h a n f l a n g e s t o reduce t h e l i k e l i h o o d o f l e a k s . Each t r a n s f e r arm i s equipped w i t h two s e t s o f redundant sensing devices t h a t i n i t i a t e alarms i n b o t h c o n t r o l rooms and a u t o m a t i c a l l y a c t i v a t e t h e O f f s h o r e Emergency Shutdown (OES) system when excessive motion i s sensed (see S e c t i o n D.4.2). valve. activated.
D.3.2
LNG Storage
Each t r a n s f e r arm a1 so has a f a i l safe-closed-type,
air-operated
T h i s v a l v e c l o s e s a u t o m a t i c a l l y when t h e emergency shutdown system i s
The LNG i s s t o r e d a t t h e f a c i l i t y u n t i l i t i s r e g a s i f i e d and s e n t o u t t o the pipeline. The s t o r a g e system and r e l a t e d equipment and procedures a r e d e s c r i b e d i n d e t a i 1 be1 ow. The process f l o w diagram f o r t h e LNG t r a n s f e r and s t o r a g e systems i s shown i n F i g u r e D.7. Associated process c o n d i t i o n s and equipment i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s a r e g i v e n i n Table D.2.
B
I
A
1-101 STORAGE TANK
TO THREE OTHER
* - VALVES CLOSED WHEM IMPROPER LTVELS

M V L DlTlONAL VAPOR
- VALVES CLOSED BY MES SYSTEM - VALVES CLOSED BY VES SYSTEM - VALVES CLOSED BY LES SYSTEM
OR TEMPERATURES ARE SENSED I N TANKS
FIGURE D.7.
Piping and Instrumentation for LNG Transfer and Storage
TABLE D.2.
ID -
LNG Transfer and Storage Systems

Pressure ( p s i g ) 100 60 60 10 0 10 Temp.
(OF)
Stream I d e n t i f i c a tion Description LNG Unloading L i n e LNG R e c i r c u l a t i o n L i n e

LNG from Storage Tanks
Flow Rate Unloading Normal 53,000 gpm 1,500 gpm 4,000 gpm 0 0 4,000 gpm 0 13 MMscfd
1 2
-258 -258 -258 -1 52 -200 -152
3
4 5
Vapor Return t o Ship Storage Tank B o i l o f f t o VentGas Compressor Vapor Return t o Storage Tank Equipment I d e n t i f i c a t i o n
16 MMscfd
52 F1Mscfd 0
11 MMscfd
C-201 P-101, 102 P-201 T-101, 102
Vent Gas Compressor Primary Storage Tank Pump Secondary Pump Storage Tank
D.3.2.1
Storage Tank double-walled, above-
Storage f o r t h e f a c i l i t y c o n s i s t s o f two f l a t - b o t t o m , shown i n F i g u r e D.8.
ground LNG storage tanks, each w i t h a c a p a c i t y o f 550,000 b b l
The tank i s
The i n n e r tank i s constructed o f 9% n i c k e l s t e e l , an a l l o y The diameters o f t h e i n n e r The h e i g h t o f t h e o u t e r
t h a t r e t a i n s i t s s t r e n g t h and d u c t i l i t y throughout t h e LNG temperature range. The o u t e r s h e l l i s constructed o f A131 carbon s t e e l . and o u t e r tanks a r e 21 5 f t and 225 ft, r e s p e c t i v e l y .
s h e l l i s 98 ft, w h i l e t o t a l h e i g h t t o t h e t o p o f t h e tank dome i s 146 ft. The annulus between t h e i n n e r and o u t e r tank w a l l s i s f i l l e d w i t h expanded per1 it e , an inorganic, non-flammable, rock.
2000F (llOOC).
1 i g h t w e i g h t i n s u l a t i o n produced from s p e c i a l
The rock o r o r e i s f i n e l y ground and then expanded i n furnaces a t about The p e r l i t e i s expanded o n s i t e and placed i n t h e i n s u l a t i o n
space w h i l e hot.
The thermal c o n d u c t i v i t y o f p e r l i t e i n a methane atmosphere 2 i s 0.25 B t u - i n . / h r f t OF. A r e s i l i e n t f i b e r g l a s s b l a n k e t i s wrapped around t h e The space
o u t s i d e o f t h e i n n e r s h e l l t o p r o t e c t t h e p e r l i t e from excess pressure due t o thermal c y c l i n g and movement o f t h e i n n e r she1 1 (see F i g u r e D.9). foamgl ass, a n o n f l amniabl e load-bearing i n s u l a t i o n . between t h e i n n e r and o u t e r tank f l o o r s i s i n s u l a t e d w i t h a 25-in. l a y e r o f The 1oad-bearing i n s u l a t i o n
SAFETY VALVES 8 PIPING CONNECTIONS ROOF INSULATION
SUSPENDED INSULATION DECK INNER SHELL
4
DIMENSIONS: INNER TANK DIAMETER OUTER TANK DIAMETER
EXPANDED PERLITE, INSULATION
RESILIENT BLANKET
INNER TANK HEIGHT OUTER TANK HEIGHT
.INNER BOTTOM
CONCRETE RINGWALL FOUNDATION
', .
NOTES. -
SAND CUSHION WITH HEATING COILS
OUTER SHELL
BOTTOM
MATFRlAl C . .... ..- . .. .--
CAPAC ITY - 550,000BBL DESIGN PRESSURE
LOAD BEARING B O l l O M INSULATION
INTERNAL - 2.0 psig EXTERNAL - 2" HZO DESIGN TEMPERATURE - INTERNAL - 2 6 6 ~ WIND LOAD - 104 mph EARTHQUAKE
LIQUID CONTAINER - 9 NICKEL STEEL % INSULATION SUPPORT DECK - 9%NICKEL STEEL OUTER TANK - A131 CARBON STEEL DECK INSULATION - ROCK WOOL BOTTOM INSULATION - FOAM GLASS SHELL INSULATION - PI-40 PERLITEAND FIBERGLASS
- RICHTER 7
SPECIFICATIONS - A P I 620
FIGURE D.8.
LNG Storage Tank Details
OUTER TANK
RES ILIENT BLANKET I

I
., . -s,e&, :
: .
.
I ,1 .,
A @ ? :
'L->*
T "
1,
p"f*
lr
INNER SHELL WARM POSITION INNER SHELL COLD POSITION
FIGURE D.9.
Resilient Blanket in Annular Space Between Walls o f LNG Storage Tank
r e s t s on a concrete ringwall foundation around the perimeter and on a compacted sand foundation in the middle. A 1 - f t layer of compacted sand i s located beneath the outer tank floor and contains electrical heating elements to prevent freezing of moisture in the subsoil and the "heaving" t h a t can r e s u l t . There are two s e t s of anchor bolts in the ringwall, one connected to the outer tank wall and the other connected to the inner tank wall. These bolts hold down the tank against 1i f t i n g forces resulting from internal pressure. (See Figure D.lO.) The outer tank has a lap-welded, dome-shaped, steel roof. Suspended from the roof framing of the outer tank i s a lap-welded metal deck that serves as a ceiling for the inner tank. Mineral wool insulation i s spread evenly over the deck. Open pipe vents are installed in the deck to allow product vapor to c i r culate freely in the insulation space to keep the insulation dry.
STORAGE TANK
SAND
HEATING COILS
COURSE
FIGURE D.lO.
Storage Tank Foundation Details
The tanks are designed to withstand instantaneous wind gusts u p t o 104 mph, earthquakes of u p t o 7 on the Richter scale, and a maximum horizontal acceleration of 0.21 g. Both storage tanks are tested prior t o use. They also meet the requirements of the American Petroleum I n s t i t u t e standard 620, Appendix Q , which governs
materials selection, tank design, construction and testing procedures. During construction, the welds on a l l vertical seams are 100%x-ray inspected. Welds not 100% x-ray inspected are checked by the liquid penetrant method, as are a l l attachment welds. Inner tank welds are checked by a combination of x-ray, dye penetrant, vacuum box, and solution film t e s t methods. Hydrostatic and pressure t e s t s subject each tank to 125% of the maximum product weight and 125% of the maximum design vapor pressure. All piping t o the inner tank enters through the roof of the storage tank. Independent structures support a l l piping external to the tank and prevent the transmission of s t a t i c and dynamic pipe loads to the storage tank walls. Two separate f i l l nozzles permit e i t h e r top or bottom f i l l i n g . Incoming LNG heavier than the tank heel i s introduced through the top f i l l l i n e . This procedure permits the tank contents to mix by natural convection and should eliminate the possibility of s t r a t i f i c a t i o n . The i n l e t and o u t l e t lines of the tank are valved so that LNG can be pumped from the bottom of the tank t o the top, pumped from one tank to another, pumped out the 4-in. recirculation arm through the transfer arms and back t o the tanks, o r pumped out the 20-in. sendout l i n e t o the secondary pumps. The tank i n l e t valves are failsafe-closed valves that can be controlled locally, from the main control room, o r by the emergency shutdown system. The tank o u t l e t valves are also failsafe-closed valves that can be controlled locally o r from the main control room. D.3.2.2 Pressure Control System
The storage tanks have an operating pressure of 0.8 psig ($15.5 psia) and a maximum and minimum design pressure of 1.5 psig and 0 psig respectively. Normal tank boiloff and vapors from LNG tanker unloading are handled by a vent gas compressor system. The compressors and the secondary LNG pumps are shown i n Figure D. 11. Associated process conditions and equipment identifications are shown i n Table D.3.
C - M 1 VLNT GAS COMPRESSORS 14 REQUlREDl
E-201 FUEL GAS PREHEAER
C -209 FUEL GAS COMPRESSORS 12-STAGE, 3 REQUIRE01
C-203 PIPELINE COMPRESSORS 12-STAGE. 3 REQUIRED)
M - VALVES CLOSED B Y M E S S Y S T E M V - VALVES CLOSED BY VES S Y S T E M L - VALVES CLOSED B Y E S S Y S T E M

4
FIGURE D . l l .
TABLE D.3.
'ID -

Pressure ( p s i g ) Temp. -258 -258
( O F )
Stream i d e n t i f i c a t i o n Description
F l owrate U n l o a d i n q Normal 1,500 gpm 0 4,000 gpm 52 MMscfd 0 16 MMscfd 36 MMscfd 36 MMscfd 36 MMscfd 4,000 gpm 13 MMscfd 11 MMscfd 0 2 MMscfd 2 MPscfd
2 LNG R e c i r c u l a t i o n L i n e 3 LNG f r o m Storage Tanks 5 Storage Tank B o i l o f f t o Vent Gas Compressor

6 Vapor Return t o Storage Tank Vapor Return t o Ship Vapor f r o m Vent Gas Compressor t o Fuel Gas Preheater Vapor from Fuel Gas Preheater t o Fuel Gas Co~npressor Vapor from Fuel Gas Compressor Vapor f r o m Gas Cooler t o P i p e l i n e Compressor Vapor from P i p e l i n e Compressor LNG f r o m Secondary Pumps t o 'iapori zers Equipment I d e n t i f i c a t i o n C-201 C-202 C-203 E-201 5-202 2-201 V-301 Y-302 Yent Gas Compressor Fuel Gas Compressor P i p e l i n e Compressor Fuel Gas P r e h e z t e r Gas Cooler Secondary P ~ m p Saseload Seawater Vaporizers Standby 3nd P e a ~ i n gGas-Fired Vaporizers
- 200
7
8 9 10 11
12
2 MMscfd
2 MMscfd 2 MMscfd
36 MHscfd
36 MMscfd
13
8,550 gpm 8,550 gpm
T-101 ,102 Storaqe T a n k 5
Storage t a n k p r e s s u r e i s m a i n t a i n e d a t 0.8 p s i g by r e t u r n i n g vapor f r o m t h e v e n t gas compressors through pressure c o n t r o l v a l v e s a t t h e 30-in. vapor l i n e s t o t h e tanks. f u e l gas o r f o r d e l i v e r y t o t h e gas t r a n s m i s s i o n p i p e l i n e . inlet Excess vapors a r e f u r t h e r compressed t o be used as
I f the pressure
c o n t r o l system f a i l s and t h e p r e s s u r e i n t h e t a n k reaches 1.5 p s i g , each s t o r a g e t a n k i s a l s o equipped w i t h a 20-in. v e n t v a l v e and t h r e e 12-in. p r e s s u r e v a l v e s t h a t open t o t h e atmosphere.
I f t h e p r e s s u r e i n t h e t a n k f a l l s below 0.15 p s i g , I f the pressure continues
a backup gas system s u p p l i e s v a p o r i z e d LNG f r o m t h e gas t r a n s m i s s i o n p i p e l i n e t o m a i n t a i n a p p r o p r i a t e p r e s s u r e i n each s t o r a g e tank. atmosphere. t o f a l l and reaches 0.031 p s i g , t h r e e 12-in. vacuum r e 1 i e f v a l v e s open t o t h e Pressure c o n t r o l s e t t i n g s a r e summarized i n Table D.4.
TABLE D.4. Pressure ( p s i g) 1.5 1.3 0.8 (15.5 psia) 0.15 0.031
Pressure Control Settings Function
Full Re1 i e f (vent valve a.nd r e l i e f valves) High Pressure Alarm Control Pressure Vapor Injection from Fuel Gas System Vacuum Re1 i ef
The compression f a c i l i t i e s f o r the boiloff vent gas consist of four 250-bhp, e l e c t r i c-motor-driven, sing1 e-stage centrifugal u n i t s , each w i t h a capacity of approximately 13 x 106 scfd discharging a t 10 psig and -150F. Two of the four compressors serve a s backups. During tanker unloading, the design gas r a t e ( b o i l o f f and f l a s h ) i s 50 x lo6 scfd. Each storage tank has a normal boiloff r a t e (0.05% of f u l l tank capacity per day) of 1 x 106 scfd. A t o t a l design boiloff and f l a s h gas r a t e s from 2 storage tanks and tanker unloading i s 52 x 106 scfd. A t the o u t l e t s i d e of the vent gas compressors a r e pressure control valves f o r maintaining appropriate pressures i n the 36-in. piping system leading t o the fuel gas compressors and the piping system returning t o the ship. From the vent gas compressors, the vapor i s taken t o three 2,000-bhp, gas-driven, reciprocating 6 compressor u n i t s , each having a capacity of 17 x 10 scfd a t a discharge temperat u r e and pressure of 285OF and 150 psig, respectively. These serve as the fuel gas compressors, with two compressors on 1 ine and the t h i r d being a backup. An additional three pipe1 ine compressors a r e included in the system. These a r e s i m i l a r t o the fuel gas compressors i n design and capacity, and they pump the gas t o the gas transmission l i n e a t 120F and 1,300 psig. D.3.2.3 Additional Control and Instrumentation
Instrumentation i n each LNG storage tank includes a v e r t i c a l temperature probe supporting thermocouples a t 1 0 - f t i n t e r v a l s f o r the purpose of detecting the onset and buildup of thermal s t r a t i f i c a t i o n in the stored LNG. A t o t a l of
12 temperature sensors on t h e f l o o r and l o w e r she1 1 o f each t a n k rnoni t o r LNG s t o r a g e cooldown.
A thermocouple p l a c e d i n t h e e l e c t r i c a l l y heated s o i l founda-
t i o n m o n i t o r s and c o n t r o l s t h e temperature t h e r e . Each t a n k i s equipped w i t h two f l o a t - t y p e l i q u i d l e v e l i n d i c a t o r s and one ultrasonic l i q u i d level indicator. a l l l i q u i d f l o w s i n t o t h e tank. I n the event o f high-high l e v e l , the u l t r a s o n i c i n d i c a t o r sounds an a l a r m i n t h e main c o n t r o l room and a u t o m a t i c a l l y stops The f l o a t - t y p e l e v e l i n d i c a t o r s a r e each s e t Alarms a r e a c t i v a t o i n d i c a t e h i g h , h i g h - h i g h , low, and low-low l i q u i d l e v e l s . t e d i n t h e c o n t r o l room f o r each o f t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s . I n s t r u m e n t a t i o n i s a l s o i n c l u d e d t o i n d i c a t e r e l a t i v e movement between t h e i n n e r and o u t e r s h e l l s o f t h e s t o r a g e tanks. This instrumentation i s located i n a quadrant a t o r near t h e f l o o r o f t h e i n n e r s h e l l , and can be o f e i t h e r t h e d i r e c t r e a d i n g o r t h e e l e c t r o n i c ( 1 i n e a r - m o t i o n t r a n s d u c e r ) type. D.3.2.4 Cooldown. Procedures The f i r s t s t e p i n t h e cooldown o f t h e s t o r a g e t a n k i s t o purge T h i s prevents an e x p l o s i v e gas m i x t u r e from f o r m i n g The n i t r o g e n used must be d r y t o a v o i d d e p o s i t i n g
the tank w i t h nitrogen.
and a l s o d r i e s o u t t h e tank. ness.
w a t e r i n t h e c o l d per1 i t e i n s u l a t i o n , t h u s r e d u c i n g t h e i n s u l a t i o n ' s e f f e c t i v e The i n n e r t a n k i s purged by a d m i t t i n g t h e n i t r o g e n gas i n t o t h e bottom The a n n u l a r o f t h e t a n k and v e n t i n g t h e m i x t u r e o f a i r and i n e r t gas through t h e vents i n t h e suspended c e i l i n g and o u t t h e dome and r e l i e f v a l v e vents. space i s purged by c l o s i n g t h e dome v e n t and t h e r e l i e f v a l v e vent, a l l o w i n g t h e n i t r o g e n t o f l o w down through t h e i n s u l a t e d annulus and o u t t h e p e r l i t e
f i l l n o z z l e s a t t h e bottom o f t h e tank.
A f t e r t h e purge, LNG b r o u g h t t o t h e f a c i l i t y by t r u c k i s s l o w l y a d m i t t e d t o t h e t a n k t h r o u g h t h e coo.ldown n o z z l e where i t i s d e f l e c t e d and sprayed o v e r t h e f l o o r area. I n s t r u m e n t s t h a t m o n i t o r t h e e f f e c t s o f cooldown on t h e t a n k a r e :
l i n e a r movement i n d i c a t o r s t h a t measure r e l a t i v e movement between t h e i n n e r and o u t e r t a n k w a l l s

a
s t o r a g e t a n k thermocoupl es
The LNG f l o w r a t e i s 1 i m i t e d t o a v o i d exceeding s p e c i f i e d maximum temperature g r a d i e n t s between t h e t a n k thermocouples. When t h e l i q u i d l e v e l i n t h e t a n k reaches 1 f t o r more and t h e t a n k i s s u f f i c i e n t l y cooled, LNG can be fed through t h e normal l i q u i d fill l i n e and t h e i n p u t r a t e can be i n c r e a s e d t o t h e maximum. The cooldown purges t h e n i t r o g e n from t h e t a n k and t h e o f f gas i s vented through t h e v e n t gas header. When t h e methane l e v e l i n t h e o f f gas reaches a s p e c i f i e d l e v e l , t h e o f f gas i s compressed and s e n t t o t h e p i p e l i n e . Heatup, Purging, and E n t r y . m a t e l y 1 f t o f LNG i n t h e tank. heated t o 275"F, P r i o r t o t h e heatup o f t h e tank, t h e LNG T h i s leaves a p p r o x i The Heatup i s then begun by i n j e c t i n g n a t u r a l gas,
l e v e l i s lowered u n t i l t h e sendout pumps l o s e s u c t i o n .
i n t o t h e s t o r a g e t a n k through t h e bottom p e n e t r a t i o n .
n a t u r a l gas r i s e s , due t o i t s temperature buoyancy, t o t h e t o p of t h e vessel and leaves v i a t h e 3 6 - i n . vapor o u t l e t l i n e . The t a n k p r e s s u r e c o n t r o l system The i n l e t gas f l o w i s m a i n t a i n e d 6 a t approximately t h e normal b o i l o f f r a t e , 1.0 x 10 s c f d . A t t h i s r a t e , i t t a k e s a p p r o x i m a t e l y 20 days t o warm t h e tank from -250F t o +60F. The f o l l o w i n g i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n systems m o n i t o r t h e e f f e c t s o f warmup on t h e tank: l i n e a r movement i n d i c a t o r s t h a t measure r e l a t i v e movement between t h e i n n e r and o u t e r t a n k w a l l s s t o r a g e t a n k thermocouples s t r a i n gauges i n s t a l l e d around t h e p e r i p h e r y o f t h e e x t e r i o r t a n k t o monit o r any s t r e s s e s due t o expansion o f t h e i n n e r vessel and r e s u l t i n g compaction o f the p e r l i t e . The s t o r a g e t a n k must be purged t o a 98%+ n i t r o g e n atmosphere b e f o r e p e r sonnel e n t r y . L i q u i d n i t r o g e n i s b r o u g h t i n by c r y o g e n i c t r a i l e r , vaporized, The p u r g i n g i s As t h e p u r g i n g nears completion, Because t h e r e i s and a d m i t t e d t o t h e t a n k t h r o u g h t h e bottom p e n e t r a t i o n i n l e t . done i n t h e same manner as d e s c r i b e d b e f o r e . however, t h e n i t r o g e n c o n t e n t o f t h e o f f gas r i s e s r a p i d l y . f u n c t i o n s as i t would d u r i n g normal o p e r a t i o n .
a l i m i t on t h e n i t r o g e n c o n c e n t r a t i o ~i n gas t h a t i s s e n t t o t h e p i p e l i n e , t h e l a s t p o r t i o n o f t h e o f f gas i s vented t h r o u g h t h e v e n t gas header. t h e vent. Combustible gas d e t e c t o r s a r e l o c a t e d around t h e t a n k t o d e t e c t any o f f gas descending f r o m E s t a b l i s h e d weather c r i t e r i a d e f i n e a c c e p t a b l e atmospheric c o n d i t i o n s f o r venting. Storage Tank I s o l a t i o n . n i t r o g e n atmosphere. I n i s o l a t i n g t h e s t o r a g e tank, c a r e must be taken t o ensure t h a t t h e i n n e r vessel w i l l n o t be s u b j e c t e d t o an e x c e s s i v e p o s i t i v e o r n e g a t i v e p r e s s u r e cond ition. The s t o r a g e t a n k i s o l a t i o n i s performed by a p h y s i c a l s e p a r a t i o n o f a l l none s s e n t i a l p i p i n g connections a t t h e s t o r a g e t a n k f l a n g e s . e s t a b l i s h e d between blanks. Where v a l v e s a r e removed, t h e two r e m a i n i n g f l a n g e s a r e blanked o f f and a minimum 4 - i n . a i r space The o n l y p i p i n g p e n e t r a t i o n t h a t remains connected On t h i s p a r t i c u l a r l i n e , a l l cont o t h e s t o r a g e t a n k i s t h e t r a i l e r u n l o a d i n g l i n e through which t h e v a p o r i z e d n i t r o g e n purge gas e n t e r s t h e s t o r a g e tank. n e c t i o n s t o o t h e r p i p i n g systems a r e p h y s i c a l l y i s o l a t e d , i n c l u d i n g r e v e r s i n g a l l s a f e t i e s t o p r e v e n t d i s c h a r g e i n t o t h e p l a n t - v e n t system. Manometers a r e i n s t a l l e d t o m o n i t o r i n n e r vessel and a n n u l a r space p r e s s u r e s . I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e normal p u r g i n g n i t r o g e n , a f u l l l o a d o f n i t r o g e n i s m a i n t a i n e d a t t h e s i t e a t a l l times. T h i s p r o v i d e s a s u f f i c i e n t r e s e r v e t h a t can be v a p o r i zed i n t o t h e t a n k i n t h e e v e n t o f a r a p i d b a r o m e t r i c p r e s s u r e change. D.3.2.5 Release P r e v e n t i o n and C o n t r o l Features The o b j e c t i v e o f t h e s t o r a g e t a n k i s o l a t i o n i s t o
e l i m i n a t e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f an u n c o n t r o l l e d source o f gas c o n t a m i n a t i n g t h e
Each LNG s t o r a g e t a n k i s surrounded by a c o n c r e t e d i k e w a l l w i t h a c a p a c i t y o f about 737,500 b b l , o r 1.34 times t h e c a p a c i t y o f t h e tank. The i n s i d e o f t h e d i k e w a l l i s l i n e d w i t h a 2 1 1 2 - i n . - t h i c k The d i k e w a l l i s a p p r o x i m a t e l y 81 f t 4 i n . high, 1 f t 6 i n . t h i c k , and 259 f t i n s i d e diameter. insulating material t o reduce t h e e v a p o r a t i o n r a t e o f LNG i n t h e e v e n t o f a t a n k f a i l u r e . space separates t h e d i k e f r o m t h e o u t e r s h e l l o f t h e s t o r a g e tank. w a l l r e s t s on t h e same 4 - f t - t h i c k ,
A 10-ft
The d i k e
r e i n f o r c e d c o n c r e t e mat t h a t s u p p o r t s t h e
storage tank. However, the dike wall i s not structurally tied into the foundat i o n , in order to allow the concrete wall to contract freely in the event of a large LNG spi 11 .
A weather shield extends from the top of the concrete dike to the outer tank roof to keep precipitation from f a l l i n g into the annular space. An a i r circula-
tion system i s instal 1 ed to circulate ambient temperature a i r throughout the annular space. Withdrawal of cold a i r by t h i s system prevents excessive moisture buildup, condensation, and ice formation i n the annular space. A water pump designed f o r a flow of 44 gpm i s installed a t the bottom of the annular space to remove any water t h a t might c o l l e c t there. High-expansion foam generation systems in t h i s area can be activated e i t h e r manually or automatically from lowtemperature detectors located in the pumpout area. Also, UV f i r e detectors located in the pumpout area near the s p i l l basin and a t each pressure/vacuum r e l i e f valve on top of the tank can activate dry chemical and high-expansion foam systems and shut down pumps and associated equipment. Combustible gas detectors located i n the pump area sound alarms a t 25% of lower flammable l i m i t . A t 65% of lower flammable l i m i t , another alarm sounds and the sendout pumps are shut down, e i t h e r automatically or manually. (For a l i s t of detectors that activate the shutdown system, see Section D.4.2.) Each of the main storage tanks i s also protected by a fixed water deluge system. Water from t h i s system i s applied only to the roof of the tank because the walls of the main containment extend to the t o p of the outer shell of the tank. The excess water runoff from the water deluge system i s carried across the annular space between the tank snd the concrete containment and discharged down the outside of the containment wall. The deluge system i s designed to deliver sufficient water t o maintain the tank roof a t safe operating temperature during the maximum f i r e t h a t could be expected a t the receiving terminal. Deluge water i s provided by electrical pumps in addition to the c i t y water pressure. A UV f i r e detector located near the tank r e l i e f valves automatically activates a dry chemical extinguisher aimed a t the r e l i e f valves. Also, each storage tank area contains a manual f i r e alarm and two portable dry chemical f i r e extinguishers, each with a 30-lb capacity.
A f i r e t r u c k c o n t a i n i n g a d r y chemical system i s used as a backup.
A d d i t i o n a l hoses and a sniall water-pumping capabi 1 it y a r e a1 so p r o v i d e d on t h e truck. D.3.3
LNG Sendout Pumps

Each s t o r a g e tank c o n t a i n s two removable, submerged, cryogenic, p r i m a r y
pumps ( w i t h an a d d i t i o n a l pump w e l l f o r i n s t a l l a t i o n o f a t h i r d pump as r e q u i r e d ) t o t r a n s f e r LNG from t h e s t o r a g e tanks t o t h e s u c t i o n o f t h e secondary pumps l o c a t e d e x t e r n a l t o t h e tanks. The p r i m a r y pumps a r e a1 so used t o r e c i r c u l a t e Each p r i m a r y
LNG t o t h e s h i p ' s u n l o a d i n g l i n e s t o keep t h e l i n e s cooled down.
pump has a c a p a c i t y o f 2,000 gpm w i t h a d i s c h a r g e pressure o f 60 p s i g . There a r e 103secondary pumps, w i t h n i n e o p e r a t i n g and one as backup. pump i s a 15-stage, 950-gpm, 1,200-hp, 3,600-rpm, w i t h a d i s c h a r g e p i p e l i n e pressure o f 1,280 p s i g . Each
submerged-motor pump designed The secondary pumps and t h e i r This The pump and
motor d r i v e s a r e h e r m e t i c a l l y sealed i n a vessel and submerged i n LNG. design e l i m i n a t e s t h e extended pump s h a f t and a s s o c i a t e d s e a l . motor surroundings a r e 100% r i c h i n LNG and w i l l n o t s u p p o r t combustion. There a r e two o u t l e t l i n e s from each t a n k .
Each l i n e c o n t a i n s a check
v a l v e , a 1 i n e t h a t connects t o t h e t a n k i n l e t l i n e s f o r r e c i r c u l a t i o n , and a f a i l s a f e - c l o s e d c o n t r o l v a l v e t h a t can be operated l o c a l l y , from t h e c o n t r o l room, by t h e emergency shutdown system, o r by a s i g n a l from temperature o r l e v e l sensors i n t h e tank. The o u t l e t l i n e s j o i n t o form t h e 20-in. sendout l i n e . w i t h the 4-in. This l i n e i s
i n t e r r u p t e d by a f a i 1s a f e - c l osed, a i r - o p e r a t e d c o n t r o l v a l v e and t h e n j o i n s
LNG c i r c u l a t i o n l i n e t o become t h e 36-in. f e e d l i n e t o t h e
secondary pumps. The secondary pump o u t l e t s a r e d i v i d e d i n t o two l i n e s . I l i n e s , which c o n t a i n a check v a l v e and a f a i l s a f e - c l o s e d , become t h e main f e e d l i n e t o t h e v a p o r i z e r s . s t o r a g e tanks. The 24-in. main air-operated valve
t h a t can be a c t i v a t e d l o c a l l y o r from t h e main c o n t r o l room, j o i n t o g e t h e r t o The minimum f l o w l i n e s , which c o n t a i n t h e same v a l v e s as t h e main l i n e s , j o i n t o g e t h e r and r e t u r n t o t h e Each pump a l s o has a vapor v e n t l i n e w i t h t h e same v a l v i n g The vapor v e n t l i n e s combine and r e t u r n t o t h e t a n k s v i a as t h e l i q u i d l i n e s .
t h e 3 0 - i n . vapor r e t u r n l i n e .
P i p i n g and i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n f o r t h e sendout pumps
were shown p r e v i o u s l y i n F i g u r e D.11. An independent d i k e surrounding t h e pumpout area h e l p s c o n t a i n any s p i l l s t h a t m i g h t occur i n t h i s area. D.3.4 Vaporization LNG s e n t o u t f r o m s t o r a g e i s vaporized and i n j e c t e d i n t o t h e p i p e l i n e . V a p o r i z a t i o n equipment and procedures a r e d e s c r i b e d here. The process f l o w Corresponding diagram f o r t h e v a p o r i z a t i o n system i s shown i n F i g u r e D.12.
process c o n d i t i o n s and equipment i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s a r e g i v e n i n Table D.5.
Baseload v a p o r i z a t i o n occurs i n f i v e f a 1 1 i n g - f i l m , open-rack, v a p o r i z e r s w i t h a t o t a l c a p a c i t y o f 550 MMscfd. i n F i g u r e D.13.
seawater
One such v a p o r i z e r i s shown The LNG passes upward
LNG i s i n t r o d u c e d through m a n i f o l d s a t t h e bottom o f banks o f
v e r t i c a l panels c o n s t r u c t e d o f s p e c i a l extruded f i n s . t h e o u t s i d e o f t h e panels. 24-in. o u t l e t l i n e .
i n s i d e t h e tubes where i t i s heated by t h e seawater which f a l l s as a f i l m over Vaporized LNG emerges a t t h e t o p and i s r o u t e d t o a
The f a l l i n g water f i l m used i n t h i s design g i v e s extremely h i g h heat t r a n s f e r c o e f f i c i e n t s , which reduces t h e amount o f i c e formed, thus m a i n t a i n i n g h i g h performance. With t h i s open t y p e o f system, t h e small amount o f i c e t h a t i s The panels o f f i n n e d tubes formed does n o t i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e f l o w o f water. i t s s t r e n g t h a t low temperature.
and a l l p a r t s i n c o n t a c t w i t h t h e LNG a r e made o f aluminum a l l o y , which m a i n t a i n s The s u r f a c e o f t h e panels i n c o n t a c t w i t h t h e seawater a r e p r o t e c t e d by a s a c r i f i c i a l z i n c c l a d d i n g . The seawater i s pumped t o t h e v a p o r i z e r s a t r a t e s t h a t r e s u l t i n a p p r o x i m a t e l y a 5OF temperature d r o p between incoming and o u t g o i n g seawater. About 170,000 gpm i s r e q u i r e d f o r t h e 550 MMscfd v a p o r i z a t i o n c a p a c i t y . The seawater supply system t o t h e LNG p l a n t c o n s i s t s o f an 8 3 0 - f t - l o n g , supply b a s i n and a 1,650-ft-long, t h e b a s i n t o t h e LNG v a p o r i z e r s . 9-ft-diameter, 14-ft-diameter, carbon-steel p i p e l i n e from a n e i g h b o r i n g power p l a n t ' s condensers t o a pump carbon-steel p i p e l i n e f r o m The temperature o f t h e water i s about 90F.
VAPOR FROM V-301 BlClDlE
LNG T O 4 A D D l T l O N A L
SEAWATER INLET
SEAWATER FROM V-301 BlClDlE SEAWATER RETURN
,----7
M - VALVES CLOSED B Y MES SYSTEM V - VALVES CLOSED BY M S SYSTEM L - VALVES CLOSED BY LES SYSTEM
FROM PIPELINE
LNG TO 3 ADDITIONAL PEAKING VAPORIZERS V - M e BlClD
TANK PRESSURE CONTROL V-%?A STANDBY AND R A K I N G VAPORIZER (SUBMERGED COMBUSTION TYPL. 4 REQUIRED1
FIGURE D.12.
Flow Diagram o f V a p o r i z a t i o n System
GAS TO PIPELINE
1
FIGURE D.13.
F a l l i n g F i l m Open-Rack Seawater Vaporizers TABLE D.5. V a p o r i z a t i o n System Pressure ( p s i g ) 1 ,280 1,300 20 Temp. ( F O ) -252 30 Flowrate 4,700 gpm 550 MMscfd 170,000 gpm 170,000 gpm 3,850 gprn 450 MMscfd
ID
13 15 16 17
Stream I d e n t i f i c a t i o n 'Description LNG t o Baseload Vaporizers Seawater I n l e t Seawater Return LNG t o Peaking Vaporizers
14 Vapor f r o m Baseload Vaporizers
90
85 -252
30
20
1,280 1,300
18 Vapor from Peaking Vaporizers Equipment I d e n t i f i c a t i o n P-201 V-301 A/B/C/D/E V-302 A/B/C/D Secondary Pump
Baseload Seawater Vapori zers Backup and Peaking G a s - f i r e d Vaporizers
A p a r a l l e l 2,500-ft-long,
9-ft-diameter,
carbon-steel p i p e l i n e returns the
seawater f r o m t h e v a p o r i z e r s t o t h e power p l a n t a t a t e m p e r a t u r e 5F c o o l e r t h a n t h e s u p p l y w a t e r f r o m t h e power p l a n t ' s condensers ( a b o u t 85F). F o r s t a n d b y o r p e a k i n g v a p o r i z a t i o n , f o u r submerged combustion, g a s - f i r e d v a p o r i z e r s h a v i n g a t o t a l c a p a c i t y o f 450 MMscfd a r e used. each u n i t v i a a 1 2 - i n . 1 i n e . 1 b i l l i o n s c f d o f gas d u r i n g peak c o n d i t i o n s . used a p p r o x i m a t e l y 800 h o u r s p e r y e a r . The g a s - f i r e d v a p o r i z e r s a r e d e s i g n e d such t h a t t h e b u r n e r s e x h a u s t h o t combustion gases downward t h r o u g h a downcomer and i n t o a w a t e r b a t h below t h e l i q u i d surface. The e x h a u s t b u b b l e s i n t o t h e w a t e r c a u s i n g t u r b u l e n c e , m i x i n g , T h i s l i f t i n g a c t i o n f o r c e s t h e w a t e r up t h r o u g h an The w a t e r f l o w s o v e r t h e Bath temperature ranges and a " l i f t i n g " a c t i o n . V a p o r i z e d LNG e x i t s This brings the t o t a l p l a n t output capacity t o The g a s - f i r e d v a p o r i z e r s a r e
a n n u l a r space c r e a t e d b y a w e i r a r o u n d t h e downcomer. t o p o f t h e w e i r and i n t o t h e more q u i e s c e n t o u t e r t a n k . f r o m 90F t o 130F.
A h e a t exchanger t u b e c o i l f o r t h e LNG i s l o c a t e d i n t h e
a n n u l a r space between t h e w e i r and t h e downcomer where i t i s scrubbed by t h e warm g a s - w a t e r m i x t u r e , t h u s t r a n s f e r r i n g h e a t t o t h e LNG and v a p o r i z i n g i t . The submerged c o m b u s t i o n t e c h n i q u e r e s u l t s i n a v e r y h i g h t h e r m a l e f f i c i e n c y o f 94-96% because: 1 ) a l l t h e w a t e r i n t h e combustion p r o d u c t s condenses and t h e h i g h h e a t i n g v a l u e o f t h e f u e l can be used, and 2 ) t h e v i o l e n t t u r b u l e n c e and m i x i n g o f t h e gas and w a t e r r e s u l t i n a h i g h r a t e o f h e a t t r a n s f e r t o t h e tubes. The v a p o r i z e r s consume gas e q u i v a l e n t t o 1.5% t o 2.0% o f t h e LNG v a p o r i z e d .
The LNG i n l e t p i p i n g , t u b e b u n d l e , and o u t l e t p i p i n g t o t h e f i r s t f l a n g e are a l l stainless steel construction. The r e s t o f t h e o u t l e t p i p i n g i s c a r b o n The s e c t i o n o f each downcomer s t e e l , as a r e t h e t a n k , w e i r , and downcomer. t i o n o f cooling water.
above t h e w a t e r b a t h i s s u r r o u n d e d by a w a t e r j a c k e t w i t h c o n t i n u o u s c i r c u l a The b u r n e r , f u e l gas p i p i n g , a i r i n l e t p i p i n g , and The a i r b l o w e r d r i v e i s a 250-hp e l e c t r i c m o t o r . blower a r e a l l carbon s t e e l . a h e i g h t o f 10 f t . weather p r o t e c t i o n .
The o v e r a l l d i m e n s i o n s o f each v a p o r i z e r a r e a p p r o x i m a t e l y 12 f t x 27 f t w i t h The v a p o r i z e r i s s u r r o u n d e d by a f i b e r g l a s s b u i l d i n g f o r
The main l i n e from the secondary pumps divides i n t o two l i n e s , one of which goes t o the seawater vaporizers and the other t o the submerged combustion vaporizers. The i n l e t l i n e s t o each of the vaporizers a r e interrupted by f a i l s a f e closed, air-operated, control valves. These valves a r e used t o control the LNG flow t o the vaporizers b u t can a l s o be closed l o c a l l y , from the main control room, by t h e emergency shutdown systems (see Section D.4.2), and i f desired, by several sensors located in the vaporizer system (see Section D.3.4.4). The o u t l e t l i n e s from the vaporizers each contain a valve t h a t can be closed l o c a l l y , from the control room, by the emergency shutdown system, or by a low temperature sensor in the gas o u t l e t l i n e . The o u t l e t l i n e s join together in a 30-in. l i n e t h a t contains a check valve, a fail-safe-closed a i r operated valve (normally used f o r pressure c o n t r o l ) , and a pressure sensing device. The 30-in. l i n e expands t o a 48-in. l i n e t h a t contains a metering s t a t i o n , the odorant injection 1ine, a f a i l safe-closed valve (closed l o c a l l y , from the control room, or by the emergency shutdown system), and the fuel gas supply l i n e f o r the terminal. D.3.4.2 Control System and Instrumentation
Two major controls associated with the vaporizers (both seawater and gasf i r e d types) are:
LNG flow control
gas o u t l e t temperature control.

LNG throughput i s automatically maintained a t a preselected flowrate by a cont r o l valve i n each vaporizer i n l e t 1ine. Each LNG control valve i s t i e d into a gas-outlet flow recorder c o n t r o l l e r . The control valve in the seawater i n l e t l i n e i s t i e d i n t o a temperature recorder c o n t r o l l e r i n the gas o u t l e t l i n e and regulates t h e o u t l e t gas temperature by adjusting the seawater flow r a t e . The gas o u t l e t temperature from the submerged combustion vaporizer i s controlled by automatic adjustment of the air-operated control valves in the fuel gas and a i r supply 1 ines.
Water level in the tank (of each submerged combustion vaporizer) i s cont r o l l e d by several means. An overflow nozzle i s located a t the normal water depth
t o prevent high l e v e l s .
A small pump s i t s a t t h e s u r f a c e o f t h e water i n
t h e b a t h and pumps water t o t h e c o o l i n g j a c k e t s on t h e burners. p r e s s u r e s w i t c h t h e n opens a c o n t r o l v a l v e t o admit more water. l e v e l alarm i s a l s o included.
I f the water
A low
l e v e l i s low, t h e pump l o s e s s u c t i o n and t h e d i s c h a r g e pressure f a l l s .
A l o w water
Vaporizer o u t l e t pressure i s c o n t r o l l e d by a pressure c o n t r o l v a l v e i n t h e 3 0 - i n . l i n e beyond where t h e o u t l e t l i n e s come t o g e t h e r . t o r f o r t h e burners. D.3.4.3 Procedures Other c o n t r o l s i n c l u d e a pneumatic f u e l p r e s s u r e c o n t r o l v a l v e and a p i l o t l i n e w i t h a pressure r e g u l a -
To s t a r t up t h e v a p o r i z e r s , t h e f i r s t s t e p i s t h e cooldown o f t h e secondary LNG pumps. The b l o c k v a l v e s on t h e o u t l e t l i n e s t o t h e v a p o r i z e r s a r e c l o s e d The sendout pumps t h e n o p e r a t e on and t h e p r i m a r y i n t a n k pumps a r e s t a r t e d .
t o t a l r e c y c l e u n t i l t h e y and t h e i r a s s o c i a t e d p i p i n g a r e s u f f i c i e n t l y c o o l . The vapor produced by c o o l i n g t h e pumps i s vented through t h e vapor v e n t l i n e on each pump. These v e n t l i n e s combine and r e t u r n t o t h e t a n k v i a t h e 3 0 - i n . vapor r e t u r n l i n e , as d e s c r i b e d p r e v i o u s l y . Seawater f l o w t o t h e open r a c k v a p o r i z e r s i s brought up t o t h e a n t i c i p a t e d normal f l o w r a t e and t h e n t h e d i s c h a r g e valves on t h e secondary pumps a r e opened t o t h e v a p o r i z e r s . LNG f l o w t o t h e v a p o r i z e r s i s i n c r e a s e d s l o w l y t o Once t h e d e s i r e d LNG f l o w p r o v i d e gradual cooldown o f t h e heat exchanger tubes. p r e v i o u s l y i n S e c t i o n D.3.4.2.
i s reached, o p e r a t i o n o f t h e v a p o r i z e r s i s a u t o m a t i c a l l y c o n t r o l l e d as d e s c r i b e d To shut down t h e seawater v a p o r i z e r s , t h e LNG Seawater f l o w c o n t i n u e s u n t i l no During emergency shutdown o f t h e v a p o r i f l o w i s g r a d u a l l y reduced and then stopped. more vapor f l o w s o u t o f t h e v a p o r i z e r s . t h e vapor f 1ow ceases. To s t a r t up t h e submerged combustion v a p o r i z e r s , t h e burners a r e f i r e d and t h e w a t e r b a t h heated t o t h e proper o p e r a t i n g temperature (95 t o 130F). t h i s p o i n t , t h e d i s c h a r g e valves on t h e secondary pumps a r e opened t o t h e At
zers, t h e LNG i s stopped immediately and t h e seawater f l o w i s c o n t i n u e d u n t i l
v a p o r i z e r s and a small f l o w o f LNG s t a r t s .
The r e s t o f t h e s t a r t u p o f these
v a p o r i z e r s i s semi-automatic, w i t h t h e b u r n e r f i r i n g r a t e and t h e LNG f l o w r a t e b o t h g r a d u a l l y i n c r e a s e d u n t i l t h e d e s i r e d f l o w r a t e i s reached. Shutdown o f these v a p o r i z e r s i s a l s o semi-automatic, b u r n e r f i r i n g r a t e g r a d u a l l y reduced. w i t h t h e LNG f l o w and
The l a r g e heat-storage c a p a c i t y o f t h e
water b a t h p e r m i t s f a i r l y r a p i d s t a r t u p and shutdown o f t h e v a p o r i z e r s w i t h l i t t l e v a r i a t i o n i n t h e process o u t l e t temperature. Emergency shutdown procedures f o r t h e v a p o r i z e r s a r e d e s c r i b e d i n S e c t i o n D.4.2. D.3.4.4 Release P r e v e n t i o n and C o n t r o l Features
The seawater v a p o r i z e r area and submerged combustion v a p o r i z e r area a r e c o n t i n u o u s l y m o n i t o r e d by mu1 t i p l e combustible gas d e t e c t o r s , u l t r a v i o l e t flame d e t e c t o r s , and low temperature d e t e c t o r s . Each d e t e c t o r i s hooked t o an alarm i n t h e main c o n t r o l room and i s i d e n t i f i e d by t y p e and l o c a t i o n . High-expansion foam u n i t s a r e l o c a t e d a t t h e v a p o r i z e r s and a r e a c t i v a t e d e i t h e r manually o r a u t o m a t i c a l l y by low temperature d e t e c t o r s (grade l e v e l ) t h a t a l s o a c t i v a t e an a l a r m and a u t o m a t i c a l l y s h u t down t h e v a p o r i z e r s . The UV f i r e d e t e c t o r s have v e r y f a s t , a d j u s t a b l e ( 0 t o 30 seconds) response times. These d e t e c t o r s sound an a l a r m and a c t i v a t e t h e d r y chemical u n i t s f o r a p p r o x i m a t e l y 30 seconds, expending t h e supply, a f t e r which t h e high-expansion foam u n i t s a r e a c t i v a t e d t o cover any LNG s p i l l s and l i m i t t h e amount o f vapor generation. Gas d e t e c t o r s i n t h e area a c t i v a t e alarms a t 25% o f t h e l o w e r flammable 1 i m i t .
A t 65% o f t h e l o w e r flammable l i m i t , another alarm sounds;
automatic o r manual shutdown o f t h e v a p o r i z e r f o l l o w s . Manual f i r e a l a r m switches, as w e l l as two 3 0 - l b chemical e x t i n g u i s h e r s , a r e a l s o l o c a t e d i n t h e area. A f i r e t r u c k i s a v a i l a b l e t o back up t h e d r y chemical, water, and h i g h expansion foam systems. T h i s t r u c k c o n t a i n s a d r y chemical u n i t which connects A d d i t i o n a l hoses and a small water pumping capat o t h e v a p o r i z a t i o n system. F i r e h y d r a n t s w i t h spray m o n i t o r s a r e l o c a t e d a t t h e v a p o r i z e r s .
b i l i t y a r e a l s o p r o v i d e d on t h e t r u c k .
Pressure r e l i e f v a l v e s s e t below c r i t i c a l l e v e l s f o r t h e equipment a r e l o c a t e d a t t h e o u t l e t and i n l e t p o r t i o n s o f t h e v a p o r i z e r s .

