Petitioners seek review on certiorari to nullify and set aside two issuances of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Respondent Bayan Telecommunications, Inc. Is a legislative franchise holder under Rep. Act No. 3259. Section 232 of the Code grants local government units within the Metro Manila Area the power to levy tax on real properties.
Petitioners seek review on certiorari to nullify and set aside two issuances of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Respondent Bayan Telecommunications, Inc. Is a legislative franchise holder under Rep. Act No. 3259. Section 232 of the Code grants local government units within the Metro Manila Area the power to levy tax on real properties.
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Petitioners seek review on certiorari to nullify and set aside two issuances of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Respondent Bayan Telecommunications, Inc. Is a legislative franchise holder under Rep. Act No. 3259. Section 232 of the Code grants local government units within the Metro Manila Area the power to levy tax on real properties.
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ENRGA, Petitioners, vs. BAYAN TELECOMMUNCATONS, NC., Respondent. D E C S O N GARCA, Before the Court, on pure questions of law, is this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to nullify and set aside the following issuances of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 227, in its Civil Case No. Q-02-47292, to wit: 1) Decision 1 dated June 6, 2003, declaring respondent Bayan Telecommunications, nc. exempt from real estate taxation on its real properties located in Quezon City; and 2) Order 2 dated December 30, 2003, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The facts: Respondent Bayan Telecommunications, nc. 3 (Bayantel) is a legislative franchise holder under Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 3259 4 to establish and operate radio stations for domestic telecommunications, radiophone, broadcasting and telecasting. Of relevance to this controversy is the tax provision of Rep. Act No. 3259, embodied in Section 14 thereof, which reads: SECTON 14. (a) The grantee shall be liable to pay the same taxes on its real estate, buildings and personal property, exclusive of the franchise, as other persons or corporations are now or hereafter may be required by law to pay. (b) The grantee shall further pay to the Treasurer of the Philippines each year, within ten days after the audit and approval of the accounts as prescribed in this Act, one and one- half per centum of all gross receipts from the business transacted under this franchise by the said grantee (Emphasis supplied). On January 1, 1992, Rep. Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC), took effect. Section 232 of the Code grants local government units within the Metro Manila Area the power to levy tax on real properties, thus: SEC. 232. Power to Levy Real Property Tax. A province or city or a municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area may levy an annual ad valorem tax on real property such as land, building, machinery and other improvements not hereinafter specifically exempted. Complementing the aforequoted provision is the second paragraph of Section 234 of the same Code which withdrew any exemption from realty tax heretofore granted to or enjoyed by all persons, natural or juridical, to wit: SEC. 234 - Exemptions from Real Property Tax. The following are exempted from payment of the real property tax: xxx xxx xxx Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax previously granted to, or enjoyed by, all persons, whether natural or juridical, including government-owned-or-controlled corporations is hereby withdrawn upon effectivity of this Code (Emphasis supplied). On July 20, 1992, barely few months after the LGC took effect, Congress enacted Rep. Act No. 7633, amending Bayantel's original franchise. The amendatory law (Rep. Act No. 7633) contained the following tax provision: SEC. 11. The grantee, its successors or assigns shall be liable to pay the same taxes on their real estate, buildings and personal property, exclusive of this franchise, as other persons or corporations are now or hereafter may be required by law to pay. n addition thereto, the grantee, its successors or assigns shall pay a franchise tax equivalent to three percent (3%) of all gross receipts of the telephone or other telecommunications businesses transacted under this franchise by the grantee, its successors or assigns and the said percentage shall be in lieu of all taxes on this franchise or earnings thereof. Provided, That the grantee, its successors or assigns shall continue to be liable for income taxes payable under Title of the National nternal Revenue Code .. xxx. [Emphasis supplied] t is undisputed that within the territorial boundary of Quezon City, Bayantel owned several real properties on which it maintained various telecommunications facilities. These real properties, as hereunder described, are covered by the following tax declarations: (a) Tax Declaration Nos. D-096-04071, D-096-04074, D-096-04072 and D-096-04073 pertaining to Bayantel's Head Office and Operations Center in Roosevelt St., San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City allegedly the nerve center of petitioner's telecommunications franchise operations, said Operation Center housing mainly petitioner's Network Operations Group and switching, transmission and related equipment; (b) Tax Declaration Nos. D-124-01013, D-124-00939, D-124-00920 and D-124-00941 covering Bayantel's land, building and equipment in Maginhawa St., Barangay East Teacher's Village, Quezon City which houses telecommunications facilities; and (c) Tax Declaration Nos. D-011-10809, D-011-10810, D-011-10811, and D-011-11540 referring to Bayantel's Exchange Center located in Proj. 8, Brgy. Bahay Toro, Tandang Sora, Quezon City which houses the Network Operations Group and cover switching, transmission and other related equipment. n 1993, the government of Quezon City, pursuant to the taxing power vested on local government units by Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, infra, in relation to Section 232 of the LGC, supra, enacted City Ordinance No. SP-91, S-93, otherwise known as the Quezon City Revenue Code (QCRC), 5 imposing, under Section 5 thereof, a real property tax on all real properties in Quezon City, and, reiterating in its Section 6, the withdrawal of exemption from real property tax under Section 234 of the LGC, supra. Furthermore, much like the LGC, the QCRC, under its Section 230, withdrew tax exemption privileges in general, as follows: SEC. 230. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges. Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including government owned or controlled corporations, except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under RA 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, business enterprises certified by the Board of nvestments (BO) as pioneer or non-pioneer for a period of six (6) and four (4) years, respectively, . are hereby withdrawn effective upon approval of this Code (Emphasis supplied). Conformably with the City's Revenue Code, new tax declarations for Bayantel's real properties in Quezon City were issued by the City Assessor and were received by Bayantel on August 13, 1998, except one (Tax Declaration No. 124-01013) which was received on July 14, 1999. Meanwhile, on March 16, 1995, Rep. Act No. 7925, 6 otherwise known as the "Public Telecommunications Policy Act of the Philippines," envisaged to level the playing field among telecommunications companies, took effect. Section 23 of the Act provides: SEC. 23. Equality of Treatment in the Telecommunications ndustry. Any advantage, favor, privilege, exemption, or immunity granted under existing franchises, or may hereafter be granted, shall ipso facto become part of previously granted telecommunications franchises and shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the grantees of such franchises: Provided, however, That the foregoing shall neither apply to nor affect provisions of telecommunications franchises concerning territory covered by the franchise, the life span of the franchise, or the type of service authorized by the franchise. On January 7, 1999, Bayantel wrote the office of the City Assessor seeking the exclusion of its real properties in the city from the roll of taxable real properties. With its request having been denied, Bayantel interposed an appeal with the Local Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA). And, evidently on its firm belief of its exempt status, Bayantel did not pay the real property taxes assessed against it by the Quezon City government. On account thereof, the Quezon City Treasurer sent out notices of delinquency for the total amount ofP43,878,208.18, followed by the issuance of several warrants of levy against Bayantel's properties preparatory to their sale at a public auction set on July 30, 2002. Threatened with the imminent loss of its properties, Bayantel immediately withdrew its appeal with the LBAA and instead filed with the RTC of Quezon City a petition for prohibition with an urgent application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction, thereat docketed as Civil Case No. Q-02-47292, which was raffled to Branch 227 of the court. On July 29, 2002, or in the eve of the public auction scheduled the following day, the lower court issued a TRO, followed, after due hearing, by a writ of preliminary injunction via its order of August 20, 2002. And, having heard the parties on the merits, the same court came out with its challenged Decision of June 6, 2003, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, pursuant to the enabling franchise under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7633, the real estate properties and buildings of petitioner [now, respondent Bayantel] which have been admitted to be used in the operation of petitioner's franchise described in the following tax declarations are hereby DECLARED exempt from real estate taxation: (1) Tax Declaration No. D-096-04071 (2) Tax Declaration No. D-096-04074 (3) Tax Declaration No. D-124-01013 (4) Tax Declaration No. D-011-10810 (5) Tax Declaration No. D-011-10811 (6) Tax Declaration No. D-011-10809 (7) Tax Declaration No. D-124-00941 (8) Tax Declaration No. D-124-00940 (9) Tax Declaration No. D-124-00939 (10) Tax Declaration No. D-096-04072 (11) Tax Declaration No. D-096-04073 (12) Tax Declaration No. D-011-11540 The preliminary prohibitory injunction issued in the August 20, 2002 Order of this Court is hereby made permanent. Since this is a resolution of a purely legal issue, there is no pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the court in its Order dated December 30, 2003, petitioners elevated the case directly to this Court on pure questions of law, ascribing to the lower court the following errors: . []n declaring the real properties of respondent exempt from real property taxes notwithstanding the fact that the tax exemption granted to Bayantel in its original franchise had been withdrawn by the [LGC] and that the said exemption was not restored by the enactment of RA 7633. . [n] declaring the real properties of respondent exempt from real property taxes notwithstanding the enactment of the [QCRC] which withdrew the tax exemption which may have been granted by RA 7633. . [n] declaring the real properties of respondent exempt from real property taxes notwithstanding the vague and ambiguous grant of tax exemption provided under Section 11 of RA 7633. V. [n] declaring the real properties of respondent exempt from real property taxes notwithstanding the fact that [it] had failed to exhaust administrative remedies in its claim for real property tax exemption. (Words in bracket added.) As we see it, the errors assigned may ultimately be reduced to two (2) basic issues, namely: 1. Whether or not Bayantel's real properties in Quezon City are exempt from real property taxes under its legislative franchise; and 2. Whether or not Bayantel is required to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief with the trial court. We shall first address the second issue, the same being procedural in nature. Petitioners argue that Bayantel had failed to avail itself of the administrative remedies provided for under the LGC, adding that the trial court erred in giving due course to Bayantel's petition for prohibition. To petitioners, the appeal mechanics under the LGC constitute Bayantel's plain and speedy remedy in this case. The Court does not agree. Petitions for prohibition are governed by the following provision of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. When the proceedings of any tribunal, . are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise, granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. With the reality that Bayantel's real properties were already levied upon on account of its nonpayment of real estate taxes thereon, the Court agrees with Bayantel that an appeal to the LBAA is not a speedy and adequate remedy within the context of the aforequoted Section 2 of Rule 65. This is not to mention of the auction sale of said properties already scheduled on July 30, 2002. Moreover, one of the recognized exceptions to the exhaustion- of- administrative remedies rule is when, as here, only legal issues are to be resolved. n fact, the Court, cognizant of the nature of the questions presently involved, gave due course to the instant petition. As the Court has said in Ty vs. Trampe: 7
xxx. Although as a rule, administrative remedies must first be exhausted before resort to judicial action can prosper, there is a well- settled exception in cases where the controversy does not involve questions of fact but only of law. xxx. Lest it be overlooked, an appeal to the LBAA, to be properly considered, required prior payment under protest of the amount of P43,878,208.18, a figure which, in the light of the then prevailing Asian financial crisis, may have been difficult to raise up. Given this reality, an appeal to the LBAA may not be considered as a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. t is thus understandable why Bayantel opted to withdraw its earlier appeal with the LBAA and, instead, filed its petition for prohibition with urgent application for injunctive relief in Civil Case No. Q-02-47292. The remedy availed of by Bayantel under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court must be upheld. This brings the Court to the more weighty question of whether or not Bayantel's real properties in Quezon City are, under its franchise, exempt from real property tax. The lower court resolved the issue in the affirmative, basically owing to the phrase "exclusive of this franchise" found in Section 11 of Bayantel's amended franchise, Rep. Act No. 7633. To petitioners, however, the language of Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 7633 is neither clear nor unequivocal. The elaborate and extensive discussion devoted by the trial court on the meaning and import of said phrase, they add, suggests as much. t is petitioners' thesis that Bayantel was in no time given any express exemption from the payment of real property tax under its amendatory franchise. There seems to be no issue as to Bayantel's exemption from real estate taxes by virtue of the term "exclusive of the franchise" qualifying the phrase "same taxes on its real estate, buildings and personal property," found in Section 14, supra, of its franchise, Rep. Act No. 3259, as originally granted. The legislative intent expressed in the phrase "exclusive of this franchise" cannot be construed other than distinguishing between two (2) sets of properties, be they real or personal, owned by the franchisee, namely, (a) those actually, directly and exclusively used in its radio or telecommunications business, and (b) those properties which are not so used. t is worthy to note that the properties subject of the present controversy are only those which are admittedly falling under the first category. To the mind of the Court, Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 3259 effectively works to grant or delegate to local governments of Congress' inherent power to tax the franchisee's properties belonging to the second group of properties indicated above, that is, all properties which, "exclusive of this franchise," are not actually and directly used in the pursuit of its franchise. As may be recalled, the taxing power of local governments under both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions solely depended upon an enabling law. Absent such enabling law, local government units were without authority to impose and collect taxes on real properties within their respective territorial jurisdictions. While Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 3259 may be validly viewed as an implied delegation of power to tax, the delegation under that provision, as couched, is limited to impositions over properties of the franchisee which are not actually, directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise. Necessarily, other properties of Bayantel directly used in the pursuit of its business are beyond the pale of the delegated taxing power of local governments. n a very real sense, therefore, real properties of Bayantel, save those exclusive of its franchise, are subject to realty taxes. Ultimately, therefore, the inevitable result was that all realties which are actually, directly and exclusively used in the operation of its franchise are "exempted" from any property tax. Bayantel's franchise being national in character, the "exemption" thus granted under Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 3259 applies to all its real or personal properties found anywhere within the Philippine archipelago. However, with the LGC's taking effect on January 1, 1992, Bayantel's "exemption" from real estate taxes for properties of whatever kind located within the Metro Manila area was, by force of Section 234 of the Code, supra, expressly withdrawn. But, not long thereafter, however, or on July 20, 1992, Congress passed Rep. Act No. 7633 amending Bayantel's original franchise. Worthy of note is that Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 7633 is a virtual reenacment of the tax provision, i.e., Section 14, supra, of Bayantel's original franchise under Rep. Act No. 3259. Stated otherwise, Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 3259 which was deemed impliedly repealed by Section 234 of the LGC was expressly revived under Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 7633. n concrete terms, the realty tax exemption heretofore enjoyed by Bayantel under its original franchise, but subsequently withdrawn by force of Section 234 of the LGC, has been restored by Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 7633. The Court has taken stock of the fact that by virtue of Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, 8 local governments are empowered to levy taxes. And pursuant to this constitutional empowerment, juxtaposed with Section 232 9 of the LGC, the Quezon City government enacted in 1993 its local Revenue Code, imposing real property tax on all real properties found within its territorial jurisdiction. And as earlier stated, the City's Revenue Code, just like the LGC, expressly withdrew, under Section 230 thereof, supra, all tax exemption privileges in general. This thus raises the question of whether or not the City's Revenue Code pursuant to which the city treasurer of Quezon City levied real property taxes against Bayantel's real properties located within the City effectively withdrew the tax exemption enjoyed by Bayantel under its franchise, as amended. Bayantel answers the poser in the negative arguing that once again it is only "liable to pay the same taxes, as any other persons or corporations on all its real or personal properties, exclusive of its franchise." Bayantel's posture is well-taken. While the system of local government taxation has changed with the onset of the 1987 Constitution, the power of local government units to tax is still limited. As we explained in Mactan Cebu nternational Airport Authority: 10
The power to tax is primarily vested in the Congress; however, in our jurisdiction, it may be exercised by local legislative bodies, no longer merely be virtue of a valid delegation as before, but pursuant to direct authority conferred by Section 5, Article X of the Constitution. Under the latter, the exercise of the power may be subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide which, however, must be consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. (at p. 680; Emphasis supplied.) Clearly then, while a new slant on the subject of local taxation now prevails in the sense that the former doctrine of local government units' delegated power to tax had been effectively modified with Article X, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution now in place, .the basic doctrine on local taxation remains essentially the same. For as the Court stressed in Mactan, "the power to tax is [still] primarily vested in the Congress." This new perspective is best articulated by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., himself a Commissioner of the 1986 Constitutional Commission which crafted the 1987 Constitution, thus: What is the effect of Section 5 on the fiscal position of municipal corporations? Section 5 does not change the doctrine that municipal corporations do not possess inherent powers of taxation. What it does is to confer municipal corporations a general power to levy taxes and otherwise create sources of revenue. They no longer have to wait for a statutory grant of these powers. The power of the legislative authority relative to the fiscal powers of local governments has been reduced to the authority to impose limitations on municipal powers. Moreover, these limitations must be "consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy." The important legal effect of Section 5 is thus to reverse the principle that doubts are resolved against municipal corporations. Henceforth, in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal fiscal powers, doubts will be resolved in favor of municipal corporations. t is understood, however, that taxes imposed by local government must be for a public purpose, uniform within a locality, must not be confiscatory, and must be within the jurisdiction of the local unit to pass. 11 (Emphasis supplied). n net effect, the controversy presently before the Court involves, at bottom, a clash between the inherent taxing power of the legislature, which necessarily includes the power to exempt, and the local government's delegated power to tax under the aegis of the 1987 Constitution. Now to go back to the Quezon City Revenue Code which imposed real estate taxes on all real properties within the city's territory and removed exemptions theretofore "previously granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical ..," 12 there can really be no dispute that the power of the Quezon City Government to tax is limited by Section 232 of the LGC which expressly provides that "a province or city or municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area may levy an annual ad valorem tax on real property such as land, building, machinery, and other improvement not hereinafter specifically exempted." Under this law, the Legislature highlighted its power to thereafter exempt certain realties from the taxing power of local government units. An interpretation denying Congress such power to exempt would reduce the phrase "not hereinafter specifically exempted" as a pure jargon, without meaning whatsoever. Needless to state, such absurd situation is unacceptable. For sure, in Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, nc. (PLDT) vs. City of Davao, 13 this Court has upheld the power of Congress to grant exemptions over the power of local government units to impose taxes. There, the Court wrote: ndeed, the grant of taxing powers to local government units under the Constitution and the LGC does not affect the power of Congress to grant exemptions to certain persons, pursuant to a declared national policy. The legal effect of the constitutional grant to local governments simply means that in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers, doubts must be resolved in favor of municipal corporations. (Emphasis supplied.) As we see it, then, the issue in this case no longer dwells on whether Congress has the power to exempt Bayantel's properties from realty taxes by its enactment of Rep. Act No. 7633 which amended Bayantel's original franchise. The more decisive question turns on whether Congress actually did exempt Bayantel's properties at all by virtue of Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 7633. Admittedly, Rep. Act No. 7633 was enacted subsequent to the LGC. Perfectly aware that the LGC has already withdrawn Bayantel's former exemption from realty taxes, Congress opted to pass Rep. Act No. 7633 using, under Section 11 thereof, exactly the same defining phrase "exclusive of this franchise" which was the basis for Bayantel's exemption from realty taxes prior to the LGC. n plain language, Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 7633 states that "the grantee, its successors or assigns shall be liable to pay the same taxes on their real estate, buildings and personal property, exclusive of this franchise, as other persons or corporations are now or hereafter may be required by law to pay." The Court views this subsequent piece of legislation as an express and real intention on the part of Congress to once again remove from the LGC's delegated taxing power, all of the franchisee's (Bayantel's) properties that are actually, directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENED. No pronouncement as to costs. ALTERNATVE CENTER FOR ORGANZATONAL REFORMS AND DEVELOPMENT, NC., VS. ZAMORA G.R. No. 144256 Subject: Public Corporation Doctrine: Automatic release of RA Facts: Pres. Estrada, pursuant to Sec 22, Art V mandating the Pres to submit to Congress a budget of expenditures within 30 days before the opening of every regular session, submitted the National Expenditures program for FY 2000. The President proposed an RA of P121,778,000,000. This became RA 8760, "AN ACT APPROPRATNG FUNDS FOR THE OPERATON OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLC OF THE PHLPPNES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THRTY-ONE, TWO THOUSAND, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES also known as General Appropriations Act (GAA) for the Year 2000. t provides under the heading "ALLOCATONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNTS that the RA for local government units shall amount to P111,778,000,000. n another part of the GAA, under the heading "UNPROGRAMMED FUND, it is provided that an amount of P10,000,000,000 (P10 Billion), apart from the P111,778,000,000 mentioned above, shall be used to fund the RA, which amount shall be released only when the original revenue targets submitted by the President to Congress can be realized based on a quarterly assessment to be conducted by certain committees which the GAA specifies, namely, the Development Budget Coordinating Committee, the Committee on Finance of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. Thus, while the GAA appropriates P111,778,000,000 of RA as Programmed Fund, it appropriates a separate amount of P10 Billion of RA under the classification of Unprogrammed Fund, the latter amount to be released only upon the occurrence of the condition stated in the GAA. On August 22, 2000, a number of NGOs and POs, along with 3 barangay officials filed with this Court the petition at bar, for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus With Application for Temporary Restraining Order, against respondents then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, then Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management Benjamin Diokno, then National Treasurer Leonor Magtolis-Briones, and the Commission on Audit, challenging the constitutionality of provision XXXV (ALLOCATONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNTS) referred to by petitioners as Section 1, XXXV (A), and LV (UNPROGRAMMED FUND) Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the GAA (the GAA provisions) Petitioners contend that the said provisions violates the LGUs autonomy by unlawfully reducing the RA allotted by 10B and by withholding its release by placing the same under "Unprogrammed funds. Although the effectivity of the Year 2000 GAA has ceased, this Court shall nonetheless proceed to resolve the issues raised in the present case, it being impressed with public interest. Petitioners argue that the GAA violated the constitutional mandate of automatically releasing the RAs when it made its release contingent on whether revenue collections could meet the revenue targets originally submitted by the President, rather than making the release automatic. SSUE: WON the subject GAA violates LGUs fiscal autonomy by not automatically releasing the whole amount of the allotted RA. HELD: Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution provides: SECTON 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. Petitioners argue that the GAA violated this constitutional mandate when it made the release of RA contingent on whether revenue collections could meet the revenue targets originally submitted by the President, rather than making the release automatic. Respondents counterargue that the above constitutional provision is addressed not to the legislature but to the executive, hence, the same does not prevent the legislature from imposing conditions upon the release of the RA. Respondents thus infer that the subject constitutional provision merely prevents the executive branch of the government from "unilaterally withholding the RA, but not the legislature from authorizing the executive branch to withhold the same. n the words of respondents, "This essentially means that the President or any member of the Executive Department cannot unilaterally, i.e., without the backing of statute, withhold the release of the RA. As the Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically release the just share of local governments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature not to pass laws that might prevent the executive from performing this duty. To hold that the executive branch may disregard constitutional provisions which define its duties, provided it has the backing of statute, is virtually to make the Constitution amendable by statute a proposition which is patently absurd. f indeed the framers intended to allow the enactment of statutes making the release of RA conditional instead of automatic, then Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution would have been worded differently. Since, under Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution, only the just share of local governments is qualified by the words "as determined by law, and not the release thereof, the plain implication is that Congress is not authorized by the Constitution to hinder or impede the automatic release of the RA. n another case, the Court held that the only possible exception to mandatory automatic release of the RA is, as held in Batangas: .if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40 percent of the collections of the preceding third fiscal year, in which case what should be automatically released shall be a proportionate amount of the collections for the current fiscal year. The adjustment may even be made on a quarterly basis depending on the actual collections of national internal revenue taxes for the quarter of the current fiscal year. This Court recognizes that the passage of the GAA provisions by Congress was motivated by the laudable intent to "lower the budget deficit in line with prudent fiscal management. The pronouncement in Pimentel, however, must be echoed: "[T]he rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be carried out by legal methods. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. XXXV and LV Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the Year 2000 GAA are hereby declared unconstitutional insofar as they set apart a portion of the RA, in the amount of P10 Billion, as part of the UNPROGRAMMED FUND.
