Vietnam: Part I

A Chronology of Events
 The War in Southeast Asia
Background
 America’s most unpopular war
 America’s longest and most expensive
war
 The best technical war money could
buy
 America hardly ever lost a tactical battle
 A war America did not win
 The War in Southeast Asia
Background
 Often called the Vietnam War
 Americans flew from bases in Thailand,
Laos, Guam, and South Vietnam
 Troops from Thailand, Australia, New
Zealand, South Korea, and Philippines
fought with the U.S. and South Vietnam
 China and the Soviet Union heavily
supported North Vietnam
 The War in Southeast Asia
General Causes
 A regional power vacuum existed in
Southeast after WW II
 South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia were
politically unstable
 North Vietnam wanted to reunite North
and South Vietnam under communist rule
 America wanted to prevent the spread of
communism, by force if necessary
 The French Era –
1940 to 1954
 Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia were originally a
French colony -- 19th century
 Japanese occupied SEA at start of WW II
• Opposed by guerrilla force led by Ho Chi Minh
• U.S. backed Ho Chi Minh’s efforts to oust Japan
 At end of WW II, Ho declared Vietnam an
independent nation
 Allies ignored Ho and divided Vietnam at the 16th
parallel -- Potsdam Conference
 The War in Southeast Asia
The French Era (Cont)
 French returned to fill power vacuum after WW II,
U.S. supports French, but not happy
 Fighting between France and Vietminh began in
1946
 France was defeated at Dien Bien Phu by General
Vo Nguyen Giap -- 7 May 1954
• Requested U.S. air support -- nuclear if necessary --
didn’t get it
 France withdrew from Indochina--for good
 Geneva Accords - July 1954

 Officially ended France-Vietminh struggle

 U.S. and South Vietnam didn’t sign Accords
 Divided Vietnam at the 17th parallel
• Separated by a demilitarized zone (DMZ)
 Partition was to be temporary
• Elections were planned in 1956 -- didn’t occur
• President Diem (South Vietnam) feared Ho Chi
Minh of North Vietnam would win
 Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization (SEATO)
 Initiated by the U.S. in Sept 1954 to prevent
spread of communism -- “Domino Theory”
 Member nations were: U.S., Great Britain,
France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand
Philippines, and Pakistan
 Didn’t require participants to support each other
with military force
 Politically justified U.S. actions in S Vietnam
 U.S. Involvement -
1955 to 1964
 U.S. reluctantly moved to fill power vacuum
• April 1955—U.S. agrees to advise S Vietnam
• Green Berets arrive Oct 1959 -- to train only
 1959 -- North Vietnam increased actions to
unify North and South
• U.S. increased action to prevent a North victory
 Aug 64 -- N Vietnamese gunboats attack 2
U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin
 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
-Aug ‘64
 Passed by Congress 5 Aug 1964
• Radically altered the War in Southeast Asia
• Empowered President Johnson to:
“To take all necessary steps to repel armed
attack against U.S. forces”
“To take all necessary steps, including
force, to assist S Vietnam and any member
of SEATO”
 Committed U.S. to fight for S Vietnam
 U.S. Build-up -- 1965 to 1968

 March 1965 – U.S. Marine and Army arrive

• “Rolling Thunder”bombing campaign begun
 By 1969, U.S. troop strength reached
543,000 (500,000 supported the war from
other Asian countries and Pacific bases)
 U.S. became heavily involved in fighting a
guerrilla war-- they were not prepared
 30 Jan ‘68 -- North launched Tet Offensive
 Tet Offensive of 1968
The Beginning of the End
 North attacked 12 U.S. bases and Embassy
 Objective -- Shatter the South’s army and cause
a civilian revolt -- Neither happened
 A tactical failure -- a huge strategic success
• American confidence in war effort plummeted
• Opposition to the war increased significantly
 After Tet, U.S. objective was to get out, quickly
and gracefully
 Vietnamization
The U.S. Withdrawal
 Nov 1968 -Nixon elected on promise to end the
war in Southeast Asia
 Nixon’s Vietnamization program was to return the
war to the South Vietnamese
• U.S. to provide advice, training and material
• Returned U.S. and S Vietnam to pre-1965 roles
 U.S. forces began withdrawing in June 1969
• U.S. morale dropped / winning no longer a goal
 Events Surrounding the
Paris Peace Talks
 Talks began in 68 but achieved nothing
• North Vietnam knew time was on their side
 U.S. units continued to withdraw
• By 1972, 200,000 U.S. troops had left Vietnam
 Mar 72-- North launched its “Easter
Offensive” against South Vietnam
• Attack repelled by U.S. air power (Linebacker I)
 Events Surrounding the Paris
Peace Talks (Cont)
 Talks resumed following the Easter
Offensive --again little movement
 Late 1972, Nixon ordered massive bombing
of North Vietnam (Linebacker II)
 Linebacker II forced the North to negotiate
in earnest
 Peace Accords signed 27 Jan 1973
• Called for U.S. to withdraw all units by Mar 73
 The Fall of South Vietnam
 Between 1973 and 1975, North continued to build
strength in violation of Peace Accords
 Nixon preoccupied with Watergate
 U.S. Congress tired of Vietnam and refused to
help
 Feb 75, North launched the Ho Chi Minh
campaign against the South
• South easily defeated without U.S. air support
 Laos and Cambodia fell quickly thereafter
 The War in Southeast Asia
Costs to the U.S.
 58,135 Americans killed, 153,000
wounded, 2500 missing in action
 $141 billion spent
 6.3 million tons of bombs dropped (12
times more than Korea, 2 times more than
WW II)
 2,257 aircraft lost ($3.1 billion value)
 5.2 million combat sorties flown
 The War in Southeast
Asia Results
 U.S. reluctance to enter military conflicts that don’t
directly threaten national interests
 Congressional restriction on President’s ability to
commit U.S. military forces
 Lessened public opinion of the government and
the military
 The all-volunteer military force
 Increased emphasis on military resources,
training and weapons
 Vietnam: Part II
Uses of Air Power