i t i s routed t o the vent stack.
Gas d i s c h a r g e
f r o m t h e pressure r e l i e f v a l v e s e n t e r s a n i trogen-purged c o l l e c t o r system where An independent d i k e system surrounds t h e v a p o r i z e r s t o c o n t a i n any s p i l l s t h a t m i g h t occur. A1 1 v a p o r i z e r s a r e equipped wi t h an automatic v a p o r i z e r emergency shutdown (VES) t h a t , upon a c t i v a t i o n , a u t o m a t i c a l l y shuts down t h e v a p o r i z e r s and t h e LNG sendout pumps and i s o l a t e s t h e pumps from b o t h t h e v a p o r i z e r s and t h e LNG tank. The VES can be a c t i v a t e d manually a t t h e v a p o r i z e r s o r t h e c o n t r o l room. The VES can a l s o be a c t i v a t e d a u t o m a t i c a l l y , i f d e s i r e d , by a temperature sensor i n t h e gas o u t l e t l i n e , temperature and f l o w sensors i n t h e w a t e r l i n e s , UV burner flame m o n i t o r s , w a t e r bath l e v e l i n d i c a t o r s , o r t h e p r e s s u r e sensor i n the 30-in. o u t l e t l i n e . Normally, t h e VES i s n o t a u t o m a t i c a l l y a c t i v a t e d .
GENERAL PLANT INFORMATION The f o l l o w i n g subsections p r o v i d e general i n f o r m a t i o n on v a r i o u s aspects o f t h e LNG i m p o r t t e r m i n a l and i t s o p e r a t i o n .
The i m p o r t t e r m i n a l i s designed t o be operated w i t h o u t v e n t i n g . t e r m i n a l b o i l o f f gas i n t o t h e end of t h e p i p e l i n e . b e f o r e any v e n t i n g i s r e q u i r e d .
Even i n a
case where t h e p i p e l i n e f a c i l i t i e s a r e s h u t down, i t i s p o s s i b l e t o pack normal Provided t h e f i r s t 10 m i l e s a r e a v a i l a b l e , t h i s a l l o w s a complete t e r m i n a l shutdown f o r a t l e a s t 2-112 days
A l l gas l i n e s and gas h a n d l i n g equipment can be vented t o t h e v e n t s t a c k through a n i trogen-purged v e n t header ( c o l l e c t o r ) system. The header i s s i z e d t o accommodate t h e l o a d caused by any s i n g l e f a i l u r e o r r e l i e v i n g s i t u a t i o n . Gas i s n o t n o r m a l l y vented except i n t h e case of an emergency shutdown, when t h e Master Emergency Shutdown (MES) system a u t o m a t i c a l l y v e n t s a1 1 gas 1 i n e s and gas h a n d l i n g equipment. The LNG sendout pumps a r e vented back t o t h e s t o r a g e t a n k v i a t h e 3 0 - i n . vapor r e t u r n l i n e .
The s t o r a g e t a n k has t h r e e 1 2 - i n . pressure/vacuum r e l i e f v a l v e s which v e n t t o t h e atmosphere. t h e b o i l o f f compressor. Normal o f f gas from t h e s t o r a g e t a n k i s handled by The r e l i e f valves open o n l y when needed t o p r o t e c t
t h e t a n k f r o m over o r u n d e r p r e s s u r i z a t i o n .
A l l v e s s e l s o r s e c t i o n s o f LNG l i n e s t h a t can be i s o l a t e d w i t h LNG i n

them and a l l o w e d t o warm a r e p r o t e c t e d by r e l i e f v a l v e s v e n t i n g t o t h e atmosphere. 0.4.2 Emeraencv Shutdown Svstem The o p e r a t i o n and a c t i v a t i o n o f t h e emergency shutdown system f o r t h e i m p o r t t e r m i n a l a r e d e s c r i b e d here. D.4.2.1 Operation o f Emergency Shutdown
The p l a n t emergency shutdown (ESD) system c o n s i s t s o f t h r e e major systems: 1 ) t h e blaster Emergency Shutdown (MES) , 2) t h e Vaporizer Emergency Shutdown (VES), and 3 ) t h e O f f s h o r e Emergency Shutdown (OES). It takes a p p r o x i m a t e l y 30 seconds a f t e r a c t i v a t i o n f o r any o f these systems t o complete shutdown. The MES a l l o w s t h e r a p i d shutdown o f t h e i m p o r t t e r m i n a l and i s o l a t i o n o f t h e v a r i o u s p l a n t systems. the following actions: 1 When a c t i v a t e d , t h e MES a u t o m a t i c a l l y i n i t i a t e s
E l e c t r i c a l s u p p l i e s t o a1 1 normal p l a n t c i r c u i t s a r e de-energized; p l a n t e l e c t r i c a l equipment (e.g., system v a l v e o p e r a t o r s ) remain energized.
essential
f i r e pumps, f i r e and gas d e t e c t o r s , f i r e
2.
N a t u r a l gas v a l v e s a t p l a n t boundaries a r e c l o s e d t o i s o l a t e t h e p l a n t from t h e n a t u r a l gas p i p e l i n e . gas from v a p o r i z e r s

e
These v a l v e s i n c l u d e :
b o i l o f f gas f r o m s t o r a g e tanks and s h i p s f u e l gas t o v a p o r i z e r s .
3.
The LNG t a n k and d i k e area i s i s o l a t e d from t h e remainder o f t h e p l a n t by the following:

0
v a l v e s a t t h e LNG pump s u c t i o n and v a l v e s on t h e l i q u i d withdrawal l i n e s are closed b l o c k v a l v e s on t h e t a n k i n l e t 1 i n e s a r e c l o s e d
LNG pump motors a r e s h u t down b l o c k v a l v e s between t h e LNG pumps and t h e v a p o r i z e r s a r e c l o s e d l o a d i n g arm b l o c k valves a r e c l o s e d .
4.
A t e l e m e t r i c s i g n a l "MES Tripped" i s t r a n s m i t t e d t o t h e company's head

office.
5.
With l o s s o f i n s t r u m e n t a i r , a l l c o n t r o l valves go t o t h e i r f a i l s a f e positions.
6.
Gas f r o m a l l gas h a n d l i n g equipment and l i n e s i s vented through t h e r e l i e f header t o t h e v e n t s t a c k . The second shutdown system, t h e VES, a l l o w s t h e r a p i d shutdown and i s o l a -
t i o n o f LNG sendout systems o u t s i d e t h e dock area. automatically i n i t i a t e s the following actions: 1.
When a c t i v a t e d , t h e VES
The f o l l o w i n g n a t u r a l gas v a l v e s a t p l a n t boundaries a r e c l o s e d : gas from v a p o r i z e r s b o i l o f f f r o m s t o r a g e tanks and s h i p s

e
f u e l gas t o v a p o r i z e r s .
2.
LNG pump motors a r e s h u t down. Block v a l v e s between t h e pumps and t h e v a p o r i z e r s a r e closed. Pump s u c t i o n v a l v e s and t h e v a l v e s on t h e l i q u i d withdrawal li'nes a r e closed.
3.
4.
5.
Gas f r o m a l l gas h a n d l i n g equipment and l i n e s i s vented through t h e r e l i e f header t o t h e v e n t s t a c k . The t h i r d shutdown system, t h e OES, a l l o w s t h e r a p i d shutdown and i s o l a t i o n
o f a l l LNG sendout f r o m t h e s h i p s and vapor r e t u r n t o t h e ships. t h e OES a u t o m a t i c a l l y i n i t i a t e s t h e f o l l o w i n g a c t i o n s : 1. Block v a l v e s i n t h e u n l o a d i n g arms a r e c l osed.
When a c t i v a t e d ,
2.
Block v a l v e s i n t h e vapor bypass l i n e s a r e l o c k e d i n t o p o s i t i o n t o p r e v e n t operation.
3.
4.
Block valves in the vapor return l i n e are closed.

LNG transfer pump motors on the ship are shut down.
The closing rates of the block valves and the sequence of shutdown events are programmed to limit f l u i d hammer and t o keep any LNG from being trapped between val ves. In the event of a total power f a i l u r e , the MES, VES, and OES c i r c u i t s are energized with a battery power supply. After approximately 10 seconds, a 600-kW diesel-driven emergency generator i s automatically started t o provide the power t o these systems. Fire water i s provided during emergency shutdown through the use of diesel -driven pumps and/or ci ty water pressure.
D.4.2.2
Activation of Emergency Shutdown System
Both the MS and V S can be activated manually a t the two e x i t gates. The E E MS can also be activated automatically by the u l t r a v i o l e t ( U V ) f i r e detectors E t h a t monitor the following areas: compressor building vaporizers LNG pumps piping on or adjacent t o pipe racks next to compressor area unloading dock area. The VES may be automatically activated, i f desired, by a temperature sensor in the vaporizer gas o u t l e t 1ine (1o temperature), temperature and flow w sensors in the seawater lines of the open rack vaporizers, by the UV flame monitors on the submerged combustion vaporizer burners (burner flameout) and throughout the vaporizer area ( f i r e ) , by gas detectors i n the area, or by the water bath level indicator (low level ) on the submerged combustion vaporizers. The OES may be activated by U V f i r e detectors on the dock, low temperature detectors, combustible gas detectors, power and a i r supply f a i 1ure, high o r low pressure in the transfer l i n e s , excess flowrate, and tanker movements outside the established operating conditions. In addition t o automatic shutdown of the OES system, manual shutdown may be i n i t i a t e d from several locations in the unloading area, including the main terminal control room, the loading platform control room, and the ship's bridge.
D.4.3
C o n s t r u c t i o n , I n s p e c t i o n , and T e s t i n g The procedures used d u r i n g c o n s t r u c t i o n , i n s p e c t i o n , and t e s t i n g o f an
i m p o r t t e r m i n a l a r e discussed be1 ow. D. 4.3.1 Codes and Standards
Various codes and standards a p p l y t o t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n , t e s t i n g , and operat i o n o f LNG f a c i l i t i e s . These codes and standards a r e discussed i n S e c t i o n E.4.2.1 o f Appendix E and w i l l n o t be covered f u r t h e r here. D.4.3.2 Procedures
A l l w e l d i n g on t h e LNG s t o r a g e tanks i s performed i n s t r i c t accordance w i t h

API 620 Appendix Q. radiographed. penetrant tested. A l l i n n e r t a n k b u t t welds a r e v i s u a l l y i n s p e c t e d and 100% I n a d d i t i o n , t h e t a n k i s i n s p e c t e d by an independent o u t s i d e A l l o u t e r t a n k b u t t welds a r e v i s u a l l y i n s p e c t e d and 100% dye
agency i n accordance w i t h API 620. S t r e n g t h and l e a k t e s t procedures f o r t h e completed t a n k s a r e c a r e f u l l y conducted and i n c l u d e t h e f o l l o w i n g major s t e p s :
1.
Bottom seams o f b o t h t h e i n n e r and o u t e r tanks a r e l e a k t e s t e d by vacuum box.
2.
I n n e r t a n k s h e l l - t o - b o t t o m f i l l e t welds a r e l e a k t e s t e d by a i r p r e s s u r e and soap suds.
3.
Outer t a n k s h e l l - t o - b o t t o m f i l l e t welds a r e t e s t e d by e i t h e r a i r p r e s s u r e and soap suds o r by p e n e t r a t i n g o i l .
4.
The i n n e r t a n k i s f i l l e d w i t h w a t e r t o t h e e q u i v a l e n t p r e s s u r e o f t h e f u l l head o f LNG. Appendix Q a l l o w s t h i s head t o be i n c r e a s e d by 25% i f cons i d e r e d d e s i r a b l e , b u t l i m i t s t a n k s h e l l s t r e s s e s t o a maximum o f 80% o f t h e s p e c i f i e d minimum y i e l d s t r e n g t h o f t h e m a t e r i a l o r 50% o f t h e s p e c i f i e d minimum t e n s i l e s t r e n g t h .
5. The i n n e r t a n k i s then p r e s s u r i z e d i n s e v e r a l stages t o a maximum o f

150% o f design pressure.
6.
The pressure i s then reduced to the design pressure, and shell and roof seams above the liquid level are tested with soap suds. Opening pressure of the pressure vent i s checked a t t h i s time. While the inner tank i s being emptied, the opening pressure of the vacuum vent i s checked. With the tank empty, the inner tank i s again pressurized to design pressure and the anchor system i s rechecked. The outer tank i s then pressurized to i t s design pressure and i s tested f o r leaks with soap suds. A an alternate to t h i s , the outer tank shell s seams can be checked by penetrating o i l . Also, outer tank roof seams can be checked by vacuum box. Operation of outer tank pressure vents i s checked during t h i s t e s t , and the vacuum vent i s checked by applying the design vacuum.
7.
8.
9.
10.
The tanker unloading system and the cold piping to the sendout system are insulated with a combination of fiberglass, urethane, and a vapor barrier. The fiberglass i s applied on the pipe wall, and urethane of required thickness i s added and sealed with fiberglass-reinforced-plastic vapor barrier. For f i t t i n g s and components, the urethane i s applied to the pipe wall. The pipeline i s strung along the right-of-way and bent as required t o conform with the plant contours. Pipe sections are welded and inspected in compliance with the Department of Transportation minimum Federal Safety Standards, Section 192.243. All piping welds a t water crossings, in environmentally sensit i v e areas, and in encased sections are 100% radiographically inspected.
D.5
SOURCES OF INFORMATION
The description of the LNG import terminal was developed using information from the sources l i s t e d below.
1.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Docket F i 1es : Environmental Impact Statements P a c i f i c - I n d o n e s i a P r o j e c t , Western LNG Terminal Co., CP 75-83-3 Cook I n l e t P r o j e c t , Western LNG Terminal Co., CP 75-83-1 Western D e p t f o r d CP76-16 N a t i o n a l Bureau o f Standards - Cryogenic Reviews Western LNG Co., Oxnard Storage F a c i l i t y , CP 75-83-3 Southern Energy Co., Elba I s l a n d Terminal, C 73-272 P D i s t r i g a s , E v e r e t t Marine Terminal, CP 73-132 D i s t r i g a s , New York Terminal, CP 73-132 Transco Terminal Co., Gloucester County Terminal, C 73-268 P Algonquin LNG Inc., Providence F a c i l i t i e s , CP 73-139 T r u n k l i n e LNG Co., Lake Charges Terminal, CP 73-138
2.
LNG Terminal Risk Assessment Study f o r Oxnard, C a l i f o r n i a Prepared f o r Western LNG Terminal Company by Science A p p l i c a t i o n s , I n c . , La J o l l a , C a l i f o r n i a , December 22, 1975 LNG Terminal Risk Assessment Study f o r P o i n t Conception, C a l i f o r n i a Prepared f o r Western LNG Terminal Company by Science A p p l i c a t i o n s , I n c . , La J o l l a , C a l i f o r n i a , January 23, 1976
3.
Environmental Impact Report f o r t h e Proposed Oxnard LNG F a c i l i t i e s Prepared by Socio-Economic Systems, I n c . , Los Angeles, C a l i f o r n i a
4.
LNG Equipment Vendor L i t e r a t u r e : Chicago B r i d g e and I r o n Co. Chicago B r i d g e and I r o n Co. Chicago B r i d g e and I r o n Co. Pittsburg-Des Moines S t e e l Company FMC F l u i d C o n t r o l Equipment Ryan I n d u s t r i e s Sumi tomo P r e c i s i o n Products A1 ison C o n t r o l I n c .
Cryogenic Storage, B u l l e t i n No. 8600, Cryogenic Systems, B u l l e t i n No. 8650, USA Standards f o r Design and C o n s t r u c t i o n o f LNG I n s t a l l a t i o n s , B u l l e t i n No. 831, LNG Storage Tanks, B u l l e t i n No. 303, Chiksan Loading Systems, Sub-X Vaporizer, B u l l e t i n LNG-200, LNG Open Rack Vaporizers, F i r e Detection System.
E x t i nguishnient C o n t r o l
5.
Open L i t e r a t u r e : Alexander, Jean B . , and N . Thomas Williams, "Elba Island LNG F a c i l i t y on Schedule." P i p e l i n e and Gas J o u r n a l , pp. 26-31, June 1976. Anderson, P . J . , and W. W. Bodle, "Safety Considerations i n t h e Design and Operation of LNG Terminals." Paper presented a t t h e 4th Internat i o n a l LNG Conference, A1 g i e r s , A g e r i a , January 24-27, 1974. 1 Bolan, R. J . , "Safety and Design P r i o r i t i e s f o r LNG Import Terminals." P i p e l i n e and Gas J o u r n a l , pp. 46-56, June 1974. Brock, N . H . , and R . M. Howard, "Upgrading LNG P l a n t S a f e t y . " Paper presented a t t h e AGA Transmission conference, Bal Harbour, F l o r i d a , May 19-21, 1975. Crawford, D. B . , and R. A. Bergman, "Innovations Will Mark LNG Receiving Terminal." Oil and Gas J o u r n a l , August 5, 1974. Crawford, 0. B . , and G. P. Eschenbrenner, "Heat Transfer Equipment f o r LNG P r o j e c t s . " Chemical Engineering Progress, pp. 62-70, September 1972. DeVanna, L . , and G . Doulames, "Planning i s t h e Key t o LNG Tank Purging, Entry and Inspection. " Oil and Gas Journal , pp. 74-82, September 8 , 1975. Duckman, H . E., "LNG Import Terminal Design Considerations." and I n d u s t r i a l Gases. D D . 41-48. Se~tember/October. 1972. Cryogenics
Durr, C . A . , "Progress Techniques and Hardware Uses Out1 ined f o r LNG Regasi f i c a t i o n . " Oil and Gas J o u r n a l , May 13, 1974.
Durr, C. A . , and D. B. Crawford, "LNG Terminal Design." c e s s i ng, November 1973.
Hydrocarbon Pro-
Dzubak, Edward, "Cove Point: Nation's Largest LNG Receiving Terminal. " Pi pel i ne Industry, pp. 41 -45, February 1976. Hale, Dean, "LNG Scorecard." P i p e l i n e and Gas J o u r n a l , pp. 19-21, June 1968.
Hanke, C . C . , I . V . , LaFare and L i t z i n g e r , L . F . , "Purging LNG Tanks Into and O u t of Service Considerations and Experiences." Paper presented a t t h e AGA D i s t r i b u t i o n Conference, Minneapolis, Minnesota, Flay 6-8, 1974. Levy, M. M., "Cove Point Terminal Near Completion." J o u r n a l , DD. 35-40. June 1976. Levy, M. M . , "LNG Terminal W 11 Ease Gas Shortage." i pp. 133-1 36, June 21, 1976. P i p e l i n e and Gas Oi 1 and Gas Journal ,
LNG I n f o r m a t i o n Book, Prepared by t h e LNG I n f o r m a t i o n Book Task Group o f t h e L i q u e f i e d N a t u r a l Gas Committee, American Gas A s s o c i a t i o n , 1973. N a p o l i , R. N. D., "Design Needs f o r Base-Load LNG Storage, R e g a s i f i c a t i o n . " O i 1 and Gas J o u r n a l , pp. 67-70, October 22, 1973. S c h u l l e r , M. R., and J. C. Murphy, "LNG Storage Tanks f o r M e t r o p o l i t a n Areas." Paper presented a t t h e 4 t h I n t e r n a t i o n a l LNG Conference, A l g i e r s , A l g e r i a , January 24-27, 1974. Seroka, S., and R. J., Bolan, " S a f e t y Considerations i n t h e I n s t a l l a t i o n o f an LNG Tank." Cryogenics and I n d u s t r i a l Gases, pp. 22-28, September/October 1970. and M. K. Vora, "Worldwide LNG Survey C i t e s E x i s t i n g Planned Shaheen, E. I., P r o j e c t s . " O i l and Gas Journal , pp. 59-71 , June 20, 1977. Smith, L. R., "Submerged Pumps f o r LNG Sendout." D i s t r i b u t i o n Conference, 1968. Paper presented a t AGA
Uhl, A. E., L. A. Amoroso and R. H. S e i t e r , " S a f e t y and R e l i a b i l i t y o f LNG F a c i 1 it i e s . " Paper presented a t t h e ASME P e t r o l eum Mechanical E n g i n e e r i n g and Pressure Vessel and P i p i n g Conference, New Orleans, L o u i s i a n a , September 17-21 , 1972. Warner, V. A., " L i q u i f i e d N a t u r a l Gas F i r e C o n t r o l . " Paper presented a t t h e AGA Transmission Conference, Las Vegas, Nevada, May 3-5, 1976. Wesson, H. R. " C o n s i d e r a t i o n R e l a t i n g t o F i r e P r o t e c t i o n Requirements f o r LNG P l a n t s . " Paper presented a t t h e AGA Transmission Conference, Bal Harbour, F l o r i d a , [lay 19-21, 1975. W i s s m i l l e r , I.L., and E. 0. Mattocks, "How t o Use LNG S a f e l y . " and Gas J o u r n a l , Clarch 1972. World Wide LKG Market, p u b l i s h e d by F r o s t & S u l l i v a n , Inc., New York, June 1977. Pipeline
New York,
APPENDIX E FACILITY DESCRIPTION OF REFERENCE LNG PEAKSHAVING PLANT
APPENDIX E FACILITY DESCRIPTION OF REFERENCE LNG PEAKSHAVING PLANT L i q u e f i e d N a t u r a l Gas (LNG) peakshaving p l a n t s a r e one o f s e v e r a l means by which gas d i s t r i b u t i o n companies handle v a r i a t i o n s i n demand. e v e r y day o f t h e year. and seasonal v a r i a t i o n s . Minimum t r a n s m i s s i o n c o s t s r e s u l t when t h e p i p e l i n e s a r e operated a t o r near c a p a c i t y Demand f o r gas, however, i s s u b j e c t t o h o u r l y , d a i l y , To r e c o n c i l e these d i f f e r e n c e s , n a t u r a l gas i s LNG f a c i l i t i e s r e f e r r e d t o as
l i q u e f i e d d u r i n g t h e o f f season and s t o r e d u n t i l peak-demand p e r i o d s when i t i s r e v a p o r i z e d and d e l i v e r e d t o customers. peakshaving p l a n t s have a l i q u e f a c t i o n u n i t , s t o r a g e f a c i l i t i e s , and v a p o r i z e r s . Faci 1 it i e s used f o r peakshaving purposes t h a t have o n l y s t o r a g e and v a p o r i z a t i o n c a p a b i l i t i e s a r e r e f e r r e d t o as s a t e l l i t e s ; t h e y r e c e i v e LrjG, u s u a l l y by t r u c k , from a f a c i l i t y w i t h a l i q u e f a c t i o n u n i t (see Appendix F). LNG peakshaving o p e r a t i o n s a r e u s u a l l y based on a 240-daylyear l i q u e f a c t i o n c y c l e and a 120-day/year v a p o r i z a t i o n c y c l e . Liquefaction u n i t s are sized Vaporizers have t h e t o f i l l t h e s t o r a g e tanks over a p e r i o d o f 200-240 days.
c a p a c i t y t o empty t h e s t o r a g e tanks i n 5 t o 25 days o f continuous o p e r a t i o n . Normal o p e r a t i o n i n v o l v e s f i l l i n g and emptying t h e s t o r a g e tanks once p e r y e a r . Thus a peakshaving p l a n t operates i n t h r e e modes: and storage. p l a c e ( e x c e p t f o r b o i l o f f gases). I n t h e l i q u e f a c t i o n mode, gas i s taken from t h e p i p e l i n e and t r e a t e d t o remove water and C02. removal. T h i s i s t y p i c a l l y done by passing t h e gas through molec u l a r sieves, a l t h o u g h amine and o t h e r scrubbing processes a r e used f o r C02 A f t e r treatment, t h e gas i s l i q u e f i e d by c o o l i n g i t t o about -260F. Any o f s e v e r a l l i q u e f a c t i o n c y c l e s can be used depending on t h e r a t e o f l i q u e f a c t i o n , f e e d gas c o n d i t i o n s (composition, pressure, temperature), PIt 1o m an t i o n , and economic f a c t o r s . The cascade c y c l e was t h e f i r s t l i q u e f a c t i o n c y c l e . I n t h i s cycle, a series liquefaction, vaporization, I n t h e l a t t e r mode, n e i t h e r l i q u e f a c t i o n n o r v a p o r i z a t i o n takes
o f r e f r i g e r a n t s ( u s u a l l y propane, ethylene, and methane) a r e used t o c o o l t h e
t h e gas stepwise by heat exchange.
The use of a s e r i e s o f r e f r i g e r a n t s r e q u i r e s As
many separate pieces o f equipment such as compressors and heat exchangers. a r e t h e h i g h e s t o f any l i q u e f a c t i o n c y c l e .
a r e s u l t , i n i t i a l investment costs and maintenance costs f o r t h e cascade c y c l e Consequently, t h e cascade c y c l e has n o t been used f o r new peakshaving f a c i l i t i e s i n several years. Expander cycles apply t h e w e l l known Joule-Thompson o r s e l f - r e f r i g e r a t i o n e f f e c t by expanding a compressed gas i s e n t r o p i c a l l y through a t u r b i n e o r engine t o e x t r a c t work and simultaneously lower the temperature o f the gas. l e t down from transmission t o d i s t r i b u t i o n pressure. cool and l i q u e f y a separate gas stream. The mixed r e f r i g e r a n t cycle, a f u l l y developed and proven concept, i s considered t h e most economical and p r a c t i c a l f o r a wide range o f l i q u e f a c t i o n requirements. The process uses a s i n g l e mixed r e f r i g e r a n t c o n t a i n i n g v a r i o u s The use o f a s i n g l e compressor and fewer l i g h t hydrocarbons and n i t r o g e n . The expans i o n c y c l e i s u s u a l l y employed where considerable q u a n t i t i e s o f gas a r e being This energy can be used by expanding t h e gas through a t u r b i n e and using the low-temperature gas t o
heat exchangers i s l e s s c o s t l y than t h e conventional cascade process. The b a s i c components o f the cascade and mixed r e f r i g e r a n t cycles a r e : compressor(s) t o p r o v i d e the work r e q u i r e d t o t r a n s f e r heat from a 1ower temperature t o a higher temperature heat r e j e c t i o n system ( c o o l i n g tower o r a i r c o o l e r s ) heat exchanger(s) t o t r a n s f e r heat from t h e n a t u r a l gas t o the r e f r i g erant f l u i d . I n t h e expander cycle, the t u r b i n e replaces the compressors and t h e heat r e j e c t i o n equipment. The LNG, a t about -260F and s l i g h t l y above atmospheric pressure ( % I p s i g ) i s s t o r e d i n a double-walled cryogenic storage tank. nesium a l l o y . The i n n e r w a l l i s conThe space s t r u c t e d o f a cryogenic m a t e r i a l , u s u a l l y 9% n i c k e l s t e e l o r an aluminum magThe o u t e r tank i s t y p i c a l l y made of carbon s t e e l .
between t h e two w a l l s i s f i l l e d w i t h p e r l i t e , a g r a n u l a r i n s u l a t i o n m a t e r i a l . Surrounding t h e s t o r a g e t a n k i s a containment area, u s u a l l y formed by an e a r t h e n dike. T h i s area i s l a r g e enough t o c o n t a i n a1 1 t h e LNG i n t h e s t o r a g e tank i n the event o f f a i l u r e .
A small q u a n t i t y o f b o i l o f f gases r e s u l t s f r o m h e a t leakage i n t o t h e

tank. These gases a r e compressed and e i t h e r s e n t o u t t o t h e p i p e l i n e o r reliquefied. During p e r i o d s of peak demand, t h e LNG i s pumped o u t o f t h e t a n k and up t o p i p e l i n e p r e s s u r e and i s then f e d t o v a p o r i z e r s t o be heated and r e c o n v e r t e d t o gas before e n t e r i n g t h e p i p e l i n e . i n t o f o u r major categories: direct fired submerged combustion intermediate f l u i d ( i n d i r e c t f i r e d ) ambient a i r type. D i r e c t f i r e d u n i t s use f l u e gases from a b u r n e r t o heat a p r o d u c t c o i l . t a i n i n g the product c o i l s . t h e LNG. SubVaporizers f o r peakshaving p l a n t s f a l l
merged c o z ~ b u s t i o nv a p o r i z e r s bubble t h e f l u e gases through a water b a t h conI n t e r m e d i a t e f l u i d systems use a f i r e d h e a t e r t o h e a t a f l u i d t h a t i s pumped through separate h e a t exchangers t o v a p o r i z e Ambient a i r v a p o r i z e r s ( l a r g e p r o d u c t c o i l s exposed t o ambient cond i t i o n s ) a r e t h e s i m p l e s t t y p e b u t a r e s i g n i f i c a n t l y more expensive. Most peakshaving f a c i 1 it i e s a l s o have t h e c a p a b i l i t y o f s h i p p i n g and r e c e i v i n g LNG i n s p e c i a l l y designed c r y o g e n i c t r a i l e r s
The t r a i l e r s a r e
designed t o t r a n s p o r t LNG a t -260F and s l i g h t l y above atmospheric pressure. The t a n k c o n s i s t s o f an i n n e r vessel o f 5083 aluniinum and an o u t e r vessel o f carbon s t e e l . The annulus i s f i l l e d w i t h p e r l i t e and i s m a i n t a i n e d a t a p r e s s u r e of 50 microns t o i n s u l a t e t h e i n n e r vessel. pump i s used f o r f i l l i n g o p e r a t i o n s . t r u c k by t h e p r e s s u r e o f t h e vapor above t h e l i q u i d . of 10,500 g a l and weigh 60,000 I b s when f u l l . There a r e c u r r e n t l y over 50 peakshaving f a c i l i t i e s i n o p e r a t i o n i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , about 90% o f which a r e l o c a t e d ' i n t h e e a s t e r n h a l f o f t h e c o u n t r y .
A small (350 gpm) sendout

The t r u c k s have a c a p a c i t y
During unloading, LNG i s f o r c e d from t h e
Storage c a p a c i t i e s o f these f a c i l i t i e s range from 45,000 t o 630,000 b b l . A 6 t y p i c a l f a c i l i t y has l i q u e f a c t i o n c a p a c i t y o f 6.0 x 10 scfd, storage c a p a c i t y 6 6 o f 400,000 bbl (1400 x 10 s c f ) , and v a p o r i z a t i o n c a p a c i t y o f 135 x 10 scfd. Table E . l shows t h e percentages o f v a r i o u s types o f l i q u e f a c t i o n cycles, s t o r age tanks, and v a p o r i z a t i o n u n i t s used by U.S. TABLE E. 1. Liquefaction Cascade Expander
M i xed Refrigerant
peakshaving p l a n t s .
U. S. LNG Peakshaving Plants

Storage Vaporization 50% D i r e c t F i r e d 35%
15% 40%
9% Nickel
Aluminum Other
48% Submerged Combustion 46%

2% I n d i r e c t Fired
45%
16%
E. 1
BASIC PROCESS FLOW The b a s i c process f l o w f o r an LNG peakshaving f a c i l i t y i s described i n t h e
f o l lowing subsections.
The d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e LNG peakshaving f a c i l i t y was
developed u s i n g i n f o r m a t i o n from t h e sources l i s t e d i n Section E.5. E.l.l U n i t Operations
A b l o c k f l o w diagram o f an LNG peakshaving f a c i l i t y i s shown i n Figure E.1.

The major u n i t operations i n v o l v e d are gas treatment, l i q u e f a c t i o n , storage, v a p o r i z a t i o n , and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and t r a n s f e r . The gas treatment system c o n s i s t s o f two molecular sieve adsorbers and associated regeneration f a c i l i t i e s . molecular sieves remove water, n a t u r a l gas. An i n t e g r a t e d cascade r e f r i g e r a t i o n (ICR) process i s used f o r t h e 1 iquef a c t i o n cycle. gas. The adsorbers a l t e r n a t e operation, w i t h The one adsorber on l i n e a t a l l times w h i l e t h e o t h e r adsorber regenerates.
C02, and s u l f u r compounds from t h e incoming
A s i n g l e mixed r e f r i g e r a n t c o n s i s t i n g o f methane, ethylene,
propane, isobutane, pentane, and n i t r o g e n i s used t o 1 i q u e f y t h e n a t u r a l
NATURAL GAS FROM PIPELINE
GAS TREATMENT MOLECULAR SIEVES
GAS TO PIPELINE
I
REFRIGERANT COMPRESSOR LIQUEFACT lON INTEGRATED CASCADE REFRIGERATION 6 . 0 ~ 1 0SCFD ~
4
BOILOFF GASES 0 . 6 ~ 1 0SCFD ~
BOILOFF COMPRESSOR
1L
FLUE GAS
FUEL G A S - - ,
VAPORIZATION SUBMERGED COMBUST ION 225x10~ SCFD 5-15 d a y s l y r
200 dayslyr
REJECTION
STORAGE ABOVE GROUND ALUMINUM TANK 348, OW BBL
SEN DOUT PUMPS 1245 gpm
+ - &
AIR
LNG Peakshaving P l a n t
TRUCK F I LLING PUMP 350 gPm
LNG TRUCK 10, MO gal
I
FIGURE E.1.
B l o c k Flow Diagram
A f t e r l i q u e f a c t i o n , t h e LNG i s s t o r e d i n an aboveground, double-walled s t o r a g e tank. The i n n e r t a n k i s aluminum and t h e o u t e r t a n k i s carbon s t e e l . B o i l o f f gases a r e warmed e i t h e r i n t h e l i q u e f a c P e r l i t e i n s u l a t i o n between t h e w a l l 2 reduces i n - l e a k a g e o f h e a t and l i m i t s p r o d u c t i o n o f b o i l o f f gases. and r e t u r n e d t o t h e pipe1 i n e . Submersible LNG pumps draw on t h e s t o r a g e tank, pump t h e LNG t o p i p e l i n e pressure, and send i t t o t h e v a p o r i z e r s . The v a p o r i z e r s a r e submerged combustion u n i t s . exchanger t u b i n g . A gas b u r n e r heats a t i o n u n i t o r i n t h e i r own h e a t exchangers, compressed t o p i p e l i n e pressure,
w a t e r b a t h which i n t u r n heats and vaporizes t h e LNG p a s s i n g through t h e The gas from t h e v a p o r i z e r s i s then f e d i n t o t h e p i p e l i n e . The
Truck l o a d i n g and u n l o a d i n g i s performed on an as-needed b a s i s . t r u c k t r a i l e r s a r e double-walled, o p e r a t i n g pressure o f 70 p s i g .
i n s u l a t e d , c r y o g e n i c tankers w i t h a design Because o f t h e e x c e l l e n t i n s u l a t i o n , t r i p s up
t o 4 weeks l o n g w i t h no l o s s o f p r o d u c t a r e p o s s i b l e . E.1.2 Flow Rates and O p e r a t i n g C o n d i t i o n s The I C R l i q u e f a c t i o n u n i t has a c a p a c i t y o f 6.0 x bbl/day. f o r 200 t o 240 d a y s l y e a r f r o m s p r i n g through f a l l .
lob
s c f d o r 1710
The p l a n t operates i n t h e l i q u e f a c t i o n mode a t o r near t h i s c a p a c i t y The n a t u r a l gas e n t e r s After
t h e m o l e c u l a r s i e v e adsorbers a t 500 p s i a and ambient temperature. and then l e t down t o 1 p s i g as i t e n t e r s t h e s t o r a g e tank. operates a t about 1 p s i g and -260F. f u l l t a n k volume: 0.6 x
treatment, i t i s c o o l e d and l i q u e f i e d i n t h e c r y o g e n i c h e a t exchangers t o -260F The s t o r a g e t a n k B o i l o f f gases average 0.052 o f
Flash gas produced when t h e 6 LNG i s l e t down t o s t o r a g e t a n k pressure i s 0.3 x 10 scfd, thus t h e t o t a l o f f 6 gas p r o d u c t i o n d u r i n g l i q u e f a c t i o n i s approximately 0.9 x 10 s c f d . The c o l d s c f d o r 170 bbl/day. b o i l o f f gases pass through a s e r i e s o f heat exchangers t o cool t h e r e f r i g e r a n t f o r l i q u e f a c t i o n and t o warm t h e b o i l o f f gases; i f t h e l i q u e f a c t i o n u n i t i s n o t working, t h e b o i l o f f gases a r e warmed by t h e i r own heat exchangers. p i p e l ine. The b o i l o f f i s t h e n compressed t o p i p e l i n e pressure, cooled, and s e n t o u t t o t h e
lo6
During t h e w i n t e r season t h e p l a n t operates i n a h o l d i n g mode u n t i l a p e r i o d o f peak demand. on demand.

A t t h i s time the LNG i s pumped from t h e tanks t o pipe-
l i n e pressure (870 p s i g ) a t r a t e s up t o 1245 gpm (43,000 b b l / d a y ) depending The LNG goes t o the v a p o r i z e r s where i t i s vaporized and warmed t o approximately 60F b e f o r e e n t e r i n g t h e pipe1 ine. The f o u r v a p o r i z e r s 6 have a t o t a l c a p a c i t y o f 300 x 10 s c f d (86,000 b b l l d a y ) ; however, one v a p o r i z e r 6 i s a spare so t h e c a p a c i t y of t h e p l a n t i s considered t o be 225 x 10 s c f d (65,000 b b l l d a y ) . The v a p o r i z e r s r e q u i r e f u e l e q u i v a l e n t t o 1.5% t o 2 .O% o f t h e LNG vaporized. The p l a n t operates i n t h e v a p o r i z a t i o n mode f o r up t o 20 days/year, w i t h 10 t o 1 2 days being average. Trucking a c t i v i t y v a r i e s g r e a t l y from p l a n t t o p l a n t . u s u a l l y i n t h e s p r i n g and summer. 12,800 g a l l o n s . E.2 Some f a c i 1it i e s
t r u c k LNG r a r e l y , i f ever; others s h i p o r r e c e i v e LNG on a f a i r l y r e g u l a r basis, Gross t r u c k c a p a c i t i e s range from 10,500 t o The normal r a t e f o r f i l l i n g and emptying i s 350 gpm.
PLANT LAYOUT
A p l o t p l a n f o r the f a c i l i t y i s shown i n F i g u r e E.2.

o f equipment and t h e v a r i o u s s a f e t y f e a t u r e s a r e shown. from t h i s p l o t p l a n i n c l u d e :
a
a
A l l t h e major pieces
Key items t o note
storage tank impoundment area-- 110,000 f t average d i k e h e i g h t - - 17 f t
minimum d i s t a n c e from storage tank t o p l a n t boundary-- 350 f t

a
minimum d i s t a n c e from major equipment ( v a p o r i z e r s ) t o p l a n t boundary-- 100 f t minimum d i s t a n c e from storage tank t o major equipment ( c o l d box)-- 325 f t .
The s a f e t y f e a t u r e s shown i n the f i g u r e w i l l be discussed i n l a t e r s e c t i o n s w i t h t h e v a r i o u s processes t o whi ch they a r e r e l a t e d . E.3 PROCESS DESCRIPTION The b a s i c processes i n v o l v e d i n t h e peakshavi ng f a c i l i t y a r e described i n d e t a i l i n t h e f o l l o w i n g subsections.
DETECTORS GD GAS UV FLAME LTD LOW TEMPERATURE FlRE PROTECTION H HALON WT WATER TURRU FH FlRE HYDRANT DC DRY CHEMICAL C02 CARBON DIOXIDE HEF HIGH-EXPANSION FOAM
D l STANCES CONTROL ROOM TO COMPRESSOR BLDG CONTROL ROOM TO COLD BOX CONTROL ROOM TO VAPOR1 ZERS COLD BOX TO VAPOR1 ZERS STORAGE TANK TO COLD BOX STORAGE TANK TO PLANT BOUNDARY (S) STORAGE TANK TO PLANT BOUNDARY (E) STORAGE TANK TO PLANT BOUNDARY (N) VAPORIZER TO PLANT BOUNDARY (N) CONTROL ROOM TO PLANT BOUNDARY (W)
I I
VAPORIZER LIQUEFACTION UNIT (COLD BOX)
TRUCK TERMINAL
I I I I I I 1 I I I I I
TO PIPELINE GAS ABSORBERS WATER STORAGE COMPRESSOR BUILDING REFR l GERANT COMPRESSOR BOILOFF COMPRESSOR PUMPHOUSE
u
FIGURE E.2.
CONTROL ROOM
LNG P e a k s h a v i n g P l a n t
Plot Plan
Gas Treatment
1 I I I I I
I
The gas treatment system, described in detail here, prepares incoming natural gas from the pipeline f o r liquefaction by removing impurities such as water and C02. E.3.1.1 Equipment f o r Gas Treatment
The gas treatment system consists of an i n l e t separator, a moisture and C02 removal unit (molecular s i e v e s ) , and a regeneration gas system (heater, coolers, and compressor). A flow diagram f o r the gas treatment system i s shown in Figure E.3. (Flow diagram symbols are defined in Appendix H . ) Associated process conditions and equipment identifications are given in Table E.2. Gas from the pipeline f i r s t enters a f i l t e r separator, V-101, t h a t removes any free liquids present. of gas. The gas then goes to the molecular sieve adsorbers.
6
I I I
I
I
There are two adsorbers, V-102A and B y each capable of handling 12.3 x 1 0 One adsorber i s on l i n e while the other i s regenerating.
scfd
The adsorber From the
vessels are designed t o the l a t e s t ASME pressure vessel code f o r an operating pressure of 870 psia. f o r regeneration. They are packed with molecular sieve type 4A. adsorbers, part of the gas goes to the liquefaction unit and the r e s t i s used The regeneration gas heater, E-101, i s a gas-fired, s a l t bath The regeneration gas unit capable of heating the regeneration gas t o 550F.
compressor, C-101, compresses the gas back to pipeline pressure, and two fin-fan coolers, E-102 and 103, cool the gas before i t i s returned t o the pipeline.
E . 3.1 . 2
Reaenerati on Procedure
To regenerate an adsorber, clean gas from the adsorber that i s on l i n e i s heated t o 550F in E-101 and then passed through the adsorber being
regenerated. Total gas flow t o the adsorber on l i n e i s ~ 1 2 . 3 MMscfd. O t h i s , f 6.3 MMscfd goes t o the liquefaction unit and ~ 6 . 0 MMscfd i s used f o r regeneration. The hot gas removes the impurities collected in the adsorber and then i s f i l t e r e d in V-104 and cooled in E-102, with the resulting liquids separated in V-105. The gas i s then compressed by C-101, cooled in E-103, and sent t o The regeneration cycle, one hour on l i n e and one hour regenerathe pipeline.
t i n g , i s automatically controlled by timers and switches in a locally mounted panel.
GAS
V-103 ADSORBER GAS FILTER
FIGURE E.3.
Gas Treatment Section Process F l o w Diagram
TABLE E. 2.
Stream I d e n t i f i c a t i o n
ID - Description
Gas Treatment S e c t i o n
Temperature (OF) Phase ( % L o r V) F l o w Rate (MMscfd)
Pressure ( p s i a )
Feed Gas f r o m P i p e l ine
500
65
100% V : 94.0% C , 2.0% N ; H 2.8% C2H6; .o% C02; 1 .O% C3H8
12.3
B
1 2
Feed Gas t o L i q u e f a c t i o n Regeneration Gas t o Adsorber Regeneration Gas t o Pipe1 i n e
485 485 870
68 550 120
100% V 100% V 100% V : 93% CHq; 2% N2; 2% C2Hg; 2% C02; 1% C3H8
6.3 6.0 6.0
Equipment I d e n t i f i c a t i o n C-101 E-101 E-102 E-103 V-101 V-102 V-103 V-104 V-105 Regeneration Gas Compressor Regeneration Gas H e a t e r Regeneration Gas C o o l e r Regeneration Gas C o o l e r Feed Gas F i l t e r S e p a r a t o r
A / B Adsorbers
Adsorber Gas F i l t e r Regeneration Gas F i l t e r Regeneration Gas S e p a r a t o r
E. 3.2
Liquefaction The 1 i q u e f a c t i o n system, which c o o l s and condenses t h e n a t u r a l gas f o r
s t o r a g e , i s d e s c r i b e d here. E.3.2.1 L i q u e f a c t i o n Cycle
R e f r i g e r a t i o n f o r t h e l i q u e f a c t i o n u n i t i s p r o v i d e d by an i n t e g r a t e d cascade r e f r i g e r a t i on (ICR) mixed r e f r i g e r a n t c y c l e . The e s s e n t i a l f u n c t i o n o f gas condensation b y The cont h i s c y c l e i s t o p r o v i d e p r o g r e s s i v e gas c o o l i n g ( i .e.,
s u c c e s s i v e c o o l ing s t a g e s ) u s i n g a mu1 t i p l e-component r e f r i g e r a n t . v a p o r i z a t i o n p r e s s u r e ($47 p s i a ) . t a k e s p l a c e a t each stage.
d e n s a t i o n p r e s s u r e i s e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same f o r a l l stages ($490 p s i a ) as i s t h e P a r t i a l condensation o f t h e r e f r i g e r a n t The r e s u l t i n g l i q u i d i s t h e n r e v a p o r i z e d a t t h e
1ower p r e s s u r e , t h u s 1o w e r i ng t h e temperature.
The c o m p o s i t i o n o f t h e r e f r i g e r a n t i s a d j u s t e d so t h a t t h e successive p a r t i a l condensations e x a c t l y correspond t o t h e amount of c o l d r e q u i r e d by t h e n e x t stage downstream. Thus, t h e r e f r i g e r a n t ' s v a p o r i z a t i o n c u r v e c l o s e l y f o l The design composition o f t h e 8.0% C3H8, 7.1% iC4HIO, and 40.8% C2H4, lows t h e l i q u e f a c t i o n c u r v e o f t h e r a t u r a l gas. r e f r i g e r a n t i s 4.3% N2, 26.3% CH4, 13.5% nC5H12. The process f l o w diagram f o r t h e l i q u e f a c t i o n u n i t i s shown i n F i g u r e E.4. Table E.3 l i s t s t h e m a j o r streams shown i n t h e f i g u r e , g i v i n g t h e design f l o w r a t e , t h e phase ( l i q u i d o r vapor), and t h e o p e r a t i n g temperature and p r e s s u r e o f each stream. The t r e a t e d n a t u r a l gas from t h e adsorbers i s p r o g r e s s i v e l y TABLE E.3.
Stream I d e n t i f i c a t i o n ID - Description 3 4 5 6 B C D E R e f r i g e r a n t a t C-221 Suction C-221 Discharge C-222 D i s c h a r g e R e f r i g e r a n t Return Gas f r o m Absorbers V-102 A/B LNG t o S t o r a g e T-301 B o i l o f f Gas f r o m T-301 B o i l o f f Gas t o B o i l o f f Compressor C-501 Equipment I d e n t i f i c a t i o n C-221 C-222 1 s t Stage R e f r i g e r a t i o n Compressor 2nd Stage R e f r i g e r a t i o n Compressor Cold Box Heat Exchanger Cold Box Heat Exchanger Cold Box Heat Exchanger Cold Box Heat Exchanger Cold Box Heat Exchanger Cold Box Heat Exchanger Cold Box Heat Exchanger Cold Box Heat Exchanger Cold Box Heat Exchanger (a)E-201 , 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 21 1, 21 2, 21 3 and V-201 r e d t o as E-200, Cold Box. E-221 E-222 I n t e r s t a g e Cooler A f t e r Cooler Pressure ( p s i a )
Liquefaction Section
Temperature
( O F )
Phase ( % L o r V)
Flow Rate (MMscfd)
(a)~-2~1 Cold Box S e p a r a t o r V-202 V-203 V-204 V-205 V-221 V-222 Cold Box S e p a r a t o r Cold Box S e p a r a t o r Cold Box S e p a r a t o r Low Pressure R e f r i g e r a n t S e p a r a t o r I n t e r s t a g e Cooler Separator A f t e r Cooler S e p a r a t o r
, 202,
203, 204, a r e c o l l e c t i v e l y r e f e r -
f-2Ul
COLD BOX
- --
- - - - - - ,
J
L i q u e f a c t i o n Section Process Flow Diagram
FIGURE E - 4 .
E-15
cooled i n exchangers E-206, E-205, and E-204; l i q u e f i e d i n exchanger E-203; and subcooled i n exchangers E-202 and E-201. storage tank. s t o r a g e pressure. The mixed r e f r i g e r a n t i s compressed, cooled, and p a r t i a l l y condensed i n a two-stage compression c y c l e . The vapor phase i s c o o l e d and p a r t i a l l y condensed The l i q u i d phase, which i s i n each o f t h e exchangers E-201 through E-206. The r e s u l t i n g LNG i s t h e n s e n t t o t h e The s u b c o o l i n g minimizes f l a s h gas when t h e LNG i s l e t down t o
separated from t h e vapor a f t e r each p a r t i a l condensation, i s subcooled i n exchangers E-201 through E-206 and a l s o i n exchangers E-211 t h r o u g h E-213, a f t e r which i t i s expanded i n t o t h e s h e l l s i d e o f an exchanger (E-201 through E-206) t o p r o v i d e r e f r i g e r a t i o n t o c o o l t h e incoming, tube-side streams. E-213. Each exchanger E-202 t h r o u g h E-206 has 5 streams passing t h r o u g h i t (see S e c t i o n E.3.2.2 f o r a d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e exchangers). On t h e tube s i d e t h e r e a r e four streams: separator. 500 p s i a ) . t h e n a t u r a l gas ( v a p o r o r l i q u i d ) , two streams o f r e f r i g e r a n t Cold b o i l o f f gases from t h e s t o r a g e t a n k p r o v i d e t h e c o o l i n g i n exchangers E-211 through
l i q u i d s from s e p a r a t o r s o r o t h e r exchangers, and r e f r i g e r a n t vapor from a The t u b e s i d e o f t h e exchanger operates a t h i g h e r pressures (400On t h e s h e l l s i d e , which operates a t l o w e r pressure (40-50 p s i a ) , The f i n a l exchanger,
r e f r i g e r a n t l i q u i d i s expanded t o a gas t o p r o v i d e c o o l i n g . subcooled and t h e vapor from t h e l a s t separator, V-201. of E-201.
E-201, has o n l y two streams on t h e t u b e side, t h e l i q u e f i e d n a t u r a l gas t o be The vapor from V-201 i s c o o l e d and condensed i n E-202 and E-201 and then expanded i n t o t h e s h e l l s i d e The l i q u e f i e d n a t u r a l gas from E-201 goes t o t h e s t o r a g e t a n k (T-301) where i t i s l e t down t o s t o r a g e pressure ( 1 p s i g ) E.3.2.2 L i q u e f a c t i o n Equipment
The l i q u e f a c t i o n u n i t i s comprised o f a c o l d box, r e f r i g e r a n t compressor and c o o l e r s , and r e f r i g e r a n t storage. V-201 t h r o u g h V-204, Major c o l d box equipment i n c l u d e s n i n e heat exchangers, E-201 through E-206 and E-211 through E-213, f o u r vessels, and a s s o c i a t e d p i p i n g and i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n a l l surrounded The d o t t e d l i n e on by p e r l i t e i n s u l a t i o n and enclosed i n a s t e e l s h e l l . F i g u r e E.4 i n d i c a t e s t h e boundaries o f t h e c o l d box.
The heat exchangers a r e t h e spiral-wound type, w i t h aluminum t u b i n g wound on a c e n t e r mandrel as shown i n F i g u r e E.5. sheets a t each end. The tubes a r e a t t a c h e d t o tubeThe tubesheets and t h e The number o f tubesheets depends on t h e number o f process
streams handled on t h e tube s i d e o f t h e exchanger. c o n n e c t i n g p i p i n g and v a l v e s i n t h e c o l d box. also stainless steel.
s h e l l surrounding t h e w i n d i n g a r e made o f s t a i n l e s s s t e e l , as a r e a l l t h e i n t e r A1 1 t h e s e p a r a t o r v e s s e l s a r e f o r a descripThe h e a t exchangers and vessels a r e surrounded by The cold-box she1 1, made o f carbon s t e e l , has
gaseous-ni trogen-purged p e r l it e i n s u l a t i o n (see S e c t i o n E.3.3.1 t i o n o f p e r l it e i n s u l a t i o n ) . approximate dimensions o f 1 3 ' x 1 2 ' x 6 0 '
SHELL IN
PASS OUT
PASS IN
SHELL OUT
FIGURE E.5.
Spiral-Wound Heat Exchanger
The r e f r i g e r a n t recycle compressor i s a two-stage, electric-motor-driven, centrifugal compressor w i t h 4500 brake horsepower. The compressor, geardrive, motor, and o i l coolers a r e mounted on a common baseplate and located i n the compressor building. To minimize leakage, the compressor i s equipped with a special seal t h a t a l s o provides positive shutoff d u r i n g shutdown conditions. Two fin-fan heat exchangers provide i n t e r s t a g e and after-cooling f o r the r e f r i g e r a n t compressor. These exchangers consist of a carbon s t e e l , finned tube bundle through which the r e f r i g e r a n t flows and an electric-motor-driven, two-speed, induced-draft fan t h a t draws a i r over the bundles t o cool the refrigerant. Refrigerant storage c a p a c i t i e s f o r the plant a r e : liquid nitrogen storage -- 0.6 MMscf equivalent gas capacity pentane make-up storage -- 3500 gallon capacity isobutane make-up storage -- 1500 gallon capacity propane make-up storage -- 2500 gallon capacity ethylene make-up storage -- 10,000 gallon capacity cycle f l u i d storage -- 3000 gallon capacity. Control Sys tem
An interlocking system of controls regulates the liquefaction system and determines the LNG product temperature. The liquefaction u n i t normally operates a t f u l l capacity, b u t i f the flow of LNG i s reduced, the u n i t c o n t r o l l e r s a d j u s t the system parameters t o maintain the desired o u t l e t temperature. The r a t e of LNG production varies depending on the ambient temperature and the corresponding amount of heat leakage i n t o the system.
E. 3.2.4
Procedures
I n i t i a l Startup and Cooldown. To begin the cooldown process, the liquef a c t i o n system i s charged w i t h r e f r i g e r a n t and the r e f r i g e r a n t compressor i s operated on t o t a l recycle t o check out the controls and instrumentation. A small r e f r i g e r a n t flow i s then s t a r t e d t o the cold box. As the cold box cools down, progressively more r e f r i g e r a n t i s allowed t o c i r c u l a t e through the system. When the cold box i s s u f f i c i e n t l y cool, natural gas flow i s s t a r t e d .
I f t h e s t o r a g e t a n k i s n o t a l r e a d y cooled down, t h e i n i t i a l l i q u e f a c t i o n r a t e i s l i m i t e d t o ensure proper c o o l i n g o f t h e t a n k (see S e c t i o n E.3.3.5). I f t h e t a n k i s a l r e a d y c o o l , t h e c o l d box can be cooled down and maximum l i q u e f a c t i o n r a t e s reached i n 4 t o 8 hours. Shutdown. Shutdown o f t h e l i q u e f a c t i o n u n i t i s instantaneous a f t e r pushing R e f r i g e r a n t f l o w stops and n a t u r a l gas and LNG The i s designed
t h e compressor s t o p b u t t o n .
f l o w a r e stopped almost immediately by t h e o u t l e t temperature c o n t r o l . s u c t i o n s i d e o f t h e compressor, i n c l u d i n g t h e s u c t i o n p o t V-205, S e t t l e - o u t pressure i s approximately 170 p s i a .
t o handle t h e r e f r i g e r a n t i n v e n t o r y a t ambient temperature w i t h o u t v e n t i n g . Startup o f the r e f r i g e r a n t l o o p from t h e s e t t l e - o u t c o n d i t i o n i s v i r t u a l l y instantaneous. upon how l o n g t h e u n i t was s h u t down ( i .e.
LNG p r o d u c t i o n
can reach f u l l c a p a c i t y anywhere from 112 t o 4 hours a f t e r s t a r t u p , depending
, how much cooldown i s r e q u i r e d ) .
The l i q u e f a c t i o n u n i t i s connected t o t h e einergency shutdown system, which i s d e s c r i b e d i n S e c t i o n E.4.1.

