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Iran’s nuclear ambitions have U.S. reviewing controversial options

By Jason Lauritzen
July 31, 2005 6:00 am

In his 2002 State of the Union speech President Bush labeled Iran as one of the members of the
“axis of evil.” Pressure has been building for action to be taken against the Islamic republic.

“Iran is engaged in a clandestine nuclear weapons program,” said Adam Ereli, the deputy
spokesman at the State Department, in August 2004. “This program is a matter of concern to the
international community.”

Undersecretary of State John Bolton echoed Ereli’s concerns and said more than a half-dozen
activities, such as uranium enrichment and plutonium programs, are a sign of a nuclear weapons
program.

Iran is a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and claims it is only pursuing nuclear
technology for energy purposes. Critics say there is more to the program and that the real
purpose of Iran’s nuclear energy program is to develop nuclear weapons.

Iran’s Foreign Minister, Kamal Kharrazi, addressed accusations of a nuclear weapons program in
March: “I declare for the umpteenth time that there is no room for nuclear weapons in Iran’s
defense policy. What is more, we consider them to be a serious threat to our own security.
Therefore, being a signatory to the non-proliferation treaty, Iran insists on getting nuclear
technologies for peaceful purposes.”

The European Union (EU) has offered economic, political and technological incentives to stop
Iran from enriching uranium. Enriched uranium could be used to develop a nuclear weapon, but
could also be used for nuclear energy. In November 2004, Iran suspended enrichment activities,
but on July 27 Iran announced it would restart enrichment, which would violate a November
agreement with the EU.

Robert Litwak, Director of International Security Studies at the Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars, said in an interview earlier this month Iran would continue to insist that it is
entitled to produce enriched uranium under Article IV of the NPT.

Article IV specifically addresses the right to pursue nuclear energy: “Nothing in this Treaty shall
be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop
research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and
in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.”
The real problem with Iran’s nuclear program arises from a lack of transparent debate, said
Litwak. The Bush administration insists that Iran is pursuing more than nuclear energy and Iran
insists that it needs nuclear energy not only to be a modern state, but also to have a secure
secondary source of energy since oil is a finite resource.

Officials in the Bush administration are not buying the Iranian rationale for a nuclear program.
Vice President Dick Cheney described a broad opinion within the administration when he said,
“They’re already sitting on an awful lot of oil and gas. Nobody can figure out why they need
nuclear as well to generate energy.”

Vice President Cheney’s rationale, however, contradicts a position he and several others formed
over 30 years ago when heading national security posts in the Ford administration.

In 1976 Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and Henry Kissinger
endorsed plans for Iran to start a nuclear energy program. The deal with Iran was for “reactors
powered by and regenerating fissile materials on a self-sustaining basis,” according to
declassified documents reviewed by The Washington Post.

Several other declassified documents, from the Ford Presidential Library, show that the National
Security Council encouraged Iran to pursue a nuclear energy program.

Gary Sick, who dealt with nonproliferation issues under Ford, said, “The Shah made a big
convincing case that Iran was going to run out of gas and oil and they had a growing population
and a rapidly increasing demand for energy. The mullahs make the same argument today, but we
don’t trust them.”

“Iran is one of the major oil producers … but then again, so is the U.S., which has a nuclear
energy program, so Cheney’s argument doesn’t hold up,” said Dr. Curtis Ryan, assistant
professor of political science at Appalachian State University. “And Iran has been mindful for
years of not counting solely on oil to survive. Saudi Arabia counts solely on oil and the Iranians
think this is short-sighted.”

Pressure for action against Iran not only arises from the Bush administration, but also from
Israel. Senior Israeli officials have visited Washington and said that if the nuclear problem with
Iran is not resolved, Israel may be left with no option but to bomb Iranian nuclear facilities,
according to The Washington Times.

Israel developed options for bombing Iran’s nuclear sites in 2003. Israel has a nuclear arsenal of
85 warheads, according to a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report. Israeli officials said
President Bush is on a course to take military action against Iran before he leaves office in 2009,
according to The Washington Times.

The bombing of Iranian nuclear sites would almost certainly not have a positive effect. When
Israel bombed the Osirak reactor in Iraq in 1981, it drove the Iraqis to hasten development of a
nuclear weapon. If Israel used the same tactic against Iran it would have a similar effect. “It
would create an incentive to reconstitute a program,” said Litwak.

Concerns from Israel drove the Bush administration to stepping up intelligence collection efforts
on Iran. For the past year flying surveillance drones have been sent to Iran from Iraq. Iraq has
become a base for spying on Iran, said a former U.S. official, according to a report in The
Washington Post.