BATANGAS CATV, NC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE BATANGAS CTY SANGGUNANG PANLUNGSOD and BATANGAS CTY MAYOR [G.R. No. 138810. September 29, 2004]
FACTS: On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210 granting petitioner a permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City. Section 8 of the Resolution provides that petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers the maximum rates specified therein, "provided, however, that any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
Sometime in November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per month. As a result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its permit unless it secures the approval of respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, pursuant to Resolution No. 210.
Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition for injunction alleging that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators because under Executive Order No. 205, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to regulate the CATV operation in the Philippines.
SSUE : may a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators within its territorial jurisdiction?
HELD: No.
x x x
The logical conclusion, therefore, is that in light of the above laws and E.O. No. 436, the NTC exercises regulatory power over CATV operators to the exclusion of other bodies.
x x x
Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the general welfare clause. This is primarily because the CATV system commits the indiscretion of crossing public properties. (t uses public properties in order to reach subscribers.) The physical realities of constructing CATV system the use of public streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures, and the parceling of large regions allow an LGU a certain degree of regulation over CATV operators.
x x x
But, while we recognize the LGUs' power under the general welfare clause, we cannot sustain Resolution No. 210. We are convinced that respondents strayed from the well recognized limits of its power. The flaws in Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it violates the mandate of existing laws and (2) it violates the State's deregulation policy over the CATV industry.
LGUs must recognize that technical matters concerning CATV operation are within the exclusive regulatory power of the NTC.
LEONARDO TAN, ROBERT UY and LAMBERTO TE, petitioners, vs SOCORRO Y. PEREA, respondent D E C S O N TNGA, .: The resolution of the present petition effectively settles the question of how many cockpits may be allowed to operate in a city or municipality. There are two competing values of high order that come to fore in this casethe traditional power of the national government to enact police power measures, on one hand, and the vague principle of local autonomy now enshrined in the Constitution on the other. The facts are simple, but may be best appreciated taking into account the legal milieu which frames them. n 1974, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 449, otherwise known as the Cockfighting Law of 1974, was enacted. Section 5(b) of the Decree provided for limits on the number of cockpits that may be established in cities and municipalities in the following manner: Section 5. Cockpits and Cockfighting in General. (b) Establishment of Cockpits. Only one cockpit shall be allowed in each city or municipality, except that in cities or municipalities with a population of over one hundred thousand, two cockpits may be established, maintained and operated. With the enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991, [1] the municipal sangguniang bayan were empowered, "[a]ny law to the contrary notwithstanding, to "authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks. [2]
n 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipality of Daanbantayan, [3] Cebu Province, enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 6 (Ordinance No. 6), Series of 1993, which served as the Revised Omnibus Ordinance prescribing and promulgating the rules and regulations governing cockpit operations in Daanbantayan. [4] Section 5 thereof, relative to the number of cockpits allowed in the municipality, stated: Section 5. There shall be allowed to operate in the Municipality of Daanbantayan, Province of Cebu, not more than its equal number of cockpits based upon the population provided for in PD 449, provided however, that this specific section can be amended for purposes of establishing additional cockpits, if the Municipal population so warrants. [5]
Shortly thereafter, the Sangguniang Bayan passed an amendatory ordinance, Municipal Ordinance No. 7 (Ordinance No. 7), Series of 1993, which amended the aforequoted Section 5 to now read as follows: Section 5. Establishment of Cockpit. There shall be allowed to operate in the Municipality of Daanbantayan, Province of Cebu, not more than three (3) cockpits. [6]
On 8 November 1995, petitioner Leonardo Tan (Tan) applied with the Municipal Gamefowl Commission for the issuance of a permit/license to establish and operate a cockpit in Sitio Combado, Bagay, in Daanbantayan. At the time of his application, there was already another cockpit in operation in Daanbantayan, operated by respondent Socorro Y. Perea (Perea), who was the duly franchised and licensed cockpit operator in the municipality since the 1970s. Perea's franchise, per records, was valid until 2002. [7]
The Municipal Gamefowl Commission favorably recommended to the mayor of Daanbantayan, petitioner Lamberto Te (Te), that a permit be issued to Tan. On 20 January 1996, Te issued a mayor's permit allowing Tan "to establish/operate/conduct the business of a cockpit in Combado, Bagay, Daanbantayan, Cebu for the period from 20 January 1996 to 31 December 1996. [8]
This act of the mayor served as cause for Perea to file a Complaint for damages with a prayer for injunction against Tan, Te, and Roberto Uy, the latter allegedly an agent of Tan. [9] Perea alleged that there was no lawful basis for the establishment of a second cockpit. She claimed that Tan conducted his cockpit fights not in Combado, but in Malingin, at a site less than five kilometers away from her own cockpit. She insisted that the unlawful operation of Tan's cockpit has caused injury to her own legitimate business, and demanded damages of at least Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) per month as actual damages, One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) as moral damages, and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages. Perea also prayed that the permit issued by Te in favor of Tan be declared as null and void, and that a permanent writ of injunction be issued against Te and Tan preventing Tan from conducting cockfights within the municipality and Te from issuing any authority for Tan to pursue such activity. [10]
The case was heard by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), [11] Branch 61 of Bogo, Cebu, which initially granted a writ of preliminary injunction. [12] During trial, herein petitioners asserted that under the Local Government Code of 1991, the sangguniang bayan of each municipality now had the power and authority to grant franchises and enact ordinances authorizing the establishment, licensing, operation and maintenance of cockpits. [13] By virtue of such authority, the Sangguniang Bayan of Daanbantayan promulgated Ordinance Nos. 6 and 7. On the other hand, Perea claimed that the amendment authorizing the operation of not more than three (3) cockpits in Daanbantayan violated Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law of 1974, which allowed for only one cockpit in a municipality with a population as Daanbantayan. [14]
n a ecision dated 10 March 1997, the RTC dismissed the complaint. The court observed that Section 5 of Ordinance No. 6, prior to its amendment, was by specific provision, an implementation of the Cockfighting Law. [15] Yet according to the RTC, questions could be raised as to the efficacy of the subsequent amendment under Ordinance No. 7, since under the old Section 5, an amendment allowing additional cockpits could be had only "if the municipal population so warrants. [16] While the RTC seemed to doubt whether this condition had actually been fulfilled, it nonetheless declared that since the case was only for damages, "the [RTC] cannot grant more relief than that prayed for. [17] t ruled that there was no evidence, testimonial or documentary, to show that plaintiff had actually suffered damages. Neither was there evidence that Te, by issuing the permit to Tan, had acted in bad faith, since such issuance was pursuant to municipal ordinances that nonetheless remained in force. [18] Finally, the RTC noted that the assailed permit had expired on 31 December 1996, and there was no showing that it had been renewed. [19]
Perea filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated 24 February 1998. n this Order, the RTC categorically stated that Ordinance Nos. 6 and 7 were "valid and legal for all intents and purpose[s]. [20] The RTC also noted that the Sangguniang Bayan had also promulgated Resolution No. 78-96, conferring on Tan a franchise to operate a cockpit for a period of ten (10) years from February 1996 to 2006. [21] This Resolution was likewise affirmed as valid by the RTC. The RTC noted that while the ordinances seemed to be in conflict with the Cockfighting Law, any doubt in interpretation should be resolved in favor of the grant of more power to the local government unit, following the principles of devolution under the Local Government Code. [22]
The ecision and Order of the RTC were assailed by Perea on an appeal with the Court of Appeals which on 21 May 2001, rendered the ecision now assailed. [23] The perspective from which the Court of Appeals viewed the issue was markedly different from that adopted by the RTC. ts analysis of the Local Government Code, particularly Section 447(a)(3)(V), was that the provision vesting unto the sangguniang bayan the power to authorize and license the establishment of cockpits did not do away with the Cockfighting Law, as these two laws are not necessarily inconsistent with each other. What the provision of the Local Government Code did, according to the Court of Appeals, was to transfer to the sangguniang bayan powers that were previously conferred on the Municipal Gamefowl Commission. [24]
Given these premises, the appellate court declared as follows: Ordinance No. 7 should [be] held invalid for allowing, in unconditional terms, the operation of "not more than three cockpits in Daan Bantayan (sic), clearly dispensing with the standard set forth in PD 449. However, this issue appears to have been mooted by the expiration of the Mayor's Permit granted to the defendant which has not been renewed. [25]
As to the question of damages, the Court of Appeals agreed with the findings of the RTC that Perea was not entitled to damages. Thus, it affirmed the previous ruling denying the claim for damages. However, the Court of Appeals modified the RTC's Decision in that it now ordered that Tan be enjoined from operating a cockpit and conducting any cockfights within Daanbantayan. [26]
Thus, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari. Petitioners present two legal questions for determination: whether the Local Government Code has rendered inoperative the Cockfighting Law; and whether the validity of a municipal ordinance may be determined in an action for damages which does not even contain a prayer to declare the ordinance invalid. [27] As the denial of the prayer for damages by the lower court is not put in issue before this Court, it shall not be passed upon on review. The first question raised is particularly interesting, and any definitive resolution on that point would have obvious ramifications not only to Daanbantayan, but all other municipalities and cities. However, we must first determine the proper scope of judicial inquiry that we could engage in, given the nature of the initiatory complaint and the rulings rendered thereupon, the exact point raised in the second question. Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals, in declaring Ordinance No. 7 as invalid, embarked on an unwarranted collateral attack on the validity of a municipal ordinance. [28] Perea's complaint, which was for damages with preliminary injunction, did not pray for the nullity of Ordinance No. 7. The Municipality of Daanbantayan as a local government unit was not made a party to the case, nor did any legal counsel on its behalf enter any appearance. Neither was the Office of the Solicitor General given any notice of the case. [29]
These concerns are not trivial. [30] Yet, we must point out that the Court of Appeals did not expressly nullify Ordinance No. 7, or any ordinance for that matter. What the appellate court did was to say that Ordinance No. 7 "should therefore be held invalid for being in violation of the Cockfighting Law. [31] n the next breath though, the Court of Appeals backtracked, saying that "this issue appears to have been mooted by the expiration of the Mayor's Permit granted to Tan. [32]
But our curiosity is aroused by the dispositive portion of the assailed ecision, wherein the Court of Appeals enjoined Tan "from operating a cockpit and conducting any cockfights within Daanbantayan. [33] Absent the invalidity of Ordinance No. 7, there would be no basis for this injunction. After all, any future operation of a cockpit by Tan in Daanbantayan, assuming all other requisites are complied with, would be validly authorized should Ordinance No. 7 subsist. So it seems, for all intents and purposes, that the Court of Appeals did deem Ordinance No. 7 a nullity. Through such resort, did the appellate court in effect allow a collateral attack on the validity of an ordinance through an action for damages, as the petitioners argue? The initiatory Complaint filed by Perea deserves close scrutiny. mmediately, it can be seen that it is not only an action for damages, but also one for injunction. An action for injunction will require judicial determination whether there exists a right in esse which is to be protected, and if there is an act constituting a violation of such right against which injunction is sought. At the same time, the mere fact of injury alone does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. n other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, there must be damnum et injuriathat act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. [34]
ndubitably, the determination of whether injunction or damages avail in this case requires the ascertainment of whether a second cockpit may be legally allowed in Daanbantayan. f this is permissible, Perea would not be entitled either to injunctive relief or damages. Moreover, an examination of the specific allegations in the Complaint reveals that Perea therein puts into question the legal basis for allowing Tan to operate another cockpit in Daanbantayan. She asserted that "there is no lawful basis for the establishment of a second cockpit considering the small population of [Daanbantayan], [35] a claim which alludes to Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law which prohibits the establishment of a second cockpit in municipalities of less than ten thousand (10,000) in population. Perea likewise assails the validity of the permit issued to Tan and prays for its annulment, and also seeks that Te be enjoined from issuing any special permit not only to Tan, but also to "any other person outside of a duly licensed cockpit in Daanbantayan, Cebu. [36]
t would have been preferable had Perea expressly sought the annulment of Ordinance No. 7. Yet it is apparent from her Complaint that she sufficiently alleges that there is no legal basis for the establishment of a second cockpit. More importantly, the petitioners themselves raised the valid effect of Ordinance No. 7 at the heart of their defense against the complaint, as adverted to in their Answer. [37] The averment in the Answer that Ordinance No. 7 is valid can be considered as an affirmative defense, as it is the allegation of a new matter which, while hypothetically admitting the material allegations in the complaint, would nevertheless bar recovery. [38] Clearly then, the validity of Ordinance No. 7 became a justiciable matter for the RTC, and indeed Perea squarely raised the argument during trial that said ordinance violated the Cockfighting Law. [39]
Moreover, the assailed rulings of the RTC, its ecision and subsequent Order denying Perea's Motion for Reconsideration, both discuss the validity of Ordinance No. 7. n the Decision, the RTC evaded making a categorical ruling on the ordinance's validity because the case was "only for damages, [thus the RTC could] not grant more relief than that prayed for. This reasoning is unjustified, considering that Perea also prayed for an injunction, as well as for the annulment of Tan's permit. The resolution of these two questions could very well hinge on the validity of Ordinance No. 7. Still, in the Order denying Perea's Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC felt less inhibited and promptly declared as valid not only Ordinance No. 7, but also Resolution No. 78-96 of the Sangguniang Bayan dated 23 February 1996, which conferred on Tan a franchise to operate a cockpit from 1996 to 2006. [40] n the Order, the RTC ruled that while Ordinance No. 7 was in apparent conflict with the Cockfighting Law, the ordinance was justified under Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the Local Government Code. This express affirmation of the validity of Ordinance No. 7 by the RTC was the first assigned error in Perea's appeal to the Court of Appeals. [41] n their Appellee's Brief before the appellate court, the petitioners likewise argued that Ordinance No. 7 was valid and that the Cockfighting Law was repealed by the Local Government Code. [42] On the basis of these arguments, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed ecision, including its ruling that the Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law remains in effect notwithstanding the enactment of the Local Government Code. ndubitably, the question on the validity of Ordinance No. 7 in view of the continuing efficacy of Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law is one that has been fully litigated in the courts below. We are comfortable with reviewing that question in the case at bar and make dispositions proceeding from that key legal question. This is militated by the realization that in order to resolve the question whether injunction should be imposed against the petitioners, there must be first a determination whether Tan may be allowed to operate a second cockpit in Daanbantayan. Thus, the conflict between Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law and Ordinance No. 7 now ripens for adjudication. n arguing that Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law has been repealed, petitioners cite the following provisions of Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the Local Government Code: Section 447. Powers, uties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang bayan, as the legislative body of the municipality, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the municipality as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall: . . . . (3) Subject to the provisions of Book of this Code, grant franchises, enact ordinances authorizing the issuance of permits or licenses, or enact ordinances levying taxes, fees and charges upon such conditions and for such purposes intended to promote the general welfare of the inhabitants of the municipality, and pursuant to this legislative authority shall: . . . . (v) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding, authorize and license the establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks; Provided, that existing rights should not be prejudiced; For the petitioners, Section 447(a)(3)(v) sufficiently repeals Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law, vesting as it does on LGUs the power and authority to issue franchises and regulate the operation and establishment of cockpits in their respective municipalities, any law to the contrary notwithstanding. However, while the Local Government Code expressly repealed several laws, the Cockfighting Law was not among them. Section 534(f) of the Local Government Code declares that all general and special laws or decrees inconsistent with the Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly, but such clause is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the acts that are intended to be repealed. [43] t is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are disfavored and will not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators is manifest. [44] As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and with knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is logical to conclude that in passing a statute it is not intended to interfere with or abrogate a former law relating to the same subject matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable but also clear and convincing as a result of the language used, or unless the latter Act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier. [45]
s the one-cockpit-per-municipality rule under the Cockfighting Law clearly and convincingly irreconcilable with Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the Local Government Code? The clear import of Section 447(a)(3)(v) is that it is the sangguniang bayan which is empowered to authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks, notwithstanding any law to the contrary. The necessity of the qualifying phrase "any law to the contrary notwithstanding can be discerned by examining the history of laws pertaining to the authorization of cockpit operation in this country. Cockfighting, or sabong in the local parlance, has a long and storied tradition in our culture and was prevalent even during the Spanish occupation. When the newly-arrived Americans proceeded to organize a governmental structure in the Philippines, they recognized cockfighting as an activity that needed to be regulated, and it was deemed that it was the local municipal council that was best suited to oversee such regulation. Hence, under Section 40 of Act No. 82, the general act for the organization of municipal governments promulgated in 1901, the municipal council was empowered "to license, tax or close cockpits. This power of the municipal council to authorize or license cockpits was repeatedly recognized even after the establishment of the present Republic in 1946. [46] Such authority granted unto the municipal councils to license the operation of cockpits was generally unqualified by restrictions. [47] The Revised Administrative Code did impose restrictions on what days cockfights could be held. [48]
However, in the 1970s, the desire for stricter licensing requirements of cockpits started to see legislative fruit. The Cockfighting Law of 1974 enacted several of these restrictions. Apart from the one-cockpit-per-municipality rule, other restrictions were imposed, such as the limitation of ownership of cockpits to Filipino citizens. [49] More importantly, under Section 6 of the Cockfighting Law, it was the city or municipal mayor who was authorized to issue licenses for the operation and maintenance of cockpits, subject to the approval of the Chief of Constabulary or his authorized representatives. [50] Thus, the sole discretion to authorize the operation of cockpits was removed from the local government unit since the approval of the Chief of Constabulary was now required. P.D. No. 1802 reestablished the Philippine Gamefowl Commission [51] and imposed further structure in the regulation of cockfighting. Under Section 4 thereof, city and municipal mayors with the concurrence of their respective sangguniang panglunsod or sangguniang bayan, were given the authority to license and regulate cockfighting, under the supervision of the City Mayor or the Provincial Governor. However, Section 4 of P.D. No. 1802 was subsequently amended, removing the supervision exercised by the mayor or governor and substituting in their stead the Philippine Gamefowl Commission. The amended provision ordained: Sec. 4. City and Municipal Mayors with the concurrence of their respective "Sanggunians shall have the authority to license and regulate regular cockfighting pursuant to the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission and subject to its review and supervision. The Court, on a few occasions prior to the enactment of the Local Government Code in 1991, had opportunity to expound on Section 4 as amended. A discussion of these cases will provide a better understanding of the qualifier "any law to the contrary notwithstanding provided in Section 447(a)(3)(v). n Philippine Gamefowl Commission v Intermediate Appellate Court, [52] the Court, through Justice Cruz, asserted that the conferment of the power to license and regulate municipal cockpits in municipal authorities is in line with the policy of local autonomy embodied in the Constitution. [53] The Court affirmed the annulment of a resolution of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission which ordered the revocation of a permit issued by a municipal mayor for the operation of a cockpit and the issuance of a new permit to a different applicant. According to the Court, the Philippine Gamefowl Commission did not possess the power to issue cockpit licenses, as this was vested by Section 4 of P.D. No. 1802, as amended, to the municipal mayor with the concurrence of the sanggunian. t emphasized that the Philippine Gamefowl Commission only had review and supervision powers, as distinguished from control, over ordinary cockpits. [54] The Court also noted that the regulation of cockpits was vested in municipal officials, subject only to the guidelines laid down by the Philippine Gamefowl Commission. [55] The Court conceded that "[if] at all, the power to review includes the power to disapprove; but it does not carry the authority to substitute one's own preferences for that chosen by the subordinate in the exercise of its sound discretion. The twin pronouncements that it is the municipal authorities who are empowered to issue cockpit licenses and that the powers of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission were limited to review and supervision were affirmed in eang v Intermediate Appellate Court, [56] Municipality of Malolos v Libangang Malolos Inc [57] and Adlawan v Intermediate Appellate Court. [58] But notably in Cootauco v Court of Appeals, [59] the Court especially noted that Philippine Gamefowl Commission did indicate that the Commission's "power of review includes the power to disapprove. [60] nterestingly, Justice Cruz, the writer of Philippine Gamefowl Commission, qualified his concurrence in Cootauco "subject to the reservations made in [Philippine Gamefowl Commission] regarding the review powers of the PGC over cockpit licenses issued by city and municipal mayors. [61]
These cases reiterate what has been the traditional prerogative of municipal officials to control the issuances of licenses for the operation of cockpits. Nevertheless, the newly-introduced role of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission vis--vis the operation of cockpits had caused some degree of controversy, as shown by the cases above cited. Then, the Local Government Code of 1991 was enacted. There is no more forceful authority on this landmark legislation than Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., its principal author. n his annotations to the Local Government Code, he makes the following remarks relating to Section 447(a)(3)(v): 12. Licensing power. n connection with the power to grant licenses lodged with it, the Sangguniang Bayan may now regulate not only businesses but also occupations, professions or callings that do not require government examinations within its jurisdiction. t may also authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits, regulate cockfighting, and the commercial breeding of gamecocks. Existing rights however, may not be prejudiced. The power to license cockpits and permits for cockfighting has been removed completely from the Gamefowl Commission. Thus, that part of the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Municipality of Malolos v Libangang Malolos, Inc et al., which held that ".the regulation of cockpits is vested in the municipal councils guidelines laid down by the Philippine Gamefowl Commission is no longer controlling. Under [Section 447(a)(3)(v)], the power of the Sanggunian concerned is no longer subject to the supervision of the Gamefowl Commission. [62]
The above observations may be faulted somewhat in the sense that they fail to acknowledge the Court's consistent position that the licensing power over cockpits belongs exclusively to the municipal authorities and not the Philippine Gamefowl Commission. Yet these views of Senator Pimentel evince the apparent confusion regarding the role of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission as indicated in the cases previously cited, and accordingly bring the phrase Section 447(a)(3)(v) used in "any law to the contrary notwithstanding into its proper light. The qualifier serves notice, in case it was still doubtful, that it is the sanggunian bayan concerned alone which has the power to authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks within its territorial jurisdiction. Given the historical perspective, it becomes evident why the legislature found the need to use the phrase "any law to the contrary notwithstanding in Section 447(a)(3)(v). However, does the phrase similarly allow the Sangguniang Bayan to authorize more cockpits than allowed under Section 5(d) of the Cockfighting Law? Certainly, applying the test of implied repeal, these two provisions can stand together. While the sanggunian retains the power to authorize and license the establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits, its discretion is limited in that it cannot authorize more than one cockpit per city or municipality, unless such cities or municipalities have a population of over one hundred thousand, in which case two cockpits may be established. Considering that Section 447(a)(3)(v) speaks essentially of the identity of the wielder of the power of control and supervision over cockpit operation, it is not inconsistent with previous enactments that impose restrictions on how such power may be exercised. n short, there is no dichotomy between affirming the power and subjecting it to limitations at the same time. Perhaps more essential than the fact that the two controverted provisions are not inconsistent when put together, the Court recognizes that Section 5(d) of the Cockfighting Law arises from a valid exercise of police power by the national government. Of course, local governments are similarly empowered under Section 16 of the Local Government Code. The national government ought to be attuned to the sensitivities of devolution and strive to be sparing in usurping the prerogatives of local governments to regulate the general welfare of their constituents. We do not doubt, however, the ability of the national government to implement police power measures that affect the subjects of municipal government, especially if the subject of regulation is a condition of universal character irrespective of territorial jurisdictions. Cockfighting is one such condition. t is a traditionally regulated activity, due to the attendant gambling involved [63] or maybe even the fact that it essentially consists of two birds killing each other for public amusement. Laws have been enacted restricting the days when cockfights could be held, [64] and legislation has even been emphatic that cockfights could not be held on holidays celebrating national honor such as ndependence Day [65] and Rizal Day. [66]
The Whereas clauses of the Cockfighting Law emphasize that cockfighting "should neither be exploited as an object of commercialism or business enterprise, nor made a tool of uncontrolled gambling, but more as a vehicle for the preservation and perpetuation of native Filipino heritage and thereby enhance our national identity. [67] The obvious thrust of our laws designating when cockfights could be held is to limit cockfighting and imposing the one-cockpit-per- municipality rule is in line with that aim. Cockfighting is a valid matter of police power regulation, as it is a form of gambling essentially antagonistic to the aims of enhancing national productivity and self- reliance. [68] Limitation on the number of cockpits in a given municipality is a reasonably necessary means for the accomplishment of the purpose of controlling cockfighting, for clearly more cockpits equals more cockfights. f we construe Section 447(a)(3)(v) as vesting an unlimited discretion to the sanggunian to control all aspects of cockpits and cockfighting in their respective jurisdiction, this could lead to the prospect of daily cockfights in municipalities, a certain distraction in the daily routine of life in a municipality. This certainly goes against the grain of the legislation earlier discussed. f the arguments of the petitioners were adopted, the national government would be effectively barred from imposing any future regulatory enactments pertaining to cockpits and cockfighting unless it were to repeal Section 447(a)(3)(v). A municipal ordinance must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, otherwise it is void. [69] Ordinance No. 7 unmistakably contravenes the Cockfighting Law in allowing three cockpits in Daanbantayan. Thus, no rights can be asserted by the petitioners arising from the Ordinance. We find the grant of injunction as ordered by the appellate court to be well-taken. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENED. Costs against petitioners.