E. 3.2.5
Re1 ease P r e v e n t i o n and C o n t r o l Systems t h e f o l l o w i n g d e t e c t o r s , alarms, and
As shown p r e v i o u s l y i n F i g u r e E.2,
f i r e p r o t e c t i o n equipment a r e l o c a t e d i n t h e l i q u e f a c t i o n area: combustible gas d e t e c t o r s (see S e c t i o n E.3.4.4

0
f o r detector operation)
low temperature d e t e c t o r s w i t h alarms i n c o n t r o l room

UV f i r e d e t e c t o r s which a u t o m a t i c a l l y a c t i v a t e t h e Master Emergency Shut-
down system ( S e c t i o n E.4.1)
and a l a r m i n c o n t r o l room
20# d r y chemical f i r e e x t i n g u i s h e r f i r e hydrant. The r e f r i g e r a n t compressor i s l o c a t e d i n t h e compressor b u i l d i n g ( a l o n g w i t h t h e b o i l o f f compressor and r e g e n e r a t i o n gas compressor) n e x t t o t h e c o l d box. T h i s b u i l d i n g has t h e f o l l o w i n g d e t e c t o r s , alarms, and f i r e p r o t e c t i o n equipment: c o m b u s t i b l e gas d e t e c t o r s i n each c o r n e r o f t h e b u i l d i n g low temperature d e t e c t o r s w i t h alarms i n c o n t r o l b u i l d i n g
Halon f i r e e x t i n g u i s h i n g system (see S e c t i o n E.3.4.4
f o r description)
UV f i r e d e t e c t o r s which a u t o m a t i c a l l y a c t i v a t e t h e Halon system and t h e
Master Emergency Shutdown system ( S e c t i o n E.4.1) #20 d r y chemical f i r e e x t i n g u i s h e r f i r e hydrant adjacent t o the building.
When t h e combustible gas c o n c e n t r a t i o n i n t h e b u i l d i n g reaches 25% o f t h e l o w e r f l a m m a b i l i t y l i m i t (LFL), an a l a r m i n t h e c o n t r o l room i s a c t i v a t e d (see S e c t i o n E.3.4.4 f o r further details)
H i g h - r a t e v e n t i l a t i n g fans t u r n on auto-
m a t i c a l l y t o reduce t h e gas c o n c e n t r a t i o n .
I f t h e gas c o n c e n t r a t i o n reaches
60% o f LFL, another a l a r m i n t h e c o n t r o l room i s a c t i v a t e d , t h e fans a r e s h u t
down, b u i l d i n g openings ( l o u v e r e d windows) a r e closed, and t h e Halon system i s discharged, a l l a u t o m a t i c a l l y . t h e atmosphere. E.3.3 LNG Storage The LNG i s s t o r e d a t t h e f a c i l i t y u n t i l needed. r e l a t e d equipment a r e d e s c r i b e d i n d e t a i l below. The process f l o w diagram f o r t h e s t o r a g e s e c t i o n i s shown i n F i g u r e E.6. Associated process c o n d i t i o n s and equipment i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s a r e g i v e n i n Table E.4. E.3.3.1 Storage Tank double-walled, aboveThe s t o r a g e system and The Halon f l o o d s t h e b u i l d i n g and i n e r t s
Storage f o r t h e f a c i l i t y i s a standard f l a t - b o t t o m ,
ground LNG s t o r a g e t a n k w i t h a c a p a c i t y o f 348,000 b b l as shown i n F i g u r e E.7. The i n n e r t a n k i s c o n s t r u c t e d o f aluminum-magnesium a l l o y AA5083. magnesium a1 l o y s , 9% n i c k e l s t e e l AluminumCarbon
, and
300-series s t a i n l e s s s t e e l s a1 1 possess
e x c e l l e n t low temperature d u c t i l i t y and can be used f o r t h e i n n e r tank. tank. tively.
s t e e l , which has a v e r y poor low temperature d u c t i l i t y , i s used f o r t h e o u t e r The diameters o f t h e i n n e r and o u t e r tanks a r e 164 f t and 173 ft, respecThe space between t h e t a n k w a l l s i s f i l l e d w i t h expanded p e r l i t e , an The
i n o r g a n i c , nonflammable, l i g h t w e i g h t i n s u l a t i o n produced from s p e c i a l rock. r o c k o r o r e i s f i n e l y ground and then expanded i n furnaces a t about 2000F (1100C). The per1 i t e i s expanded o n s i t e and placed i n t h e i n s u l a t i o n space
x
BOl LOFF FROM COLDBOX
6 0 1 LOFF FROM COLDBOX
1~2
E - 301 BOILOFF HEAT EXCHANGER
FROM COMPRESSER INTERSTAGE
F i g u r e E.6.
Storage Section P r o c e s s F l o w Diagram
LNG FROM E-200
TABLE E.4.
Stream I d e n t i f i c a t i o n Pressure ( p s i a )
Storage S e c t i o n
Temperature (OF) Phase ( % L o r V) Flow Rate (MMscfd)
!3 C
Description LNG from E-200 B o i l o f f Gas from T-301 S o i l o f f Gas f r o m E-200 B o i l o f f Gas t o P i p e l i n e L!iG t o V-401 15.8 15.8 15.1 870 900 -257 -229 97 120 -257 Equipment I d e n t i f i c a t i o n 95.7% L 4.3% V 1O O W 100% 6.0 0.3 0.9 0.9 0.9 150 ( o r 1245 gpm)
D E
F G
100% V 1OO%L
C-301 A/B E-301 A l B E-302 ?-301A/B/C 1-301
B o i l o f f Conipressors Aftercoole r LNG Sendout Pumps LNG S t o r a g e Tank
2 Stage
PRCA-301
S t o r a g e Tank P r e s s u r e C o n t r o l l e r B o i l o f f Gas Temperature C o n t r o l l e r s
B o i l o f f Heat Exchangers
ITC-301 A/B
PIC-302 A/B/C LNG Pump D i s c h a r g e Pressure C o n t r o l l e r PS-301 S t o r a g e Tank Underpressure S w i t c h
while hot.
A r e s i l i e n t f i b e r g l a s s b l a n k e t 12 inches t h i c k i s a t t a c h e d t o t h e
o u t s i d e o f t h e i n n e r t a n k w a l l t o p r o t e c t t h e p e r l i t e from excess p r e s s u r e due t o expansion and c o n t r a c t i o n o f t h e tank w a l l s (see F i g u r e E.8). c o n d u c t i v i t y o f p e r l i t e i n a methane atmosphere i s 0.25 B t u - i n . / h r The o u t e r tank has a lap-welded, dome-shaped, s t e e l r o o f . h e i g h t t o t h e t o p o f t h e dome i s 134 f t . tank, as shown i n F i g u r e E.9. The thermal f t 2 OF.
Total tank
Suspended from t h e r o o f f r a m i n g o f Perlite
t h e o u t e r tank i s a lap-welded metal deck t h a t serves as a c e i l i n g f o r t h e i n n e r The h e i g h t o f t h e i n n e r t a n k i s 97 ft. i n s u l a t i o n i s spread evenly o v e r t h e deck. t o keep t h e i n s u l a t i o n d r y . Open p i p e vents a r e i n s t a l l e d i n
t h e deck t o a l l o w p r o d u c t vapor t o c i r c u l a t e f r e e l y i n t h e i n s u l a t i o n space Superheated vapors remain s t r a t i f i e d i n t h e upper The butt-welded o u t e r space, w h i l e c o l d e r , s a t u r a t e d vapors a r e below t h e deck. t h e t a n k i n s u l a t i o n as w e l l as an a i r - t i g h t s e a l . The i n n e r tank s i t s on l o a d - b e a r i n g i n s u l a t i o n t h a t c a r r i e s t h e w e i g h t o f t h e c o n t e n t s t o t h e f o u n d a t i o n (see Figures E. 10 and E . l l ) . and i s n o t s u b j e c t t o s i g n i f i c a n t s t r e s s . The bottom o f t h e t a n k i s a t h i n s e c t i o n o f aluminum a l l o y AA5083 t h a t serves o n l y as a seal The l o a d - b e a r i n g i n s u l a t i o n r e s t s on
s t e e l s h e l l and lap-welded s t e e l r o o f p r o v i d e permanent weather p r o t e c t i o n f o r
SAFETY VALVES 8 PIPING CONNECTIONS

\
DIMENSIONS: INSULATION DECK INNER TANK DIAMETER OUTER TANK DIAMETER INNER TANK HE l GHT EXPANDED PERLITE OUTER TANK HEIGHT
RE5 ILIENT BLANKET
BOTTOM INSULATION NOTES: CAPACITY MATERIALS:
- 268.000 66L DESIGN PRESSURE INTERNAL - 1.0 prig EXTERNAL - 102

DESIGN EMRRATURE WIND LOAD 100 mph EARTHQUAKE ZONE 2, a 7 g 0 SPECIFICATIONS A P I 620
LIQUID CONTAINER
- 5083 ALUMINUM
INSULATION SUPPORT DECK OUTER TANK
- 5083 ALUMINUM
- INTERNAL -2604
M C K INSULATION PI-40 PERLITE B O l l O M INSUUTION
- A131 CARBON STEEL -
- FOAM GLASS
S M L L INSULATION - PI-40 PTRLlTE AND F I B E R W S S
FIGURE E.7.
LNG Storage Tank D e t a i l s
LAP WELDED STEEL ROOF
OUTER TANK
\
RES l L l ENT BLANKET
$... ...............:.,:;.;:::::: ..,.,., :... :,
(.....................
\\
SUSPENDED INSULATION DECK BUTT WELDED OUTER + STEEL SHELL

.::.::::.. ...
..:.:
FIGURE E.8.
R e s i l i e n t Blanket i n Annular Space Between Walis o f LNG Storage Tank FIGURE E.9. LNG Storage Tank Suspended I n s u l a t i o n Deck
OU BLE WALL TANK
OUTER
H l GH LOAD BEAR lNG BLOCKS
LOAD BEARING INSULATION
ANCHOR
WELDED PLATE VAPOR BARRIER
FIGURE E. 10. Load Bearing I n s u ' l a t i o n and Anchor B o l t s
STORAGE TANK
1
ANCHORAGE
LOAD BEARING INSULATION
SAND LEVEL l N G CUSHION
HEATING COILS
FIGURE E. 11.
COURSE
Storage Tank Foundation Detai 1s
a concrete ringwall foundation around the perimeter and on a compacted soil foundation in the middle. Electrical resistance heating c o i l s are embedded in the foundation soil to prevent freezing of moisture and possible "heaving". There are two s e t s of anchor bolts in the ring wall, one s e t connected t o the outer tank wall and the other connected to the inner tank wall. These bolts hold down the tank against l i f t i n g forces resulting from internal pressure, b u t permit the vessel to move readily in response t o thermal displacements. Table E.5 shows the i n l e t and o u t l e t connections and f i t t i n g s f o r the tank. The major connections are the i n l e t and o u t l e t liquid lines a t the bottom of the inner tank, the vapor o u t l e t a t the top of the inner tank, and the r e l i e f vents a t the top of the outer tank. All f i t t i n g s which carry cold gases or liquids and pass through the outer carbon steel tank are provided with "distance pieces." These protect the outer she1 1 from b r i t t l e fracture by dissipating cold before i t reaches the carbon s t e e l .
TABLE E.5. I tem Description Vapor Outlet Liquid Level Float Gage Overfill Indicator Liquid F i l l Line
Storage Tank Connections and Fittings Location Top inner tank Top inner tank Top inner tank Bottom inner tank 3-in., s p i l l s into 4-in. downcomer/ standpipe 12-in. l i n e with 12-in. internal valve T o 12-in. pressure w r e l i e f valves T o 12-in. vacuum w re1 i ef val ves Size and Fittings
8 in.
---
Liquid Outlet Lines Access Manhole Relief Vent Pressure Vacuum Breather Vent Insulation F i l l Holes
Bottom inner tank (with vortex breakers) Top outer tank Top outer tank Top outer tank Top outer tank Bottom inner tank Top inner tank Top inner tank Top inner tank Top inner tank Top inner tank Bottom outer tank
Pump Liquid Recirculation Line

Vapor Return Line Liquid Level (Displacer Type) Liquid Level (D.P. Gage Thermocoupl e High Level Alarm Purge Ring E.3.3.2
Pressure Control System
The storage tank has a design operating pressure of 1 psig and a design maximum pressure of 2 psig. The maximum external pressure i s 1 oz gauge. The pressure in the tank i s controlled by adjusting the boiloff compressor recycle r a t e .
The boiloff compressors a r e multi-stage, horizontal reciprocating compressors f o r continuous compression of boiloff and f l a s h gases.
6
Each compressor has a capacity of 1 . 2 x 10 scfd and discharges i n t o the pipeline a t approximately 870 psig. There a r e two compressors, with one being a spare. During 1iquefaction, t h e design gas r a t e ( b o i l o f f and f l a s h gas) i s 0.9 x 106 s c f d . In the holding o r vaporization mode, the design boiloff gas r a t e i s 0.6 x 106 scfd (0.05% of f u l l tank c a p a c i t y ) . The boiloff compressor has high and low suction pressure alarms, a high discharge pressure alarm, a low temperature alarm on the i n l e t , and a high temperature alarm on the o u t l e t . I t i s a l s o equipped with the standard compressor alarms and t r i p s f o r high v i b r a t i o n , low lube-oil level o r pressure, and high bearing temperature. In the l i q u e f a c t i o n mode, the boiloff and f l a s h gases go through the cold box (E-211, 212, 213) t o cool the r e f r i g e r a n t and warm the b o i l o f f . ing holding o r vaporization, the boiloff i s warmed by waste heat from the compressor. Piping and valves t o t h e o u t l e t of E-200 and the boiloff heat exchangers (E-301 A / B ) a r e s t a i n l e s s s t e e l ; a l l other piping and equipment a r e carbon s t e e l . The storage tank i s equipped with two 12-inch pressure r e l i e f valves In the event of an underpressure, gas from the pipeline i s brought back i n t o the tank. If t h i s i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o prevent underpressure damage, two 12-inch vacuum re1 i e f valves admit a i r t o the tank. Addi t i o n a l Control and Instrunientati on In order t o monitor l i q u i d l e v e l , the tank i s equipped with a servo-powered, displacer-type l i q u i d level device, a d i f f e r e n t i a l pressure gauge, and a 2-inch trapped l i q u i d overflow l i n e with a temperature sensor and wave b a f f l e . t h a t vent t o the atmosphere.
Dur-
A high liquid-level alarm i s activated a t 95% of f u l l capacity.

The tank has thermocouples i n the inner tank s h e l l and f l o o r t o monitor cooldown. Ther~ocouplesembedded i n the foundation control the e l e c t r i c heating c o i l s under the tank t o prevent f r o s t heave. In the event of an emergency, the storage tank i s i s o l a t e d from other equipment by block valves on the i n l e t and o u t l e t l i n e s which a r e a c t i v a t e d by e i t h e r the Master Emergency Shutdown o r t h e Vaporizer Emergency Shutdown system.
E.3.3.4
LNG Sendout Pumps
The three LNG sendout pumps (P-301 A , B , C ) a r e vertical submerged, potmounted LNG pump systems. The pumps and the motor drives are hermetically sealed in a vessel and submerged in LNG. This design eliminates the extended
pump s h a f t and the associated s e a l .
The pump and motor surroundings are 100%
rich with LNG and will n o t support combustion. The pumps are mounted in a suction pot below grade to provide s u f f i c i e n t suction head for operation. Each pump has a capacity of 75 MMscfd or 625 gpm f o r a t o t a l rated sendout capacity of 150 MMscfd with one pump as a spare. -260F and the discharge pressure i s 945 psia. Each pump has two liquid discharge lines. the vaporizers, V-401. tank. tank. The main lines join and go t o The operating temperature i s
The secondary l i n e s join and return to the storage
Sendout flowrate i s control led by the amount of LNG returned t o the This liquid return l i n e i s also used t o recirculate the tank contents
i f necessary. Each pump also has a vapor return l i n e t o the tank t o vent vapors during startup and shutdown.
E.3.3.5
Procedures The f i r s t step in cooldown of the storage tank i s t o purge This prevents an explosive gas mixture from farming The nitrogen purge i s carried out from top t o bot-
Cooldown.
the tank with nitrogen.
and also dries o u t the tank.
tom with the nitrogen entering the 8-in. vapor o u t l e t and leaving through the 4-in. downcomer on the 3-in. liquid f i l l line. Nitrogen also enters a t the top of the dome through the r e l i e f vent and e x i t s through the purge ring a t the bottom of the outer tank, thus purging the annular space between the inner and outer walls. If the tank has been taken out of operation and i s f i l l e d with nitrogen, no purge i s required. After the purge, LNG from the liquefaction unit i s slowly admitted to the top of the tank via the 2-inch cool down line. The LNG i s deflected and sprayed over the floor. The following instruments monitor the e f f e c t s cif cooldown on the tank:
1.
l i n e a r movement indicators t h a t measure r e l a t i v e movement between the inner and outer tank walls
2.
storage tank thermocouples.
The LNG f l o w r a t e i s l i m i t e d t o a v o i d exceeding s p e c i f i e d maximum temperat u r e g r a d i e n t s between t h e s t o r a g e t a n k thermocouples. When t h e l i q u i d l e v e l i n t h e t a n k reaches 1 f o o t o r more and t h e t a n k i s s u f f i c i e n t l y cooled, LNG can be f e d through t h e normal l i q u i d f i l l l i n e and t h e l i q u e f a c t i o n u n i t can be a d j u s t e d t o maximum LNG p r o d u c t i o n . The cooldown purges t h e n i t r o g e n f r o m t h e tank and t h e o f f gas i s vented through t h e v e n t gas header. When t h e methane l e v e l i n t h e o f f gas reaches a s p e c i f i e d l e v e l , t h e o f f gas i s compressed and s e n t t o t h e p i p e l i n e . Heatup, Purging, and E n t r y . mately 1 f t o f LNG i n t h e tank. P r i o r t o t h e heatup o f t h e tank, t h e LNG T h i s leaves a p p r o x i The Heatup i s then begun by a d m i t t i n g warm n a t u r a l
l e v e l i s lowered u n t i l t h e sendout pumps l o s e s u c t i o n .
gas i n t o t h e 1 2 - i n c h l i q u i d withdrawal l i n e i n t h e bottom o f t h e tank. line.
gas r i s e s and d i s p e r s e s through t h e t a n k and leaves v i a t h e 8 - i n . vapor o u t l e t The gas i s compressed by t h e b o i l o f f compressor and s e n t t o t h e p i p e l i n e . The t a n k pressure c o n t r o l system f u n c t i o n s as i t would d u r i n g normal o p e r a t i o n . The i n l e t gas f l o w i s m a i n t a i n e d a t approximately t h e normal b o i l o f f p l u s f l a s h 6 r a t e , 0.9 x 10 s c f d . A t t h i s r a t e , i t takes approximately 20 days t o warm t h e t a n k from -257F t o +60F. The f o l l o w i n g i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n systems m o n i t o r t h e e f f e c t s o f heatup on the tank: 1. l i n e a r movement i n d i c a t o r s t h a t measure r e l a t i v e movement between t h e i n n e r and o u t e r t a n k w a l l s 2. s t o r a g e t a n k thermocouples s t r a i n gauges i n s t a l l e d around t h e p e r i p h e r y o f t h e e x t e r i o r t a n k t o m o n i t o r any s t r e s s e s due t o expansion o f t h e i n n e r vessel and subsequent compaction o f t h e per1 it e . The s t o r a g e t a n k must be purged t o a 98%' n i t r o g e n atmosphere b e f o r e personnel e n t r y . L i q u i d n i t r o g e n i s brought i n by cryogenic t r a i l e r , vaporized, The and a d m i t t e d t o t h e t a n k through t h e 12-inch l i q u i d withdrawal l i n e .
3.
n i t r o g e n i s m a i n t a i n e d a t t h e l o w e s t temperature p o s s i b l e ( ~ 2 0 F ) t o ensure a l a r g e d i f f e r e n c e between t h e d e n s i t i e s o f t h e n i t r o g e n and o f t h e gas i n t h e
tank.
This minimizes m i x i n g and r e s u l t s i n a p i s t o n e f f e c t .
The gas e x i t s
through t h e vapor o u t l e t , a f t e r which i t i s compressed i n t h e b o i l o f f compressor and s e n t t o t h e p i p e l i n e . m a i n l y methane. o f t h e o f f gas r i s e s r a p i d l y . During most o f t h e purging, t h e o f f gas i s Because t h e r e i s a l i m i t on t h e n i t r o g e n conCombustible gas d e t e c t o r s a r e l o c a t e d As t h e purge nears completion, however, t h e n i t r o g e n c o n t e n t
c e n t r a t i o n i n gas sent t o t h e p i p e l i n e , t h e l a s t p o r t i o n o f t h e o f f gas i s vented through t h e v e n t gas header. around t h e tank t o d e t e c t any combustible gases descending from the vent. Establ ished weather c r i t e r i a d e f i n e acceptable atmospheric c o n d i t i o n s f o r venting. When t h e i n n e r tank purge i s complete, the vapor o u t l e t i s blocked and t h e i n s u l a t i o ~f i l l holes and the r e l i e f v e n t i n t h e dome a r e opened so t h e dome can be purged. i s opened. o f t h e tank. E.3.3.6 Re1ease Prevention and Control Features A f t e r the dome i s purged, t h e i n s u l a t i o n f i l l holes and t h e r e l i e f v e n t a r e closed and t h e purge r i n g i n t h e bottom o f t h e o u t e r tank N i t r o g e n then f l o w s down through t h e i n s u l a t i o n space and o u t t h e purge r i n g , thus purging t h e annular space between t h e i n n e r and o u t e r w a l l s
The LNG storage tank and sendout punips share a common s p i l l basin, as shown p r e v i o u s l y i n F i g u r e E.2. High-expansion foam s e n e r a t i o n systems i n s t a l l e d i n t h i s area can be a c t i v a t e d e i t h e r manually o r a u t o m a t i c a l l y by low-temperature d e t e c t o r s o r UV f i r e d e t e c t o r s l o c a t e d i n t h e pumpout area. The s p i l l b a s i n d r a i n s i n t o a t r a p e z o i d a l d i k e d area l o c a t e d t o t h e e a s t o f the storage tank. The area o f t h i s impoundment b a s i n i s 110,000 f t 2 and t h e d i k e w a l l s average 17 f t i n h e i g h t . The b a s i n can b o l d about 480,000 b b l A1 1 s t r u c t u r a l s t e e l i n the of LNG, o r 137% o f t h e c a p a c i t y o f t h e tank.
d i k e d area i s coated w i t h an i n s u l a t i n g , f i r e - r e t a r d i n g concrete. The f o l l o w i n g d e t e c t o r s , alarms, and f i r e p r o t e c t i o n equipment a r e l o c a t e d i n the LNG pump area: combustible gas d e t e c t o r s (see S e c t i o n E.3.4.4 f o r detector operation)
low temperature d e t e c t o r s w i t h alarms i n c o n t r o l room
Halon f i r e e x t i n g u i s h i n g system (see S e c t i o n E.3.4.4
f o r description)
UV f i r e d e t e c t o r s t h a t a u t o m a t i c a l l y a c t i v a t e t h e Halon system and t h e
Master Emergency Shutdown system ( S e c t i o n E .4.1) 20# d r y chemical f i r e e x t i n g u i s h e r

o
f i r e hydrant.
A UV f i r e d e t e c t o r and d r y chemical e x t i n g u i s h e r a r e l o c a t e d on t o p of
t h e t a n k near t h e r e l i e f v a l v e s . The e x t i n g u i s h e r , d i r e c t e d a t t h e r e l i e f valves, i s a c t i v a t e d by t h e UV d e t e c t o r .
E .3.4
V a p o r i z a t i o n and Sendou t When e x t r a gas i s needed t o meet a peak demand, LNG i s withdrawn froin t h e
s t o r a g e tank, vaporized, and s e n t o u t t o t h e p i p e l i n e . o u t a r e d e s c r i b e d here. E.3.4.1 Vaporizers
V a p o r i z a t i o n and send-
The process f l o w diagram f o r t h e v a p o r i z a t i o n s e c t i o n i s shown i n F i g u r e E.12. Corresponding process c o n d i t i o n s and equipment i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s a r e g i v e n i n Table E.6. The v a p o r i z e r s f o r t h e p l a n t a r e f o u r submerged com6 b u s t i o n u n i t s each r a t e d a t 75 x 10 s c f d c a p a c i t y . With one v a p o r i z e r con6 s i d e r e d a spare, t h e t o t a l v a p o r i z a t i o n c a o a c i t y o f t h e p l a n t i s 225 x 10 s c f d . The v a p o r i z e r s a r e designed such t h a t t h e burners exhaust h o t combustion gases d i r e c t l y downward through a downcomer and i n t o a water b a t h , as shown i n F i g u r e E.13. The exhaust bubbles i n t o t h e water causing t u r b u l e n c e , m i x i n g , This l i f t i n g z c t i o n f o r c e s t h e water up through an The water f l o w s o v e r Bath temperature and a " l i f t i n g " a c t i o n .
a n n u l a r space c r e a t e d by a w e i r around t h e downcomer. ranges from 90F t o 130F.
t h e t o p o f t h e w e i r and i n t o t h e more c u i e s c e n t o u t e r tank.
A h e a t exchanger tube c o i l f o r t h e LNG i s l o c a t e d
i n t h e a n n u l a r space between t h e w e i r and t h e downcomer where i t i s scrubbed by t h e warm gas-water m i x t u r e , thus t r a n s f e r r i n g h e a t t o t h e LNG and vapori z i n g i t . The submerged combustion technique r e s u l t s i n a v e r y h i g h thermal e f f i c i e n c y o f 94 t o 96% because: 1 ) a1 1 t h e water i n t h e combustion p r o d u c t s condenses and t h e h i g h h e a t i n g v a l u e (HHV) of t h e f u e l can be used, and
GAS TO PIPELINE
METERING STATION
II
---@
9
2
C - 401 COMBUST ION AIR BLOWER AIR
Q
I
r-------, I
bu --+@
I
I I
I
I
"
h
FUEL GAS FROM PI
Uv
uv
WATER TO DRAIN
I
Q
I
8
LCA
I
I
L,
LNG FROM P- 301'
S
I
I I I I ,
'
E- 401 AUXl L l ARY BATH HEATER V-401A VAPORIZER
I I
MAKE - UP WATER
( I
TO THREE ADDITIONAL VAPORIZERS V - 401 BlClD
FIGURE E.12.
Vaporization Section Process Flow Diagram
TABLE E. 6.
Stream I d e n t i f i c a t i o n ID - Description
G
H
Vaporization Section
Temperature (OF) Phase (% L o r V) Flow Rate (MMscfdl
Pressure ( p s i a )
LNG from P-301's Gas t o P i p l i n e
900 870 20
-257
100% L 100% V 100% V
70
70
225 ( o r 1870 gpm) 150

3.5
I Fuel Gas t o Vaporizers
Equipment I d e n t i f i c a t i o n C-401 E-401 V-401 A/B/C/D Combusti on A i r Blower A u x i l i a r y Bath Heater Vaporizers
GAS I NLET COMBUSTI ON COMBUSTI ON CHAMBER
COVER
LEVEL
FIGURE E.13.
Cutaway View o f Submerged Combustion Vaporizer
2) the violent turbulence and mixing of the gas and water r e s u l t in a high r a t e of heat transfer to the tubes. The vaporizers consume gas equivalent t o 1 .5% t o 2.0% of the LNG vaporized.
Figure E. 14 shows the major components of the vaporizers.
The LNG i n l e t
piping, tube bundle, and o u t l e t piping to the f i r s t flange are a l l s t a i n l e s s steel construction. The r e s t of the o u t l e t piping i s carbon s t e e l , as are the tank, weir, and downcomer. The section of each downcomer above the water bath i s surrounded by a water jacket with continuous circulation of cooling water. The burner, fuel gas piping, a i r i n l e t piping, and blower are a l l carbon s t e e l . The a i r blower drive i s a 150-hp e l e c t r i c motor. The overall dimensions of the vaporizer are approximately 1 2 f t x 20 f t with a height of 10 f t . The vaporizer i s surrounded by a fiberglass building f o r weather protection.
COMBUSTION
NERS
EXHAUST STACK
DOWNCOMER
TANK OR PIT
FIGURE E.14.
Components of Submerged Combustion Vaporizers
E .3.4.2
C o n t r o l System and I n s t r u m e n t a t i o n
Two major c o n t r o l s a r e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e v a p o r i z e r s : LNG f l o w c o n t r o l gas o u t l e t temperature c o n t r o l . LNG t h r o u g h p u t i s a u t o m a t i c a l l y c o n t r o l l e d by a pneumatScally operated c o n t r o l v a l v e i n t h e l i n e from t h e sendout pumps. The gas o u t l e t temperature from t h e v a p o r i z e r i s c o n t r o l l e d by automatic adjustment o f t h e a i r - o p e r a t e d c o n t r o l v a l v e s i n t h e f u e l gas and a i r supply l i n e s . Water l e v e l i n t h e tank i s c o n t r o l l e d by s e v e r a l means. An o v e r f l o w nozA small pump
z l e i s l o c a t e d a t t h e normal water depth t o p r e v e n t h i g h l e v e l s . j a c k e t s on t h e burners.
t s i t s a t t h e s u r f a c e o f t h e water i n t.he b a t h and pumps ~ a t e r o t h e c o o l i n g

I f t h e water l e v e l i s low, t h e pump l o s e s s u c t i o n and
t h e d i s c h a r g e pressure f a l l s . v a l v e t o a d m i t more water.
A low p r e s s u r e s w i t c h then opens a c o n t r o l
A low water l e v e l a l a r m i s a l s o i n c l u d e d .
Other v a p o r i z e r c o n t r o l s i n c l u d e a pneumatic f u e l - p r e s s u r e c o n t r o l v a l v e and a p i l o t 1 i n e w i t h pressure r e g u l a t o r f o r t h e b u r n e r . was shown p r e v i o u s l y i n F i g u r e E.12.) The v a p o r i z e r i s equipped v i t h an automatic Vaporizer Emergency Shutdown (VES) system which, on a c t i v a t i o n , a u t o m a t i c a l l y shuts down t h e v a p o r i z e r s and t h e LNG sendout pumps and i s o l a t e s t h e pumps f r o m b o t h t h e v a p o r i z e r s and t h e LNG s t o r a g e tank. i n t h e c o n t r o l room. The VES can be a c t i v a t e d manually a t t h e v a p o r i z e r s o r The VES can a l s o be a c t i v a t e d a u t o m a t i c a l l y by a temperaNormally, t h e VES i s n o t a u t o m a t i c a l l y (The i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n
t u r e sensor i n t h e gas o u t l e t l i n e , a UV b u r n e r flame m o n i t o r (see S e c t i o n E.4.4), o r t h e water b a t h l e v e l i n d i c a t o r . activated.
E.3.4.3
Procedures
To s t a r t up t h e LNG pumps, t h e d i s c h a r g e v a l v e t o t h e v a p o r i z e r s i s c l o s e d and t h e pumps a r e operated on t o t a l r e c y c l e u n t i l they c o o l down. 4 - i n c h vapor r e t u r n l i n e . The burners on t h e v a p o r i z e r s a r e f i r e d and t h e At this The vapor produced by c o o l i n g t h e pumps i s vented t o t h e s t o r a g e tank through t h e w a t e r b a t h heated t o proper o p e r a t i n g temperature (95-1 30F).
point the discharge valve t o the vaporizers i s opened and a small flow of LNG s t a r t s . The r e s t of the s t a r t u p i s semi-automatic, with the burner f i r i n g r a t e and LNG flow r a t e both gradually increased until the desired flow r a t e i s reached. Shutdown of the vaporizers i s also semi-automatic, with the LNG flow and burner f i r i n g r a t e gradually decreased. The large heat-storage capacity of the water bath permits f a i r l y rapid s t a r t u p or shutdown of the vaporizers with 1it t l e variation in the process out1 e t temperature. The vaporizers can also be shut down by the M S and V S systems ( s e e E E Section E.4.1). E.3.4.4 Release Prevention and Control Features
Each vaporizer building has four combustible gas d e t e c t o r s , one in each corner. A detector i s also located near the a i r blower outside the building. Each detector has four indicating l i g h t s located on the control panel which den0 t e : 1 . "Safe" condition
2. "Warning!' condition, which s i g n i f i e s a gas concentration of approximately 25% of the LFL of methane
3 . "Danger" condition, which indicates a gas concentration of approximately 60% o r greater of LFL ( t h i s condition a l s o sounds an alarm)
4. "Trouble," which indicates a malfunction of the gas detection system. The warning condition automatically a c t i v a t e s a high-rate v e n t i l a t i o n fan to reduce the gas concentration in the vaporizer building. If the danger condit i o n s t i l l r e s u l t s , the fan i s turned off and the building openings a r e closed automatically. The Halon f i r e zxtinguisher system then discharges automatically. The f i r e extinguisher system i n the vaporizer building i s a Halon (halogenated hydrocarbons 1301 and 1212) i n e r t i ng and f i r e extinguishment, t o t a l flooding system. This system can be used not only t o extinguish natural gas f i r e s but a l s o t o i n e r t an enclosure and prevent an explosion. The Halon system i s activated by a UV detector s e n s i t i v e t o the u l t r a v i o l e t radiation from flames. I t can a l s o be activated by the combustible qas detection system
The UV f i r e d e t e c t o r s have v e r y f a s t , a d j u s t a b l e ( 0 t o 30 seconds) response t i m e s . They d e t e c t v e r y small f i r e s i n any wind c o n d i t i o n . However, t h e UV sensors tend t o g i v e f a l s e alarms f r o m such t h i n g s as r e f l e c t e d weldi n g a r c s , and they use AC power and thus a r e s e n s i t i v e t o induced c u r r e n t s and power f l u c t u a t i o n s . The d e t e c t o r s a r e o f t e n t u r n e d o f f when c o n s t r u c t i o n o r A c t i v a t i o n o f t h e Halon o r o t h e r maintenance r e q u i r e s w e l d i n g i n t h e area. l o c a t e d i n t h e same area. The f i r s t f l a n g e on t h e v a p o r i z e r o u t l e t p i p i n g marks t h e change f r o m c r y o g e n i c m a t e r i a l s f o r LNG (9% n i c k e l , aluminum a l l o y , o r s t a i n l e s s s t e e l ) t o carbon s t e e l c o n s t r u c t i o n f o r n a t u r a l gas. As a r e s u l t , t h e v a p o r i z e r A l l burners c o n t a i n s s e v e r a l safeguards t o ensure t h a t c o l d LNG does n o t reach t h e carbon s t e e l p i p i n g where i t c o u l d cause f a i l u r e due t o embri t t l e m e n t . o f flame-out. a r e equipped w i t h UV flame d e t e c t o r s t h a t alarm i n t h e c o n t r o l room i n t h e e v e n t The UV d e t e c t o r can a l s o be t i e d i n t o t h e VES (see S e c t i o n E.4.4) The water bath c o n t a i n s t o s h u t down t h e v a p o r i z e r i n case o f a b u r n e r flameout. LNG t c t h e o u t l e t p i p i n g a f t e r b u r n e r flameout.
f i r e f i g h t i n g systems r e q u i r e s simultaneous s i g n a l s from two UV d e t e c t o r s
a s i g n i f i c a n t amount o f thermal s t o r a g e t h a t prevents immediate c a r r y o v e r o f The o u t l e t l i n e a l s o has a The temperature sensor t h a t i s t i e d t o t h e burner c o n t r o l s and t o t h e VES. t h e b a t h d u r i n g abnormal o p e r a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y shutdown. E.3.5 T r a n s p o r t a t i o n and T r- n s f e r a
w a t e r b a t h i s equipped w i t h an e l e c t r i c h e a t e r t o h e l p p r e v e n t freezeup o f
The equipment and procedures used f o r t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and t r a n s f e r o f LNG a r e d e s c r i b e d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g subsections. E.3.5.1 LNG Truck T r a i l e r s
The t r a i l e r s used t o t r a n s p o r t LNG t o and from t h e peakshaving f a c i l i t y a r e s p e c i a l l y designed f o r LNG use. o f the t r a i l e r s . F i g u r e E.15 shows a cutaway view o f one The t a n k e r s a r e designed and c o n s t r u c t e d i!nder CGA 341, a Transportation o f
Compressed Gas A s s o c i a t i o n s p e c i f i c a t i o n f o r i n s u l a t e d t a n k t r u c k s i n t e n d e d p r i m a r i l y f o r t h e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n o f c o l d l i q u e f i e d gases. LNG i s a l s o governed by t h e hazardous l i q u i d r e g u l a t i o n s o f t h e Department o f T r a n s p o r t a t i o n (DOT), p a r t 170 through 179 o f T i t l e 49 o f t h e Code o f Federal Regulations, and by DOT Special P e r m i t Number 6113.
ANNULAR SPACE PACKED WITH PERLITE INSULATION
OUTER TANK CARBON STEEL
I NNER TANK AA5083-0 ALUM1 NUM
LI QU I D NATURAL GAS
'50 MICRON VACUUM l N ANNULAR SPACE
FIGURE E.15.
Cross Section o f LNG T r a i l e r
The i n n e r vessel i s constructed o f 5083 aluminum and t h e o u t e r vessel o f carbon s t e e l . The annular space i s f i l l e d w i t h p e r l i t e and a vacuum o f 50 microns The i n n e r s h e l l i s supported by Three f l o w b a f f l e s prevent excesThe o u t e r s h e l l a c t s as a s t r u c i s e s t a b l i s h e d t o i n s u l a t e t h e i n n e r vessel. low-heat-1 eak rods w i t h i n t h e o u t e r she1 1. s i v e s l o s h i n g o f t h e cargo d u r i n g shipment. tandem assemblies.
t u r a l member o f t h e s e m i - t r a i l e r and i s attached t o t h e f i f t h wheel and The i n n e r vessel i s designed t o conform t o t h e ASME presThe o u t e r vessel The t r a i l e r has a 10,500 g a l l o n c a p a c i t y and a sure vessel code, w i t h a maximum working pressure o f 70 psig. i s designed f o r vacuum service.
l e n g t h o f 40 f e e t , and i t weighs 21,500 1b empty and 60,000 I f u l l y 1oaded. b Because o f t h e r e l a t i v e l y low d e n s i t y o f LNG, t h e tank diameter i s r a t h e r l a r g e (I.D.
= 7 f e e t 4 inches, O.D.
= 8 feet).
The l a r g e diameter r e s u l t s i n
a h i g h center o f g r a v i t y , about n i n e inches higher than t h a t o f an LPG t r a i l e r . T h i s r e s u l t s i n an increased suscepti b i 1it y t o o v e r t u r n i n g accidents d u r i n g c o l l i s i o n s and high-speed turns.
F i g u r e E.16 shows t h e p i p i n g , v a l v i n g , and i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n f o r t h e LNG t r a i l e r and t h e l o a d i n g l u n l o a d i n g t e r m i n a l . The t r a i l e r ' s niain f i l l and d r a i n The l i n e i s l i n e i s a 3 - i n c h l i n e passing through t h e l o w e r h a l f o f t h e s h e l l . a l i n e safety valve.
equipped w i t h a manual t h r o t t l i n g valve, a remotely operated s h u t o f f valve, and
A gas r e t u r n l i n e a t t h e t o p o f t h e t r a i l e r a l l o w s vapors A pressure
t o r e t u r n t o t h e s t o r a g e t a n k d u r i n g normal f i l l i n g o p e r a t i o n s . adequate t r a i l e r pressure. and unloading.
b u i l d u p c o i l i s p r o v i d e d t o v a p o r i z e l i q u i d d u r i n g u n l o a d i n g and thus m a i n t a i n Three manual t r y c o c k v a l v e s a l s o a s s i s t i n l o a d i n g The t r a i l e r i s equipped w i t h numerous pressure r e l i e f devices,
a l l o f which v e n t t o a common e l e v a t e d stack. E.3.5.2 T r a n s f e r System
The t r a n s f e r system c o n s i s t s o f a graded and d i k e d t r a n s p o r t t e r m i n a l and s t a i n l e s s s t e e l l i q u i d and vapor l i n e s connecting t h e t e r m i n a l t o t h e peakshavi n g f a c i l i t y ' s LNG s t o r a g e tank. operated emergency valve. has a manual v a l v e o n l y . tank. The t e r m i n a l i s equipped w i t h w e i g h t scales t o i n d i c a t e t h e t r a i l e r l i q u i d level. The t r a i l e r i s connected t o t h e a p p r o p r i a t e l i n e s w i t h f l e x i b l e 3 - i n c h The t e r m i n a l area i s d i k e d and graded so t h a t s p i l l s f l o w away metal hose.
A 350-gpni t r a n s f e r pump loads t h e LNG.
The
3 - i n c h t r u c k l o a d i n g l i n e has a hand-operated s h u t o f f v a l v e and a remotely The vapor r e t u r n l i n e i s 2 inches i n diameter and The 3 - i n c h l i q u i d u n l o a d i n g l i n e has a manual v a l v e
and no pump s i n c e t r a i l e r pressure i s used t o t r a n s p o r t t h e LNG t o t h e s t o r a g e
from t h e t r a i l e r and i n t o a sump. E.3.5.3 C o n t r o l System
The t r a n s p o r t t e r m i n a l c o n t r o l system c o n s i s t s s i m p l y o f t h e pump o n l o f f c o n t r o l , manual valves on a l l t h r e e t r a n s f e r 1 i n e s , and a remotely operated shutoff valve i n the truck loading l i n e . The l o a d i n g pump i s s i z e d t o p r o If
v i d e t h e c o r r e c t f l o w r a t e f o r f i l l i n g a t r u c k under normal c o n d i t i o n s . v a l v e i s used.
t h r o t t l i n g i s r e q u i r e d ( f o r f i l l i n g a warm t r u c k , f o r i n s t a n c e ) , t h e manual The l e v e l t o which t h e t r u c k i s f i l l e d i s determined by t h e s c a l e s and by opening t h e 87% f u l l and 90% f u l l t r y c o c k s w h i l e f i l l i n g
KEY: VENT STACK
&
EH
HAND OPERATED VALVE RELIEF VALVE REMOTE OPERATED VALVE VENT

