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TheHaqqaniNexusandthe
EvolutionofalQaida





HARMONYPROGRAM
THECOMBATINGTERRORISMCENTERATWESTPOINT

www.ctc.usma.edu

14July2011

TheviewsexpressedinthisreportaretheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyreflectthoseoftheCombating
TerrorismCenter,U.S.MilitaryAcademy,DepartmentofDefense,orU.S.government.


AUTHORSACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The lead author of the present report is Don Rassler, based on collaborative research
conducted over the past two years by Don Rassler and Vahid Brown. We owe a
tremendousdebtofgratitude to Ahmed,our Pashto and Urdulanguageanalyst,who
helpedustomakesenseofamassofprimarysourcematerial.Thisreportisasmucha
testamenttohisskillandintellectasitistoourabilities.Weareequallygratefultothe
Combating Terrorism Centers (CTC) Director, LTC Reid Sawyer, who provided us
withthesupportnecessarytopursuethisproject.

Our appreciation must also be extended to our reviewers Nelly Lahoud, Thomas
Ruttig,ThomasHegghammer,GretchenPeters,BobNickelsberg,AriePerliger,andBill
Braniffwhosecommentshelpedtomakethisamorecogentproduct.Thislistwould
notbecompletewithoutacknowledgingScottHelfstein,AlexGalloandourotherCTC
colleagues.Severalotherindividualsalsoprovidedinvaluableinsights,especiallyJere
VanDyk,PirZubairShah,AntonioGiustozzi,MortenSkoldager,andthosewhovisited
theCTC.

Credit is also due to the CTCs Distinguished Chair, General (ret.) John Abizaid, who
alwayschallengesus,andtoVinnieViola.Thisprojectwouldnothavebeenpossible
without support from our partners at USSOCOM and the 75th Ranger Regiment. We
also thank Colonels Mike Meese and Cindy Jebb for their leadership and continued
support to the CTC. Cadet Greg Wuestner, Brian Fishman, Christine Fair, and AMB
Michael Sheehan also deserve specific acknowledgement, as do many others who
choosefortheirownsecuritytonotbementioned.

DonRassler VahidBrown
NewYork Oregon
July2011





INTRODUCTION

The targeted killing of Usama bin Ladin at a compound in the garrison city of
Abbottabad, Pakistan has raised a number of important questions about the infamous
global jihadists local connections. It has also highlighted how little is really known
aboutthepatronsandsupportersthatenabledalQaidascharismaticleadertohidein
plainsight,andcommunicatewithhiskeylieutenants,forsomanyyears.AlQaidas
successful integration into the complex local landscape of Islamist militancy in the
AfghanistanPakistan region is not a recent phenomenon, and since the 1980s Bin
Ladins organization hasbeen dependent ona networkoflocalsupporterstoconduct
an increasingly global campaign of violence. Indeed, the inception, execution and
continuityofalQaidasglobaljihadcannotbemeaningfullyseparatedfromthislocal
dimension, which todayremainsoneofthe leaststudiedaspectsofthe organizations
history.Thepresentreportaimstoaddressthisgapthroughananalysisofthehistory
andorganizationalrelationshipsoftheHaqqaninetwork,asinglemajorconstantthat,
for the entirety of alQaidas existence, has shaped the latters local trajectory in the
region.

A great deal of attention has been given to the activities of the Haqqani network in
recentyears,withthegrouphavingbeendescribedasthepivotissuebetweenPakistan
and the United States.1 TheHaqqaninetwork,asitiscommonlycalled,is anAfghan
and Pakistani insurgent group that has its roots in the 1970s.2 The identity and
evolutionofthegroupisintimatelytiedtoitspatriarchandhistoricleader,Jalaluddin
Haqqani. Over three decades of conflict the group has played a unique role in the
region due to its interpersonal relations, geographic position and strategic approach.
Today,theHaqqaninetworkoperatesasasemiautonomouscomponentoftheTaliban


1MullenlaunchesdiatribeagainstISI,Dawn,21April2011.
2Outsideofinternalmilitaryusage,whichwaslikelysomewhatearlier,theappellationfirstappearsin
the9March2006SenatetestimonyofRearAdmiralRobertMoeller,inwhichhedescribedthethreemain
componentsoftheAfghaninsurgencyastheTaliban,theHaqqaniTribalNetwork,andHizbiIslami
Gulbuddin(HIG).Aweeklater,theU.S.StateDepartmentsWashingtonFileintroducedtheshortened
appellationHaqqaninetwork(DavidMcKeeby,PartnershipKeytoProgressinAfghanistan,U.S.
GeneralSays,WashingtonFile,16March2006),thoughthephrasedidnotentercommonusageinthe
Westernpressuntillate2006,followingAnthonyCordesmanseditorialOneWarWeCanStillWin,
NewYorkTimes,13December2006.
1


with primacy in southeastern Afghanistan. Part of the networks power also stems
fromitsclosetiestoPakistansArmyandintelligenceagencies,whichhavehistorically
usedthegroupasaproxytoexertinfluenceinAfghanistanandtomediatedisputesin
Pakistans Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Throughout its history the
Haqqani networkhasoperated onandinfluencedmilitancyonthelocal,regionaland
globallevels,themostunderappreciateddimensionofwhichistheglobalcharacterof
theHaqqaninetworkandthecentralroleithasplayedintheevolutionofalQaidaand
the global jihadi movement. This is a gap of strategic proportions, insofar as the
Haqqani network has been more important to the development and sustainment of
alQaidaandtheglobaljihadthananyothersingleactororgroup.

Three main factors explain why a more developed understanding of the Haqqani
networksbroadroleinthishistoryhasremainedelusive.First,althoughrecognizedas
adistinctorganization(i.e.atanzim)byforeignjihadistsasearlyas1994,thehistorical
evolutionoftheHaqqaninetworkhasreceivedlimitedattention.3Almostallhistorical
treatmentsofthegrouparetangentialinnatureandrelyheavilyonsecondarysources.
Few studies offer unique or granular insights about the evolution of the Haqqani
network,thepre2001actionsofthegroupanditslongstandingtieswithkeyactors.

Second,thescholarlyandcounterterrorismcommunitieshavenarrowlyapproachedthe
history of alQaida through the lens of Peshawar and Arab precursor organizations,
such as Maktab alKhidamat (Afghan Services Bureau, hereinafter MAK). Less
credenceandattentionhasbeengiventoareaslikeLoyaPaktiaandMiranshah,which
functioned (and continue to function) as other centers of gravity for the mobilization
and operational development of foreign war volunteers and future members of al
Qaida. These areas, and the Haqqani networks role in them, were not only more
central to the operational development of alQaida than Peshawar, but have also
provedtobemoreenduringovertime.


3Harmonydocument,AFGP2002800581,p.5,inwhichtheadministratorofanalQaidatrainingcamp
atthemainHaqqanibaseinKhostwritestoalQaidasleadershipinSudan(1994)thatthegovernorof
KhostisfromtheHaqqaniorganizationandisprotectingalQaidafromattacksbyoneofGulbuddin
Hekmatyarscommanders.
2


Third,thehistoryofalQaidahasbeennarrowlyapproachedthroughArabicsources,
asifthedevelopmentofalQaidawassolelyanArabphenomenon.Lessattentionhas
been paid to Pashto and Urdu language material produced by Afghan and Pakistani
insurgentgroups,muchofwhichprovidesinsightsintothelocalcontextofalQaidas
trajectoryandisripeforstudy.

This report also provides insights into the strategic value of the Haqqani network.
Specifically, it examines how, for the past three decades, the Haqqani network has
functioned as an enabler for other groups and as the fountainhead (manba) of local,
regionalandglobalmilitancy.Althoughthisreportexploresallthreeofthesemilitant
levels,itemphasizestheHaqqaninetworksimpactontransnationalmilitancy.While
theHaqqaninetworkisundoubtedlyasophisticatedanddangerousorganizationinits
ownright,thegroupisbestunderstoodasanexusplayer,tyingtogetheradiversemix
ofactorscentraltovariousconflictnetworks.Bydetailingthesetiesandexploringhow
the group functions inthisrole, wewill elucidate andcontextualizethe historyofthe
Haqqaninetwork.

TheHaqqaninetworksstrategyispragmaticandtheorganizationismotivatedbylocal
concernsandalessvisiblebutfirmlyheldideologicalcommitmenttothephilosophyof
expansive and global jihad. We will also illustrate how the Haqqani network and al
Qa`idafunctionasaninterdependentsystem,andrevealthattheseedsofglobaljihad
wereplantedmuchearlierthanpreviouslythoughtandwerenurturedjustasmuchby
theHaqqanisasbyalQa`ida,itspredecessororganizationsandtheArabforeignfighter
movement. Although not the main focus of this report, this history refines the
argumentsmadebyothersaboutthealQaidaandTalibanrelationshipandestablishes
thatthethreattoU.S.nationalintereststhatemergedmostfullyon9/11stemmedfrom
bothalQaidaandtheHaqqaninetwork.

ThisintroductionproceedsbyofferingananalyticalframeworktosituatetheHaqqani
networksroleandinfluenceacrosslocal,regionalandglobaldimensionsofjihad.This
discussion is then followed by a review of our sources and methods and an
acknowledgment of this reports limitations. The first section then proceeds by
discussing the Haqqani network in more detail, focusing on three key characteristics
that have contributed to its endurance and effectiveness over time. The bulk of the
3


reportstartinginthesecondsectionexplorestheevolutionoftheHaqqaninetworkand
the nature of the groups relations with key actors, especially alQaida. This is done
through a chronological review, starting with the emergence and rise of Jalaluddin
Haqqanitoatrustedpositionofinfluenceacrosslocal,regionalandglobalplainsinthe
late1970sand1980s,followedbyanassessmentofhowtheHaqqaninetworkusedits
nexus position and resources to enable other forms of militancy during the 1990s and
thepost2001period.Theconclusionexaminestheimplicationsofourfindingsandthe
challenges they present to regional security, U.S./Pakistan ties and Taliban
reconciliationefforts.

AnalyticalFramework
Tosituate theHaqqaninetworksnexuspositionandrole,it may beusefultorefer to
John Padgetts and Paul McLeans multiplenetwork ensemble, which uses separate
plainsandfunctionstoexplaintheevolutionofpowerinRenaissanceItaly.4Insteadof
transversing between the economic, kinship and political plains that Padgett and
McLean outline, the Haqqani network can be understood as operating in a similar
manneracrosslocal,regionalandglobaldimensionsofjihad(visuallydisplayedinthe
Appendix).5 Moreover, while Padgetts and McLeans plains are segmented based on
guild,neighborhoodandsocialclass,theHaqqaninetworksactionswithinandacross
each plain can be organized into three functional categories: direct action (i.e.,
operations), diplomatic activity and support functions. Padgetts and McLeans
conclusion that themostsuccessfulfamiliesare those with networksthatpenetrate
thekeyfunctionalcategorieswhilealsotransversingacrossdimensionscansimilarly

4 JohnPadgettandPaulMcLean,OrganizationalInventionandEliteTransformation:TheBirthof
PartnershipSystemsinRenaissanceFlorence,AmericanJournalofSociology111,no.5(March2006).
5Foranalyticalclarity,thelocalplainincludesthosemilitantgroupsthatareindigenoustothetribal

areasofAfghanistanandPakistan,andwhoareprimarilyactiveinoneofthesetwocountriesandseekto
createchangethere.TheregionalplainisspecificallydevotedtothePakistanistate,givenIslamabads
interestsinshapingSouthAsiassecurityenvironmentandhistoricuseofproxiestocounterIndian
influenceintheregion.GroupssuchasalQaidaandtheIslamicJihadUnionwhoareprimarily
motivatedbyglobaljihadanddirectlyengageinactsofinternationalterrorismareincludedinthe
globalplain.Theauthorsrecognizethatthesecategorieswhileanalyticallyusefularealsoattimes
partiallyblurredduetothefluidityoftheAfghanistanPakistanborder,overlappingmembership
betweengroupsandthefactthattheactivityofseveralmilitantactorsisnotlimitedtoonespecificplain.
Forexample,eventhoughthePakistaniTaliban(TTP)isalocal,indigenousmilitantgroupthatis
primarilyconcernedwithattackingthePakistanistate,theTTPisalsomotivatedbyglobaljihadandhas
provenitsdesiretoattacktheUnitedStates.
4


be used to explain the success of the Haqqani network, given the groups ability to
operate across local, regional and global plains and provide value within each
functional category. For example, the Haqqani network functions as the primary
conduitformanyPakistaniTaliban(alsoknownastheTehrikeTalibanPakistan,orthe
TTP) fighters to access the jihad in Afghanistan and as a central diplomatic interface
between the TTP and the Pakistani state when important issues need to be discussed.
PlayingsucharoleenhancestheHaqqaninetworksutilityandcredibilitywithin,and
across,multipledimensionsofjihad.ThisisnottosuggestthattheHaqqaninetworkis
the only actor operating in this capacity in the AfghanistanPakistan tribal areas, but
ratherthatithasbeenthemostinfluential.

SourcesandMethods
Tocontextualize theHaqqaninetworkanditsrelationships we conductedareviewof
primary and secondary source material in English, French, Arabic, Pashto, Dari and
Urdu.Thisincludedthefirstknownreviewofanearcompletesetofover1,000pages
ofthreejihadistmagazinesreleasedbytheHaqqaninetworkfrom19891993:Manbaal
Jihad(oneversioninPashtoandanotherinArabic)andNusratalJihad(Urdu);aseries
ofdigitalvideosproducedbythegroupsince2001;andanumberofArabiclanguage
memoirswrittenbycurrentandformermembersofalQaidaandotherforeignfighters
presentinAfghanistanduringtheperiodunderstudy(19732010).Tocorroboratethis
information and gain additional insights, we conducted interviews with prominent
scholars,practitionersandjournalistswhoeitherpersonallyoperatedwithorhavehad
firsthandknowledgeoftheHaqqaninetworkatspecificpointsinhistory.

The authors also reviewed several thousand pages of letters written to and from
Haqqanicommandersduringthe1980sand1990s,whichwerecapturedinAfghanistan
after the U.S. invasion and have since been stored in the Department of Defenses
Harmony database. While this material is extremely rich and illuminating, readers
should beawarethatanalyzing suchdatais fraughtwithcertainrisks.Documents in
theHarmonydatabasewerecollectedonthebattlefieldinanadhocmanner.Thereis
no way to knowhow representativethedocumentscapturedbyU.S.forcesareof the
larger body of information produced by the Haqqani network, alQaida or other
insurgents.Theauthors,however,madeeveryattempttocorroboratematerialfoundin
thesedocumentswithothersources.
5


LimitationsandCaveats
This report is not a comprehensive history of the Haqqani network. Although it
representsaseriousattempttopresentthecontoursofsuchahistory,itdoessothrough
the lens of the Haqqani networks support for alQaida and to a lesser extent its
relations with the Pakistani state and Pakistani Taliban. A detailed exploration of
JalaluddinHaqqanisrelationswithkeyAfghaninsurgent/politicalfactionsduringthe
antiSoviet jihad, for example, or the commercial role of the Haqqani network, are
beyond the scope of this report although they are touched upon. We encourage
others to expand upon our research by exploring (in greater detail) primary source
material produced byindividuals like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Abd alRabb Rasul
SayyafotheractorswhoplayedaroleinenablingtheArabforeignfightermovement
andlateralQaida.Finally,asatermofconvenience,theauthorsoccasionallyreferto
theHaqqaninetworksimplyastheHaqqanis.

6


INTRODUCINGTHEHAQQANINETWORK

The Haqqani network is an Afghan and Pakistani insurgent group whose senior
leadership structure is hierarchical and mostly familial in nature.6 Most of the
operationsconductedbythegroupoveritsthreedecadelonghistoryhavebeencarried
outbysmall,local,andsemiautonomousfightingunitsorganizedalongtribalandsub
tribal lines, with Haqqani commanders often coordinating activity and providing
logistics.7 Theidentityofthegroup,anditsevolutionfromacollectionoflikeminded
tribalfightersinthemid1970sintoamorestructurednetwork,withitsowncommand
and control and media, is intimately tied to the career of Jalaluddin Haqqani, the
groups historic leader.8 While Jalaluddin was organizationally affiliated with the
faction of the Afghan mujahidin party HizbeIslami led by Yunis Khalis during the
1980s and early 1990s, and since 1996 with the Taliban, Haqqani has always had a
considerable amount of autonomy and been in charge of his own network of local
fighters.9 It is difficult to pinpoint when the group led by Jalaluddin (and now
nominally by his son Sirajuddin) became a cohesive entity, but the Haqqani network
wasrecognizedasadistinctorganization(i.e.atanzim)byforeignjihadistsasearlyas
1994.10Today,thegroupisbelievedtobecomprisedofseveralhundredcoremembers
andthousandsoffighterswithvaryingdegreesofaffiliationandloyalty.11Assessments
suggestthattheHaqqaninetworkdrawsfromapoolofroughly10,00015,000fighters.12


6MajorfamilialleadersincludeJalaluddinandhisbrotherKhalil,aswellasJalaluddinssonsBadruddin,
NasiruddinandSirajuddin.LeadershiproleshavealsobeenfilledbygraduatesoftheDaralUlum
HaqqaniyyamadrassaandindividualslikeJanBazZadran,DarimSedgai(deceased),BakhtaJanand
MullahSangeenhaveplayedimportantrolesinthegroup,butarenotknownasnuclearfamilymembers.
7Forahistoricalperspective,seeMohammadYousafandMarkAdkin,AfghanistanTheBearTrap:The

DefeatofaSuperpower(Havertown,PA:Casemate,2001),167.Asexplainedbelow,sincethemid1980s,
theseunitshavebeenaugmentedbyforeignwarvolunteerswhohaveeitherbeenintegratedinto
Haqqanifightingcolumnsorfoughtsemiindependentlyalongsidethem.Thesedynamicsarebestlaid
outbyAbulWalidalMasriandhiswriting.
8ThenameHaqqaniisanhonorifictitlethatJalaluddinearnedafterhisstudiesatDaralUlum

Haqqaniyya(seebelow).
9ForexampleinterviewsconductedbyJereVanDykin1981indicatethatJalaluddinwasviewedatthat

timeastheleaderforallof[Loya]PaktiaprovinceandforallofSoutheasternAfghanistan.SeeJereVan
Dyk,InAfghanistan:AnAmericanOdyssey(NewYork:CowardMcCann,1983),126.
10Harmonydocument,AFGP2002800581,5.

