~4 The University within the Limits of Reason ‘The characteristic of the modern University is to have an idea that functions as its referent, as the end and meaning of its activities. As 1 mentioned earlier, in general the modern University has had three ideas. The story begins, as do so many stories about modernity, with, Kant, who envisioned the University as guided by the concept of reason. Kant’s vision is followed by Humboldt’s idea of culture, and more re- cently the emphasis has been on the techno-bureaucratic notion of excellence. The distinguishing feature of the last on this list is that it actually lacks a referent. That is to say, the idea that functions as the ‘University’s referent—excellence—itself has no referent. The Univer- sity of Excellence is the simtulacrum of the idea of a University. Ifyou want a practical example, think of what a University president is supposed to do, In the Kantian University, his or her function js the purely disciplinary one of making decisive judgments in inter-faculty conflicts on the grounds of reason alone. tn the University founded on, culture, the president incatnates a pandisciplinary ideal of general cul- tural orientation, becoming the figure of the University itself (nine- seenth-century University presidents such a8 Charles Eliot or Benjamin Jowett spring to mind here).’ As Schleiermacher puts it, the true “idea” of @ rector is that of a single individual who can stand metaphorically for the University in the eyes of the world while remaining metonym- ically connected to the rest of the faculty. Primus inter pares, such @ president figures the double function of culture as the animating prin- ‘The University within the Limits of Reason —> The University in Ruias rida in “Mochlos; or, The Conflict of the Faculties.”* Kant’s text ex- plicitly addresses the question of the link between the University and the state and argues that one of the functions of the University is to produce technicians for the state, that is, men of affairs. Likewise, the function of the state with regard to the University is to intervene at all, times to remind these men of affairs that they must submit their use of knowledge in the service of the state to the control of the faculties, ultimately to the faculty of philosophy. So on the one hand, the state must protect the University in order to ensure the rule of reason in public life. On the other hand, philosophy must protect the University: from the abuse of power by the state, in limiting the rule of established interests in the higher faculties. This unlimited right of reason to in- tervene is what distinguishes legitimate conflict, concordia discors, from illegitimate conflict (which is the arbitrary exercise of authority by the established powers of the higher faculties and the state). ‘Thus the problem is already posed as the modern University begins to be thought: how to unify reason and the state, knowledge and power, how to resolve the aporia of this conflict? Autonomous reason breaks down the established authority of heteronomous superstition, but how is autonomy to be institutionalized? That is, does not the institution: ‘alization of reason’s autonomy in a University necessarily cause it (© become heteronomous to itself How can the reason embodied in the University not come to be the object of @ superstitious rather than rational respect? Philosophy promises to do this by first carrying on the activity of self-critique and then, through that critique, realizing the ‘essence of humanity. At the same time, in order that thought be pre- served against the heteronomy of fatalism, che realization of this essence must not be the product of an empirical historical process but of ra- tional reflection. ‘An example of the kind of paradox that this produces comes right at the beginning of The Conflict of the Faculties, where Kant describes the positioning of the University among other institutional forms for the propagation of knowledge. After explaining that the division of faculties within the University is based on what he claims are purely rational grounds, he then remarks that by pure chance the empirical history of the Prussian people has led them to adopt these forms of 58 Ene DREISY Wists TE Lan ey eee ‘organization as well. Unlike Hegel, Kant does not attempt to derive a reason of history from this fact, so as (0 argue that history is @ rational process. Rather, he leaves us to remark the glaring coincidence. Fe does this because he wants to preserve the possibility that reason can install itself in history, even if he is concerned to preserve the separation be- tween empirical history and critique. What Kant needs, then, is a third term in which reason can combine institution and autonomy, while holding pure reason and empirical history apart. Kant seeks to do so by producing the figure of the republican subject who incarnates this conflict, IF the regulative principle of the Kantian University is the sapere ande of reason, the problematic of institution- alization is circumvented in the figure of the subject, who is rational in matters of knowledge, republican in matters of power, Thus, it might ‘secm odd that in a text designed to appease a monarch Kant speaks with enthusiasm of the “enthusiasm” generated by the French Revo- lution, He is clearly not interested, however, in the empirical people but in the way in which the French Revolution, as “a historical sign,” signifies the possibility of a universal subject of humanity to be realized through history: “It is provisionally the duty of monarchs, [even] if they rule'as autocrats, to govern in a republican (not democratic) ways that is, to treat the people in accordance with principles which are commensurate with the spirit of libertarian laws (as a nation with ma- ture understanding would prescribe them for itself), although they ‘would not be literally canvassed for their consent.” "The University, then, with reason as its principle, only institution- alizes reason fictionally by analogy with the enlightened despot who rules his people as if they were mature. Although he imposes laws autocratically (that is, heteronomously in function of an arbitrary power) the imposition of these laws must be guided by a regulative principle of reason. A heteronomous power is invoked in order to give toa people the laws that it would give itself if it were autonomous, The University institutionalizes reason, but although its authority to impose Feason may function heteronomously (by virtue of the superstitious respect accorded to the University as the institution of reason), that ‘authority must only function so as to affirm the principle of the au- tonomy of the rational subject. Thus, in a very literal sense, the Kantian 59