-
cj3
v-1
3"
-
w
N
GAS RETURN LINE
J
\
v-2 v-3
ROAD RELIEF SHUlOFF HOSE D R A I N GAS RETURN

-
112"
112"
v -4
b
v-5 V -6 v-7
2"
-
GAS GAGE L l N E
114"
-
9@'/0FULL TRYCOCK
1'4" 114"
87% FULL TRYCOCK GAGE B Y - P A S S

-
v -8
v-9
v-10
114"
-
EMP7Y TRYCOCK
114"
-
L I Q U I D GAGE LlNE
114"
v - 11
v-12 V-13 V-14
REMOTE CON1 KOL SHIJTOFF F l l L AND D R A I N t1OSE D R A I N

-
7"
112"
PRtSSURt BUII DUP RtCULATOR SHUTOFt
PKESSUHE B U I L D U P INNLR TANK RCLlEt ROAD SAfETY L INE SAFETY

-
2'
3"
112" 114"
1 PBR
I I
BURST D I S K
Y'
L
GAS RETURN C H t C K VALVE
TANK PRESSURE GAGt L Id11 I D I t V E l GAGL PRESSURt 8 U ILDUP HtGIJLATOK
PRESSURE BUILDUP C O l l
FIGURE E.16.
F l o w Diagram f o r Trailer Loading and Unloading
(Figure E.16). The r a t e a t which a truck i s unloaded i s controlled by e i t h e r the manual valve in the unloading l i n e or the t h r o t t l i n g valve on the pressure buildup c o i l . The LNG t r a i l e r requires only passive pressure control devices, including r e l i e f valves and burst d i s c s , since i t i s designed t o operate f o r u p t o 28 days without loss of cargo. A mentioned previously, a pressure buildup coil i s pros vided t o increase t r a i l e r pressure f o r unloading. E.3.5.4 Procedures
A t most f a c i l i t i e s , t r a i l e r s are f i l l e d by plant employees rather than the truckers themselves. Trailers are inspected f o r general roadworthiness and other requirements: (1 ) evidence of a good annulus vacuum; ( 2 ) a serviceable f i r e extinguisher; ( 3 ) valves and gauges in good condition; ( 4 ) positive t r a i l e r pressure not more than 25 psig; and ( 5 ) no oxygen gas present inside the t r a i l e r . If acceptable, the t r a i l e r i s then weighed, chocked, and grounded. The liquid f i l l l i n e and vapor return l i n e are cooled with LNG and then connected to the t r a i l e r with 3-inch f l e x i b l e metal hose. If the t r a i l e r i s warm, the top f i l l l i n e i s used a t a reduced flow r a t e t o minimize thermal shock. Cold t r a i l e r s are f i l l e d through the bottom f i l l l i n e a t about 350 gpm. A cold t r a i l e r requires only 112 hour to f i l l , while a warm one can take u p t o 4 hours. Weight scales provide the primary indication of a f u l l load. The 87% and 90% f u l l trycocks provide a backup indication. When the truck i s f u l l , drain valves on the f i l l and vapor return lines are opened and the trapped LNG flows into a heated sump, where i t i s vaporized and returned t o storage. The f l e x i b l e l i n e s are disconnected, and together the operator and driver verify the truck weight and the final valve positioning. The chocks and grounding cable are then removed and the truck leaves the terminal.
Truck Filling. Truck Unloading. Unloading i s carried out in much the same way as f i l l ing. The truck i s inspected and then chocked and grounded. The t r a i l e r i s connected t o the terminal with a 3-inch f l e x i b l e metal hose. The LNG i s forced from the truck t o the storage tank by the vapor pressure in the t r a i l e r . If the pressure i s too low, a small amount of liquid i s routed through the pressure buildup coil where i t i s vaporized by the ambient a i r . The vapor i s
routed t o the top of the tank to provide the desired pressure increase. ing proceeds a t a r a t e of about 350 gpm and requires about 1 / 2 hour.
E.3.5.5
Unload-
Release Prevention and Control Features
L N G t r a i l e r s have proven to be safe and r e l i a b l e f o r transporting LNG.
A of October 1978, LNG t r a i l e r s had travelled roughly 26 million miles with s only 1 2 accidents in t r a n s i t . However, 9 of these accidents resulted in r o l l overs of the LNG t r a i l e r s , due a t l e a s t in part to t h e i r high center of gravity. Three accidents, one a rollover, resulted in L N G s p i l l s , the worst releasing 20% of the cargo. None of the accidents involved a f i r e of the natural gas. The primary reason f o r t h i s good safety record i s the durability of the double-walled tank design. The outer shell and p e r l i t e insulation protect
I n the event of a f i r e , the carbon-steel outer shell retains i t s structural i n t e g r i t y and the insulation
and cushion the inner shell and i t s contents. keeps the cargo cool f o r several hours.
LNG t r a i l e r s are equipped with numerous pressure r e l i e f valves and a

burst disc t o prevent overpressurization (see Figure E.16). shutoff valves are i n s t a l l e d in a l l liquid l i n e s . Remotely operated
A fusible link i s included with the remote controls so the valves will close in the event of a f i r e . The trucks are inspected on a regular basis, and drivers are given a formal t r a i n ing program t h a t includes instruction on the characteristics and safe handling of LNG.
Three separate dry chemical f i r e extinguishers and three water t u r r e t s with multi-position nozzles are available in the transport terminal area. A closed-circuit television camera scans the terminal whenever a t r a i l e r i s pres e n t a n d an operator watches f o r liquid or vapor leaks. The s p i l l retention system has the capacity to contain the cargo of a f u l l t r a i l e r plus the holdup in the loading l i n e s . trailers. fire loss of e l e c t r i c a l power loss of a i r pressure The area i s graded so t h a t s p i l l s flow away from the Five events resulting in three automatic and two manual sequences
will stop LNG flow within 10 seconds of emergency:
LNG l i n e rupture emergency shutdown.
E.4
GENERAL PLANT INFORMATION The f o l l o w i n g subsections p r o v i d e general i n f o r m a t i o n on v a r i o u s aspects
o f t h e LNG peakshaving f a c i l i t y and i t s o p e r a t i o n . E.4.1 Emergency Shutdown System The o p e r a t i o n and a c t i v a t i o n o f t h e emergency shutdown system f o r t h e peakshaving f a c i l i t y a r e d e s c r i b e d here. E.4.1.1 Operation o f Emergency Shutdown System
The p l a n t emergency shutdown system c o n s i s t s o f two separate systems, t h e Master Emergency Shutdown (MES) and t h e Vaporizer Emergency Shutdown (VES). The MES a l l o w s t h e r a p i d shutdown o f t h e p l a n t and i s o l a t i o n o f t h e v a r i o u s p l a n t systems. actions: 1 When a c t i v a t e d , t h e MES a u t o m a t i c a l l y i n i t i a t e s t h e f o l l o w i n g
E l e c t r i c a l s u p p l i e s t o a1 1 normal p l a n t c i r c u i t s a r e de-energized; t i a l p l a n t e l e c t r i c a l equipment (e.g., f i r e system v a l v e o p e r a t o r s ) remains energized.
essen-
f i r e pumps, f i r e and gas d e t e c t o r s ,
2.
N a t u r a l gas valves a t p l a n t boundaries a r e c l o s e d t o i s o l a t e t h e p l a n t f r o m t h e n a t u r a l gas p i p e l i n e . n a t u r a l gas f e e d t o p l a n t gas f r o m v a p o r i z e r s b o i l o f f gas f r o m s t o r a g e t a n k f u e l gas t o v a p o r i z e r s . These v a l v e s i n c l u d e :
3.
The LNG t a n k and d i k e area i s i s o l a t e d from t h e remainder o f t h e p l a n t by t h e f o l 1owing : v a l v e s a t t h e LNG pump s u c t i o n and t h e i n t e r i o r t a n k o u t l e t valves are closed v a l v e on t h e l i q u i d i n l e t l i n e f r o m t h e l i q u e f a c t i o n u n i t i s c l o s e d LNG pump motors a r e s h u t down b l o c k v a l v e s between t h e LNG pumps and t h e v a p o r i z e r s a r e closed.
4.
A telemetric signal "MES Tripped" i s transmitted to the company's head office. With loss of instrument a i r , a1 1 control valves go to t h e i r f a i l s a f e positions. Gas from a l l gas handling equipment and lines i s vented through the r e l i e f header to the vent stack.
5.
6.
The second shutdown system, the VES, allows the rapid shutdown and isolation of a l l LNG sendout systems. When activated, the VES automatically i n i t i ates the following actions:
1.
The following natural gas valves a t the plant boundaries are closed: gas from vaporizers fuel gas t o vaporizers.
LNG pump motors a r e shut down.
2.
3.
4.
Block valves between the pumps and the vaporizers are closed.
Pump suction valves and the i n t e r i o r valves on the liquid withdrawal lines are closed.
5.
Gas from a l l gas handling equipment and lines i s vented through the r e l i e f header t o the vent stack.
The MES and VES c i r c u i t s are energized with 120 VAC power from a separate "Uninterruptable Power Supply" (UPS) unit that maintains these systems energized and ready for operation. When these c i r c u i t s are de-energized ( f a i l s a f e ) , the emergency shutdown actions described above are i n i t i a t e d . E.4.1.2 Activation of Emergency Shutdown System
Both the MES and VES can be activated manually a t the control room and a t the two plant e x i t gates. The MES can also be activated automatically by the ultraviolet ( U V ) f i r e detectors that monitor the fol lowing areas: 1 . compressor building 2. vaporizers 3 . refrigerant storage
4. 5.
6.
LNG pumps p i p i n g on o r a d j a c e n t t o p i p e r a c k s n e x t t o compressor b u i l d i n g c o l d box adsorbers r e g e n e r a t i o n heater.
7.
8.
The VES may be a u t o m a t i c a l l y a c t i v a t e d , i f d e s i r e d , by a temperature sensor i n t h e v a p o r i z e r gas o u t l e t 1 i n e ( l o w teniperature), by t h e UV flame m o n i t o r s on t h e v a p o r i z e r burners ( b u r n e r f l a m e o u t ) , o r by t h e water b a t h l e v e l i n d i c a t o r (1 ow 1eve1 ) E.4.2
C o n s t r u c t i o n , I n s p e c t i o n , and T e s t i n g The procedures used d u r i n g c o n s t r u c t i o n , i n s p e c t i o n , and t e s t i n g o f a
peakshaving f a c i l i t y , as w e l l as t h e codes and standards governing these a c t i v i t i e s , a r e discussed here. E.4.2.1 Codes and Standards
The i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e between a code and a standard i s a q u e s t i o n o f law. I n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , codes o f f i c i a l l y adopted by f e d e r a l o r s t a t e Standards a r e n o t governments become l e g a l documents w i t h t h e f o r c e o f law. t o form p a r t s o f c o n t r a c t u a l s p e c i f i c a t i o n s .
g e n e r a l l y b i n d i n g by law, b u t a r e o f t e n i n c l u d e d as p a r t o f a code o r used
A f a c i l i t y operated by an i n t e r s t a t e n a t u r a l gas p i p e l i n e company i s

under t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e Department o f T r a n s p o r t a t i o n (DOT) O f f i c e o f P i p e l i n e S a f e t y Operations. facilities. The DOT f e d e r a l s a f e t y standards i n c l u d e d i n t h e Code o f Federal Regulations, T i t l e 49, P a r t s 191 and 192 cover i n t e r s t a t e LNG The code i n c o r p o r a t e s t h e N a t i o n a l F i r e P r o t e c t i o n A s s o c i a t i o n I n t r a s t a t e gas companies Standard 59A f o r L i q u e f i e d N a t u r a l Gas F a c i l i t i e s .
a r e r e g u l a t e d by s t a t e codes t h a t a l s o q u i t e f r e q u e n t l y r e f e r t o NFPA59A. The American Petroleum I n s t i t u t e has i s s u e d two standards t h a t a r e o f t e n used f o r LNG f a c i l i t i e s : 1 ) A P I Standard 2510A
Design and C o n s t r u c t i o n o f
LNG I n s t a l l a t i o n s a t Petroleum Terminals, N a t u r a l Gas Processing P l a n t s , R e f i n e r i e s and Other I n d u s t r i a l P l a n t s ; and 2 ) A P I Standard 620
Recommended
Rules f o r Design and C o n s t r u c t i o n o f Large, Welded, Low Pressure Storage Tanks. Appendix Q i s d i r e c t e d s p e c i f i c a l l y t o aboveground, metal LNG s t o r a g e tanks.
Various s e c t i o n s ( V I I I and I X ) o f t h e ASME B o i l e r and Pressure Vessel Code a r e a p p l i c a b l e t o s p e c i f i c components of an LNG f a c i l i t y such as b o i l e r s , u n f i r e d p r e s s u r e vessels, and h e a t exchangers. 31 s t a t e s where i t i s b i n d i n g by law. The American S o c i e t y o f T e s t i n g and M a t e r i a l s i s s u e s standards f o r materials. A l l o f t h e U.S. codes and standards use these as bases f o r m a t e r i a l For example, ASTM A-353-64 and -65 cover r e q u i r e s p e c i f i c a t i o n requirements. T h i s code has been adopted i n
ments f o r 9% n i c k e l s t e e l , which i s w i d e l y used i n LNG p l a n t c o n s t r u c t i o n . E .4.2.2 Cold Box. ProceduresA l l w e l d i n g i n t h e c o l d box was performed i n s t r i c t accordance A l l welds i n t h e c o l d box were
w i t h ANSI B31.3 and ASME S e c t i o n V I I I , and a l l welders were a u a l i f i e d i n accordance w i t h ANSI B31.3 and ASME S e c t i o n I X . f o r visual inspection. ments o f ANSI B31.3. v i s u a l l y examined and met t h e requirements o f ANSI 631.3 and ASME S e c t i o n V I I I A l l p i p e b u t t welds and some o t h e r c o l d box welds were 100% radiographed i n accordance w i t h t h e 100% radiography i n s p e c t i o n r e q u i r e -
A l l welds n o t 100% radiographed were 100% dye p e n e t r a n t
t e s t e d i n accordance w i t h ASME S e c t i o n V I I I . Storage Tank. A l l w e l d i n g on t h e t a n k was performed i n s t r i c t accordance
w i t h API 620 Appendix Q . A l l i n n e r tank b u t t welds were v i s u a l l y i n s p e c t e d and 100% radiographed.
A l l o u t e r t a n k b u t t welds were v i s u a l l y i n s p e c t e d and

I n a d d i t i o n , the tank was i n s p e c t e d by an i n d e -
100% dye p e n e t r a n t t e s t e d .
pendent o u t s i d e agency i n accordance w i t h API 620. F o l l o w i n g c o n s t r u c t i o n , t h e t a n k was s u b j e c t e d t o a s e r i e s o f o v e r l o a d t e s t s t o f u r t h e r ensure i t s i n t e g r i t y , l e a k t i g h t n e s s , and readiness f o r LNG service. P r i o r t o t h i s f i n a l proof-testing, t h e i n n e r and o u t e r t a n k bottoms were vacuum-box t e s t e d w i t h soap s o l u t i o n t o ensure t h a t t h e r e were no l e a k s o r d e f e c t s i n t h e s e p a r t s o f t h e tanks. For h y d r o s t a t i c l o a d i n g , t h e i n n e r t a n k was f i l l e d w i t h w a t e r t o a l e v e l ( % I 1 2 f u l l ) t h a t s t r e s s e d t h e lower p o r t i o n of t h e t a n k t o 125% o f t h e s t r e s s produced when t h e t a n k i s c o m p l e t e l y f i l l e d w i t h t h e l i g h t e r LNG. Pneumatic p r e s s u r e was t h e n a p p l i e d t o t h e upper p o r t i o n o f t h e t a n k t o 1.25 times
t h e design pressure.
For t h e p o r t i o n s o f t h e t a n k above t h e l i q u i d l e v e l , a T h i s method was a l s o used t o A f t e r t h e h y d r o s t a t i c t e s t , a pneumatic A vacuunl t e s t was c a r r i e d
soap s o l u t i o n was a p p l i e d t o d e t e c t leakage. t e s t t h e r o o f and o u t e r t a n k s h e l l .
o v e r p r e s s u r e t e s t was c a r r i e d o u t f o r t h e purpose o f o v e r l o a d i n g t h e anchor b o l t s 2nd f o r t e s t i n g t h e p r e s s u r e v e n t i n g system. o u t t o t e s t t h e vacuum r e l i e f system. E.4.3 Venting
A l l gas l i n e s and gas h a n d l i n g equipment can be vented t o t h e v e n t s t a c k

t h r o u g h t h e v e n t gas header. gas h a n d l i n g equipment. Gas i s n o t n o r m a l l y vented e x c e p t i n t h e case o f an emergency shutdown, when t h e MES a u t o m a t i c a l l y v e n t s a l l gas l i n e s and The LNG sendout pumps a r e vented back t o t h e s t o r a g e t a n k v i a t h e 4 - i n c h vapor r e t u r n l i n e . The s t o r a g e t a n k has two 1 2 - i n c h p r e s s u r e r e l i e f v a l v e s t h a t v e n t t o t h e atmosphere. o f f systeni. overpressure. A l l v e s s e l s o r s e c t i o n s o f LNG l i n e s t h a t can be i s o l a t e d w i t h LNG i n them and a l l o w e d t o warn1 a r e p r o t e c t e d by r e l i e f v a l v e s v e n t i n g t o t h e atmosphere. P l a n t Operation The c o n t r o l system f o r t h e peakshaving p l a n t i s designed f o r unattended o p e r a t i o n i n t h e l i q u e f a c t i o n , v a p o r i z a t i o n , and h o l d i n g modes. o u t p u t r a t e s as d i c t a t e d by t h e c e n t r a l o f f i c e . One o p e r a t o r i s on d u t y each s h i f t t o m o n i t o r t h e p l a n t and t o a d j u s t p l a n t p r o d u c t i o n o r A l l c r i t i c a l o p e r a t i n g equipment and process v a r i a b l e s a r e m o n i t o r e d so t h a t i f t h e r e i s an equipment malf u n c t i o n o r process upset, t h e e n t i r e p l a n t o r s e c t i o n o f t h e p l a n t a f f e c t e d
w i l l a u t o m a t i c a l l y s h u t down i n a s a f e manner.
Normal o f f gas f r o m t h e s t o r a g e t a n k i s handled by t h e b o i l -
The r e l i e f v a l v e s open o n l y when needed t o p r o t e c t t h e t a n k f r o m
When t h e emergency shutdown
system i s a c t i v a t e d , a t e l e m e t r i c s i g n a l "MES t r i p p e d " i s t r a n s m i t t e d t o t h e company's head o f f i c e .
For scheduled s t a r t u p s , two o p e r a t o r s a r e on s h i f t ; however, t h e p l a n t i s d e s i g n e d so one t r a i n e d o p e r a t o r can r e s t a r t any p o r t i o n o f t h e p l a n t a f t e r a shutdown, p r o v i d i n g t h a t a l l equipment i s i n p r o p e r w o r k i n g o r d e r . sys tem. M a j o r t a s k s such as heatup and cooldown of t h e s t o r a g e t a n k and i n i t i a l f i l l i n g and s t a r t u p o f t h e l i q u e f a c t i o n system r e q u i r e a s i g n i f i c a n t number o f a d d i t i o n a l o p e r a t i n g and s u p e r v i s o r y p e r s o n n e l . automated ( s e e S e c t i o n s E.3.2.4 monitoring f o r safe operation. The f i r e e x t i n g u i s h m e n t systems f o r t h e v a p o r i z e r b u i l d i n g , compressor b u i l d i n g , LNG pumpout area, and s t o r a g e t a n k r e l i e f v a l v e s a r e a l l a c t i v a t e d a u t o m a t i c a l l y by UV f i r e d e t e c t o r s o r by c o m b u s t i b l e gas d e t e c t o r s . The h i g h expansion foam system i n t h e s t o r a g e t a n k s p i l l b a s i n can be a c t i v a t e d a u t o m a t i c a l l y by l o w t e m p e r a t u r e d e t e c t o r s o r UV d e t e c t o r s o r can be o p e r a t e d manually. A l l o t h e r equipment f o r f i r e s and f o r c o n t r o l o f vapor g e n e r a t i o n and d i s p e r s i o n must be o p e r a t e d m a n u a l l y . E.5 SOURCES OF INFORMATION The LNG peakshaving p l a n t d e s c r i p t i o n was developed u s i n g i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m t h e sources 1 is t e d be1 ow. 1 and E.3.3.5) These o p e r a t i o n s a r e n o t and r e q u i r e c l o s e , c o n t i n u o u s V i s u a l and a u d i o alarms i n d i c a t e t h e n a t u r e of t h e problem t h a t caused shutdown o f t h e
F e d e r a l Energy R e g u l a t o r y Commission f i l e s o f a p p l i c a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g LNG f a c i 1 it i e s : FPC Docket No. CP74-46, N o r t h w e s t P i p e l i n e Corp., September 20, 1973, FPC Docket No. CP76-106, N o r t h w e s t P i p e l i n e Corp., September 29, 1975.
2.
LNG Equipment Vendors: Chicago B r i d g e and I r o n Chicago B r i d g e and I r o n Chicago B r i d g e and I r o n Ryan I n d u s t r i e s
Cryogenic Storage, B u l l e t i n No. 8600, Cryogenic Systems, B u l l e t i n No. 8650, USA Standards f o r Design and C o n s t r u c t i o n o f LNG I n s t a l l a t i o n , B u l l e t i n No. 831,
Sub-X V a p o r i z e r , P r o d u c t B u l l e t i n LNG-200,
Pittsburg-Des Moines S t e e l Company American A i r L i q u i d e A l l i s o n Control, Inc American A i r L i q u i d e 3. Open L i t e r a t u r e :
LNG Storage Tanks, B u l l e t i n No. 303,
Teal L i q u e f a c t i o n Process B u l l e t i n ,
J. F. P r i t c h a r d and Company
p r i c o T M Process Brochure,
F i r e D e t e c t i o n and Extinguishment C o n t r o l Systems, (various materials) , Turnkey L i q u e f i e d N a t u r a l Gas P l a n t s B u l l e t i n .
E. I. Shaheen and M. K. Vora, "Worldwide LNG Survey C i t e s E x i s t i n g , Planned P r o j e c t s . " O i 1 and Gas Journal , pp. 59-71 , June 20, 1977. R. F. Stebbing and J . V. OIBrien, "Core Exchangers Update Peak Shaving." O i l and Gas J o u r n a l , pp. 46-49, December 22, 1975.
L. DeVanna and G. Doul ames, "Planning i s t h e Key t o LNG Tank Purging, E n t r y and I n s p e c t i o n . " O i l and Gas J o u r n a l , pp. 74-82, September 8, 1975. A r t h u r D. L i t t l e , Inc., "Assessment o f Risks and Risks Control Options Associated w i t h L i q u e f i e d N a t u r a l Gas T r u c k i n g Operations from t h e D i s t r i g a s Terminal, E v e r e t t , Massachusetts, " ( p r e l i m i n a r y d r a f t f o r comment) , ADL Ref 82280, December 1978. F.P. Schulz, " S a f e t y a t an LNG Peakshaving F a c i l i t y . " Paper presented a t t h e ASME W i n t e r Annual Meeting, New York, NY, November 17-22, 1974. Hanke, C.C., LaFare, I. V., and L i t z i n g e r , L. F., "Purging LNG Tanks I n t o and Out o f S e r v i c e Considerations and Experiences." Paper presented a t t h e AGA D i s t r i b u t i o n Conference, Minneapolis, Minnesota, May 6-8, 1974.
V. A. Warner, " L i q u e f i e d N a t u r a l Gas F i r e C o n t r o l . " Paper presented a t t h e AGA Transniission Conference, Las Vegas, NV, May 3-5, 1976. N.H. Brock and R. M. Howard, '-Upgrading LNG P l a n t S a f e t y . " Paper presented a t t h e AGA Transmission conference, Bal Harbour, FLY May 19-21, 1975.
H.R. Wesson, " C o n s i d e r a t i o n R e l a t i n g t o F i r e P r o t e c t i o n Requirements f o r LNG P l a n t s . " Paper presented a t t h e AGA Transmission Conference, Bal Harbour, FLY May 19-21 , 1975. R.G. S c h l a t e r and C.J. Noel, "Gbod A x i a l Compressor Control Aids LNG P l a n t s . " O i 1 and Gas Journal , pp. 52-57, January 15, 1973.
Gas Processing Handbook Issue. A p r i l , 1973.
Hydrocarbon Processing, pp. 132-138,
LNG I n f o r m a t i o n Book, prepared by t h e LNG I n f o r m a t i o n Book Task Group o f t h e L i q u e f i e d N a t u r a l Gas Committee, American Gas A s s o c i a t i o n , 1973.
D. B . Crawford and G . P . Eschenbrenner, "Heat Transfer Equipment f o r LNG
Projects."
Chemical Engineering Progress, pp. 62-70, September, 1972.
A . E . Uhl, L . A . Amoroso and R. H . S e i t e r , "Safety and R e l i a b i l i t y of LNG F a c i l i t i e s . " Paper presented a t the ASME Petroleum Mechanical Engineering and Pressure Vessel and Piping Conference, Nw Orleans, LA, e September 17-21 , 1972.
P.J. Anderson and E . J . Daniels, "The LNG Industry: Past, Present, and Future." Prepared by I n s t i t u t e of Gas Technology f o r U ERDA under S c o n t r a c t No. EE-77-C-02-4234.
I . L . Wissmiller and E. 0. Mattocks, "How t o Use LNG Safely." and Gas Journal, March, 1972.
Pipeline
S. Seroka and R. J . Bolan, "Safety Considerations i n the I n s t a l l a t i o n of an LNG Tank." Cryogenics and I n d u s t r i a l Gases, pp. 22-28, September/ October, 1970. I . C . S t a n f i l l , "Startup Experiences and Special Features a t Memphis LNG Plant." Paper presented a t the F i r s t LNG International Conference, Chicago, IL, April 7-12, 1968. Smith, L. R. "Submerged Pumps f o r LNG Sendout." Distribution Conference, 1968. 4. 5. Paper presented a t AGA
Tour of Northwest Pipelines Peakshaving Plant a t Plymouth, Washington, April 11, 1978. World Wide LNG Market, published by Frost & Sullivan, I n c . , Nw York, N Y , e June 1977.
APPENDIX F FACILITY DESCRIPTION OF REFERENCE LNG SATELLITE PLANT
APPENDIX F FACILITY DESCRIPTION OF REFERENCE LNG SATELLITE PLANT LNG peakshaving o p e r a t i o n s a r e one means by which gas d i s t r i b u t i o n companies handle seasonal v a r i a t i o n s i n demand f o r n a t u r a l gas. Most peakshaving f a c i l i t i e s l i q u e f y n a t u r a l gas d u r i n g t h e off-season, s t o r e i t u n t i l w i n t e r peak-demand p e r i o d s , and then v a p o r i z e i t and p u t i t back i n t o t h e p i p e l i n e f o r customer use (see Appendix E). I n some cases, however, i t i s more economical t o b u i l d a peakshaving p l a n t c o n s i s t i n g o n l y o f s t o r a g e and v a p o r i z a t i o n f a c i l i t i e s and t o t r u c k t h e LNG i n from another f a c i l i t y w i t h a l i q u e f a c t i o n u n i t o r from an i m p o r t terminal. Peakshaving p l a n t s w i t h o n l y s t o r a g e and v a p o r i z a t i o n f a c i l i t i e s a r e
r e f e r r e d t o as s a t e l l i t e p l a n t s . There a r e two b a s i c types o f LNG t r u c k - t r a i l e r s t h a t serve LNG s a t e l l i t e plants. The f i r s t and most common t y p e i s a p e r l i t e - f i l l e d , vacuum-insulated t r a i l e r w i t h a t y p i c a l c a p a c i t y o f 10,000 t o 12,500 gal
This type o f t r a i l e r
has an i n n e r she1 1 o f c r y o g e n i c metal, u s u a l l y a1 uminum; an a n n u l a r space f i 1 l e d w i t h p e r l i t e and under a moderate vacuum of 50 microns; and an o u t e r carbon-steel shell integral t o the t r a i l e r . insulation. sheet. Although some o f t h e s a t e l l i t e f a c i l i t y owners have t h e i r own LNG tankers, most arrange t r a n s p o r t a t i o n w i t h t r u c k i n g companies. Because t h e requirements f o r LNG v a r y depending on w i n t e r weather, t r a n s p o r t a t i o n c o n t r a c t s g e n e r a l l y t a k e t h e forni o f t e r m c o n t r a c t s f o r a s p e c i f i e d number o f d e l i v e r i e s d u r i n g t h e season and s p o t d e l i v e r i e s as r e q u i r e d t o f i l l s t o r a g e c a p a c i t y . A t t h e s a t e l l i t e f a c i l i t y , t h e LNG i s s t o r e d i n a double-walled, cryogenic The The second t y p e o f t r a i l e r uses urethane foam
I t c o n s i s t s o f an i n n e r c r y o g e n i c s h e l l , u s u a l l y aluminum; a 5-112 i n .
l a y e r o f urethane foam i n s u l a t i o n ; and an o u t e r s k i n o f 20 gauge s t a i n l e s s s t e e l
1 s t o r a g e t a n k a t -260F and s l i g h t l y above atmospheric p r e s s u r e ( ~ p s i g ) . enough t o h o l d t h e e n t i r e c o n t e n t s o f t h e tank.
t a n k i s surrounded by a containment area, u s u a l l y an e a r t h e n d i k e , t h a t i s l a r g e B o i l o f f gases, r e s u l t i n g from h e a t leakage i n t o t h e tank, a r e compressed and s e n t t o t h e p i p e l i n e .
D u r i n g p e r i o d s o f peak demand, t h e LNG i s pumped o u t o f t h e t a n k and up t o p i p e l i n e pressure.

I t i s t h e n f e d t o t h e v a p o r i z e r s where i t i s heated and con-
v e r t e d back t o a gas b e f o r e b e i n g fed t o t h e p i p e l i n e . p l a n t s f a l l i n t o f o u r major c a t e g o r i e s : direct fired submerged conibustion

e
Vaporizers f o r s a t e l l i t e
intermediate f l u i d ( i n d i r e c t f i r e d ) ambient a i r t y p e .
D i r e c t f i r e d u n i t s use f l u e gases from a b u r n e r t o h e a t a p r o d u c t c o i l . product c o i l s .
Sub-
merged combustion u n i t s bubble f l u e gases t h r o u g h a w a t e r b a t h c o n t a i n i n g t h e I n t e r m e d i a t e f l u i d systems use a f i r e d h e a t e r t o h e a t a f l u i d Ambient t h a t i s pumped t h r o u g h separate h e a t exchangers t o v a p o r i z e t h e LNG. t o ambient c o n d i t i o n s . There a r e about 20 LNG s a t e l l i t e f a c i l i t i e s c u r r e n t l y o p e r a t i n g i n t h e U.S.; a l l l o c a t e d i n the eastern h a l f o f the country. These f a c i l i t i e s range i n s i z e f r o m 5000 t o 450,000 b b l o f s t o r a g e c a p a c i t y w i t h a median c a p a c i t y o f about 55,000 b b l . i n n e r tanks. A l l b u t t h r e e o f t h e s t o r a g e tanks a r e aboveground metal tanks, o f which 84% have aluminum i n n e r tanks and t h e r e s t have 9% n i c k e l s t e e l O f t h e t h r e e r e m a i n i n g tanks, one i s a p a r t i a l i n - g r o u n d aluminum tank, and two a r e aboveground c o n c r e t e tanks. To d e l i v e r LNG t o these s a t e l l i t e f a c i l i t i e s , t h e r e a r e a p p r o x i m a t e l y 130 LNG t r u c k - t r a i l e r s , o f which 90% a r e t h e p e r l i t e - f i l l e d , vacuum-insulated t y p e . C a p a c i t i e s f o r t h e s e t a n k e r s g e n e r a l l y a r e 10,000 t o 12,500 g a l . F.l BASIC PROCESS FLOW The b a s i c process f l o w f o r an LNG s a t e l 1 i t e f a c i l i t y i s d e s c r i b e d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g subsections.
a i r v a p o r i z e r s , t h e s i m p l e s t type, c o n s i s t o f l a r g e p r o d u c t c o i l s exposed
F.l.l
Unit O ~ e r a t i o n s
A block flow diagram f o r an LNG s a t e l l i t e plant i s shown i n Figure F.1. The major unit operations involved a r e transportation and t r a n s f e r , storage, vaporization and sendout.
LNG i s transported t o the s a t e l l i t e f a c i l i t y in specially designed, cryo-
genic t r u c k - t r a i l e r s . These t r a i l e r s are loaded a t an LNG f a c i l i t y w i t h liquefaction capability. The LNG i s unloaded into an aboveground, double-walled, metal storage tank. The inner cryogenic b a r r i e r i s constructed of an aluminum alloy and the outer tank i s constructed of carbon s t e e l . The annular space between the walls i s f i l l e d with p e r l i t e insulation t o reduce heat leakage i n t o the tank and reduce the amount of boiloff. The boiloff gases are compressed to d i s t r i b u t i o n pressure and sent o u t .
GAS TO P I PELINE B 01LOFF COMPRESSORS 2 AT 0.15~106scfd (ONE I S $SPARE)
_ ,I suBMLRGED
b
scfd
100 psig
,
FLUE GAS
&I il
r df ;~:~; l ( .0 7 I UNLOAD1NG I TRAILER
4
I
FUEL GAS
COMBUSTI ON VAPOR1 ZERS
o. 13xlo6
NORMAL BOI LOFF
DOUBLE-WALLED STORAGE TANK 1 1 . 5 5 ~ 1bbl 37,000 0gal) ~
ABOVE GROUND
1
2 AT 6x10 scfd EACH
Ij-1
-
FIGURE F.1.
LNG Sate1 1i t e Plant
Block Flow Diagram
Two submersible LNG pumps t a k e s u c t i o n on t h e s t o r a g e tank, pump t h e LNG t o p i p e l i n e pressure, and send i t t o t h e two submerged combustion v a p o r i z e r s . These v a p o r i z e r s exhaust h o t combustion gases from a b u r n e r i n t o a w a t e r b a t h c o n t a i n i n g LNG p r o d u c t c o i l s . From t h e v a p o r i z e r , t h e gas i s metered and o d o r i z e d and t h e n f e d t o t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n main. F. 1.2 Flow Rates and O p e r a t i n g C o n d i t i o n s LNG i s unloaded f r o m t h e t r u c k - t r a i l e r s t o t h e s t o r a g e t a n k a t r a t e s v a r y i n g from 150 t o 350 gpm. about 30 t o 60 min. 10 Mscfd.
A t these r a t e s , t h e t i m e r e q u i r e d t o unload a t r a i l e r i s
The vapors produced d u r i n g u n l o a d i n g a r e vented t o t h e Vapor p r o d u c t i o n from u n l o a d i n g i s a p p r o x i m a t e l y
storage tank b o i l o f f l i n e .
Normal t a n k b o i l o f f i s about 130 Mscfd.
The maximum sendout r a t e w i t h b o t h pumps and b o t h v a p o r i z e r s o p e r a t i n g i s 100 gpm o r 12 MMscfd. are a l l paired. The b o i l o f f compressors, sendout pumps, and v a p o r i z e r s Each o f t h e b o i l o f f compressors i s capable o f hand1 i n g The sendout pumps and v a p o r i z e r s each f u r n i s h 50% o f t h e
p l a n t ' s maximum c a p a c i t y .
100% o f t h e p l a n t b o i l o f f , w i t h t h e o t h e r compressor h e l d as a spare.
F. 2
PLANT LAYOUT
A p l o t p l a n f o r t h e s a t e l l i t e f a c i l i t y i s shown i n F i g u r e F.2.
t h e s t o r a g e t a n k and p l a n t equipment t o t h e south. area.
The s i t e
i s graded so t h a t i t p r o v i d e s a d i k e d impoundment area l o c a t e d i m m e d i a t e l y below Any s p i l l a g e f r o m t h e t a n k o r process equipment w i l l f l o w away from t h e t a n k and p l a n t i n t o t h e impoundment The average h e i g h t o f t h e d i k e i n t h e impoundment area i s 10 ft, and t h e area i s s i z e d t o h o l d t h e e n t i r e c o n t e n t s o f t h e s t o r a g e t a n k . The s a f e t y f e a t u r e s shown i n t h e f i g u r e w i l l be discussed i n l a t e r s e c t i o n s w i t h t h e v a r i o u s processes t o which t h e y a r e r e l a t e d . F. 3 PROCESS DESCRIPTIO?! The b a s i c processes i n v o l v e d i n t h e s a t e l l i t e f a c i l i t y a r e discussed i n t h e f o l l o w i n g subsections. The d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e LNG sate1 1 it e f a c i 1 it y was developed u s i n g i n f o r m a t i o n from t h e sources l i s t e d i n S e c t i o n F.5.
@ @
75'
STORAGE TANK IMPOUNDMENT AREA
BOl L OFF HEAT
DC EF
f
DRY CHEMICAL EXTINGUISHER EXPANS ION FOAM UNITS F l RE HYDRANT GAS DETECTOR HALON SYSTEM ULTRA VIOLET FLAME DETECTOR
FACILITY TRAl LER PARK1 NG AREA
FH GD H UV
%9
FIGURE F.2. F.3.1 Transportation and Transfer
Plot Plan for LNG S a t e l l i t e Facility
The equipment and procedures used for LNG transportation and transfer a t the s a t e l l i t e plant are essentially the same as those described in Section E.3.5 of Appendix E f o r the peakshaving plant; thus, transportation and transfer are not discussed in detail here. Because of the lack of liquefaction capability a t the s a t e l l i t e plant, LNG i s only received there, never shipped out.
F.3.2
LNG Storage The LNG t r u c k e d i n t o t h e f a c i l i t y i s s t o r e d o n s i t e u n t i l needed. The
s t o r a g e system and r e l a t e d equipment a r e d e s c r i b e d i n d e t a i l here. The process f l o w diagram f o r t h e s t o r a g e s e c t i o n i s shown i n F i g u r e F.3. (Flow diagram symbols a r e d e f i n e d i n Appendix H . ) i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s a r e g i v e n i n Table F.1. TABLE F.1. Stream I d e n t i f i c a t i o n ID Description Storage System Size ( i n . ) 3 Flowrate 150-350 gpm Associated process stream
LNG from Truck Unloading t o Storage Tank Vapor from Truck Unloading t o Storage Tank Normal Tank Boiloff to Compressors Normal B o i l o f f Gas from B o i l o f f Compressors t o P i p e l ine LNG f r o m Storage Tank t o Vaporiz o r s LNG Return from Sendout Pumps t o Storage Tank Vapor Return from Sendout Pumps t o Storage Tank
0.01 MMscfd
0.13 MMscfd
0.13 MMscfd
-1
12 MMscfd
---
LNG FROM TRUCK UNLOAD1 NG
FIGURE F.3.
Process Flow Diagram f o r LNG S t o r a g e
F.3.2.1
Storage Tank
Storage f o r t h e f a c i l i t y i s a f l a t - b o t t o m e d , double-walled, aboveground LNG s t o r a g e t a n k w i t h a 37,000-bbl c o n s t r u c t e d o f A131 carbon s t e e l . a r e 69 f t and 72 ft, r e s p e c t i v e l y . c a p a c i t y as shown i n F i g u r e F . 4 . The i n n e r t a n k i s c o n s t r u c t e d o f aluminum-magnesium a l l o y AA5083 and t h e o u t e r t a n k i s The diameters of t h e i n n e r and o u t e r tanks The a n n u l a r space between t h e t a n k w a l l s
SARTY VALVES AND P I PING CONNECTIONS
DIMENSIONS: INNER TANK DIAMETER OUTER TANK DIAMETER INNERTANKHEIGHT OUTER TANK HE1GHT
EXPANDED PERLITE
NOTES: CAPACITY - 37. MM bbl DESIGN PRESSURE INTERNAL 2.0 psig EXTERNAL 1 oz. DESIGN TEMPERATURE - INTERNAL - 260'~ SPECIFICATIONS - API 620
MATERIALS: LIQUID CONTAINER - A l - M g ALLOY AA5083 INSULATION SUPPORT DECK - A l - Mg ALLOY AA5083 OUTER TANK - A131 CARBON STEEL DECK INSULATION - ROCK WOOL BOlTOM INSULATION - FOAM GLASS SHELL INSULATION - P I -40 PERLITE AND FIBERGLASS
FIGURE F.4.
LNG Storage Tank
i s f i l l e d with expanded p e r l i t e , an inorganic, nonflammable, lightweight insul a t i o n produced from special rock. The rock o r ore i s finely ground and then thermally expanded onsite and placed i n the insulation space while hot. A r e s i l i e n t fiberglass blanket i s attached to the outside of the inner tank wall t o protect the per1 i t e from excess pressure, due to expansion and contraction of the tank walls (see Figure F.5). The outer tank has a lap-welded, dome-shaped steel roof. Total tank height to the top of the dome i s 73 f t . Suspended from the roof framing of the outer tank i s a lap-welded, metal deck t h a t serves as a ceiling f o r the inner tank, as shown in Figure F.6. The height of the inner tank i s 63 f t . Rock wool insulation i s spread evenly over the deck. Open pipe vents are installed in the deck to allow product vapor to circulate freely in the insulation space to keep the insulation dry. Superheated vapors remain s t r a t i f i e d in the upper space, while colder, saturated vapors are below the deck. The butt-welded outer steel shell and lap-welded steel roof provide permanent weather protection for the tank insulation as well as an a i r - t i g h t seal.
OUTER TANK
\
RES ILIENT BLANKET
FIGURE F.5.
Resilient Blanket in Annular Space Between Walls of LNG Storage Tank
LAP WELDED
....... .:., ....... ......... : : .........
....... ..._....
SUSPENDED INSULATION DECK
BU r r WELDED
FIGURE F.6.
Suspended I n s u l a t i o n Deck
The i n n e r t a n k s i t s on l o a d b e a r i n g i n s u l a t i o n t h a t c a r r i e s t h e w e i g h t o f t h e i n n e r t a n k and i t s c o n t e n t s t o t h e f o u n d a t i o n (see F i g u r e F.7). a seal and i s n o t s u b j e c t t o s i g n i f i c a n t s t r e s s . The b o t tom o f t h e t a n k i s a t h i n s e c t i o n of aluminum a l l o y AA5083 t h a t serves o n l y as The l o a d b e a r i n g i n s u l a t i o n The r e s t s on a l e v e l c o n c r e t e pad which s i t s on t h e bottom o f t h e o u t e r tank. ground.
o u t e r t a n k s i t s on a r e i n f o r c e d c o n c r e t e p i l e cap which r e s t s on p i l e s i n t h e A i r passage under t h e tank bottom e l i m i n a t e s t h e need f o r a f o u n d a t i o n h e a t i n g system such as t h a t used f o r tanks r e s t i n g d i r e c t l y on t h e ground, as d e s c r i b e d i n S e c t i o n E.3.3 o f Appendix E. There a r e two s e t s o f anchor b o l t s i n t h e p i l e cap, one s e t connected t o t h e o u t e r t a n k w a l l and t h e o t h e r connected t o t h e i n n e r t a n k w a l l . These b o l t s h o l d down t h e t a n k a g a i n s t l i f t i n g f o r c e s r e s u l t i n g f r o m i n t e r n a l pressure, b u t p e r m i t t h e vessel t o move r e a d i l y i ' n response t o thermal displacement. The major connections a r e t h e i n l e t and o u t l e t l i q u i d l i n e s i n t h e bottom o f t h e i n n e r tank, t h e vapor o u t l e t and pressure r e l i e f connections i n t h e t o p
STORAGE
GRADE
PILES
FIGURE F.7.
Foundation f o r LNG Storage Tank A l l fit-
o f t h e i n n e r tank, and t h e r e l i e f v e n t i n t h e t o p o f t h e o u t e r tank. t a n k a r e p r o v i d e d w i t h " d i s t a n c e pieces."
t i n g s which c a r r y c o l d gases o r l i q u i d s and pass through t h e o u t e r carbon s t e e l These p r o t e c t t h e o u t e r s h e l l f r o m b r i t t l e f r a c t u r e by d i s s i p a t i n g c o l d b e f o r e i t reaches t h e carbon s t e e l , and t h e y a1 so a l l o w f o r thermal expansion and c o n t r a c t i o n w i t h o u t damage t o f i t t i n g s o r t h e tank.
A l l m a t e r i a l s o f t h e i n n e r tank, manholes, n o z z l e connections, and o t h e r
appurtenances which come i n c o n t a c t w i t h t h e l i q u e f i e d n a t u r a l gas, o r which o p e r a t e a t o r near t h e temperature o f LNG, a r e made o f AA5083 aluminum.
F.3.2.2
Pressure Control System
The storage tank has a design operating pressure of 1 psig and a design maximum pressure of 2 psig. The maximum external pressure i s 1 oz gauge. The pressure in the tank i s controlled by adjusting the boiloff compressor recycle rate. The boiloff compressors are heavy-duty industrial, slow-speed, reciprocating machines f o r continuous compression of the tank boiloff gases and vent gases from t r a i l e r unloading operations. Boiloff r a t e for the storage tank i s 0.13 x 106 scfd (0.1% of f u l l tank capacity). The boiloff compressors have a total capacity of 0.15 x 106 scfd each, giving reserve capacity to handle intermittent truck unloading. Each compressor has high and low suction pressure alarms, a high discharge pressure alarm, a low temperature alarm on the i n l e t , and a high temperature alarm on the o u t l e t . I t i s also equipped with the standard compressor alarms and t r i p s f o r high vibration, low lube oil level or pressure, and high bearing temperature. The boiloff gases are heated by two e l e c t r i c heaters before being compressed. Piping and valves t o the o u t l e t of the heaters a r e a l l stainless s t e e l ; a l l other piping and equipment, including the compressor, are carbon s t e e l . The storage tank i s equipped with two pressure r e l i e f valves t h a t vent to the atmosphere a t 2.0 psig. If tank pressure f a l l s to 0.15 psig, gas from the pipeline i s automatically brought back into the tank. If this i s insufficient to prevent underpressure damage, two vacuum r e l i e f valves admit a i r to the tank when the pressure reaches 0.031 psig.
F . 3.2.3
Additional Instrumentation and Control Svstems
To monitor liquid level, the tank i s equipped with a float-type liquid level device and a differential pressure gauge. A high-level alarm i s activated a t 95% of f u l l capacity. Thermocouples in the inner tank shell and floor monitor cool down. In the event of an emergency, the storage tank i s isolated from other equipment by block valves on the i n l e t and o u t l e t 1 ines. These valves are closed by the Emergency Shutdown (ESD) system.
F.3.2.4
Procedures
Cooldown. The f i r s t step in the cooldown of the storage tank i s to purge the tank with nitrogen. This prevents an explosive mixture from forming and also dries out the tank. The nitrogen purge i s carried out from top to bottom with the nitrogen entering the 2-in. vapor o u t l e t and leaving via the 4-in. downcomer on the 3-in. liquid f i l l line. Nitrogen also enters a t the top of the dome through the r e l i e f vent and e x i t s through the purge ring a t the bottom of the outer tank, thus purging the annular space between tanks. If the tank has been taken out of operation and i s f i l l e d with nitrogen, no purge i s required. After the purge, LNG i s slowly admitted to the top of the tank via the 1-in. liquid return l i n e . The LNG i s deflected and sprayed over the floor. All storage tank thermocouples are continuously monitored to determine the e f f e c t of cooldown on the tank. The temperatures in the tank are carefully analyzed to make sure the maximum temperature gradients are not exceeded. The LNG flow r a t e i s limited by these temperature gradients. When the liquid level in the tank reaches 1 f t or more and the tank i s sufficiently cooled, LNG can be fed through the normal liquid f i l l l i n e . The cooldown purges the nitrogen from the tank and the off gas i s vented to the atmosphere. When methane reaches a specified concentration in the off gas, i t i s compressed and sent to the pipe1 ine. Heatup, Purging, and Entry. Prior to the heatup of the tank, the LNG level i s lowered until the sendout pumps lose suction. This leaves approximately 1 f t of LNG in the tank. Heatup i s then begun by admitting natural gas, heated to 275"F, into the 3-in. liquid withdrawal l i n e i n the bottom of the tank. The gas r i s e s and disperses through the tank and leaves via the 2-in. vapor outl e t l i n e . The gas i s compressed by the boiloff compressor and sent to the pipel i n e . The tank pressure i s controlled the same as during normal operation. The i n l e t gas flow i s maintained a t approximately the normal boiloff r a t e , 0.13 x 106 scfd. A t t h i s rate, i t takes approximately 20 days to warm the tank from -260F to +60F. A 1 storage tank temperatures are constantly moni tored and analyzed 1 t o make sure the maximum temperature gradients are not exceeded.
The s t o r a g e t a n k must be purged t o a 98%+ n i t r o g e n atmosphere b e f o r e personnel e n t r y . L i q u i d n i t r o g e n i s brought i n by c r y o g e n i c t r a i l e r , vaporized, 1 i q u i d withdrawal 1 i n e . The n i t r o g e n This and a d m i t t e d t o t h e t a n k through t h e 3 - i n .
i s m a i n t a i n e d a t t h e l o w e s t temperature p o s s i b l e ( ~ 2 0 F ) t o ensure a l a r g e d i f ference between t h e d e n s i t i e s o f t h e gas i n t h e tank and t h e n i t r o g e n . minimizes m i x i n g and r e s u l t s i n a p i s t o n e f f e c t . t o the pipeline. rapidly. The gas e x i t s t h r o u g h t h e As
vapor o u t l e t , a f t e r which i t i s compressed i n t h e b o i l o f f compressor and s e n t D u r i n g most o f t h e purging, t h e o f f gas i s m o s t l y methane. t h e purge nears completion, however, t h e n i t r o g e n c o n t e n t o f t h e o f f gas r i s e s Because t h e r e i s a l i m i t on t h e n i t r o g e n c o n c e n t r a t i o n i n gas s e n t t o Combustible gas d e t e c t o r s a r e l o c a t e d around Establ ished t h e p i p e l i n e , t h e l a s t p o r t i o n o f t h e o f f gas may have t o be vented through t h e v e n t gas header t o t h e atmosphere. t h e t a n k t o d e t e c t any combustible gases descending from t h e v e n t .
weather c r i t e r i a d e f i n e a c c e p t a b l e atmospheric c o n d i t i o n s f o r v e n t i n g . When t h e i n n e r t a n k i s purged, t h e vapor o u t l e t i s b l o c k e d and t h e i n s u l a t i o n
fill h o l e s and t h e r e 1 i e f v e n t i n t h e t a n k dome a r e opened so t h e dome can be