11JanePerlez,RebuffingU.S.,PakistanBalksatCrackdown,NewYorkTimes,14December2009.

12See,e.g.,JereVanDyk,128.

7



The Haqqani network has remained an effective militant actor while playing a broad
role over three decades of conflict due to its ability to manage three important
characteristics. It is the Haqqani networks geographic position, organizational
centralityandstrategicapproachthathavesetitapartfromothergroups.Thissection
is organized according to these three characteristics and serves as a basis to help the
readersituatethemoredetailedanalysisthatfollows.

GeographicCentrality

TheHaqqaninetworksidentityandenduranceisintimatelytiedtothegeographically
centralterrainfromwhichitemergedandinwhichithasalwaysbeenbased.Sincethe
mid1970s the Haqqani network has increasingly wielded a tremendous amount of
operationalanddiplomaticinfluenceovertheSoutheasternAfghanprovincesofKhost,
Paktia and Paktika (together known as Loya Paktia) and Pakistans North Waziristan.
Thismountainousregion,whichstraddlestheDurandLineandhaslongbeenacenter
forpoliticalresistanceagainstAfghanregimes,ishosttoanumberofmilitantnetworks
and has served as the groups primary area of operation and its key region of refuge
and political interest.13 Although less central to the groups identity, since the early
1980s the Haqqani network has also had a presence in and operational ties to Kabul,
Ghazni,LogarandWardak.14

The particular history and characteristics of this region have not only shaped the
Haqqaninetworksevolutionandstrategicbehaviorovertime,theyhavealsoprovided
thegroupwiththeabilitytocarveoutanenduringpositionofpoweroverthreeanda
halfdecadesofregionalconflictandglobalizedpoliticalviolence.Themagnitudeofthe
resourcesthatpouredintoAfghanistantosupportthemujahidinduringtheantiSoviet


13ForanoverviewofothermilitantactorsactiveinLoyaPaktia,seeThomasRuttig,TheHaqqani
NetworkasanAutonomousEntity,inDecodingtheNewTaliban:InsightsfromtheAfghanField,ed.
AntonioGiustozzi(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2009);SebastienTrives,Rootsofthe
InsurgencyintheSoutheast,inDecodingtheNewTaliban:InsightsfromtheAfghanField,ed.Antonio
Giustozzi(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2009).
14Seee.g.,MartyrsofthePathoftheTruth,ManbaalJihad(Pashto),1:23,(AugustSeptember1989);

MawlawiAzizKhan,TheFirstJihadiOperationinAfghanistan,andtheRiseoftheUlemaAgainstthe
Communists,ManbaalJihad(Pashto),1:45(OctoberNovember1989).
8


jihad in the 1980s are well known; the United States, Saudi Arabia, China and other
partnerstatescontributedupwardsof$12billionindirectaidtoPakistantosupportthe
insurgency.15 According to the Brigadier General of the InterServices Intelligence
Directorate (ISI) responsible for directing this massive supply chain to the mujahidin,
upto60percentofoursupplieswereroutedthroughKhostandPaktia,afullthirdof
this directly through Haqqanis headquarters and supply base at Zhawara, just four
kilometers across the Afghanistan border between Miranshah, North Waziristan and
Khost.16JalaluddinHaqqani,thegroupspatriarch,notedtheimportanceandvalueof
theseresourcemobilizationnetworksaftertheSovietwithdrawal,remarking:

Khost is one of four strategic places in Afghanistan. It is very important

becauseKhosthasmorethantensofroutestoPakistan,andmorethaneleven
routesintootherpartsofAfghanistan.Theseroutesarestrategicallyimportant
becauseweusethemforshippingweaponsandammunitionintothecountry,
andtakingourwoundedanddeadout.17

It is therefore understandable that Khost the city located at the distributing end of
this international resource mobilization network was the first city captured by the
mujahidin after the departure of the Soviets, or that Jalaluddin led the operation.18
Furthermore, these resource networks have proven to be of consistent value to the
Haqqaninetworkandotherlocalactorsduringsuccessiveconflicts,includingthat
which the group is fighting today against Afghan and Coalition forces.19 Due to its
history and ties with other actors, the Haqqani network remains the actor best
positionedtocapitalizeandmakeuseofthem.

Ofequalimportance,asnotedbyJalaluddin,istheconnectionbetweenthesenetworks
and other parts of Afghanistan. Loya Paktia provides the shortest route from the


15SteveColl,GhostWars(NewYork:PenguinBooks,2004),238.
16YousafandAdkin,159,164.Seesamesourceforbackgroundonotherroutes(atpage110)and
distributionofmaterieltoothercommanders(Sayyaf,Hekmatyar,etc.)viaKhostroutesandothers.
17ManbaalJihad(Pashto),2:12,(June1991).

18ForbackgroundseeHistoricBattle,GreatVictory,ManbaalJihadpublishing,authoranddatenot

known;Forperspectivesongeographiccentralitysee:HarmonyDocumentAFGP2002600093,102;Steve
Coll,GhostWars,157.
19ForareviewofotheractorsinLoyaPaktiaseefootnote1.

9


sanctuaries of North and South Waziristan to Afghanistans capital, Kabul. This, and
the nature of the Haqqani networks relationships (explored further below), helps to
explainwhythegroupisusuallyresponsibleforsuicideattacksconductedinKabul.20
ThemountainousgeographyandtheshelterprovidedbyPakistanscloseborderhave
also historically allowed the Haqqani network and, by extension, its operational
partnerstomaintainarearsupplybaseandlimittheirownrateofattrition.

OrganizationalCentralityandNexusPosition

TheHaqqaninetworkhaslonghadintimatetieswithawiderangeofactorsduetoits
geographicposition,historyofinclusivenessandstrategicapproach.Indeed,oneofthe
moreremarkableandenduringaspectsoftheHaqqaninetworkhasbeenitsabilityand
willingnesstoworkwithawidevarietyofleaders,partiesandforeignsupporters,and
tobringoftenfractiousandrivalgroupsintoeffectivetacticalalliances.Thisflexibility
andabilitytomanagevariousinterestshashistoricallysettheHaqqaninetworkapart
andallowedittoactasacentralhub,tyingtogetheradiverseconstituencyofgroups.
ThisisperhapsbestillustratedbythefactthattheHaqqaninetworkhaslongbeenan
essentialoperationalpartnerforbothPakistanandalQaida,andthatbothIslamabad
andtheTehrikeTalibanPakistan(TTP,alsoknownasthePakistaniTaliban)oftenrely
upontheHaqqanisgoodofficestonegotiatewithoneanother.21

The Haqqani networks organizational centrality is built upon the foundation and
relationsforgedbyJalaluddinHaqqaniandthoseclosetohimoverthepastfortyyears.
The ideological roots and organizational basis for what would later become the
Haqqani networkwerefirmlyfixedinthe1960sand1970s,and theyarejustasmuch
Pakistani in nature as they are Afghan.22 A major foundational component was the
educationthatJalaluddinandmanyofhischieflieutenantsandbattlefieldcommanders
receivedatPakistansprestigiousDaralUlumHaqqaniyya,aDeobandimadrassanear

20AnandGopal,TheMostDeadlyUSFoeinAfghanistan,ChristianScienceMonitor,1June2009.
21Theserelationshipsarereviewedbelow.Theuseofthetermgoodofficereferstodiplomaticservices
providedbytheHaqqaninetworkandnotaphysicaloffice.See,e.g.,AnandGopal,MansurKhan
MahsudandBrianFishman,TheBattleforPakistan:MilitancyandConflictinNorthWaziristan,
CounterterrorismStrategyInitiativePolicyPaper,NewAmericaFoundation(April2010).
22ForinsightintothecrossbordernatureoftheHaqqaninetworksee:InterviewwithTaliban

CommanderMaulviJalaluddinHaqqani,TheNews,20October2001.
10


the border city of Peshawar, during the 1960s.23 Indeed, Jalaluddins connections to
MawlawiAbdalHaq,founderoftheHaqqaniyyamadrassa,andhissonSamialHaq
wouldonlydeepenoverthecourseofsuccessiveconflicts,andthelattertiesstillendure
today.24 In the 1970s that Jalaluddin established early ties to the Persian Gulf and
operational connectionswithkey AfghanIslamistpartyleaders,suchasYunis Khalis,
GulbuddinHekmatyar,AbdalRabbRasulSayyaf,BurhanuddinRabbaniandAhmad
ShahMassoud,allofwhomhadbecomeinvolvedinIslamistactivisminKabulinthe
1960s and early 1970s. After declaring a jihad against Afghan President Muhammad
DaoudfromthevillageofNika(PaktiaProvince)in1973,Jalaluddinestablishedcenters
of underground antigovernment activities in Miranshah, Khost, and Kabul and he
dispatched several of his supporters to Peshawar to liaise with the Kabuli Islamists.25
Although Jalaluddins relations with these Afghan leaders would at times be strained
andinsomecaseshostile,theywouldremainimportantoverthenextseveraldecades.

The Haqqani networks centrality to the regions conflict economy and the role it has
played as a local conflict mediator over multiple decades have helped to solidify the
Haqqanisstatusinthetribalareas.AtthelocallevelinPakistan,relationsbetweenthe
Haqqaninetworkandlocalmilitantgroupsaredeeplyintegratedandinterdependent.
Theyareguidedbytribalsolidarity,deeppersonalties,andpragmaticconsiderations,
suchasthelocalalliancesneededtofacilitatethemovementoffightersacrossdifferent
tribal territories in North Waziristan to battlefields in Khost. According to New York
Times journalist Pir Zubair Shah, when fighters under [Mullah] Nazir or [Hafiz] Gul
Bahadur[theTTPcommanderinNorthWaziristan]goin[toAfghanistan],theyoperate
under the Haqqaninetwork and needthemto allowaccess.26Othersourcesconfirm


23Jalaluddinschieflieutenantsduringthe1970sand1980sincludedNezamuddinHaqqani,Fatehullah
Haqqani,HanifShah,andMawlawiAzizKhan;forbackgroundontheseindividualsseebelow.
24ForbackgroundontheconnectionbetweenJalaluddinandAbdulandSamiulHaqseeAlhaj

MawlawiJalaluddinHaqqaniinaGeneralGatheringoftheJamiateUlamaeIslaminLahore,Manbaal
Jihad(Pashto),2:11,(May1991).ThecontinuityofthesetiesisreflectedbyNasiruddinandKhalil
HaqqanispresenceatarecentHaqqaniyyagraduation.Authorsinterviewwithanonymoussource.
25Ibid;AlHajHaqqanisInterviewwiththeArabMagazinealMarabitun,ManbaalJihad(Pashto)2:12

(June1991).
26AuthorsinterviewwithPirZubairShah,13September2010;ForbackgroundonMullahNazirand

HafizGulBahadurseeCarolineWadhamsandColinCookman,FacesofPakistansMilitant
Leaders,CenterforAmericanProgress(22July2009).
11


that Mullah Nazir is close to Sirajuddin Haqqani and that Gul Bahadur coordinates
closelywiththeHaqqaninetworkonbothstrategyandoperationsinAfghanistan.27

There is also a qualitative dimension to which TTP fighters have fought with the
HaqqaninetworkinAfghanistan.28BaitullahMehsudwasacloseallyofkeyHaqqani
commandersandfoughtwiththeTaliban(likelyunderJalaluddinintheShomaliPlains
northofKabul),andbothBaitullahandhissuccessorHakimullahMehsudhelpedthe
Afghan Taliban to regroup after the U.S. invasion.29 In short biographical notes
allegedlywrittenbyHakimullahMehsud,theTTPleaderemphasizedthathe,Baitullah
MehsudandAbdullahMehsud(killedin2007)foughttogetherwithMullahSangeen,a
keyHaqqanicommander,inKhostprovince.30Tofacilitatetheintegrationbetweenthe
HaqqaninetworkandtheTTPintegration,seniorHaqqanileadersareknowntovouch
forPakistaniswhowanttogainaccesstofrontsinKhostandindividualslikeQariAmil
(deceased)coordinatethistypeofintegrationinthefield.31

Across the border in Afghanistan, the Haqqani network remains a central partner for
the Quetta Shura Taliban the primary insurgent group confronting Afghan, U.S.
andNATOforcesfortwomainreasons.32First,theHaqqaninetworkhasactedasan
important regional platform for the Taliban to project power and influence in
Southeastern Afghanistan.33 The relationship between the two parties is structured in

27HakimullahMehsudandHafizGulBahadurreportedlyhaveclosetiesaswell.SeeImtiazGul,The
MostDangerousPlace:PakistansLawlessFrontier,(NewYork:Viking,2010).
28Foroneperspective,seeClaudioFranco,TheTehrikeTalibanPakistan,inDecodingtheNewTaliban:

InsightsfromtheAfghanField,ed.AntonioGiustozzi(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2009).
29Ruttig,76;Gul,37;AbubakarSiddique,PakistaniTalibanChiefsDeathwouldhaveBroad

Implications,RFE/RL(7August2009).
30TranslationofHakimullahMehsudsHandwrittenAutobiographicalNotes,NEFA,3October2009;

ForbackgroundonBaitullahMehsudseeImtiazAli,BaitullahMehsudtheTalibansNewLeaderin
Pakistan,TerrorismFocus,9January2008;ForbackgroundonAbdullahMehsudandhisdeath,see
FormerGuantanamoInmateBlowshimselfupinPakistan,Dawn,24July2007.
31AuthorsinterviewwithPirZubairShah,13September2010;ForbackgroundonQariAmil,whowas

recentlykilled,seeRebelCommanderKilledinAfghanEast,PajhwokNews,2November2010;Byusing
thetermfrontstheauthorsarereferringtoalineorzoneofbattle.
32TheauthorsusethetermQuettaShuraTalibanduetoitscommonusage.Itisimportanttonotethat

theQuettaShuraisoneoftheTalibansregionalcommands,butisnottheoverallleadershipcouncil.
TheAfghanTalibanmovementpreferstocallitselftheIslamicEmirateofAfghanistan.
33TheHaqqaninetworkhasarichhistorywiththeAfghanTalibananditsprecursororganizations,but

asThomasRuttigpointsout,LoyaPaktiawasneverastrongholdoftheTalibanmovement,neither
12


thiswayoutofnecessity,asthereareimportantdifferencesbetweenthelowlandtribes
of Loya Kandahar, where the majority of the Talibans leadership is from, and the
mountain tribes of Loya Paktia.34 Due to its local tribal connections and its history in
the region, the Haqqani network is more credible than the Taliban in these areas and
thus is more capable of navigating local issues sucessfully.35 This leaves the Taliban
reliantontheHaqqaninetworktofunctionasthelocal,andmoreacceptable,faceofits
movement.Byactinginthisway,theHaqqaninetworkhelpstheTalibantoextendits
brandandprojectitselfasacohesivenational(i.e.,morethanaKandahari)movement.36
Second,givenitsmilitaryeffectiveness,theHaqqaninetworkactsasaforcemultiplier
for the Taliban, strengthening the latters campaigns in Loya Paktia and elsewhere.37
Afghanistans capital is where the Haqqani networks effectiveness and operational
sophistication is most apparent, for the group is the entity tied to most, if not all,
complex and strategic suicide attacks there. These attacks, which are almost always
claimedbytheTaliban,extend theperceptionof theTalibansreachand reinforcethe
viewthattheKarzaigovernmentisweakandcannotprovidesecurity.38

Attheregionallevel,thePakistanistatehaslongbeenacoresponsorandbeneficiaryof
the Haqqani network. During the 1980s Jalaluddin quickly rose to be one of the ISIs
mostfavoredfieldcommandersandthesupportheprovidedwouldhaveasignificant
impactuponPakistanssecurityestablishmentandthejihadinKashmirintheyearsto
follow.39 The intimacy of Jalaluddins relations to various spheres of Pakistans
establishment, and the operational assistance he provided Pakistans Army and
intelligence service during this period, are key to the Haqqani networks value to
Pakistan,aswellastounderstandingthelattersreluctancetomoveagainstthegroup.
Since the antiSoviet war, the Haqqani network has continued to function as a proxy
throughwhichelementsofthePakistanistatecouldpursuetheirstrategicinterestsand


duringtheirIslamicEmirate(19962001)norinthephaseofitsnewincarnation,thepost2001neoTaliban
insurgency.SeeRuttig,58.
34ForbackgroundseeRuttig.

