guilty in juvenile court to first-degree murder, kidnapping,armed robbery, and credit card fraud. In exchange for his tes-timony and guilty plea, Norton was committed to juveniledetention until he turned 18, with no subsequent incarceration.Libberton was convicted of first-degree murder, aggravatedkidnapping, robbery, and theft, and sentenced to death.
, 685 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ariz. 1984). A panel of this court granted Libberton habeas relief with respect to hisdeath sentence.
Libberton v. Ryan
, 583 F.3d 1147, 1151-52(9th Cir. 2009),
, 130 S. Ct. 3412 (2010). Jameswas convicted of first-degree murder and kidnapping, andsentenced to death.
State v. James
, 685 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Ariz.1984).James raises three grounds for relief. First, he claims thatthe state failed to disclose an oral plea agreement with Nor-ton, in violation of
Brady v. Maryland
, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),and
Giglio v. United States
, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). Second, heclaims that the state failed to correct Norton’s false testimonydenying the existence of this agreement, in violation of
, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). Third, he claims that his trialcounsel provided ineffective assistance at the penalty phase,in violation of
Strickland v. Washington
, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).We affirm the denial of relief with respect to James’s guilt-phase claims based on
. However,we reverse with respect to James’s penalty-phase claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which was not decided onthe merits in state court. We conclude that counsel’s completefailure to investigate and present mitigating evidence of James’s troubled childhood, his mental illness, and his historyof chronic drug abuse constituted deficient performance. Wefurther conclude that this failure prejudiced James because itprevented the sentencing judge from learning that James had“the kind of troubled history we have declared relevant toassessing a defendant’s moral culpability.”
Wiggins v. Smith
,539 U.S. 510, 535 (2003);
see also, e.g.
Penry v. Lynaugh
,492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (“[E]vidence about the defendant’s