Miranda v. Aguirre Facts: n 1994, RA 7720 converting the municipality of Santiago toan independent component city was signed into law and thereafterratified in a plebiscite. Four years later, RA 8528 which amendedRA 7720 was enacted, changing the status of Santiago from an CCto a component city. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA8528 because it does not provide for submitting the law forratification by the people of Santiago City in a proper plebiscite.ssues:1. WON petitioners have standing. YES. Rule: constitutionality of law can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of itsenforcement Miranda was mayor when he filed the petition, hisrights would have been greatly affected. Otherpetitioners are residents and voters of Santiago.1. WON petition involves a political question. NO. PQ: concerned with issues dependent upon thewisdom, not legality, of a particular measure, Justiciable issue: implies a given right, legallydemandable and enforceable, an act or omissionviolative of such right, and a remedy granted andsanctioned by law, for said breach of right Case at bar=justiciable. WON petitioners have rightto a plebiscite is a legal question. WON laws passedby Congress comply with the requirements of the Consti pose questions that this court alone candecide.1. WON the change involved any creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries. YES. 2. WON a plebiscite is necessary considering the change was a mere reclassification from CC to CC. YES. A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal that the creation, division, merger,abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUs involve a common denominator material change in the political and economic rights of the LGUs directly affected as well as the people therein.t is precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the people "in the political units directly affected." Sec 10, Art X addressed the undesirable practice inthe past whereby LGUs were created, abolished,merged or divided on the basis of the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people. Thus,the consent of the people of the LGU directly affected was required to serve as a checkingmechanism to any exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or alteringthe boundaries of LGUs. t is one instance where the people in their sovereign capacity decide on amatter that affects them direct democracy of the people as opposed to democracy thru people'srepresentatives. This plebiscite requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of the Constitutiongranting more autonomy to LGUs. The changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city are many and cannot be characterized as insubstantial. The independence of the city as a political unitwill be diminished: The city mayor will be placed under theadministrative supervision of theprovincial governor. The resolutions and ordinances of the citycouncil of Santiago will have to bereviewed by the Provincial Board of sabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city willnow have to be shared with the province. When RA 7720 upgraded the status of SantiagoCity from a municipality to an independentcomponent city, it required the approval of itspeople thru a plebiscite called for the purpose.There is neither rhyme nor reason why thisplebiscite should not be called to determine thewill of the people of Santiago City when RA 8528downgrades the status of their city. There is morereason to consult the people when a lawsubstantially diminishes their right. Rule , Art 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the RRs of theLGC is in accord with the Constitution when itprovides that no creation, conversion, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUS shall take effect unlessapproved by a majority of the votes cast in aplebiscite called for the purpose in the LGU orLGUs affected. The plebiscite shall be conductedby the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)within one hundred twenty (120) days from theeffectivity of the law or ordinance prescribingsuch action, unless said law or ordinance fixesanother date. The rules cover all conversions, whether upwardor downward in character, so long as they resultin a material change in the LGU directly affected,especially a change in the political and economicrights of its people This is a petition for a writ of prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction assailing the constitu-tionality of Republic Act No. 8528, converting the City of Santiago, sabela from an independent component city to merely a component city. On May 5, 1994, RA No. 7720 was signed into a law, which converted the municipality of Santiago, sabela, into an independent component city. on July 4, 1994, RA No. 7720 was approved by the people of Santiago in a plebiscite. On February 14, 1998, RA No. 8528 was enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that practically downgraded the City of Santiago from an independent component city to a merely component city. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the lack of provision to submit the law for the approval of the people of Santiago in a proper plebiscite. Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the said act merely reclassified the City of Santiago from an independent component city into a component city. t allegedly did not involve any "creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, therefore, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary. They also questioned the standing of petitioners to file the petition and argued that the petition raises a political question over which the Court lacks jurisdiction. SSUE/S: WHETHER OR NOT RA NO. 8528 S UNCONSTTUTONAL FOR TS FALURE TO SUBMT T TO PROPER PLEBSCTE. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETTONERS LACKS STANDNG OR PERSONALTY N FLNG THS PETTON. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT HAS JURSDCTON OVER THE PETTON AT BAR ON THE GROUND THAT T NVOLVES A POLITICAL QUESTON. DECSON:
Petition was GRANTED. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional and the writ of prohibition is hereby issued commanding the respondents to desist from implementing the said law. RATO DECDEND: RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional because Sec. 10 of Art. X of the 1987 Constitution clearly states that: No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly affected is mandatory. Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA No. 8528. Petitioner Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City, Afiado was the President of the Sangguniang Liga, together with 3 other petitioners were all residents and voters in the City of Santiago. t is their right to be heard in the conversion of their city thru a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. Thus, denial of their right in RA No. 8528 gives them proper standing to strike down the law as unconstitutional. Sec. 1 of Art. V of the Constitution states that: the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instru-mentality of the Government. That the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction over said petition because it involves not a political question but a justiciable issue, and of which only the court could decide whether or not a law passed by the Congress is unconstitutional.
The Facts During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities.However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic ActNo. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001.RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million.The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, "the mad rush of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the nternal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress.However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval.However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills.The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting allthe 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009. On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills.The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007.The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President's signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the nternal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code. The ssues The petitions raise the following fundamental issues: 1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and 2.Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
The Ruling of the Court We grant the petitions. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional. First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later. Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units. Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction. Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code. Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress. Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. Preliminary Matters Prohibition is the proper action for testing the constitutionality of laws administered by the COMELEC,like the Cityhood Laws, which direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites in implementation of the Cityhood Laws.Petitioner League of Cities of the Philippines has legal standing because Section 499 of the Local Government Code tasks the League with the "primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting city government administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto.Petitioners-in-intervention, which are existing cities, have legal standing because their nternal Revenue Allotment will be reduced if the Cityhood Laws are declared constitutional.Mayor Jerry P. Treas has legal standing because as Mayor of loilo City and as a taxpayer he has sufficient interest to prevent the unlawful expenditure of public funds, like the release of more nternal Revenue Allotment to political units than what the law allows. Applying RA 9009 is a Prospective Application of the Law RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 during the 11th Congress.This law specifically amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code, which now provides: Section 450.Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a locally generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites: (i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Land Management Bureau; or (ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office. The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein. (b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non- recurring income.(Emphasis supplied) Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million.Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not provide any exemption from the increased income requirement. Prior to the enactment of RA 9009, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in Congress.Thirty- three cityhood bills became law before the enactment of RA 9009.Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills during the 11th Congress. During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, exempting from the income requirement of P100 millionin RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not acted upon during the 11th Congress.This Resolution reached the Senate.However, the 12th Congress adjourned without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed between November and December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress,individual cityhood bills containing a common provision, as follows: Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009. This common provisionexempted each of the 16 municipalities from the income requirement of P100 million prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009.These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates from March to July 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them. ndisputably, Congress passed the Cityhood Laws longafter the effectivity of RA 9009.RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 or during the 11th Congress.The 13th Congress passed in December 2006 the cityhood bills which became law only in 2007.Thus, respondent municipalities cannot invoke the principle of non-retroactivity of laws.This basic rule has no application because RA 9009, an earlier law to the Cityhood Laws, is not being applied retroactively but prospectively. Congress Must Prescribe in the Local Government Code All Criteria Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides: No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.(Emphasis supplied) The Constitution is clear.The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code.The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city.Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the creation of a city.No other law, not even the charter of the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code.Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million income requirement.Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement. n enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009.The Cityhood Laws, all enactedafter the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section THE CTY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CTY, AND THE CTY TREASURER OF QUEZON CTY, DR. VCTOR B. ENRGA, Petitioners, vs. BAYAN TELECOMMUNCATONS, NC., Respondent. D E C S O N GARCA, Before the Court, on pure questions of law, is this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to nullify and set aside the following issuances of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 227, in its Civil Case No. Q-02-47292, to wit: 1) Decision 1 dated June 6, 2003, declaring respondent Bayan Telecommunications, nc. exempt from real estate taxation on its real properties located in Quezon City; and 2) Order 2 dated December 30, 2003, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The facts: Respondent Bayan Telecommunications, nc. 3 (Bayantel) is a legislative franchise holder under Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 3259 4 to establish and operate radio stations for domestic telecommunications, radiophone, broadcasting and telecasting. Of relevance to this controversy is the tax provision of Rep. Act No. 3259, embodied in Section 14 thereof, which reads: SECTON 14. (a) The grantee shall be liable to pay the same taxes on its real estate, buildings and personal property, exclusive of the franchise, as other persons or corporations are now or hereafter may be required by law to pay. (b) The grantee shall further pay to the Treasurer of the Philippines each year, within ten days after the audit and approval of the accounts as prescribed in this Act, one and one- half per centum of all gross receipts from the business transacted under this franchise by the said grantee (Emphasis supplied). On January 1, 1992, Rep. Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC), took effect. Section 232 of the Code grants local government units within the Metro Manila Area the power to levy tax on real properties, thus: SEC. 232. Power to Levy Real Property Tax. A province or city or a municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area may levy an annual ad valorem tax on real property such as land, building, machinery and other improvements not hereinafter specifically exempted. Complementing the aforequoted provision is the second paragraph of Section 234 of the same Code which withdrew any exemption from realty tax heretofore granted to or enjoyed by all persons, natural or juridical, to wit: SEC. 234 - Exemptions from Real Property Tax. The following are exempted from payment of the real property tax: xxx xxx xxx Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax previously granted to, or enjoyed by, all persons, whether natural or juridical, including government-owned-or-controlled corporations is hereby withdrawn upon effectivity of this Code (Emphasis supplied). On July 20, 1992, barely few months after the LGC took effect, Congress enacted Rep. Act No. 7633, amending Bayantel's original franchise. The amendatory law (Rep. Act No. 7633) contained the following tax provision: SEC. 11. The grantee, its successors or assigns shall be liable to pay the same taxes on their real estate, buildings and personal property, exclusive of this franchise, as other persons or corporations are now or hereafter may be required by law to pay. n addition thereto, the grantee, its successors or assigns shall pay a franchise tax equivalent to three percent (3%) of all gross receipts of the telephone or other telecommunications businesses transacted under this franchise by the grantee, its successors or assigns and the said percentage shall be in lieu of all taxes on this franchise or earnings thereof. Provided, That the grantee, its successors or assigns shall continue to be liable for income taxes payable under Title of the National nternal Revenue Code .. xxx. [Emphasis supplied] t is undisputed that within the territorial boundary of Quezon City, Bayantel owned several real properties on which it maintained various telecommunications facilities. These real properties, as hereunder described, are covered by the following tax declarations: (a) Tax Declaration Nos. D-096-04071, D-096-04074, D-096-04072 and D-096-04073 pertaining to Bayantel's Head Office and Operations Center in Roosevelt St., San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City allegedly the nerve center of petitioner's telecommunications franchise operations, said Operation Center housing mainly petitioner's Network Operations Group and switching, transmission and related equipment; (b) Tax Declaration Nos. D-124-01013, D-124-00939, D-124-00920 and D-124-00941 covering Bayantel's land, building and equipment in Maginhawa St., Barangay East Teacher's Village, Quezon City which houses telecommunications facilities; and (c) Tax Declaration Nos. D-011-10809, D-011-10810, D-011-10811, and D-011-11540 referring to Bayantel's Exchange Center located in Proj. 8, Brgy. Bahay Toro, Tandang Sora, Quezon City which houses the Network Operations Group and cover switching, transmission and other related equipment. n 1993, the government of Quezon City, pursuant to the taxing power vested on local government units by Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, infra, in relation to Section 232 of the LGC, supra, enacted City Ordinance No. SP-91, S-93, otherwise known as the Quezon City Revenue Code (QCRC), 5 imposing, under Section 5 thereof, a real property tax on all real properties in Quezon City, and, reiterating in its Section 6, the withdrawal of exemption from real property tax under Section 234 of the LGC, supra. Furthermore, much like the LGC, the QCRC, under its Section 230, withdrew tax exemption privileges in general, as follows: SEC. 230. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges. Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including government owned or controlled corporations, except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under RA 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, business enterprises certified by the Board of nvestments (BO) as pioneer or non-pioneer for a period of six (6) and four (4) years, respectively, . are hereby withdrawn effective upon approval of this Code (Emphasis supplied). Conformably with the City's Revenue Code, new tax declarations for Bayantel's real properties in Quezon City were issued by the City Assessor and were received by Bayantel on August 13, 1998, except one (Tax Declaration No. 124-01013) which was received on July 14, 1999. Meanwhile, on March 16, 1995, Rep. Act No. 7925, 6 otherwise known as the "Public Telecommunications Policy Act of the Philippines," envisaged to level the playing field among telecommunications companies, took effect. Section 23 of the Act provides: SEC. 23. Equality of Treatment in the Telecommunications ndustry. Any advantage, favor, privilege, exemption, or immunity granted under existing franchises, or may hereafter be granted, shall ipso facto become part of previously granted telecommunications franchises and shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the grantees of such franchises: Provided, however, That the foregoing shall neither apply to nor affect provisions of telecommunications franchises concerning territory covered by the franchise, the life span of the franchise, or the type of service authorized by the franchise. On January 7, 1999, Bayantel wrote the office of the City Assessor seeking the exclusion of its real properties in the city from the roll of taxable real properties. With its request having been denied, Bayantel interposed an appeal with the Local Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA). And, evidently on its firm belief of its exempt status, Bayantel did not pay the real property taxes assessed against it by the Quezon City government. On account thereof, the Quezon City Treasurer sent out notices of delinquency for the total amount ofP43,878,208.18, followed by the issuance of several warrants of levy against Bayantel's properties preparatory to their sale at a public auction set on July 30, 2002. Threatened with the imminent loss of its properties, Bayantel immediately withdrew its appeal with the LBAA and instead filed with the RTC of Quezon City a petition for prohibition with an urgent application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction, thereat docketed as Civil Case No. Q-02-47292, which was raffled to Branch 227 of the court. On July 29, 2002, or in the eve of the public auction scheduled the following day, the lower court issued a TRO, followed, after due hearing, by a writ of preliminary injunction via its order of August 20, 2002. And, having heard the parties on the merits, the same court came out with its challenged Decision of June 6, 2003, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, pursuant to the enabling franchise under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7633, the real estate properties and buildings of petitioner [now, respondent Bayantel] which have been admitted to be used in the operation of petitioner's franchise described in the following tax declarations are hereby DECLARED exempt from real estate taxation: (1) Tax Declaration No. D-096-04071 (2) Tax Declaration No. D-096-04074 (3) Tax Declaration No. D-124-01013 (4) Tax Declaration No. D-011-10810 (5) Tax Declaration No. D-011-10811 (6) Tax Declaration No. D-011-10809 (7) Tax Declaration No. D-124-00941 (8) Tax Declaration No. D-124-00940 (9) Tax Declaration No. D-124-00939 (10) Tax Declaration No. D-096-04072 (11) Tax Declaration No. D-096-04073 (12) Tax Declaration No. D-011-11540 The preliminary prohibitory injunction issued in the August 20, 2002 Order of this Court is hereby made permanent. Since this is a resolution of a purely legal issue, there is no pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the court in its Order dated December 30, 2003, petitioners elevated the case directly to this Court on pure questions of law, ascribing to the lower court the following errors: . []n declaring the real properties of respondent exempt from real property taxes notwithstanding the fact that the tax exemption granted to Bayantel in its original franchise had been withdrawn by the [LGC] and that the said exemption was not restored by the enactment of RA 7633. . [n] declaring the real properties of respondent exempt from real property taxes notwithstanding the enactment of the [QCRC] which withdrew the tax exemption which may have been granted by RA 7633. . [n] declaring the real properties of respondent exempt from real property taxes notwithstanding the vague and ambiguous grant of tax exemption provided under Section 11 of RA 7633. V. [n] declaring the real properties of respondent exempt from real property taxes notwithstanding the fact that [it] had failed to exhaust administrative remedies in its claim for real property tax exemption. (Words in bracket added.) As we see it, the errors assigned may ultimately be reduced to two (2) basic issues, namely: 1. Whether or not Bayantel's real properties in Quezon City are exempt from real property taxes under its legislative franchise; and 2. Whether or not Bayantel is required to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief with the trial court. We shall first address the second issue, the same being procedural in nature. Petitioners argue that Bayantel had failed to avail itself of the administrative remedies provided for under the LGC, adding that the trial court erred in giving due course to Bayantel's petition for prohibition. To petitioners, the appeal mechanics under the LGC constitute Bayantel's plain and speedy remedy in this case. The Court does not agree. Petitions for prohibition are governed by the following provision of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. When the proceedings of any tribunal, . are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise, granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. With the reality that Bayantel's real properties were already levied upon on account of its nonpayment of real estate taxes thereon, the Court agrees with Bayantel that an appeal to the LBAA is not a speedy and adequate remedy within the context of the aforequoted Section 2 of Rule 65. This is not to mention of the auction sale of said properties already scheduled on July 30, 2002. Moreover, one of the recognized exceptions to the exhaustion- of- administrative remedies rule is when, as here, only legal issues are to be resolved. n fact, the Court, cognizant of the nature of the questions presently involved, gave due course to the instant petition. As the Court has said in Ty vs. Trampe: 7
xxx. Although as a rule, administrative remedies must first be exhausted before resort to judicial action can prosper, there is a well- settled exception in cases where the controversy does not involve questions of fact but only of law. xxx. Lest it be overlooked, an appeal to the LBAA, to be properly considered, required prior payment under protest of the amount of P43,878,208.18, a figure which, in the light of the then prevailing Asian financial crisis, may have been difficult to raise up. Given this reality, an appeal to the LBAA may not be considered as a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. t is thus understandable why Bayantel opted to withdraw its earlier appeal with the LBAA and, instead, filed its petition for prohibition with urgent application for injunctive relief in Civil Case No. Q-02-47292. The remedy availed of by Bayantel under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court must be upheld. This brings the Court to the more weighty question of whether or not Bayantel's real properties in Quezon City are, under its franchise, exempt from real property tax. The lower court resolved the issue in the affirmative, basically owing to the phrase "exclusive of this franchise" found in Section 11 of Bayantel's amended franchise, Rep. Act No. 7633. To petitioners, however, the language of Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 7633 is neither clear nor unequivocal. The elaborate and extensive discussion devoted by the trial court on the meaning and import of said phrase, they add, suggests as much. t is petitioners' thesis that Bayantel was in no time given any express exemption from the payment of real property tax under its amendatory franchise. There seems to be no issue as to Bayantel's exemption from real estate taxes by virtue of the term "exclusive of the franchise" qualifying the phrase "same taxes on its real estate, buildings and personal property," found in Section 14, supra, of its franchise, Rep. Act No. 3259, as originally granted. The legislative intent expressed in the phrase "exclusive of this franchise" cannot be construed other than distinguishing between two (2) sets of properties, be they real or personal, owned by the franchisee, namely, (a) those actually, directly and exclusively used in its radio or telecommunications business, and (b) those properties which are not so used. t is worthy to note that the properties subject of the present controversy are only those which are admittedly falling under the first category. To the mind of the Court, Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 3259 effectively works to grant or delegate to local governments of Congress' inherent power to tax the franchisee's properties belonging to the second group of properties indicated above, that is, all properties which, "exclusive of this franchise," are not actually and directly used in the pursuit of its franchise. As may be recalled, the taxing power of local governments under both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions solely depended upon an enabling law. Absent such enabling law, local government units were without authority to impose and collect taxes on real properties within their respective territorial jurisdictions. While Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 3259 may be validly viewed as an implied delegation of power to tax, the delegation under that provision, as couched, is limited to impositions over properties of the franchisee which are not actually, directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise. Necessarily, other properties of Bayantel directly used in the pursuit of its business are beyond the pale of the delegated taxing power of local governments. n a very real sense, therefore, real properties of Bayantel, save those exclusive of its franchise, are subject to realty taxes. Ultimately, therefore, the inevitable result was that all realties which are actually, directly and exclusively used in the operation of its franchise are "exempted" from any property tax. Bayantel's franchise being national in character, the "exemption" thus granted under Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 3259 applies to all its real or personal properties found anywhere within the Philippine archipelago. However, with the LGC's taking effect on January 1, 1992, Bayantel's "exemption" from real estate taxes for properties of whatever kind located within the Metro Manila area was, by force of Section 234 of the Code, supra, expressly withdrawn. But, not long thereafter, however, or on July 20, 1992, Congress passed Rep. Act No. 7633 amending Bayantel's original franchise. Worthy of note is that Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 7633 is a virtual reenacment of the tax provision, i.e., Section 14, supra, of Bayantel's original franchise under Rep. Act No. 3259. Stated otherwise, Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 3259 which was deemed impliedly repealed by Section 234 of the LGC was expressly revived under Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 7633. n concrete terms, the realty tax exemption heretofore enjoyed by Bayantel under its original franchise, but subsequently withdrawn by force of Section 234 of the LGC, has been restored by Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 7633. The Court has taken stock of the fact that by virtue of Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, 8 local governments are empowered to levy taxes. And pursuant to this constitutional empowerment, juxtaposed with Section 232 9 of the LGC, the Quezon City government enacted in 1993 its local Revenue Code, imposing real property tax on all real properties found within its territorial jurisdiction. And as earlier stated, the City's Revenue Code, just like the LGC, expressly withdrew, under Section 230 thereof, supra, all tax exemption privileges in general. This thus raises the question of whether or not the City's Revenue Code pursuant to which the city treasurer of Quezon City levied real property taxes against Bayantel's real properties located within the City effectively withdrew the tax exemption enjoyed by Bayantel under its franchise, as amended. Bayantel answers the poser in the negative arguing that once again it is only "liable to pay the same taxes, as any other persons or corporations on all its real or personal properties, exclusive of its franchise." Bayantel's posture is well-taken. While the system of local government taxation has changed with the onset of the 1987 Constitution, the power of local government units to tax is still limited. As we explained in Mactan Cebu nternational Airport Authority: 10