35Forexample,thesetribaldifferencescametotheforeonnumerousoccasionsduringTalibanrulewhen

theLoyaPaktiatribesopenlyresistedwhatwasperceivedofKandaharidominance.SeeRuttig,73.
36ForbackgroundseeRuttig.

37Ibid.

38TajmeerJawadreportedlyheadsHaqqanioperationsinKabul.SeeGopal,KhanandFishman,8.

39Thisissueisexploredingreaterdetailbelow.

13


seekmilitaryandpoliticalinfluenceintheFATA.Forexample,todaythegroupoften
servesastheprimaryconduitorgoodofficethroughwhichPakistancanmanagelocal
hostilities, gain access to TTP leaders, and try to shape the direction and priorities of
militant groups in the FATA, especially those fighting against Islamabad.40 On the
Afghansideoftheborder,theHaqqaninetworkalsofunctionsasakineticstrikeforce
through which Pakistan can achieve important signaling effectsvisvis India and its
regionalposture.TheHaqqaninetworkplayingsucharoleisbestexemplifiedbythe
2008 suicide attack it conducted against Indias embassy in Kabul, which killed fifty
three people including Indias Defense Attach.41 This attack, which was reportedly
carriedoutwithISIassistance,waslikelyconductedtosendastrongmessagetoIndia
to limit its role in Afghanistan given Pakistans concerns about New Delhis influence
there.

At the global level, alQaida and other transnational terrorist actors including the
Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) and the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) also rely on and
leverage the Haqqani network.42 The internationalization of the antiSoviet jihad
brought Jalaluddin and his close cohort into partnership with a widerange of foreign
war volunteers and local fighters. Jalaluddins facilities in Peshawar, Miranshah and
LoyaPaktiawerekeymeetingplaceswherethismixofactorsAfghanfighters,Arab
volunteersandPakistanisfromvariousbackgroundscouldgetweaponsandfood,as
wellasprepareforattacks.43Throughoutthe1990s,therelationshipbetweenalQaida
andtheHaqqaninetworkonlydeepened,withthelatterprovidingspaceforalQaida
and other militantgroups todevelop and toinitiateacampaign ofattacksagainstthe
West. Today,this contextenduresas theHaqqaninetworkremains theprimary local
partnerforalQaida,theIJUandotherglobalmilitants.


40Forexamplessee,AnandGopal,MansurKhanMahsudandBrianFishman,TheBattleforPakistan:
MilitancyandConflictinNorthWaziristan;InterviewwithPervezMusharraf,DerSpiegel,7June2009;
IsmailKhan,Forces,MilitantsHeadingforTruce,Dawn,23June2006.
41JaySolomon,USTiesPakistaniIntelligencetoAttackinKabul,WallStreetJournal,2August2008.

42TIPisusuallyreferredtointhesecondaryliteratureastheEastTurkestanIslamicMovement(ETIM),

thoughthegroupchangeditsnametotheTIPinthe1990s.
43MuhammadAmirRana,JihadandJihadi,MashalBooks(Lahore),2003;SeealsothewritingsofAbu

WalidalMasricitedbelow.
14


PragmatismandStrategicApproach

The Haqqani network has maintained its nexus position over time by pursuing a
strategy of extreme pragmatism. Due to the complexity of Afghanistans conflict
environment most militant groups are pragmatic actors, but given its nexus position
andthevariousinterestsitmustconsidertheHaqqaninetworkneedstobeevenmore
judicious in how it evaluates the practical consequences of its actions. The success of
such an approach is predicated on the Haqqani networks acute awareness of its
positionandthestructuralnecessities,orinternalandexternalconstraints,whichlimit
itspublicroleandpursuitofpower.Asillustratedinthisreport,theHaqqaninetwork
has limited political goals and has a history of subordinating itself to other entities.
Jalaluddin HaqqanisrelationshipwithHizbeIslami(Khalis) and theTalibanpriorto
9/11 are indicative of the groups constrained approach, as is the Haqqani networks
publicdeferencetotheAfghanTalibantoday.Unlikemanyotheractors,theHaqqani
network has little interest in governing Afghanistan nationally and seeks instead to
maintain its autonomy and influence locally in Loya Paktia and North Waziristan,
whilealsosupportingeffortstospreadjihadelsewhere.TheHaqqaninetworkappears
confident in its capabilities and standing and is not overly concerned with receiving
publicrecognitionforitsactions.Theirconstrainedapproachalsohelpstoexplainwhy
theHaqqaninetworkscentralroleinthedevelopmentofalQaidaandtheemergence
ofglobaljihadhasuntilnowbeenunderappreciated.

Tolimittheperceptionofitsbroadroleandimpactsince9/11,theHaqqaninetworkhas
consciouslyportrayeditselfasalocalactorpreoccupiedwithlocalconcerns.Thegroup
has been able to do so through a deceptive and segmented strategic communications
campaignthatmasksthevarietyanddepthofitsrelationswithotheractors.Thishas
allowedtheHaqqaninetworktotailoritsmessagestodifferentaudiences.Perhapsthe
bestexampleofthisis Jalaluddinstreatmentofthe roleof theArabsinthesiege and
captureofKhostin1991.InthePashtoandUrdulanguageversionsofManba`/Nusrat
alJihad, the role of the Arabs is either ignored or specifically denied, while it is
celebrated in the Arabic language versions of the same magazine.44 Segmentation

SeeMartyrsoftheConquestofKhost(ArabMartyrs),ManbaalJihad(Arabic)2:10(June1991).In
44

oneofthemainPashtoversionsofManba`thatrecountthebattleJalaluddinstatesDespitewhatthe
enemyclaims,therearenoforeignfightersinourfrontsinKhost.WedidnotallowPakistani,Arabor
15


proved useful to the Haqqani network in this case as it bolstered its credentials with
Gulf supporters while also distancing the group from pointed criticism made by
Afghan President Najibullah about the presence of foreign fighters, specifically
PakistanisandArabs,inthisbattle.45AnanecdotalanalysisoftheHaqqaninetworks
communications post2001 reveals that the group is engaged in similar activity and
carefully avoids two primary redlines: direct association with either antiPakistan
militancy or global jihad, despite having close operational ties with the two primary
actors the TTP and alQaida that are driving these jihads. This suggests that
whiletheHaqqaninetworksnexuspositionandthenatureofitsvariousoperational
relationships is a source of its strength, it is also a potential weakness, as its nexus
positionpresentsmorewaystodisruptthegroup.


IranianfighterstocomeanddirectlytakepartinthebattlesSeeAlhajMawlawiJalaludinHaqqaniin
anInterviewwithManbaalJihad,ManbaalJihad(Pashto),2:8,(January1991).
45InaseriesoftelevisedspeechestoPashtunandTajikeldersduringthisperiodPresidentNajibullah

criticizedtheroleofforeignersfightinginAfghanistan,KhostandJalalabad,
www.youtube.com/watch?v=pnvIrb8L9hk&NR=1.HegivesspeechestothegatheringsofPashtunand
Tajikeldersinthecountry,appealingtothemtosupportthegovernmentbecausetheforeignersarethere,
fightingtodestroyAfghanistan.HementionsthateverynightheshowsArabandPakistanicaptiveson
nationaltelevision,pleadingguiltyoffightinginAfghanistan.HementionsKhostandNangarhar.
16


EVOLUTIONANDVALUEOFTHEHAQQANINEXUS

TheHaqqaninetworkmaintainsitsnexuspositionbyprovidingservicesorotheritems
of value that suit the interests of its local, regional and global partners. The primary
waythatitdoesthisisbyfunctioningasareliableandeffectiveplatformthroughwhich
violence, driven by the specific interests of each actor, can be interjected into
Afghanistan and/or launched abroad. This platform is of strategic value because it
integrates military capabilities across networks to enhance effectiveness, while also
creatingabufferbetweentheHaqqanispartnersthatmasksthenatureofeachpartys
inputs, thus minimizing their public association with operational incidents.46 The
Haqqaninetworkderivesadditionalbenefitfromthispositionbyleveragingitstiesto
thismixofactorstoextractconcessionsortoimproveitsrelativepower.

Understanding the value that the Haqqani network provides to its local, regional and
global partners also provides insights into the identity of the group and the strong
enablingroleithaslongplayed.Forinstance,byfacilitatingbattlefrontaccessforlocal
and global groups over multiple decades, the Haqqani network has created the space
and context for alQaida and other fighters to intermingle and be influenced by one
another. It thus should not be a surprise that today, TTP leaders like Hakimullah
Mehsud who at times operated in Loya Paktia with Haqqani commanders
describes his groups fight in terms ideologically similar to those of alQaida. The
ideologicalconvergenceofTTPandalQaidaandtheemergenceofthePakistanjihad
is, at least in part, an outgrowth of the operational glocalization of conflict long
facilitatedbytheHaqqaninetwork.47TheparadoxicalchallengeforPakistanisthatthe
maingroupitreliesupontoshapeAfghanistansandtheFATAspoliticallandscapesis
thesameactorthathasincubatedalQaidaandservedasanenablerforotherformsof
militancy,includingthatthreateningIslamabad.


46Forexample,theHaqqaninetworkcanconductattacksagainststrategictargets(i.e.,theIndian
Embassy)insuchawaythattheyaredirectedtowardPakistansobjectivesandare,oratleastappearto
be,distinctfromandnotintegratedwiththeactionsofalQaidaorotherglobalactors.
47OtherfactorsthathaveledtothecreationoftheTTP/PakistanjihadincludePakistanioperationsand

U.S.dronestrikes,whichhavespurredtheunificationofmilitantentities.Forbackgroundontheterm
glocalizationseeRolandRobertson,Globalization:SocialTheoryandGlobalCulture,(London:Sage,1992).
17


ThesectionthatfollowsexplorestheHaqqaninetworksevolutionandthevalueithas
historically provided to other militant groups. It is organized via three time periods.
The first what we characterize as the Birth of the Nexus stretches from the mid
1970s to the end of the antiSoviet jihad in 1989. The second covers the period from
1989to11September2001,aspanoftimeduringwhichtheHaqqaninetworkusedits
nexuspositiontoenableothergroupsandspreadjihad.Thelastperiodillustratesthe
continuityoftheHaqqaninetworkanditscentralrolepost9/11.

BirthoftheNexus:EarlyOutreach&theHaqqaniNetworkintheAntiSovietJihad

TheHaqqaninetworkstrajectorytoatrustedpositionofinfluenceacrosslocal,regional
andgloballevelsduringtheantiSovietjihadisthecentralnarrativeofthistimeperiod
(mid 1970s to 1989). The birth of the Haqqani nexus is tied not just to Jalaluddins
militaryachievementsandoperationalpartneringwithadiversesetofactors,butalso
to the broader dynamic and ethos of jihad that he came to embody. Indeed,
JalaluddinsdirectregionalcontrolofwhatoneofhisArabjihadisupporterscalledthe
true base for the liberation of Afghanistan set him apart from all of the mujahidin
partyleadersbasedinPeshawarandgavehisnetworkwhatwasandistodaya
uniquelyvaluableasset:ageographicallycentralplatformforthedeliveryofviolence.48
The Haqqani network capitalized on this asset early and consistently, opening up its
fronts and its unparalleled military resources to an astonishing diversity of militant
actors,fromArabstoKashmiris,NorthAfricanstoIndonesians,andPakistanimadrassa
students to ISI agents. In doing so, the Haqqani network was instrumental in the
formation and operational maturation of alQaida and several other jihadi
organizations over time.49 Such support was driven as much by pragmatism (i.e., a
desire to diversify resources) as by an ideological commitment to what these groups
aimedtoachieve.

The transnational reach of the Haqqani network, and its broad influence, emerged
early.JalaluddinHaqqanifirstcalledforjihad(againsttheDaoudregime)in1973a


48 MustafaHamid,Maarikalbawwabaalsakhriyya(alFaruqCamp,Paktia:1995),40.
49 AlQa`idawasfoundedinPeshawar,Pakistanin1988.
18


full six years before the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.50 From that point on
using Pakistans North Waziristan as his early resource base and sanctuary
JalaluddinHaqqanibegantodevelopanoperationalnetworkoffightersandsupporters
thatextendedtotheArabGulfstatesandlikelydrewonISIsupport.51Morethanayear
before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Jalaluddin sent several of his followers to
establishofficesthroughouttheGulftoraisemoneyandawarenessofthethreatposed
by the recent communist coup in Kabul.52 In 1978, Mawlawi Hanif Shah, a junior
classmate of Jalaluddins at the Haqqaniyya madrassa and an early supporter in the
mid1970s uprisings in Paktia, was sent to Saudi Arabia for two years under such
auspices.53MawlawiAzizKhan,laterthedirectoroftheHaqqaninetworksManbaal
UlummadrassainMiranshah,wasalsosentaroundthistimealongwithafewother
brothers...totheGulftopromotethecauseoftheAfghanjihadthere.54Yearslaterhe
remarked, Spending five years in the Gulf, I had many material and moral
achievements for the jihad.55 That their efforts to procure financial support were
successfulisevidencedbytheexistenceofanassistanceprogramforGulfbaseddonors
toaidthefamiliesofAfghansmartyredonHaqqanifrontsasearlyas1980.56

Unlike other Afghan commanders, Jalaluddins early outreach to the Gulf was not
limited to seeking financial contributions. Haqqani fronts were especially unique in
theirearlyandconsistentwillingnesstoacceptArabsseekingbattlefieldparticipation,
and Haqqanidominated Loya Paktia was the single most common destination for the
ArabswhowentbeyondPeshawarinthe1980s.Yetmostaccountsoftheoriginsofthe
Afghan Arab phenomenon ignore Haqqani and emphasize the part played by the
PalestinianscholaractivistAbdullahAzzamandhisMAKininitiatingthemovement,
and point to Hekmatyar and Sayyaf as the primary Afghan patrons of the foreign

50MawlawiAzizKhan,TheFirstJihadiOperationinAfghanistan;Ruttig;PortraitofaMujahid,
Arabia(December,1985).
51JalaluddinsearlytiestotheGulfcouldhavebeenfacilitatedbyhisfather,KhwajaMuhammadKhan

(alandowner/trader),orbyhisreligiousconnectionsatDaralUlumHaqqaniyya.
52TheHaqqanisattemptedtoestablishofficesinIran;seeHarmonyDocumentAFGP2002008681,24.

53InterviewwithCommanderMawlawiHanifShah,ManbaalJihad(Pashto)1:45(OctoberNovember

1989).
54MawlawiAzizKhan,TheFirstJihadiOperationinAfghanistanandtheRisingoftheUlamaAgainst

theCommunists,ManbaalJihad(Pashto)1:45(OctoberNovember1989).
55Ibid;Forinsightintothesenetworksinthe1990sseeHarmonyDocumentAFGP2002800775.

56SeeHarmonyDocumentAFGP2002008587,234.

19


fighters.57 Azzam was unquestionably the most successful promoter of the Afghan
jihad to international Muslim audiences and his efforts did bring large numbers of
wouldbemujahidintoPeshawarinthelatterhalfofthe1980s.Azzamdeferredtothe
Afghanpartyleaders,however,onhowbesttoplacethesevolunteersinservicetothe
Afghan struggle, and Sayyaf and Hekmatyar, though happy to welcome the financial
support that Azzams organization attracted, were loath to involve untested and
overeager foreigners in actual battles in Afghanistan. As the MAKs guest houses in
Peshawar and training camps in the Pakistani tribal areas swelled with recruits, a
growing number of these men grew frustrated with the MAKs limited capacity to
facilitatebattlefieldaccess.ThisfrustrationultimatelyledtothesplitbetweenAzzam
and his wealthy patron, Usama bin Ladin, who established in Paktia the camps that
wouldgrowintoalQaida.ThesecampswerelocatedalongtheHaqqanissupplylines
andnearthesitesoftheHaqqanisepicbattlesagainstcommunistforces.58Itwasthus
inHaqqanicontrolledPaktia,andnotPeshawar,thattheinternationalmobilizationto
whichAzzamhadmadehissignalcontributionswastransformedintotheglobaljihadi
movement.