purged. A f t e r t h e dome i s purged, t h e i n s u l a t i o n f i l l h o l e s and t h e r e l i e f v e n t Nitroa r e c l o s e d and t h e purge r i n g i n t h e bottom o f t h e o u t e r t a n k i s opened. p u r g i n g t h e a n n u l a r space between t h e i n n e r and o u t e r t a n k w a l l s . t h e n be purged w i t h a i r , as desired, u s i n g t h e same procedures. F.3.2.5 Release P r e v e n t i o n and C o n t r o l Features
gen then f l o w s down t h r o u g h t h e i n s u l a t i o n space and o u t o f t h e purge r i n g , thus The t a n k can
The s t o r a g e t a n k a t t h e f a c i l i t y i s surrounded by an e a r t h e n d i k e averaging 10 f t i n h e i g h t and capable o f h o l d i n g a p p r o x i m a t e l y 44,000 b b l o f LNG, as shown p r e v i o u s l y i n F i g u r e F.2. S i t e g r a d i n g i n t h e impoundment area ensures t h a t any LNG s p i l l a g e d r a i n s away from t h e t a n k .
A high-expansion foam genera-
t i o n system i n s t a l l e d i n t h i s area can be a c t i v a t e d e i t h e r manually o r autom a t i c a l l y by low-temperature d e t e c t o r s o r UV f i r e d e t e c t o r s l o c a t e d i n t h e pumpout area. The f o l l o w i n g d e t e c t o r s , alarms, and f i r e p r o t e c t i o n equipment a r e l o c a t e d i n t h e pump and s t o r a g e areas:
combusti b l e gas d e t e c t o r s l o w temperature d e t e c t o r s w i t h alarms i n c o n t r o l room Halon f i r e e x t i n g u i s h i n g system
UV f i r e d e t e c t o r s which a u t o m a t i c a l l y a c t i v a t e t h e Halon system and t h e

Master Emergency Shutdown (MES) sys tem
20 1b d r y chemical f i r e e x t i n g u i s h e r
f i r e hydrant.
A UV f i r e d e t e c t o r and d r y chemical e x t i n g u i s h e r a r e l o c a t e d on t o p o f
t h e s t o r a g e t a n k near t h e r e l i e f valves.
The e x t i n g u i s h e r , d i r e c t e d a t t h e
r e 1 i e f valves, i s a c t i v a t e d by t h e UV d e t e c t o r .
A f i x e d w a t e r deluge system i s
a l s o i n c l u d e d t o d i r e c t water on t h e r o o f o f t h e s t o r a g e t a n k t o keep i t a t a s a f e o p e r a t i n g temperature d u r i n g t h e maximum f i r e t h a t c o u l d be expected a t the terminal .
F. 3.2.6
Sendou t Pumps
The two LNG sendout pumps (P-201 A, B ) a r e v e r t i c a l submerged, pot-mounted LNG pump systems. seal. The pumps and motor d r i v e s a r e h e r m e t i c a l l y sealed i n a vessel T h i s design e l i m i n a t e s t h e extended s h a f t and a s s o c i a t e d and submerged i n LNG. combustion.
The pump and motor surroundings a r e 100% r i c h w i t h LNG and w i l l n o t s u p p o r t The pumps a r e mounted i n a s u c t i o n p o t below grade t o p r o v i d e s u f -
f i c i e n t s u c t i o n head f o r o p e r a t i o n . Each pump 'has a c a p a c i t y o f 6 MMscfd o r 50 gpm f o r a t o t a l r a t e d sendout c a p a c i t y o f 12 MMscfd. p r e s s u r e i s 130 p s i g . Each pump has two l i q u i d d i s c h a r g e l i n e s . the vaporizers. The main l i n e s j o i n and go t o This The o p e r a t i n g temperature i s -260F and t h e d i s c h a r g e
The secondary l i n e s j o i n and r e t u r n t o t h e s t o r a g e tank.
l i q u i d r e t u r n l i n e can be used t o r e c i r c u l a t e t h e tank c o n t e n t s i f necessary. Each pump a l s o has a vapor r e t u r n 1 i n e t o t h e tank t o v e n t vapors d u r i n g s t a r t u p and shutdown.
F.3.3
V a p o r i z a t i o n and Sendout When t h e r e i s a demand f o r gas from t h e s a t e l l i t e f a c i l i t y , LNG i s drawn
f r o m t h e s t o r a g e tank, vaporized, and s e n t o u t t o t h e p i p e l i n e . and sendout a r e d e s c r i b e d here.
Vaporization
The process f l o w diagram f o r t h e v a p o r i z a t i o n s e c t i o n i s shown i n F i g u r e F.8. A s s o c i a t e d process stream i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s a r e g i v e n i n Table F.2. TABLE F.2. V a p o r i z a t i o n and Sendout System F l owrate (MMscfd) 12 12 0.02
ID
E
F
Stream I d e n t i f i c a t i o n Description LNG from Storage Tank t o Vaporizers Vaporized LNG t o P i p e l ine Fuel Gas from Pipel i n e t o LNG Vaporiz e r
F.3.3.1
Vaporizers
The v a p o r i z e r s f o r t h e p l a n t a r e two submerged combustion u n i t s , each r a t e d 6 a t 6 x 1 0 s c f d c a p a c i t y . These u n i t s a r e designed such t h a t t h e b u r n e r s exhaust h o t combustion gases d i r e c t l y downward t h r o u g h a downcomer and i n t o a w a t e r b a t h below t h e l i q u i d s u r f a c e , as shown i n F i g u r e F.9. The exhaust bubbles i n t o t h e This l i f t i n g action w a t e r causing t u r b u l e n c e , m i x i n g , and a " l i f t i n g " a c t i o n . comer. tank.
f o r c e s t h e w a t e r up t h r o u g h an a n n u l a r space c r e a t e d by a w e i r around t h e downThe w a t e r f l o w s o v e r t h e t o p o f t h e w e i r and i n t o t h e more q u i e s c e n t B a t h temperatures range f r o m 90F t o 130F. A h e a t exchanger t u b e c o i l
f o r t h e LNG i s l o c a t e d i n t h e a n n u l a r space between t h e w e i r and t h e downcomer where i t i s scrubbed by t h e warm gas-water m i x t u r e , thus t r a n s f e r r i n g h e a t t o t h e LNG and v a p o r i z i n g i t . The submerged combustion technique r e s u l t s i n a v e r y h i g h thermal e f f i c i e n c y o f 94 t o 96% because 1 ) a l l t h e w a t e r i n t h e comb u s t i o n p r o d u c t s condenses and t h e h i g h h e a t i n g v a l u e (HHV) o f t h e f u e l can be
I,
I I
AIR C-301 A I R BLOWER
Q
I k
-.
FUEL GAS FROM PI PEL1 NE
AUXI LI AR'Y BATH HEATER
GAS FROM V-301-B V-301-A VAPOR I ZER TYPE: SUBMERGED COMBUSTION CAPACITY: 6 M M scfd
tb
GAS TO P I PEL1 NE MAKE-UP WATER
.-I
T o v - 3 1 B VAPORIZER
F I G U R E F.8.
Process F l o w Diagram f o r LNG V a p o r i z a t i o n and Sendout
COVER
LEVEL
FIGURE F. 9. -
Cutaway View o f Submerged Combustion Vaporizer
used, and 2) t h e v i o l e n t turbulence and mixing of the gas and water r e s u l t i n a h i g h r a t e o f heat t r a n s f e r t o t h e tubes. t o 1.5 t o 2.0% o f t h e LNG vaporized. F i g u r e F. 10 shows t h e major components o f the vaporizers. The LNG i n l e t The vaporizers consume gas e q u i v a l e n t
p i p i n g , tube bundle, and o u t l e t p i p i n g t o the f i r s t flange a r e a l l s t a i n l e s s s t e e l c o n s t r u c t i o n . The r e s t o f the o u t l e t p i p i n g i s carbon s t e e l , as a r e t h e tank, weir, and downcomer. downcomer. The s e c t i o n o f each downcomer above t h e water b a t h i s surrounded by a water j a c k e t w i t h continuously c i r c u l a t i n g water t o cool t h e
A small pump s i t s a t the surface o f the water i n t h e b a t h and pumps

The burner, f u e l gas p i p i n g , a i r i n l e t The o v e r a l l dimensions o f t h e v a p o r i z e r
water t o the water j a c k e t on t h e burner. p i p i n g , and blower a r e a l l carbon s t e e l .
a r e approximately 10 x 12 ft, w i t h a h e i g h t o f 9 ft.
The v a p o r i z e r i s surrounded by a f i b e r g l a s s b u i l d i n g f o r weather p r o t e c t i o n .
TANK OR PIT
FIGURE F.lO.
F.3.3.2
Components of Submerged Combustion Vaporizers
Control System and Instrumentation
Two major controls are associated with the vaporizers:

L N G flow control
gas o u t l e t temperature control.

LNG throughput i s automatically control led by a pneumatically operated control valve in the discharge l i n e from the sendout pumps. The gas o u t l e t temperature
from the vaporizer i s controlled by automatic adjustment of the air-operated control valves in the fuel gas and a i r supply l i n e s . Water level i n the tank i s controlled by several means. An overflow nozzle i s located a t the normal water depth t o prevent high levels. Water flow i n t o the bath i s control 1ed t o keep the temperature i n the bath i n the proper range. A low-level alarm and switch will override t h i s temperature control and admit additional water i f the water level f a l l s too low.
Other c o n t r o l s i n c l u d e a pneumatic f u e l - p r e s s u r e c o n t r o l v a l v e and a p i l o t 1 i n e w i t h p r e s s u r e r e g u l a t o r f o r t h e burner. p r e v i o u s l y i n F i g u r e F.8.) The v a p o r i z a t i o n system i s equipped w i t h an automatic V a p o r i z e r Emergency Shutdown (VES) system which, on a c t i v a t i o n , a u t o m a t i c a l l y shuts down t h e vapori z e r s and t h e LNG sendout pumps and i s o l a t e s t h e pumps f r o m b o t h t h e v a p o r i z e r s and t h e LNG s t o r a g e tank. o r t h e c o n t r o l room. b a t h 1 eve1 i n d i c a t o r . F.3.3.3 The VES can be a c t i v a t e d manually a t t h e v a p o r i z e r s The VES can a1 so be a c t i v a t e d a u t o m a t i c a l l y by a temperNormally t h e VES i s a u t o m a t i c a l l y a c t i v a t e d . (The i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n was shown
a t u r e sensor i n t h e gas o u t l e t l i n e , a UV burner flame m o n i t o r , o r t h e w a t e r
Procedures
To s t a r t t h e LNG pumps, t h e d i s c h a r g e v a l v e t o t h e v a p o r i z e r s i s c l o s e d and t h e pumps a r e operated on t o t a l r e c y c l e u n t i l they c o o l down. 1 - i n . vapor r e t u r n l i n e . The vapor produced by c o o l i n g t h e pumps i s vented back t o t h e s t o r a g e t a n k through t h e The burners on t h e v a p o r i z e r s a r e f i r e d and t h e viater b a t h heated t o t h e p r o p e r o p e r a t i n g temperature (95 t o 130F). o f LNG s t a r t s .
A t t h i s point,
t h e d i s c h a r g e v a l v e on t h e pumps i s opened t o t h e v a p o r i z e r s and a small f l o w The r e s t o f t h e s t a r t u p i s semi-automatic, w i t h t h e b u r n e r f i r i n g r a t e and t h e LNG f l o w r a t e b o t h g r a d u a l l y increased u n t i l t h e d e s i r e d flop; r a t e i s reached. Shutdown o f t h e v a p o r i z e r s i s a l s o semi-automatic, w i t h t h e LNG f l o w and burner f i r i n g r a t e g r a d u a l l y decreased. The l a r g e heat-storage c a p a c i t y of ,the w a t e r b a t h p e r m i t s f a i r l y r a p i d s t a r t u p o r shutdown o f t h e v a p o r i z e r w i t h 1 it t l e v a r i a t i o n i n t h e process out1 e t temperature. The v a p o r i z e r s can a l s o be s h u t down by t h e MES and VES systems (see S e c t i o n F.4.1).
F. 3.3.4
Re1ease P r e v e n t i o n and Control Features An a d d i t i o n a l Each d e t e c t o r
Each v a p o r i z e r b u i l d i n g has two cornbusti b l e gas d e t e c t o r s . d e t e c t o r i s l o c a t e d near t h e a i r blower o u t s i d e t h e b u i l d i n g .
has f o u r i n d i c a t i n g 1 i g h t s l o c a t e d on t h e c o n t r o l panel t o denote:
1.
2.
"Safe" condition "Warning" condition, which signifies a gas concentration of approximately 25% of the Lower Flammable Limit ( L F L ) of methane. "Danger" condition, which indicates a gas concentration of approximately 60% o r greater of LFL ( t h i s condition also sounds an alarm). "Trouble," which indicates a malfunction of the gas detection system.
3.
4.
The warning condition autoniatical ly activates a high-rate ventilating fan to reduce the gas concentration in the vaporizer building. If the danger condition s t i l l r e s u l t s , the fan i s turned off and the building openings closed automatically. The Halon f i r e extinguisher system i s then discharged automatically. The f i r e extinguishment system in the vaporizer building i s a Halon (halogenated hydrocarbons 1301 and 1212 ) inerting and f i r e extinguishment, total flooding system. This system can be used not only to extinguish natural gas f i r e s b u t also to i n e r t an enclosure and prevent an explosion. The Halon system i s activated by a UV detector sensitive to the ultraviolet radiation from flames. I t can also be activated by the combustible gas detection system. The UV f i r e detectors have very f a s t , adjustable ( 0 to 30 seconds) response times. They detect very small f i r e s in any wind condition. However, the UV sensors tend to give f a l s e alarms from such things as reflected welding arcs, and they use AC power and thus are sensitive to induced currents and power fluctuations. The detectors are often turned off when construction or maintenance requires welding in the area. Activation of the Halon or other f i r e fighting systems requires simultaneous signals from two UV detectors located in the same area. The f i r s t flange on the vaporizer o u t l e t piping marks the change from cryogenic materials for LNG (aluminum alloy) t o carbon steel construction f o r natural gas. A a r e s u l t , the vaporizer contains several safeguards to ensure s t h a t cold LNG does not reach the carbon steel piping where i t could cause a f a i l u r e due to embrittlement. All burners are equipped with UV flame detectors t h a t alarm in the control rooni in the event of flameout. The UV detector can also be tied in t o the VES to shut down the vaporizer in case of a burner flameout. The water bath contains a significant amount of thermal storage, thus preventing immediate carryover of LNG to the o u t l e t piping a f t e r burner flameout.
The o u t l e t 1 i n e a l s o has two temperature sensors t h a t a r e independently t i e d t o alarms i n t h e c o n t r o l room and t o t h e VES. t i n g c o n d i t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y shutdown. F.4 GENERAL PLANT INFORMATION The f o l l o w i n g subsections p r o v i d e general i n f o r m a t i o n on v a r i o u s aspects o f t h e LNG s a t e l l i t e f a c i l i t y and i t s o p e r a t i o n . F. 4.1 Emergency Shutdown Sy s tern The o p e r a t i o n and a c t i v a t i o n o f t h e Emergency Shutdown (ESD) system f o r t h e sate1 1 it e f a c i l it y a r e d e s c r i b e d here. The water b a t h i s equipped w i t h an e l e c t r i c h e a t e r t o h e l p p r e v e n t freeze-up o f t h e b a t h d u r i n g abnormal opera-
F. 4.1 .1
O p e r a t i o n o f Emergenc,~Shutdown System
The p l a n t emergency shutdown system c o n s i s t s o f two separate systems, t h e Master Emergency Shutdown (MES) and t h e V a p o r i z e r Emergency Shutdown (VES). The MES a1 lows t h e r a p i d shutdown o f t h e p l a n t and i s o l a t i o n o f t h e v a r i o u s p l a n t systems. actions: 1. E l e c t r i c a l s u p p l i e s t o a1 1 normal p l a n t c i r c u i t s a r e de-energized; p l a n t e l e c t r i c a l equipment (e.g., sys tern v a l v e o p e r a t o r s ) remains energized. essential When a c t i v a t e d , t h e MES a u t o m a t i c a l l y i n i t i a t e s t h e f o l l o w i n g
f i r e pumps, f i r e and gas d e t e c t o r s , f i r e
2.
N a t u r a l gas v a l v e s a t p l a n t boundaries a r e c l o s e d t o i s o l a t e t h e p l a n t f r o m t h e n a t u r a l gas p i p e l i n e . gas f r o m v a p o r i z e r s b o i l o f f gas from s t o r a g e t a n k f u e l gas t o v a p o r i z e r s . These v a l v e s i n c l u d e :
3.
The LNG t a n k and d i k e area i s i s o l a t e d f r o m t h e remainder o f t h e p l a n t by the following: v a l v e s a t t h e LNG pump s u c t i o n a r e c l o s e d LNG pump motors a r e s h u t down b l o c k v a l v e s between t h e LNG pumps and t h e v a p o r i z e r s a r e closed.
4.
A telemetric signal "MES Tripped" i s transmitted to company's head office.

With loss of instrument a i r , a l l control valves go t o t h e i r f a i l - s a f e positions.
5.
6.
Gas from a l l gas handling equipment and lines i s vented through the r e l i e f header to the vent stack.
The second shutdown system, the VES, allows the rapid shutdown and isolation of a l l LNG sendout systems. When activated, the VES autoniatically i n i t i a t e s the following actions:
1.
The following natural gas valves a t the plant boundaries are closed: gas from vaporizers fuel gas to vaporizers.
2.
LNG pump motors are shut down. Elock valves between the pumps and the vaporizers are closed.
Pump suction valves on the 1iquid withdrawal 1 ines a r e closed.
3.
4.
5.
Gas from a l l gas handling equpiment and lines i s vented through the r e l i e f header t o the vent stack. The MES and V E S c i r c u i t s are energized with a 525-kW, gas-engine-driven
generator, with a second u n i t f o r 100%standby, t h a t maintains these systems energized and ready f o r operation. When these ci rcui t s are de-energi zed ( f a i 1 s a f e ) , the emergency shutdown actions described above a r e i n i t i a t e d .
F. 4.1.2
Activation of Emergency Shutdown System
Both the MES and VES can be activated nianually a t the control room and a t the two plant e x i t gates. The MES can also be operated automatically by the ul t r a v i o l e t ( U V ) f i r e detectors t h a t monitor the following areas: 1 . conipressor building 2. vaporizers
3.
LNG pumps
piping on or adjacent to pipe racks next t o compressor building.
4.
The VES i s normally a c t i v a t e d automatically by a temperature sensor i n t h e v a p o r i z e r gas out1 e t 1 i n e (1 ow temperature), by t h e UV f 1ame monitors on t h e v a p o r i z e r burners (burner flameout), o r by the water bath level i n d i c a t o r (low 1e v e l ) . F.4.2 Plant Fire Protection
A combination of dry chemical, high-expansion foam, and water systems has been i n s t a l l e d a t t h e p l a n t f o r f i r e p r o t e c t i o n .
Water from a 750,000 gal s t o r a g e tank i s provided t o a 10-in. d u c t i l e - i r o n , f i r e - w a t e r loop by an engine-driven f i r e pump. A second engine-driven pump provides a 100% standby. F i r e plugs with hose, nozzles, and hose c a b i n e t s a r e l o c a t e d throughout t h e p l a n t . Nozzles a r e a combination stream and fog type with shutoff. Monitor nozzles a r e s t r a t e g i c a l l y located t o provide cooling water f o r major p l a n t components. Monitor nozzl e s a r e handwheel operated f o r e l e v a t i o n , w i t h lockable ball -bearing swivel bases f o r f u l l 360" horizontal r o t a t i o n . Elevation i s by wheel-operated worm g e a r , which locks p o s i t i v e l y unless t h e wheel i s turned. Each nozzle, discharging 350 gpm, i s a d j u s t a b l e f o r s t r a i g h t stream, narrow fog, o r wide fog water p a t t e r n . Localized irnpoundnient wells made of i n s u l a t e d concrete a r e provided f o r t r u c k unloading s t a t i o n s , vaporizers, and sendout pumps. Manual dry chemical systems with hose 1 i n e s a r e provided t o make dry chemical a v a i l a b l e t o p l a n t equipment . High-expansion foam i s produced by water-motor-driven f a n s supplied w i t h a mixture of foam c o n c e n t r a t e (biodegradable d e t e r g e n t ) and water a t f i r e main p r e s s u r e of 125 p s i g . These u n i t s produce foam having an expansion r a t i o of 500:l i n s u f f i c i e n t q u a n t i t y t o maintain a 3 - f t - t h i c k blanket of foam over a l l impounding a r e a s . This blanket serves t o warm the vapors produced by a s p i l l , providing control of t h e vapor cloud by reducing the d i s t a n c e of t r a v e l t o reach a temperature of p o s i t i v e buoyancy. I t a l s o s e r v e s , i n case of i g n i t i o n , t o reduce both t h e e f f e c t of r a d i a n t energy from a f i r e and t h e r a t e of pool evap o r a t i o n , reducing t h e heat r e l e a s e t o 5% of t h e amount with no foam blanket.
I n the event of a s p i l l , high-expansion foam generators are activated automatically by a temperature sensor in the impoundment sump, and both high-expansion foam and dry chemical units a r e activated by UV detectors i f ignition takes p l ace.
F.4.3
Venting
A1 1 gas 1 i nes and gas hand1 ing equipment, incl udi ng those in the loading area, can be vented to the vent stack through the vent gas header. Gas i s not normally vented except in the case of an emergency shutdown, when the MES automatically vents a l l gas lines and gas handling equipment. The LNG sendout pumps a r e vented back t o the storage tank via the 1-in. vapor return l i n e .
The storage tank has two pressure re1 ief valves t h a t vent to the atmosphere. Normal off gas from the storage tank i s handled by the boiloff compressor. r e l i e f valves open only when needed to protect the tank from overpressure. All vessels or sections of L N G lines t h a t can be isolated with LNG in them and allowed to warm are protected by r e l i e f valves venting to the atmosphere. F.5 The
SOURCES OF INFORMATION
The LNG sate1 1 i t e plant description was developed using information from
the sources l i s t e d below. 1. LNG Equipment Vendors: Chicago Bridge and Iron - Cryogenic Storage, Bulletin No. 8600, Chicago Bridge and Iron
Cryogenic Systems, Bulletin No. 8650,
Chicago Bridge and Iron - USA Standards f o r Design and Construction of LNG I n s t a l l a t i o n , Bulletin No. 831, Ryan Industries - Sub-X Vaporizer, Product Bulletin No. LNG-200, Ryan Industries - Sate1 1 i t e and Transport Systems f o r Liquefied Natural Gas, Bulletin LNG-100, Pi ttsburgh-Des Moines Steel Company - LNG Storage Tanks, Bulletin No. 303.
2.
Open L i t e r a t u r e : Devanna, L. and G . Doulames, "Planning i s t h e Key t o LNG Tank Purging, Entry and Inspection." Oil and Gas J o u r n a l , pp. 74-82, September 8 , 1975. Hanke, C . C . , I . V. LaFare, and L . F . L i t z i n g e r , "Purging LNG Tanks I n t o and O u t of Service, Considerations and Experiences." Paper presented a t t h e AGA D i s t r i b u t i o n Conference, Minneapolis, MN, May 6-8, 1974. Gas Processing Handbook Issue. April 1973. Hydrocarbon Processing, pp. 132-1 38,
LNG Information Book, prepared by the LNG Information Book Task Group of t h e Liquefied Natural Gas Committee, American Gas Association 1973.
Crawford, D . B. and G . P . Eschenbrenner, "Heat Transfer Equipment f o r LNG Projects." Chemical Engineering Progress, pp. 62-70, September 1972. Anderson, P . J . and E . J . Daniels, "The LNG Industry: P a s t , Present, and Future." Prepared by I n s t i t u t e of Gas Technology f o r U.S. ERDA Under Contract No. EE-77-C-02-4234. Seroka, S. and R. J . Bolan, "Safety Considerations i n the I n s t a l l a t i o n of an LNG Tank. " Cryogenics and I n d u s t r i a l Gases, pp. 22-28, September/October 1970.
LNG Economics and Technology (ed. by Dean Hale) Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 74-1 9766, copyright 1974 by Energy Communications, I n c . , Petroleum Engineer Pu bl i s h i ng Co.
Bennett, W. F . , Algerian LNG Plays Dual Peakshaving Role i n Georgia." Pipe1 i n e and Gas J o u r n a l , p p . 54-58, November 1978. Del T a t t o , D. L . , "LNG - S a t e l l i t e Peakshaving." Presented a t t h e American Gas Association D i s t r i b u t i o n Conference, Houston, TX, May 6-9, 1968, 12 P P . Wakefield, B. D . , " P l a n t Launches LNG S a t e l l i t e . " November 13, 1969. Iron Age, pp. 78-79,
Stevens, J . L . , S r . , "LNG - From We1 1head t o User by Highway Tanker Transport." P i p e l i n e and Gas Journal, pp. 32-34, May 1975. Fowler, D . B . , J . M. Burns, "Trucking Gas: A New Way t o Market I s o l a t e d Reserves." World O i l , pp. 71-75, November 1977. Parker, M . L. "Automated Truck L0a.d-Out System." Chemical Engineering Progress, Vol. 65, No. 4 , pp. 58-60, April 1969.
Warner, V . A., "Liquefied Natural Gas Fire Control. " Paper presented a t the AGA Transmission Conference, Las Vaga, N V , May 3-5, 1976. Brock, N . H . and R. M. Howard, "Upgrading LNG Plant Safety." Paper presented a t the AGA Transmission conference, Bal Harbour, FL, May 1921, 1975. Wesson, H. R . , "Consideration Relating t o Fire Protection Requirements f o r LNG Plants." Paper presented a t the AGA Transmission Conference, Bal Harbour, FL, May 19-21, 1975. Wissniiller, I . L . and E . 0. Mattocks, "How t o Use LNG Safely." and Gas Journal, March 1972. Pipeline
Schulz, F . P . , "Safety a t an LNG Peakshaving F a c i l i t y . " Paper presented SE e a t the A M Winter Annual Meeting, Nw York, N Y , November 17-22, 1974. Smith, L. R . , "Submerged Pumps f o r LNG Sendout." Distribution Conference, 1968. Paper presented a t AGA
Anderson, P . J . and W. W. Bidle, "Safety Considerations i n the Design and Operation of LNG Terminals. " Paper presented a t the 4th International LNG Conference, Algiers, A1 g e r i a , June 24-27, 1974.
Durr, C . A., "Process Techniques and Hardware Uses Outlined f o r LNG Regasi f i c a t i o n . " Oil and Gas Journal, May 13, 1974.
Durr, C . A. and D . B. Crawford, "LNG Terminal Design." sing, November 1973.
Hydrocarbon Proces-
Hale, D . , Ed., "Peakshaving Supplies Reach All-Time High f o r 1978-1979 Winter." Pipe1 ine and Gas Journal, November 1978. Sarkes, L . A . , e t a l . , "LNG: Current Status Confirms i t s Technical Maturity." Pi pel ine and Gas Journal, November 1978.
APPENDIX G ANALYSES OF REPRESENTATIVE RELEASE EVENTS
APPENDIX G
ANALYSES OF REPRESENTATIVE RELEASE EVENTS
Representative re1 ease events for the L N G faci 1 it i e s considered i n t h i s study are developed in Sections 3 through 7. events a r e analyzed in t h i s appendix. release event are: possible i n i t i a t i n g events leading to the potential release
6
These representative release
Included in the analysis of each
r e s u l t s and e f f e c t s of release prevention and control systems (includes magnitude of re1 ease)
additional information required for more accurate or complete analysis of the event potential design and operational changes t h a t could prevent or reduce the consequences of the release. The arialyses presented here are only prel iminary . Kore detai 1ed technical
and cost evaluations a r e needed before any specific design modifications can be recommended. In most cases, the release quantities calculated in t h i s appendix are niaximutns, based on plant throughput capacities and component inventories given in the f a c i l i t y descriptions (Appendices B through F ) . Several simp1 ifying assumptions are made t o f a c i l i t a t e the analyses: 1. Shutdown times are chosen t o be r e a l i s t i c and representative of actual times for the event in question. In most cases, two shutdown times are considered: 1 niinute for automatic or manual shutdown with the emergency shutdown (ESD) system and 10 minutes f o r manual shutdown without the ESD ( e . g . , ESD f a i 1 s t o operate).
2.
Leak r a t e s are assumed to be step functions, with the flow continuing a t a constant level f o r the specified time and then ceasing instantaneously. I t i s recognized t h a t t h i s i s somewhat inaccurate in t h a t , as shutoff valves close, the flow will gradually be reduced. However, because of a
l a c k o f good d a t a and t h e p r e l i m i n a r y n a t u r e o f these analyses, t h e approach used i s judged t o be s u f f i c i e n t l y a c c u r a t e .
3.
Due t o a l a c k o f good data, no speed-up o f pumps ( o r compressors) i s assumed t o r e s u l t f r o m breaks i n t h e 1 i n e s p r e s s u r i z e d by t h e pumps ( o r conlpressors), even though t h e drop i n back p r e s s u r e i s 1 ik e l y t o a l l o w a c e r t a i n amount o f speed-up t o o c c u r .
4.
Holdup o f LNG and n a t u r a l gas i n l i n e s and equipment d r a i n e d by a l e a k i s c a l c u l a t e d t o be r e a l i s t i c ( i .e., a t the f a c i l i t y ) . representative o f actual conditions
Any o t h e r assumptions used a r e d e s c r i b e d i n t h e s p e c i f i c analyses t o which t h e y apply.

G.l
REPRESENTATIVE RELEASE EVENTS FOR THE LNG EXPORT TERMINAL The p o t e n t i a l r e l e a s e events chosen t o be r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e r e f e r e n c e
LNG e x p o r t t e r m i n a l a r e 1 i s t e d i n Table G . 1 .
(The f a c i l i t y d e s c r i p t i o n o f
t h e r e f e r e n c e e x p o r t t e r m i n a l appears i n Appendix B . )
The analyses o f t h e
in d i v i d u a l events a r e presented be1ow.

TABLE G.1.
1.
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Release Events f o r an LNG E x p o r t Terminal

R u p t u r e o f t h e 3 6 - i n . main t r a n s f e r l i n e between t h e l o a d i n g pumps and t h e dock.
2.
Rupture o f t h e 24-in. f i r s t block valve.
l i q u i d o u t l e t l i n e between t h e s t o r a g e t a n k and t h e
3.
R u p t u r e o f a 1 6 - i n . l o a d i n g arm S t o r a g e t a n k p r e s s u r e r e l i e f v a l v e s open S t o r a g e t a n k vacuum r e l i e f v a l v e s open. I n n e r t a n k i s o v e r f i l l e d w i t h LNG. Complete f a i l u r e . o f s t o r a g e t a n k . R u p t u r e o f 1 8 - i n . f e e d gas l i n e i n l i q u e f a c t i o n t r a i n . Rupture o f 20-in. mixed r e f r i g e r a n t l i q u i d p i p i n g between h i g h p r e s s u r e
4. 5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
s e p a r a t o r and m a i n c r y o g e n i c h e a t exchanger. 10. 11. 12. R u p t u r e o f 1 0 - i n . n o z z l e t o p r o p a n e l m i x e d r e f r i g e r a n t exchanger. F a i l u r e o f a r e f r i g e r a n t compressor ( p r o p a n e o r mixed r e f r i g e r a n t ) Rupture o f 12-in. t r a n s f e r l i n e from l i q u e f a c t i o n area t o t h e storage tanks. 13. R u p t u r e o f o u t l e t n o z z l e o r p i p i n g on r e f r i g e r a n t s t o r a g e t a n k s ( p r o p a n e , ethylene).
G.1.1
Rupture of t h e 36-in. Main Transfer Line Between t h e Loading Pumps and t h e Dock Possible I n i t i a t i n g Events F a i l u r e of valve c l o s u r e control mechanism causes valve t o c l o s e too f a s t and t h e r e s u l t i n g f l u i d hammer overpressures t h e l i n e . (low probabil i t y ) The l i n e i s blocked and f i l l e d with L N G and t h e d r a i n system i s not activated. The l i n e heats up and t h e r e l i e f valves do not f u n c t i o n (1ow probabi 1 i t y ) (The properly, causi ng t h e 1 i ne t o overpressure.
Fatigue f a i l u r e from thermal cycling and p r e s s u r e c y c l i n g . by c i r c u l a t i n g LNG. ) (low p r o b a b i l i t y ) (low p r o b a b i l i t y )
t r a n s f e r l i n e i s normally kept a t o p e r a t i n g temperature and p r e s s u r e
F a i l u r e of valve body o r pipe f i t t i n g s . F a i l u r e a t t h e expansion j o i n t .
(medium p r o b a b i l i t y )
S t r e s s e s t o t r e s t l e support from l a r g e waves, winds, o r earthquakes. (low p r o b a b i l i t y ) Results and E f f e c t s of Release Prevention and Control Systems ESD s h u t s o f f t h e loading pumps within 1 minute of s p i l l , l i m i t i n g r e l e a s e t o c o n t e n t s of t h e l i n e , 170,000 g a l l o n s . ESD i s not a c t i v a t e d o r f a i l s t o respond. minutes t o s h u t down system. I t t a k e s o p e r a t o r 10
The maximum r e l e a s e i s 670,000 g a l l o n s .
I f t h e s p i l l occurs a t t h e dock, i t w i l l d r a i n i n t o a containment a r e a . I f t h e s p i l l occurs i n t h e middle of t h e t r e s t l e , i t w i l l d r a i n i n t o t h e ocean. I f t h e s p i l l occurs near t h e loading pumps, i t w i l l d r a i n i n t o t h e diked a r e a . Additional Information Required What a r e t h e d e t a i l s of t h e ESD, i . e . and how f a s t i t i s o l a t e s t h e system? What a r e t h e d e t a i l s of d r a i n system--if a break occurs, how f a s t and how much of t h e l i n e can be drained i n t o a containment a r e a ?
, how f a s t i t would be a c t i v a t e d
What i s t h e f a i l u r e frequency o f long, l a r g e c r y o g e n i c p i p e s and fittings? P o t e n t i a l Design and O p e r a t i o n a l Changes

o
I n s t a l l a double-pipe t r a n s f e r l i n e o r some t y p e o f e n c l o s u r e around transfer l i n e t o contain a s p i l l . Two s m a l l e r l i n e s (e.g., 36-in. l i n e .
24 i n . ) c o u l d be used i n s t e a d o f t h e l a r g e
The s m a l l e r v a l v e s , expansion j o i n t s , and o t h e r f i t t i n g s
may be more r e l i a b l e , t h u s r e d u c i n g t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f f a i l u r e .
6.1.2
Rupture of the 24-in. Liquid Outlet Line Between the Storage Tank and the F i r s t Block Valve Possible I n i t i a t i n g Events Fatigue f a i l u r e from pressure and thermal cycling. (low probability) Failure of block valve or pipe f i t t i n g . (low probability) Failure of expansion j o i n t . Fluid hammer. (medium probability) (low probability)
Results and Effects of Release Prevention and Control Systems Gas detector warns operator who closes the internal block valve. Elapsed time - one minute, maximum s p i l l volume - 110,000 gallons. Gas detectors f a i l or operator ignores warning and internal valve i s n o t closed f o r 10 minutes. Maximum s p i l l - 1.1 x 10 gallons. Entire tank contents
6
Internal valve f a i l s and cannot be closed. are spilled.
Maximum s p i l l i s 23 x lob gallons.
S p i l l s will be contained by diked area around the storage tanks. Additional Information Required What i s the f a i l u r e frequency of large cryogenic pipes and f i t t i n g s ? What are the d e t a i l s on operation of the internal valve and p o s s i b i l i t y of f a i l u r e ? Potential Design and Operational Changes Internal block valve could be activated by the Master Emergency Shutdown system.
G.1.3
Leak o r Rupture o f a 1 6 - i n . Loading Arm P o s s i b l e I n i t i a t i n g Events

e
Bad make-up o f t h e f l a n g e c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e s h i p .
(nedium p r o b a b i l i t y )
Loading-arm sviivel j o i n t f a i l s from excessive m o t i o n o r l a c k o f i n s p e c t i o n and maintenance.

e
(medium p r o b a b i l it y ) (low p r o b a b i l i t y )
F a t i g u e f a i l u r e f r o m thermal and p r e s s u r e c y c l i n g . The l o a d i n g arm i s blocked i n and n o t d r a i n e d . t o f a i 1 from overpressure. ( l o w probabi 1 it y )
The l i n e heats up
and t h e r e l i e f valves do n o t f u n c t i o n p r o p e r l y , causing t h e l i n e
F a i l u r e o f h y d r a u l i c power u n i t p r e v e n t s arm f r o m moving f r e e l y , r e s u l t i n g i n r u p t u r e o f arm. (low p r o b a b i l i t y ) ( l o w p r o b a b i 1 it y )
Emergency uncoupl i n g p r i o r t o s h u t t i n g down system.
F a i l u r e o f m o t i o n i n d i c a t o r t o a c t i v a t e ESD system i n t h e e v e n t o f e x c e s s i v e s h i p m o t i o n causes r u p t u r e o f l o a d i n g arm.

e
( l o w probabi 1 it y ) (low
Another vessel c o l l i d e s w i t h LNG t a n k e r w h i l e i t i s docked. probability)
R e s u l t s and E f f e c t s o f Release P r e v e n t i o n and C o n t r o l Systems

o
The ESD s h u t s o f f l o a d i n g pumps and c l o s e s b l o c k v a l v e s w i t h i n 1 m i n u t e after spill. Maximum s p i l l volume would be 14,000 g a l l o n s .
The ESD i s n o t a c t i v a t e d o r f a i l s t o respond, and i t t a k e s 10 minutes f o r o p e r a t o r t o s h u t down system. Maximum r e l e a s e i s 140,000 g a l l o n s .
S p i l l s w i l l d r a i n i n t o t h e containment area under l o a d i n g arms, except f o r s p i l l s a t f l a n g e c o n n e c t i o n which c o u l d s p i l l o n t o s h i p and i n t o t h e water. Leaks f r o m s w i v e l j o i n t s and o t h e r f a i l u r e s c o u l d spray a l l o v e r dock area.
A d d i t i o n a l I n f o r m a t i o n Required
@
What a r e t h e d e t a i l s o f o p e r a t i o n o f t h e ESD, i - e . , how f a s t a s p i l l i s d e t e c t e d and how soon t h e ESD s h u t s down t h e system? What i s t h e f a i l u r e frequency o f cryogenic, marine l o a d i n g arms?
G.1.4
Storage Tank P r e s s u r e S a f e t y Valves Relieve.
I f t h e s e valves f a i l on demand o r t h e i r c a p a c i t y (792,000 1b / h r ) i s exceeded, t h e s t o r a g e tank could f a i l from overpressure. P o s s i b l e I n i t i a t i n g Events R e f r i g e r a n t systems s h u t down but natural gas flow i s not stopped e i t h e r by temperature o v e r r i d e of flow c o n t r o l valve o r manually by t h e o p e r a t o r . Tank reaches vent p r e s s u r e i n two minutes and vent r a t e i s 350,000 l b l h r . ( 9 . 4 x 104 e q u i v a l e n t g a l l o n s l i q u i d ) (medi um probabi 1 i t y )
L N G leaving l i q u e f a c t i o n t r a i n i s not s u f f i c i e n t l y cooled because
of f a i l u r e of t h e l i q u e f a c t i o n process c o n t r o l equipment o r because c o n t r o l l e r s e t p o i n t s a r e wrong. produced. I f temperature i s w i t h i n 14F of tank s a t u r a t i o n temperature, b o i l o f f compressor w i l l handle vapor I f temperature i s 17F above s a t u r a t i o n , t h e tank w i l l reach r e l i e f p r e s s u r e i n 20 t o 60 minutes and t h e vent r a t e would be 3 3 8,000 t o 26,000 l b l h r . ( 2 . 2 . x 10 t o 7.0 x 10 e q u i v a l e n t g a l l o n s 1 i q u i d ) (medium probabi 1 i t y ) Rollover - t h e amount of vapor vented depends on excess thermal energy o f feed and on f i l l i n g r a t e .
e
(low p r o b a b i l i t y )
Boiloff compressor o r p r e s s u r e c o n t r o l l e r f a i l s and no vapor i s removed from t h e tank ( e . g . , power f a i l u r e ) .
A t normal b o i l o f f r a t e s , i t would t a k e 4 t o 5 days t o reach vent p r e s s u r e . Vent r a t e 2 2000 l b l h r . ( 5 . 4 x 10 e q u i v a l e n t g a l l o n s l i q u i d ) (medium p r o b a b i l i t y )

I n s u l a t i o n f a i l u r e - t h i s i s not l i k e l y t o cause o v e r p r e s s u r e , a s
t o t a l f a i l u r e would only i n c r e a s e b o i l o f f t o 5000 l b / h r , which can be handled by one compressor. ( 1 . 3 x 10"~uivalent gallons liquid) (low p r o b a b i l i t y ) Results and E f f e c t s of Release Prevention and Control Systems Vapor re1 eased by re1 i e f valves wi 11 be denser than t h e a i r and wi 11 tend t o d r i f t downward.
I f t h e r e l i e f v a l v e s f a i l , t h e tank c o u l d overpressure and s p l i t . S p l i t would most l i k e l y occur a t r o o f - w a l l seam and o n l y vapor woul d be r e 1 eased.
a
e
F a i l u r e a t r o o f j o i n t c o u l d p o s s i b l y cause f a i l u r e o f e n t i r e t a n k . There i s l i t t l e chance o f r o l l o v e r o c c u r r i n g i f f e e d c o m p o s i t i o n i s c o n s t a n t and l i q u e f a c t i o n o p e r a t i o n i s normal.
Tank c o n t a i n s t o p and bottom f i l l nozzles.
The bottom f i l l n o z z l e
empties i n t o a 6 0 - i n . s t i l l i n g w e l l and f l a s h e s a t t a n k c o n d i t i o n s . The l i q u i d i s d i s p e r s e d o u t h o l e s a t t h e bottom o f t h e w e l l .
If l i g h t f e e d i s bottom f i l l e d and heavy f e e d t o p f i l l e d , chances of

s t r a t i f i c a t i o n are less. I f t h e t a n k became s t r a t i f i e d and r o l l o v e r occurred, t h e r e s u l t i n g vapor produced would be reduced by t h e f a c t t h a t a l l f e e d i s f l a s h e d a t tank conditions. The r e s u l t i n g vapor produced would be equal t o t h e h e a t l e a k i n t o t h e bottom l a y e r . A d d i t i o n a l I n f o r m a t i o n Required
e
What i s t h e frequency o f r e l i e f v a l v e f a i l u r e and t h e e f f e c t o f i n s p e c t i o n and t e s t i n g on frequency o f f a i l u r e ?
What a r e t h e f r e q u e n c i e s o f l i q u e f a c t i o n p l a n t upsets and p r o d u c t control valve f a i l ures? tank. I f t a n k overpressures and r e l i e f v a l v e s f a i l o r a r e n o t l a r g e enough, where w i l l t a n k f a i l and what i s l i k e l i h o o d o f t h e whole t a n k c o l l a p s i n g ? Combination c o u l d l e a d t o o v e r p r e s s u r e o f
P o t e n t i a l Design and O p e r a t i o n a l Changes Design t a n k t o w i t h s t a n d h i g h e r pressures. Design t a n k t o s p l i t a t r o o f / w a l l seam, l e a v i n g bottom c o n t a i n e r i n t a c t i n t h e event o f overpressure. f o r LNG t a n k s . ) ( T h i s i s n o r m a l l y t h e case
6.1.5
Storage Tank Underpressures and Vacuum Relief Valves Open. If these valves f a i l or are not large enough, storage tank could collapse. Possible I n i t i a t i n g Events The following events can cause the pressure in the storage tank t o fall:
- Pressure control system f a i l s or i s inoperable and b o t h boiloff
ccmpressors a r e run a t f u l l speed. reach vacuum re1 ief pressure.
Will take 36 minutes to
(medi uni probabi 1 i t y )
- N vapor i s returned to tank during ship loading. The tank will o

reach 0.03 psig in 1 2 minutes. (niediuni probability) Results and 'Effects of Release Prevention and Control Systems In each of these cases, the emergency gas supply system would be automatically activated before the r e l i e f valves would open. For the r e l i e f valves t o open, the emergency gas supply system would have t o f a i l t o operate or not have a large enough capacity. Additional Information Reauired
e
Capacity of emergency gas supply system and frequency of f a i l u r e of control valve and control 1 e r .
Frequency of r e l i e f valve f a i l u r e and e f f e c t of inspection and t e s t i n g on frequency of f a i l u r e .
Potential Design and Operational Changes Design tank t o withstand higher vacuum.
6.1.6
The Storage Tank i s Overfilled with L N G . The L N G covers the suspended ceiling a n d flows down the annular space bet-
ween the tank walls. Possible I n i t i a t i n g Events T o levels of f a i l u r e are required: w

- High level alarm f a i l s , or level indicator gives improper reading,
or operator ignores high level alarm.

