3violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and may obtain appropriate relief againsta government.”
As Mr. Huelsmann’s Supplemental Affidavit makes painfully evident, the IllinoisDepartment of Children & Family Services (DCFS) is now accelerating its insistent demandsthat over a thousand foster children precariously poised on the brink of being “transitioned” fromthe ongoing care and oversight of the plaintiff Catholic agencies and the foster families theyrecruited be moved to other agencies – a move that inevitably will cause disruption, dislocation,and discontinuity to at least some, if not a good many, of those children. Now DCFS insists thatthe “transitioning” process begin
and without further delay, and that the entireprocess be completed by November 30
– a date that will arrive well before this Court couldadjudicate the merits of plaintiffs’ claims, even subject to an expedited briefing schedule. Anysupposed need for this “hurry up” is belied by the fact that DCFS apparently is willing to leavethe
status quo ante
fully intact through January 31, 2012, for the foster children under the careand oversight of the Peoria Diocese’s Catholic Charities entity, also a plaintiff below but whichopted not to pursue its religious liberty claims on appeal.
New Information Provided by DCFS This Past Wednesday Belies
Claimof Harm on the Part of the Defendants and Intervenors.
Four other large Illinois child welfare agencies have already been forced to submit to thedefendant DCFS’s coercive choice, three of them quitting the field altogether and the other
cf. Perry v. Sinderman,
408 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1972), discussed in plaintiffs’ motion toreconsider (SR-100-101), holding that the plaintiff’s “lack of a contractual or tenure ‘right’ to re-employment for the 1969-1970 academic year is immaterial to his free speech claim,” and “thateven though a person has no ‘right’ to a valuable governmental benefit and even though thegovernment may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons uponwhich the government may not rely … that infringes his constitutionally protected interests –especially, his interest in freedom of speech,” etc. Thus the high Court held “that the grant of summary judgment against the respondent, without full exploration of this issue, was improper.”