Much of Azzams fame rests on what has long been regarded as his revolutionary
innovationinthedoctrineofjihad,declaringinafatwa(Islamiclegalopinion)in1984
that supportingtheAfghanjihadwasanindividual duty (fard ayn) bornebyallable
bodied Muslims worldwide, and thus not contingent upon ones parents or
governments permission tocomeandofferaid.59Yetina lengthyinterviewwiththe
AbuDhabibasednewspaperalIttihadin1980,JalaluddinHaqqani,declared:


57Inasignificantexceptiontothishistoriographictendencyadeclassified2001DefenseIntelligence
Agency(DIA)assessmentcalledJalaluddinHaqqanitheJadran[sic]triballeadermostexploitedbyISI
duringtheSovietAfghanwartofacilitatetheintroductionofArabmercenaries;DefenseIntelligence
Agency,Cable,IIR[Excised]/VeteranAfghanistanTravelersAnalysisofAlQaedaandTaliban
ExploitableWeaknesses,October2,2001,Secret,www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/.
58SeeVahidBrown,ClassicalandGlobalJihad:AlQaidasFranchisingFrustrations,inFaultLinesin

GlobalJihad,ed.AssafMoghadamandBrianFishman(LondonandNewYork:Routledge,2011),90.
59Forthisfatwa,seeThomasHegghammer,trans.,TheDefenseofMuslimTerritoriesConstitutesthe

FirstIndividualDuty,inAlQaedainitsOwnWords,ed.GilesKepelandJeanPierreMilelli(Cambridge,
MA:Belknap/Harvard,2008),1029.Onthesignificanceofthefatwa,seeThomasHegghammer,The
RiseofMuslimForeignFighters,InternationalSecurity35,no.3(201011),74f.
20


 Eventhoughtherevolutionaryfightersaregreatinnumber,thisdoesnotmean
thattherevolutionshouldcloseitsdoorstothosewhowishtoparticipateinthe
jihad.Scoresofvolunteersfromvariouspartsoftheworldarecomingtousto
jointheranksofthemujahidin.Theyaredoingsooftheirownvolition.Ifthe
Islamic world truly wants to support and help us, let it permit its men and
young men to join our ranks. There is a tendency in most of the Islamic
countries which wish to help us to present aid and food as a kind of jihad.
Some even think that this is the best kind of jihad. This, however, does not
absolvetheMuslimofthedutytoofferhimselfforthejihad.60

This declaration was made years before Abdullah Azzam issued his purportedly
revolutionaryfatwaontheindividuallyobligatory(fardayn)natureofsupportingthe
Afghanjihad.ClearlyHaqqani,andnotAzzam,wastheinnovatorinthisregard,and
itisevenpossiblethatJalaluddinsviewsonthisissueinfluencedthoseofAzzam,as
the two were very close Azzam wrote his own will and testament in Haqqanis
home.61 While Haqqanis 1980 appeal did not take the same technical jurisprudential
formasAzzams1984fatwa,itwasneverthelessinnovativeinallofthewaysclaimed
forAzzamsruling.62ThedifferencewasthatHaqqanihadthemeansandwherewithal
todirectlyfacilitatethatparticipation.

ManyofthosewhoheededJalaluddinscallwouldlaterplayleadingrolesinalQaida
and other militant organizations. One of the first Arab volunteers to link up with


60JalaluddinHaqqani,interviewwithSamiAbdalMuttalib,AlIttihad(AbuDhabi),11June1980(FBIS
trans.).Jalaluddinmadesimilarappealsinotherinterviewsduringthewar.See,e.g.,theinterviewwith
JalaluddinHaqqaniduringthesiegeofKhost,ManbaalJihad(Arabic)2:78(FebruaryMarch1991).
61Afterhisassassination,AzzamswillwaspublishedinalJihad63(January1990),58ff.,andatpage58,

itisheadedwiththeinscription,writtenApril20,1986inthehomeoftheheroicShaykhJalaluddin
Haqqani.
62HaqqaniwasnottheonlyAfghanleadertoprecedeAzzamindeclaringsupportfortheAfghanjihad

anindividualduty.InDecemberof1980severalofthePeshawarbasedpartyleadersvisitedEgyptto
thankSadatforhissupportandtoseekfurtheraid.SayyidAhmadGilani,leaderofoneoftheparties,
wasquotedinalAhramon22Decemberassayingthatjihadisanindividualjihad(jihadalnafs)a
financialjihad(jihadalmal)andisobligatory(fard)uponallMuslims.MuhammadNabiMuhammadi,
leaderoftheHarakatparty,wasquotedinthesamepaperon27Decemberassayingthatitistheduty
(wajib)ofeveryMuslimtosupportAfghanistan.SeeIsamDiraz,alAidunminAfghanistan(Cairo:al
DaralMisriyyalilNashrwalIlam,1993),56f.Theseappeals,however,allemphasizedmaterialsupport
anddidnotgototheextentofinvitingvolunteerfighterstofight.
21


Jalaluddin was the Egyptian journalist Mustafa Hamid (better known by his nom de
guerre,AbulWalidalMasri).AftermeetingwithagroupofPaktianulamathatwere
sent by Jalaluddin to Abu Dhabi in the spring of 1979, he and two of his Egyptian
friendsdecidedtomaketheirwaytotheHaqqanifronts.63AbulWalidalMasriwould
spend the next eleven years fighting with Haqqani and in the early 1990s he began
working closely with alQaida, becoming the amir of alQaidas alFaruq training
camp,locatedattheHaqqanibaseatZhawara.64AnotherearlyarrivalwasAbdullah
Abd alRahman, who arrived at Peshawar in July of 1981, stayed at the single guest
house operated by Sayyaf, and then left from there with Shaykh Jalaluddin Haqqani
and Mawlawi Arsalan [Fatehullah Haqqani].... The Arabs at that time were very few,
and some of the Syrian and Iraqi brothers went for jihad, participating in the battles
with Shaykh Jalaluddin.65 In late 1983 another Egyptian, Abd alRahman alMasri
came to join Haqqani commanders, bought a home in Miranshah, and fought with
HaqqanicommandersuntilhisdeathatKhostin1988.66Soonafterhisarrival,Abdal
RahmanalMasriwouldmakeafatefulintroductionforanotherearlyAfghanArabto
the Haqqani scene: Abu Hafs alMasri (Muhammad Atif), who later became the first
lieutenantandthenheadofalQaidasmilitarycommittee.AbuHafswasinPeshawar
atthetime,andlaterrecounted:

Abd alRahman had preceded me [in coming to the jihad] by some months,
and informed me about the fronts of Shaykh Jalaluddin Haqqani and his
treatment of the Arabs, which I discovered was truly different than the
treatment[inPeshawar].ProfessorSayyafsgroupmadeyoufeellikeyouwere
justaguest...[,]sowhenIheardfromAbdalRahmanaboutShaykhJalaluddin
and his relations with the Arabs, and the involvement of the latter in training
andoperations,IsaidGodwillingIwillreturnwithyou.67

63HarmonyDocumentAFGP2002600087,22f.SeealsoalAnsaralArabfiAfghanistan(Riyadh:Lajnatal
BirralIslamiyya,1991),89.
64OnAbulWalidscareer,seeVahidBrown,AbulWalidalMasri:ABiographicalSketch,(2008),

www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/aprofileofabu%e2%80%99lwalidalmasri.
65Muhammad,alAnsaralArabfiAfghanistan,80.

66Ibid,106n.8;AlJihad44(July1988),36.ForJalaluddinHaqqanispraiseofAbdalRahman,seeIsam

Diraz,MalhamatalMujahidinalArabfiAfghanistan(Cairo,1989),36f;FatehullahHaqqaniwasthebrother
ofNezamuddinHaqqani.In1980,MawlawiFatehullahwasappointedheadofJalaluddinHaqqanis
fronts.HewaskilledinSeptember1985.
67Ibid.,102.AbuHafswaskilledintheAmericanbombingofAfghanistanfollowingthe9/11attacks.

22



TheopennessofHaqqanisfrontsandtheassistanceandinfrastructurethatJalaluddin
would provide in the decades to follow was interwoven with the support the group
received from Pakistan and at least during the antiSoviet jihad other countries,
includingtheUnitedStates.Theconfluenceoftheselocal,regionalandglobalelements
was perhaps nowhere more apparent than at Jalaluddins headquarters at Zhawara.
ThiscomplexservedasacentralnodeandstrategicoutpostforHaqqanicommanders
and(attimes)ISIagentstoplanandcoordinatetheiroperations,includingJalaluddins
epic 1991 capture of Khost.68 Pakistans role in directing the insurgency against the
SovietsisrevealedinnumerousletterstoandfromHaqqaninetworkleadersthatwere
captured in Afghanistan after the U.S. invasion. For example, in a personal letter to
Nezamuddin Haqqani in 1980 Fatehullah Haqqani explains why the group needed to
temporarilyhaltitsactivity:Forafewdays,thegovernmentofPakistanhasprohibited
the mujahideen from carrying [out] logistical or combat operations. But we will,
Inshallah, load up some weapons and equipments in three to four days [after the
prohibitionislifted].69CommunicationlogsbetweenHaqqanicommandersandtheISI
from1989to1992areevenmoreinsightful.TheyshowtheISIprovidingtacticallevel
direction and shaping the activity of an interlinked network of Afghan mujahidin.70
OnemessagesentfromStarIIatZhawaratoCommanderHaqqaniinDecember1988
is typical: Soviet [sic] have launched maj[or] defensive in Kandahar. Intensify your
jehad and capture Gardez ASP. May Allah help you.71 These communications also
functioned as a way for Jalaluddin and other Haqqani commanders to request
assistance,moneyandequipmentandprovideintelligenceupdatestotheISI.72

Zhawara was also an important meeting point for Afghan Arabs who were eager to
fight. After Abu Hafs arrived at Haqqanis headquarters in Zhawara far from the


68See,e.g.,YousafandAdkin,171.ForinsightintoJalaluddinshostingofPakistanimilitaryofficerssee
HarmonyDocumentAFGP200200858813.
69HarmonyDocumentAFGP2002008587,2324;NezamuddinwasadeputytoJalaluddin,aswellasa

fieldcommanderonmanyfrontsduringtheantiSovietjihad.Hisstatusisnotknown.
70HarmonyDocumentsAFGP2002008581andAFGP2002008582.

71HarmonyDocumentsAFGP2002008581andAFGP2002008582;StarIIwaspotentiallytheDirectorof

theAfghanunitwithinISI;DonRasslerinterviewwithBillMurray(formerCIAstationchiefattheU.S.
EmbassyinPakistan),29June2011.
72HarmonyDocumentsAFGP2002008581andAFGP2002008582.

23


vortexofPeshawarandtheproblemsoftheArabsthere,hemetAbulWalidalMasri,
Abu Ubayda alIraqi and another important Arab Haqqani ally Abu Ubayda al
Banshiri, who would later become alQaidas first military commander. Eyewitness
accounts provided by Abul Walid and others document the participation of these
fightersinanumberofbattlesfoughtalongsideHaqqanicommandersandlocalfighters
from1984on,includingthe1986battleagainstSovietandAfghanforcesinZhawara.73

Nestledinthemountains,Zhawarawascentraltotheresourcinganddevelopmentofa
rich network of alQaida, antiKashmir and other training camps. After the battle in
1986, Bin Ladin invested heavily in repairing and fortifying the damaged base at
Zhawara,withJalaluddinhavinggivenhimthreecavesatthesideofthebasenearthe
Afghan kitchen.74 In October 1986, Bin Ladin went on to use his construction
equipment to build a fortified training area at Jaji (also referred to as Dzadzi) in
NorthernPaktia,onthesupplylinebetweenZhawaraandAlikhel.BinLadindubbed
his camp Masadat alAnsar, the Lions Den of the Supporters, though it quickly
became known among the Afghan Arab community as alqaida alaskariyya, or the
militarybase.ItwasfromthisappellationthatthenameofthealQaidaorganization
waslatertaken,andindeedthetrainingcamprepresentedanearlystageinalQaidas
development.75 According to the memoirs of Abu Jafar alQandahari, an Egyptian
AfghanArabwhoarrivedatPeshawarin1987:

It was customary for new arrivals to go to the Sada training camp run by the
MaktabalKhidamat,butIpreferredtogotoanewtrainingcampthathadbeen
announcedatthattimetoanyandallwhosoughttocarryoutjihad,atraining
campinwhichthecourseoftrainingwouldbeofahigherandmorestrenuous


73 See,e.g.,MustafaHamid,Maarikalbawwabaalsakhriyya(alFaruqCamp,Paktia:1995),40(describing
abattlefoughtin1984underthecommandofFatehullahHaqqaniatwhichAbuHafsandAbdal
RahmanfoughtwithacourageborderingonmadnessandearnedtheepithetsthemadArabs[al
arabalmajanin]amongtheHaqqanisAfghanfighters).
74MustafaBadi(AbuIbrahimalLogari),Afghanistan:Ihtilalaldhakira(Sanaa:2003),

http://tokhaleej.jeeran.com/archive/2008/6/597637.html.AbuIbrahimworkedbrieflyforMAKbefore
aligninghimselfwithHaqqaniandestablishinganindependenttrainingcampatLajja,justnorthwestof
theZhawarabase.
75SeePeterBergen,ed.,TheUsamabinLadinIKnow(NewYork:FreePress,2006),74.

24


 levelthanthatatSada.76Itwasacenterwhichwouldwinnowoutthosesuitable
to be admitted into alQaida alAskariyya, an organization that had been
advertisedasformingthenucleusofanIslamicarmycapableoffightingjihad
anywhereintheworld.77

ThoughtheareainJajiwheretheMasadacampwasbuiltwasunderthesupervisionof
Sayyafs party, Masada was structurally integrated with Haqqani operations at
Zhawara.78 Abu Jafar relates that before proceeding to the advanced training at Bin
Ladins military base, he and a group of other Arabs bound for Masada had to
proceedtoZhawaraviaMiranshahandthereundergotendaysofpreliminarytraining
alongsidetheHaqqanilinkedAfghantrainees.79TojointhenascentalQaida,inother
words, meant first training with the Haqqani network. In that sense, Zhawara was a
kindofmilitaryacademyforthosethatwouldeventuallyfillalQaidasranks.80

The early training and battlefield experiences that were being facilitated by Haqqani
leaders,andtoalesserextentotherAfghancommanders,inLoyaPaktiawerebuilding
to a major inflection point: the Ramadan battle at Jaji in 1987. This battle was a
watershed moment for alQaida and for the Afghan Arab movement in general,
leading to an exponential increase in the number of war volunteers pouring into
Pakistan and Afghanistan from throughout the Muslim world. Touted as a major
victory,itwasthefirstofitskindforanindependentArabunitinAfghanistan,andit


76SadawasaMAK/SayyafcamplocatednearthetownofSadaintheKurramtribalagencyofPakistan.
AccordingtoMuhammad,alAnsaralArab,183f.,SadawasestablishedafterthefirstbattleatZhawarain
1986.However,thereisevidencethatSoutheastAsiantraineesbegantoattendtheSadaCampasearlyas
1985.SeeInternationalCrisisGroup,JemaahIslamiyahinSouthEastAsia:DamagedbutStill
Dangerous,26August2003,4.
77AymanSabriFaraj(AbuJafaralQandahari),DhikriyyatArabAfghanAbuJafaralMasrialQandahari

(Cairo:DaralShuruq,2002),25.
78TheHaqqanicorrespondenceintheHarmonydatabasedocumentsthelogisticalcoordinationbetween

theHaqqanisandthevariousotherpartiesoperatinginthesoutheast.Forinformationonthesupplying
ofSayyafsIttihad,seeHarmonyDocumentAFGP2002008612,49.Jajiwaslocatedsomewhatcloserto
theAlikhelsupplypointovertheKurramPaktiaborderthantoZhawara,butthisbasewasunder
HekmatyarscontrolandthelongstandingrivalrybetweenSayyafandHekmatyarlefttheformertorely
ontheHaqqanisforsupplies.
79Ibid.,p.28.AbuJafarsguidefromZhawaratoJajiwasanIraqiKurd,andhesaysthattherewere

manysuchpeopleinAfghanistanatthetime,whocameinoverlandfromIran.
80MustafaHamid(AbulWalid),Maarikalbawwabaalsakhriyya,133.

25


would propel Bin Ladin into a leadership position amongst the Arab community in
Peshawar. Just as important, however, was the media impact of the battle and the
subsequent increase in international attention. Following the example of AbuWalid,
whohadforyearsbeenfilingregularreportsfromthefrontlinesaboutHaqqanibattles
for the alIttihad newspaper, Bin Ladin had invited Arab journalists from the Gulf to
observe his men at Jaji.81 He even commissioned a film crew to record their exploits,
again, an area in which Haqqani leaders had been earlier innovators.82 The resulting
growth in volunteers was immediate and dramatic. As Thomas Hegghammer notes,
mid1987 seems to have represented a tipping point of the mobilization, after which
recruitmenttranscendedpersonalsocialnetworks....83

With thearrivaloflargenumbersofnewrecruitsafter1987,theareasunderHaqqani
control witnessed an explosion of training camps serving an extremely eclectic
spectrum of ideological interests and militant causes, and these would continue to
proliferate throughout the 1990s. In 1988, alQaida officially established itself as a
clandestine,hierarchicalorganization,anditbegantoerectitsfirsttrainingcamps:al
Faruq at Zhawara and the Jihadwal and Siddiq camps in Hekmatyars region at
Zhawarassoutheasternapproach.84Untilthelate1990s,thesecampswouldremainthe
coreelementsofalQaidasinfrastructure,andagentsofallofalQaidasmajorattacks
duringthe1990swouldbetrainedinthesefacilities.85Othercampsareattestedinthe
sources as well, but the alQaida camps around Zhawara appear to have been the
destination of choice for the majority of the new arrivals, and in the Afghan Arab
memoirliteraturefromthisperiodalFaruqstandsoutasthemostfrequentlyattended
camp.86


81SeeHegghammer,JihadinSaudiArabia:ViolenceandPanIslamismsince1979(CambridgeMiddleEast
Studies,2010),45.
82TheBritishcameramanPeterJouvenal,describingavisittotheZhawarabasein1982,saysthatThey

[theHaqqanis]shotvideosofexecutionsofRussiansandsentthemtoSaudiArabiaforfundraising
purposes.PeterBergen,HolyWar,Inc.(NewYork:Touchstone,2001),57.
83Hegghammer(2010),45;MustafaHamid,Maarikaalbawwabaalsakhriyya,229ff.

84AccordingtoAbulWalid,alQaidahadtorentthelandfortheselattercampsfromHekmatyar,

thoughnoneofthesourcesmentionanysuchremunerationrequiredforthecampsatHaqqanifacilities.
SeeAbulWalidsdialoguewithLeahFarral,http://allthingscounterterrorism.com/.
85SeeBahri,DanslombredeBenLaden,pp.104ff.