The power to tax is primarily vested in the Congress; however, in our jurisdiction, it may be exercised by local legislative bodies, no longer merely be virtue of a valid delegation as before, but pursuant to direct authority conferred by Section 5, Article X of the Constitution. Under the latter, the exercise of the power may be subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide which, however, must be consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. (at p. 680; Emphasis supplied.) Clearly then, while a new slant on the subject of local taxation now prevails in the sense that the former doctrine of local government units' delegated power to tax had been effectively modified with Article X, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution now in place, .the basic doctrine on local taxation remains essentially the same. For as the Court stressed in Mactan, "the power to tax is [still] primarily vested in the Congress." This new perspective is best articulated by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., himself a Commissioner of the 1986 Constitutional Commission which crafted the 1987 Constitution, thus: What is the effect of Section 5 on the fiscal position of municipal corporations? Section 5 does not change the doctrine that municipal corporations do not possess inherent powers of taxation. What it does is to confer municipal corporations a general power to levy taxes and otherwise create sources of revenue. They no longer have to wait for a statutory grant of these powers. The power of the legislative authority relative to the fiscal powers of local governments has been reduced to the authority to impose limitations on municipal powers. Moreover, these limitations must be "consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy." The important legal effect of Section 5 is thus to reverse the principle that doubts are resolved against municipal corporations. Henceforth, in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal fiscal powers, doubts will be resolved in favor of municipal corporations. t is understood, however, that taxes imposed by local government must be for a public purpose, uniform within a locality, must not be confiscatory, and must be within the jurisdiction of the local unit to pass. 11 (Emphasis supplied). n net effect, the controversy presently before the Court involves, at bottom, a clash between the inherent taxing power of the legislature, which necessarily includes the power to exempt, and the local government's delegated power to tax under the aegis of the 1987 Constitution. Now to go back to the Quezon City Revenue Code which imposed real estate taxes on all real properties within the city's territory and removed exemptions theretofore "previously granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical ..," 12 there can really be no dispute that the power of the Quezon City Government to tax is limited by Section 232 of the LGC which expressly provides that "a province or city or municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area may levy an annual ad valorem tax on real property such as land, building, machinery, and other improvement not hereinafter specifically exempted." Under this law, the Legislature highlighted its power to thereafter exempt certain realties from the taxing power of local government units. An interpretation denying Congress such power to exempt would reduce the phrase "not hereinafter specifically exempted" as a pure jargon, without meaning whatsoever. Needless to state, such absurd situation is unacceptable. For sure, in Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, nc. (PLDT) vs. City of Davao, 13 this Court has upheld the power of Congress to grant exemptions over the power of local government units to impose taxes. There, the Court wrote: ndeed, the grant of taxing powers to local government units under the Constitution and the LGC does not affect the power of Congress to grant exemptions to certain persons, pursuant to a declared national policy. The legal effect of the constitutional grant to local governments simply means that in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers, doubts must be resolved in favor of municipal corporations. (Emphasis supplied.) As we see it, then, the issue in this case no longer dwells on whether Congress has the power to exempt Bayantel's properties from realty taxes by its enactment of Rep. Act No. 7633 which amended Bayantel's original franchise. The more decisive question turns on whether Congress actually did exempt Bayantel's properties at all by virtue of Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 7633. Admittedly, Rep. Act No. 7633 was enacted subsequent to the LGC. Perfectly aware that the LGC has already withdrawn Bayantel's former exemption from realty taxes, Congress opted to pass Rep. Act No. 7633 using, under Section 11 thereof, exactly the same defining phrase "exclusive of this franchise" which was the basis for Bayantel's exemption from realty taxes prior to the LGC. n plain language, Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 7633 states that "the grantee, its successors or assigns shall be liable to pay the same taxes on their real estate, buildings and personal property, exclusive of this franchise, as other persons or corporations are now or hereafter may be required by law to pay." The Court views this subsequent piece of legislation as an express and real intention on the part of Congress to once again remove from the LGC's delegated taxing power, all of the franchisee's (Bayantel's) properties that are actually, directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENED. No pronouncement as to costs. ALTERNATVE CENTER FOR ORGANZATONAL REFORMS AND DEVELOPMENT, NC., VS. ZAMORA G.R. No. 144256 Subject: Public Corporation Doctrine: Automatic release of RA Facts: Pres. Estrada, pursuant to Sec 22, Art V mandating the Pres to submit to Congress a budget of expenditures within 30 days before the opening of every regular session, submitted the National Expenditures program for FY 2000. The President proposed an RA of P121,778,000,000. This became RA 8760, "AN ACT APPROPRATNG FUNDS FOR THE OPERATON OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLC OF THE PHLPPNES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THRTY-ONE, TWO THOUSAND, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES also known as General Appropriations Act (GAA) for the Year 2000. t provides under the heading "ALLOCATONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNTS that the RA for local government units shall amount to P111,778,000,000. n another part of the GAA, under the heading "UNPROGRAMMED FUND, it is provided that an amount of P10,000,000,000 (P10 Billion), apart from the P111,778,000,000 mentioned above, shall be used to fund the RA, which amount shall be released only when the original revenue targets submitted by the President to Congress can be realized based on a quarterly assessment to be conducted by certain committees which the GAA specifies, namely, the Development Budget Coordinating Committee, the Committee on Finance of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. Thus, while the GAA appropriates P111,778,000,000 of RA as Programmed Fund, it appropriates a separate amount of P10 Billion of RA under the classification of Unprogrammed Fund, the latter amount to be released only upon the occurrence of the condition stated in the GAA. On August 22, 2000, a number of NGOs and POs, along with 3 barangay officials filed with this Court the petition at bar, for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus With Application for Temporary Restraining Order, against respondents then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, then Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management Benjamin Diokno, then National Treasurer Leonor Magtolis-Briones, and the Commission on Audit, challenging the constitutionality of provision XXXV (ALLOCATONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNTS) referred to by petitioners as Section 1, XXXV (A), and LV (UNPROGRAMMED FUND) Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the GAA (the GAA provisions) Petitioners contend that the said provisions violates the LGUs autonomy by unlawfully reducing the RA allotted by 10B and by withholding its release by placing the same under "Unprogrammed funds. Although the effectivity of the Year 2000 GAA has ceased, this Court shall nonetheless proceed to resolve the issues raised in the present case, it being impressed with public interest. Petitioners argue that the GAA violated the constitutional mandate of automatically releasing the RAs when it made its release contingent on whether revenue collections could meet the revenue targets originally submitted by the President, rather than making the release automatic. SSUE: WON the subject GAA violates LGUs fiscal autonomy by not automatically releasing the whole amount of the allotted RA. HELD: Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution provides: SECTON 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. Petitioners argue that the GAA violated this constitutional mandate when it made the release of RA contingent on whether revenue collections could meet the revenue targets originally submitted by the President, rather than making the release automatic. Respondents counterargue that the above constitutional provision is addressed not to the legislature but to the executive, hence, the same does not prevent the legislature from imposing conditions upon the release of the RA. Respondents thus infer that the subject constitutional provision merely prevents the executive branch of the government from "unilaterally withholding the RA, but not the legislature from authorizing the executive branch to withhold the same. n the words of respondents, "This essentially means that the President or any member of the Executive Department cannot unilaterally, i.e., without the backing of statute, withhold the release of the RA. As the Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically release the just share of local governments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature not to pass laws that might prevent the executive from performing this duty. To hold that the executive branch may disregard constitutional provisions which define its duties, provided it has the backing of statute, is virtually to make the Constitution amendable by statute a proposition which is patently absurd. f indeed the framers intended to allow the enactment of statutes making the release of RA conditional instead of automatic, then Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution would have been worded differently. Since, under Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution, only the just share of local governments is qualified by the words "as determined by law, and not the release thereof, the plain implication is that Congress is not authorized by the Constitution to hinder or impede the automatic release of the RA. n another case, the Court held that the only possible exception to mandatory automatic release of the RA is, as held in Batangas: .if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40 percent of the collections of the preceding third fiscal year, in which case what should be automatically released shall be a proportionate amount of the collections for the current fiscal year. The adjustment may even be made on a quarterly basis depending on the actual collections of national internal revenue taxes for the quarter of the current fiscal year. This Court recognizes that the passage of the GAA provisions by Congress was motivated by the laudable intent to "lower the budget deficit in line with prudent fiscal management. The pronouncement in Pimentel, however, must be echoed: "[T]he rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be carried out by legal methods. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. XXXV and LV Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the Year 2000 GAA are hereby declared unconstitutional insofar as they set apart a portion of the RA, in the amount of P10 Billion, as part of the UNPROGRAMMED FUND.
BATANGAS CATV, NC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE BATANGAS CTY SANGGUNANG PANLUNGSOD and BATANGAS CTY MAYOR [G.R. No. 138810. September 29, 2004]
FACTS: On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210 granting petitioner a permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City. Section 8 of the Resolution provides that petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers the maximum rates specified therein, "provided, however, that any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
Sometime in November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per month. As a result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its permit unless it secures the approval of respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, pursuant to Resolution No. 210.
Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition for injunction alleging that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators because under Executive Order No. 205, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to regulate the CATV operation in the Philippines.
SSUE : may a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators within its territorial jurisdiction?
HELD: No.
x x x
The logical conclusion, therefore, is that in light of the above laws and E.O. No. 436, the NTC exercises regulatory power over CATV operators to the exclusion of other bodies.
x x x
Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the general welfare clause. This is primarily because the CATV system commits the indiscretion of crossing public properties. (t uses public properties in order to reach subscribers.) The physical realities of constructing CATV system the use of public streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures, and the parceling of large regions allow an LGU a certain degree of regulation over CATV operators.
x x x
But, while we recognize the LGUs' power under the general welfare clause, we cannot sustain Resolution No. 210. We are convinced that respondents strayed from the well recognized limits of its power. The flaws in Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it violates the mandate of existing laws and (2) it violates the State's deregulation policy over the CATV industry.
LGUs must recognize that technical matters concerning CATV operation are within the exclusive regulatory power of the NTC.
LEONARDO TAN, ROBERT UY and LAMBERTO TE, petitioners, vs SOCORRO Y. PEREA, respondent D E C S O N TNGA, .: The resolution of the present petition effectively settles the question of how many cockpits may be allowed to operate in a city or municipality. There are two competing values of high order that come to fore in this casethe traditional power of the national government to enact police power measures, on one hand, and the vague principle of local autonomy now enshrined in the Constitution on the other. The facts are simple, but may be best appreciated taking into account the legal milieu which frames them. n 1974, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 449, otherwise known as the Cockfighting Law of 1974, was enacted. Section 5(b) of the Decree provided for limits on the number of cockpits that may be established in cities and municipalities in the following manner: Section 5. Cockpits and Cockfighting in General. (b) Establishment of Cockpits. Only one cockpit shall be allowed in each city or municipality, except that in cities or municipalities with a population of over one hundred thousand, two cockpits may be established, maintained and operated. With the enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991, [1] the municipal sangguniang bayan were empowered, "[a]ny law to the contrary notwithstanding, to "authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks. [2]
n 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipality of Daanbantayan, [3] Cebu Province, enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 6 (Ordinance No. 6), Series of 1993, which served as the Revised Omnibus Ordinance prescribing and promulgating the rules and regulations governing cockpit operations in Daanbantayan. [4] Section 5 thereof, relative to the number of cockpits allowed in the municipality, stated: Section 5. There shall be allowed to operate in the Municipality of Daanbantayan, Province of Cebu, not more than its equal number of cockpits based upon the population provided for in PD 449, provided however, that this specific section can be amended for purposes of establishing additional cockpits, if the Municipal population so warrants. [5]
Shortly thereafter, the Sangguniang Bayan passed an amendatory ordinance, Municipal Ordinance No. 7 (Ordinance No. 7), Series of 1993, which amended the aforequoted Section 5 to now read as follows: Section 5. Establishment of Cockpit. There shall be allowed to operate in the Municipality of Daanbantayan, Province of Cebu, not more than three (3) cockpits. [6]
On 8 November 1995, petitioner Leonardo Tan (Tan) applied with the Municipal Gamefowl Commission for the issuance of a permit/license to establish and operate a cockpit in Sitio Combado, Bagay, in Daanbantayan. At the time of his application, there was already another cockpit in operation in Daanbantayan, operated by respondent Socorro Y. Perea (Perea), who was the duly franchised and licensed cockpit operator in the municipality since the 1970s. Perea's franchise, per records, was valid until 2002. [7]
The Municipal Gamefowl Commission favorably recommended to the mayor of Daanbantayan, petitioner Lamberto Te (Te), that a permit be issued to Tan. On 20 January 1996, Te issued a mayor's permit allowing Tan "to establish/operate/conduct the business of a cockpit in Combado, Bagay, Daanbantayan, Cebu for the period from 20 January 1996 to 31 December 1996. [8]
This act of the mayor served as cause for Perea to file a Complaint for damages with a prayer for injunction against Tan, Te, and Roberto Uy, the latter allegedly an agent of Tan. [9] Perea alleged that there was no lawful basis for the establishment of a second cockpit. She claimed that Tan conducted his cockpit fights not in Combado, but in Malingin, at a site less than five kilometers away from her own cockpit. She insisted that the unlawful operation of Tan's cockpit has caused injury to her own legitimate business, and demanded damages of at least Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) per month as actual damages, One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) as moral damages, and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages. Perea also prayed that the permit issued by Te in favor of Tan be declared as null and void, and that a permanent writ of injunction be issued against Te and Tan preventing Tan from conducting cockfights within the municipality and Te from issuing any authority for Tan to pursue such activity. [10]
The case was heard by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), [11] Branch 61 of Bogo, Cebu, which initially granted a writ of preliminary injunction. [12] During trial, herein petitioners asserted that under the Local Government Code of 1991, the sangguniang bayan of each municipality now had the power and authority to grant franchises and enact ordinances authorizing the establishment, licensing, operation and maintenance of cockpits. [13] By virtue of such authority, the Sangguniang Bayan of Daanbantayan promulgated Ordinance Nos. 6 and 7. On the other hand, Perea claimed that the amendment authorizing the operation of not more than three (3) cockpits in Daanbantayan violated Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law of 1974, which allowed for only one cockpit in a municipality with a population as Daanbantayan. [14]
n a ecision dated 10 March 1997, the RTC dismissed the complaint. The court observed that Section 5 of Ordinance No. 6, prior to its amendment, was by specific provision, an implementation of the Cockfighting Law. [15] Yet according to the RTC, questions could be raised as to the efficacy of the subsequent amendment under Ordinance No. 7, since under the old Section 5, an amendment allowing additional cockpits could be had only "if the municipal population so warrants. [16] While the RTC seemed to doubt whether this condition had actually been fulfilled, it nonetheless declared that since the case was only for damages, "the [RTC] cannot grant more relief than that prayed for. [17] t ruled that there was no evidence, testimonial or documentary, to show that plaintiff had actually suffered damages. Neither was there evidence that Te, by issuing the permit to Tan, had acted in bad faith, since such issuance was pursuant to municipal ordinances that nonetheless remained in force. [18] Finally, the RTC noted that the assailed permit had expired on 31 December 1996, and there was no showing that it had been renewed. [19]
Perea filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated 24 February 1998. n this Order, the RTC categorically stated that Ordinance Nos. 6 and 7 were "valid and legal for all intents and purpose[s]. [20] The RTC also noted that the Sangguniang Bayan had also promulgated Resolution No. 78-96, conferring on Tan a franchise to operate a cockpit for a period of ten (10) years from February 1996 to 2006. [21] This Resolution was likewise affirmed as valid by the RTC. The RTC noted that while the ordinances seemed to be in conflict with the Cockfighting Law, any doubt in interpretation should be resolved in favor of the grant of more power to the local government unit, following the principles of devolution under the Local Government Code. [22]
The ecision and Order of the RTC were assailed by Perea on an appeal with the Court of Appeals which on 21 May 2001, rendered the ecision now assailed. [23] The perspective from which the Court of Appeals viewed the issue was markedly different from that adopted by the RTC. ts analysis of the Local Government Code, particularly Section 447(a)(3)(V), was that the provision vesting unto the sangguniang bayan the power to authorize and license the establishment of cockpits did not do away with the Cockfighting Law, as these two laws are not necessarily inconsistent with each other. What the provision of the Local Government Code did, according to the Court of Appeals, was to transfer to the sangguniang bayan powers that were previously conferred on the Municipal Gamefowl Commission. [24]
Given these premises, the appellate court declared as follows: Ordinance No. 7 should [be] held invalid for allowing, in unconditional terms, the operation of "not more than three cockpits in Daan Bantayan (sic), clearly dispensing with the standard set forth in PD 449. However, this issue appears to have been mooted by the expiration of the Mayor's Permit granted to the defendant which has not been renewed. [25]
As to the question of damages, the Court of Appeals agreed with the findings of the RTC that Perea was not entitled to damages. Thus, it affirmed the previous ruling denying the claim for damages. However, the Court of Appeals modified the RTC's Decision in that it now ordered that Tan be enjoined from operating a cockpit and conducting any cockfights within Daanbantayan. [26]
Thus, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari. Petitioners present two legal questions for determination: whether the Local Government Code has rendered inoperative the Cockfighting Law; and whether the validity of a municipal ordinance may be determined in an action for damages which does not even contain a prayer to declare the ordinance invalid. [27] As the denial of the prayer for damages by the lower court is not put in issue before this Court, it shall not be passed upon on review. The first question raised is particularly interesting, and any definitive resolution on that point would have obvious ramifications not only to Daanbantayan, but all other municipalities and cities. However, we must first determine the proper scope of judicial inquiry that we could engage in, given the nature of the initiatory complaint and the rulings rendered thereupon, the exact point raised in the second question. Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals, in declaring Ordinance No. 7 as invalid, embarked on an unwarranted collateral attack on the validity of a municipal ordinance. [28] Perea's complaint, which was for damages with preliminary injunction, did not pray for the nullity of Ordinance No. 7. The Municipality of Daanbantayan as a local government unit was not made a party to the case, nor did any legal counsel on its behalf enter any appearance. Neither was the Office of the Solicitor General given any notice of the case. [29]
These concerns are not trivial. [30] Yet, we must point out that the Court of Appeals did not expressly nullify Ordinance No. 7, or any ordinance for that matter. What the appellate court did was to say that Ordinance No. 7 "should therefore be held invalid for being in violation of the Cockfighting Law. [31] n the next breath though, the Court of Appeals backtracked, saying that "this issue appears to have been mooted by the expiration of the Mayor's Permit granted to Tan. [32]
But our curiosity is aroused by the dispositive portion of the assailed ecision, wherein the Court of Appeals enjoined Tan "from operating a cockpit and conducting any cockfights within Daanbantayan. [33] Absent the invalidity of Ordinance No. 7, there would be no basis for this injunction. After all, any future operation of a cockpit by Tan in Daanbantayan, assuming all other requisites are complied with, would be validly authorized should Ordinance No. 7 subsist. So it seems, for all intents and purposes, that the Court of Appeals did deem Ordinance No. 7 a nullity. Through such resort, did the appellate court in effect allow a collateral attack on the validity of an ordinance through an action for damages, as the petitioners argue? The initiatory Complaint filed by Perea deserves close scrutiny. mmediately, it can be seen that it is not only an action for damages, but also one for injunction. An action for injunction will require judicial determination whether there exists a right in esse which is to be protected, and if there is an act constituting a violation of such right against which injunction is sought. At the same time, the mere fact of injury alone does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. n other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, there must be damnum et injuriathat act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. [34]
