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Cohen v. Facebook, 10-5282 (N.D. Cal.; Oct. 27, 2011)

Cohen v. Facebook, 10-5282 (N.D. Cal.; Oct. 27, 2011)

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Court dismisses publicity rights class action against Facebook over disclosure of use of the 'friend finder' feature to Facebook friends.
Court dismisses publicity rights class action against Facebook over disclosure of use of the 'friend finder' feature to Facebook friends.

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Published by: Venkat Balasubramani on Oct 28, 2011
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**E-filed 10/27/11**
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIASAN FRANCISCO DIVISIONROBYN COHEN, et al.,Plaintiffs,v.FACEBOOK, INC.,Defendant.____________________________________/ 
 
No. C10-5282 RS
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TODISMISS FIRST AMENDEDCOMPLAINT WITHOUT LEAVE TOAMEND
I. INTRODUCTIONThis is a putative class action challenging the alleged practice of defendant Facebook, Inc. of promoting its “Friend Finder” feature by disclosing to users that their Facebook “friends” have usedthat function. The central question presented by this motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint(“FAC”) is whether the use of the names and likenesses of non-celebrity private individuals withoutcompensation or consent causes injury sufficient to support standing, where plaintiffs cannot allegethat their names and likenesses have any general commercial value, and they have not chosen toallege that they suffered any distress, hurt feelings, or other emotional harm. As plaintiffs havefailed to plead a cognizable injury, the motion will be granted, without leave to amend.II. LEGAL STANDARDA complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleaderis entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While “detailed factual allegations are not required,” a
Case3:10-cv-05282-RS Document78 Filed10/27/11 Page1 of 6
 
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complaint must include sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
 Ashcroft v. Iqbal
, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing
 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
, 550 US 544,570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the pleaded factual content allows the court todraw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
 Id 
.A motion to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proceduretests the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in the complaint.
See Parks Sch. of Bus. v.Symington
, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based eitheron the “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or on “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under acognizable legal theory.”
 Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t 
, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988).When evaluating such a motion, the court must accept all material allegations in the complaint astrue, even if doubtful, and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Twombly
, 550 US at 570). “[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences,” however,“are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.”
 Epstein v. Wash. EnergyCo.
, 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1996);
see also Iqbal
, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing
Twombly
, 550 USat 555 (“threadbare recitals of the elements of the cause of action, supported by mere conclusorystatements,” are not taken as true).III. DISCUSSION
1
 1. The prior dismissalFacebook challenged the original complaint in this action by arguing that under the terms of use agreements applicable to Facebook accounts, plaintiffs had effectively consented to the use of their names and likenesses in the manner that they are now contending was wrongful. The priororder concluded that issue could not be decided in Facebook’s favor at the pleading stage, and theargument has not been reasserted in this motion. The initial motion to dismiss, however, alsoargued that plaintiffs had alleged no facts to support any cognizable harm, and it was granted on
1
The factual background of this action was set forth in the order dismissing the original complaint,and will not be recounted here.
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those grounds. The order observed that the sole allegation of injury was a conclusory assertion thatplaintiffs, “have suffered injury-in-fact by having their name[s] and likeness[es] misappropriatedwithout their knowledge or consent.” June 27, 2011 Order at 8:26-9:1.The order rejected plaintiffs’ apparent argument that the availability of minimum statutorydamages under California Civil Code §3344 could, in and of itself, supply the requisite element of injury. Noting that the Civil Code provision appeared designed primarily to provide a remedy forthose whose actual damages might be difficult to quantify, such as plaintiffs who were claimingonly non-economic damages, the order stated, “plaintiffs must, at a minimum, plead that theysuffered mental anguish as a result of the alleged misappropriation, and a plausible supportingfactual basis for any such assertion.” See June 27, 2011 Order at 9:18-20 (citing
 Miller v.Collectors Universe, Inc.,
159 Cal.App.4th 988 (2008)).A large portion of plaintiffs’ opposition to the present motion is devoted to rebutting theproposition that non-celebrity plaintiffs may recover for misappropriation of their names andlikenesses
only
if they can plead that they suffered mental anguish. Plaintiffs argue that anyimplication in
 Miller 
to that effect was ill-considered dicta, and that the June 27, 2011 Order waserroneous in suggesting that plaintiffs can only proceed under a theory that they suffered emotionalharm. As Facebook correctly points out, however, plaintiffs are reading the June 27, 2011 Ordertoo narrowly. Because plaintiffs had not identified or clearly articulated any economic harm theyhad allegedly suffered, the order merely explained what allegations would be necessary for them tostate a claim for non-economic harm.
2
Nothing in the June 27, 2011 Order, nor in
 Miller 
, representsa holding that non-celebrity plaintiffs can never pursue claims for economic loss and are insteadlimited to emotional damages. Facebook fully and correctly acknowledges that even non-celebrityplaintiffs
may
pursue economic damages claims. The question is what kind of facts must be allegedto show the existence of economic damages, such that plaintiffs will have standing to proceed.
2
Indeed, at the hearing on the initial motion to dismiss, plaintiffs indicated they were claimingemotional harm, and that they could amend to state facts showing such harm with greaterspecificity.
Case3:10-cv-05282-RS Document78 Filed10/27/11 Page3 of 6

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