86Forexample,seetheworkofAbdullahMuhammadFazul,alQa`idaschiefofoperationsinEast

Africa;Fazul,alHarbalalIslam,vol.1,p.57f.
26



Summary:Bythelate1980stheHaqqanifrontshadalreadyemergedasthecenterofthe
growing nexus of the diverse strands of transnational militancy then converging in
Afghanistan. Theemergenceandgrowthofthisnexuswas predicated uponthe local
supply routes and terrain managed by Jalaluddin and his key lieutenants, as well as
Haqqanisbattlefieldachievements.Jalaluddinfunctioned,

[A]stheISIsmainanticommunistbatteringraminKhost.Heoperatedfund
raising offices in the Persian Gulf and hosted young Arab jihad volunteers in
histribalterritory.InpartbecauseofHaqqanispatronage,theborderregions
nearest Pakistan became increasingly the province of interlocking networks of
Pakistaniintelligenceofficers,Arabvolunteers,andWahhabimadrassas.87

Attheregionallevel,manyofthePakistaniswhofoughtwithHaqqaniwouldlatershift
their attention and employ the fighting skills and training they had acquired in Loya
Paktia against Indian forces in Kashmir. Some would even go on to create their own
jihadist organizations and become legendary commanders, a dynamic perhaps best
exemplified by Fazlur Rahman Khalil and Zakiur Rahman Lakhvi, who were
respectively central to the formation of Harakat ulMujahidin (HuM) and Lashkare
Taiba.88Themakingsofwhatwouldbecometheglobaljihadimovementwereallalso
present:robustresourcemobilizationnetworksspanningtheglobe,trainingcampsfor
foreign fighters of many nationalities, and open fronts for the transformation of
internationalmuhajirinemigrants,orinAbuHafsphrase,guestsintofighting
mujahidin.Outofthismix,theselfproclaimedvanguardofthatmovementalQaida
would be born, and in a form that was and remains to this day inextricably
connectedtotheHaqqaninetwork.


SteveColl,GhostWars,(Penguin:2004),pg.157.
87

MuhammadAmirRana,JihadandJihadi,MashalBooks(Lahore),2003;ZakiurRahmanLakhviisLeTs
88

currentoperationschiefandisalsobelievedtobethemastermindbehindthe2008Mumbaiattacks.
SourceslinkingLakhvitoJalaluddinHaqqaniareextremelythinandshouldbetreatedwithsome
skepticism.DuringtheSovietperiodLakhvialsospentaconsiderableamountoftimeinNuristan.
27


TheFountainhead:TheHaqqaniNetwork,theTaliban,andtheRiseofGlobalJihad

During the 1990s the Haqqani network would leverage its nexus position and look
outward, playing an important role in enabling others to conduct and expand jihad.
TheperiodfollowingtheSovietwithdrawalfromAfghanistanwitnessedadevastating
civil war in Afghanistan; eruptions of militant violence in Kashmir, Northwestern
China and the former Soviet Central Asian states; the rise of the Taliban; and the
initiation by alQaida of a global campaign of political violence against the United
States.ThequadrangleofrelationsbetweentheHaqqaninetwork,theTaliban,Pakistan
and alQaida lie at the heart of this story, a story that significantly challenges the
prevailingconceptionsintheAmericanpolicycommunity.

On the global level, the Gulf War radically polarized the already conflictprone
Peshawarscene,dividingtheAfghanpartyleadersandtheArabvolunteercommunity
between supporters and opponents of Saddam Hussein and, more significantly, over
SaudiArabiascontroversialinvitationtotheU.S.militarytoinitiateOperationDesert
Shield.AgainstthebackgroundofthisacrimoniousdebateBinLadinandmuchofal
Qaidas leadership left for Sudan, where the organization focused its early efforts on
theArabianPeninsula.89YettheHaqqaninetworkandalQaidaremainedintertwined
during this period, with the Haqqani network providing the space, context and
ideological support for alQaida to operate training camps, conduct important media
operations and conduct jihadelsewhere. Onthe regionallevel,Haqqanicommanders
would consolidate their operational capabilities and prove valuable to Pakistan by
helping to foster its use of militant proxies in Kashmir. The Haqqani network would
also enhance its credibility and power at the local level in the tribal areas through its
mediationactivityandbyhelpingtheTalibantomaintainitsgriponAfghanistan.

AmajoroperationalturningpointforJalaluddinandtheISIwasthecaptureofKhostin
1991.Duringthisbattle,followedsoonbythecaptureofGardez,Jalaluddinsabilityto
manage and combine the resources (and spirit) of local, regional and global elements
wereinfulldisplay.ThiscampaignwouldnotjustsolidifyJalaluddinsreputationwith
the Pakistani state, it would further endear him to the foreign fighter community and


89 Brown(2011).
28


validatehisdesiretodeepenthislocalandglobalpartnership.Thecaptureofthesetwo
citieswasinstrumentalinthefallofthecommunistgovernmentofNajibullahinKabul
in 1992, a feat that only gave Pakistan more influence and power west of the Durand
Line. These two battles (and the earlier battle in Jalalabad) saw the most extensive
integration of foreign fighters into the order of battle of the entire anticommunist
conflict in Afghanistan.90 Participation in the battle of Khost subsequently became a
badge of honor for Afghan Arab veterans of the war, and the foreign fighter
involvement was a veritable United Nations of transnational jihadism; by some
estimates, these fighters hailed from more than forty countries.91 For the first time,
Arabsfighting in this battlewereledbyArab commanders, whowereintegrated into
the Haqqanis chain of command; these included a Yemeni front led out of Camp
MubarakatLajja(alsoknownasLizhaorLezhi),aswellasaJordanianfrontunderthe
commandofAbulHarithalUrduni.92AlQaidasmilitaryleadershipalsoparticipated
inthebattle.93ManyoftheleadersofthemilitantIslamistorganizationsestablishedin
the 1990s, from North Africa to Southeast Asia, got their first taste of jihad under
Haqqanis command in this fight. It was not just alQaida, then, that the Haqqani
networkhadhelpedfosterintobeingduringtheantiSovietjihad,butratherthebroad
spectrumoflate20thcenturytransnationaljihadistactors.

BinLadin wasalreadyinSudanbythistime,wherehewascomingtotermswiththe
aftermath wrought by Saddams invasion of Kuwait and the presence of infidel


90ThiswasnotedbytheDIAin2001,seeDefenseIntelligenceAgency,Cable,Secret.Foraccountsof
thesebattlesandtheAfghanArabinvolvement,seeMustafaHamid,Thartharafawqsaqfalalam,vols.4
(onthebattleofJalalabad),8(onKhost),and9(onGardez).Lengthyaccountsofthesebattlesfromcan
alsobefoundinHami,Fursanalfaridaalghayba.
91MohammedHafez,JihadafterIraq:LessonsfromtheArabAfghans,StudiesinConflictandTerrorism

32(2009),75;MartyrsoftheConquestofKhost(ArabMartyrs),ManbaalJihad(Arabic)2:10(June
1991).SeealsotheinterviewwithNomanBenotman,aKhostveteranandformerLibyanIslamicFighting
Groupleader,inMahanAbedin,FromMujahidtoActivist:AnInterviewwithaLibyanVeteranofthe
AfghanJihad,SpotlightonTerrorism3,no.2(May2005).
92SeeLorettaNapoleoni,InsurgentIraq:AlZarqawiandtheNewGeneration(NewYork:SevenStories

Press,2005),239,n.2.OntheYemenifront,seeBadi.ForbackgroundonAbulHarithalUrduni,seethe
writingsofAbulWalid.
93OnalQaidasinvolvement,seeVahidBrown,CracksintheFoundation:LeadershipSchismsinAlQaida

19892006(WestPoint,NY:CombatingTerrorismCenter,2007),5f.ThestatementthatHaqqanioperated
undertheaegisofGulbuddinHekmatyarsHizbeIslamiisanerror,andshouldreadYunusKhalis
HizbeIslami.
29


troopsinSaudiArabia.DuringthistransitionalperiodBinLadinandalQaidawere
principally focused on repurposing the organization, continuing their training
operationsinKhostandestablishingapresenceinandaroundtheArabianPeninsula,
especiallyinYemenandSomalia.AlthoughalQaidadidnotknowitatthetime,the
organization was on the cusp of a new mission, and the ideological support and
assistanceprovidedbyJalaluddinwouldprovecentraltoalQaidasabilitytotrainand
deployoperatives,spreadjihadandtodefinetheUnitedStatesasitsprimaryenemy.

ThisisespeciallytruewithrespecttoalQaidasearlyeffortsinAfrica.InJuly1991,the
samemonththatBinLadinandmuchoftheseniorleadershipofalQaidaweresettling
intoKhartoum,Jalaluddinpublishedalengthycommuniquandrequestforassistance
bytheEritreanIslamicJihadMovement(EIJM)intheArabiclanguageManbaalJihad
the first time that any such communication by a nonAfghan organization was
publishedintheManbamagazines.94LeadersoftheEIJMwerealsoenjoyingSudans
hospitality during this period, and alQaida reportedly extended financial aid and
trainingtothegroupatthistime.95TheEIJMliaisontoalQaidawasreportedlyclose
to Haqqani associate Abu Ubayda alBanshiri, and the leader of the militant Salafi
factionoftheEIJM,MuhammadAhmadSalih(AbuSuhayl),issaidtohavepreviously
foughtinAfghanistan.96GiventhisinformationandthefactthattheEIJMcommuniqu
appeared in Manba, there is a strong possibility that the EIJM veterans of the Afghan
jihadhadfoughtortrainedatHaqqanifronts.

Jalaluddin Haqqani also issued declarations of support in 1991 for the jihad being
waged by the revolutionary Islamist regime of Hassan alTurabi against the Southern
Sudanese forces of John Garang. In 2002 Bosnian authorities raided the offices of the
Benevolence International Foundation (BIF) in Sarajevo being run by Enaam Arnaout
(Abu MahmudalSuri),acofounderof alQaida,associateof GulbuddinHekmatyar,


94ImportantStatementfromtheEritreanIslamicJihadMovementinregardstotherecentdevelopments
intheEthiopianandEritreanarenas,ManbaalJihad(Arabic)2:11(July1991).Thestatementisnotable
foritsframingoftheEritreanIslamiststruggleasnestedwithinaglobalconfrontationbetweenIslamand
anallianceofCrusadersandZionistsandtheirArabandMuslimregimeagents.
95RohanGunaratna,InsideAlQaeda(NewYork:BerkleyBooks,2002),201ff.,(basedonlate1990s

interviewswithEritreanIslamicJihadleadersintheNidaalIslammagazine).
96SeeTheEritreanIslamicJihadMovement,inAlQaidas(mis)AdventuresintheHornofAfrica(West

Point,NY:CombatingTerrorismCenter,2006),835.
30


andaveteranoftheHaqqanifrontsduringthe1980s,anddiscoveredstatementscalling
for support of the Sudanese jihad written by both Jalaluddin Haqqani and Yunis
Khalis.97 The correspondence discovered on the BIF computers also documents the
extensive alQaida infrastructure in and around Zhawara at this time, referring to
centerswhichbelongtoalQaidaatZhawara,Bori,JihadwalandManikandaw,and
noting that the Khostarea operations of alQaida are in the hands of Abu Hafs [al
Masri].98ThefilesalsoincludednumerousrecordsoftransactionsbetweenalQaida
members, including Arnaout, and HezbeIslami Khalis for vehicles and weapons,
makingfrequentreferencetoalQaidainfrastructureinPaktia.99

These areas of cooperation demonstrate that the HaqqanialQaida alliance did not
cease with Bin Ladins move to Africa, but rather expanded and was considerably
internationalized.ButwhereasBinLadinremainedfocusedontheArabianPeninsula,
therhetoricandactivitiesoftheHaqqaninetworkbecamemarkedlyglobalduringthis
period. In a series of conferences in Pakistan convened by the Islamist political party
JamiatUlemaeIslam(JUI)anditsjihadistoffshootsin1991and1992,Jalaluddinspoke
frequentlyabouttheneedtoexpandjihadandtheemergenceoftheUnitedStatesasthe
next main enemy of the Muslim world following the disintegration of the Soviet
Union.100 This rhetoric was also reflected in a number of articles published by the
Haqqani network in the first years of the 1990s. An article written by Nezamuddin
Haqqani,Jalaluddinsdeputy,inJanuary1991ischaracteristic:RussiaandAmericaare
both infidel forces, and our struggle continues against both. They are both against
Muslims, and are united in their quest against Muslims. They have never done
anything for the good of Islam, and will never do so.101 The antiAmerican tone of
these pronouncements was not limited to the perception of American conspiratorial
policies inAfghanistan, but was also linked to the viewthatU.S.involvement in the
Gulf since 1990 was part of a broader AmericanIsraeli strategy to exercise an


97SeeUnitedStatesv.EnaamArnaout,GovernmentsEvidentiaryProffer,NDIEasternDivision,02CR892,
21and3743;J.MillardBurrandRobertO.Collins,RevolutionarySudan(Leiden:Brill,2003),Ch.3.
98UnitedStatesv.EnaamArnaout,Exhibit53.

99Ibid.,Exhibits8498.ThisprofferalsoincludesdocumentsfromHekmatyarsHezbeIslamiGulbuddin.

100See,e.g.,AlhajJalaluddinHaqqaniVisitsIslamicMadrasasandSocietiesinKarachi,ManbaalJihad

(Pashto),3:910(May1992).
101AlhajMawlawiNezamuddinHaqqaniinanInterviewwithManbaalJihad,ManbaalJihad(Pashto)

2:8(Jan1991);seealsostatementbyMawlanaAbdullahZakeriinthesameissue.
31


oppressive and antiIslamic hegemony throughout the Muslim world.102 Even more
revealing is how Jalaluddin Haqqanis peers viewed him and the great role he would
playinspreadingjihadandcombatingthisnewthreat.Thisisperhapsbestcaptured
by Mawlana Fazlur Rahman, a leader of the Pakistani Islamist party Jamiat Ulemae
Islam,whosaidthefollowingaboutJalaluddinin1992:

The Afghan jihad, which was spearheaded by Mawlawi Haqqani and other
truthfulleaders,defeatedtheSovietempire.Butnowthereisanotherenemyto
thisjihad.ThatisAmericaanditsconspiratorialpoliciesthatareintendedto
bring Afghanistan, the center of jihad, under American attacks. But we are
absolutely certain that people like Mawlawi Haqqani will give the Americans
the sameanswer they gave totheRussians.Andwearesure thatpeoplelike
Haqqaniwillfueltheflamesofjihadworldwide.103

This statement, which Jalaluddin published in his Pashto language magazine, was an
ideologicalharbingerofthingstocome.EventhetitleofHaqqanismagazineManba
alJihad, or fountainhead of jihad, is reflective of his broader aspirations and
transnationaloutlookbefore9/11.Itistellingthatseveralyearslater,afterhavingbeen
expelledfromSudan,itwasJalaluddinHaqqaniandYunisKhaliswhofirstembraced
andhostedUsamabinLadinwhenhereturnedtoAfghanistanin1996.Fromthatpoint
on,thepartnershipbetweenJalaluddinHaqqani,UsamabinLadinandothermembers
of alQaida would prove to be instrumental in helping to make Fazlur Rahmans
statementareality.