ndubitably, the determination of whether injunction or damages avail in this case requires the ascertainment of whether a second cockpit may be legally allowed in Daanbantayan. f this is permissible, Perea would not be entitled either to injunctive relief or damages. Moreover, an examination of the specific allegations in the Complaint reveals that Perea therein puts into question the legal basis for allowing Tan to operate another cockpit in Daanbantayan. She asserted that "there is no lawful basis for the establishment of a second cockpit considering the small population of [Daanbantayan], [35] a claim which alludes to Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law which prohibits the establishment of a second cockpit in municipalities of less than ten thousand (10,000) in population. Perea likewise assails the validity of the permit issued to Tan and prays for its annulment, and also seeks that Te be enjoined from issuing any special permit not only to Tan, but also to "any other person outside of a duly licensed cockpit in Daanbantayan, Cebu. [36]
t would have been preferable had Perea expressly sought the annulment of Ordinance No. 7. Yet it is apparent from her Complaint that she sufficiently alleges that there is no legal basis for the establishment of a second cockpit. More importantly, the petitioners themselves raised the valid effect of Ordinance No. 7 at the heart of their defense against the complaint, as adverted to in their Answer. [37] The averment in the Answer that Ordinance No. 7 is valid can be considered as an affirmative defense, as it is the allegation of a new matter which, while hypothetically admitting the material allegations in the complaint, would nevertheless bar recovery. [38] Clearly then, the validity of Ordinance No. 7 became a justiciable matter for the RTC, and indeed Perea squarely raised the argument during trial that said ordinance violated the Cockfighting Law. [39]
Moreover, the assailed rulings of the RTC, its ecision and subsequent Order denying Perea's Motion for Reconsideration, both discuss the validity of Ordinance No. 7. n the Decision, the RTC evaded making a categorical ruling on the ordinance's validity because the case was "only for damages, [thus the RTC could] not grant more relief than that prayed for. This reasoning is unjustified, considering that Perea also prayed for an injunction, as well as for the annulment of Tan's permit. The resolution of these two questions could very well hinge on the validity of Ordinance No. 7. Still, in the Order denying Perea's Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC felt less inhibited and promptly declared as valid not only Ordinance No. 7, but also Resolution No. 78-96 of the Sangguniang Bayan dated 23 February 1996, which conferred on Tan a franchise to operate a cockpit from 1996 to 2006. [40] n the Order, the RTC ruled that while Ordinance No. 7 was in apparent conflict with the Cockfighting Law, the ordinance was justified under Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the Local Government Code. This express affirmation of the validity of Ordinance No. 7 by the RTC was the first assigned error in Perea's appeal to the Court of Appeals. [41] n their Appellee's Brief before the appellate court, the petitioners likewise argued that Ordinance No. 7 was valid and that the Cockfighting Law was repealed by the Local Government Code. [42] On the basis of these arguments, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed ecision, including its ruling that the Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law remains in effect notwithstanding the enactment of the Local Government Code. ndubitably, the question on the validity of Ordinance No. 7 in view of the continuing efficacy of Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law is one that has been fully litigated in the courts below. We are comfortable with reviewing that question in the case at bar and make dispositions proceeding from that key legal question. This is militated by the realization that in order to resolve the question whether injunction should be imposed against the petitioners, there must be first a determination whether Tan may be allowed to operate a second cockpit in Daanbantayan. Thus, the conflict between Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law and Ordinance No. 7 now ripens for adjudication. n arguing that Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law has been repealed, petitioners cite the following provisions of Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the Local Government Code: Section 447. Powers, uties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang bayan, as the legislative body of the municipality, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the municipality as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall: . . . . (3) Subject to the provisions of Book of this Code, grant franchises, enact ordinances authorizing the issuance of permits or licenses, or enact ordinances levying taxes, fees and charges upon such conditions and for such purposes intended to promote the general welfare of the inhabitants of the municipality, and pursuant to this legislative authority shall: . . . . (v) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding, authorize and license the establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks; Provided, that existing rights should not be prejudiced; For the petitioners, Section 447(a)(3)(v) sufficiently repeals Section 5(b) of the Cockfighting Law, vesting as it does on LGUs the power and authority to issue franchises and regulate the operation and establishment of cockpits in their respective municipalities, any law to the contrary notwithstanding. However, while the Local Government Code expressly repealed several laws, the Cockfighting Law was not among them. Section 534(f) of the Local Government Code declares that all general and special laws or decrees inconsistent with the Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly, but such clause is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the acts that are intended to be repealed. [43] t is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are disfavored and will not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators is manifest. [44] As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and with knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is logical to conclude that in passing a statute it is not intended to interfere with or abrogate a former law relating to the same subject matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable but also clear and convincing as a result of the language used, or unless the latter Act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier. [45]
s the one-cockpit-per-municipality rule under the Cockfighting Law clearly and convincingly irreconcilable with Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the Local Government Code? The clear import of Section 447(a)(3)(v) is that it is the sangguniang bayan which is empowered to authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks, notwithstanding any law to the contrary. The necessity of the qualifying phrase "any law to the contrary notwithstanding can be discerned by examining the history of laws pertaining to the authorization of cockpit operation in this country. Cockfighting, or sabong in the local parlance, has a long and storied tradition in our culture and was prevalent even during the Spanish occupation. When the newly-arrived Americans proceeded to organize a governmental structure in the Philippines, they recognized cockfighting as an activity that needed to be regulated, and it was deemed that it was the local municipal council that was best suited to oversee such regulation. Hence, under Section 40 of Act No. 82, the general act for the organization of municipal governments promulgated in 1901, the municipal council was empowered "to license, tax or close cockpits. This power of the municipal council to authorize or license cockpits was repeatedly recognized even after the establishment of the present Republic in 1946. [46] Such authority granted unto the municipal councils to license the operation of cockpits was generally unqualified by restrictions. [47] The Revised Administrative Code did impose restrictions on what days cockfights could be held. [48]
However, in the 1970s, the desire for stricter licensing requirements of cockpits started to see legislative fruit. The Cockfighting Law of 1974 enacted several of these restrictions. Apart from the one-cockpit-per-municipality rule, other restrictions were imposed, such as the limitation of ownership of cockpits to Filipino citizens. [49] More importantly, under Section 6 of the Cockfighting Law, it was the city or municipal mayor who was authorized to issue licenses for the operation and maintenance of cockpits, subject to the approval of the Chief of Constabulary or his authorized representatives. [50] Thus, the sole discretion to authorize the operation of cockpits was removed from the local government unit since the approval of the Chief of Constabulary was now required. P.D. No. 1802 reestablished the Philippine Gamefowl Commission [51] and imposed further structure in the regulation of cockfighting. Under Section 4 thereof, city and municipal mayors with the concurrence of their respective sangguniang panglunsod or sangguniang bayan, were given the authority to license and regulate cockfighting, under the supervision of the City Mayor or the Provincial Governor. However, Section 4 of P.D. No. 1802 was subsequently amended, removing the supervision exercised by the mayor or governor and substituting in their stead the Philippine Gamefowl Commission. The amended provision ordained: Sec. 4. City and Municipal Mayors with the concurrence of their respective "Sanggunians shall have the authority to license and regulate regular cockfighting pursuant to the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission and subject to its review and supervision. The Court, on a few occasions prior to the enactment of the Local Government Code in 1991, had opportunity to expound on Section 4 as amended. A discussion of these cases will provide a better understanding of the qualifier "any law to the contrary notwithstanding provided in Section 447(a)(3)(v). n Philippine Gamefowl Commission v Intermediate Appellate Court, [52] the Court, through Justice Cruz, asserted that the conferment of the power to license and regulate municipal cockpits in municipal authorities is in line with the policy of local autonomy embodied in the Constitution. [53] The Court affirmed the annulment of a resolution of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission which ordered the revocation of a permit issued by a municipal mayor for the operation of a cockpit and the issuance of a new permit to a different applicant. According to the Court, the Philippine Gamefowl Commission did not possess the power to issue cockpit licenses, as this was vested by Section 4 of P.D. No. 1802, as amended, to the municipal mayor with the concurrence of the sanggunian. t emphasized that the Philippine Gamefowl Commission only had review and supervision powers, as distinguished from control, over ordinary cockpits. [54] The Court also noted that the regulation of cockpits was vested in municipal officials, subject only to the guidelines laid down by the Philippine Gamefowl Commission. [55] The Court conceded that "[if] at all, the power to review includes the power to disapprove; but it does not carry the authority to substitute one's own preferences for that chosen by the subordinate in the exercise of its sound discretion. The twin pronouncements that it is the municipal authorities who are empowered to issue cockpit licenses and that the powers of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission were limited to review and supervision were affirmed in eang v Intermediate Appellate Court, [56] Municipality of Malolos v Libangang Malolos Inc [57] and Adlawan v Intermediate Appellate Court. [58] But notably in Cootauco v Court of Appeals, [59] the Court especially noted that Philippine Gamefowl Commission did indicate that the Commission's "power of review includes the power to disapprove. [60] nterestingly, Justice Cruz, the writer of Philippine Gamefowl Commission, qualified his concurrence in Cootauco "subject to the reservations made in [Philippine Gamefowl Commission] regarding the review powers of the PGC over cockpit licenses issued by city and municipal mayors. [61]
These cases reiterate what has been the traditional prerogative of municipal officials to control the issuances of licenses for the operation of cockpits. Nevertheless, the newly-introduced role of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission vis--vis the operation of cockpits had caused some degree of controversy, as shown by the cases above cited. Then, the Local Government Code of 1991 was enacted. There is no more forceful authority on this landmark legislation than Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., its principal author. n his annotations to the Local Government Code, he makes the following remarks relating to Section 447(a)(3)(v): 12. Licensing power. n connection with the power to grant licenses lodged with it, the Sangguniang Bayan may now regulate not only businesses but also occupations, professions or callings that do not require government examinations within its jurisdiction. t may also authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits, regulate cockfighting, and the commercial breeding of gamecocks. Existing rights however, may not be prejudiced. The power to license cockpits and permits for cockfighting has been removed completely from the Gamefowl Commission. Thus, that part of the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Municipality of Malolos v Libangang Malolos, Inc et al., which held that ".the regulation of cockpits is vested in the municipal councils guidelines laid down by the Philippine Gamefowl Commission is no longer controlling. Under [Section 447(a)(3)(v)], the power of the Sanggunian concerned is no longer subject to the supervision of the Gamefowl Commission. [62]
The above observations may be faulted somewhat in the sense that they fail to acknowledge the Court's consistent position that the licensing power over cockpits belongs exclusively to the municipal authorities and not the Philippine Gamefowl Commission. Yet these views of Senator Pimentel evince the apparent confusion regarding the role of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission as indicated in the cases previously cited, and accordingly bring the phrase Section 447(a)(3)(v) used in "any law to the contrary notwithstanding into its proper light. The qualifier serves notice, in case it was still doubtful, that it is the sanggunian bayan concerned alone which has the power to authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks within its territorial jurisdiction. Given the historical perspective, it becomes evident why the legislature found the need to use the phrase "any law to the contrary notwithstanding in Section 447(a)(3)(v). However, does the phrase similarly allow the Sangguniang Bayan to authorize more cockpits than allowed under Section 5(d) of the Cockfighting Law? Certainly, applying the test of implied repeal, these two provisions can stand together. While the sanggunian retains the power to authorize and license the establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits, its discretion is limited in that it cannot authorize more than one cockpit per city or municipality, unless such cities or municipalities have a population of over one hundred thousand, in which case two cockpits may be established. Considering that Section 447(a)(3)(v) speaks essentially of the identity of the wielder of the power of control and supervision over cockpit operation, it is not inconsistent with previous enactments that impose restrictions on how such power may be exercised. n short, there is no dichotomy between affirming the power and subjecting it to limitations at the same time. Perhaps more essential than the fact that the two controverted provisions are not inconsistent when put together, the Court recognizes that Section 5(d) of the Cockfighting Law arises from a valid exercise of police power by the national government. Of course, local governments are similarly empowered under Section 16 of the Local Government Code. The national government ought to be attuned to the sensitivities of devolution and strive to be sparing in usurping the prerogatives of local governments to regulate the general welfare of their constituents. We do not doubt, however, the ability of the national government to implement police power measures that affect the subjects of municipal government, especially if the subject of regulation is a condition of universal character irrespective of territorial jurisdictions. Cockfighting is one such condition. t is a traditionally regulated activity, due to the attendant gambling involved [63] or maybe even the fact that it essentially consists of two birds killing each other for public amusement. Laws have been enacted restricting the days when cockfights could be held, [64] and legislation has even been emphatic that cockfights could not be held on holidays celebrating national honor such as ndependence Day [65] and Rizal Day. [66]
The Whereas clauses of the Cockfighting Law emphasize that cockfighting "should neither be exploited as an object of commercialism or business enterprise, nor made a tool of uncontrolled gambling, but more as a vehicle for the preservation and perpetuation of native Filipino heritage and thereby enhance our national identity. [67] The obvious thrust of our laws designating when cockfights could be held is to limit cockfighting and imposing the one-cockpit-per- municipality rule is in line with that aim. Cockfighting is a valid matter of police power regulation, as it is a form of gambling essentially antagonistic to the aims of enhancing national productivity and self- reliance. [68] Limitation on the number of cockpits in a given municipality is a reasonably necessary means for the accomplishment of the purpose of controlling cockfighting, for clearly more cockpits equals more cockfights. f we construe Section 447(a)(3)(v) as vesting an unlimited discretion to the sanggunian to control all aspects of cockpits and cockfighting in their respective jurisdiction, this could lead to the prospect of daily cockfights in municipalities, a certain distraction in the daily routine of life in a municipality. This certainly goes against the grain of the legislation earlier discussed. f the arguments of the petitioners were adopted, the national government would be effectively barred from imposing any future regulatory enactments pertaining to cockpits and cockfighting unless it were to repeal Section 447(a)(3)(v). A municipal ordinance must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, otherwise it is void. [69] Ordinance No. 7 unmistakably contravenes the Cockfighting Law in allowing three cockpits in Daanbantayan. Thus, no rights can be asserted by the petitioners arising from the Ordinance. We find the grant of injunction as ordered by the appellate court to be well-taken. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENED. Costs against petitioners.
Miranda v. Aguirre Facts: n 1994, RA 7720 converting the municipality of Santiago toan independent component city was signed into law and thereafterratified in a plebiscite. Four years later, RA 8528 which amendedRA 7720 was enacted, changing the status of Santiago from an CCto a component city. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA8528 because it does not provide for submitting the law forratification by the people of Santiago City in a proper plebiscite.ssues:1. WON petitioners have standing. YES. Rule: constitutionality of law can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of itsenforcement Miranda was mayor when he filed the petition, hisrights would have been greatly affected. Otherpetitioners are residents and voters of Santiago.1. WON petition involves a political question. NO. PQ: concerned with issues dependent upon thewisdom, not legality, of a particular measure, Justiciable issue: implies a given right, legallydemandable and enforceable, an act or omissionviolative of such right, and a remedy granted andsanctioned by law, for said breach of right Case at bar=justiciable. WON petitioners have rightto a plebiscite is a legal question. WON laws passedby Congress comply with the requirements of the Consti pose questions that this court alone candecide.1. WON the change involved any creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries. YES. 2. WON a plebiscite is necessary considering the change was a mere reclassification from CC to CC. YES. A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal that the creation, division, merger,abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUs involve a common denominator material change in the political and economic rights of the LGUs directly affected as well as the people therein.t is precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the people "in the political units directly affected." Sec 10, Art X addressed the undesirable practice inthe past whereby LGUs were created, abolished,merged or divided on the basis of the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people. Thus,the consent of the people of the LGU directly affected was required to serve as a checkingmechanism to any exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or alteringthe boundaries of LGUs. t is one instance where the people in their sovereign capacity decide on amatter that affects them direct democracy of the people as opposed to democracy thru people'srepresentatives. This plebiscite requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of the Constitutiongranting more autonomy to LGUs. The changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city are many and cannot be characterized as insubstantial. The independence of the city as a political unitwill be diminished: The city mayor will be placed under theadministrative supervision of theprovincial governor. The resolutions and ordinances of the citycouncil of Santiago will have to bereviewed by the Provincial Board of sabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city willnow have to be shared with the province. When RA 7720 upgraded the status of SantiagoCity from a municipality to an independentcomponent city, it required the approval of itspeople thru a plebiscite called for the purpose.There is neither rhyme nor reason why thisplebiscite should not be called to determine thewill of the people of Santiago City when RA 8528downgrades the status of their city. There is morereason to consult the people when a lawsubstantially diminishes their right. Rule , Art 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the RRs of theLGC is in accord with the Constitution when itprovides that no creation, conversion, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUS shall take effect unlessapproved by a majority of the votes cast in aplebiscite called for the purpose in the LGU orLGUs affected. The plebiscite shall be conductedby the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)within one hundred twenty (120) days from theeffectivity of the law or ordinance prescribingsuch action, unless said law or ordinance fixesanother date. The rules cover all conversions, whether upwardor downward in character, so long as they resultin a material change in the LGU directly affected,especially a change in the political and economicrights of its people This is a petition for a writ of prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction assailing the constitu-tionality of Republic Act No. 8528, converting the City of Santiago, sabela from an independent component city to merely a component city. On May 5, 1994, RA No. 7720 was signed into a law, which converted the municipality of Santiago, sabela, into an independent component city. on July 4, 1994, RA No. 7720 was approved by the people of Santiago in a plebiscite. On February 14, 1998, RA No. 8528 was enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that practically downgraded the City of Santiago from an independent component city to a merely component city. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the lack of provision to submit the law for the approval of the people of Santiago in a proper plebiscite. Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the said act merely reclassified the City of Santiago from an independent component city into a component city. t allegedly did not involve any "creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, therefore, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary. They also questioned the standing of petitioners to file the petition and argued that the petition raises a political question over which the Court lacks jurisdiction. SSUE/S: WHETHER OR NOT RA NO. 8528 S UNCONSTTUTONAL FOR TS FALURE TO SUBMT T TO PROPER PLEBSCTE. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETTONERS LACKS STANDNG OR PERSONALTY N FLNG THS PETTON. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT HAS JURSDCTON OVER THE PETTON AT BAR ON THE GROUND THAT T NVOLVES A POLITICAL QUESTON. DECSON:
Petition was GRANTED. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional and the writ of prohibition is hereby issued commanding the respondents to desist from implementing the said law. RATO DECDEND: RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional because Sec. 10 of Art. X of the 1987 Constitution clearly states that: No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly affected is mandatory. Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA No. 8528. Petitioner Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City, Afiado was the President of the Sangguniang Liga, together with 3 other petitioners were all residents and voters in the City of Santiago. t is their right to be heard in the conversion of their city thru a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. Thus, denial of their right in RA No. 8528 gives them proper standing to strike down the law as unconstitutional. Sec. 1 of Art. V of the Constitution states that: the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instru-mentality of the Government. That the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction over said petition because it involves not a political question but a justiciable issue, and of which only the court could decide whether or not a law passed by the Congress is unconstitutional.
. LCP vs CD|ELEC November 18, 2008
Facts:
0urIng the 11th Congress, Congress enacted Into law JJ bIlls convertIng JJ munIcIpalItIes Into cItIes. However, Congress dId not act on bIlls convertIng 24 other munIcIpalItIes Into cItIes. 0urIng the 12th Congress, Congress enacted Into law FepublIc Act No. 9009 whIch took effect on June J0, 2001. FA 9009 amended SectIon 450 of the Local Covernment Code by IncreasIng the annual Income requIrement for conversIon of a munIcIpalIty Into a cIty from P20 mIllIon to P100 mIllIon. After the effectIvIty of FA 9009, the House of FepresentatIves of the 12th Congress adopted JoInt FesolutIon No. 29, whIch sought to exempt from the P100 mIllIon Income requIrements In FA 9009 the 24 munIcIpalItIes whose cItyhood bIlls were not approved In the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended wIthout the Senate approvIng JoInt FesolutIon No. 29. 0urIng the 1Jth Congress, the House of FepresentatIves re adopted JoInt FesolutIon No. 29 as JoInt FesolutIon No. 1 and forwarded It to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate agaIn faIled to approve the JoInt FesolutIon. FollowIng the advIce of Senator AquIlIno PImentel, 16 munIcIpalItIes fIled, through theIr respectIve sponsors, IndIvIdual cItyhood bIlls. The 16 cItyhood bIlls contaIned a common provIsIon exemptIng all the 16 munIcIpalItIes from the P100 mIllIon Income requIrements In FA 9009. Dn 0ecember 22, 2006, the House of FepresentatIves approved the cItyhood bIlls. The Senate also approved the cItyhood bIlls In February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu whIch was passed on June 7, 2007. The cItyhood bIlls lapsed Into law (CItyhood Laws) on varIous dates from |arch to July 2007 wIthout the PresIdent's sIgnature. The CItyhood Laws dIrect the CD|ELEC to hold plebIscItes to determIne whether the voters In each respondent munIcIpalIty approve of the conversIon of theIr munIcIpalIty Into a cIty. PetItIoners fIled the present petItIons to declare the CItyhood Laws unconstItutIonal for vIolatIon of SectIon 10, ArtIcle X of the ConstItutIon, as well as for vIolatIon of the equal protectIon clause. PetItIoners also lament that the wholesale conversIon of munIcIpalItIes Into cItIes wIll reduce the share of exIstIng cItIes In the nternal Fevenue Allotment because more cItIes wIll share the same amount of Internal revenue set asIde for all cItIes under SectIon 285 of the Local Covernment Code.