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 Uses of Air Power
Background
 War was primarily a land war -- most air
power used in conjunction with ground
operations
 North stayed above DMZ, so air superiority
over the South was never a concern
 In-country operations centered around
interdiction, close air support, airlift, recce,
search and rescue, and air refueling

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 Uses of Air Power
Background
 After Tonkin, U.S. air units built up rapidly
 U.S. Air Force occupied 10 major air bases
• All were built and defended by the Air Force
• Huge logistical effort
 Also flew from 6 bases in Thailand
 Navy flew from carriers in Gulf of Tonkin
 B-52s flew from Guam and, at times, from the
U.S.

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 Uses of Air Power
1964 to 1968
 Forestall suspected enemy offensives
 Defend and supply isolated outposts
 Interdict the Southern end of the Ho Chi
Minh Trail
• a series of roads and paths through the
dense jungle
• North Vietnam’s primary supply route into
South Vietnam

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 Uses of Air Power
During Vietnamization
 Train the South Vietnamese Air Force
(VNAF)
 Support the South Vietnamese Army
 Forestall suspected enemy attacks
against withdrawing American units

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 Uses of Air Power
Interdiction
 A major mission during SEA war
 Aircraft used: F-4 Phantom, F-100 Super
Sabre, F-105 Thunderchief (Thud), AC-130
Gunships
 Best known interdiction aircraft was the B-52-
a nuclear bomber modified to carry
conventional bombs
• Arc Light--Name for B-52 interdiction missions

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 Uses of Air Power
Close Air Support
 Missions to support forces of the ground
 Aircraft used: A-4 Skyhawk, F-4, F-100, A-37
Dragonfly, A-1 Skyraider and AC-47
Gunships (Puff the Magic Dragon)
 Gunships, cargo aircraft armed with rapid-fire
machine guns, were very effective
 Forward Air Controllers (FACs) were used to
locate the enemy and mark targets for faster
flying jets

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 Close Air Support ( Cont)
 B-52 Arc Light aircraft were
occasionally used for close air support
 B-52s were used extensively in close air
support at Khe Sanh
• Flew 2,548 sorties and dropped bombs
within 300 yards of of US Marine perimeter
 B-52 credited with saving Khe Sanh and
repelling the Tet and Easter Offensives

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 Uses of Air Power
Tactical Airlift
 Vital to successful U.S. operations because of
poor security on roads
 Aircraft used: UH-1 Hueys, C-7 Caribous,
C-123 Providers, and C-130 Hercules
 Missions often flown while under attack
 Supplies often air-dropped because of enemy
fire and poor landing facilities
 A major factor in keeping Khe Sanh alive

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 Uses of Air Power
Reconnaissance
 Aircraft used: RF-4C, RB-57 Canberra,
and RB-66 Destroyers
 Aircraft were equipped with variety of
cameras and sensing devices
 Missions consisted of locating lucrative
targets and assessing battle damage
 A valuable part of repelling Tet and
protecting Khe Sanh

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 Uses of Air Power
Search and Rescue
 An extremely important part of the air support
mission throughout Southeast Asia
 Buttressed aircrew morale -- fliers knew every
effort would be made to save them if shot
down
 Aircraft used: HH-3 Jolly Green Giants and
HH-53 Super Jolly Greens
 By ’73, USAF had rescued 3,883 Americans

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 Uses of Air Power
Air to Air Refueling
 Indispensable -- extended the range of
combat aircraft and enabled many aircraft to
return safely
 C-130s refueled helicopters, KC-135s
refueled fixed wing aircraft
 SAC tankers flew 195,000 sorties, unloaded 9
billion pounds of fuel and took part in 814,000
individual refuelings

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 Campaigns:
“Rolling Thunder”
 Officially began 2 March 1965
 Objectives
• Interdict the flow of supplies from the
North
• Force the North to stop supporting
the Vietcong and quit the war
• Raise South Vietnamese morale

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 Rolling Thunder
 Strategic bombing and interdiction campaign
• Strategic because it was aimed at the North’s will to
wage war
• Interdiction because the North had few large industries
and got most of their material from China and the
Soviet Union
 Employed mostly tactical aircraft -- F-105s, F-4s
and F-111s -- B-52s used in ‘66 in the Southern
part of North Vietnam