102TheviewofU.S.involvementintheGulfaspartofalongstandingU.S.strategywasnotuniquetothe
Haqqaninetwork.SeeSafaralHawali,kashfalghumma`an`ulamaalumma,(Riyadh:DaralHikma,1991).
TheauthorsthankThomasHegghammerforthispointandreference.Forgeneralreferencestothe
AmericanconspiracyinAfghanistansee,TextofAlhajJalaluddinHaqqanisInterviewwithBidarDigest
inAfghanistan,ManbaalJihad(Pashto),1:12(June1990);AlhajMawlawiJalaluddinHaqqaniina
GeneralGatheringoftheJamiateUlamaeIslaminLahore,ManbaalJihad(Pashto),2:11(May,1991);
AbuAbdullah,BeAwareoftheIntellectualInvasion,ManbaalJihad(Arabic),1:4(November1990).For
referencestothisconspiracyanditstiestotheGulfsee,e.g.,NusratalJihad3:4(February1991),inwhich
thefirstarticleargues:AmericahasbeeninterferingintheinternalaffairsoftheMuslimGulfstatesin
ordertosecurethestableflowofoiltotheUS.Nowtheopportunityhasarisentomeettheobjective.In
thiswar,Americahaseverythingtogainandnothingtolose.Muslimsdie,theircountriesaredestroyed,
theypayforthecostsofthewar,whileAmericagetscontrolovertheoilfields.SeealsothearticleThe
NewWorldOrder,NusratalJihad(Urdu)3:5(March1991).
103ManbaalJihad(Pashto),3:910(May1992)[emphasisaddedinquote].ForbackgroundonFazlur

Rahman,seeHaroonRashid,Profile:MaulanaFazlurRahman,BBC,6November2002.
32



Pronouncements by Haqqani commanders during this period were far from empty
rhetoric,andwerebackedupbyanintensiveinvestmentintrainingandmobilizationof
IslamistmilitantsfromPakistan,Kashmir,NorthwesternChina,Tajikistan,Uzbekistan,
SoutheastAsiaandavarietyofArabcountries.104Thisassistancewouldprovepivotal
to the development and military sophistication of alQaida and many antiKashmir
groups. In the summer of 1991, several new training camps were established at
Zhawara in partnership with the JUIlinked Kashmiri jihadi organizations HuM (also
knownas HarakatalAnsar,orHuA)andHuJI.105OneoftheHaqqanicampsserving
thispopulationwastheSalmanalFarsiCamp,establishedatZhawaraanddescribedin
Manba alJihad as serving as the main military training camp for students at the
HaqqanisManbaalUlummadrassainNorthWaziristan.106

Jalaluddin Haqqani was not bashful about his influence or impact upon the Kashmir
jihad,andhisassistancewouldpaydividendstothePakistanistateanditscovertwar
againstIndia.107DuringameetinginKarachiattendedbysomeofPakistansreligious
elite, including the General Secretary of Jamiat UlemaeIslam, Haqqani boasted, We
havetrainedthousandsofKashmirimujahidin,andhavemadethemreadyforjihad.108
Farooq Kashmiri, the Deputy Head of HuM, directed students at the madrassa where
thisgatheringwasheldtospendtheirsummerinAfghanistansotheycouldtrainunder


104SomeevidencesuggeststhatJalaluddinwasconnectedtoandtriedtofundraiseonbehalfofthe
IslamicJihadMovementofBangladeshatthistime,seeHarmonyDocumentAFGP2002800928,5.
105Ontheestablishmentofthesecampsin1991,seeHarmonyDocumentAFGP2002000079;seealso

HarmonyDocumentAFGP2002600088,18.MustafaHamidcallsthemjamaatalmujahidinand
jamaataljihadalalami,respectively,butitisclearthatheisreferringtoHarakatulJihadalIslami
andHarakatulMujahidin.
106ManbaalUlumisaResourcetotheJihad,ManbaalJihad(Arabic),1:1(February1990).According

toB.Raman,attheSalmanalFarsiCampPakistanis,Kashmiris,Filippinos,BosnianMuslims,Uighurs
fromXinjiangetc.werebeingtrained.SeeB.Raman,AnAnalysisofUnitedStatesBombingof
TerroristCampsinAfghanistan,4November1998;SeealsoHarmonyDocumentAFGP2002800928.
107DonRasslerinterviewwithRobertNickelsberg,23September2010;In1990and1991Nickelsberg

visitedZhawaraandhewassurprisedbythenumberofKashmirisengagingintraining,andJalaluddin
boastedtohimabouttheirpresencebutdeclinedNickelsbergsrequesttointerviewsomeofthem.
108ManbaalJihad(Pashto),3:910(May1992);JalaluddinHaqqani,IstheAfghanistanWartheRussian

AmericanWar?(Pashto),ed.AbdulhadiMullakhail(ManbaalJihad,198889).Forbackgroundonthe
HaqqanisroleinthetrainingoffightersforKashmirigroups,seeRogerHoward,WrathofIslam:HUA
Analyzed,JanesIntelligenceReview,1October1997.
33


Jalaluddin.109TheseandotherPakistanimadrassastudentslikelyformedtherankand
fileatHuM/HarakatulAnsar(HUA)trainingcampsthroughoutthe1990s,allofwhich
werebasedinLoyaPaktiaandsupportedbytheISI.110

Several of these camps would eventually become structurally integrated with al

Qaidasinfrastructureintheyearstofollow,includingthosethatweretargetedbyU.S.
cruise missiles after the East African embassy bombings in 1998. The Haqqani
networks direct support for various Kashmiri training camps are revealed in a 1998
communication from the Pakistani government to the Taliban, contained in the
Harmonydatabase.ThisdocumentincludesalistinPashtoandEnglishofninewanted
Pakistaniterrorists,withphotographsandnames,aliasesandlastknownsightings.111
ThedocumentremindstheTalibanthatPakistanwasthefirstcountryintheworldto
recognizetheirregimeandthatitexpectstheTalibanscooperationindisallowingany
antiPakistan activity from Afghan soil.112 Three of the four camps identified as
harboringfugitivesfromPakistanareindicatedasbeingunderHaqqanicontrol.113

TheTalibanhadsoughttodismantlemanyofthesetrainingcampsseveralyearsearlier,
after it rose to power in 1994, but these efforts yielded little results for reasons that
remain poorly understood.114 Jalaluddin Haqqani initially wanted to confront the
Taliban, and there were some skirmishes between the two groups, but his decision to
join and assist the Taliban was critical to the Talibans consolidation of power inside
Afghanistan.115HaqqanibroughtadepthofmilitaryexpertisetotheTaliban,anditis
likely that the Talibans capture of Kabul would not have been possible without
securing an alliance with the man with the most military influence in Afghanistans


109ManbaalJihad(Pashto),3:910(May1992).
110Howard;CentralIntelligenceAgency,HarakatulAnsar:IncreasingThreattoWesternandPakistani
Interests,DITR96008,August1996,www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB227/index.htm#10;
AnthonyDavis,PakistanswarbyproxyinAfghanistanlosesitsdeniability,JanesIntelligenceReview,1
October1999.
111HarmonyDocumentAFGP2002000079.

112Ibid.

113Ibid.

114OnepotentialexplanationisthattheTalibanhadlimitedinfluenceinLoyaPaktiaandcouldnotforce

thesedecisionsuponJalaluddinHaqqani.
115DonRasslerinterviewwithThomasRuttig,25May2010;seealsoFBISLD2510195295,RadioReports

onFierceTalibanInfighting,KabulRadioAfghanistanNetwork(Pashto),25October1995.
34


Southeast. Jalaluddins membership in the Taliban functioned as another mechanism
through which the ISI could diversify their influence over Mullah Omar and his
movement, something that still holds true today. Shortly after joining the Taliban in
1995,JalaluddinHaqqanihelpedtheTalibantorecruitabout2,000fightersfromPaktia
andneighboringPakistantoreinforceitsranks.116JalaluddinalsocommandedTaliban
troopsinKabulduringthistimeandforcesledbyHaqqaniarecreditedwithrepulsing
amajorassaultonthecapitalcarriedoutbyUzbekcommanderAbdulRashidDostum
in 1996.117 The Haqqani networks ability to train and raise fighters similarly proved
critical to the Taliban in various battles in Afghanistans North against the Northern
Alliance,aforcebackedbyIndiaandothercountries.118

The early relations between alQaida and the Taliban were marked by mutual
suspicion and conflict from the beginning, and remained turbulent throughout the
period of the Taliban regime. The differences between the Haqqani networks and
Talibans support for Bin Ladin are deeprooted and are best captured by the politics
associated with Yunis Khalis initial pledge to the Saudi after he first arrived from
Sudan. According to a firsthand account told by alQaida strategist Abu Musab al
Suri,He[YunisKhalis]saidinhisexcellentArabicandhisthickforeignaccenttoAbu
Abdallah [Usama bin Ladin]: you are our guests and no one will get to you. If
anything comes from the Taliban, tell me. I may not be able to do much since they
came, butIwill try.119 BinLadinsformerbodyguard NasiralBahri(also known as
AbuJandal)hasalsodescribedthemutualdistrustbetweenBinLadinandtheTaliban
during this period, recounting that when the Taliban sent representatives to find out
where Bin Ladin stood, the latter refused to meet them personally. He says that Bin
Ladin also initially refused to allow his followers, who were then actively engaged in
training at the various alQaida camps around Zhawara, to fight for the Taliban, and
alludes to the negative impression of the Taliban among many of the Arabs and the


116SeeAnthonyDavis,HowtheTalibanBecameaMilitaryForce,inFundamentalismReborn:
AfghanistanandtheTaliban,ed.WilliamMaley(NewYork:NewYorkUniversity,1998),4364.
117HarmonyDocumentAFGP2002602383;seealsoAhmedRashid,Taliban(London:I.B.Taurus,2001),

60.OntheroleofJalaluddinandAbuHafsalMasriinMazareSharif,seeRoyGutman,HowweMissed
theStory(Washington,DC:U.S.InstituteofPeace,2008),110.
118NeamatollahNojumi,TheRiseoftheTalibaninAfghanistan:MassMobilization,CivilWarandtheFutureof

theRegion,Palgrave(NewYork),2002,146.
119HarmonyDocumentAFGP2002602383.

35


circulationofrumorsabouttherebeingformercommunistsamongtheirranks.120Itis
alsotellingthatwhenmajoralQaidafiguressuchasAbuHafsalMasrididfightwith
theTalibantheydidsowithJalaluddinHaqqani.121

A major source of tension between the Taliban and alQaida was Bin Ladins media
activity and provocative statements against the West, activities that Mullah Omar
expressly forbade and viewed as a threat. About six months after issuing his 1996
communiqu that called on Muslims to boycott Americanmade goods and to wage
jihad against ZionistCrusader interests in Saudi Arabia, Bin Ladin invited CNN
journalistPeterBergentovisithiminToraBoraandfilmaninterview.Hisrhetoricin
this interview went much further than that in his 1996 communiqu and came much
closer to the language and ideological tone of the early1990s statements found in
Haqqani and other jihadist magazines.122 A CNN interview was a much more public
pronouncementthan thedistributionofhis1996fatwa,anddrewtheimmediateireof
theTaliban.Notlongafter,MullahOmarorderedBinLadinandhisfamilytopackup
andrelocatetoKandahar,wherethesituationismoresecure.123WithKandaharbeing
the birthplace of the Taliban such an order was likely issued so Mullah Omar could
exertmorecontroloverBinLadinandkeepaclosereyeonhisactivities.

From that point on, alQaida came to increasingly rely on the Haqqani networks
autonomyfromtheTalibaninLoyaPaktiaasalaunchingpadforitsdeclarationsofwar
on the West.124 It was at the alSiddiq Camp in the Zhawara valley and not in


120AlBahri,83f.ThereareinfactstrongindicationsthatsignificantnumbersofformerAfghan
communist(Khalqi)officersjoinedtheTalibanbyearly1995andhelpedtofillkeygapsinthe[ir]
fightingcapability.Davis(1998),54.HajiAbdalQadir,BinLadinsinitialhostinJalalabad,alsocited
thepresenceofcommunistofficersinTalibanranksasonereasonforhisoppositiontothemovement.
KamalMatinuddin,TheTalibanPhenomenon:Afghanistan19941997(Karachi:OxfordUniversityPress,
1999),58.
121See,e.g.,Gutman,110.

122Ontheearly1990santiAmericanturninsomeofthejihadiperiodicalspublishedoutofPakistan,see

R.KimCragin,EarlyHistoryofalQaida,HistoricalJournal51,no.4(2008),1058.
123AlBahri,82.

124AbulWalidalMasri,QissatalbayatalarabiyaliamiralmumininMullahMuhammadUmar,nodate,

postedtovariousjihadiinternetforumson19and20July2007.SeealsoVahidBrown,TheFacadeof
Allegiance:BinLadinsDubiousPledgetoMullahOmar,CTCSentinel3,no.1(January2010),16.Some
evidencesuggeststhattheHaqqaninetworkandalQaidahadoverlappingfinancialnetworksinthe
Gulfduringthisperiodaswell.Forexample,seeHarmonyDocumentAFGP2002800775,3,6.
36


Kandahar where Bin Ladin and several leaders from other jihadist organizations
announced the formation of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and
CrusadersinFebruary1998.125Thiswasthemostsweepingdeclarationofglobaljihad
ever issued by alQaida, and called on Muslims worldwide to kill the Americans
whereveryoufindthem.126Membersoftheinternationalpresswereinvitedaheadof
time to attend, and were escorted from North Waziristan by members of HuA, the
Kashmirfocused jihadi organization whose training operations were integrated with
HaqqaniandalQaidacampsatZhawara.127

CarriedoutindirectcontraventionofTalibanrestrictions,thesemediaeventsenraged
theTalibanleadershipandfurtherstrainedrelationsbetweentheTalibanandtheArab
jihadis residing in Afghanistan.128 After another press conference that same year,
Mullah Omar angrily phoned Rahimullah Yusufzai, a Pakistani journalist present at
thatevent,toaskhowthelatterhadenteredAfghanistanwithoutaTalibanapproved
visa.AfterYusufzaiexplainedhispresence,MullahOmarshoutedHowdarehe[Bin
Ladin] give a press conference without my permission! There will be one ruler in
Afghanistan, either I or Usama bin Ladin. I will see to it.129 According to the
journalist Ahmad Zaydan, who was also present during these events, the Arabs in
Afghanistan clearly understood that alQaida was using its alliance with Haqqani
leaderstogetaroundTalibanattemptstorestricttheiractivities:

I learned later from Afghan Arab sources who were there that Usama had
soughttosidesteptheTalibanpressureonhimbymeetingthepressinareasfar
awayfromtheTalibancityofKandahar,suchasJalalabad,whereHizbiIslami
leader Mawlawi Yunis Khalis enjoyed power and good relations with Usama
since the days of the Afghan jihad, or in Paktia, where Shaykh Jalaluddin
Haqqani, the Taliban Minister of Borders and Tribes, had strong ties with Bin
Ladin as well. Haqqani was considered a king in his region. He is also
known to have established good relations with Pakistani Islamist groups and

125ForthetextoftheannouncementoftheFront,seeBruceLawrence,ed.,MessagestotheWorld:The
StatementsofOsamaBinLaden(Verso,2005),58ff.
126Ibid.

127Bahri,88.

128Onthisissue,seeBrown(2010a).

129Gutman,129.

37


 the security agencies in Pakistan since the days of Afghan jihad. This might
explain why the declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the
Jews and Crusaders in May of 1998 by Bin Ladin, Zawahiri, and Pakistani
figures, was issued in Khost, not Kandahar, or other areas where the Taliban
andMullahMuhammadOmarenjoyedsignificantinfluence.130

Summary: AlQaidas antiAmerican jihad, launched from Haqqani headquarters, had

thus made operating outside of Haqqanicontrolled territory in Afghanistan an
increasingly prohibitive exercise for the foreign jihadis prior to 9/11. This, along with
thedeephistorybetweentheHaqqaninetworkandtheotherregionalandinternational
militant groups operating in Afghanistan, helps to explain why it was to the Haqqani
networksrefugeinWaziristan,andnottheTalibansinBaluchistan,thatthesegroups
turnedforsafehavenaftertheU.S.invasionofAfghanistanfollowingthe9/11attacks.
Much more than personal ties, the nexus of local, regional and global jihadism that
JalaluddinHaqqanihadfosteredovertheprevioustwodecadesenabledtheHaqqanis
militant partners to deploy violence beyond the AfghanistanPakistan border region
throughout the 1990s, fueling Islamist conflicts as far afield as Kashmir, Central Asia
andAfrica.TheAmericanledinvasionofAfghanistanforcedthisintertwinedcollection
ofmilitantstofleeitsHaqqanidominatedsanctuaryofsoutheasternAfghanistan,butit
did not have far to go to reestablish itself. In fact, the Americanled invasion of
Afghanistan that had succeeded in toppling the Taliban regime so quickly only
managed to force this nexus of fighters a few dozen kilometers east, into North
Waziristan,whereithasremainedeversince,withtheHaqqaniscontinuingtoplaya
centralrole.

Post9/11:ContinuityandConsolidationoftheHaqqaniNexus

During the decade following the 9/11 attacks, the Haqqani network would further
consolidate its nexus position and act in a manner similar to prior decades, proving
central to the Taliban, Afghanistans internal conflicts, and Pakistans efforts to hedge
itspositionandcultivateinfluenceonboth sidesoftheDurandLine.Assistedbythe


130 AhmadZaydan,UsamaBinLadinbilaQina(Beirut:alSharakaalAlamililKitab,2003),130.
38


ISI, and leveraging its key characteristics and nexus position, the Haqqani network
quickly emerged as a primary and lethal driver of antiCoalition activity inside
Afghanistan. Instead of disassociating itself from alQaida and its global jihad, 9/11,
and the United States response to it, brought Haqqani and alQaida members even
closer together. The Haqqani network has fostered this closeness by maintaining its
open fronts and by providing protection and a base from which alQaida and others
couldconductattacksinsideAfghanistanandplanactsofinternationalterrorism.The
activitiesofthetwogroupsremaindeeplyintegratedacrossoperationalandfunctional
(i.e.,media)linesinLoyaPaktiaandNorthWaziristantoday.Theclosebondsbetween
alQaida and the Haqqani fighters have also survived the transition of Haqqani
networkleadershipfromJalaluddintohissonSirajuddin,indicatingthatthesetiesare
notjusthistoric,butarealsonowmultigenerational,afactthatislikelytocontributeto
alQaidasresiliencyandfurtherstrainU.S./Pakistanrelations.

Since the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan the Haqqani network has been essential to the
rise and geographic spread of the Taliban insurgency inside Afghanistan. The
value of Haqqani network contributions to the Taliban has been acknowledged by
senior Taliban leaders, such as Mullah Dadullah, who before his death in 2007
confirmedtheHaqqanisimportantrole:ThereisnodoubtthatShaykhHaqqaniand
his son lead the battles and draw up military plans.131 The Haqqani networks
leadershipoftheMiranshahShura,anditsrepresentationontheRahbariShurathe
Talibans central coordinating body, highlights the organizations value to the Taliban
asatrustedpartnerwithprimacyinSoutheasternAfghanistan.

