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CRS-Iran, October 26, 2011

CRS-Iran, October 26, 2011

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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs October 26, 2011

Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL32048

CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses

Summary
The Obama Administration views Iran as a major threat to U.S. national security interests, a perception generated by uncertainty about Iran’s intentions for its nuclear program as well as its materiel assi
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs October 26, 2011

Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL32048

CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses

Summary
The Obama Administration views Iran as a major threat to U.S. national security interests, a perception generated by uncertainty about Iran’s intentions for its nuclear program as well as its materiel assi

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Published by: Confederation of Iranian students on Oct 27, 2011
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CRS Report for Congress
 Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern AffairsOctober 26, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700www.crs.govRL32048
 
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy ResponsesCongressional Research Service
Summary
The Obama Administration views Iran as a major threat to U.S. national security interests, a perception generated by uncertainty about Iran’s intentions for its nuclear program as well as itsmateriel assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, andto Lebanese Hezbollah. Since mid-2011, U.S. officials have openly accused Iran of stepping upsupport for Iraqi Shiite militias that have attacked U.S. forces, and U.S. officials accused Iran inOctober 2011 of plotting to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States. U.S. officialsalso accuse Iran of helping Syria’s leadership try to defeat a growing popular oppositionmovement, and of taking advantage of Shiite majority unrest against the Sunni-led, pro-U.S.government of Bahrain.The Obama Administration initially offered Iran’s leaders consistent and sustained engagementwith the potential for closer integration with and acceptance by the West in exchange for limits toits nuclear program. After observing a crackdown on peaceful protests in Iran in 2009, and failingto obtain Iran’s agreement to implement any nuclear compromise, the Administration has workedsince early 2010 to increase economic and diplomatic pressure on Iran. Significant additionalsanctions were imposed on Iran by the U.N. Security Council (Resolution 1929), as well asrelated “national measures” by the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and other countries.Further measures intended to compel foreign firms to exit the Iranian market were contained inU.S. legislation passed in June 2010 (the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, andDivestment Act, P.L. 111-195). In concert, the Administration has stepped up arms sales toregional states that share the U.S. suspicions of Iran’s intentions.Perhaps hoping to avoid additional sanctions, Iran attended December 2010 and January 2011talks with the six powers negotiating with Iran, but no substantive progress was reported at any of these meetings. The prospects for new talks have increased since August 2011 as a result of Iran-Russia discussions of new formulas for compromise, supplemented by Iranian official statementssuggesting potential acceptance of some widely discussed international proposals. However, nodate for new talks has been announced.Some in and outside the 112
th
Congress hold out no hope for an acceptable compromise and believe that the United States and its partners should increase economic and diplomatic pressureon Iran. U.S. officials, particularly following the October 11, 2011 U.S. revelations of the allegedIranian assassination plot, support additional economic pressure on Iran, perhaps by sanctioningIran’s Central Bank. Administration officials couple that with a stated willingness to engage infurther nuclear talks if Iran demonstrates a willingness to engage seriously. There does not appear to be consideration of U.S., Israeli, or Persian Gulf military action against Iran.In 2011, in the context of the popular uprisings throughout the Middle East, and perhapsaddressing criticism that it did not sufficiently support the popular uprising in Iran in 2009, theAdministration has increased its public criticism of Iran’s human rights record. Some in the 112
th
 Congress believe the United States should provide additional vocal and material support to thedemocracy movement in Iran, despite its outward quiescence in most of 2011. The Administrationargues that it has supported the opposition through civil society and other programs, and by usingrecent authorities to sanction Iranian officials who suppress human rights in Iran and help Syriarepress human rights. For further information, see CRS Report RS20871,
 Iran Sanctions
; andCRS Report RL34544,
 Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status
.
 
Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy ResponsesCongressional Research Service
Contents
Political History...............................................................................................................................1
 
Regime Structure, Stability, and Opposition....................................................................................2
 
Unelected Governing Institutions: The Supreme Leader, His Powers, and Other Ruling Councils......................................................................................................................3
 
Council of Guardians and Expediency Council..................................................................3
 
Elected Institutions: The Presidency, the Majles (Parliament), the Assembly of Experts, and Recent Elections................................................................................................7
 
The Presidency....................................................................................................................8
 
The Majles...........................................................................................................................8
 
The Assembly of Experts....................................................................................................8
 
Recent Presidential Elections: First Ahmadinejad Election in 2005...................................9
 
Ahmadinejad (Disputed) Reelection on June 12, 2009: Protests Erupt............................10
 
Ahmadinejad’s Second Term: Divisions Within the Regime Increase WithPopular Unrest and Arab Uprisings As Backdrop..........................................................11
 
The Opposition........................................................................................................................14
 
The Green Movement........................................................................................................14
 
Green Movement Allies and Other U.S.-Based Activists..................................................16
 
The Opposition: Armed Factions.............................................................................................17
 
People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI)/Camp Ashraf......................................17
 
Pro-Monarchy Radical Groups..........................................................................................20
 
Ethnic or Religiously Based Armed Groups.....................................................................20
 
Other Human Rights Practices.......................................................................................................21
 
Criticism of Iran’s Record in U.N. Bodies..............................................................................21
 
Special U.N. Rapporteur Reestablished............................................................................21
 
Iran’s Strategic Capabilities and Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs...................................24
 
Conventional Military/Revolutionary Guard/Qods Force.......................................................24
 
 Nuclear Program and Related International Diplomacy..........................................................27
 
Status of Enrichment and Time Frame Estimates..............................................................28
 
The International Response...............................................................................................29
 
The International Response Under the Obama Administration.........................................33
 
Possible Additional U.N. Actions......................................................................................37
 
Chemical Weapons, Biological Weapons, and Missiles..........................................................39
 
Ballistic Missiles/Warheads..............................................................................................39
 
Foreign Policy and Support for Terrorist Groups..........................................................................41
 
Alleged Plot to Assassinate the Saudi Ambassador.................................................................43
 
Relations with the Persian Gulf States.....................................................................................43
 
Iranian Policy in Iraq...............................................................................................................46
 
Supporting Palestinian Militant Groups..................................................................................47
 
Iran and Hamas..................................................................................................................47
 
Lebanese Hezbollah and Syria................................................................................................48
 
Syria..................................................................................................................................49
 
Central Asia and the Caspian...................................................................................................50
 
South Asia: Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India..........................................................................51
 
Afghanistan.......................................................................................................................51
 
Pakistan.............................................................................................................................52
 
India...................................................................................................................................53
 

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