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 Rolling Thunder
Restrictions
 Johnson administration controlled
campaign tightly
 Restriction imposed by civilians included:
• Hanoi, Haiphong, China border -- off limits
• MIG bases and non-firing SAM sites--off limits
• Dams, dikes, hydroelectric plants--off limits
 White House selected targets, weapons
and flying routes -- with little military input

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 Rolling Thunder
 Graduated increases in bombing intensity
worked to advantage of North Vietnamese
• Gave them time to recover from damage
• Allowed them to establish the world’s most intense
antiaircraft defense system
• Provided them the will to fight on and a sense they
could survive
 By 1965, it became clear that Rolling Thunder
didn’t work

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 Rolling Thunder
 Impacts
• South’s morale improved as the North suffered under
the bombing
• North used frequent halts and restrictions to repair
damage and resupply forces in South
• Criticism grew at home and internationally
 Johnson ended Rolling Thunder prior to 1968
elections
 Campaign, America’s longest, was a failure

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 Linebacker I
 Easter Offensive (Mar 72) made it apparent
the North was not willing to negotiate
 Objectives of Linebacker
• Initially a close air support effort to aid retreating
South Vietnamese forces
• Later, changed to an interdiction campaign against
North Vietnam
 A systematic campaign with little civilian
control -- unlike Rolling Thunder

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 Linebacker I
 Civilian casualties were a consideration but
didn’t determine how missions were flown
 Haiphong harbor was mined for the first
time to restrict in-coming supplies
 Strikes were flown over Hanoi and
Haiphong -- B-52 strikes on Haiphong
began April ‘72
 “Smart bombs” were used extensively
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 Linebacker I
 Linebacker I was the most successful U.S.
bombing campaign of the war
• Had more impact on the North Vietnam in 9 months
than Rolling Thunder did in 4 years
 Successful largely because Easter Offensive
was a conventional, mechanized attack
 Peace Talks resumed in July 1972
 Nixon restricted Linebacker I attacks to below
the 20th parallel

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 Linebacker II
 Peace Talks stalled again in Dec 72
 Nixon ordered Linebacker II to run
concurrently with Linebacker I
 Purpose of Linebacker II was to force the
North Vietnamese to negotiate and sign a
peace treaty
 Ran from 18 Dec to 30 Dec 1972 -- referred
to as the “Christmas Campaign”

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 Linebacker II
 Very intense and logistically complex
 Specific targets in Hanoi and Haiphong
 B-52s used for the first time over Hanoi
 By the end of Linebacker II, North
Vietnam was defenseless
• 1,200 SAMs were fired
• 80% of the North’s electrical systems and
25% of their POL facilities were destroyed

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 Linebacker II
 North Vietnam returned to the
bargaining table 30 Dec 72
 All bombing ceased on 15 Jan 73
 Peace treaty was signed on 27 Jan 73
 Linebacker II was a success
• Some believe that if Rolling Thunder had
been conducted like Linebacker II, the war
would have ended in 65 -- unlikely

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 Summary
 Uses of Airpower
• Interdiction Close Air Support
• Airlift Air Refueling
• Reconnaissance Search and Rescue
 Rolling Thunder
 Linebacker I
 Linebacker II

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Additional Vietnam
Information, Part II

Lessons Learned

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 The War in Southeast Asia
Costs to the U.S.
 58,135 Americans killed, 153,000 wounded,
2500 missing in action
 $141 billion spent
 6.3 million tons of bombs dropped (12 times
more than Korea, 2 times more than WW II)
 2,257 aircraft lost ($3.1 billion value)
 5.2 million combat sorties flown

44
 The War in Southeast Asia
Results
 U.S. reluctance to enter military conflicts that
don’t directly threaten national interests
 Congressional restriction on President’s ability to
commit U.S. military forces
 Lessened public opinion of the government and
the military
 The all-volunteer military force
 Increased emphasis on military resources,
training, and weapons 45
 The War in Southeast Asia
Lessons Learned
 U.S. can’t win a counterinsurgency war in
another country--only the people of that
country can
 Force and technology are of limited value in a
“people’s war”
 Before committing force, national leaders
leaders must base decisions on realistic
assessments
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 More Lessons Learned

 Know your enemy and know yourself

 “Graduated Response” is an ineffective way
to employ air power -- reduces surprise,
flexibility and concentration of force
 In a democracy, congressional and public
support are critical, and difficult to get
 Modern war is open to public scrutiny
 Let those who understand war conduct it
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 Competencies

 Air Superiority
 Precision Engagement
 Global Attack
 Rapid Global Mobility
 Agile Combat Support

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 Functions

 Counterland
• Close Air Support
• Interdiction
 Airlift
 Reconnaissance
 Search and Rescue
 Air Refueling
 Strategic Attack
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 Doctrine

 Strategic attack and nuclear deterrence

prior to Vietnam
 Shift towards deterrence through
strength and global attack

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