TheHaqqaninetworksembraceofforeignfightersandalQaidacontrastssharplywith
the Quetta Shura Talibans reluctance to open its ranks to outsiders and its efforts to
publically distance itself from alQaida since 9/11. The continuity of the Haqqanis
openfrontsanditsoperational integrationwithalQaidaandtheIJUisconfirmedby
materialreleased by jihadistmediaoutlets,aswellasjournalisticaccounts,interviews
withTalibancommanders,andDepartmentofDefensecommunications.Collectively,
thesesourcesprovethatanumberofalQaidaandIJUfightingunitsarestillintegrated


131 TodaysEncounter,AlJazirah(Arabic),31May2006.
39


with, and operating alongside, Haqqani network insurgents in Loya Paktia.132 Al
Qaidas claim of responsibility for a multipronged suicide attack against Forward
OperatingBase(FOB)SalernoinKhost,thecentralresourcingbaseforCoalitiontroops
intheregion,inAugust2008illustratesthisdynamic.133Duringaninterviewin2009,
alQaidas commander for Afghanistan, Mustafa Abu alYazid (killed by a drone in
NorthWaziristanin2010),saidthatthisattackwasorganizedbyalQaidaandjointly
executedwithitslocalpartners.134WhiletheHaqqaninetworkdoesnothaveexclusive
controloverLoyaPaktia,itisthestrongestgroupintheregion.135Onseveraloccasions
seniorHaqqaninetworkleadershavespokenabouttheircloseoperationalrelationship
withalQaida,revealingthatthereisnodistinctionbetweenus[;]weareallone.136
In fact, many security analysts believe that the Haqqani network participated in, and
likelydirected,thebotchedassaultonFOBSalerno.137Thestrongestindicationofanal
Qaida role in the incident comes from Bryant Neal Vinas, an American alQaida
operative,whowasinNorthWaziristanatthetimeoftheattackandmetMustafaAbu
alYazid,AbuYahyaalLibi,RashidRauf,AttiyatAllahandBaitullahMehsud.138Inan
interrogation conducted by Belgian authorities Vinas said that the attack had been
planned by alQaida leaders and that it went badly.139 Vinas had such intimate


132ForbackgroundontheIJU/Haqqanirelationship,seeEinarWigen,IslamicJihadUnion:alQa`idas
KeytotheTurkicWorld,NorwegianDefenseResearchEstablishment,23February2009;Guido
Steinberg,ATurkishalQaeda:TheIslamicJihadUnionandtheInternationalizationofUzbekJihadism,
StrategicInsights,July2008.SmallergroupsofUzbekfighterswerealsopresentinZabulprovincein2007.
SeeAndrewFeitt,CounteringtheIMUinAfghanistan,SmallWarsJournal(2010).Amixofforeign
fightershasalsobeenactiveinAfghanistansNorthsince2009.SeeAntonioGiustozziandChristopher
Reuter,TheInsurgentsoftheAfghanNorth,AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork,April2011.
133MustafaAbualYazidsInterviewonalJazeera,NEFA,22June2009.TheTalibanalsoclaimed

responsibilityforthisattack.SeeMattDupee,FOBSalernoWithstands2DayTalibanOnSlaught,Long
WarJournal,18August2008.
134MustafaAbualYazidsInterviewonalJazeera.OnthedeathofMustafaAbualYazid,seeEric

Schmitt,AmericanStrikeisSaidtoKillaTopQaedaLeader,NewYorkTimes,31May2010.
135AccordingtoThomasRuttig,95percentofthecommandersinKhostarelinkedtotheHaqqani

network.SeeRuttig,59.
136AnInterviewwiththeDirectorofMilitaryAffairsinPaktika:MawlawiSangeen,AsSahab(English

TranslationprovidedbyDaralMurabiteenPublications,nodate).
137See,e.g.,UnravellingHaqqanisNet,JanesTerrorismandSecurityMonitor,30June2009.

138VahidBrowninterviewwithSebastianRotella11August2010;seealsoSebastianRotellaandJosh

Meyer,AyoungAmericansjourneyintoalQa`ida,LosAngelesTimes,24July2009.
139PaulCruickshank,NicRobertsonandKenShifman,FromLongIslandtoLahore:ThePlottoBomb

NewYork,CNN,21May2010;RotellaandMeyer.
40


knowledgeoftheattackthathewasevenabletoidentifyoneofthesuicideattackers,
withwhomhehadtrained.140

Even more convincing is the death of a Haqqani network family member alongside a
veteran alQaida leader during an attack in Loya Paktia. It is not a coincidence that
MuhammadOmarHaqqani,thesonofJalaluddinandbrotherofSirajuddin,waskilled
in a firefight in July 2008 along with AbuHasanalSaidi in the Seta Kandao area of
Paktia.141Atthetime,alSaidiwasbelievedtobealQaidastopmilitarycommander
in Southeastern Afghanistan. He also reportedly served as the head of alQaidas
training camps in Loya Paktia for a period after the antiSoviet jihad.142 This incident
speaks to the depth of Haqqani network and alQaida ties and illustrates how the
intimacyofthepersonalrelationshipsestablishedduringthe1980sand1990smanifest
operationallyinAfghanistanandPakistantoday.JalaluddinHaqqaniwouldnotlethis
eighteen yearold son fight with just anybody; AbuHasanalSaidi was a trusted
confidant.ThedeathsofothersenioralQaidamembersinLoyaPaktiaalsohighlight
these close ties. Take for instance, the deaths of Abu Dujanah alQahtani, and Abu
SulaymanalUtaybitwoimportantalQaidamemberskilledtogetherinMay2008in
Paktiaprovince.143PriortohisarrivalinAfghanistan,AbuSulaymanalUtaybiworked
asaShariaofficialfortheMujahidinShuraCouncilinIraqandwasaseniorleaderofal
QaidainIraq(AQI).144ItisunlikelythatthepresenceofsuchahighprofileAQIfigure
inLoyaPaktiawouldhaveescapedHaqqaniattention.


140Ibid.
141AlQa`idahcommanderkilledinAfghaneast,PajhwokAfghanNews,13July2008;Haqqanisson
killedinPaktia,TheNews,11July2008.AlQaidaleadersandHaqqanifamilymembershavealsobeen
killedtogetheronthePakistanisideoftheborderinNorthWaziristan.SeeGuard:AlQaedaChiefin
PakistanKilled,CNN,9September2008;MushtaqYusufzai,ThreemoreUSattackvictimssuccumbto
injuries,TheNews,10September2008;seealsoPeterBergenandKatherineTiedemann,TheYearofthe
Drone:AnAnalysisofU.S.DroneStrikesinPakistan,20042010,CounterterrorismStrategyInitiativePaper,
updatedasof24May2010.
142AlQaedaCommanderDiesinFightwithUSandAfghanForces,JanesTerrorismandInsurgency

Centre,16July2008.
143EvanF.Kohlmann,Dossier:ShaykhMustafaAbualYazid(akaShaykhSaeed),NEFA,June2008;

TheMartyrdomofAbuSulaimanalOtaibi,NEFA,11May2008;BillRoggio,AlQa`idaOperatives
KilledinAfghanistanwereSaudis,LongWarJournal,13May2008.
144TheMartyrdomofAbuSulaimanalOtaibi.

41


Counterterrorism pressures have brought alQaida and the Haqqani network into
greater geographic proximity since 9/11, and the campaign of drone strikes has
amplifiedtheirsenseofsharedsufferingandideologicalaffinityforoneanother.This
wasperhapsmostapparenttoDavidRohde,who,alongwithhistranslatoranddriver,
washeldhostagebytheHaqqaninetworkinNorthWaziristan.Afterspendingseven
months with his captors, Rohde realized that his Haqqani guards were really
committed to something far broader than simply driving American troops out of
Afghanistan.145 In addition to liberating Kabul, they also wanted to create a global
Islamic caliphate that spanned the Muslim world.146 The Haqqani networks
appreciation for alQaidas worldview became most clear when Rohdes guards told
himhoweagertheyweretocarryoutsuicideattacksintheUnitedStatesinrevenge
for the drone strikes.147 These comments could be dismissed as frustration or mere
posturing, but they also reveal important contradictions between how the Haqqani
networkpublicallyportraysitselfasalocalactorandthebroaderjihadistinterestsithas
longhelpedtofacilitate.

The operational access and local partnering that the Haqqani network provides has a
numberofimportantderivativebenefitsforalQaida,theIJUandotherforeignfighting
units. On a practical level, access to Haqqani network fronts allows transnational
jihadistgroupstotestnewrecruits,honetheircapabilitiesanddeepentheiroperational
expertise.148 An invitation to join Haqqani fighters on the battlefield also provides al
Qaida and the IJU with an opportunity to deepen their ties to the Haqqani family,
makingitallthemoreunlikelythatSirajuddinwilldenythemsafehaven.Jalaluddin
was one of several key organizers of alQaidas escape from Afghanistan after the
topplingoftheTalibanandAymanalZawahiriswifewastakingrefugeinaHaqqani
owned building on the Afghan side of the border when she was killed by a U.S.
airstrikeinlate2001.149TheHaqqaninetwork,alongwithotherlocalpartners,helped


145AReportersTaleofAmbushandCaptivity,NPR,27October2009,
www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=114173568
146DavidRohde,YouHaveAtomicBombs,butWeHaveSuicideBombers,NewYorkTimes,19

October2009.
147AReportersTaleofAmbushandCaptivity.

148Foradiscussionofhowforeignfightermobilizationsempowertransnationalterroristgroups,see

Hegghammer(201011).
149AhmedRashid,DescentIntoChaos(PenguinGroup,2008),99,268.

42


alQaidatoestablishasafehaveninPakistanstribalareasaftertheirescapefromTora
Bora.150 Some have even identified Jalaluddin Haqqani as the key organizer.151 A
document captured in Afghanistan in 2005 illustrates how the Haqqani network
continued to shelter foreign fighters and local militants several years into the
insurgency.

Mullah Abdullah is from Logar and has 30 fighters of different nationalities:

Afghans;Uzbeks;Chinese;Chechens;andtwoArabs.Theyvereceivedmilitary
training from the training camp. It is managed by Mullah Dawood from
Logar,andanArabistheheadofthiscamp.UnderthesupervisionsofMullah
Dawood,theyarrivedinMiranShahafterspendinganightataMadrassainthe
headquarters of Haqqani. After the battle only a limited number of people
enteredAfghanistan[;]othersreturnedtoMiranShah.152

ByfacilitatingaccesstothefightinAfghanistan(aclassicaljihad),theHaqqaninetwork
also helps to sustain alQaidas relevance and branding as the leader of the global
jihadistmovement.153SenioralQaidaleadershavelongrecognizedtheimportanceof
mediatotheircauseandtheHaqqaninetworksareaofoperationsremainscentraltoal
Qaidas media operations just like it was in the past.154 Norwegian scholar Anne
Stenersen recently conducted a review of over ninety films released by alSahab from
2005 to 2009 as part of its Pyre for the Americans in the Land of Khorasan series.155
Sincemostofthesevideosdetailtheattacklocationshewasabletoestablish,according
to alQaidas own reporting, that the highest concentration of operational films
releasedbyalSahabduringthistimeperiodwerefilmedinKhost(thirty),followedby


150MarkMazzettiandEricSchmitt,CIAOutlinesPakistanLinkswithMilitants,NewYorkTimes,30
July2008.
151Rashid,268.

152HarmonyDocument,AFGP20050003302.

153Foraperspectiveonthissee,Brown(2011).

154Forexample,inapersonallettertoMullahOmar,UsamabinLadinmentionedthatItisobviousthat

themediawarinthiscenturyisoneofthestrongestmethods;infact,itsratiomayreach90%ofthetotal
preparationforthebattles.SeeHarmonyDocumentAFGP2002600321.
155Apyreisaheapofcombustiblematerialthatisoftenusedforcrematingacorpse.

43


Paktika(fourteen)andKunar(twelve)provinces.156Putanotherway,footageofattacks
in Khost and Paktika, territory where the Haqqani network is the main executor of
Taliban operations, account for 50 percent of all operational videos released by al
Qaida as part of this seminal series over a four year period.157 These films do not
necessarilymeanthatAraborotherforeignfighterstookpartintheattacks,buttheydo
imply a connection between the fighting group and alQaedas media operation[s].158
They also reveal that Loya Paktia still functions as a central arena for alQaidas
operational and media activity inside Afghanistan. A similar analysis conducted by
Intel Center corroborates Stenersens findings, as does an anecdotal dataset of raids
compiledbytheauthors.159

ThenetworkassociatedwiththeDecember2009suicideattackagainstFOBChapmanin
Khost, which killed seven CIA officers, speaks to the broader nature of the Haqqani
networks media ties and the existence of an integrated media syndicate in
Waziristan.160 It also solidifies the close personal and operational ties between the
Haqqaninetwork,alQaidaandthosewholeadandcontinuetodeveloptheTTP.The
individualwhoconductedtheattack,HumamKhalilAbuMulalalBalawi(alsoknown
as Abu Dujanah alKhorasani), was an influential writer on Arabiclanguage jihadist
forums who was recruited and sent by Jordanian and U.S. intelligence agents to the
FATAtocollectintelligenceonAymanalZawahiri.Insteadofcooperatingwiththese
authorities, Abu Dujanah joined forces with the TTP and alQaida and turned on his
intelligence contacts. What was most revealing about the attack was which
organizationclaimedresponsibilityforit,whereitoccurredandthemediaactivitythat
transpired afterword. The first organization to publically celebrate the attack was al
Qaida, which noted in its media release that the the appropriate media entity will


156Forabreakdownofallprovinces,seeAnneStenersen,AlQaedasAllies:ExplainingtheRelationship
BetweenAlQaedaandVariousFactionsoftheTalibanAfter2001,CounterterrorismStrategyInitiative
PolicyPaper,NewAmericaFoundation(April2010).
157ForquoteseeSteinberg.

158Stenersen.

159IntelCenter,JihadiVideoProductionGroupBreakoutbyAfghanProvincev1.0,28October2008;

VahidBrown,HaqqaniRaids:AnalysisoftheData,internalCTCdocument(asofJune2010).
160FOBChapmanreportedlyfunctionsasaCIAoutpostusedtocollectintelligence,seeMarkMazzetti,

CIATakesonBiggerandRiskierRoleonFrontLines,NewYorkTimes,31December2009.
44


publish his [the suicide bombers] story in a proper production.161 This statement
suggests that alQaida had prior knowledge of the attack and that the TTP was soon
planning to release a video about the incident.162 Not long after, the TTP formally
claimedresponsibilityfortheattackthroughaseriesofvideosthatfeaturedalBalawi
andTTPleaderHakimullahMehsud.163TheHaqqaninetworkremainedsilentonthis
issue, but according to Michael Scheuer, There is no way this operation would have
occurred in Khost without the knowledge and active support of Jalaluddin Haqqani
and/orhisson.164

DirectHaqqaninetworktiestoalBalawiarehardtoprove,buttheHaqqaninetworkis
one person removed from a network of Arab foreign fighters and media operators
linkedtotheJordaniansuicidebomber,suggestingthatSirajuddinsgroupwastiedto
theattack.ThecenterpiecetothisstoryinvolvesaninterviewthatSirajuddinHaqqani
conductedwithalBalaghmediacorrespondentAbuDujanahalSan`ani(alsoknownas
Mohammed Naqaa alHamli) in April 2010.165 Less than one month after conducting
the interview, that very same correspondent was killed in North Waziristan while
making a suicide bomb for himself.166 Similar to the Jordanian suicide bomber, al
Hamaliwasalsoaprolificcontributortowebbasedjihadistsocialnetworkingforums,
particularly the Falluja Islamic Network.167 Even more revealing is the death and
backgroundofanotherjihadist writerfromYemen,SaddamHusseinalHussami(also
knownasGhazwanalYemeni),whohadtiestoalBalawiandalHamaliandwasalso
killedinNorthWaziristan,albeitseveralmonthsearlier.168AnanalysisofalHussamis


161StatementontheAbuDujanahAlKhurasaniRaid(MayGodAcceptHim)ToInfiltratetheFortresses
oftheAmericans.AlQa`idaGeneralCommand,6January2010.
162Suchintegrationisnotsurprising.SeequotefromBryantNealVinasinPaulCruickshank,The

MilitantPipeline:BetweentheAfghanistanPakistanBorderRegionandtheWest,Counterterrorism
StrategyInitiativePolicyPaper(February2010).
163Forexample,seehttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RTZQTC6ucVI.

164AlexSpillius,CIAsuicidebomberworkedwithbinLadenallies,Telegraph,7January2010.

165InterviewwithSirajuddinHaqqani,alBalaghMediaCenter,13April2010.

166YemeniBombmakerMartyredinWaziristan,FlashpointPartners,9May2010.Forbackgroundonal

San`ani,seeEvanKohlmann,AlQa`idasYemeniExpatriateFactioninPakistan,CTCSentinel4,no.1
(January2011).
167Kohlmann(2011).

168Ibid.