- The high-high level signal f a i l s t o activate shutdown system or
level indicator gives improper reading and does not a c t i v a t e alarm. (low probabi 1 i t y )
Liquid sloshes over inner wall due to horizontal acceleration of the tank from earthquake. (low probability)
Results and Effects of Release Prevention and Control Systems

a
The consequences of o v e r f i l l are hard to determine. increasing heat leakage t o 2-112 times normal. fail
The insulating
properties of the p e r l i t e in the annular space would be reduced, ,-he outer carbon steel shell could f a i l and the roof f a l l , causing the inner tank t o
The inner tank has 13 f t of freeboard (distance from maximum liquid level t o top of tank) t o prevent liquid from sloshing over. Additional Information Reauired
e
What e f f e c t would overflow have on the following parts of the tank?
- Suspended ceiling
- Insulation - Outer tank
a
Details on level indicator and likelihood of i t giving an incorrect reading .
Potential Design and Operational Changes Construct outside tank of niaterials suitable f o r cryogenic service.
Provide the tank with an overflow l i n e t o prevent s p i l l i n g into the annular space between the inner and outer tanks.
G.1.7
Storage Tank Fails. Size of s p i l l could be u p to 550,000 bbls (2.3 x 107 gallons) f o r a t o t a l
failure. Possible I n i t i a t i n g Events Overpressure or underpressure of outer tank (see other release events) Sabotage (low probabi 1 i t y ) Large earthquake (1 o probabi 1 i ty ) w Airplane crash (low probabi 1 i t y )
e
Fire and explosion in other sections of the plant ( l o w probability) Stress from thermal and pressure cycling (low probability) Stress corrosion (1 o probabi 1 i t y ) w Fai 1 ure of shel 1 -to-roof we1 ds, nozzle we1 ds, or shel 1-to-bottom we1 ds ( 1 o probabi 1 i t y ) w Differential s e t t l i n g of foundation or frostheave resulting from heater f a i l u r e (low probability)

0
Overpressure or underpressure do not necessarily cause complete f a i 1 ure. The high, small-diameter dike surrounding the tank holds 133'%of f u l l tank contents.
Additional Information Required What i s the e f f e c t of f i r e or explosions in other sections of the plant on the storage tank? What e f f e c t will collapse of the tank have on the structural i n t e g r i t y of the dike?
@
What design factors are included t o account for cycling s t r e s s e s ?
Potential Design and Operational Changes Build the tank underground.
G.1.8
Rupture of 1 8 - i n . Feed Gas L i n e i n L i q u e f a c t i o n T r a i n . P o s s i b l e I n i t i a t i n g Events

-
A l e a k f r o m c o l d l i n e c o n t a c t s carbon s t e e l l i n e and causes i t t o f a i 1 . (medi um probabi 1 it y )

F a t i g u e f r o m s t a t i c and c y c l i c s t r e s s e s .
e
(low p r o b a b i l i t y ) (low p r o b a b i l i t y )
F a i l u r e o f v a l v e body o r p i p e f i t t i n g .
R e s u l t s and E f f e c t s o f Release P r e v e n t i o n and C o n t r o l Systems There a r e no gas d e t e c t o r s i n area, so o p e r a t o r would have t o n o t i c e spill be: 1 minute 10 minutes A d d i t i o n a l I n f o r m a t i o n Required Does p r e s s u r e i n d i c a t o r i n t h e l i n e a l a r m i n t h e c o n t r o l room? t h e r e o t h e r i n s t r u n l e n t a t i o n t h a t would i n d i c a t e a p i p e break? How l o n g would i t t a k e o p e r a t o r t o i s o l a t e t h e system? P o t e n t i a l Design and O p e r a t i o n a l Changes P u t c o m b u s t i b l e gas d e t e c t o r s i n l i q u e f a c t i o n area.
e
l o w p r e s s u r e i n p i p e l i n e would be an i n d i c a t i o n o f a break.
Depend-
i n g on how l o n g i t takes t o i s o l a t e t h e system, t h e maximum r e l e a s e s would
1.7 x 10
3 s c f (2.1 x 10 e q u i v a l e n t g a l l o n s 1i q u i d ) 6 4 1 . 4 x 10 s c f (1.7 x 10 e q u i l v a l e n t gallons l i q u i d )
Is
Pressure i n d i c a t o r i n f e e d gas l i n e c o u l d a c t i v a t e t h e MES i n t h e e v e n t of l o w o r h i g h pressure. The MES c o u l d i n c l u d e i s o l a t i o n v a l v e s i n t h e l i q u e f a c t i o n system.
G . 1.9
Rupture of 20-in. Nixed R e f r i g e r a n t Liquid Piping Between High Pressure Separator and Main Cryogenic Heat Exchanger. P o s s i b l e I n i t i a t i n g Events Fatigue from thermal cycl ing. Fatigue from pressure cycl i ng. (low p r o b a b i l i t y ) (low probabi 1i t y ) (medi urn probabi 1 i t y ) (low p r o b a b i l i t y ) (low p r o b a b i l i t y )
Fai 1 ure of expansion j o i n t t o o p e r a t e properly. F a i l u r e of valve body o r pipe f i t t i n g . Fluid hammer from f a s t valve c l o s u r e .
Results and E f f e c t s of Release Prevention and Control Systems
LNG product valve would reduce o r s t o p t h e feed gas flow because of lack of c o o l i n g . Refrigerant c y c l e s would go t o t o t a l r e c y c l e . Operator would have t o recognize s p i l l and i s o l a t e system. E n t i r e inventory of 4000 g a l l o n s would be l o s t i n 1 minute.
Additional Information Required
0
A l a r g e portion of t h e r e f r i g e r a n t inventory would be exhausted before t h e o p e r a t o r could i s o l a t e t h e system. s p i l l would depend on the following: The s i z e of t h e
- inventory i n t h e system - p o r t i o n of t h e inventory t h a t could escape through t h e break.

o
Frequency of f a i l u r e of piping, f i t t i n g s , and v e s s e l s in r e f r i g e r a n t systems.
P o s s i b l e Design and Operational Changes See niodifications l i s t e d i n Section G.1.8.
G . 1.10
R u ~ t u r eof 10-in. I n l e t Nozzle t o Pro~ane/Mixed R e f r i a e r a n t Exchanaer.
Possible I n i t i a t i n g Events Fatigue f a i l u r e from thermzl cycl ing. (low probabil i t y ) (law p r o b a b i l i t y ) (low p r o b a b i l i t y )
Fatigue f a i l u r e from pressure c y c l i n g . F a i l u r e of valve body o r pipe f i t t i n g .
Results and E f f e c t s of Release Prevention and Control Systems
L N G product valve would reduce o r s t o p t h e feed gas flow because of lack of cooling. Refrigerant c y c l e s would go t o t o t a l r e c y c l e . Operator
would have t o recognize s p i l l and i s o l a t e system. g a l l o n s could be l o s t i n 3 minutes. Additional Information Reauired A l a r g e portion of t h e r e f r i g e r a n t inventory would be exhausted before t h e o p e r a t o r could i s o l a t e t h e system. would depend on t h e following:
- inventory i n t h e system - portion of t h e inventory t h a t could escape through t h e break.
e
E n t i r e inventory of 10,000
The s i z e of t h e s p i l l
Frequency of f a i l u r e of piping, f i t t i n g s , and v e s s e l s i n r e f r i g e r a n t systems.
Po - tential
Design and Operational Changes
See modifications l i s t e d i n Section G.1.8.
G.l . l l
Leak o r Rupture i n a R e f r i g e r a n t Compressor ( i n c l u d i n g i n l e t and o u t l e t nozzles and pi ping) .
P o s s i b l e I n i t i a t i n a Events
o
Low flow r a t e causes surging t h a t could r e s u l t i n f a i l u r e . scheme includes a n t i s u r g e c o n t r o l . (medium probabi 1 i t y )
Control
C o n t r o l l e r f a i l u r e o r improper control p o i n t allows l i q u i d carryover from t h e f l a s h drums o r s e p a r a t o r s t o t h e compressor s u c t i o n . (medi urn probabi 1i t y )
F a i l u r e of a i r c o o l e r s causes compressor t o o v e r h e a t . (probabil i t y ) Low oi 1 p r e s s u r e causes compressor t o overheat.
(medium
(medium p r o b a b i l i t y )
Results and E f f e c t s of Release Prevention and Control Systems I n i t i a l r e l e a s e would be 1 imi ted t o t h e vapor i n t h e system. system heats u p t h e l i q u i d would e v e n t u a l l y boil o u t . The compressors t r i p o u t a u t o m a t i c a l l y f o r t h e following c o n d i t i o n s : As t h e
- high v i b r a t i o n - high o r low s u c t i o n o r discharge p r e s s u r e

- high o i l temperature
- high bearing temperature - low o i l p r e s s u r e

- Master Emergency Shutdown i s a c t i v a t e d - gas d e t e c t o r i n compressor building reaches second l e v e l alarm.
Additional Information Required Inventory i n t h e r e f r i g e r a n t systems and t h e q u a n t i t y t h a t would escape from a leak a t t h e compressors. Rate of compressor f a i l u r e from s u r g i n g , overheating, and l i q u i d i n the suction l i n e . Frequency of f a i l u r e of c o n t r o l l e r s and control valves. P o s s i b l e Design and Operational Changes Combustible gas d e t e c t o r s could be located i n t h e a r e a . Each r e f r i g e r a n t s t o r a g e tank with a bottom o u t l e t 1 i n e could be equipped with an i n t e r n a l block valve.
G- 16
6.1.12
-s Rupture of 12-in. T r a n- f e r Line from Liquefaction Area t o t h e Storage
Tanks. P o s s i b l e I n i t i a t i n a Events Fatigue f a i l u r e from thermal c y c l i n g . F a i l u r e of valve body o r pipe f i t t i n g s . (low p r o b a b i l i t y ) (low p r o b a b i l i t y )
Results and E f f e c t s of Release Prevention and Control Systems S p i l l i s d e t e c t e d by gas s e n s o r and o p e r a t o r s h u t s down system i n one minute. S p i l l i s 10,000 g a l l o n s .
S p i l l goes undetected f o r 10 minutes - t o t a l s p i l l volume i s 40,000 gal 1ons . Additional Information Required Frequency of f a i l u r e of l a r g e cyrogenic pipes and f i t t i n g s .
G.1.13
Rupture o f O u t l e t Nozzle o r P i p i n g on R e f r i g e r a n t Storage Tanks (propane, e t h y l ene)
.
(low p r o b a b i l i t y ) (low p r o b a b i l i t y )
P o s s i b l e I n i t i a t i n g Events F a t i g u e f a i l u r e f r o m thermal c y c l i n g . F a i l u r e o f v a l v e body o r p i p e f i t t i n g .
S e c t i o n o f o u t l e t p i p i n g b l o c k e d i n and f i l l e d w i t h l i q u i d r e f r i g e r a n t . Re1 i e f v a l v e s f a i l t o handle thermal p r e s s u r e b u i l d u p . R e s u l t s and E f f e c t s o f Release P r e v e n t i o n and C o n t r o l Systems No gas d e t e c t o r i n area, must depend on o p e r a t o r observance. l i m i t spill.
If
( l o w p r o b a b i 1 it y )
r u p t u r e s o c c u r a f t e r 1 s t b l o c k v a l v e , o p e r a t o r can b l o c k i n t a n k and I f not, t h e e n t i r e contents o f t h e tank w i l l s p i l l 100,000 g a l l o n s from e t h y l e n e t a n k o r 170,000 g a l l o n s f r o m e i t h e r o f t h e propane t a n k s . A d d i t i o n a l I n f o r m a t i o n Required
e
Several i n c i d e n t s o f t h i s t y p e have been r e p o r t e d i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e . The consequences o f t h i s t y p e o f i n c i d e n t c o u l d a f f e c t t h e main LNG storage tanks

pu
120 f t away.
F a i l u r e frequency f o r these t y p e s o f
t a n k s s h o u l d be determined.
G.2
REPRESENTATIVE RELEASE EVENTS FOR THE LNG MARINE VESSEL The p o t e n t i a l r e l e a s e s chosen as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e r e l e a s e events f o r t h e
LNG marine vessel a r e 1 i s t e d i n Table G.2. was d e s c r i b e d p r e v i o u s l y i n Appendix C.) r e l e a s e events appear below. TABLE G . 2 .
(The r e f e r e n c e marine vessel The analyses o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Release Events f o r an LNG Marine Vessel
1.
2. 3.
Rupture o r l e a k i n one o f t h e LNG cargo tanks. Cargo t a n k i s o v e r f i l l e d . Pressure s a f e t y v a l v e s r e l i e v e t o t h e atmosphere. Rupture o r l e a k i n t h e 1 i q u i d cargo hand1 i n g system. Rupture o r l e a k i n t h e vapor h a n d l i n g system. Release o f LNG o r n a t u r a l gas from s h i p d u e - t o n i i s o p e r a t i o n o f t h e cargo h a n d l i n g system.
4.
5.
6.
G.2.1
R u p t u r e o r Leak i n One o f t h e LNG Cargo Tanks. P o s s i b l e I n i t i a t i n a Events C o l l i s i o n w i t h another ship.

e
Grounding.
( l o w p r o b a b i 1 it y )
F a t i g u e f a i l u r e f r o m dynamic l o a d s imposed by wave-induced f o r c e s . ( l o w p r o b a b i l it y )

c
F a t i g u e f a i l u r e f r o m t h e r m a l c y c l i n g ( t h e c a r g o t a n k s may be k e p t c o o l d u r i n g b a l l a s t voyages u s i n g t h e s p r a y s y s t e m ) . O v e r p r e s s u r e ( s e e S e c t i o n G. 2 . 4 ) . (low probability)
( l o w p r o b a b i l it y ) (low p r o b a b i l i t y )
F i r e o r explosion i n another p a r t o f the ship. Sabotage. (low p r o b a b i l i t y )
F a i l u r e o f s t o r a g e t a n k s u p p o r t s k i r t due t o b e n d i n g and c o m p r e s s i v e l o a d s t r e s s e s and d e f o r m a t i o n s due t o h u l l b e n d i n g and t o r s i o n . ( 1 ow p r o b a b i 1 it y ) R e s u l t s and E f f e c t s o f Release P r e v e n t i o n and C o n t r o l Systems Loss o f one c a r g o s t o r a g e t a n k c o u l d r e l e a s e up t o 25,000 m 3 (160,000 b b l ) o f LNG. A d d i t i o n a l I n f o r m a t i o n Required e
P r o b a b i l i t y o f LNG v e s s e l b e i n g i n v o l v e d i n a c o l l i s i o n . E f f e c t o f l o s s o f one c a r g o t a n k on t h e i n t e g r i t y o f t h e s h i p and t h e o t h e r cargo tanks.
P - otential
D e s i g n and O p e r a t i o n a l Changes
Design t a n k s t o w i t h s t a n d h i g h e r pressures. P r o v i d e s e c o n d a r y c o n t a i n m e n t system.
G.2.2
Cargo Tank i s Overfilled. Possible Ini t i a t i n a Events Level i n d i c a t o r s in tank give f a l s e readings. (medium p r o b a b i l i t y ) Crewman does not c l o s e i n l e t valve and ESD f a i l s . (medium p r o b a b i l i t y ) Results and Effects of Release Prevention and Control Systems Liquid will e n t e r the vapor header a t a r a t e of 11,000 gpm u n t i l the flow t o the tank i s stopped. Liquid would leave the tank through the vapor l i n e t o the compressors and could cause compressor f a i l u r e . Liquid would eventually have t o be drained from vapor 1 ine. Additional Information Reauired Type of level i n d i c a t o r s used and the likelihood of t h e i r f a i l i n g o r giving an i n c o r r e c t reading.
0
Effect of LNG on vapor header and compressors. from the vapor handling system?
Hw i s l i q u i d removed o
Potential Design and Operational Changes Provide overflow l i n e t o other tanks t o prevent overflow i n t o vapor header.
6.2.3
Pressure Safety Val ves Re1 ieve t o t h e Atmosphere. F a i l u r e of t h e s e s a f e t y valves could e v e n t u a l l y r e s u l t i n f a i l u r e of a
cargo t a n k ( s ) from overpressure. P o s s i b l e Ini t i a t i n a Events Loss of boi 1o f f compressor. (medi um probabi 1 i t y )
Fai 1 ure of p r e s s u r e control 1 e r (compressor speed control ) o r p r e s s u r e i n d i c a t i n g device. (medium probabi 1 i t y ) (low p r o b a b i l i t y )
F a i l u r e of tank i n s u l a t i o n . Roll ~ v e r(1 oadi ng) .
( 1 o probabi 1 i t y ) w (medium p r o b a b i l i t y )
Addi :ion of "warm" L N G t o cargo tanks ( l o a d i n g ) .
F a i l u r e of p r e s s u r e r e g u l a t o r on vapor r e t u r n l i n e ( u n l o a d i n g ) . (medium probabi 1 i t y ) Ship i n p o r t and not allowed t o unload o r vent b o i l o f f . probabi 1 i t y ) Results and E f f e c t s of Release Prevention and Control Systems Under normal c o n d i t i o n s , t h e tank would take 2 t o 3 days t o reach r e l i e f valve pressure ( 3 . 5 p s i g ) i f no vapor i s removed from t h e tank. The tanks have a maximum design pressure of 31 psig in p o r t . Under (medium
normal circumstances, t h e tank w i l l reach t h i s p r e s s u r e i n 10 t o 40 days i f no vapor i s removed from t h e tank. The tanks have a maximum design pressure of 10 psig a t s e a . Under normal c o n d i t i o n s , t h e tank w i l l reach t h i s pressure i n 5 t o 12 days i f no vapor i s removed. Relief valve c a p a c i t y i s 24,000 scfm per valve a t 4 . 7 p s i g . Additional Information Required P r o b a b i l i t y of f a i l u r e of pressure c o n t r o l l e r , p r e s s u r e r e g u l a t o r , and b o i l o f f compressor. Does s h i p have c a p a b i l i t y t o vent steam when i t i s i n p o r t ? P o t e n t i a l Design and Operational Changes Design tank f o r higher p r e s s u r e .
G- 22
G.2.4
Rupture or Leak in the -- -Liquid C a r ~ H a n d l i n gSystem.

Possible Ini t i a t i n g E v e n t s
,
Fluid hammer from f a s t valve closure.
(low probability) (low probability)
Fatigue fai 1 ure from thermal and pressure cycl ing. Failure of valves or pipe f i t t i n g s .
e
(medium probability)
Failure of expansion j o i n t .
(medium probability)
Line i s blocked and f i l l e d with LNG. The l i n e i s allowed to heat u p and the thermal re1 ief valves do not open, allowing the l i n e to overpressure. (low probabi 1 i ty ) (low probability) (low probability)
Coll ision or grounding.
Fire or explosion in another part of the ship.
Results and Effects of Release Prevention and Control Systems A gas detector alarm or a crewman activates the ESD and the system i s isolated in 1 minute. Spill s i z e would range from 0 t o 67,000 gallons depending on s i z e of the rupture or leak. Rupture or leak goes undetected or emergency shutdown system f a i l s to i s o l a t e 1 eak--re1 ease continues for 10 minutes--release ranges from 0 t o 520,000 gallons. Additional Information Required Hw long does i t take t o detect a leak or rupture? o Complete description of liquid handling system--number and type of valves and f i t t i n g s , s i z e and materials o f construction f o r pipes, and number of expansion joints or loops. Potential Design and Operational Changes Provide some type of secondary containment system, e . g . , a pipe within a pipe or a diked area beneath the liquid header.
G.2.4
Rupture o r Leak i n t h e Vapor H a n d l i n g System. P o s s i b l e I n i t i a t i n g Events F a i l u r e o f valves o r pipe f i t t i n g s from manufacturing defects. (medium p r o b a b i l i t y ) F a t i g u e f a i 1u r e f r o m t h e r m a l and p r e s s u r e c y c l i n g . F a i l u r e o f expansion j o i n t . (medium p r o b a b i l i t y ) Thermal ( l o w p r o b a b i 1 it y )
L i n e f i l l e d w i t h LNG i s b l o c k e d i n and a l l o w e d t o h e a t up. (low p r o b a b i l i t y ) C o l l i s i o n o r grounding. (low p r o b a b i l i t y )
r e l i e f v a l v e s do n o t open, a l l o w i n g t h e l i n e t o o v e r p r e s s u r e .
F i r e o r explosion i n another p a r t o f the ship.

e
A gas d e t e c t o r o r a crewman a c t i v a t e s t h e ESD and t h e system i s

i s o l a t e d i n 1 m i n u t e - - s p i l l s i z e would range f r o m 0 t o 18,000 s c f depending on t h e s i z e o f t h e r u p t u r e o r l e a k .
R u p t u r e o r l e a k goes u n d e t e c t e d o r ESD f a i l s t o i s o l a t e l e a k and r e l e a s e c o n t i n u e s For 10 m i n u t e s - - r e l e a s e ranges f r o m 0 t o 155,000 s c f .
e
How l o n g does i t t a k e t o d e t e c t a l e a k o r r u p t u r e ? Complete d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e vapor h a n d l i n g system--number and t y p e o f v a l v e s and f i t t i n g s , s i z e and m a t e r i a l s o f c o n s t r u c t i o n f o r p i p i n g , and nutxber o f e x p a n s i o n j o i n t s o r l o o p s . P r o b a b i l i t y o f f a i l u r e o f t h e components o f t h e p i p i n g n e t w o r k .
P o t e n t i a l Design and O p e r a t i o n a l Changes

0
Ciake t h e v a p o r header a p i p e w i t h i n a p i p e t o p r o v i d e f o r c o n t a i n ment o f a r e l e a s e .
G.2.6
Release - LNG o r Natural Gas from Ship due t o bifsoperation of Cargo of Handling System. P o s s i b l e I n i t i a t i n g Events Operator disconnects loading arms while loadinglunloading i s t a k i n g place. (medium p r o b a b i l i t y )
Loading ( c r o s s o v e r ) valves a r e l e f t open and bl inds a r e o f f o r improperly connected on t h e s i d e of t h e s h i p o p p o s i t e from where 1oadi nglunl oadi ng i s t a k i n g p l a c e . (medi um probabi 1 i t y )
Valve t o vent s t a c k o r r i s e r i s l e f t open during loading/unloading operations. (medium probabi 1 i t y )
Results and Effects of Release Prevention and Control System

Q
S p i l l s i z e would range from 0 t o 67,000 g a l l o n s , assuming t h e s i t u a t i o n i s r e c t i f i e d i n one minute.
S p i l l s o u t t h e vent r i s e r could crack deck p l a t e s . Coast Guard i n s p e c t i o n of t h e vessel p r i o r t o o f f l o a d i n g should reduce e r r o r s of t h i s t y p e .
Additional Information Required Complete piping and instrument drawings (P&ID) of cargo hand1 ing system a r e needed t o determine a l l p o s s i b l e means of misoperation of t h e system.
0
D e t a i l s on which valves and equipment a r e inspected by t h e Coast Guard p r i o r t o unl oadi ng/l oadi ng .
P o t e n t i a l Design and Operational Changes Provide an i n t e r l o c k system which would autoniatically open and c l o s e valves a s r e q u i r e d f o r loading and unloading, i . e . , a l l valves t h a t must be closed during loading would be closed a u t o m a t i c a l l y by a c t i v a t i o n of one switch.
6.3
REPRESENTATIVE RELEASE EVENTS FOR THE LNG I P R TERMINAL MO T
The potential release events chosen as representative of the LNG import terminal are given in Table 6 . 3 . ( A discussion of the reference import t e r minal was presented previously in Appendix D . ) are analyzed here. The individual re1 ease events
TABLE 6 . 3 .
Representative Release Events for an LNG Import Terminal
Failure of 9% nickel-steel inner storage tank. Failure of carbon-steel outer barrier for L N G storage tank.
LNG release from 16-in. loading arms.
Failure of 42-in. liquid transfer l i n e from unloading dock to shore. Failure of 42-in. liquid transfer l i n e from shore t o storage. Failure of 20-in. LNG transfer l i n e from storage t o the secondary pumps. Failure of 24-in. LNG transfer l i n e from secondary pumps to vaporizers. Seawater vaporizer f a i l u r e . Submerged combustion vaporizer f a i l u r e . Failure of vaporizer e x i t l i n e s . Failure of fuel gas compressor suction l i n e . Failure of 4-in. LNG recirculation l i tie. Failure of 16-in. vapor return l i n e t o s h i p ' s tanks. Failure of 30-in. vapor l i n e from pipeline compressors t o gas transmission pipeline.
G.3.1
F a i l u r e o f 9% N i c k e l - S t e e l I n n e r Storage Tank. P o s s i b l e I n i t i a t i n a Events Overpressure o r underpressure o f tank (medium p r o b a b i l it y ) Sabotage ( l o w p r o b a b i l i t y ) Large earthquake (1 ow probabi 1 it y ) A i r p l a n e c r a s h (1 ow probabi 1 it y ) F i r e and e x p l o s i o n i n o t h e r s e c t i o n s o f t h e p l a n t ( l o w p r o b a b i l i t y ) F a i l u r e of s h e l l - t o - r o o f o r s h e l l - t o - b o t t o m welds and n o z z l e welds (low p r o b a b i l i t y ) D i f f e r e n t i a l foundation s e t t l i n g , o r frostheave from foundation h e a t i n g c o i l f a i l u r e ( l o w p r o b a b i l it y )
s
C o r r o s i o n s t r e s s ( 1 ow p r o b a b i 1 it y ) Outer t a n k c o l l a p s e . (low p r o b a b i l i t y )
R e s u l t s and E f f e c t s o f Release P r e v e n t i o n and C o n t r o l Systems The maximum amount o f LNG r e l e a s e f r o m each o f t h e two tanks i s 7 550,000 b b l . (2.3 x 70 g a l l o n s ) A d d i t i o n a l I n f o r m a t i o n Required Are t h e s h e l l - t o - r o o f and s h e l l - t o - b o t t o m j o i n t s weak i n case o f o v e r p r e s s u r e t o p r e v e n t a complete t a n k f a i l u r e ? P o t e n t i a l Design and O p e r a t i o n a l Changes B u i l d t a n k underground and s u r r o u n d i n g e a r t h c o u l d be used as cont a i nment d i ke. Design t a n k t o w i t h s t a n d h i g h e r p r e s s u r e s and a h i g h e r vacuum.
G.3.2
F a i l u r e o f Carbon-Steel Outer B a r r i e r f o r LNG Storage Tank. P o s s i b l e I n i t i a t i n g Events Leaks from t h e i n n e r t a n k ( l o w p r o b a b i l i t y ) I n s u l a t i o n f a i l u r e r e s u l t i n g i n f r o s t s p o t s on t h e o u t e r s h e l l and p o s s i b l e f r a c t u r e due t o compression and expansion c y c l i n g o f t h e i n s u l a t i o n ( l o w probabi 1 it y ) C y c l i c thermal p r e s s u r e and s t a t i c l o a d s t r e s s e s ( l o w p r o b a b i l i t y ) D i f f e r e n t i a l s e t t l i n g o f t h e f o u n d a t i o n o r f r o s t h e a v e due t o foundat i o n h e a t e r f a i l u r e s (1 ow probabi 1 it y ) Flaws i n t h e c o r n e r welds, n o z z l e welds, and r o o f - s h e l l j o i n t s ( l o w p r o b a b i l it y )
I f i n n e r t a n k p r e s s u r e r e l i e f v a l v e s were a c t i v a t e d , c o l d vapor
c o u l d s e t t l e on t h e o u t e r t a n k and f r a c t u r e i t ( l o w p r o b a b i l i t y ) Leakage o f a i r i n t o t h e
N2 purge l i n e i n t o t h e a n n u l a r space, m o i s t u r e
c o u l d f o r m and f r o s t s p o t s c o u l d f o r m on t h e e x t e r i o r s h e l l and c o u l d f r a c t u r e i t (low p r o b a b i l i t y ) Sabotage (1 ow probabi 1it y ) Large earthquake ( 1 ow probabi 1 it y ) A i r p l a n e c r a s h ( 1 ow probabi 1 it y ) F i r e o r e x p l o s i o n i n o t h e r f a c i l i t i e s nearby. (low p r o b a b i l i t y )
R e s u l t s and E f f e c t s o f Release P r e v e n t i o n and C o n t r o l Systems A complete f a i l u r e o f t h e o u t e r s h e l l c o u l d c o l l a p s e t h e i n n e r s h e l l , r e s u l t i n g i n a maximum r e l e a s e o f 550,000 bbl o f
LNG from each t a n k .
A c o n c r e t e d i k e designed t o c o n t a i n 1.3 times t h e maximum s t o r a g e t a n k c a p a c i t y surrounds each t a n k . D i s c u s s i o n and A d d i t i o n a l I n f o r m a t i o n Required What i s t h e e f f e c t on t h e c o n c r e t e d i k e i n t h e event o f a s t o r a g e tank collapse?
What i s the e f f e c t on the storage tank of a f i r e or explosion in adjacent areas? What design factors are included f o r the cyclic stresses the storage tank undergoes? Potential Design and Operational Changes Utilize s t a i n l e s s steel or other cryogenic material f o r outer s h e l l . Incorporate an overflow l i n e t o prevent any overflow of L N G from making contact with the outer s h e l l .
6.3.3
LNG Release from 1 6 - i n . L o a d i n a Arms. P o s s i b l e I n i t i a t i n g Events

8
Bad c o n n e c t i o n o f t h e f l a n g e s w i t h t h e arms and t h e s h i p (medium p r o b a b i 1 it y )
Emergency u n c o u p l i n g due t o e x t r e m e m o t i o n o f t h e s h i p (medium p r o b a b i l it y ) F i s s u r e o r b r e a k due t o e x t r e m e m o t i o n s t r e s s e s and f a i l u r e o f t h e h i g h r o t a t i o n a l s e n s i n g d e v i c e s ( l o w p r o b a b i l it y ) H y d r a u l i c power f a i l u r e w o u l d f a i l t o keep t h e arms moving f r e e l y and a r u p t u r e c o u l d r e s u l t ( 1 ow p r o b a b i l it y )
F a t i g u e f a i l u r e from t h e r m a l and p r e s s u r e c y c l i n g ( l o w p r o b a b i l i t y ) The l o a d i n g arm i s b l o c k e d i n and n o t d r a i n e d . p r e s s u r e (1 ow p r o b a b i 1 it y ) Thermal and p r e s s u r e c y c l i c s t r e s s e s . ( l o w p r o b a b i l it y ) The l i n e h e a t s up
and i f t h e r e l i e f v a l v e s f a i l e d , t h e l i n e c o u l d r u p t u r e f r o m o v e r -

e
The ESD s h u t s o f f l o a d i n g pumps and c l o s e s b l o c k v a l v e s w i t h i n 1 m i n u t e a f t e r s p i 11 . LNG r e 1 ease volume w o u l d be 15,000 g a l l o n s .
I f t h e ESD f a i l e d t o r e s p o n d and a normal shutdown was r e q u i r e d , a

maximum o f t e n m i n u t e s t o shutdown w o u l d r e s u l t i n a 1 3 4 , 0 0 0 - g a l l o n LNG r e l e a s e f o r a b r e a k .
o
A c o n t a i n m e n t system c o u l d h o l d s p i l l s f r o m t h e l o a d i n g arms.
Leaks f r o m s w i v e l j o i n t s and o t h e r components c o u l d s p r a y a l l o v e r t h e dock.
A d d i t i o n a l I n f o r m a t i o n Requi r e d
e
How f a s t can t h e ESD system a c t u a l l y d e t e c t t h e h a z a r d and s h u t down t h e process?
What i s t h e f a i l u r e f r e q u e n c y f o r t h e l o a d i n g arms?
P o t e n t i a l Design and O p e r a t i o n a l Changes P r o v i d e a movable t r o u g h under t h e arms t o c a t c h s p i l l s and d r a i n i n t o t h e containment f a c i l i t i e s under t h e dock.
Failure of 42-in. Liquid Transfer Line from Unloading Dock t o Shore. Possible I n i t i a t i n g Events S t r e s s e s t o the t r e s t l e support and piping from l a r g e waves, high winds, earthquakes, 1 ightni n g , e t c . (low p r o b a b i l i t y )
Malfunction of a valve causing i t t o close too rapidly could r e s u l t in extreme f l u i d hammer and rupture the l i n e . (low p r o b a b i l i t y ) The drain system i s e i t h e r not activated or f a i l s t o a c t i v a t e when the l i n e i s blocked, leaving the l i n e f i l l e d with L N G . The r e l i e f valves f a i l when the l i n e heats u p and pressurization r e s u l t s . (low p r o b a b i l i t y ) Thermal, s t a t i c , and pressure cycling s t r e s s e s ; however, the l i n e i s normally maintained a t operating conditions by r e c i r c u l a t i n g L N G . (low probabi 1 i t y )
e
Failure of valve bodies o r welding flaws a t the pipe f i t t i n g s . (low p r o b a b i l i t y ) Failure of expansion j o i n t . (medium p r o b a b i l i t y )
Results and Effects of -Release Prevention and Control Systems S p i l l s enroute would f a l l i n t o the ocean. E D shuts down the system in 1 minute. S takes 10 min t o shut down the system. If E D f a i l s t o operate, i t S
Amount of Release 1 -mi n Shutdown 10-mi n Shutdown Break Additional Information Required Hw f a s t can t h e E D system a c t u a l l y d e t e c t the hazard and shut o S down the system?
e
485,000 gal
962,000 gal
What i s t h e frequency of f a i l u r e of t h i s l i n e ?
A more d e t a i l e d description of the drain system i s required.
P o t e n t i a l Design and O p e r a t i o n a l Changes Employ a p i p e - w i t h i n - a - p i p e r e 1 ease. Use two s m a l l e r t r a n s f e r l i n e s r a t h e r t h a n t h e 4 2 - i n . s m a l l e r components should be more r e l i a b l e . line. The system o f f s h o r e t o c o n t a i n any LNG
G.3.5
F a i l u r e o f 42-in.
L i q u i d T r a n s f e r L i n e from Shore t o Storage.
P o s s i b l e I n i t i a t i n g Events M a l f u n c t i o n o f a v a l v e causing i t t o c l o s e t o o r a p i d l y c o u l d r e s u l t i n extreme f l u i d hammer and c o u l d r u p t u r e t h e l i n e . (low p r o b a b i l i t y )
Thermal, s t a t i c , and pressure c y c l i c s t r e s s e s ; however, t h e s e a r e u n l i k e l y because r e c i r c u l a t i n g LNG m a i n t a i n s t h e l i n e a t o p e r a t i n g conditions. (low p r o b a b i l i t y ) (low p r o b a b i l i t y )
Valve body f a i l u r e s o r f l a w s a t welded p i p e f i t t i n g s . Expansion j o i n t ma1 f u n c t i o n . (medium p r o b a b i l it y )
R e s u l t s and E f f e c t s o f Release P r e v e n t i o n and C o n t r o l Systems ESD system s h u t s down t h e o p e r a t i o n s i n 1 minute. operate, i t c o u l d t a k e up t o 10 min t o s h u t down. Amount o f Release 10-mi n Shutdown 1 - m i n Shutdown Break 485,000 g a l 962,000 g a l I f ESD f a i l s t o
A containment d i k e i s l o c a t e d on shore t o c o n t a i n any s p i l l s o f LNG.

A d d i t i o n a l I n f o r m a t i o n Required What t y p e o f components a r e i n c l u d e d t o a c t i v a t e t h e ESD system? How l o n g does t h e ESD system a c t u a l l y t a k e t o d e t e c t , a c t i v a t e , and s h u t down t h e system? What i s t h e frequency o f f a i l u r e o f t h i s system?
G.3.6
F a i l u r e o f 2 0 - i n . LNG T r a n s f e r L i n e from Storage t o t h e Secondary Pumps. P o s s i b l e I n i t i a t i n a Events S t a t i c , c y c l i c , and thermal s t r e s s e s . 345 d a y s l y r . seldom change. (low p r o b a b i l i t y ) However, these l i n e s o p e r a t e
Therefore, t h e o p e r a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s a t these l i n e s
F l u i d hammer s t r e s s e s due t o a v a l v e m a l f u n c t i o n and r a p i d c l o s u r e o f the valve during operation. (low probability)
Leaky v a l v e s , f l a n g e s , c o u p l i n g s , o r f l a w s c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n . (medi um probabi 1 it y ) Expansion j o i n t ma1 f u n c t i o n . (medium p r o b a b i l it y )
R e s u l t s and E f f e c t s o f Release P r e v e n t i o n and C o n t r o l Systems The ESD system shuts down t h e pumps and c l o s e s t h e v a l v e s i n 1 m i n u t e . I f t h e ESD system f a i l s , i t takes 10 minutes f o r shutdown t o o c c u r .
Q
An independent d i k e system encloses t h e secondary pumps t o c o n t a i n any s p i l l t h e r e . Amount o f Release 1 -nii n Shutdown 10-mi n Shutdown Break 16,000 g a l 52,000 g a l
e
What i s t h e frequency o f f a i l u r e f o r t h i s system?
G.3.7
F a i l u r e o f 2 4 - i n . LNG T r a n s f e r L i n e f r o m Secondary Pumps t o V a p o r i z e r s . P o s s i b l e I n i t i a t i n g Events S t a t i c , c y c l i c , and thermal s t r e s s e s . probabi 1 it y ) I f t h e l i n e i s b l o c k e d o f f and r e l i e f valves f a i l t o o p e r a t e when i t h e a t s up, a r u p t u r e c o u l d o c c u r . (low p r o b a b i l i t y ) However, these systems o p e r a t e (low
345 d a y s l y r and o p e r a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s v e r y seldom change.
Leaky v a l v e s , o r f i t t i n g s o r f l a w s f o r c r a c k p r o p a g a t i o n t h e r e i n . (medi um p r o b a b i 1 it y ) Welding f l a w s i n f i t t i n g s o r p i p e coup1 i n g s . ( l o w p r o b a b i l i t y ) F l u i d hammer f r o m r a p i d c l o s i n g o f a m a l f u n c t i o n i n g v a l v e . probabi 1 it y ) R e s u l t s and E f f e c t s o f Release P r e v e n t i o n and C o n t r o l Systems The ESD system s t o p s o p e r a t i o n s i n 1 minute. t a k e s 10 m inutes t o manually c l o s e v a l v e s . I f t h e ESD systern f a i l s , i t (low
1 - m i n Shutdown
Break A d d i t i o n a l I n f o r m a t i o n Reauired 23,000 gal
Amount o f Release 1 0-mi n Shutdown 100,000 g a l
I f t h e p r e s s u r e c o n t r o l system m a l f u n c t i o n s , can t h e system o v e r -
p r e s s u r e due t o a c o n t i n u e d pumping i n c r e a s e and r e l i e f v a l v e f a i 1u r e ?

a
What i s t h e frequency o f f a i l u r e f o r t h i s system?
P o t e n t i a l Design and O p e r a t i o n a l Changes I n c o r p o r a t e a spray s h i e l d t o cover t r a n s f e r l i n e .
G.3.8
Seawater Vaporizer F a i l u r e . Possible I n i t i a t i n g Events

e
Vaporizer leaks from tube v i b r a t i o n s causes f a i l u r e by local f r e t t i n g . (medium p r o b a b i l i t y ) Icing on t h e e x t e r i o r f i n s would r e s u l t in poor heat t r a n s f e r c a p a b i l i t i e s , which could allow cold vapors t o reach carbon-steel components i f t h e temperature o u t l e t i n d i c a t o r f a i l s . probabil i t y ) Temperature c o n t r o l l e r f a i l s and allows cold vapors t o reach carbons t e e l components. (medium probabi 1 i t y )
(low
Results and Effects of Release Prevention and Control Systems The E D system should shut down the pumps and valves in 1 minute. S I f the E D system f a i l s , i t would take approximately 10 minutes t o S manually shut down t h e system. Any s p i l l from t h e seawater vaporization system i s control led by a dike surrounding t h e immediate v i c i n i t y . Amount of Release 1 -mi n Shutdown 10-min Shutdown Break Additional Information Required What i s t h e frequency of f a i l u r e f o r t h e seawater vaporizers? What would be t h e e f f e c t on the vaporizer in t h e event of a tube f a i l u r e ? 1,700 gal 17,000 gal
G.3.9
Submerged Combustion Vaporizer Failure. Possible Ini t i a t i n a Events Clogging of a nozzle can r e s u l t in a hot spot on the downcomer which can eventually burn through, thus allowing hot gases access t o the tube chamber above the water l i n e . If the water level should be low (medium probabil i t y ) and any of the top tubes exposed due t o controller f a i l u r e , t h i s would in turn expose the tube to the hot gases.
Temperature controller and flow controller f a i l u r e could allow cold vapors to reach carbon-steel components. (medium probabi 1 i t y )
Results and Effects of Release Prevention and Control Systems The vaporization ESD system would shut down appropriate pumps and valves automatically within 1 minute. If the ESD system f a i l s , the system can be
LNG would be released into the water bath and vapor would e x i t through the exhaust gas stack.
manually shut down in approximately 10 minutes. Additional Information Reaui red Is there a containment dike located in the area to contain any s p i l l s ? What i s the maximum LNG flow capacity f o r these vaporizers? Potential Design and Operational Changes Backup controls t o ensure the downcomer stays cool and the LNG c o i l s a r e never exposed.
6.3.10
F a i l u r e o f Vaporizer E x i t Lines. -
P o s s i b l e I n i t i a t i n g Events M a l f u n c t i o n o f temperature c o n t r o l l e r a l l o w i n g c o l d vapors t o reach carbon-steel components by n o t s u p p l y i n g enough water t o t h e v a p o r i z e r o r a1 l o w i n g t h e LNG t o f l o w t o o r a p i d l y . (medium p r o b a b i l i t y )
C o n t r o l v a l v e m a l f u n c t i o n a l l o w i n g an increased f l o w r a t e and c o l d e r o u t l e t product. (medium p r o b a b i l i t y )
Loss o f seawater f l o w and f a i l u r e o f f l o w sensor t o a c t i v a t e ESD system. (1 ow probabi 1 it y )
R e s u l t s and E f f e c t s o f Release P r e v e n t i o n and C o n t r o l Svstems The v a p o r i z e r ESD shuts down t h e system a u t o m a t i c a l l y i n 1 minute. I f the
ESD system f a i l s , t h e system can be s h u t down i n 10 minutes manually.

Amount o f Release 1-min Shutdown 10-mi n Shutdown Break 84,000 s c f (1000 e q u i v a l e n t gal lons) 770,000 s c f (9300 e q u i v a l e n t g a l 1ons)
A d d i t i o n a l I n f o r m a t i o n Reauired How c l o s e a r e t h e i n l e t and carbon-steel o u t l e t l i n e s ?

it.
A small l e a k i n
t h e v a p o r i z e r i n l e t l i n e c o u l d p o s s i b l y spray LNG on t h e o u t l e t l i n e and c r a c k
P o t e n t i a l Design and O p e r a t i o n a l Changes Incorporate stainless steel e x i t l i n e s f o r a longer distance t o handle any c o l d vapors. I n c o r p o r a t e a spray s h i e l d around t h e e x i t l i n e s t o p r o t e c t a d j a c e n t components f r o m c o l d vapors.
G.3.11
F a i l u r e o f Fuel Gas Compressor S u c t i o n L i n e .
P o s s i b l e I n i t i a t i n g Events Fuel-gas p r e h e a t e r f a i l u r e a l l o w i n g c o l d vapors t o r e a c h c a r b o n - s t e e l components. (medi um probabi 1 it y ) (low p r o b a b i l i t y )
F a i l u r e o f v a l v e s , f i t t i n g s , o r welds.
R e s u l t s and E f f e c t s o f Release P r e v e n t i o n and C o n t r o l Systems The VES system c l o s e s a p p r o p r i a t e v a l v e s and s h u t s down punips i n 1 m i n u t e .
I f t h e VES system f a i l s , t h e system can be s h u t down m a n u a l l y i n 10 minutes.
Amount o f Release 1 -min Shutdown 10-mi n Shutdown Break* 1 I ,000 s c f (140 e q u i v a l e n t g a l 1ons ) 35,000 s c f (420 e q u i v a l e n t g a l 1ons)
-
24,000 s c f (290 e q u i v a l e n t g a l 1ons) 260,000 s c f (3100 e q u i v a l e n t g a l 1ons)
Break**
*Normal O p e r a t i ons **Unloading Operations A d d i t i o n a l I n f o r m a t i o n Required E x a c t l y where i s i t i n t h e compressors t h a t t h e s t a i n l e s s s t e e l components change t o c a r b o n - s t e e l ? What i s t h e frequency o f f a i l u r e f o r t h i s system? P o t e n t i a1 Design and O p e r a t i o n a l Changes I n c l u d e s t a i n l e s s s t e e l l i n e s up t o f u e l gas compressors. Temperature sensor i n s u c t i o n l i n e s h o u l d a c t i v a t e ESD system i n t h e e v e n t o f l o w temperature.
6.3.12
Failure of --4-in. LNG Recirculation Line.

