errida Interview on Lovehttp://www.csun.edu/coms/grad/jd.nik.html1 of 310/6/2006 8:50 AM

An Interview With Jacques Derrida

by Nikhil PadgaonkarN.P.:

Let me begin this interview by asking you what has been retained today from the word "philosophy" asthe Greeks understood it nearly three thousand years ago - that is, as love of wisdom. Are either "love" or"wisdom" issues today?

J.D.:

Well, when we teach philosophy in France, at the beginning of every academic year, we recall thisetymology. We remember that philosophia in Greek means the love or friendship towards Sophia which iswisdom but also cleverness or skill or knowledge. So then we ask what is Philia - what is love or friendshipor desire? In this way, we begin defining philosophy on the basis of this etymology. And there are a numberof texts today concerned with love and friendship. I myself wrote a book on the politics of friendship.Deleuze was interested in friendship, and so was Foucault. I would agree that in fact we often lose thisetymological definition of philosophy: every philosopher has his own definition of philosophy, and this isone of the typical features of discussions among philosophers about the essence of philosophy - when andwhere does it start? What is the origin of philosophy? And you cant of course rely simply on the word todefine the concept of philosophy. The word by itself is not enough. And when one agrees that philosophy is aGreek noun and that philosophy as such was born in Greece, then there are so many interpretations of whathappened then - when did it occur and why, and is every thinking a philosophy? As you know, Heideggerclaimed that there was a Greek thinking before philosophy, that philosophy was putting an end to something,to some thought by Parmenides or Heraclitus. So philosophy was in a way, the beginning of an end tothinking...

N.P.:

Over the years, you have repeatedly defended the view that deconstruction is not an inherently negativeterm, that it is not to be understood as criticism or destruction. And indeed in an interview you gave in 1982and which was subsequently published in Le Monde, you even said that deconstruction is alwaysaccompanied by love. Could you comment on this "love". Is it the same love as in "philia"?

J.D.:

This love means an affirmative desire towards the Other - to respect the Other, to pay attention to theOther, not to destroy the otherness of the Other - and this is the preliminary affirmation, even if afterwardsbecause of this love, you ask questions. There is some negativity in deconstruction. I wouldn't deny this. Youhave to criticise, to ask questions, to challenge and sometimes to oppose. What I have said is that in the finalinstance, deconstruction is not negative although negativity is no doubt at work. Now, in order to criticise, tonegate, to deny, you have first to say "yes". When you address the Other, even if it is to oppose the Other,you make a sort of promise - that is, to address the Other as Other, not to reduce the otherness of the Other,and to take into account the singularity of the Other. That's an irreducible affirmation, its the original ethics if you want. So from that point of view, there is an ethics of deconstruction. Not in the usual sense, but there isan affirmation. You know, I often use a quote from Rosensweig or even from Levinas which says that the"yes" is not a word like others, that even if you do not pronounce the word, there is a "yes" implicit in everylanguage, even if you multiply the "no", there is a "yes". And this is even the case with Heidegger. You knowHeidegger, for a long time, for years and years kept saying that thinking started with questioning, thatquestioning (fragen) is the dignity of thinking. And then one day, without contradicting this statement, hesaid "yes, but there is something even more originary than questioning, than this piety of thinking," and it iswhat he called zusage which means to acquiesce, to accept, to say "yes", to affirm. So this zusage is not onlyprior to questioning, but it is supposed by any questioning. To ask a question, you must first tell the Otherthat I am speaking to you. Even to oppose or challenge the Other, you must say "at least I speak to you", "Isay yes to our being in common together". So this is what I meant by love, this reaffirmation of theaffirmation.

errida Interview on Lovehttp://www.csun.edu/coms/grad/jd.nik.html2 of 310/6/2006 8:50 AM

N.P.:

To many of your readers, one of the important consequences of reading your works is the realizationthat criticism from an "outside" position is no longer possible, that one is always working with inheritedlanguage, and because one inherits language, one inevitably works within a shared framework. Now, if oneseeks to question or to displace without seeking recourse to an outside position, does one not run the risk of conservatism?

J.D.:

Well you see, everything depends on this concept of inherited. When you inherit a language, it does notmean you are totally in it or you are passively programmed by it. To inherit means to be able to, of course,appropriate this language, to transform it, to select something. Heritage is not something you are given as awhole. It is something that calls for interpretations, selections, reactions, response and responsibility. Whenyou take your responsibility as an heir, you are not simply subjected to the heritage, you are not called tosimply conserve or keep this heritage as it is, intact. You have to make it live and survive, and that is aprocess - a selective and interpretive process. So no doubt, there is a temptation simply to repeat and to takeup conservative positions. But it is not absolutely necessary, and I would even say that in order to makesomething new happen, you have to inherit, you have to be inside the language, inside the tradition. Youwould not be able to transform or displace anything without in some way being inside the tradition, withoutunderstanding the language.

N.P.:

There is no difference without repetition...

J.D.:

Of course, of course, some repetition, some kind of repetition. But the choice is not between repetitionand innovation, but between two forms of repetition and two forms of invention. So I think there areinventive forms of respecting the tradition, and there are reactive or non-inventive forms. But I would not saythat in order to invent something new, or to make something new happen, you have to betray the tradition orto forget the tradition. If I may say something about the way I try to work within the French tradition, I havethe feeling that the more I understand from within a poet or a writer, the more I am able to, let us sayreproduce what he is doing, the more I am able to write something else, or to counter-sign. That is, to signanother text which encounters the generic text. When I write on authors such as Genet, I dont write like them,I try to incorporate what they give me in order to perform something else which bears my own signature-which is not simply mine but which is another signature. And this happens not only in philosophy or literarytheory; it happens all the time. To speak with someone else, you have to understand what the Other says, youhave to be able to repeat it - thats what understanding means - and to be able to answer, to respond, and yourresponse will be different, it will be something else, and the response includes the possibility of understanding what youre responding to. So I would put all this in terms of response - and responsibility-towards your heritage.

N.P.:

You have argued that language is subject to a generalized "iterability" - that is, it can be grafted intonew and unforeseen contexts...

J.D.:

I have a vague idea of the Sanskrit etymology of "itera" which means again, the same, repetition, andsomething else, some alteration...

N.P.:

...so language reproduces itself in new contexts, in new frames, and it becomes impossible therefore tolimit the range of possible meanings it thus produces. Significantly enough, iterability suggests that onecannot attempt to delineate the meaning of a text by referring to the intentions of its author. This much said,is there any possibility of holding an author responsible for the fate of his or her book? I am of coursethinking of your discussion of Nietzsche, but more generally, can a writer be held to account for the way hisor her writings are interpreted or could possibly be interpreted? Is there any way for an author to regulate, inadvance, the range of possible interpretations?

J.D.:

If you expect an answer in the form of a "yes or no", I would say no. But if you give me more time, Iwould be more hesitant. I would say that a philosopher or writer should try of course, to be responsible for