Issues:
1. Whether the CItyhood Laws vIolate SectIon 10, ArtIcle X of the ConstItutIon; and 2. Whether or not the CItyhood Laws vIolate the equal protectIon clause.
eId:
1. The CItyhood Laws vIolate SectIons 6 and 10, ArtIcle X of the ConstItutIon, and are thus unconstItutIonal.
2. Yes. There Is no substantIal dIstInctIon between munIcIpalItIes wIth pendIng cItyhood bIlls In the 11th Congress and munIcIpalItIes that dId not have pendIng bIlls. The mere pendency of a cItyhood bIll In the 11th Congress Is not a materIal dIfference to dIstInguIsh one munIcIpalIty from another for the purpose of the Income requIrement. The pendency of a cItyhood bIll In the 11th Congress does not affect or determIne the level of Income of a munIcIpalIty. |unIcIpalItIes wIth pendIng cItyhood bIlls In the 11th Congress mIght even have lower annual Income than munIcIpalItIes that dId not have pendIng cItyhood bIlls. n short, the classIfIcatIon crIterIon - mere pendency of a cItyhood bIll In the 11th Congress - Is not ratIonally related to the purpose of the law whIch Is to prevent fIscally nonvIable munIcIpalItIes from convertIng Into cItIes. The Case These are consolidated petitions Ior prohibition with prayer Ior the issuance oI a writ oI preliminary injunction ortemporary restraining order Iiled by the League oI Cities oI the Philippines, City oI Iloilo, City oI Calbayog, and Jerry P.Treas assailing the constitutionality oI the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections(COMELEC) and respondent municipalities Irom conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws. The Facts During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities.However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic A ctNo. 9009 (RA 9009), which took eIIect on30 June 2001.RA 9009 amended Section 450 oI the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement Ior conversion oI a municipality into a city Irom P20 million to P100 million.The rationale Ior the amendment was to restrain, in the words oI Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 'the mad rush oI municipalities to convert intocities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the Iact that they are incapable oI Iiscal independence. After the eIIectivity oI RA 9009, the House oI Representatives oI the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt Irom the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood billswere not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint ResolutionNo. 29. During the 13th Congress, the House oI Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and Iorwarded it to the Senate Ior approval.However, the Senate again Iailed to approve the Joint Resolution.Following the advice oI Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities Iiled, through their respective sponsors, individualcityhood bills.The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting allthe 16 municipalities Irom the P100million income requirement in RA 9009. On 22 December 2006, the House oI Representatives approved the cityhood bills.The Senate also approved thecityhood bills in February 2007, except that oI Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007.The cityhood bills lapsedinto law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates Irom March to July 2007 without the President`s signature. The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve oI the conversion oI their municipality into a city. Petitioners Iiled the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional Ior violation oI Section 10,Article X oI the Constitution, as well as Ior violation oI the equal protection clause.Petitioners also lament that thewholesale conversion oI municipalities into cities will reduce the share oI existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotmentbecause more cities will share the same amount oI internal revenue set aside Ior all cities under Section 285 oI the LocalGovernment Code. The Issues The petitions raise the Iollowing Iundamental issues: 1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X oI the Constitution; and 2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause The Ruling of the Court We grant the petitions. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X oI the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional. First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took eIIect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than Iive years later. Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria Ior the creation oI a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X oI the Constitution because they prevent a Iair and just distribution oI the national taxes to local government units. Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 oI the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, Ior converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction. Fifth, the intent oI members oI the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities Irom the coverage oI RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 oI the Local Government Code. Sixth, the deliberations oI the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress. Seventh, even iI the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 oI the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional Ior violation oI the equal protection clause. !reliminary Matters Prohibition is the proper action Ior testing the constitutionality oI laws administered by the COMELEC, like the Cityhood Laws, which direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites in implementation oI the Cityhood Laws. Petitioner League oI Cities oI the Philippines has legal standing because Section 499 oI the Local Government Code tasks the League with the 'primary purpose oI ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues aIIecting city government administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto.Petitioners-in-intervention, which are existing cities, have legal standing because their Internal Revenue Allotment will be reduced iI the Cityhood Laws are declared constitutional .Mayor Jerry P. Treas has legal standing because as Mayor oI Iloilo City and as a taxpayer he has suIIicient interest to prevent the unlawIul expenditure oI public Iunds, like the release oI more Internal Revenue Allotment to political units than what the law allows. Applying RA 99 is a !rospective Application of the Law RA 9009 became effective on 30 1une 2001 during the 11th Congress. This law speciIically amended Section 450 oI the Local Government Code, which now provides: Section 450.#equisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster oI barangays may be converted into a component city iI it has a locally generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and iI it has either oI the Iollowing requisites: (i) a contiguous territory oI at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certiIied by the Land Management Bureau; or (ii) a population oI not less than one hundred IiIty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certiIied by the National Statistics OIIice. The creation thereoI shall not reduce the land area, population and income oI the original unit or units at the time oI said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein. (b)The territorial jurisdiction oI a newly-created city shall be properly identiIied by metes andbounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composedoI one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous iI it comprises two (2) or more islands. (c)The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general Iund, exclusive oI special Iunds, transIers, and non-recurring income.(Emphasis supplied) Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement Ior conversion oI a municipality into a city Irom P20 million to P100million.Section 450 oI the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not provide any exemption Irom the increased income requirement. Prior to the enactment oI RA 9009, a total oI 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in Congress.Thirty-three cityhood bills became law beIore the enactment oI RA 9009.Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills during the 11th Congress. During the 12th Congress, the House oI Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, exempting Irom theincome requirement oI P100 millionin RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not acted upon duringthe 11th Congress. This Resolution reached the Senate.However, the 12th Congress adjourned without the Senate approving 1oint Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress, 16 oI the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 Iiled between November and December oI 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress, individual cityhood bills containing a common provision, as Iollows: Exemption Irom Republic Act No. 9009. The City oI x x x shall be exempted Irom the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009. This common provisionexempted each of the 16 municipalities from the income requirement of P100 million prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009.These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates Irom March to July 2007 aIter President Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo Iailed to sign them. Indisputably, Congress passed the Cityhood Laws longafter the eIIectivity oI RA 9009.RA 9009 became effective on 30 1une 2001 or during the 11th Congress.The 13th Congress passed in December 2006 the cityhood bills which became law only in 2007.Thus, respondent municipalities cannot invoke the principle oI non-retroactivity oI laws.This basic rule has no application because RA 9009, an earlier law to the Cityhood Laws, is not being applied retroactively but prospectively. ongress Must !rescribe in the Local Covernment ode All riteria Section 10, Article X oI the 1987 Constitution provides: No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority oI the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly aIIected.(Emphasis supplied) The Constitution is clear.The creation oI local government units must Iollow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code.The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary Ior the creation oI a city, including the conversion oI a municipality into a city.Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the creation oI a city.No other law,not even the charter oI the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent oI the Constitution is to insure that the creationoI cities and other political units must Iollow the same uniform, non- discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation Irom the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X oI the Constitution. RA 9009 amended Section 450 oI the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement Irom P20million to P100 million Ior the creation oI a city. This took effect on 30 1une 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million income requirement. Section 450 oI the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption Irom this income requirement. In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009.The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the eIIectivity oI RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities Irom the increased income requirement in Section 450 oI the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009.Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. ityhood Laws Jiolate Section , Article X of the onstitution &niIorm and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the Local Government Code are essential to implement aIair and equitable distribution oI national taxes to all local government units. Section 6, Article X oI the Constitution provides: Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.(Emphasis supplied) II the criteria in creating local government units are not uniIorm and discriminatory, there can be no Iair and just distribution oI the national taxes to local government units. A city with an annual income oI only P20 million, all other criteria being equal, should not receive the same sharein national taxes as a city with an annual income oI P100 million or more. The criteria oI land area, population and income, as prescribed in Section 450 oI the Local Government Code, must be strictly Iollowed because such criteria,prescribed by law, are material in determining the 'just share oI local government units in national taxes. Since the Cityhood Laws do not Iollow the income criterion in Section 450 oI the Local Government Code, they prevent the Iairand just distribution oI the Internal Revenue Allotment in violation oI Section 6, Article X oI the Constitution. Section 45 of the Local Covernment ode is lear, !lain and Unambiguous There can be no resort to extrinsic aids like deliberations oI Congress iI the language oI the law is plain, clearand unambiguous.Courts determine the intent oI the law Irom the literal language oI the law, within the law`s Iourcorners.II the language oI the law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts simply apply the law according to its expressterms.II a literal application oI the law results in absurdity, impossibility or injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsicaids oI statutory construction like the legislative history oI the law. Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 oI the Local Government Code, did not provide anyexemption Irom the increased income requirement, not even to respondent municipalities whose cityhood bills were thenpending when Congress passed RA 9009.Section 450 oI the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, containsno exemption whatsoever.Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert into acity must meet the increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter oI the law in applying Section450 oI the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. %he 11th ongress' Intent was not Written into the Local Covernment ode True, members oI Congress discussed exempting respondent municipalities Irom RA 9009, as shown by the variousdeliberations on the matter during the 11th Congress.However, Congress did not write this intended exemption into law.Congress could have easily included such exemption in RA 9009 but Congress did not. This is Iatal to the cause oIrespondent municipalities because such exemption must appear in RA 9009 as an amendment to Section 450 oI the LocalGovernment Code. The Constitution requires that the criteria Ior the conversion oI a municipality into a city, includingany exemption Irom such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government Code.Congress cannot prescribe suchcriteria or exemption Irom such criteria in any other law. In short, Congress cannot create a city through a law that does not comply with the criteria or exemption found in the Local Government Code. Section 10 oI Article X is similar to Section 16, Article XII oI the Constitution prohibiting Congress Irom creating private corporations except by a general law. Section 16 oI Article XII provides: The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest oI the common good and subject to the test oI economic viability. (Emphasis supplied) Thus, Congress must prescribe all the criteria Ior the 'Iormation, organization, or regulation oI private corporations in a general law applicable to all without discrimination. Congress cannot create a private corporation through a special law or charter. eliberations of the 11th ongress on Unapproved Bills Inapplicable Congress is not a continuing body. The unapproved cityhood bills Iiled during the 11th Congress became mere scraps oI paper upon the adjournment oI the 11th Congress. All the hearings and deliberations conducted during the 11thCongress on unapproved bills also became worthless upon the adjournment oI the 11th Congress. These hearings and deliberations cannot be used to interpret bills enacted into law in the 13th or subsequent Congresses. The members and oIIicers oI each Congress are diIIerent. All unapproved bills Iiled in one Congress become functus officio upon adjournment oI that Congress and must be re-Iiled anew in order to be taken up in the next Congress. When their respective authors re-Iiled the cityhood bills in 2006 during the 13th Congress, the bills had to start Irom square one again, going through the legislative mill just like bills taken up Ior the Iirst time, Irom the Iiling to the approval. Section 123, Rule XLIV oI the Rules oI the Senate, on &nIinished Business, provides: Sec. 123.x x x All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if presented for the first time. (Emphasis supplied) Similarly, Section 78 oI the Rules oI the House oI Representatives, on &nIinished Business, states: Section 78. Calendar oI Business. The Calendar oI Business shall consist oI the Iollowing: a. nIinished Business. This is business being considered by the House at the time oI its last adjournment. Its consideration shall be resumed until it is disposed oI. The &nIinished Business at the end oI a session shall be resumed at the commencement oI the next session as iI no adjournment has taken place. At the end of the term of a Congress, all Unfinished Business are deemed terminated. (Emphasis supplied) Thus, the deliberations during the 11th Congress on the unapproved cityhood bills, as well as the deliberations during the 12th and 13th Congresses on the unapproved resolution exempting Irom RA 9009 certain municipalities, have no legal signiIicance. They do not qualiIy as extrinsic aids in construing laws passed by subsequent Congresses. Applicability of Equal !rotection lause II Section 450 oI the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contained an exemption to the P100 million annual income requirement, the criteria Ior such exemption could be scrutinized Ior possible violation oI the equal protection clause. Thus, the criteria Ior the exemption, iI Iound in the Local Government Code, could be assailed on the ground oI absence oI a valid classiIication. However, Section 450 oI the Local Government Code, as amended by RA9009, does not contain any exemption. The exemption is contained in the Cityhood Laws, which are unconstitutional because such exemption must be prescribed in the Local Government Code as mandated in Section 10, Article X oI the Constitution. Even iI the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 oI the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, such exemption would still be unconstitutional Ior violation oI the equal protection clause. The exemption provision merely states, 'xemption from Republic Act No. 9009- The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.This one sentence exemption provision contains no classiIication standards or guidelines diIIerentiating the exempted municipalities Irom those that are not exempted. Even iI we take into account the deliberations in the 11th Congress that municipalities with pending cityhood bills should be exempt Irom the P100 million income requirement, there is still no valid classiIication to satisIy the equalprotection clause. The exemption will be based solely on the fact that the 16 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in the 11th Congress when RA 9009 was enacted. This is not a valid classiIication between those entitled and those not entitled to exemption Irom the P100 million income requirement. To be valid, the classiIication in the present case must be based on substantial distinctions, rationally related to a legitimate government objective which is the purpose oI the law, not limited to existing conditions only, and applicable toall similarly situated. Thus, this Court has ruled: The equal protection clause oI the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classiIication under the Iollowing conditions: 1. The classiIication must rest on substantial distinctions; 2. The classiIication must be germane to the purpose oI the law; 3. The classiIication must not be limited to existing conditions only; and 4. The classiIication must apply equally to all members oI the same class. There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency oI a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material diIIerence to distinguish one municipality Irom another Ior the purpose oI the income requirement. The pendency oI a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not aIIect or determine the level oI income oI a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classiIication criterion mere pendency oI a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress isnot rationally related to the purpose oI the law which is to prevent Iiscally non-viable municipalities Irom converting intocities. Municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills were not inIormed that a pending cityhood bill in the 11th Congress would be a condition Ior exemption Irom the increased P100 million income requirement. Had they been inIormed, many municipalities would have caused the Iiling oI their own cityhood bills. These municipalities, even iIthey have bigger annual income than the 16 respondent municipalities, cannot now convert into cities iI their income is less than P100 million. The Iact oI pendency oI a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a speciIic condition existing atthe time oI passage oI RA 9009.That speciIic condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement that a valid classiIication must not be limited to existing conditions only. This requirement is illustrated in Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck, where the challenged law allowed milk dealers engaged in business prior to a Iixed date to sell at a price lower than that allowed to newcomers in the same business. In Mayflower, the &.S. Supreme Court held: We are reIerred to a host oI decisions to the eIIect that a regulatory law may be prospective in operation and may except Irom its sweep those presently engaged in the calling or activity to which it isdirected. Examples are statutes licensing physicians and dentists, which apply only to those entering the proIession subsequent to the passage oI the act and exempt those then in practice, or zoning laws which exempt existing buildings, or laws Iorbidding slaughterhouses within certain areas, but excepting existing establishments. The challenged provision is unlike such laws, since, on its face, it is not a regulation of a business or an activity in the interest of, or for the protection of, the public, but an attempt togive an economic advantage to those engaged in a given business at an arbitrary date as against all those who enter the industry after that date. The appellees do not intimate that the classiIication bears any relation to the public health or welIare generally; that the provision will discourage monopoly; or thatit was aimed at any abuse, cognizable by law, in the milk business. In the absence oI any such showing,we have no right to conjure up possible situations which might justiIy the discrimination. The classiIication is arbitrary and unreasonable and denies the appellant the equal protection oI the law.(Emphasis supplied) In the same vein, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 municipalities a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date the Iiling oI their cityhood bills beIore the end oI the 11th Congress as against all other municipalities that want to convert into cities aIter the eIIectivity oI RA 9009. Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classiIication must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannotconvert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision Iound in theCityhood Laws, even iI it were written in Section 450 oI the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional Iorviolation oI the equal protection clause. HRFOR, we GRANT the petitions and declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491
League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al. G.R. No. 176951, G.R. No. 177499 & G.R. No. 178056; 24 August 2010 Facts: The 11 th Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, it did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. Subsequently, the 12 th Congress enacted Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 20 June 2001, amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20million to P100million. Thereafter, 16 municipalities filed their individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16municipalities from the P100million income requirement of RA 9009. The cityhood bills were approved by the House of Representatives and the Senate, and lapsed into law without the President's signature. Said Cityhood Laws directed the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each municipality approved of the conversion. Petitioners sought to declare the 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10,Article X of the Constitution and the equal protection clause, lamenting that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities would reduce the share of existing cities in the nternal Revenue Allotment (RA). On 18 November 2008, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a majority vote, declared the 16 Cityhood Laws to be in violation of Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that no city shall be created except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code. The Supreme Court held that since respondent municipalities did not meet the P100million income requirement under Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, th e Cityhood Laws converting said municipalities into cities were unconstitutional. The Supreme Court also declared the 16 Cityhood Laws to be in violation of the equal protection clause since there was no valid classification between those entitled and those not entitled to exemption from theP100million income requirement: (1) there was no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11thCongress when RA 9009 was enacted and municipalities that did not have such pending bills; (2) the classification criterion mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11 th Congress was not germane to the purpose of the law, which was to prevent fiscally nonviable municipalities from converting into cities; (3) the pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11 th
Congress limited the exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009 a condition that would never happen again, violating the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) limiting the exemption only to the 16 respondent municipalities violated the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated; municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities could not convert into cities. On 31 March 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, also by a majority vote, denied the respondent municipalities' first motion for reconsideration. On 28 April 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a split vote, denied the respondent municipalities' second motion for reconsideration. The 18 November 2008 Decision became final and executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments on 21 May 2009. However, on 21 December 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc reversed the 18 November 2008 Decision and upheld the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws. The Court reasoned that: (1) When Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution speaks of the local government code, the reference cannot be to any specific statute or codification of laws, let alone the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991. t would be noted that at the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 337, the then LGC, was still in effect. Had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to isolate the embodiment of the criteria only in the LGC, they would have referred to BP 337. Also, they would not have provided for the enactment by Congress of a new LGC, as they did in Section 3, Article X of the Constitution. Accordingly, the criteria for creation of cities need not be embodied in the LGC. Congress can impose such criteria in a consolidated set oflaws or a single-subject enactment or through amendatory laws. The passage of amendatory laws, such as RA 9009, was no different from the enactment of the cityhood laws specifically exempting a particular political subdivision from the criteria earlier mentioned. Congress, in enacting the exempting laws, effectively decreased the already codified indicators. (2) Deliberations on RA 9009, particularly the floor exchange between Senators Aquilino Pimentel and Franklin Drilon, indicated the following complementary legislative intentions: (a) the then pending cityhood bills would be outside the pale of the proposed P100million minimum income requirement; and (b) RA 9009 would not have any retroactive effect insofar as the pending cityhood bills were concerned. That said deliberations were undertaken in the 11 th and/or 12 th Congress (or before the cityhood laws were passed during the 13 th Congress) and Congress was not a continuing legislative body, was immaterial. Debates, deliberations, and proceedings of Congress and the steps taken in the enactment of the law, in this case the cityhood laws in relation to RA 9009 or vice versa, were part of its legislative history and may be consulted, if appropriate, as aids in the interpretation of the law. (3) Petitioners could not plausibly invoke the equal protection clause because no deprivation of property resulted by the enactment of the Cityhood Laws. t was presumptuous on the part of petitioner LCP member-cities to already stake a claim on the RA, as if it were their property, as the RA was yet to be allocated. Furthermore, the equal protection clause does not preclude reasonable classification which (a) rests on substantial distinctions; (b) is germane to the purpose of the law; (c) is not be limited to existing conditions only; and (d) applies equally to all members of the same class. All of these requisites had been met by the subject Cityhood Laws: (a) Respondent municipalities were substantially different from other municipalities desirous to be cities. They had pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009, and years before the enactment of the amendatory RA 9009, respondent municipalities had already met the income criterion exacted for cityhood under the LGC of 1991. However, due to extraneous circumstances (the impeachment of then President Estrada, the related jueteng scandal investigations conducted before, and the EDSA events that followed the aborted impeachment), the bills for their conversion remained unacted upon by Congress. To imposed on them the much higher income requirement after what they had gone through would appear to be unfair; (b) the exemption of respondent municipalities from the P100million income requirement was meant to reduce the inequality, occasioned by the passage of the amendatory RA 9009, between respondent municipalities and the 33 other municipalities whose cityhood bills were enacted during the 11 th
Congress; and (c) the uniform exemption clause would apply to municipalities that had pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009 and were compliant with then Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, which prescribed an income requirement of P20 million. (4) The existence of the cities consequent to the approval of the Cityhood Laws in the plebiscites held in the affected municipalities is now an operative fact. New cities appear to have been organized and are functioning accordingly, with new sets of officials and employees. Pursuant to the operative fact doctrine, the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws in question should be upheld. Petitioners moved for reconsideration (ad cautelam) and for the annulment of 21 December 2009 Decision. Some petitioners-in-intervention also moved for reconsideration (ad cautelam).
88ue8: Whether or not the 16 Cityhood Laws violated Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and the equal protection clause
eId: The 16 Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional. (1) Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is clear the creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units follows the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code. From the moment RA 9009 took effect (on 30 June 2001), the LGC required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100million income requirement. Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement, even for municipalities with pending cityhood bills in Congress when RA 9009 was passed. The uniform exemption clause in the Cityhood Laws, therefore, violated Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local Government Code. RA 9009, by amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code, embodies the new and prevailing Section 450 of the Local Government Code. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet the increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law. Moreover, where the law does not make an exemption, the Court should not create one. (2) Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. n fact, the invocation of the operative fact doctrine is an admission that the law is unconstitutional. Respondent municipalities' theory that the implementation of the Cityhood Laws, which resulted in 16 municipalities functioning as new cities with new sets of officials and employees, operated to contitutionalize the unconstitutional Cityhood Laws, was a misapplication of the operative fact doctrine and would set a gravely dangerous precedent. This view would open the floodgates to the want on enactment of unconstitutional laws and a mad rush for their immediate implementation before the Court could declare them unconstitutional. The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an unconstitutional law. Under the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional, but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. Accordingly, the 16 Cityhood Laws remain unconstitutional because they violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, the effects of the implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior to the declaration of their nullity, such as the payment of salaries and supplies by the "new cities or their issuance of licenses or execution of contracts, may be recognized as valid and effective, as a matter of equity and fair play, to innocent people who may have relied on the presumed validity of the Cityhood Laws prior to the Court's declaration of their unconstitutionality. (3) There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11 th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11 th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality. n short, the classification criterion mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11 th Congress is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities. Moreover, the pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11 th Congress, as a criterion, limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated; municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. * Re: the split or tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration of the 18 November 2008 Decision. The dissenting opinion stated that "a deadlocked vote of six is not a majority and a non-majority does not constitute a rule with precedential value. However, Section 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court provides that when, in appealed cases, the court en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed and on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied. The 6-6 tie-vote by the Court en banc on the second motion for reconsideration necessarily resulted in the denial of the second motion for reconsideration. Since the Court was evenly divided, there could be no reversal of the 18 November 2008 Decision, for a tie-vote cannot result in any court order or directive. The tie-vote plainly signifies that there is no majority to overturn the prior 18 November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution denying reconsideration, and thus the second motion for reconsideration must be denied. Hence, the 18 November 2008 judgment and the 31 March 2009 resolution stand in full force. These prior majority actions of the Court en banc can only be overruled by a new majority vote, not a tie-vote because a tie-vote cannot overrule a prior affirmative action. The 18 November 2008 Decision, declaring the 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional, was reinstated.
avarro v8 Ermita 2010 The ationaI Stati8tic8 Office certified that Dinagat 8Iand8 popuIation i8 120,813. t8 Iand area i8 802.12 86uare kiIometer8 and it8 average annuaI income i8 P82,696,433.23, a8 certified by the Bureau of LocaI Government Finance. On October 2, 2006, the Pre8ident approved into Iaw R.A. 9355 creating the Province of Dinagat 8Iand8. On December 3, 2006, the COMELEC conducted the mandatory pIebi8cite for the ratification of the creation of the province under the LGC which yieIded 69,943 affirmative vote8 and 63,502 negative vote8. With the approvaI of the peopIe from both the mother province of Surigao deI orte and the Province of Dinagat 8Iand8 (Dinagat), the Pre8ident appointed the interim 8et of provinciaI officiaI8 who took their oath of office on January 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 8ynchronized eIection8, the Dinagatnon8 eIected their new 8et of provinciaI officiaI8 who a88umed office on JuIy 1, 2007. MeanwhiIe, on ovember 10, 2006, petitioner8 RodoIfo G. avarro and other former poIiticaI Ieader8 of Surigao deI orte, fiIed before the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. o. 175158) chaIIenging the con8titutionaIity of R.A. o. 9355 aIIeging that that the creation of Dinagat a8 a new province, if uncorrected, wouId perpetuate an iIIegaI act of Congre88, and wouId unju8tIy deprive the peopIe of Surigao deI orte of a Iarge chunk of the provinciaI territory, nternaI Revenue AIIocation (RA), and rich re8ource8 from the area. 8 R.A. o. 9355 con8titutionaI? February 10, 2010 Ruling No. The SC ruled that the population of 120,813 is below the Local Government Code (LGC) minimum population requirement of 250,000 inhabitants. Neither did Dinagat slands, with an approximate land area of 802.12 square kilometers meet the LGC minimum land area requirement of 2,000 square kilometers. The Court reiterated its ruling that paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, which exempts proposed provinces composed of one or more islands from the land area requirement, was null and void as the said exemption is not found in Sec. 461 of the LGC. "There is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rules and regulations implementing the said law, the basic law prevails, because the rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law, held the Court. (GR No. 180050, avarro v. Ermita, May 12, 2010) The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and Dinagat filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Decision. n its Resolution dated May 12, 2010, the Supreme Court denied the said motions.