45


onlineactivityandthejihadistcommunitysresponsetohisdeathbyEvanKohlmannis
worthquotingatlength:

In early October 2009, alYemeni [alHussami] had posted a flurry of requests

via the chat forum on behalf of the Jalaluddin Haqqani Organization in the
Shadow of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. In one such message, he
appealed,we,yourbrothersfromtheJalaluddinHaqqaniOrganization,have
encounteredsomeproblemsinregardstothesubjectsTawheedandAqeedah,and
wewanttheemailorwebsiteoftherenownedshaykhsinthisfield.169

Other analysis by Kohlmann confirms that alBalawi, alHamali and alHussami all
knewoneanotherandthatalHussamihadbeentrainedbyalQaida.170Thissuggests
that the Haqqani network was not only connected to this group, but that it is also
learningfrommoreexperiencedmediahands.TheslowbutsteadyemergenceofManba
alJihad as a digital production entity speaks to this trend as does Sirajuddins recent
question and answer session with an Arabiclanguage jihadist forum, especially when
oneconsiderstheconnectionsthatarerequiredtofacilitatesuchanevent.171

Byservingasaplatformforoperationaldevelopmentandforceprojection,theHaqqani
networkfunctionsasamilitaryincubatorforlethalsegmentsofTTP.Infact,onecan
arguethattheTTPanditsjihadagainstthePakistanistateareanoutgrowth,oratleast
apartialresultof,theoperationalinterminglingbetweenlocalandglobalactorsinLoya
Paktia.172 Even though the Haqqani network does not actively, or publically, support
attacksagainstthePakistanistate,ithashelpedtocreateandsustaintheconditionsand
relationships that facilitate and drive the jihad against Islamabad. It is true that the
QuettaShuraTalibanandtheHaqqaninetworkhavetriedtoreorienttheTTPsjihad


169Ibid.
170Forexample,asnotedbyKohlmann,AllahawardedthemtospendEidthereinthehighestlevelsof
Paradise,withtheirbelovedonesandbrothersGhazwanalYemeni,AbuDujanahalSanaani,andAbu
DujanahalKhorasani.JustasHegatheredtheminlife,Hehasgatheredthemintheafterlife.Ibid.
171OpenInterviewwithSirajuddinHaqqani,amemberoftheShuraCounciloftheIslamicEmirateof

AfghanistanandacommanderinthesoutheasternprovincesofAfghanistan.AnsaralMujahidin
Network,27April2010.
172Asmentionedabove,theU.S.dronecampaignandPakistanioperationshavealsoplayedcentralroles.

46


away from Islamabad towards Afghanistan.173 The Haqqani network has also put
systems in place to minimize its public association with and participation in the
Pakistan jihad. According to a source with firsthand access, Haqqani fighters were
ordered in one case in 2009 to not participate in an expected clash with Pakistani
soldiers.174 Haqqani fighters were told that Pakistani Taliban, not Afghan Taliban,
wouldfightPakistanimilitaryforces.175Theneedforsuchmanagementandoperational
deconfliction illustrates the depth of Haqqani/TTP integration on both sides of the
Durand Line.176 It also demonstrates the Haqqani networks cognizance of this issue
andthegroupsneedtodrawlimitsandmanagewhereandhowitsfightersact.

But just as the Afghanistan and Pakistan jihads are distinct and the application of
violenceissegmentedbyseparatechainsofcommand,theinfrastructureandeconomy
of violence that they create are integrated and mutually reinforcing, ultimately
enhancingtheresiliencyandlongevityofeachjihad.Forexample,thedeploymentof
TTPmanpower(i.e.,suicidebombersandactualfighters)toLoyaPaktiaoperationally
benefits the Haqqani network, and thus also the Quetta Shura Taliban.177 Yet, the
benefitsofthisintegrationarenotunidirectionalandlimitedtothejihadinAfghanistan
only.TheyarebidirectionalandtheTTPcanalsoleverageHaqqaninetworkexpertise
and resources either through training or personal contacts and incorporate the
knowledge and combat experience gained in Afghanistan to strengthen its campaign
againstPakistan.

The Haqqani network partners with and provides alQaida, the TTP and other local
andforeignfightingentitiesoperationalaccesstofrontsinAfghanistansSoutheastfora
number of reasons. The most important and collective benefit is that the Haqqani
networkisabletodiversifytheresourcemobilizationnetworkstowhichithasaccess.

173Forexamples,seeKhan;MushtaqYusufzai,NoModeratesinTalibanRanks:Haqqani,TheNews,17
April2009.
174Authorsinterviewwithanonymoussource,March2010.

175Ibid.

176Foradditionalbackground,seeGretchenPeters,CrimeandInsurgencyintheTribalAreasof

AfghanistanandPakistan,CombatingTerrorismCenter(October2010);QandeelSiddique,Tehrike
TalibanPakistan,DIISReport(December2010).
177Forexample,[s]incethespringof2008[,]Haqqanisfightershadbeenreinforcedbyalargenumber

ofPakistaniTalibanfromtheWazir,DawarandMehsudtribes.Somesourcesspeakofupto4,000of
them....SeeRuttig,71.
47


Thishelps toreduce thegroupsdependence upona singleactor,suchas theISI, and
reinforces its nexus position. The Haqqani network also uses such access and its
relationships to hedge its position and gain leverage over other actors. For example,
HaqqanicommandersleveragetheirclosetieswiththeTTPtogaininfluencewiththe
PakistanistatebecausemaintainingsuchclosetiesensuresthattheHaqqaninetworkis
morefamiliarwiththeneedsandvulnerabilitiesofitsvariouspartners.178Beinglocated
attheoperationalpointofconvergenceforvariousnetworksprovidespracticalbenefits
as well, such as human (i.e., ideologically committed fighters), financial and
technological inputs, which the Haqqani network aggregates and employs to enhance
itsoperationaleffectivenessandsustainitscampaign.

Summary:ThemoststrikingelementoftheHaqqaninetworksevolutionpost9/11isthe
persistence of its crossdimensional nexus. During this decade, surprisingly little
changedintermsoftheHaqqaninetworksrelations,strategyandoutlook.Thewarin
AfghanistanhasreinforcedandstrengthenedtheHaqqaninetworkscentralrole,with
the group still being located at the nexus between local, regional and global forms of
militancy. Similar to the 1990s, areas in which the Haqqani network exerts the most
influence continue to be used as a platform to enable other actors, most notably al
QaidaandmorerecentlyelementsoftheTTP.TheHaqqaninetworkhasbeenableto
maintain close ties with these actors while also remaining a key proxy for Islamabad,
highlighting the paradox underlying Pakistans security policy. Perhaps most
importantly, this nexus has also survived a generational change in leadership from
father Jalaluddin to son Sirajuddin, as well as a ten year campaign against alQaida
conductedtheUnitedStatesanditspartnerPakistan.

CONCLUSION,IMPLICATIONSANDPOLICYCONSIDERATIONS

Several important conclusions can be drawn from this study and they inform current
policy debates about the Haqqani network, alQaida, U.S./Pakistan relations, U.S.
interestsinAfghanistanandeffortstoreconcilewiththeTaliban.


178 AuthorsinterviewwithPirZubairShah,13September2010.
48


Context, History and Evolution of alQaida and the Global Jihad: This report
challenges conventional narratives of alQaidas early history and development by
placing alQaidas trajectory within the local context of the Haqqani network. The
actionsandoutlookofHaqqaninetworkleadersarenotconfinedtotheAfghantheater
today,andtheyhavenotbeensincethelate1970s.Inadditiontooperatingasadistinct
organization, the Haqqani network has historically functioned as a nexus and key
enablerforlocal,regionalandglobalgroups.AlQaidasglobaljihadandelementsof
Kashmirs regional jihad have been shaped by the safehaven, training, combat
experience,propagandasupport,resourcemobilization,andnetworkingopportunities
facilitated by the Haqqani network. By serving as the local to alQaidas global over
multiple decades, the Haqqani network has directly contributed to the development
andenduranceofglobaljihad.

The Haqqani network has carefully avoided any direct association with international
terrorismorthetargetingofWesternersoutsideofAfghanistan.ThenatureofHaqqani
supportforinternationaljihadism,however,isbestevaluatedthroughthecontextofthe
groups consistent support for alQaida and the Haqqani networks unwillingness to
meaningfully disengage from the group since it formally declared war on the United
States in 1998. This makes the Haqqani network a willing ideological partner and an
active participant in alQaidas global jihad, as Haqqani network leaders have
consistently provided the local context and space for alQaida to sustain itself and
continue its fight. By shedding new light on the history of alQaida, this report also
tells us that alQaida and the Haqqani network, and not the Quetta Shura Taliban,
becametheUnitedStatesprimaryenemieson11September2001.

ThedeathofUsamabinLadinwillchallengealQaidaanditslongtermsurvival,and
his demise has renewed debates about U.S. interests in Afghanistan and alQaidas
presencethere.WhileitistooearlytoknowwhatthefullramificationsofBinLadins
deathwillbe,thetiesbetweentheHaqqaninetworkandalQaidahaveremainedjust
as close since 9/11 under Sirajuddins command. Barring any significant change, the
HaqqaninetworkwilllikelyremaincentraltothefutureevolutionofalQaidaandits
attemptstoattacktheUnitedStatesanditsallies.Poorlysourcedaccountssuggestthat
SirajuddinHaqqaniactedastheintermediarybetweenIranandalQaidatosecurethe
release of a top Iranian diplomat in exchange for several alQaida commanders,
49


including Saif alAdel.179 If this account is true, it would again place the Haqqani
network at the center of alQaida and its global jihad. U.S. efforts to disrupt and
degradealQaidatoday,therefore,arejustasmuchaboutdismantlingalQaidaasthey
areaboutdegradingtheHaqqaninetwork.

U.S./PakistanRelations:TheHaqqaninetwork,andtheISIstiestoandsupportforthe
group,liesatthecoreofthetroubledU.S./Pakistanrelationship.180Sincetheriseofthe
neoTalibaninsurgencyPakistanhasdistanceditselffromopenlyexpressingitssupport
fortheHaqqaninetwork.Thisisforgoodreason,giventhelethalrolethegroupplays
inAfghanistan.StatementsmadebyseniorPakistaniofficials,aswellasrecentactions
taken by the Pakistani government, demonstrate, however, that the Haqqani network
remains a strategic asset.181 For example, in June 2010, Pakistan claimed that it could
deliver the Haqqani network and reconcile it with President Karzais Afghan
government.182ThefactthatPakistanoffereduptheHaqqaninetworkasasolutionto
theAfghanconflictatatimewhentheUnitedStateswasevaluatingitscommitmentin
Afghanistan and was pressuring Pakistan to take action against the group in North
Waziristanindicatesthatthenetworkremainsacentralasset.ThetimingofPakistans
offer seems all too convenient, and it reveals that Pakistan has continually refused to


179 SyedSalaamShahzad,HowIranandalQaedamadeadeal,AsiaTimes,30April,2010;Yassin
Musharbash,SaifalAdelBackinWaziristan:ATopTerroristReturnstoalQaidaFold,DerSpiegel,25
October2010.
180DuringhisApril2011triptoPakistan,thechairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaffAdmiralMichael
Mullennoted:ItisfairlywellknownthatISIhadarelationshipwiththeHaqqaninetworkand
addressingtheHaqqaninetworkfrommyperspectiveiscriticaltothesolutionsetinAfghanistan.So
thatsatthecoreits[sic]nottheonlythingbutthatsatthecorethatIthinkisthemostdifficultpartof
the[U.S./Pakistan]relationship.See,MullenlaunchesdiatribeagainstISI,Dawn,21April2011.
MembersofCongresshavealsolinkedPakistanssupportforthegroupasamajorproblemfor
continuinganykindoffinancialsupporttoIslamabad.SeeJoshRogin,Dems:Pakistanmustgoafter
Haqqaninetworkiftheywantourmoney,Cable,17May2011.
181Forexample,InatranscriptpassedtoMikeMcConnell,theDirectorofNationalIntelligenceinMay

2008,PakistansarmychiefGeneralAshfaqKayaniwasheardreferringtoHaqqaniasastrategicasset.
SeeCatherinePhilp,PervezMusharrafwasplayingdoublegamewithUS,Times,17February2009.
FordebatesaboutPakistanspolicy,seeJayshreeBajoria,TheISIandTerrorism:Behindthe
Accusations,CFRBackgrounder,28May2009.
182SeeAlexRodriguezandLauraKing,ReconciliationeffortswithAfghanmilitantsfacemajor

obstacle,LosAngelesTimes,29June2010.OnmorerecenteffortsbyPakistantogettheHaqqaninetwork
tonegotiate,seeMatthewRosenberg,PakistanWoesInsurgentGroup,WallStreetJournal,18May2011.
50


moveagainsttheHaqqaninetworkbecausethegroupisviewedasapartofitssolution
forAfghanistan.

The findings of this report add further clarity to this picture and the challenges
involved.Since9/11theUnitedStateshasprovidedbillionsofdollarsinmilitaryaidto
PakistantohelpdegradealQaida.Pakistansassistancehasledtothecaptureand/or
deathofanumberofsenioralQaidaoperatives,andithascomeatasignificanthuman
costtoIslamabad.183Yet,PakistansfavoredAfghanproxyisalsotheverysameactor
that has served as alQaidas primary local enabler for over two decades. Given the
ISIs historicalsponsorship oftheHaqqaninetwork,itishighly unlikelythat Pakistan
hasnotbeenawareofthishistory.Althoughlessclear,thereisalsosomeevidencethat
theISIhelped,andcontinuestoalesserdegree,tofacilitatetheseties,suggestingthat
PakistancouldhaveplayedamoreinfluentialroleinthedevelopmentofalQaidathan
has thus far been recognized. More tangible is Pakistans reluctance to conduct a
military operation against the Haqqani network and the milieu of jihadist actors
sheltered in North Waziristan.184 Pakistans inaction is fueling the Afghan insurgency
and it is also providing space for the Haqqani network to sustain itself and for anti
Pakistan militants and global jihadists to further coalesce. Left unchecked, North
Waziristanwillcontinuetofunctionastheepicenterofinternationalterrorism.185Such
adynamicislikelytofurtherstraintheU.S./Pakistanrelationship.

TalibanReconciliation:ThehistoryandcontinuityofHaqqaniandalQaidatiesalso
poseschallengesforreconciliationefforts,indicatingthatitisunlikelythattheHaqqani
network will meaningfully disengage from alQaida and other global jihadist actors.
ThefactthatPakistanhasoffereduptheHaqqaninetworkasawaytoendtheconflict
inAfghanistanisreflectiveofthegroupsimportanceandcentralrole,butitalsomakes
clear that U.S. and Pakistani goals for Afghanistan are in tension. While no options
shouldbetakenoffofthetable,anyU.S.orAfghanefforttoreconcilewiththeHaqqani

183Forexample,between2004andMay2010,Pakistanlost2,421ofitspersonnelinthetribalareas
fightingagainstmilitantentitiesthatthreatenthestate.SeePakistanArmypaysheavypriceinTaliban
war,Dawn,20May2010.
184InJune2011,PakistanpublicallyannouncedthatitwillconductanoperationinNorthWaziristan.

Accordingtoinitialreports,thetargetoftheseoperationswillbethemostviolentaspectsoftheTTP.See
MuhammadSalehZaafir,PakistantolaunchoperationinNorthWaziristan,TheNews,1June2011.
185ForbackgroundontheseplotsseeCruickshank(2010).

51


network must be undertaken from a position that understands the richness of the
Haqqani/alQaida relationship, and must be informed by an acute awareness of the
risks that any future negotiated settlement with the Haqqani network presents. The
likelihood oftheHaqqanioption bringing peacetoAfghanistan should beassessed in
relationtothefailureofpriornegotiatedsettlementsorchestratedbyPakistanbetween
itandtribalmilitantsbasedintheFATA,suchasthe2006MiranshahPeaceAccord.186
ReconciliationeffortswiththeQuettaShuraTalibancomewithlessriskasthegroupis
lesscloselytiedtoalQaida.

In conclusion, the threat of international terrorism is not and has never been
represented by alQaida alone, nor did the latter emerge in a vacuum. The scholarly
and policy communities have misapprehended the precise local context for the
developmentofglobaljihadismacontexttobefoundintheHaqqanisPaktiaandnot
Azzams Peshawar and have underestimated the Haqqani networks critical role in
sustaining cycles of violence far beyond its region of overt influence. In the wake of
UsamabinLadinsdeath,thealQaidaorganizationmayfaceanuncertainfuture,but
thenexusofresourcesandrelationshipsthattheHaqqaninetworkcarefullyassembled
over the course of three decades and which helped to foster alQaidas rise remains
firmly in place. Positioned between two unstable states, and operating beyond their
effective sovereignty, the Haqqani network has long been mistaken for a local actor
withlargelylocalconcerns.Itisvitalthatthepolicycommunitycorrectthecoursethat
hastakenthiserroneousassessmentforgrantedandrecognizetheHaqqaninetworks
regionofrefugeforwhatithasalwaysbeenthefountainheadofjihad.


Forbackgroundonthesedeals,seeHassanAbbas,AnAssessmentofPakistansPeaceAgreements
186

withMilitantsinWaziristan(20042008),inTheAfghanistanPakistanTheater:MilitantIslam,Securityand
Stability,ed.DaveedGartensteinRossandCliffordMay(Washington,DC:FDDPress,2010).
52


APPENDIX:THEHAQQANINETWORKSCROSSDIMENSIONALNEXUS

Note/Explanation: The social networks shown in this graphic were generated for
illustrativepurposesonlyandnotbasedonempiricaldata,butsuchnetworkscouldbe
constructed with sufficiently accurate data.187 Within each plain the dots represent
individual actors and the lines capture relationships between them. Each plain also
consistsofthreefunctionalcategories:directaction(i.e.operations),diplomaticactivity,
and support functions (i.e. media, financing, etc.). The lines that cross dimensions
highlightthoseindividualsthatcrossbetweenthesedifferentplainsofjihad.


187 ThisgraphicisamodifiedversionofthatfoundinPadgettsandMcLeansworkcitedabove.
53