P A
Possible I n i t i a t i n g Events S t a t i c and corrosion s t r e s s e s (low p r o b a b i l i t y )

6
Welding flaws in pi pefi t t i n g s o r valves (low probabil i t y ) If a section of pipe i s blocked and the drain valves f a i l t o open, the L N G could heat u p , overpressure, and rupture the l i n e i f the r e l i e f bfalve f a i l e d . (low p r o b a b i l i t y )
Fluid hammer s t r e s s e s possibly due t o a malfunction i n a valve r e s u l t ing in a rapid closing of the valve. (low p r o b a b i l i t y )
S t r e s s e s from l a r g e waves, high winds, earthquakes, l i g h t n i n g , e t c .
( I o probabi 1i t y ) w
Results and Effects of Release Prevention and Control Systems The E D system would automatically shut down the r e c i r c u l a t i o n l i n e S i n 1 minute.
I f the ESD system f a i l e d , i t would take 10 minutes t o
shut down the system. Amount of Release 1-mi n Shutdown 1 0 4 n Shutdown Break 5,400 gal 19,000 gal
A containment dike i s located on shore and a t the unloading s i t e t o contain any s p i l l s .

a
Hw f a s t can the E D system a c t u a l l y d e t e c t the hazard and shut down o S the system?
What i s the frequency of f a i l u r e f o r t h i s system?
A more d e t a i l e d description of the drain system i s required.
G.3.13
F a i l u r e o f 16-in. Vapor Return L i n e t o S h i p ' s Tanks.
P o s s i b l e I n i t i a t i n a Events Flange, coup1 i n g , o r f i t t i n g f a i l u r e ( l o w p r o b a b i l i t y ) S t a t i c , c y c l i c y and thermal s t r e s s e s ( l o w p r o b a b i l it y ) Valve f a i l u r e ( l o w p r o b a b i l i t y ) Stresses f r o m 1arge waves, earthquakes, 1 i g h t n i n g , e t c . (1 ow probabi 1 it y ) R e s u l t s and E f f e c t s o f Release P r e v e n t i o n and C o n t r o l Systems The ESD system would a u t o m a t i c a l l y s h u t down t h e l i n e w i t h i n 1 minute.
I f t h e ESD system f a i l s , i t takes 10 minutes t o s h u t down.

Amount o f Release 1 -mi n Shutdown 10-min Shutdown
Break
35,000 s c f (420 e q u i v a l e n t gal 1ons)
135,000 s c f ( 1 600 e q u i v a l e n t gal l o n s )
A d d i t i o n a l I n f o r m a t i o n Reaui r e d How f a s t would t h e ESD system be a c t i v a t e d ? What i s t h e frequency o f f a i l u r e f o r t h i s system?
6.3.14
Failure of 30-in. Yapor Line from Pipeline Compressors t o Gas Transmission Pipeline.
Possible I n i t i a t i n g Events
Pressure control valve and re1 i e f valve malfunction could overpressure the system. (low p r o b a b i l i t y )
Failure of the cooling fans could allow the temperature t o increase dnd s t r e s s the system, causing f a i 1ure. (low p r o b a b i l i t y ) Fatigue from s t a t i c and corrosion s t r e s s e s and welding flaws. probability) Results and Effects of Release Prevention a ~ d Control Systems The E D system would i s o l a t e the l i n e and shut down compressors in 1 m i n S I f the E D system f a i l e d , i t would take 10 minutes t o manually shut down S the sytem. Amount of Release 1- m i n Shutdown 10-niin Shutdown Break 420,000 scf (5,100 equivalent gal lons) 640,000 s c f (7,800 equivalent gal 1 ons) ute. (low
Additional Information Reauired What i s the frequency of f a i l u r e f o r t h i s system? Potential Design and Operational change^ Design piping t o withstand higher pressures and temperatures.
6.4
REPRESENTATIVE RELEASE EVENTS FOR THE LNG PEAKSHAVING PLANT The p o t e n t i a l r e l e a s e events chosen as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f normal o p e r a t i o n s
a t a peakshaving p l a n t a r e l i s t e d i n Table G.4.
The r e l e a s e events f o r t r a n s (The r e f e r e n c e peakThe analyses o f t h e
p o r t a t i o n and t r a n s f e r a r e shown s e p a r a t e l y i n Table G.5. shaving p l a n t was d e s c r i b e d p r e v i o u s l y i n Appendix E . ) i n d i v i d u a l r e l e a s e events a r e presented below. TABLE 6.4.
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Release Events f o r an LNG Peakshaving Facil i t y
Gas s u p p l y l i n e from p i p e l i n e f a i l s . M o l e c u l a r s i e v e adsorber vessel f a i l s . Heat exchanger tube i n r e g e n e r a t i o n gas h e a t e r f a i 1s. LNG p i p i n g i n c o l d box f a i l s . R e f r i g e r a n t compressor s u c t i o n l i n e f a i l s . R e f r i g e r a n t s t o r a g e tank f a i 1s. LNG s t o r a g e t a n k f a i l s LNG o u t l e t l i n e f r o m s t o r a g e t a n k f a i l s
LNG vapor vented through r e l i e f v a l v e s a f t e r o v e r p r e s s u r i z a t i o n o f

s t o r a g e tank. Sendout pump vessel f a i l s . LMG supply l i n e t o v a p o r i z e r s f a i l s . Vaporizer h e a t exchanger tube f a i l s . N a t u r a l gas 1 i n e from v a p o r i z e r s f a i l s . TABLE G.5. 1. Representative Release Events f o r T r a n s p o r t a t i o n and T r a n s f e r Operations
L i q u i d l i n e from storage t o the t r u c k loading s t a t i o n f a i l s . F l e x i b l e l o a d i n g l u n l o a d i n g hoses f a i l
2.
3.
4. 5.
6.
Vapor r e t u r n l i n e f r o m t r u c k l o a d i n g s t a t i o n t o s t o r a g e f a i l s . L i q u i d l i n e from t h e t r u c k unloading s t a t i o n t o the storage tank f a i l s . Truck LNG t a n k f a i l s . T r a i l e r pressure b u i l d u p c o i l f a i l s .
6.4.1
Gas Supply Line from Pipeline Fails. Possible Initiating Events Fatigue resulting from pressure cycling or s t a t i c s t r e s s (low probabi 1 i t y ) Flaws in pipe, valves, flanges, couplings, or welds (low probability) External forces such as vehicular crash or earthquake (low pi-obabi 1 i t y ) Results and Effects of Release Prevention and Control Systems
The estimated maximum natural gas release from a guillotine break, based on times for emergency or normal shutdown, are given below: Amount of Release 1 -mi n Shutdown 10-mi n Shutdown 42,000 scf 120,000 scf
Guillotine Break
These releases include natural gas holdup in the system. The gas treatment system can be shut down e i t h e r manually or by the Master Emergency Shutdown (FIES) . Additional Information Required
e
What design factors are included for pressure cycling and s t a t i c stresses? What quality assurance ( Q A ) procedures are used to eliminate flaws in components and connections, and what i s the r e l i a b i l i t y of these
procedures?
What provisions are made for protection against and alleviation of stresses caused by external forces? Potential Design or Operational Changes
Q
Conduct periodic non-destructive t e s t s to identify component degradation and allow replacement before f a i l u r e occurs.
Install checkvalve a t molecular sieve adsorbers to prevent backflow and leakage of adsorber holdup gas.
6.4.2
Wolecular Sieve Adsorber Vessel Fai 1s . P o s s i b l e I n i t i a t i n g Events

e
F a t i g u e r e s u l t i n g from thermal c y c l i n g o r s t a t i c s t r e s s ( l o w p r o b a b i 1 it y ) Flaws i n c o n s t r u c t i o n m a t e r i a l s o r welds ( l o w p r o b a b i l i t y )
Stresses caused by uneven s e t t l i n g o f vessel f o u n d a t i o n o r s h i f t i n g o f vessel c o n t e n t s ( 1 ow probabi 1 it y ) C o r r o s i o n ( 1 ow p r o b a b i 1 it y )
P e n e t r a t i o n by f l y i n g p r o j e c t i l e ( l o w p r o b a b i l i t y ) Excessive p r e s s u r e i n vessel ( l o w p r o b a b i l i t y ) F i r e o r e x p l o s i o n i n p l a n t (medium p r o b a b i l i t y )
R e s u l t s and E f f e c t s o f Release P r e v e n t i o n and C o n t r o l Systems The e s t i m a t e d maximum n a t u r a l gas r e l e a s e s from a g u i l l o t i n e break, based on t i m e s f o r emergency o r normal shutdown, a r e g i v e n below: Amount o f Release 10-min Shutdown - 1- m i n shutdown G u i l l o t i n e Greak 42,000 s c f 120,000 s c f The gas t r e a t m e n t system The r e l e a s e s i n c l u d e n a t u r a l gas holdup i n t h e system. can be s h u t down e i t h e r manually o r by t h e MES. A d d i t i o n a l I n f o r m a t i o n Required
0
What d e s i g n f a c t o r s a r e i n c l u d e d f o r thermal c y c l i n g and s t a t i c stresses? What QA procedures a r e used t o e l i m i n a t e f l a w s i n m a t e r i a l s and welds, and what i s t h e r e l i a b i l i t y o f these procedures? What p r e c a u t i o n s a r e taken t o ensure an adequate base f o r vessel foundations?
What procedures are used during vessel f i l l i n g with molecular sieve material t o prevent against both abnormal vessel s t r e s s e s during loading a n d naterial s h i f t i n g during operation? What plant design features protect the adsorbers in the event of f i r e or explosion in the plant? What i s the r e l i a b i l i t y of the pressure control system? Potential Design or Operational Changes -
Conduct periodic non-destructive t e s t s t o identify vessel degradation and allaw repair before f a i l u r e occurs. Design vessels and foundations t o withstand greater s t r e s s e s . Incorporate features ( e - g . , shielding bulkheads) into plant design t o protect vessels in the event of f i r e or explosion i n the plant.
G.4.3
Heat Exchanger Tube in Regeneration Gas Heater Fails. Possible I n i t i a t i n g Events

e
Thermal shock or thermal cycling s t r e s s e s (low probability) Corrosion (low probability) Flaws in materials or welds (low probability) Burner explosion (low probabil i t y )
Results and Effects of Release Prevention and Control Systems The estimated maximum natural gas releases from a g u i l l o t i n e break, based on times f o r emergency or manual shutdown, are given below: Amount of Release 1-min Shutdown 10-min Shutdown 42,000 scf 120,000 scf Because
Guillotine Break
These releases include natural gas holdup in the gas treatment system. a high probability t h a t a f i r e or explosion niay occur. system can be shut down e i t h e r manually or by the KES. Jddi tional Information Required
of the proxiniity of the release to the regeneration heater burner, there i s The gas treatment
What are the d e t a i l s on diameters, thicknesses, configuration, and flow rates through the tubes in the regeneration gas heater?
e
0
Hw i s flowrate controlled t h r o u g h the regeneration gas heater? o What a r e the corrosion problems involved? What design factors are included for thermal s t r e s s e f f e c t s ? What QA procedures are employed to eliminate flaws, and what i s t h e i r re1 i abi 1 i ty?
Potential Design and Operational Changes Conduct periodic non-destructive t e s t i n g of tubes to identify degradation and allow repair or replacement before f a i l u r e occurs. Use indirect-fired or other type of heater t o reduce potential f o r f i r e or explosion as a r e s u l t of a leak.
G.4.4
LNG P i p i n g i n Cold Box F a i l s . P o s s i b l e I n i t i a t i n g Events Thermal shock o r thermal c y c l ing s t r e s s e s (medi urn probabi 1 it y )
0
Flaws i n n i a t e r i a l s o r welds ( l o w p r o b a b i l i t y )
R e s u l t s and E f f e c t s o f Release P r e v e n t i o n and Control Systems When t h e p i p i n g f a i l s , LNG i s r e l e a s e d t o t h e c o l d box, r e s u l t i n g i n p o s s i b l e f a i l u r e o f t h e c o l d box. The e s t i m a t e d niaximum r e l e a s e s o f LNG and n a t u r a l gas, based on times f o r emergency o r manual shutdown, a r e g i v e n below: Amount o f Release 1-min Shutdown 10-min Shutdown G u i l l o t i n e Break 42,000 s c f 120,000 s c f
These r e l e a s e s i n c l u d e system gas holdup. s h u t down e i t h e r manually o r by t h e MES. A -d d i t i o n a l

@
The 1 i q u e f a c t i o n system can be
I n f o r m a t i o n Required
What a r e t h e d e t a i l s on m a t e r i a l s and f a b r i c a t i o n techniques used i n t h e c o l d box?
Are t h e r e any autamatic v a l v e s t o s h u t down t h e gas supply l i n e t o t h e c o l d box? What d e s i g n f a c t o r s a r e i n c l u d e d f o r thermal s t r e s s e f f e c t s ?
What QA procedures a r e employed and what i s t h e i r r e 1 i a b i l it y ?

@
Conduct p e r i o d i c n o n - d e s t r u c t i v e t e s t s t o i d e n t i f y p i p i n g d e g r a d a t i o n and a l l o w replacement o r r e p a i r b e f o r e f a i l u r e occurs. I n c o r p o r a t e spray s h i e l d s and sump o r d r a i n system i n c o l d box t o p r e v e n t s p i l l e d LNG from c o n t a c t i n g s i d e s o f c o l d box and causing f a i 1u r e .
6.4.5
Refrigerant Compressor Suction Line F a i l s . Possible I n i t i a t i n g Events Carryover of l i q u i d r e f r i g e r a n t or cold vapor from compressor suction t r a p (medi urn probabi 1i t y ) Flaws in materials o r welds (low p r o b a b i l i t y ) Fatigue r e s u l t i n g from pressure cycling, vibrational s t r e s s (low probabi 1i t y ) Results and Effects of Release Prevention and Control Svstems The maximum r e l e a s e of r e f r i g e r a n t i s 3000 gallons, which i s the cycle
, or static
f l u i d storage capacity in the system. re1 ease q u a n t i t i e s a r e given below:
Based on a normal system flowrate of
about 190 gal/min and times f o r emergency or normal shutdown, more 1i kely
Amount of Release l-min Shutdown 10-min Shutdown G u i l l o t i n e Break 190 gal 1 ,900 gal
The l i q u e f a c t i o n system can be shut down e i t h e r manually o r by the MES. Additional Information Required 0
What i s the r e l i a b i l i t y and response time of the temperature and l i q u i d level instrumentation designed t o p r o t e c t a g a i n s t carryover? What QA procedures a r e employed and what i s t h e i r r e l i a b i l i t y ? What design f a c t o r s a r e included f o r suction l i n e s t r e s s e s ?
Potential Design and Operational Changes I n s t a l l secondary suction t r a p o r o t h e r device t o minimize chances of carryover. Conduct periodic non-destructive t e s t s t o i d e n t i f y and r e c t i f y problems before f a i l u r e occurs. High l i q u i d level alarm on suction t r a p should be t i e d t o l i q u i d recycle pump t o automatically maintain l i q u i d l e v e l .
High l i q u i d l e v e l a l a r m should be t i e d i n t o vapor f l o w c o n t r o l v a l v e t o shut o f f f l o w i n c a s e o f imminent c a r r y o v e r . I n s t a l l a low t e m p e r a t u r e alarm on s u c t i o n l i n e t i e d i n t o vapor flow control valve.
6.4.6
Refrigerant Storage Tank Fails. Possible I n i t i a t i n g Events

e
Fatigue resulting from vibration or s t a t i c s t r e s s (low probability) Flaws in construction materials or welds (low probability) External forces such as vehicular crash, earthquake, or flying proj e c t i l e (low probability) Fire or explosion in plant (medium probability)
Results and Effects of Release Prevention and Control Systems The l a r g e s t refrigerant storage tank has a 10,000 gallon capacity. the maximum release from f a i l u r e of a single tank i s 10,000 gallons. Thus,
UV flame
detectors in the refrigerant storage area would alarm in the event t h a t the
1 eaking r e f r i g e r a n t caught f i r e .
0
What design factors are included f o r vibration and s t a t i c s t r e s s e s ? What QA procedures a r e eniployed and what i s t h e i r re1 i a b i l i ty?
o e
What provisions are made f o r protection against external forces? What plant features protect the storage tanks in the event of f i r e or explosion in the plant?
Potential Design and Operational Changes

e
Instal 1 conibusti ble gas detectors in refrigerant storage area. Conduct periodic non-destructive t e s t s to identify and r e c t i f y problems before f a i l u r e occurs. Design storage tanks t o withstand greater s t r e s s e s and external forces. Incorporate features into plant design to protect storage tanks from external forces and from the e f f e c t s of f i r e or explosion in the plant.
6.4.7
LNG S t o x e Tank F a i l s .
P o s s i b l e I n i t i a t i n a Events Overpressure o r underpressure due t o f a i l u r e o f r e l i e f systems p l u s any o f t h e f o l l o w i n g :
Rol l o v e r o f LNG i n t a n k (medium p r o b a b i l i t y ) Sudden change i n b a r o m e t r i c pressure (medium p r o b a b i l it y ) Heatup o r cooldown o f t a n k t o o f a s t (medium p r o b a b i l i t y ) Boi 1o f f t r e a t m e n t system n o t p r o p e r l y c o n t r o l 1ed ( 1 ow probabi 1 it y ) F a i l u r e o f b o i l o f f compressors ( l o w p r o b a b i l i t y ) Loss o f t a n k i n s u l a t i o n e f f e c t i v e n e s s ( l o w p r o b a b i l i t y )
- F i r e (medium probabi 1 it y )
E x p l o s i o n due t o e x p l o s i v e gas m i x t u r e i n t a n k r e s u l t i n g from: - Inadequate purge (medium p r o b a b i l it y ) - Vacuum r e l i e f a l l o w i n g a i r i n t o t h e t a n k ( l o w p r o b a b i l i t y ) I n n e r she1 1 o f f - c e n t e r e d w i t h r e s u l t i n g pressure f o r c e s f a i l i n g t h e t a n k (medium p r o b a b i l it y ) Thermal s t r e s s f r o m t o o r a p i d o r nonuniform cooldown o r heatup ( l o w probabi 1 it y ) D i f f e r e n t i a l f o u n d a t i o n s e t t l i n g , o r f r o s t h e a v e from f o u n d a t i o n h e a t i n g c o i l f a i l u r e (low probability) Earthquake o r tornado (1 ow probabi 1 it y ) A i r c r a f t c r a s h ( 1 ow probabi 1 it y ) Sabotage ( 1 ow probabi 1 it y ) S t r u c t u r a l f a i l u r e due t o f l a w s i n m a t e r i a l s o r welds ( l o w p r o b a b i l i t y ) F i r e o r explosion i n other sections o f p l a n t (low p r o b a b i l i t y ) R e s u l t s and E f f e c t s o f Release P r e v e n t i o n and C o n t r o l Systems The maximum LNG r e l e a s e from a f a i l e d t a n k i s 348,000 b b l . The s p i l l
b a s i n s u r r o u n d i n g t h e s t o r a g e t a n k would r o u t e t h e LNG t o t h e d i k e d impoundment
area, which has t h e c a p a c i t y t o c o n t a i n t h e e n t i r e l e a k . are available t o control possible f i r e s . A d d i t i o n a l I n f o r m a t i o n Required
F i r e - f i g h t i n g systems
What i s t h e r e l i a b i l i t y and adequacy o f t h e p r e s s u r e and vacuum r e l i e f systems ( i n c l u d i n g b o i l o f f system and n a t u r a l gas a d d i t i o n ) ? What QA procedures a r e employed i n t a n k c o n s t r u c t i o n and what i s t h e i r reliability? What p r o v i s i o n s a r e made f o r p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t and a l l e v i a t i o n o f s t r e s s e s caused by e x t e r n a l f o r c e s ? What p r e c a u t i o n s a r e taken t o ensure an adequate base f o r t h e t a n k foundation? What i s t h e r e l i a b i l i t y and response t i m e o f t h e temperature and l i q u i d l e v e l i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n on t h e t a n k ? What i s t h e r e 1 i a b i l i t y o f t h e e l e c t r i c f o u n d a t i o n h e a t e r s ? P o t e n t i a l Design and O p e r a t i o n a l Changes Conduct p e r i o d i c n o n - d e s t r u c t i v e t e s t s on t h e s t o r a g e t a n k . Completely automate t h e cooldown and heatup procedures. Design t a n k t o w i t h s t a n d g r e a t e r s t r e s s e s . B u i l d t a n k underground so s u r r o u n d i n g e a r t h p r o v i d e s containment o f l e a k s , a d d i t i o n a l s u p p o r t , and added thermal i n s u l a t i o n . Develop and i n s t a l l i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n t o d e t e c t c o n d i t i o n s l i k e l y t o r es u l t i n r o l l over.
G.4.8
L N G Outlet Line from Storage Tank Fails. -
Possible I n i t i a t i n g Events Fatigue resulting from pressure or thermal cycling or s t a t i c s t r e s s (low probability) Overpressurization due t o L N G trapped in l i n e and vaporized, coupled with f a i 1 ure of re1 ief val ve (medium probabi 1 i t y )
Fluid hammer s t r e s s e s caused by too rapid closure of valve during operation (low probabi 1 i t y ) Flaws in pipe, valves, flanges, couplings, or weld (low probability) Failure of expansion j o i n t due t o excessive flexing (medium probability) Exterual forces such as vehicular crash or earthquake (low probabi 1 i t y )
Results and Effects of Release Prevention and Control Systems If the leak i s prior t o block valves in the l i n e and the internal block
valve in the tank f a i l s t o operate, the total contents of the tank might leak t o the s p i l l basin. Thus, the maximum release of LNG i s 348,000 bbl. Estimated releases from g u i l l o t i n e leaks beyond l i n e valves, based on times f o r emergency or manual shutdown, are given below: Amount of Release 1 -min Shutdown 10-min ~ h z 28,000 gal 280,000 gal
Guillotine Break
If the break i s between the inner and outer s h e l l s of the tank, i t would probably lead t o f a i l u r e of the tank d u e to contact of the outer tank shell with the cold LNG. (See also Section 6.4.7.)
Additional Information Required What design factors are included f o r cyclic and s t a t i c s t r e s s e s ? What i s the re1 iabil i ty of the pressure re1 ief valve?
What p r e c a u t i o n s and d e s i g n p r o v i s i o n s a r e used t o a v o i d f l u i d hammer? What p r o v i s i o n s a r e made f o r p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t and a l l e v i a t i o n o f s t r e s s e s caused by e x t e r n a l f o r c e s ? Can space between t a n k s h e l l s be d r a i n e d o f l e a k i n g LNG? d e t e c t such a l e a k ? What i s t h e r e l i a b i l i t y o f expansion j o i n t s i n t h i s s o r t o f s e r v i c e ? P o t e n t i a l Design and O p e r a t i o n a l Changes Conduct p e r i o d i c n o n - d e s t r u c t i v e t e s t s on t h e p i p e and a s s o c i a t e d valves. Put a t l e a s t two p a r a l l e l r e 1 i e f v a l v e s i n each i s o l a t a b l e s e c t i o n o f pipe. Design p i p e and connections t o w i t h s t a n d g r e a t e r s t r e s s e s . I n c o r p o r a t e p r o v i s i o n s f o r d r a i n i n g a n n u l a r space i n t a n k . Also, a r e
t h e r e any temperature o r l i q u i d l e v e l sensors i n a n n u l a r space t o
G.4.9
LNG V-rs ijge Tank.
Vented through R e l i e f Valves a f t e r O v e r p r e s s u r i z a t i o n o f S t o r -
P o s s i b l e I n i t i a t i n g Events R o l l o v e r o f LNG i n t a n k (medium p r o b a b i l i t y ) Sudden d r o p i n b a r o m e t r i c p r e s s u r e ( l o w p r o b a b i l i t y ) F i r e (medium p r o b a b i l it y ) Heatup o f LNG i n s t o r a g e t a n k t o o f a s t (medium p r o b a b i l i t y )

e
Boi 1o f f t r e a t m e n t system n o t p r o p e r l y c o n t r o l 1ed ( 1 ow probabi 1 it y ) F a i l u r e o f b o i l o f f compressors ( l o w p r o b a b i l it y ) Loss. o f t a n k i n s u l a t i o n e f f e c t i v e n e s s ( l o w p r o b a b i l i t y )
Results and E f f e c t s o f Release P r e v e n t i o n and C o n t r o l Svstems The e s t i m a t e d LNG vapor r e l e a s e s depend on t h e l e n g t h o f t i m e t h e t a n k i s overpressurized. s u r i z a t i o n events. Amount o f Release 10-min Ventina P e r i o d 2 - h r Ventina P e r i o d Two 1 2 - i n . R e l i e f Valves 740,000 s c f 8,900,000 scf The values g i v e n below a r e based on t h e maximum v e n t i n g r a t e o f 74,000 scfm and assumed v e n t i n g times f o r minor and major overpres-
The r e l e a s e d vapors may a l s o c a t c h f i r e o r explode.
A UV f i r e d e t e c t o r and
d r y chemical e x t i n g u i s h e r a r e l o c a t e d on t o p o f t h e t a n k near t h e r e l i e f valves; t h e e x t i n g u i s h e r , d i r e c t e d a t t h e valves, i s a c t u a t e d by t h e d e t e c t o r . A d d i t i o n a l I n f o r m a t i o n Required What p r e c a u t i o n s a r e taken t o ensure a g a i n s t r o l l o v e r ? What i s t h e r e l i a b i l i t y of t h e b o i l o f f t r e a t m e n t system? What i s t h e r e l i a b i l i t y and response t i m e o f t h e temperature and l i q u i d l e v e l i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n on t h e t a n k ? P o t e n t i a1 Design and Operational Changes Completely automate t h e heatup procedure. Develop and i n s t a l l i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n t o d e t e c t c o n d i t i o n s 1 ik e l y t o r e s u l t in r o l l o v e r .
6.4.10
Sendout Pump Vessel F a i l s .
P o s s i b l e I n i t i a t i n g Events
e
F a t i g u e r e s u l t i n g from c y c l i c thermal s t r e s s e s ( l o w p r o b a b i l it y ) Flaws i n m a t e r i a l s o r welds ( l o w p r o b a b i l i t y ) E x t e r n a l f o r c e s such as earthquake ( l o w p r o b a b i l i t y )
R e s u l t s and E f f e c t s o f Release P r e v e n t i o n and C o n t r o l Svstems I f t h e b l o c k v a l v e s i n t h e tank and t h e o u t l e t l i n e f a i l t o o p e r a t e , t h e maximum r e l e a s e would be t h e t o t a l c o n t e n t s o f t h e tank, o r 348,000 b b l . emergency o r normal shutdown, as g i v e n below: Amount o f Release 1-min Shutdown 10-min Shutdown T o t a l Vessel F a i 1u r e 28,000 ~ a l 280,000 gas If t h e v a l v e s o p e r a t e p r o p e r l y , t h e maximum r e l e a s e s would be based on t i m e s f o r
These r e l e a s e s i n c l u d e t h e LNG holdup i n t h e pump vessel as w e l l as t h e f l o w t h r o u g h t h e system. B o t h t h e MES and t h e V a p o r i z e r Emergency Shutdown (VES) The area around t h e can be used t o s t o p t h e f l o w o f LNG t o t h e pump v e s s e l .
pump vessel i s m o n i t o r e d by b o t h UV f i r e d e t e c t o r s and c o m b u s t i b l e gas d e t e c t o r s , and high-expansion foam and o t h e r f i r e - f i g h t i n g systems a r e a v a i l a b l e t o cont r o l any r e s u l t i n g f i r e . The l e a k would be c o n f i n e d t o t h e s p i l l b a s i n .
A d d i t i o n a l I n f o r m a t i o n Required What d e s i g n f a c t o r s a r e i n c l u d e d f o r c y c l i c thermal s t r e s s e s ? What p r o v i s i o n s a r e made f o r p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t and a l l e v i a t i o n o f s t r e s s e s caused by e x t e r n a l f o r c e s ? P o t e n t i a l Design and O p e r a t i o n a l Changes
@
Conduct p e r i o d i c n o n - d e s t r u c t i v e t e s t s on t h e pump v e s s e l s . Design v e s s e l s t o w i t h s t a n d g r e a t e r s t r e s s e s .
G.4.11
LNG Supply L i n e t o V a p o r i z e r s F a i l s .
P o s s i b l e I n i t i a t i n g Events
* *
F a t i g u e r e s u l t i n g f r o m thermal o r p r e s s u r e c y c l i n g o r s t a t i c s t r e s s (low p r o b a b i l i t y ) Flaws i n pipe, v a l v e s , f l a n g e s , c o u p l i n g s , o r welds ( l o w p r o b a b i l i t y ) E x t e r n a l f o r c e s such as v e h i c u l a r crash o r earthquake ( l o w p r o b a b i l i t y ) O v e r p r e s s u r i z a t i o n due t o LNG t r a p p e d i n l i n e and vaporized, coupled
w i t h f a i 1u r e o f r e 1 i e f v a l ve (medi um p r o b a b i 1 it y )
F l u i d hammer s t r e s s e s caused by t o o r a p i d c l o s u r e o f v a l v e d u r i n g operation (low p r o b a b i l i t y ) R e s u l t s and E f f e c t s o f Release P r e v e n t i o n and C o n t r o l Systems The e s t i m a t e d maximum LNG r e l e a s e s f r o m a g u i l l o t i n e break, based on t i m e s f o r emergency o r normal shutdown, a r e : Amount o f Release 1-min Shutdown 1C-min Shutdown G u i l l o t i n e Break 4,700 g a l 20,000 gal Even w i t h o u t sendout pumps
These r e l e a s e s i n c l u d e LNG holdup i n t h e 1 i n e . be leaked. fire. A d d i t i o n a l I n f o r m a t i o n Required
o p e r a t i n g , t h e 3000-gallon l i n e holdup (assuming 500 f t o f 1 2 - i n . l i n e ) would The sendout system can be s h u t down manually o r by u s i n g e i t h e r t h e F i r e - f i g h t i n g systems a r e a v a i l a b l e t o c o n t r o l any r e s u l t i n g
MES o r t h e VES.
What d e s i g n f a c t o r s a r e i n c l u d e d f o r c y c l i c and s t a t i c s t r e s s e s ? What p r o v i s i o n s a r e made f o r p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t and a l l e v i a t i o n o f s t r e s s e s caused by e x t e r n a l f o r c e s ? What i s t h e r e l i a b i l i t y o f t h e p r e s s u r e r e l i e f v a l v e ? What p r e c a u t i o n s and d e s i g n p r o v i s i o n s a r e used t o a v o i d f l u i d hammer?
P o t e n t i a l Design and O p e r a t i o n a l Changes Conduct p e r i o d i c n o n - d e s t r u c t i v e t e s t s on p i p e and a s s o c i a t e d v a l v e s . P u t a t l e a s t two r e l i e f v a l v e s i n each s e c t i o n o f p i p e t h a t can be isolated.

@
Design p i p e and connections t o w i t h s t a n d g r e a t e r s t r e s s e s .
G.4.12
Vaporizer H e a t m e r Tube Fails.

.
Possible I n i t i a--n g Event ti

e
Thermal shock or .thermal cycl i ng s t r e s s e s (medium probabi 1 i t y ) Corrosion ( 1 ow probabi l i t y ) Flaws in materials or welds (low probability) Bi,rner explosion (low probabi 1 i t y )
-Results
and Effects of Release Prevention and Control Systems
The estimated maximum releases of L N G and L N G vapor from a g u i l l o t i n e break, based o n time f o r emergency or manual shutdown, are given below:
-1 -mi
x tdown u
Amount of Release - n Shutdown 10-mi

1,000,000 scf
Guillotine Break
100,000 scf
The released vapor may explode or catch f i r e due t o the burner nearby. The vaporizers can be shut down by e i t h e r the PIES or the VES. The VES will also close off the fuel gas and a i r 1 ines t o the burners. Combustible gas detectors will close the vents and release Halon into the vaporizer building i f gas concentrations exceed s e t l i m i t s . Additional Information Reauired
e
What are the d e t a i l s on diameters, thickness, configuration, and flow r a t e s through the tubes in the vaporizers? What are the corrosion problems involved?
What design factors are included for thermal s t r e s s e f f e c t s ?
How r e l i a b l e are the various vaporizer components?

Potential Design and Operational Changes
e
Conduct periodic non-destructive t e s t s on tubes. Use indirect-fired or other type of heater t o reduce the potential f o r f i r e or explosion resulting from a leak.
6.4.13
N a t u r a l Gas L i n e f r o m Vaporizers F a i l s . I n i t i a t i n g Events
P - ossible
Carryover of LNG o r c o l d vapor f r o m v a p o r i z e r s (medium probabi 1 it y )

0
Fatigue r e s u l t i n g from pressure c y c l i n g o r s t a t i c s t r e s s (low probability) Flaws i n p i p e , v a l v e s , f l a n g e s , coup1 i n g s o r welds ( l o w p r o b a b i l i t y ) E x t e r n a l f o r c e s such as v e h i c u l a r c r a s h o r earthquake ( l o w p r o b a b i l it y )
R e s u l t s and E f f e c t s o f Release P r e v e n t i o n and C o n t r o l Systems Assuming t h r e e v a p o r i z e r s a r e o p e r a t i n g and based on times f o r emergency o r normal shutdown, t h e e s t i m a t e d maximum n a t u r a l gas r e l e a s e s f r o m a g u i l l o t i n e break a r e as f o l l o w s : Amount o f Release 1- m i n Shutdown 10-mi n Shutdown G u i l l o t i n e Break The l i n e can be i s o l a t e d manually o r by u s i n g t h e VES. A d d i t i o n a l I n f o r m a t i o n Required
e
What d e s i g n f a c t o r s a r e i n c l u d e d f o r p r e s s u r e c y c l i n g and s t a t i c stresses? What p r o v i s i o n s a r e made f o r p r o t e c t i o n a g i n s t and a l l e v i a t i o n o f s t r e s s e s caused by e x t e r n a l f o r c e s ? What i s t h e r e l i a b i l i t y and response t i m e o f t h e v a p o r i z e r o u t l e t temperature instrumentation?

a
Conduct p e r i o d i c n o n - d e s t r u c t i v e t e s t s on l i n e t o i d e n t i f y problems before f a i l u r e occurs. I n s t a l l v a p o r - l i q u i d s e p a r a t o r vessel a f t e r each v a p o r i z e r t o p r e v e n t LNG c a r r y o v e r t o carbon s t e e l l i n e .
6.4.14
iiquid i i n e from Storage to the Truck Loading Station Fails.
Possible I n i t i a t i n c Events
Overpressurization due t o LNG trapped in the l i n e and heated up and f a i l u r e of the re1 ief valve t o function (medium probability) Thermal cycl i c s t r e s s e s ( 1 ow probabi 1 i t y )
Vehicular damage (low probabil i t y ) Earthquake (low probability)
-Results -
and Effects of Release Prevention and Control Systems -
The estimated maximum L N G releases from a g u i l l o t i n e break are given below, based on the assumption of a time f o r an emergency or a normal shutdown: Amount of Release 1-min Shutdown 10-min Shutdown Guillotine Break 460 gal 3,600 gal
The tank loading pumps can be shut down by the Emergency Shutdown (ESD) system. The LNG released from a break will be contained within the impoundment area i f the release i s inside the dike walls. Additional Information Required
@
What i s the r e l i a b i l i t y of the r e l i e f valves on the l i n e ?
How many thermal cycles can s t a i n l e s s s t e e l pipe take prior to failure?
Possible Design and Operational Changes If economically f e a s i b l e , p u t a t l e a s t two r e l i e f valves in each section of pipe t h a t can be isolated with L N G in i t . Periodically check welds with non-destructive techniques.
F l e x i b l e Loadi ng/Unl oadi ng Hoses F a i 1 . P o s s i b l e I n i t i a t i n g Events Wearing o f t h e hose b r a i d by r u b b i n g on t h e ground o r on o t h e r sharp o r a b r a s i v e s u r f a c e s (medi um p r o b a b i l it y ) V e h i c u l a r damage (medium p r o b a b i 1 it y ) Thermal c y c l i c s t r e s s e s ( l o w p r o b a b i l i t y ) Hose coup1 i n g doesn' t seal p r o p e r l y ( l o w p r o b a b i l i t y ) R e s u l t s and E f f e c t s o f Release P r e v e n t i o n and C o n t r o l Systems The e s t i m a t e d maximum LNG r e l e a s e s from a g u i l l o t i n e break a r e g i v e n below, based on t h e assumption o f a t i m e f o r an emergency shutdown o r a normal shutdown : Amount o f Release 1-min Shutdown 10-min Shutdown G u i l l o t i n e Break: loading unloading 470 g a l 1,600 g a l 3,600 g a l 10,500 g a l
The LNG f r o m a break w i l l f l o w away f r o m t h e t r u c k and e i t h e r v a p o r i z e o r be c o n t a i n e d by d i k e s and t r e n c h e s . D u r i n g l o a d i n g , shutdown o f t h e l o a d i n g The l o a d i n g s t a t i o n pump w i l l l i m i t t h e r e l e a s e t o t h e holdup i n t h e l i n e s . v a l v e s can a l s o be c l o s e d t o s t o p t h e f l o w . D u r i n g u n l o a d i n g , t h e remote l i q u i d f l o w s h u t o f f v a l v e s on t h e t r u c k can be c l o s e d t o s t o p t h e f l o w . The f l o w o f LNG t o t h e p r e s s u r e b u i l d u p c o i l must a l s o be s h u t o f f t o p r e v e n t o v e r p r e s s u r i z a t i o n . A d d i t i o n a l I n f o r m a t i o n Reauired
a
What i s t h e 1 i f e expectancy and wear r e s i s t a n c e o f t h e f l e x i b l e hose? What i s t h e r e l i a b i l i t y o f t h e hose connectors?
P o s s i b l e Design and O p e r a t i o n a l Changes

o
P o s s i b l y remote c o n t r o l s f r o m t h e u n l o a d i n g s t a t i o n c o u l d o p e r a t e t h e t r u c k ' s remote s h u t o f f v a l v e s .
G.4.16
Vapor Return L i n e from t h e Truck Loading S t a t i o n t o Storage F a i l s .
P o s s i b l e I n i t i a t i n a Events Thermal c y c l ic s t r e s s e s ( 1 ow probabi 1 it y ) V e h i c u l a r damage ( 1 ow probabi 1 it y ) Earthquake ( l o w p r o b a b i l i t y ) R e s u l t s and E f f e c t s o f Release P r e v e n t i o n and C o n t r o l Systems The e s t i m a t e d maximum n a t u r a l gas vapor r e l e a s e s from a g u i l l o t i n e break a r e g i v e n below, based on t h e assumption o f a t i m e f o r an emergency shutdown o r a normal shutdown: Amount o f Release 1-min Shutdown 10-min Shutdown G u i l l o t i n e Break 1,100 s c f 11,000 s c f
Shutdown of t h e sendout pump may decrease t h e vapor r e l e a s e , depending on how much LNG has been pumped i n t o t h e t r u c k p r i o r t o t h e vapor r e t u r n l i n e failure. The pump can be s h u t down by t h e ESD. The vapor r e t u r n v a l v e on t h e t r u c k o r a t t h e l o a d i n g s t a t i o n can be s h u t t o s t o p f l o w through t h e vapor return line. However, t h i s may cause o v e r p r e s s u r i z a t i o n o f t h e t r u c k t a n k and A l l n a t u r a l gas vapor subsequent r e l e a s e t h r o u g h one o f t h e s a f e t y v a l v e s .
r e l e a s e s w i l l most l i k e l y r i s e i n t o t h e atmosphere and d i s s i p a t e . A d d i t i o n a l I n f o r m a t i o n Reauired How many thermal c y c l e s can s t a i n l e s s s t e e l p i p e w i t h s t a n d p r i o r t o f a i 1u r e ? P o s s i b l e Design and O p e r a t i o n a l Changes P e r i o d i c a l l y check welds w i t h n o n - d e s t r u c t i v e techniques.
G.4.17
L i q u i d L i n e from t h e Truck Unloading S t a t i o n t o t h e Storage Tank F a i l s .
P o s s i b l e I n i t i a t i n g Events O v e r p r e s s u r i z a t i o n due t o LNG t r a p p e d i n t h e l i n e and heated up, coupled w i t h f a i l u r e o f t h e r e 1 i e f v a l v e (medium p r o b a b i l i t y ) Thermal c y c l ic s t r e s s e s ( 1 ow probabi 1 it y ) V e h i c u l a r damage ( l o w p r o b a b i l i t y ) Earthquake ( l o w p r o b a b i l i t y ) R e s u l t s and E f f e c t s o f Release P r e v e n t i o n and C o n t r o l Systems The e s t i m a t e d maximum LNG r e l e a s e s f r o m a g u i l l o t i n e break a r e g i v e n below, based on t h e assumption o f a t i m e f o r an emergency shutdown o r a normal shutdown: Amount o f Release 1 - n l n Shutdown 10-min Shutdown 870 g a l 8,200 g a l
G u i l l o t i n e Break
The s t a t i o n u n l o a d i n g v a l v e o r t h e t r u c k u n l o a d i n g v a l v e can be c l o s e d o r t h e remote l i q u i d f l o w s h u t o f f v a l v e s on t h e t r u c k may be o p e r a t e d t o s t o p t h e f l o w o f LNG f r o m t h e t r u c k . The f l o w o f LNG t o t h e p r e s s u r e b u i l d u p c o i l must The LNG a l s o be s h u t o f f o r o v e r p r e s s u r i z a t i o n o f t h e t r u c k t a n k may o c c u r . release i s i n s i d e the dike wails. A d d i t i o n a l I n f o r m a t i o n Required How many c y c l e s can s t a i n l e s s s t e e l p i p e w i t h s t a n d p r i o r t o f a i l u r e ? What i s t h e r e l i a b i l i t y o f t h e r e l i e f v a l v e s on t h e l i n e ? Possi b l e Desian and O ~ e r a t i o n a l Chanaes
r e l e a s e d f r o m a break w i l l be c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n t h e impoundment area i f t h e
I f e c o n o m i c a l l y f e a s i b l e , p u t a t l e a s t two r e l i e f v a l v e s i n each
s e c t i o n o f p i p e t h a t can be i s o l a t e d w i t h LNG i n i t . P e r i o d i c a l l y check welds w i t h n o n - d e s t r u c t i v e techniques.
G.4.18
Truck
LNG Tank F a i l s .
P o s s i b l e I n i t i a t i n g Events O v e r p r e s s u r i z a t i o n due t o any one o f t h e f o l l o w i n g p l u s f a i l u r e o f t h e r e 1 ie f sys tems :
T r a i l e r r o a d s a f e t y v a l v e i s n o t opened a f t e r t r u c k l o a d i n g o r u n l o a d i n g (medium probabi 1 it y )
- F i r e (medium p r o b a b i l i t y ) - Loss o f i n s u l a t i o n and subsequent heatup o f i n n e r s h e l l (medium

probabi 1 it y )
Vapor r e t u r n v a l v e s a r e l e f t c l o s e d d u r i n g t r u c k t a n k l o a d i n g (medi um p r o b a b i 1 it y )
- R o l l o v e r o f LNG i n t h e t r u c k t a n k ( l o w p r o b a b i l i t y )
Automatic p r e s s u r e b u i l d u p r e g u l a t o r f a i l s open when f e e d v a l v e i s open ( 1 ow p r o b a b i 1 it y )
E x p l o s i o n caused by:
S t a t i c spark due t o grounding c a b l e s i n bad c o n d i t i o n o r f a i l u r e t o hook up c a b l e s (medium p r o b a b i l i t y ) E x p l o s i v e m i x t u r e o f a i r and n a t u r a l gas due t o improper p u r g i n g (medi um p r o b a b i 1 it y ) E x p l o s i v e m i x t u r e due t o use o f t a n k f o r commodity i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h LNG ( l o w p r o b a b i l i t y )
Accidents causing f a i l u r e o f both s h e l l s :
Puncture o f b o t h s h e l l s by c o l l i s i o n w i t h o t h e r o b j e c t s (medium p r o b a b i 1 it y ) O v e r t u r n o f t r u c k (medium p r o b a b i l i t y ) Thermal s t r e s s e s r e s u l t i n g i n a cracked i n n e r t a n k w i t h subsequent o u t e r t a n k f a i l u r e and r e l e a s e o f LNG ( l o w p r o b a b i l i t y ) F i r e f a i l s both s h e l l s o f t r u c k tank (low p r o b a b i l i t y )
R e s u l t s and Effects o f Release P r e v e n t i o n and C o n t r o l Systems A complete r u p t u r e o f t h e t r u c k t a n k w h i l e f u l l would r e s u l t i n t h e r e l e a s e of about 10,500 g a l o f LNG, e i t h e r as a l i q u i d o r vapor. o r f i r e s might r e s u l t from the release. A d d i t i o n a l I n f o r m a t i o n Reauired What i s t h e r e l i a b i l i t y o f t h e v a r i o u s o p e r a t o r t a s k s r e l a t e d t o l o a d i n g , t r a n s p o r t , and u n l o a d i n g o f LNG t r u c k s ? P o s s i b l e Design and Operational Changes More i n t e r l o c k s c o u l d p o s s i b l y be i n c o r p o r a t e d t o p r e v e n t e r r o r s i n p e r f o r m i n g c h e c k l i s t procedures. Explosions
6.4.19
Trailer Pressure Buildup Coil Fails.
Possible I n i t i a t i n a Events Thermal cyclic s t r e s s e s (low t o medium probability) Accident (low probabi 1 i t y ) Results and Effects of Release Prevention and Control Systems
An estimated maximum of 100 gal of LNG or natural gas could be released from a g u i l l o t i n e break of the pressure buildup c o i l , assuming 30 seconds to shut off LNG flow t o the c o i l . Flow to the coil can be shut off by e i t h e r a manual flow control valve or a remote liquid flow shutoff valve.
Hw many thermal cycles can the buildup c o i l s withstand prior to o failure? What i s the accident record regarding the pressure buildup c o i l ?
G.5
REPRESENTATIVE RELEASE EVENTS FOR THE LNG SATELLITE PLANT The p o t e n t i a l r e l e a s e events chosen t o be analyzed f o r t h e r e f e r e n c e LNG
s a t e l l i t e p l a n t a r e g i v e n i n Table G.6. i n d i v i d u a l events appear below.
(The f a c i l i t y d e s c r i p t i o n f o r t h e The analyses o f t h e
s a t e l l i t e p l a n t was presented p r e v i o u s l y i n Appendix F . )
Release events f o r t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and
t r a n s f e r o p e r a t i o n s a r e covered i n S e c t i o n 6.4 and a r e n o t i n c l u d e d here. TABLE G-6. 1. R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Release Events f o r an LNG Sate1 1 it e Faci 1 it y
Sate1 1 it e s t o r a g e t a n k f a i l s E x i t gas l i n e f r o m t h e b o i l o f f h e a t e r s f a i l s . L i q u i d discharge l i n e from t h e s a t e l l i t e storage tank p r i o r t o t h e sendout pumps f a i 1s
2.
3.
4.
Sendout pump vessel f a i l s . L i q u i d r e c i r c u l a t i o n l i n e f r o m t h e sendout pumps f a i l s . Vapor r e t u r n l i n e f r o m t h e sendout pump f a i l s . L i q u i d l i n e t o the vaporizers f a i l s . N a t u r a l gas 1 i n e f r o m t h e v a p o r i z e r s f a i l s .
5.
6.
7.
9.
8. V a p o r i z e r h e a t exchanger tubes f a i l .
G.5.1
S a t e l l i t e Storage Tank F a i l s . Possible I n i t i a t i n g Events Overpressurization due t o any of t h e following plus f a i l u r e o r re1 i ef sys terns :
- Rollover of LNG i n tank (medium p r o b a b i l i t y ) - Sudden drop in barometric pressure (medium probabil i t y )
- F i r e (medi urn probabi 1 i t y )
- Heatup of LNG too f a s t during tank heatup (medium p r o b a b i l i t y ) - Boiloff treatment system not properly c o n t r o l l e d (low p r o b a b i l i t y ) - F a i l u r e of b o i l o f f compressors (low p r o b a b i l i t y )
e
Explosion due t o explosive gas mixture from:
- Inadequate purge (medium probabi 1i t y ) - Vacuum r e l i e f allowing a i r i n t o t h e tank (low p r o b a b i l i t y )

