You are on page 1of 2

Eric Liebregts PP687 Dr. Kathy Behrendt Midterm Assignment: Abstract 1, 2011 Nov.

ABSTRACT: Jerome Bruner claims that "we seem to have no other way of describing 'lived time' save in the form of a narrative" (Life as a Narrative p. 692). Is this true? Do we really have no other ways of describing "lived time"? Before declaring the narrative supreme, shouldn't we at least investigate other possible ways to express diachronic life? I propose a weak narrativity thesis, in which a narrative structure might effectively encompass most aspects of lived time for most people, but certainly not all aspects of life for all people. Some important aspects of lived time might be better characterized by other diachronic modes of expression, such as music, and so a more robust conception of lived time would combine the narrative project with other, non-narrative models of diachronic humanity. In order for music to describe lived time in a meaningful way, it must satisfy three conditions: diachronicity, non-narrativity, and relation to lived experience. Music is deeply diachronic because its very building blocks, musical tones, are vibrations in time, which, by their very nature, cannot exist as mere time-slices. A composition must actually play in time for music to occur at all. In order to determine whether music is non-narrative, we must first consider what narrative expression is. For narrativists like Daniel Dennett, a discursive, verbal aspect is essential, while for Alasdair MacIntyre, telos is the defining feature of narrative. Music is not essentially discursive, and its teleological aspect is radically different from that of narratives, suggesting that music is clearly a form of non-narrative expression. What must a narrative (or non-narrative) form of expression do to adequately relate to lived human experience? For this section, I will draw upon elements of Marya Schechtman's "The Narrative Self-Constitution View", in which she outlines four aspects of human life that narratives must express: personal identity and survival, moral responsibility, self-interested concern, and compensation (93). I will argue that music can perform these functions at least as well as most narratives can, and that music is actually far better than narratives when it comes to one important element that Schechtman fails to mention: emotional identification.

You might also like