The drones are pilotless and use radar, video, still photography and air filters to pick up traces of
nuclear activity. The tactic is a form of aerial espionage. It is commonly used as a tool of
intimidation and can be a sign of military preparation for an eventual air attack.

An Iranian official believes that the drones were also sent to coax the Iranians into turning on
their radar system. If the Iranians turn on their radar the U.S. could learn about their defense
systems, defense frequencies, the range of their radar and where potential weaknesses lie, said
Thomas Keaney, a retired U.S. Air Force colonel and executive director of the Foreign Policy
Institute at John Hopkins University.

However, Iran is not falling for the strategy. Iran’s national security officials ordered forces not
to turn on radar or engage the drones. “Our decision was: Don’t engage,” an Iranian official said.

One person who is not surprised by the recent rise in covert activity and anti-Iran rhetoric is Sam
Gardiner. Gardiner has taught strategy and military operations at the National War College, Air
War College, and Naval War College. He helped organize a war game scenario against Iran for
The Atlantic Monthly magazine prior to the 2004 presidential election.

“We thought this would be the policy question either Bush or Kerry would have to deal with,”
said James Fallows, a writer for The Atlantic. The war game centered on how an administration
would deal with the unknown nature of Iran’s nuclear program.

Intelligence estimates, based on unknown information, range anywhere from two to five years
before Iran could have a nuclear weapon. “Their program is not as far along as North Korea,”
said Litwak.

What makes Gardiner’s war game scenario against Iran so significant is that, starting in 1989,
Gardiner developed over 50 exercises involving an attack on Iraq. The light force strategy that
General Tommy Franks used to take Baghdad surfaced in a war game Gardiner designed.

For the war game, Gardiner produced a power point presentation and assembled a group of
experienced people to play the parts of key senior national-security officials such the CIA
Director, the Secretary of State, the White House Chief of Staff and the Secretary of Defense.
The goal was to see how these people would respond to information and potential military
options related to Iran.

Three options were offered: Use a strategic strike to punish Iran for involvement in Iraq and
supporting terrorism; set back Iran’s nuclear programs with cruise missile and land and sea based
aircraft attacks; or regime change.

To make either of the three plans work, the administration would need what Gardiner called a
“strategic communications plan.” The plan is broken into several phases that show how media
can be manipulated and used as propaganda.

Gardiner outlined how criticism of Iran could be produced much faster than dialog that presented
a solution other than military response. Administration officials and supporters would dominate
the 24-hour news cycle making sure to reduce the perspective of others.

Combined with constant media pressure the phases would commence. The first phase would
stress that Iran is bad, but offer diplomacy as a solution. The second phase would stress
diplomacy is failing and that Iran is not just a problem for the United States.

The third and final phase would stress that diplomacy had failed and there is no choice but
military action.

Gardiner said this strategic communications plan would be used by whoever was pushing for war
with Iran based on the research he did of strategic communication aspects of Operation Iraqi
freedom.

He published his findings in a paper titled “Truth from These Podia.”

Gardiner, based on his war game presentation, said it was correct to assume that diplomacy
would not be exhausted. It could instead act as a cover so an administration intent on military
intervention could say, “We tried diplomacy. It didn’t work. We’re out of options.”

At the end of the war game presentation for The Atlantic, Gardiner said, “After all this effort, I
am left with two simple sentences for policymakers. You have no military solution for the issues
of Iran. And you have to make diplomacy work.”

Influential Washington insiders are not heeding Gardiner’s advice. Michael Ledeen, a
neoconservative and foreign policy expert influential in the Bush administration, has called for
regime change in Iran. He has said the Iranians want “liberation, American-style.”

Nobel Prize winner Shirin Ebadi, an Iranian lawyer and human rights activist, argues that change
must come from within a country, not from an outside source.

In an editorial, The New York Times said, “Independent organizations are essential for fostering
the culture of human rights in Iran. But the threat of foreign military intervention will provide an
excuse for authoritarian elements to uproot these groups and put an end to their growth.”

Historically, the Iranians are a very nationalist people and do not trust the intervention of foreign
powers.
In 1953, the U.S. and Britain overthrew the democratically chosen government of Iran and Prime
Minister Mohammed Mossadegh. After the coup, the U.S. armed and supported Mohdammad
Reza Shah Pahlavi. The Shah’s incompetence and corruption led to the Iranian revolution of
1979.

“I don’t think any legitimate government can be imposed from the outside,” said Appalachian
State University’s Ryan. “Most Iraqis opposed Saddam, but most Iranians, even if they don’t like
parts of the regime or its actions, support the Islamic republic. They will fight for it.”

Jason Lauritzen is a rising senior at Appalachian State University. He lives in Brevard and is
currently doing a summer internship for the AC-T.

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