The main question of this debate is “Does the Christian God exist?” I will be arguing in the negative.Thank you, JD Curtis, for agreeing to have this very important debate. I hope our audience will reallyenjoy this and learn something. This is my opening statement, so this is not the time to address myopponent's arguments just yet; I will present four arguments to undermine Christianity/belief in theChristian god in my opening statement and will refute my opponent's opening statement in my firstrebuttal.In order for my opponent to win this debate, my opponent's opening contentions need to stand andwithstand my objections. If my opponent's arguments fail to give good reason/argument/evidence for his Christian belief, he loses this debate and fails to make his case. Additionally, if my opponent'sarguments are undermined by my rebuttals, he loses this debate. In order for someone on theaffirmative to win the debate, he/she has to meet the burden of proof. It is not up to me, today, to'disprove' the Christian god, but rather it is up to my opponent to erect a case for Christianity.The issue here is also not for me to 'show atheism is true' or to 'prove atheism.' Both of these statementsare incoherent and are a shift of the burden of proof. Atheism is simply a lack of belief in any gods. Iam an atheist because I do not find any of the given arguments for any gods to be convincing; it is not amatter of “I believe there are no gods.” My atheism is similar to the 'a-ghostism' of the audience (I presume). I would wager that no readers of this debate believe in the existence of ghosts because thearguments given for ghosts are insufficient, for example.With that, I will move on to my first argument, 'the evidential problem of natural evil.'

Argument One: The evidential problem of natural evil

The evidential problem of natural evil is a well-known argument and a major threat to theistic belief.Christianity maintains that an all-loving, all-powerful, and all-knowing god [an omni-good god] createdthe universe. When one looks around the earth, one sees an egregious amount of pointless suffering.One would not expect and should not expect to see an egregious amount of suffering if an omni-goodgod created the universe because such a being could prevent the suffering, would know how to do so,would be able to create a different universe, etc.It is quite easy to see the amount of deaths and suffering that are caused by purely natural causes thatare guaranteed to happen because of the laws of the universe that Christians believe are established byGod. Can one honestly believe that malaria, AIDS, Indian Ocean Tsunamis, Chilean earthquakes, andthe like are the work of an omni-good god? In addition to human suffering, an egregious amount of animal suffering exists – ecosystems thrive because animals kill other animals, often in a slow and painful fashion. Does this seem to be the work of an all-loving, all-powerful, and all-knowing being?Common defenses to the evidential problem of natural evil – as we will probably hear in this debate – seem to ultimately miss the point/ignore the attributes of the alleged omni-good god. Defenses like“There is an unknown reason for the suffering in the world” or “Suffering is needed to build character and so that we can know good or God” seem to not recognize the alleged omnipotence of an omni-goodgod; God can simply have these 'greater goods' in a universe that is very much unlike ours or even likeours without the egregious amounts of unneeded suffering.Theists typically use the 'free will solution' to escape the problem of 'moral evil' – persons committing

heinous acts to other persons – to reconcile theism with moral evil. Although I don't think this is a gooddefense, and don't wish to argue this, I want to make it clear that my argument is focused on 'naturalevil,' not 'moral evil.' I contend that 'natural evil' – earthquakes, tornadoes, floods, tsunamis, animalsuffering, and the like – is incompatible with belief in an omni-good god and serves as a defeater toChristian belief.We understand that natural disasters are not the result of human behavior, but rather are a result of thenatural laws of the universe, so the 'free will solution' can not work to address the problem of naturalevil.To make this simple, I will posit a short deductive argument.Premise one: An egregious amount of unnecessary suffering exists.Premise two: An egregious amount of unnecessary suffering renders belief in the Christian god to be irrational.Conclusion: Belief in the Christian god is irrational.

Arguments Two and Three: The implications of the evidential problem of good

My opponent -- and most likely everyone reading this debate -- does not believe in an all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-evil god (Let's call this an omni-evil god). While there is certainly an egregiousamount of suffering in this world, one can see that individuals take pleasure in beautiful landscapes,raising children, successful relationships, and so much more. When we look at what I will call 'good' inthe world, we can reasonably assume that belief in omni-evil god is profoundly unreasonable. Why, onewonders, would an omni-evil god allow so much good in the universe that flows from the natural lawsof the universe?Perhaps my opponent would like to say, and perhaps may do so, that omni-good god's reasons for allowing suffering and death and/or guaranteeing that suffering and death that would result from thenatural laws of the universe are unknown. “You can't know the mind of omni-good god!” he may say.My response to this hypothetical is “You can't know the mind of omni-evil god!” My response todefend omni-evil god obviously is irrational – and it is similar to that which a theist may give toaddress the problem of natural evil – so the similar defense given by the theist should likewise berejected.If the amount of good in the world renders belief in an omni-evil god unreasonable, why doesn't theamount of suffering and death in the world render belief in an omni-good god unreasonable? If belief inan omni-evil god is

profoundly irrational

, why is it the case that belief in an omni-good god is not onlyrational, but

profoundly rational

? My opponent may provide several defenses for belief in an omni-good god (and perhaps does so in response to argument one), but even if this is the case, he still needsto show why belief in an omni-good god is profoundly more rational than belief in an omni-evil god.Perhaps my opponent will say, “Well, I don't believe in the Christian god because I look at the amountof good in the world,” but this misses the point of the argument. The issue here is not how one arrivesat belief in an omni-good god, but rather what an evidential survey of the world reveals. We can find asufficient amount of 'good' and 'evil' in the world to either conclude that a creator god, if one exists, iseither omni-good or omni-evil [or perhaps 'neutral']. From this, we can look at the 'good' and concludethat there is no omni-evil god. Why, then, can't we look at the 'evil' and conclude there is no omni-good

god?My arguments are as follows:Premise one: There is just as much evidence from the goodness/evil of the world that the creator god is evil, as there is that the creator god isgood.Premise two: We are justified in believing that evidence of goodness inthe world demonstrates that there is not an evil creator god.Conclusion: Therefore, we are equally justified in believing that theevidence of evil in the world demonstrates that there is not a good creator god.Premise One: Belief in an omni-evil god is profoundly irrational.Premise Two: Similar reasoning can be used to address the problem of natural good in defense of an omni-evil god as that which can be used toaddress the problem of natural evil in defense of an omni-good god.Premise Three: If such similar reasoning mentioned in premise two can be used, belief in in omni-good god is no more rational than belief in anomni-evil god.Conclusion: Belief in an omni-good god is profoundly irrational.

Argument four: The inductive argument for naturalism

Throughout human history, supernatural beliefs and explanations have gone to the wayside in favor of naturalistic explanations to create what I believe is a very strong inductive argument for naturalism – the philosophical belief that all that exists is the natural world. Here, I am not claiming any sort of absolute certainty, but rather am saying that naturalism is the most justified explanation of reality. Naturalism, of course, if true, is incompatible with belief in the Christian god because the Christian godis a supernatural entity. Here, I will build a case for naturalism and why one should reject supernatural beliefs.Humans, in the past, compared to those today, had a rudimentary understanding of the universe andwere unable to explain certain phenomena, so they looked to supernatural explanations in order toaccount for what they did not understand. Natural disasters such as earthquakes and floods werethought to have been sent by the gods. Sickness and disease were thought to be the result of demons.Lightning was thought to have been the wrath of vengeful gods. Throughout time, as our understandingincreased, supernatural explanations have been discarded in favor of naturalistic explanations; we nowunderstand that we no longer need supernatural explanations to understand a great deal of phenomenain the universe.Throughout history, countless amounts of religions have been posited and, I would wager, the personsof the audience happily reject all of them or accept one of them.