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, ET AL. v. EXECUTVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMTA, ETC. ET AL G.R. No. 180050, May 12, 2010 PeruILu, J.: Doctrine8 The r equi r ement of a cont i guous t er r i t or y and t he r equi r ement of a l and ar ea of at l east 2, 000 squar e ki l omet er s ar e di st i nct and separ at e r equi r ement s f or l and ar ea. The exempt i on under Sec 461( b) pertains only to the requirement of territorial contiguity. Fact 8 When t he Di nagat sl ands was pr ocl ai med a new pr ovi nce on December 3, 2006, i t had an of f i ci al popul at i on of onl y 106, 951 bas ed on t he 2000 Census of Popul at i on conduct ed by t he Nat i onal Statistics Office (NSO), which population is short of the statutory requirement of 250,000 inhabitants. Mor eover , t he l and ar ea of t he pr ovi nce f ai l ed t o compl y wi t h t he st at ut or y r equi r ement of 2, 000square kilometers. R.A. No. 9355 specifically states that the Province of Dinagat slands contains an approximate land area of 802.12 square kilometers.
Hence, Republ i c Act No. 9355, ot her wi se known as An Act Cr eat i ng t he Pr ovi nce of Di nagat sl ands was hel d unconst i t ut i onal and t he pr ovi si on i n Ar t i cl e 9 ( 2) of t he Rul es and Regul at i ons mpl ement i ng t he Local Gover nment Code of 1991 st at i ng, "The l and ar ea r equi r ement shal l not appl y wher e t he proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands," was declared NULL and VOD.
Respondent s i nst ead asser t ed t hat t he pr ovi nce, whi ch i s composed of mor e t han one i sl and, i s exempt ed f r om t he l and ar ea r equi r ement bas ed on t he pr ovi si on i n t he Rul es and Regul at i ons mplementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (RR), specifically paragraph 2 of Article 9 which st at es t hat " [ t ] he l and ar ea r equi r ement shal l not appl y wher e t he pr oposed pr ovi nce i s composed of one (1) or more islands." 88ue Whet her Di nagat sl ands i s exempt ed f r om t he l and ar ea r equi r ement eI d No. Ther e ar e t wo r equi r ement s f or l and ar ea: ( 1) t he l and ar ea must be cont i guous; and ( 2) t he l and area must be sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its popul ace. The r equi r ement of a cont i guous t er r i t or y and t he r equi r ement of a l and ar ea of at l east 2, 000 squar e ki l omet er s ar e di st i nct and separ at e r equi r ement s f or l and ar ea. The exempt i on above pertains only to the requirement of territorial contiguity. t clearly states that the requirement of territorial contiguity may be dispensed with in the case of a province comprising two or more islands, or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province. Nowhere in paragraph (b) is it expressly stated or may it be implied that when a province is composed of t wo or mor e i sl ands, or when t he t er r i t or y of a pr ovi nce i s separ at ed by a char t er ed ci t y or ci t i es, such pr ovi nce need not compl y wi t h t he l and ar ea r equi r ement of at l east 2, 000 squar e ki l omet er s or the requirement in paragraph (a) (i) of Section 461of the Local Government Code.
RAMR R. PABLCO, 5etitioner, vs. ALEJADRO A. VLLAPADO, res5ondent. May local legislative bodies and/or the Office of the President, on appeal, validly impose the penalty of dismissal from service on erring elective local officials? This purely legal issue was posed in connection with a dispute over the mayoralty seat of San Vicente, Palawan. Considering that the term of the contested office expired on June 30, 2001, [1] the present case may be dismissed for having become moot and academic. [2] Nonetheless, we resolved to pass upon the above-stated issue concerning the application of certain provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991. The undisputed facts are as follows: On August 5, 1999, Solomon B. Maagad, and Renato M. Fernandez, both members of the $angguniang Bayan of San Vicente, Palawan, filed with the $angguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan an administrative complaint against respondent Alejandro A. Villapando, then Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan, for abuse of authority and culpable violation of the Constitution. [3] Complainants alleged that respondent, on behalf of the municipality, entered into a consultancy agreement with Orlando M. Tiape, a defeated mayoralty candidate in the May 1998 elections. They argue that the consultancy agreement amounted to an appointment to a government position within the prohibited one-year period under Article X-B, Section 6, of the 1987 Constitution. n his answer, respondent countered that he did not appoint Tiape, rather, he merely hired him. He invoked Opinion No. 106, s. 1992, of the Department of Justice dated August 21, 1992, stating that the appointment of a defeated candidate within one year from the election as a consultant does not constitute an appointment to a government office or position as prohibited by the Constitution. On February 1, 2000, the $angguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan found respondent guilty of the administrative charge and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from service. [4] Respondent appealed to the Office of the President which, on May 29, 2000, affirmed the decision of the $angguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan. [5]
Pending respondent's motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Office of the President, or on June 16, 2000, petitioner Ramir R. Pablico, then Vice-mayor of San Vicente, Palawan, took his oath of office as Municipal Mayor. Consequently, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Palawan a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and prayer for a temporary restraining order, docketed as SPL Proc. No. 3462. [6] The petition, seeks to annul, inter alia, the oath administered to petitioner. The Executive Judge granted a Temporary Restraining Order effective for 72 hours, as a result of which petitioner ceased from discharging the functions of mayor. Meanwhile, the case was raffled to Branch 95 which, on June 23, 2000, denied respondent's motion for extension of the 72-hour temporary restraining order. [7] Hence, petitioner resumed his assumption of the functions of Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan. On July 4, 2000, respondent instituted a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals seeking to annul: (1) the May 29, 2000 decision of the Office of the President; (2) the February 1, 2000, decision of the $angguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan; and (3) the June 23, 2000 order of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Branch 95. On March 16, 2001, the Court of Appeals [8] declared void the assailed decisions of the Office of the President and the $angguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan, and ordered petitioner to vacate the Office of Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan. [9] A motion for reconsideration was denied on April 23, 2001. [10] Hence, the instant petition for review. The pertinent portion of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides: Section 60. Grounds for isciplinary Actions An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the following grounds: x x x x x x x x x An eIective IocaI officiaI may be removed from office on the ground8 enumerated above by order of the proper court. (Emphasis supplied) t is clear from the last paragraph of the aforecited provision that the penalty of dismissal from service upon an erring elective local official may be decreed only by a court of law. Thus, in $alalima, et al v Guingona, et al, [11] we held that "[t]he Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials, since such power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of the aforequoted Section 60. Article 124 (b), Rule XX of the Rules and Regulations mplementing the Local Government Code, however, adds that "(b) An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated in paragraph (a) of this Article [The grounds enumerated in Section 60, Local Government Code of 1991] by order of the proper court or the di8cipIining authority whichever fir8t ac6uire8 juri8diction to the excIu8ion of the other." The disciplining authority referred to pertains to the $angguniang Panlalawigan/Panlungsod/Bayan and the Office of the President. [12]
As held in $alalima, [13] this grant to the "disciplining authority of the power to remove elective local officials is clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules and Regulations. No rule or regulation may alter, amend, or contravene a provision of law, such as the Local Government Code. mplementing rules should conform, not clash, with the law that they implement, for a regulation which operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute is a nullity. Even Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., the principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991, expressed doubt as to the validity of Article 124 (b), Rule XX of the implementing rules. [14]
Verily, the clear legislative intent to make the subject power of removal a judicial prerogative is patent from the deliberations in the Senate quoted as follows: x x x x x x x x x Senator Pimentel. This has been reserved, Mr. President, including the issue of whether or not the Department Secretary or the Office of the President can suspend or remove an elective official. Senator Saguisag. For as long as that is open for some later disposition, may just add the following thought: t seems to me that instead of identifying only the proper regional trial court or the Sandiganbayan, and since we know that in the case of a regional trial court, particularly, a case may be appealed or may be the subject of an injunction, in the framing of this later on, would like to suggest that we consider replacing the phrase "PROPER REGONAL TRAL COURT OR THE SANDGANBAYAN simply by "COURTS. asi po, maaaring sabihin nila na mali iyong regional trial court o ang Sandiganbayan. Senator Pimentel. "OR THE PROPER COURT. Senator Saguisag. "OR THE PROPER COURT. Senator Pimentel. Thank you. We are willing to accept that now, Mr. President. Senator Saguisag. t is to be incorporated in the phraseology that will craft to capture the other ideas that have been elevated. x x x x x x x x x. [15]
t is beyond cavil, therefore, that the power to remove erring elective local officials from service is lodged exclusively with the courts. Hence, Article 124 (b), Rule XX, of the Rules and Regulations mplementing the Local Government Code, insofar as it vests power on the "disciplining authority to remove from office erring elective local officials, is void for being repugnant to the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991. The law on suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed and applied, and the authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost good faith, for what is involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people through the exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must not be put to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Where the disciplining authority is given only the power to suspend and not the power to remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power to remove. [16] As explained by the Court in Lacson v Roque [17]
".the abridgment of the power to remove or suspend an elective mayor is not without its own justification, and was, we think, deliberately intended by the lawmakers. The evils resulting from a restricted authority to suspend or remove must have been weighed against the injustices and harms to the public interests which would be likely to emerge from an unrestrained discretionary power to suspend and remove. WEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENED. LATA3A vs. C0VELEC Pel|l|or: A pel|l|or lor cerl|orar| urder Ru|e 5 ol lre Ru|es ol Courl Wr|cr see|s lo cra||erge lre reso|ul|or |ssued oy lre F|rsl 0|v|s|or ol lre Corr|ss|or or E|ecl|ors (C0VELEC) daled Apr|| 2Z, 2001 |r 3PA Case No. 01-059 erl|l|ed, Roreo V. 3urga, Pel|l|orer, versus Arser|o A. Lalasa, resporderl, ard lre Reso|ul|or ol lre C0VELEC er oarc dery|rg rere|r pel|l|orers Vol|or lor Recors|deral|or. Treassa||ed Reso|ul|or der|ed due course lo lre cerl|l|cale ol card|dacy ol pel|l|orer Arser|o A. Lalasa, dec|ar|rg r|r d|squa||l|ed lo rur lor rayor ol 0|gos C|ly, 0avao de| 3ur Prov|rce |r lre Vay 11, 2001 e|ecl|ors, order|rg lral a|| voles casl |r r|s lavor sra|| rol oe courled, ard |l re ras oeer proc|a|red W|rrer, dec|ar|rg sa|d proc|aral|or ru|| ard vo|d. Ru||rg: 0l3Vl33E0 FACT3: Pel|l|orer Arser|o A. Lalasa, Was e|ecled rayor ol lre Vur|c|pa||ly ol 0|gos, 0avao de| 3ur |r lre e|ecl|ors ol 1992, 1995, ard 1998. 0ur|rg pel|l|orers lr|rd lerr, lre Vur|c|pa||ly ol 0|gos Was dec|ared a corporerl c|ly, lo oe |roWr as lre C|ly ol 0|gos. A p|eo|sc|le corducled or 3epleroer 8, 2000 ral|l|ed Repuo||c Acl No. 8Z98 erl|l|ed, Ar Acl Corverl|rg lre Vur|c|pa||ly ol 0|gos, 0avao de| 3ur Prov|rce |rlo a Corporerl C|ly lo oe |roWr as lre C|ly ol 0|gos or lre Crarler ol lre C|ly ol 0|gos. Tr|s everl a|so rar|ed lre erd ol pel|l|orers lerure as rayor ol lre Vur|c|pa||ly ol 0|gos. loWever, urder 3ecl|or 53, Arl|c|e lX ol lre Crarler, pel|l|orer Was rardaled lo serve |r a ro|d-over capac|ly as rayor ol lre reW C|ly ol 0|gos. lerce, re loo| r|s oalr as lre c|ly rayor. 0r Feoruary 28, 2001, pel|l|orer l||ed r|s cerl|l|cale ol card|dacy lor c|ly rayor lor lre Vay 11, 2001 e|ecl|ors. le slaled lrere|r lral re |s e||g|o|e lrerelor, ard |||eW|se d|sc|osed lral re rad a|ready served lor lrree corsecul|ve lerrs as rayor ol lre Vur|c|pa||ly ol 0|gos ard |s roW rurr|rg lor lre l|rsl l|re lor lre pos|l|or ol c|ly rayor. 0r Varcr 1, 2001, pr|vale resporderl Roreo V. 3urga, a|so a card|dale lor c|ly rayor |r lre sa|d e|ecl|ors, l||ed oelore lre C0VELEC a Pel|l|or lo 0ery 0ue Course, Carce| Cerl|l|cale ol Card|dacy ard/ or For 0|squa||l|cal|or aga|rsl pel|l|orer Lalasa. Resporderl 3urga a||eged lrere|r lral pel|l|orer la|se|y represerled |r r|s cerl|l|cale ol card|dacy lral re |s e||g|o|e lo rur as rayor ol 0|gos C|ly s|rce pel|l|orer rad a|ready oeer e|ecled ard served lor lrree corsecul|ve lerrs as rayor lror 1992 lo 2001.crarroo|esv|rlua||aW||orary 0r Varcr 5, 2001, pel|l|orer Lalasa l||ed r|s arsWer, argu|rg lral re d|d rol ra|e ary la|se represerlal|or |r r|s cerl|l|cale ol card|dacy s|rce re lu||y d|sc|osed lrere|r lral re rad served as rayor ol lre Vur|c|pa||ly ol 0|gos lor lrree corsecul|ve lerrs. Voreover, re argued lral lr|s lacl does rol oar r|r lror l|||rg a cerl|l|cale ol card|dacy lor lre Vay 11, 2001 e|ecl|ors s|rce lr|s W||| oe lre l|rsl l|re lral re W||| oe rurr|rg lor lre posl ol c|ly rayor. 8olr parl|es suor|lled lre|r pos|l|or papers or Varcr 19, 2001. 0r Apr|| 2Z, 2001, resporderl C0VELECs F|rsl 0|v|s|or |ssued a Reso|ul|or, lre d|spos|l|ve porl|or ol Wr|cr reads, as lo||oWs: wrerelore, prer|ses cors|dered, lre resporderls cerl|l|cale ol card|dacy srou|d oe carce||ed lor oe|rg a v|o|al|or ol lre lrree (3)-lerr ru|e proscr|oed oy lre 198Z Corsl|lul|or ard lre Loca| 0overrrerl Code ol 1991. Pel|l|orer l||ed r|s Vol|or lor Recors|deral|or daled Vay 1, 2001, Wr|cr rera|red uracled upor url|| lre day ol lre e|ecl|ors, Vay 11, 2001. 0r Vay 1, 2001, pr|vale resporderl 3urga l||ed ar Ex Parle Vol|or lor lssuarce ol Terporary Reslra|r|rg 0rder Erjo|r|rg lre C|ly 8oard ol Carvassers Fror Carvass|rg or Taou|al|rg Resporderls voles, ard Fror Proc|a|r|rg l|r as lre 0u|y E|ecled Vayor |l le w|rs lre E|ecl|ors.[| 0esp|le lr|s, roWever, pel|l|orer Lalasa Was sl||| proc|a|red W|rrer or Vay 1Z, 2001, rav|rg garrered lre rosl ruroer ol voles. Corsequerl|y, pr|vale resporderl 3urga l||ed, or Vay 2Z, 2001, a 3upp|ererla| Vol|or Wr|cr esserl|a||y sougrl lre arru|rerl ol pel|l|orers proc|aral|or ard lre suspers|or ol |ls ellecls. 0r Ju|y 1, 2001, pel|l|orer Was sWorr |rlo ard assured r|s oll|ce as lre reW|y e|ecled rayor ol 0|gos C|ly. ll Was or|y or Augusl 2Z, 2002 lral lre C0VELEC er oarc |ssued a Reso|ul|or dery|rg pel|l|orers Vol|or lor Recors|deral|or. $$& :Wrelrer or rol pel|l|orer Lalasa |s e||g|o|e lo rur as card|dale lor lrepos|l|or ol rayor ol lre reW|y-crealed C|ly ol 0|gos |rred|ale|y aller re servedlor lrree corsecul|ve lerrs as rayor ol lre Vur|c|pa||ly ol 0|gos. : As a ru|e, |r a represerlal|ve derocracy, lre peop|e srou|d oe a||oWed lree|y lo croose lrose Wro W||| goverr lrer. Arl|c|e X, 3ecl|or 8 ol lre Corsl|lul|or |s ar excepl|or lo lr|s ru|e, |r lral |l ||r|ls lre rarge ol cro|ce ol lre peop|e. 3ecl|or 8. Tre lerr ol oll|ce ol e|ecl|ve |oca| oll|c|a|s, excepl oarargay oll|c|a|s, Wr|cr sra|| oe delerr|red oy |aW, sra|| oe lrree years ard ro sucr oll|c|a| sra|| serve lor rore lrar lrree corsecul|ve lerrs. vo|urlary rerurc|al|or ol lre oll|ce lor ary |erglr ol l|re sra|| rol oe cors|dered as ar |rlerrupl|or |r lre corl|ru|ly ol r|s serv|ce lor lre lu|| lerr lor Wr|cr re Was e|ecled. Ar e|ecl|ve |oca| oll|c|a|, lrerelore, |s rol oarred lror rurr|rg aga|r |r lor sare |oca| goverrrerl posl, ur|ess lWo cord|l|ors corcur: 1.) lral lre oll|c|a| corcerred ras oeer e|ecled lor lrree corsecul|ve lerrs lo lre sare |oca| goverrrerl posl, ar 2.) lral re ras lu||y served lrree corsecul|ve lerrs. lr lre preserl case, pel|l|orer slales lral a c|ly ard a rur|c|pa||ly rave separale ard d|sl|rcl persora||l|es. Trus lrey carrol oe lrealed as a s|rg|e erl|ly ard rusl oe accorded d|llererl lrealrerl cors|slerl W|lr spec|l|c prov|s|ors ol lre Loca| 0overrrerl Code. le does rol dery lre lacl lral re ras a|ready served lor lrree corsecul|ve lerrs as rur|c|pa| rayor. loWever, re asserls lral Wrer 0|gos Was corverled lror a rur|c|pa||ly lo a c|ly, |l alla|red a d|llererl jur|d|ca| persora||ly. Trerelore, Wrer re l||ed r|s cerl|l|cale ol card|dacy lor c|ly rayor, re carrol oe corslrued as vy|rg lor lre sare |oca| goverrrerl posl As seer |r lre alorererl|ored prov|s|ors (3ecl|or 150 (Requ|s|les lor Creal|or), 3ec Z (Creal|or ard Corvers|or) ol lre Loca| 0overrrerl Code ard 3ecl|ors 2 ard 53 ol lre Crarler ol lre C|ly ol 0|gos), lre Courl roled lral lre de||real|or ol lre relers ard oourds ol lre C|ly ol 0|gos d|d rol crarge ever oy ar |rcr lre |ard area prev|ous|y covered oy lre Vur|c|pa||ly ol 0|gos. Tr|s Courl a|so roles lral lre e|ecl|ve oll|c|a|s ol lre Vur|c|pa||ly ol 0|gos corl|rued lo exerc|se lre|r poWers ard lurcl|ors url|| e|ecl|ors Were re|d lor lre reW c|ly oll|c|a|s. True, lre reW c|ly acqu|red a reW corporale ex|slerce separale ard d|sl|rcl lror lral ol lre rur|c|pa||ly. Tr|s does rol rear, roWever, lral lor lre purpose ol app|y|rg lre suojecl Corsl|lul|ora| prov|s|or, lre oll|ce ol lre rur|c|pa| rayor Wou|d roW oe corslrued as a d|llererl |oca| goverrrerl posl as lral ol lre oll|ce ol lre c|ly rayor. As slaled ear||er, lre lerr|lor|a| jur|sd|cl|or ol lre C|ly ol 0|gos |s lre sare as lral ol lre rur|c|pa||ly. Corsequerl|y, lre |rrao|larls ol lre rur|c|pa||ly are lre sare as lrose |r lre c|ly. Trese |rrao|larls are lre sare group ol volers Wro e|ecled pel|l|orer Lalasa lo oe lre|r rur|c|pa| rayor lor lrree corsecul|ve lerrs. Trese are a|so lre sare |rrao|larls over Wror re re|d poWer ard aulror|ly as lre|r cr|el execul|ve lor r|re years. ll |s ev|derl lral |r lre cases ol 8orja, Jr. v. C0VELEC, 3ocrales vs C0VELEC, Lorzar|da vs C0VELEC, ard Adorreo vs. C0VELEC, lrere ex|sls a resl per|od or a orea| |r lre serv|ce ol lre |oca| e|ecl|ve oll|c|a|. lr Lorzar|da, pel|l|orer lrere|r Was a pr|vale c|l|zer a leW rorlrs oelore lre rexl rayora| e|ecl|ors. 3|r||ar|y, |r Adorreo ard 3ocrales, lre pr|vale resporderls lrere|r ||ved as pr|vale c|l|zers lor lWo years ard l|lleer rorlrs respecl|ve|y. lrdeed, lre |aW corlerp|ales a resl per|od dur|rg Wr|cr lre |oca| e|ecl|ve oll|c|a| sleps doWr lror oll|ce ard ceases lo exerc|se poWer or aulror|ly over lre |rrao|larls ol lre lerr|lor|a| jur|sd|cl|or ol a parl|cu|ar |oca| goverrrerl ur|l. Tr|s Courl re|lerales lral lre lrarers ol lre Corsl|lul|or spec|l|ca||y |rc|uded ar excepl|or lo lre peop|es lreedor lo croose lrose Wro W||| goverr lrer |r order lo avo|d lre ev|| ol a s|rg|e persor accuru|al|rg excess|ve poWer over a parl|cu|ar lerr|lor|a| jur|sd|cl|or as a resu|l ol a pro|orged slay |r lre sare oll|ce. To a||oW pel|l|orer Lalasa lo v|e lor lre pos|l|or ol c|ly rayor aller rav|rg served lor lrree corsecul|ve lerrs as a rur|c|pa| rayor Wou|d oov|ous|y deleal lre very |rlerl ol lre lrarers Wrer lrey Wrole lr|s excepl|or. 3rou|d re oe a||oWed arolrer lrree corsecul|ve lerrs as rayor ol lre C|ly ol 0|gos, pel|l|orer Wou|d lrer oe poss|o|y ro|d|rg oll|ce as cr|el execul|ve over lre sare lerr|lor|a| jur|sd|cl|or ard |rrao|larls lor a lola| ol e|grleer corsecul|ve years. Tr|s |s lre very scerar|o sougrl lo oe avo|ded oy lre Corsl|lul|or, |l rol aororred oy |l. RVERA V. COMELEC G.R. o. 167591 May 9, 2007 FACTS A petition for cancelation of the Certificate of Candidacy of Marino Morales as mayoralty candidate in Mabalacat, Pampanga for the May 2004 mayoralty was filed on the ground the he already served three consecutive terms in the office he seeks to run.