Inner s h e l l off-centered with r e s u l t i n g pressure f o r c e s f a i l i n g t h e tank (medium probabi 1 i t y )
@
Too rapid o r nonuniform cooldown (low p r o b a b i l i t y ) High external pressure and f a i l u r e of both vacuum r e l i e f valves (low probabi 1 i t y )
e e
P i l i n g cap f a i l u r e (low p r o b a b i l i t y ) Earthquake (low probabi 1 i t y ) Airplane crash (low probabil i t y ) Sabotage (low p r o b a b i l i t y )
Results and E f f e c t s of Release Prevention and Control Systems The maximum r e l e a s e of LNG from a completely f a i l e d tank would be 37,000 b b l , which would be contained i n t h e impoundment a r e a surrounding t h e tank. Foam g e n e r a t i o n , dry chemical f i r e e x t i n g u i s h e r s , and a water supply system a r e a v a i l a b l e t o combat f i r e and i t s e f f e c t s .
Additional Information Required What i s the r e l i a b i l i t y of the pressure and vacuum r e l i e f system? What design factors are included for the cyclic s t r e s s e s the storage tank undergoes? Possible Design and Operational Changes Connect the vacuum r e l i e f to a nitrogen supply. Completely automate the cooldown procedure. If economically f e a s i b l e , non-destructively t e s t the t o t a l tank ( e . g . , acoustic emission).
G.5.2
E x i t Gas L i n e f r o m t h e B o i l o f f Heaters F a i l s . P o s s i b l e I n i t i a t i n g Events Heaters f a i l due t o one o f t h e f o l l o w i n g , which r e s u l t s i n c o l d gases f a i l i n g t h e carbon s t e e l l i n e s :
- power outage (medi um probabi 1 it y )
mechanical f a i 1u r e (medium p r o b a b i l it y )
Rapid b o i l o f f n o t adequately handled by t h e heaters, r e s u l t i n g i n c o l d gases f a i 1 i n g t h e carbon s t e e l 1 i n e s (medium probabi 1 it y ) Earthquake ( l o w p r o b a b i l it y ) R e s u l t s and E f f e c t s o f Release P r e v e n t i o n and C o n t r o l Systems
If t h e gas l i n e f a i l s c o m p l e t e l y p r i o r t o t h e h e a t e r e x i t v a l v e , t h e n an
e s t i m a t e d 6250 s c f p e r hour would be r e l e a s e d t o t h e atmosphere.
I f t h e gas
l i n e f a i l s c o m p l e t e l y a f t e r t h e h e a t e r e x i t valve, t h e n t h e e x i t v a l v e can be closed, b u t an e s t i m a t e d 6250 s c f p e r hour would be vented t o t h e atmosphere f r o m t h e s t o r a g e tank. When l o w temperatures a r e d e t e c t e d i n t h e e x i t l i n e from t h e h e a t e r s , t h e e x i t v a l v e s a r e a u t o m a t i c a l l y closed. A d d i t i o n a l I n f o r m a t i o n Reauired
e
0
Are t h e h e a t e r e x i t l i n e s and e x i t v a l v e s made o f s t a i n l e s s s t e e l ? A d d i t i o n a l d e t a i l s concerning t h e e n t i r e b o i l o f f system a r e r e q u i r e d .
P o s s i b l e Design and O p e r a t i o n a l Changes
An a u x i l i a r y , g a s - f i r e d ,
emergencies .
h o t w a t e r b a t h h e a t e r c o u l d be on hand f o r
6.5.3
L i q u i d Discharge L i n e from t h e Sate1 1 it e Storage Tank p r i o r t o t h e Sendout Pumps F a i l s . P o s s i b l e I n i t i a t i n g Events

e
O v e r p r e s s u r i z a t i o n due t o LNG t r a p p e d i n t h e l i n e and heated up coupled w i t h f a i l u r e o f t h e r e 1 i e f v a l v e t o f u n c t i o n (medium probabi 1 it y ) Thermal c y c l i c s t r e s s e s ( 1 ow probabi 1 it y )
Earthquake ( l o w p r o b a b i l it y )
R e s u l t s and E f f e c t s o f Release P r e v e n t i o n and C o n t r o l Systems A complete break o f t h e l i n e c o u l d p o s s i b l y r e l e a s e t h e t o t a l c o n t e n t s o f t h e t a n k ( a s much as 37,000 b b l ) t o t h e d i k e d impoundment area. f a i l u r e possibly the inner shell w i l l f a i l . A d d i t i o n a l I n f o r m a t i o n Reauired
e
I f t h e break
i s between t h e i n n e r and o u t e r s h e l l s , t h e o u t e r s h e l l w i l l f a i l and w i t h i t s
What i n t e r n a l v a l v e s , i f any, a r e i n t h e t a n k ?
P o s s i b l e Design and O p e r a t i o n a l Changes I f e c o n o m i c a l l y f e a s i b l e , p u t a t l e a s t two r e l i e f v a l v e s i n t.he p i p e between t h e s t o r a g e t a n k and t h e pumps o r between v a l v e s i n t h a t section o f pipe.
o
I n s t a l 1 i n t e r n a l tank valves i f they are n o t already present.
G.5.4
Sendout Pump Vessel Fails. Possible I n i t i a t i n g Events Thermal cycl i c s t r e s s e s (low probabi 1 i t y ) Vehicular damage ( 1 ow probabi 1 i t y )
A complete rupture of the pump vessel would release the volume of LNG in the vessel t o the impoundment area, unless the feed valves t o the pump are open simultaneously. Then the release would be about 14,500 gal plus the volunle of the purnp vessel, a s s u ~ i n gi t takes 10 minutes t o close the feed valves t o the pump. Either the MES or VES could be activated t o stop the LNG flow t o the pump vessel.
Additional Information Reauired
e
What i s the volume of the pump vessel?
Is any of the pump vessel in the ground?

Possible Design and Operational Changes
e
If economically or practically f e a s i b l e , p u t a barrier around the
pump vessels.
G.5.5
L i q u i d R e c i r c u l a t i o n L i n e f r o m t h e Sendout Pumps F a i l s . P o s s i b l e I n i t i a t i n a Events Thermal c y c l i c s t r e s s ( l o w p r o b a b i l i t y ) V i b r a t i o n a l s t r e s s e s ( l o w probabi 1 it y ) R e s u l t s and E f f e c t s o f Release P r e v e n t i o n and C o n t r o l Systems The e s t i m a t e d maximum LNG r e l e a s e s f r o m a g u i l l o t i n e break a r e g i v e n below,
based on t h e assumption o f a t i m e f o r an emergency shutdown o r a normal shutdown : Amount o f Release 1-min Shutdown 10-min Shutdown G u i l l o t i n e break 100 g a l 1,000 g a l The s t o r a g e
Shutdown o f t h e pumps w i l l decrease t h e LNG r e l e a s e from a break. t a n k pumps can be s h u t down by e i t h e r a MES o r VES. break w i l l be c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n t h e impoundment area.
The LNG r e l e a s e d from a

I f t h e LNG r e l e a s e d f r o m
t h e break h i t s t h e o u t e r s h e l l o f t h e tank, t h e o u t e r s h e l l may c r a c k o r f a i l . A d-d i t i o n a l I n f o r m a t i o n Required How many thermal c y c l e s can t h e s t a i n l e s s s t e e l p i p e t a k e p r i o r t o f a i 1u r e ?

e
How much v i b r a t i o n can t h e p i p e t a k e p r i o r t o f a i l u r e ?
P o s s i b l e Design and O p e r a t i o n a l Changes Put a s h i e l d a l o n g p o r t i o n s o f t h e r e c i r c u l a t i o n l i n e t h a t r u n s c l o s e t o t h e o u t e r s h e l l o f the storage tank.
G.5.6
Vapor Return Line from the Sendout Pump Fails. Possible I n i t i a t i n g Events
Q
Thermal cyclic s t r e s s (low probability) Vibrational stresses (low probabil i t y )
A break in the vapor return l i n e while the pumps are cooling down would release cold natural gas t o the atmosphere.
@
Hw much LNG i s vaporized when one of the pumps i s cooled down? o Hw many thermal cycles can the vapor return l i n e take prior to o failure?
How much vibration can the pipe take prior to f a i l u r e ?
6.5.7
L i a u i d L i n e t o t h e V a ~ o r i z e r sF a i l s . P o s s i b l e I n i t i a t i n g Events O v e r p r e s s u r i z a t i o n due t o LNG t r a p p e d i n t h e l i n e and h e a t e d up coupled w i t h f a i l u r e o f t h e r e l i e f valves (low p r o b a b i l i t y ) V e h i c u l a r damage ( l o w p r o b a b i 1 it y )

e
E a r t h q u a k e ( l o w p r o b a b i 1 it y )
R e s u l t s and E f f e c t s o f Release P r e v e n t i o n and C o n t r o l Systems The e s t i m a t e d maximum LNG r e l e a s e s f r o m a g u i l l o t i n e b r e a k a r e g i v e n b e l o w , based o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n o f a t i m e f o r an emergency shutdown o r a normal shutdown : Amount o f Release 1 - m i n Shutdown 10-min Shutdown G u i l l o t i n e break 120 g a l 1,000 g a l
These r e l e a s e s a r e based on t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t b o t h pumps a r e o p e r a t i n g a t t h e time o f t h e break. a break. ment a r e a . A d d i t i o n a l I n f o r m a t i o n Required What d i a m e t e r i s t h e l i n e t o t h e v a p o r i z e r s ? How many t h e r m a l c y c l e s can t h e 1 i n e t a ~ e r i o r t o f a i l u r e ? p P o s s i b l e D e s i g n and G p e r a t i o n a l Changes I f e c o n o m i c a l l y f e a s i b l e , p u t a t l e a s t two r e l i e f v a l v e s i n each s e c t i o n o f p i p e t h a t can be i s o l a t e d w i t h LNG i n i t . Shutdown o f t h e pumps w i l l d e c r e a s e t h e LNG r e l e a s e f r o m The s t o r a g e t a n k pumps can be s h u t down by e i t h e r t h e FiES o r VES.
The LNG r e l e a s e d f r o m a b r e a k s h o u l d d r a i n i n t o and be c o n t a i n e d b y t h e impound-
Vaporizer Heat Exchanger Tubes Fail. Possible I n i t i a t i n g Events Thermal cyclic s t r e s s e s (medium probabil i t y ) Thermal shock (medium probabi 1 i t y ) Corrosion ( 1 ow probabi 1i t y ) Explosion (low probability) Results and Effects of Release Prevention and Control Systems
A t a maximum, about 500 gil of L N G could be released to the water bath, assuming one pump i s running a t 50 gal/min f o r 10 minutes prior t o shutdown. The LNG might explode or catch f i r e due t o the burners nearby. Shutdown of the pumps or the feed valves to the vaporizer will decrease the LNG release from a break. The pumps and the feed valves can be shut down by e i t h e r the FlES or VES. The MES will also shut off the fuel to the vaporizer burners.
Additional Information Required What a r e the d e t a i l s on diameters, configuration, and flow rates through the tubes in the vaporizers? What a r e the corrosion problems? Possible Desian and O~erational Chanaes
e
If economically f e a s i b l e , hot-water heat exchangers should be used.
6.5.9
N a t u r a l Gas L i n e f r o m t h e V a ~ o r i z e r s F a i l s . P o s s i b l e I n i t i a t i na Events
e
Cold gases o r LNG coming f r o m v a p o r i z e r s (medium p r o b a b i l i t y ) V e h i c u l a r damage ( l o w p r o b a b i l i t y ) Earthquake ( l o w p r o b a b i l i t y )
R e s u l t s and E f f e c t s o f Release P r e v e n t i o n and C o n t r o l Svstems
A maximum o f about 83,000 s c f o f n a t u r a l gas c o u l d be r e l e a s e d t o t h e

atmosphere, assuming b o t h v a p o r i z e r s o p e r a t i n g a t a t o t a l o f about 8,300 scfm f o r 10 minutes p r i o r t o shutdown o f t h e v a p o r i z e r s and v a p o r i z e r e x i t v a l v e s . The v a p o r i z e r s and v a p o r i z e r e x i t v a l v e s can be s h u t down by e i t h e r t h e MES o r VES. A d d i t i o n a l I n f o r m a t i o n Required What i s t h e response t i m e o f t h e v a p o r i z e r o u t l e t temperature c o n t r o l 1e r ?
APPENDIX H PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM SYMBOLS
APPENDIX H PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM SYMBOLS The symbols used i n t h e p r o c e s s f l o w diagrams t h r o u g h o u t t h i s s t u d y a r e d e f i n e d i n t h i s appendix. and equipment. The appendix i s d i v i d e d i n t o two p a r t s : the f i r s t d e a l s w i t h i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n and c o n t r o l s , and t h e second c o v e r s v a l v e s , 1 i n e s , A l l o f t h e i t e m s p r e s e n t e d h e r e do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l y t o each i n d i v i d u a l f a c i 1 it y c o n s i d e r e d i n t h i s s t u d y . H.l
INSTRUMENTATION
AND CONTROLS
A l l i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n and c o n t r o l s a r e i n d i c a t e d i n t h e v a r i o u s p r o c e s s f l o w diagrams b y s m a l l c i r c l e s . The l e t t e r s i n s i d e t h e c i r c l e s , d e f i n e d below, i d e n No d i s t i n c t i o n i s made between b o a r d t i f y the functions o f the various items. mounted and l o c a l l y mounted equipment. P r e s s u r e I n s t r u m e n t a t i o n. and C o n t r o l l e r s - P
i
R
C
Indicator Recorder Controller Alarm ( H o r L o u t s i d e c i r c l e i n d i c a t e s h i g h o r low) Switch
A
S
o
Flow I n s t r u m e n t a t-o n and C o n t r o l l e r s i
I
R
C
Indicator Recorder Controller Alarm ( H o r L o u t s i d e c i r c l e i n d i c a t e s h i g h o r low)
Analyzer I n s t r u m e n t- - A ation R Recorder Alarm ( H o r L o u t s i d e c i r c l e i n d i c a t e s h i g h o r low)
Level I n s t r u m e n t a t i o n - L
I R
Indicator Recorder Alarm ( H o r L o u t s i d e c i r c l e i n d i c a t e s h i g h o r l o w )
Temperature I n s t r u m e-t a t i o n and C o n t r o l l e r s n-
I
R
C
Indicator Recorder Controller Alarm ( H o r L o u t s i d e c i r c l e i n d i c a t e s h i g h o r l o w ) Shutdown
A
S
Hand A c t u a t e d C o n t r o l l e r s
I C
Indicators C o n t r o l 1e r s
Emergency Shutdown Systems LES
Loading Emergency Shutdown Master Emergency Shutdown O f f s h o r e Emergency Shutdown V a p o r i z e r Emergency Shutdown
MES
OES VES
H.2
VAL\lES, LINES, AND EQUIPMENT The m a j o r v a l v e s , l i n e s , and equipment a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e v a r i o u s LNG
f a c i l i t i e s a r e shown i n t h e a p p r o p r i a t e process f l o w diagrams. t i o n systems used f o r t h e s e components a r e e x p l a i n e d below. Valves
The i d e n t i f i c a -
A i l v a l v e s shown i n t h e process f l o w diagrams a r e i d e n t i f i e d by g r a p h i c

symbols, as shown h e r e :
81C o n t r o l & Control
v a l v e , pneumatic o p e r a t o r v a l v e , s o l e n o i d o r motor o p e r a t o r
M Hand o p e r a t e d process v a l v e
7 o r 7 R e l i e f valve.
Check v a l v e
Lines The v a r i o u s l i n e s i n t h e process f l o w diagrams a r e shown g r a p h i c a l l y as f o l 1ows : Process l i n e s

- I,-
----------
II-
Pneumatic instrument leads E l e c t r i c a l i n s t r u m e n t leads.
Equipment
A s i n g l e l e t t e r i s used t o i d e n t i f y each t y p e o f major p l a n t components:

C E or A P V
Compressor Heat exchanger Pump Vessel o r Vaporizer Tank.
Numbers a r e used w i t h each l e t t e r t o i n d i c a t e t h e s p e c i f i c p i e c e of equipment:
DISTRIBUTION
I I 1 1 I 1 I 1
I
No. o f Copies
No. o f Copies
10 J. M. Cece (EP-323) O f f i c e o f Environmental P r o t e c t i o n , S a f e t y and Emergency Preparedness U.S. Department o f Energy Washington, D.C. 20545
10 H. F. Walter (EP-35) O f f i c e O f Environmental P r o t e c t i o n , S a f e t y and Emergency Preparedness U.S. Department o f Energy Washington, D. C. 20545 D E Technical I n f o r m a t i o n Center O
A. A. A l l e n Alaskan Beaufort Sea O i l s p i l l Response Body 6700 A r c t i c Spur Road Anchorage, A K 99502
C. B a t t y B r i t i s h Petroleum North American, Inc. 620 F i f t h Avenue New York, NY 10020 L. E. B e l l Western LNG Terminal Associates 700 South Flower S t r e e t S u i t e 3300 Los Angeles, CA 90017
W. M. Benkert American I n s t i t u t e o f Merchant Shipping 1625 K S t r e e t , N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006
I I I I 1
27
P. J. Anderson I n s t i t u t e o f Gas Technology 3424 South S t a t e S t r e e t Chicago, I L 60616 S. A t a l l a h Gas Research I n s t i t u t e 8600 West Bryn Mawr Avenue Chicago, I L 60631 S. M. B a r k i n Committee on Hazardous Materials N a t i o n a l Research Counc i1 2101 C o n s t i t u t i o n Avenue Washington, D.C. 20418
G. F. Bennett Professor o f Biochemical Engineering U n i v e r s i t y o f Toledo 2801 B a n c r o f t S t r e e t Toledo, O 43606 H

K. Blower Standard O i l o f Ohio 1748 G u i l d h a l l B u i l d i n g Cleveland, OH 44115 F. Bodurtha DuPont Company L o u v i e r s B u i l d i n g 1351 Wilmington, D 19898 E
A. Boni Science A p p l i c a t i o n s Inc. 1200 Prospect S t r e e t La J o l l a , C 92037 A W. J. Bradford O l i n Corporation 120 Long Ridge Road Stamford, CT 06904
A. C. B a r r e l 1 Major Hazards Assessment U n i t Health and S a f e t y Executive 25 Chapel S t r e e t London, NW1 5DT, U K
No. o f Cop ies
No. o f Copies
W. C. B r a s i e Dow Chemical USA 633 B u i l d i n g Midland, M I 48640 F. E. B r i n k e r T r u n k l i n e LNG Company P.O. Box 1642 Houston, TX 77001
W. B r o b s t The T r a n s p o r t Environment 285 Old Squaw D r i v e K i t t y Hawk, NC 27949
W. E. Coe, J r . Southern Energy Company P.O. Box 1367 Savannah, GA 31402

R. I . Cole American Gas A s s o c i a t i o n 1515 Wilson Boulevard A r l i n g t o n , VA 22209
S. Colgate Los Alamos N a t i o n a l L a b o r a t o r y Los Alamos, N 87545 M
S. J. Broussard, P.E. Manager, O c c i d e n t a l Chemical Company P.O. Box 1185 Houston, TX 77001
G. Colonna U.S. Coast Guard (G-DMT-1) 2100 Second S t r e e t , S.W. Washington, D.C. 20593
Comni t t e e on Comierce, Science and T r a n s p o r t a t i o n U.S. Senate Washington, D.C. 20510
C. P. Buckley Boston Gas Company One Beacon S t r e e t Boston, MA 02108 D. J. Campbell T r u n k l i n e LNG Company P.O. Box 1642 Houston, TX 77001
T. C a r l i s l e Senior Mechanical S a f e t y Engi neer Santa Fe P i p e l i n e Company 1200 Thompson B u i l d i n g Tulsa, O K 74103 A. M. C l a r k e Algonquin Gas Transmission Company 1284 S o l d i e r s F i e l d Road Boston, M 02135 A John J. Closner P r e l o a d Technology 839 S t e w a r t S t r e e t Garden City, NY 11530
C. C o r b e t t Commandant ( G-WEP) U.S. Coast Guard 2100 Second S t r e e t , S.W. 20593 Washington, D.C.
P . Cubbage
B r i t i s h Gas C o r p o r a t i o n Research and Development S t a t i o n Midlands Research S t a t i o n Whaft Lane, S o l i h u l l , West Midlands B9K 2JW ENGLAND
R. Danielson Bay S t a t e Gas Company 120 Royal1 S t r e e t Canton, MA 02021
R. E. Dehart, I 1 Union Carbide C o r p o r a t i o n P.O. Box 8361 South Charleston, WV 25303
No. o f Copies
W. Dennis Office o f Pipeline Safety Regulations 400 7 t h S t r e e t , S.W. Washing ton, D. C. 20590
No. o f Copies J. A. Fay Department o f Mechanical Engineering Massachusetts I n s t i t u t e o f Technology Cambridge, M 02139 A
J. P. F r a z i e r N a t u r a l Gas P i p e l i n e Company o f America 122 South Michigan Avenue Chicago, I L 60603
L. C. Doelp Corporate E n g i n e e r i n g A i r Products and Chemicals Allentown, PA 18105 E. Drake A r t h u r D. L i t t l e , I n c . Acorn Park Cambridge, M 02140 A F. Edeskuty Los Alamos S c i e n t i f i c Laboratory P.O. Box 1663 Los Alamos, N 87545 M
S. F u j i n a m i Tankage Designing S e c t i o n Kawasaki Heavy I n d u s t r i e s , LTD 118, Futatsuzuka, Noda-shi, Chiba 278, JAPAN
M. Futana No. 3 Group Chemical P l a n t and Machinery Department B M i t s u b i s h i Heavy I n d u s t r i e s , LTD 118, I c h i g a y a Tomihisa-Cho, Shin juku-ku Tokyo 162, JAPAN
W. Geiger B a t t e l l e - I n s t i t u t e e.V. A Roemerhof 35 m 6000 F r a n k f u r t am Main 90 FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY R. D. Gerges Manager, Process Hazard A n a l y s i s Rohm and Haas Company Engineering D i v i s i o n Box 584 B r i s t o l , PA 19007
J. Edge11 Bulk P l a n t Operations Columbia Hydrocarbon Corporation 1600 Dub1 i n Road Columbus, O 43215 H
T. E i c h l e r I I T Research I n s t i t u t e 10 West 35th S t r e t Chicago, I L 606l.d
W. G. England Energy Resources Company, I n c . 3344 N o r t h T o r r e y Pines Court La J o l l a , CA 92037
H. K. Fauske Fauske and Assoc i a t e s , I n c 16070 West 83rd S t r e e t Burridge, I L 60521
D. G i deon B a t t e l l e Columbus L a b o r a t o r i e s 505 K i n g Avenue Columbus, O 43201 H
No. o f Copies E. B. Graham B r i t i s h Gas C o r p o r a t i o n 326 High Holborn London WC17PT, ENGLAND K. Hagiwara No. 1 Sales Department J.G.C. C o r p o r a t i o n 2-1, Otemachi 2-chome, Chiyoda-ku Tokyo 100, JAPAN H. C. Hardee Supervisor, F l u i d Mechanics and Heat T r a n s f e r Sandia L a b o r a t o r i e s Albuquerque, N 87115 M J. Havens College o f Engineering U n i v e r s i t y o f Arkansas 227 E n g i n e e r i n g B u i l d i n g Fayetteville, A R 72701 T. He1 lman D i r e c t o r , ENRL S e r v i c e s A l l i e d Corporation P.O. Box 2120 Houston, TX 77001 E. W. Hofer Process E n g i n e e r i n g Manager A1 l i e d C o r p o r a t i o n P.O. Box 2105R Morristown, NJ 07960 10 W. J. Hogan Lawrence Livermore L a b o r a t o r y P.O. Box 808 Livermore, CA 94550
No. o f Copies
C. C. Hong Columbia Gas System S e r v i c e Corporation 1600 D u b l i n Road Columbus, O 43215 H
W. B. Howard Manager, Process S a f e t y Monsanto 800 N o r t h Lindbergh Boulevard 5 t . Louis, MO 63166 P. E. Hyam Directorate Staff I m p e r i a l Chemical I n d u s t r i e s Box 1 B i l l inyham Cleveland TS23 1LB ENGLAND D. I g o T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Research Department o f T r a n s p o r t a t i o n 400 7 t h S t r e e t , S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590
K. I s h i d a T e c h n i c a l Department Measuring I n s t r u m e n t a t i o n Division F u j i E l e c t r i c Company, LTD No. 1, Fuji-machi, H i n o - s h i , Tokyo 191, JAPAN
F. J e g l i c N a t i o n a l Energy Board 473 A l b e r t S t r e e t Ottawa, O n t a r i o KIA OE5 CANADA D. W. Johnson A p p l i e d Technology C o r p o r a t i o n P.O. Box FF Norman, O 73070 K
R. Holden P a c i f i c Gas and E l e c t r i c Company 77 Beale S t r e e t , Room 2971 San Francisco, CA 94106
No. o f Copies
W. H. Johnson N a t i o n a l L. P. Gas A s s o c i a t i o n 1301 West 22nd S t r e e t Oak Brook, I L 60521
No. o f Copies L. Lemon Energy and M i n e r a l s Research Company P.O. Box 389 Exton, PA 19341 0. J. Lewis I m p e r i a l Chemical I n d u s t r i e s , LTD Mond D i v i s i o n , Research and Development Department P.O. Box 7 Winnington Northwich Cheshire, CW8 4DJ, UK J. P. Lewis Project Technical Liaison Associates, I n c . 4201 FM 1960 West, S u i t e 240 Houston, TX 77060
L. J. S. Kaplan Dangerous Comnodities Review Committee O f f i c e r Railway Transport Committee Ottawa, KIA ON9, CANADA
J. W. Kime U.S. Coast Guard (G-W) 2100 Second S t r e e t Washington, D.C. 20593
W. C. K o h f e l d t Exxon Chemical Company P.O. Box 271 Florham Park, NJ 07932

H. J. Kolodner D i r e c t o r , Corporate S a f e t y Celanese C o r p o r a t i o n P.O. Box 32414 C h a r l o t t e , NC 28232
C. 0. L i n d Code 3262 U.S. Naval Weapons Center China Lake, C 93555 A G. Logan P h i l l i p s Chemical Company Seneca B u i l d i n g B a r t l e s v i l l e , O 74004 K
P. Lunnie Asst. VP, I n d u s t r i a l R e l a t i o n s D i r e c t o r , OSH National Association o f Manufacturers 1776 F S t r e e t , N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006
J. K. Lathrop National F i r e Protection Assoc ia t i o n 470 A t l a n t i c Avenue Boston, M 02210 A

P. E. L a u r i e Acres C o n s u l t i n g S e r v i c e s L i m i t e d 5259 Dorchester Road P.O. Box 1001 Niagara F a l l s , CANADA L2E 6W1
J. A. Lawrence Vice P r e s i d e n t and Manager o f N i t r o g e n Operations CF I n d u s t r i e s , I n c . Salem Lake D r i v e Long Grove, I L 60047
L. Mallon Comni t t e e on Merchant Marine and Navy House o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s Washington, D.C. 20515
No. o f Copies
No. o f Copies
J. Manney American Petroleum I n s t i t u t e 2101 L S t r e e t , N.W. Washington, D. C. 20037

Comnanding O f f i c e r Marine S a f e t y O f f i c e U.S. Coast Guard B a l t i m o r e , MD 21202
R. M o r r i s o n Boston Gas Company One Beacon S t r e e t Boston, M 02108 A

N. Neafus EDECO E n g i n e e r i n g Company 1601 South Main S t r e e t P.O. Box 589 Tulsa, OK 74101
D. H. M a r k s t e i n F a c t o r y Mutual Research Corporation 1151 Boston - Providence Turnpike Norwood MA 02062
J. A. N i c h o l l s Department o f Aerospace Engineering U n i v e r s i t y o f Michigan Ann Arbor, M I 48109

R. Norton Distrigas, Inc. 125 High S t r e e t Boston, M 02110 A
J. M a r t i n S h e l l I n t e r n a t i o n a l Gas S h e l l Centre London, SE1 7NA, U K

W. E. M a r t i n s e n Energy A n a l y s t s I n c . 2001 P r i e s t l e y Avenue P.O. Box 1508 Norman, O K 73070
Y. Matsui Systems Department Toyo E n g i n e e r i n g C o r p o r a t i o n 12-10, H i g a s h i - f u n a b a s h i 6-chome Funabashi-shi, Chiba 273, JAPAN
0. Okawa Chiyoda Chemical E n g i n e e r i n g Company P.O. Box 10 Tsurumi , Yokohama 230, JAPAN
A. K. Oppenheim Department o f Mechanical Engineering University o f California Berkeley, CA 94720
H. Mayo COOP Farm Chemical A s s o c i a t i o n P.O. Box 308 Lawrence, KS 66044
J. C. Pace, J r . Long I s l a n d L i g h t i n g Company 175 East Old Country Road Hicksville, N Y 11801
R. N. Meroney F l u i d Mechanics and Wind E n g i n e e r i n g Program Department o f C i v i l Engineering Colorado S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y F o r t C o l l i n s , CO 80523
M. C. P a r n a r o u s k i s U.S. Coast Guard (G-DMT-1) 2100 2nd S t r e e t , S.W. Washington, D.C. 20593
No. o f Copies H. Pasman P r i n s M a u r i t s L a b o r a t o r y TNO T e c h n o l o g i c a l Research P.O. Box 45 2280 AA R i j s w i k j , NETHERLANDS E. Pearlman JRB Associates 8400 Westpark D r i v e McLean, V 22102 A
No. o f Copies W. B. P o r t e r Process Engineer W. R. Grace Company 100 N o r t h Main S t r e e t Memphis, TN 38101
T. Raines Alabama Gas C o r p o r a t i o n P.O. Box 721 Pinson, AL 35126 P. R a j Technology and Management Systems, I n c . 102 Drake Road B u r l i n g t o n , M 01803 A R. C. R e i d Department o f Chemical Engineering Massachusetts I n s t i t u t e o f Tech no 1ogy Cambridge, M 02139 A A. Roberts O f f i c e o f Hazardous M a t e r i a l s Regulations Department o f T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Transpoint Building 2100 Second S t r e e t , S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590
J. Peebles Comnandant (G-WPE) U.S. Coast Guard 2100 Second S t r e e t , S.W. Washing ton, D. C. 20593
W. H. Penn Tennessee Gas P i p e l i n e Company P.O. Box 2511 Houston, TX 77001
A. W. P e r r y Trumkline LNG Company Highway 384 and L i n c o l n Road P.O. Box 6327 Lake Charles, LA 70606 H. W. P e t e r B r o o k l y n Union Gas Company 195 Montague S t r e e t Brooklyn, NY 11201
C. Peterson
SRI Washington 1611 N o r t h Kent S t r e e t Rosslyn P l a z a A r l i n g t o n , VA 22209

R. E. P e t s i n g e r CNG Services, I n c . 2000 Oxford D r i v e B e t h e l Park, PA 15102
A. Rosenbaum N a t i o n a l Tank Truck C a r r i e r s , I n c . 1616 P S t r e e t , N.W. 20036 Washington, D.C.

M. I. R u d n i c k i A e r o j e t Energy Conversion Company P.O. Box 13222 Sacramen t o , CA 95813
C. N. P e t t e r s o n Northwest N a t u r a l Gas Company 123 Northwest F l a n d e r s S t r e e t P o r t l a n d , OR 97209
No. o f Copies
No. o f Copies R . F. Schwab Manager, Process S a f e t y and Loss Prevent i o n A l l i e d Corporation P.O. Box 2332R Morristown, NJ 07960
A. S a l v a d o r i Gaz de France D i r e c t i o n des Etudes e t Techniques Nouvel l e s Department des Etudes Cryogenics, I n d u s t r i e l l e s e t Metallurgiques 23, r u e P h i l i b e r t - D e l o r m e Paris-17, FRANCE
L. Santman M a t e r i a l s T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Bureau U.S. Department o f T r a n s p o r t a t i o n 400 7 t h S t r e e t , S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590
L. Sarkes American Gas A s s o c i a t i o n 1515 Wilson Boulevard A r l i n g t o n , VA 22209
P. Seay Technical D i v i s i o n O f f i c e o f Hazardous M a t e r i a l s Regulations M a t e r i a l s T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Bureau 400 Seventh S t r e e t , S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590
J. S e e l i n g e r O f f i c e o f Commercial Development U.S. M a r i t i m e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n U.S. Department o f Commerce Washington, D.C. 20230
S. M. S e t t l e A s s o c i a t e D i r e c t o r , OSH NAM 1776 F S t r e e t , N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006
L. C. S c h a l l e r E. I . du Pont de Nemours and Co. 12430 Nemours B u i l d i n g Wilmington, DE 19898 H. P. Schorr B r o o k l y n Union Gas Company 195 Montague S t r e e t Brooklyn, N Y 11201 S. S c h r e i b e r A1 1 i e d C o r p o r a t i o n P.O. Box 2332R Morristown, N 07960 H
P. Schreurs K a t h o l i e k e U n i v e r s i t e i t Leuven CIT De Croylaan 2 B .3030 Leuven THE NETHERLANDS R. J. S c h u t t l e r Manager Hooker Chemi c a 1s P.O. Box 728 Niagara F a l l s , NY
J. D. S h e f f o r d B r i t i s h Gas C o r p o r a t i o n 59 Bryanston S t r e e t Marble Arch London WlAZAZ, ENGLAND

R. 6. Smith B a t t e l l e Columbus L a b o r a t o r i e s 505 K i n g Avenue Columbus, O 43201 H
J. K. Speckhals Columbia LNG C o r p o r a t i o n 20 Montchanin Road W i 1m i ng ton, DE 19807

S p i l l Technology N e w s l e t t e r Environmental P r o t e c t i o n S e r v i c e Ottawa, O n t a r i o KIA 1C8 CANADA
14302
No. o f Copies
No. o f Copies T. Uozumi A s s i s t a n t t o t h e Manager EDP Education Department F u j i t s u LTD 17-25, Shinkamata 1-chome, Ohta-ku Tokyo 144, JAPAN
W. Walls National F i r e Protection Association 470 A t l a n t i c Avenue Boston, M 02210 A
A. N. Stewart San Diego Gas and E l e c t r i c Company P.O. Box 1831 San Diego, C 92112 A R. A. Stehlow 105 T r a n s p o r t a t i o n B u i l d i n g University o f I l l i n o i s Urbana, I L 61801
H. Stevens Northwet P i p e l i n e C o r p o r a t i o n P.O. Box 30 U m a t i l l a , OR 97882
J. D. Swanburg Supt. o f Process E n g i n e e r i n g Union Chemical D i v i s i o n Union O i l Company o f C a l i f o r n i a P.O. Box 1280 Brea, C 92621 A
B. Sweedler N a t i o n a l T r a n s p o r t a t i o n S a f e t y Board 800 Independence Avenue 20591 Washington, D.C. T. Tanaka System E n g i n e e r i n g Department J. G. C. C o r p o r a t i o n 14-1, Bessho-cho 1-chome, Minami-ku Yokohama-shi, Kanagawa 232 JAPAN
J. Tatematsu Technology T r a n s f e r I n s t i t u t e Kyodo B u i l d i n g 3-1, Akasaka 4-chome, Minato-ku Tokyo 105, JAPAN
S. K. Wakamiya Product Engineering D i v i s i o n N a t i o n a l Bureau o f Standards Department o f Commerce Washington, D.C. 20234 D. J. Watters Union Carbide C o r p o r a t i o n P.O. Box 8361 South Charleston, WV 25303
S. J. Wiersma Gas Research I n s t i t u t e 8600 West Bryn Mawr Avenue Chicago, I L 60631
J. R. Welker A p p l i e d Technology C o r p o r a t i o n P.O. Box FF Norman, O 73070 K
M. M. W i l l i a m s
U.S. Coast Guard T e c h n i c a l Advisor (G-MHMl83) 400 Seventh S t r e e t , S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590
W. Wilson San Diego Gas and E l e c t r i c Company P.O. Box 1831 San Diego, C 92112 A
R. Tatge CV I n t e r n a t i o n a l , I n c o r p o r a t e d 2741 Toledo S t r e e t , S u i t e 208 Torrance, C 90503 A

M. J. Turner H e a l t h and S a f e t y E x e c u t i v e 25 Chapel S t r e e t London NW1 5DT, ENGLAND
RADM K. E. Wiman U.S. Coast Guard (G-D) 2100 Second S t r e e t , S.W. Washington, D.C. 20593
No. o f Copies B. W i t c o f s k i NASA-Langley Hampton, VA 23665 R. E. W i t t e r Monsanto Company 800 N o r t h L i n d b e r g h Boulevard S t . Louis, MO 63166
No. o f Co~ies
60 P a c i f i c Northwest L a b o r a t o r y W.
J. E. G. H. J. C. A. W. E. J. G.
J. L. Woodward Exxon Research and E n g i n e e r i n g P.O. Box 101 Florham Park, NJ 07932
R. Zalosh F a c t o r y Mutual Research 1151 Boston-Providence T u r n p i k e Norwood, MA 02062 ONSITE DOE R i c h l a n d O p e r a t i o n s
H. E. Ransom
Bair Baker Bomelburg Counts Davis DeSteese ( 4 0 ) G. M. H o l t e r P. J. P e l t o T. B. Powers W. L. Rankin (HARC) R. E. Rhoads A. M. S c h r e i b e r R. S h i k i a r (HARC) L. D. W i l l i a m s Library (5) Pub1 i s h i n g C o o r d i n a t i o n ( 2 )
Technical Repofl Documentotion Pog.

I. Repor1 No.
2. Cowornmen~Accossem N o
3. R o c ~ p ~ m tCotaloa No. 'r
PNL-4014
4. Title m d Subhtlo
5. Report Doto
AN OVERVIEW STUDY OF LNG RELEASE PREVENTION AND CONTROL STUDIES

7. A"*o.'.)
March 1982
6 . C u k r n ~ 01~mntxmte.nCod0 r ~
8. Porformtne O t g a n ~ r s t * o n Repor1 NO.
P. J. P e l t o , E. G. B a k e r , G. M. H o l t e r , T. B. Powers
9. Perform~ng r g m ~ a o t ~ o n O Nome ond Addless
10. Work Untt N o

11. Conttoct ot Grant NO.
Paci f i c Northwest Laboratory P.O. BOX 999 R i c h l a n d , W 99352 A

12
40nsortng A ~ e n c , Nome ond Addwss
13- T Y P * 01 Report and Portod Coverod
U. S. Department o f Energy Envi r o n m e n t a l and S a f e t y E n g i n e e r i n g D i v i s i o n M a i l Room (EP-32) Washinqton, D.C. 20545

I5
Suppionontary Notes
14
Sponsortng Agency code

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-- - - -
T h i s r e p o r t was p r e p a r e d b y PNL, u n d e r t h e c o g n i z a n c e o f D r . John M. Cece and Dr. Henry F. W a l t e r . Comments a b o u t t h i s document may b e d i r e c t e d t o t h e l a t t e r a t t h e a d d r e s s i n Box 12.
16
Abstroct
The l i q u e f i e d n a t u r a l gas (LNG) i n d u s t r y employs a v a r i e t y o f r e l e a s e p r e v e n t i o n and c o n t r o l t e c h n i q u e s t o r e d u c e t h e l i k e l i h o o d and t h e consequences o f a c c i d e n t a l LNG r e l e a s e s . A s t u d y o f t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f t h e s e r e l e a s e p r e v e n t i o n and c o n t r o l systems i s b e i n g p e r f o r m e d b y P a c i f i c N o r t h w e s t L a b o r a t o r y (PNL) as p a r t o f t h e L i q u e f i e d Gaseous F u e l s S a f e t y and E n v i r o n m e n t a l C o n t r o l Assessment Program c o n d u c t e d b y t h e U - S . Department o f Energy, O f f i c e o f t h e A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y f o r E n v i r o g m e n t a l P r o t e c t i o n , S a f e t y and Emergency Preparedness (DOEIEP). The s p e c i f i c o b j e c t i v e s o f t h i s e f f o r t were t o : 1 ) c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e LNG f a c i l i t i e s o f i n t e r e s t and t h e i r r e l e a s e p r e v e n t i o n and c o n t r o l systems; 2) i d e n t i f y p o s s i b l e weak 1 i n k s and r e s e a r c h needs ; and 3 ) p r o v i d e an a n a l y t i c a l framework f o r t h e d e t a i l e d a n a l y s e s . The i n f o r m a t i o n d e v e l o p e d i n t h i s r e p o r t p r o v i d e s a n e c e s s a r y b a s i s f o r t h e f i n a l ( o n g o i n g ) phase of t h e PNL s t u d y and a l s o b a c k g r o u n d i n f o r m a t i o n t o a s s i s t t h e o v e r a l l p l a n n i n g o f t e c h n i c a l e f f o r t i n t h e DOEIEP Program. The LNG f a c i l i t i e s a n a l y r e d i n c l u d e a r e f e r e n c e e x p o r t t e r m i n a l , marine vessel, i m p o r t t e r m i n a l , peakshaving f a c i l i t y , t r u c k t a n k e r , and s a t e 1 1 it e f a c i 1 it y . T h i s r e p o r t i n c l u d e s a r e f e r e n c e d e s c r i p t i o n f o r t h e s e f a c i l i t i e s , a p r e l i m i n a r y h a z a r d s a n a l y s i s (PHA) , and a 1 i s t of representative release scenarios.
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Key Words L i q u e f i e d N a t u r a l Gas (LNG) LNC Release P r e v e n t i o n L N G Release C o n t r o l LNG E x p o r t Terminal L N G Peaksnaving F a c i l i t y LNG Satellite F a c i l i t y
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18. O ~ r t r ~ b u t t o n Ststommt
LNG Marine Vessel L N G I m p o r t Terminal
Release u n l i m i t e d
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P. S O N ~ I Clasaif. ~~
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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1982-596-114/143 REGION 1 0

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An Overview Study of LNG Release Prevention and Control Systems

P. J. Pelto E. C. Baker C. M. Holter T. B. Powers

PACIFIC NORTHWEST LABORATORY

under Contract DE-AC06-76RLO 1830

NTlS Price Coda Microfiche A01 Printed Copy Price C&

AN OVERVIEW STUDY OF LNG RELEASE PREVENTION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

P a c i f i c Northwest L a b o r a t o r y Richland, Washington 99352

Assessment o f LNG I m p o r t Terminal

Assessment o f LNG Peakshaving F a c i l i t y

Holter Schreiber Pelto Lyke

Assessment o f LNG Sate1 1 it e F a c i l it y

Word Processing and Report P r e p a r a t i o n

Burleigh Hale Rodriguez Li-nse

PNL CONTRIBUTORS 1.0 SUMMARY 1 .1 1.2

E x p o r t Terminal Marine Vessel I m p o r t Terminal

Peakshaving F a c i l i t y Truck Tanker

Satellite Facility I n f o r m a t i o n Needs

DIRECTION OF FUTURE STUDY

INTRODUCTION AND ANALYTICAL APPROACH 2.1

F i r e and Vapor C o n t r o l Assessment S u p p o r t i n g Research

ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT

3.1 - 3 3.1.4 3.1.5 3.2

SYSTEM LEVEL ANALYSIS 3.2.1 3.2.2 3.2.3

Gas Treatment and L i q u e f a c t i o n Storage Loading

COMPONENT LEVEL ANALYSIS 3.3.1 3.3.2 3.3.3 3.3.4

Gas Treatment and L i q u e f a c t i o n Storage Loading

REPRESENTATIVE RELEASE EVENTS AND INFORMATION NEEDS

B a s i c Ship and P r o p u l s i o n System Cargo Storage Tanks Cargo Handling System

SYSTEM LEVEL ANALYSIS 4.2.1 4.2.2 4.2.3

Cargo Hand1 ing System--Category

Cargo Storage Tanks--Category I 1 S p i l l s B a s i c Ship and P r o p u l s i o n System

COMPONENT LEVEL ANALYSIS 4.3.1 4.3.2

Cargo Handling System Cargo Storage Tanks

REPRESENTATIVE RELEASE EVENTS

Marine Terminal and Unloading System Storage System

Compressors and Sendout Pumps V a p o r i z a t i o n System S a f e t y Systems

SYSTEM LEVEL ANALYSIS 5.2.1 5.2.2 5.2.3 5.2.4

Marine Terminal and Unloading System Storage System

Compressors and Sendout Pumps V a p o r i z a t i o n System

COMPONENT LEVEL ANALYSIS 5.3.1 5.3.2 5.3.3 5.3.4 5.3.5

Marine Terminal and Unloading System Storage System

Compressors and Secondary Pumps V a p o r i z a t i o n System Operator I n t e r f a c e

REPRESENTATIVE RELEASE EVENTS

6.1.4 6.1.5 6.1.6 6.2

T r a n s p o r t a t i o n and T r a n s f e r System S a f e t y Systems

SYSTEM LEVEL ANALYSIS 6.2.1 6.2.2 6.2.3 6.2.4 6.2.5 6.2.6

Gas Treatment System L i q u e f a c t i o n System Storage System

T r a n s p o r t a t i o n and T r a n s f e r System Summary

COMPONENT LEVEL ANALYSIS 6.3.1 6.3.2 6.3.3 6.3.4 6.3.5 6.3.6

Gas Treatment System L i q u e f a c t i o n System Storage Systeni

T r a n s p o r t a t i o n and T r a n s f e r System Operator I n t e r f a c e

REPRESENATIVE RELEASE EVENTS

T r a n s p o r t a t i o n and T r a n s f e r System Storagesystem

V a p o r i z a t i o n and Sendout System S a f e t y Systems

SYSTEM LEVEL ANALYSIS

7.2.1 7.2.2 7.2.3 7.3

V a p o r i z a t i o n and Sendout System

COMPONENT LEVEL ANALYSIS 7.3.1 7.3.2 7.3.3

T r a n s p o r t a t i o n and T r a n s f e r System Storage System

V a p o r i z a t i o n and Sendout System

REPRESENTATIVE RELEASE EVENTS

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REFERENCES

APPENDIX A APPENDIX APPENDIX APPENDIX