Morales argues that this is not so because although he really served in 1995-1998 (1 st term) and 2004-2007 (3 rd term), he was merely a caretaker or de facto mayor in 1998-2001(2 nd term) because his election was declared void by the RTC due to an election protest.
Comelec ruled that Morales already served his third term and after an MR was filed, declared it final and executory on May 14, 2004.
SSUE WON Morales had already served his 3 consecutive terms and if so, who should take his position.
ELD For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.
Here, Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor. Such circumstance does not constitute an interruption in serving the full term.
Whether as "caretaker" or "de facto" officer, he exercises the powers and enjoys the prerequisites of the office which enables him "to stay on indefinitely".
With regard to the person who will replace Morales, it is a rule that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
Since his disqualification became final and executory after the elections, the candidate having the second highest number of votes cannot assume the position. Hence, it is the petitioner, the elected Vice Mayor Anthony Dee who should be declared as the mayor. ROBERTO L. DO, Petitioner, vs COMMSSO O ELECTOS and MARO P. MORALES, Respondents. D E C S O CARPO, .: The Ca8e This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The present petition seeks the reversal of the Resolution dated 27 July 2007 of the Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) Second Division which dismissed the petition to disqualify and/or to cancel Marino P. Morales' (Morales) certificate of candidacy, as well as the Resolution dated 14 February 2008 of the COMELEC n Banc which denied Roberto L. Dizon's (Dizon) motion for reconsideration. The Fact8 The COMELEC Second Division stated the facts as follows: Roberto L. Dizon, hereinafter referred to as petitioner, is a resident and taxpayer of the Municipality of Mabalacat, Pampanga. Marino P. Morales, hereinafter referred to as respondent, is the incumbent Mayor of the Municipality of Mabalacat, Pampanga. Petitioner alleges respondent was proclaimed as the municipal mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga during the 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 elections and has fully served the same. Respondent filed his Certificate of Candidacy on March 28, 2007 again for the same position and same municipality. Petitioner argues that respondent is no longer eligible and qualified to run for the same position for the May 14, 2007 elections under Section 43 of the Local Government Code of 1991. Under the said provision, no local elective official is allowed to serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms for the same position. Respondent, on the other hand, asserts that he is still eligible and qualified to run as Mayor of the Municipality of Mabalacat, Pampanga because he was not elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. He avers that the Commission en banc in SPA Case No. A-04-058, entitled Atty. Venancio Q. Rivera and Normandick P. De Guzman vs. Mayor Marino P. Morales, affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City declaring Anthony D. Dee as the duly elected Mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga in the 1998 elections. Respondent alleges that his term should be reckoned from 2001 or when he was proclaimed as Mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga. Respondent further asserts that his election in 2004 is only for his second term. Hence, the three term rule provided under the Local Government Code is not applicable to him. Respondent further argues that the grounds stated in the instant petition are not covered under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Respondent further contend [sic] that even if it is covered under the aforementioned provision, the instant petition failed to allege any material misrepresentation in the respondent's Certificate of Candidacy. 1
The RuIing of the COMELEC Second Divi8ion n its Resolution dated 27 July 2007, the COMELEC Second Division took judicial notice of this Court's ruling in the consolidated cases of Atty Venancio Q Rivera III v COMLC and Marino "Boking" Morales in G.R. No. 167591 and Anthony ee v COMLC and Marino "Boking" Morales in G.R. No. 170577 (Rivera case) promulgated on 9 May 2007. The pertinent portions of the COMELEC Second Division's ruling read as follows: Respondent was elected as mayor of Mabalacat from July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998. There was no interruption of his second term from 1998 to 2001. He was able to exercise the powers and enjoy the position of a mayor as "caretaker of the office" or a "de facto officer" until June 30, 2001 notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in an electoral protest case. He was again elected as mayor from July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2003 [sic]. t is worthy to emphasize that the Supreme Court ruled that respondent has violated the three-term limit under Section 43 of the Local Government Code. Respondent was considered not a candidate in the 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections. Hence, his failure to qualify for the 2004 elections is a gap and allows him to run again for the same position in the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES to DENY the instant Petition to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy and/or Petition for the Disqualification of Marino P. Morales for lack of merit. 2
Dizon filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC n Banc. The RuIing of the COMELEC n Banc The COMELEC n Banc affirmed the resolution of the COMELEC Second Division. The pertinent portions of the COMELEC n Banc's Resolution read as follows: Respondent's certificate of candidacy for the May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections was cancelled pursuant to the above- mentioned Supreme Court decision which was promulgated on May 9, 2007. As a result, respondent was not only disqualified but was also not considered a candidate in the May 2004 elections. Another factor which is worth mentioning is the fact that respondent has relinquished the disputed position on May 16, 2007. The vice-mayor elect then took his oath and has assumed office as mayor of Mabalacat on May 17, 2007 until the term ended on June 30, 2007. For failure to serve for the full term, such involuntary interruption in his term of office should be considered a gap which renders the three-term limit inapplicable. The three-term limit does not apply whenever there is an involuntary break. The Constitution does not require that the interruption or hiatus to be a full term of three years. What the law requires is for an interruption, break or a rest period from a candidate's term of office "for any length of time." The Supreme Court in the case of Latasa v Comelec ruled: ndeed, the law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit. n sum, the three-term limit is not applicable in the instant case for lack of the two conditions: 1) respondent was not the duly-elected mayor of Mabalacat for the July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007 term primordially because he was not even considered a candidate thereat; and 2) respondent has failed to serve the entire duration of the term of office because he has already relinquished the disputed office on May 16, 2007 which is more than a month prior to the end of his supposed term. x x x WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to DENY the instant Motion for Reconsideration for LACK OF MERT. The Resolution of the Commission Second Division is hereby AFFRMED. SO ORDERED. 3
The 88ue8 Dizon submits that the factual findings made in the Rivera case should still be applied in the present case because Morales had, except for one month and 14 days, served the full term of 2004-2007. Morales' assumption of the mayoralty position on 1 July 2007 makes the 2007- 2010 term Morales' fifth term in office. Dizon raises the following grounds before this Court: 1. THE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED TS DSCRETON AMOUNTNG TO LACK OR EXCESS OF TS JURSDCTON WHEN T RULED THAT RESPONDENT MORALES DD NOT VOLATE THE THREE-YEAR TERM LMT WHEN HE RAN AND WON AS MAYOR OF MABALACAT, PAMPANGA DURNG THE MAY 14, 2007 ELECTON. 2. THE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED TS DSCRETON AMOUNTNG TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURSDCTON WHEN T RULED THAT DUE TO THS HONORABLE COURT'S RULNG N THE AFORESAD CONSOLDATED CASES, RESPONDENT MORALES' FOURTH TERM S CONSDERED A GAP N THE LATTER'S SERVCE WHEN HE FLED HS CERTFCATE OF CANDDACY FOR THE 2007 ELECTONS. 3. THE COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED TS DSCRETON WHEN T RULED THAT THE FOURTH TERM OF MORALES WAS NTERRUPTED WHEN HE "RELNQUSHED" HS POSTON FOR ONE MONTH AND 14 DAYS PROR TO THE MAY 14, 2007 ELECTON. 4
The RuIing of the Court The petition has no merit. The present case covers a situation wherein we have previously ruled that Morales had been elected to the same office and had served three consecutive terms, and wherein we disqualified and removed Morales during his fourth term. Dizon claims that Morales is currently serving his fifth term as mayor. s the 2007-2010 term really Morales' fifth term? %e 11ect o1 our Ruling in te Rivera Case n our decision promulgated on 9 May 2007, this Court unseated Morales during his fourth term. We cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy dated 30 December 2003. This cancellation disqualified Morales from being a candidate in the May 2004 elections. The votes cast for Morales were considered stray votes. The dispositive portion in theRivera case reads: WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 167591 is GRANTED. Respondent Morales' Certificate of Candidacy dated December 30, 2003 is cancelled. n view of the vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga, the vice-mayor elect of the said municipality in the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections is hereby declared mayor and shall serve as such for the remaining duration of the term July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. The petition in G.R. No. 170577 is DSMSSED for being moot. This Decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED. 5
Article X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution reads: The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code restated Article X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution as follows: No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. For purposes of determining the resulting disqualification brought about by the three-term limit, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times. 6 There should be a concurrence of two conditions for the application of the disqualification: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. 7 lavvphilnet n the Rivera case, we found that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat for four consecutive terms: 1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998, 1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001, 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2004, and 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. We disqualified Morales from his candidacy in the May 2004 elections because of the three-term limit. Although the trial court previously ruled that Morales' proclamation for the 1998-2001 term was void, there was no interruption of the continuity of Morales' service with respect to the 1998-2001 term because the trial court's ruling was promulgated only on 4 July 2001, or after the expiry of the 1998-2001 term. Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales' involuntary severance from office with respect to the 2004-2007 term. nvoluntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. 8 Our decision in the Rivera case was promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was effective immediately. The next day, Morales notified the vice mayor's office of our decision. The vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. The assumption by the vice mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter how short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales' continuity of service. Thus, Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. 2007-2010: Morales' Fi1t %erm? Dizon claims that the 2007-2010 term is Morales' fifth term in office. Dizon asserts that even after receipt of our decision on 10 May 2007, Morales "waited for the election to be held on 14 May 2007 to ensure his victory for a fifth term." 9
We concede that Morales occupied the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the following periods: 1 July 1995 to 30 June 1998, 1 July 1998 to 30 June 2001, 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2004, and 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007. However, because of his disqualification, Morales was not the duly elected mayor for the 2004-2007 term. Neither did Morales hold the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the full term. Morales cannot be deemed to have served the full term of 2004-2007 because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Morales' occupancy of the position of mayor of Mabalacat from 1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three-term limit. ndeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June 2007 served as a gap for purposes of the three-term limit rule. Thus, the present 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010 term is effectively Morales' first term for purposes of the three-term limit rule. Dizon alleges that Morales "was able to serve his fourth term as mayor through lengthy litigations. x x x n other words, he was violating the rule on three-term limit with impunity by the sheer length of litigation and profit from it even more by raising the technicalities arising therefrom." 10 To this, we quote our ruling in Lonzanida v COMLC: The respondents harp on the delay in resolving the election protest between petitioner and his then opponent Alvez which took roughly about three years and resultantly extended the petitioner's incumbency in an office to which he was not lawfully elected. We note that such delay cannot be imputed to the petitioner. There is no specific allegation nor proof that the delay was due to any political maneuvering on his part to prolong his stay in office. Moreover, protestant Alvez, was not without legal recourse to move for the early resolution of the election protest while it was pending before the regional trial court or to file a motion for the execution of the regional trial court's decision declaring the position of mayor vacant and ordering the vice-mayor to assume office while the appeal was pending with the COMELEC. Such delay which is not here shown to have been intentionally sought by the petitioner to prolong his stay in office cannot serve as basis to bar his right to be elected and to serve his chosen local government post in the succeeding mayoral election. 11
Montebon v8 ComeIec Date: April 9, 2008 Petitioners: Federico Montebon and Eleonor Ondoy Respondents: Comelec and Sesinado Potencioso Jr Ponente: Ynares Santiago Facts: Montebon, Ondoy and Potencioso, Jr. were candidates for municipal councilor of the Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu for the May 14, 2007 Elections. Petitioners and other candidates filed a petition for disqualification against respondent with the COMELEC alleging that respondent had been elected and served three consecutive terms as municipal councilor in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004- 2007.Thus, he is proscribed from running for the same position in the 2007 elections as it would be his fourth consecutive term. Respondent admitted having been elected, but claimed that the service of his second term in 2001-2004 was interrupted on January 12, 2004 when he succeeded as vice mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of Vice Mayor Petronilo L. Mendoza.Consequently, he is not disqualified from vying for the position of municipal councilor in the 2007 elections. Petitioners, on the other hand contended that voluntary renunciation of the office shall not be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the official concerned was elected. The comelec denied the petition for disqualification. On appeal, the Comelec en banc affirmed and ruled that there was no voluntary renunciation of office, but rather, an effective disruption in the full service of his second term as councilor.
ssue:WON respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 interrupted his 2001- 2004 term as municipal councilor Held: Yes Ratio: n onzunIdu v. CommIssIon on EIecLIons the Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. n Borju, Jr. v. CommIssIon on EIecLIons, the Court emphasized that the term limit for elective officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position.Thus, for the disqualification to apply, it is not enough that the official has been elected three consecutive times; he must also have served three consecutive terms in the same position. While it is undisputed that respondent was elected municipal councilor for three consecutive terms, the issue lies on whether he is deemed to have fully served his second term in view of his assumption of office as vice-mayor of Tuburan on January 12, 2004. Succession in local government offices is by operation of law.Section 44 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, provides that if a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member shall become vice mayor. n this case, a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the vice mayor due to the retirement of Vice Mayor Mendoza.Respondent, being the highest ranking municipal councilor, succeeded him in accordance with law.t is clear therefore that his assumption of office as vice- mayor can in no way be considered a voluntary renunciation of his office as municipal councilor. n onzunIdu v. CommIssIon on EIecLIons, the Court explained the concept of voluntary renunciation as follows: The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, `Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected.' The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people's choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision.Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely,invo lunt ary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. Thus, respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an involuntary severance from his office as municipal councilor, resulting in an interruption in the service of his 2001-2004 term.t cannot be deemed to have been by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by operation of law. Succession by law to a vacated government office is characteristically not voluntary since it involves the performance of a public duty by a government official, the non- performance of which exposes said official to possible administrative and criminal charges of dereliction of duty and neglect in the performance of public functions.t is therefore more compulsory and obligatory rather than voluntary.
BoIo8 v. COMELEC Peralta | 2009 Facts: For three consecutive terms, petitioner Nicasio Bolos Jr. was elected to the position of Punong Bar angay of Bar angay Bi ki ng, Daui s, Bohol i n t he Bar angay El ect i ons hel d i n 1994, 1997 and2002. n May 2004, whi l e si t t i ng as t he i ncumbent Punong Bar angay, pet i t i oner r an f or Muni ci pal Councilor of Dauis, Bohol and won. He assumed office as Municipal Councilor, leaving his post as Punong Barangay. He served the full term of the Sangguniang Bayan position, which was until June 30, 2007. Thereafter, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Punong Barangay of Barangay Bikingin the 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. Respondent Cinconiegue, the incumbent Punong Barangay and candidate for the same office,f i l ed bef or e t he COMELEC a pet i t i on f or t he di squal i f i cat i on of pet i t i oner as candi dat e on t he ground that he had already served the three-term limit, in violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of R.A. No. 7160. Respondent: Contended that petitioner's relinquishment of the position of Punong Barangay in2004 was voluntary on his part, as it could be presumed that it was his personal decision to run as municipal councilor.
Petitioner's Answer: Argued that his election and assumption of office as Sangguniang Bayanmember was by operation of law; hence, it must be considered as an involuntary interruption in the continuity of his last term of service. Fi r st Di vi si on of COMELEC: Hel d t hat pet i t i oner ' s r el i nqui shment of t he of f i ce of PunongBarangay was a voluntary renunciation of his office. Cited that it was unlikely that respondent had filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Sangguniang Bayan post, campaigned and exhorted the municipal electorate to vote for him as such and then after being elected and proclaimed, return to his former position. Thus, he was disqualified from being a candidate for the same office in the2007 elections. COMELEC en banc: Denied the motion for reconsideration. ssue: Whet her or not t her e was vol unt ar y r enunci at i on of t he Of f i ce of Punong Bar angay byp e t i t i o n e r wh e n h e a s s u m e d o f f i c e a s Mu n i c i p a l C o u n c i l o r w h i c h wi l l r e n d e r u n b r o k e n t h e continuity of his service as Punong Barangay for the full term of office.
Ruling: YES. T h e t h r e e - t e r m l i mi t f o r e l e c t i v e l o c a l o f f i c i a l s i s c o n t a i n e d i n S e c t i o n 8 , A r t i c l e X o f t h e Constitution. Meanwhile, Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code provides that barangayofficials are covered by the three-term limit, while Section 43(c)[7] thereof states that the term of office of barangay officials shall be five (5) years. Socrates v. COMELEC : The rule on the three-term limit two parts: 1)An elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. 2) Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interruptscontinuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joinedtogether to form a continuous service or consecutive terms. Lonzanida v. COMELEC: The second part of the rule shows the clear intent of the framers of theConstitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people's choice and grant their elected official full serviceof a term Two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: (1) that the official concer ned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same government post; and ( 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. (2) Pet i t i oner was el ect ed as Punong Bar angay f or t hr ee consecut i ve t er ms, sat i sf yi ng t he f i rst condition for disqualification. As to the second requirement, the COMELEC correctly held that petitioner abandoned his office. Abandonment, like resignation, is voluntary. Petitioner did not assume the position of Sangguniang Bayan member by operation of law. The t er m " oper at i on of l aw i s " a t er m descr i bi ng t he f act t hat r i ght s may be acqui r ed or l ost by t he effect of a legal rule without any act of the person affected. Examples of interruption in the service of a term of office, by operation of law: 1.Municipal Councilor succeeded as Vice-Mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of the Vice-Mayor. ( Montebon v. COMELEC) 2. Vice-Mayor became Mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent Mayor.( Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC) n t hi s case, pet i t i oner di d not f i l l i n or succeed t o a vac ancy by oper at i on of l aw. He i nst ead r el i nqui shed hi s of f i ce asPunong Bar angay dur i ng hi s t hi r d t er m when he won and assumed office as Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, which is deemed a voluntary renunciation of the Office of Punong Barangay ALDOVNO VS COMELEC AND ASLO FACTS: s the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his term of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160, or the Local Government Code)? The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive suspension is an effective interruption because it renders the suspended public official unable to provide complete service for the full term; thus, such term should not be counted for the purpose of the three- term limit rule. The present petition seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. n September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the $andiganbayan's suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term n the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due course to Asilo's certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160. The COMELEC's Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilo's favour in its Resolution of November 28, 2007. t reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered. SSUE: Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the three-term limit rule; and . Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160 HELD: NEGATVE. Petition is meritorious. As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective official's stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X. Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time three years during which an official has title to office and can serve The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office., preventive suspension is not a qualified interruption. Lonzanida v Commission on lections 7 presented the question of whether the disqualification on the basis of the three-term limit applies if the election of the public official (to be strictly accurate, the proclamation as winner of the public official) for his supposedly third term had been declared invalid in a final and executory judgment We ruled that the two requisites for the application of the disqualification (viz, 1 that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2 that he has fully served three consecutive terms.. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMLC to that effect $uch involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995- 1998 mayoral term(CPTION) "nterruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective official's continuous stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms, using "voluntary renunciation" as an example and standard of what does not constitute an interruption. Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective official's stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended official's continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.
ADORMO vs. COMLC G.R. No. 147927. February 4, 2002 FACTS: Adormeo and Talaga, Jr. Iiled their certiIicates oI candidacy Ior mayor oI Lucena City Ior the 2001 elections. Talaga, Jr. was then the incumbent mayor. He was elected mayor in 1992 and was again re-elected in 1995-1998. In the election oI 1998, he lost, however, in the recall election oI May 2000, he won and served the unexpired term. Adormeo Iiled a Petition to Cancel CertiIicate oI Candidacy and/or DisqualiIication oI Talaga, Jr., on the ground that the latter was elected and had served as city mayor Ior 3 consecutive terms. Talaga, Jr. responded that he was not elected City Mayor Ior 3 consecutive terms but only Ior 2 consecutive terms since he was deIeated in the 1998 election, interrupting the consecutiveness oI his years as mayor. COMELEC First Division Iound Talaga, Jr. disqualiIied Ior the position oI city mayor. He Iiled a motion Ior reconsideration and COMELEC en banc ruled in his Iavor and held that 1) respondent was not elected Ior three (3) consecutive terms because he did not win in the 1998 elections; 2) that he was installed only as mayor by reason oI his victory in the recall elections; 3) that his victory in the recall elections was not considered a term oI oIIice and is not included in the 3-term disqualiIication rule, and 4) that he did not Iully serve the three (3) consecutive terms, and his loss in the 1998 elections is considered an interruption in the continuity oI his service as Mayor oI Lucena City. AIter canvassing, Talaga, Jr. was proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor oI Lucena City. ISSU: Whether or not Talaga, Jr was disqualiIied to run Ior mayor oI in the elections. RULING: The term limit Ior elective local oIIicials must be taken to reIer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. It is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local oIIice, he must also have been elected to the same position Ior the same number oI times beIore the disqualiIication can apply. The tw conditions Ior the application oI the disqualiIication must concur: a) that the oIIicial concerned has been elected Ior three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has Iully served three consecutive terms. COMELECs ruling that private respondent were not elected Ior three (3) consecutive terms should be upheld. The continuity oI his mayorship was disrupted by his deIeat in the 1998 elections. Voluntary renunciation oI oIIice Ior any length oI time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity oI service Ior the Iull term Ior which he was elected. Voluntary renunciation oI a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation oI the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance Irom oIIice Ior any length oI time short oI the Iull term provided by law amounts to an interruption oI continuity oI service. HRFOR, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED