Jinnah and Kashmir The Quaid-e-Azam thanked the National Conference

>leadership for the right royal reception given to him but at the same time
>said that it was not a reception for his person, but to the All India
>Muslim League, the party of ten crore Muslims of India of which he was
>President. This annoyed the Hindu leader so much that he left the stage in
>distress.
> Introduction
>
>The Quaid-e-Azam is believed to have visited the State of Jammu and Kashmir
>at least thrice. According to Mr. Justice Yusuf Saraf, author of "Kashmiris
>Fight for Freedom" the Quaid-e-Azam and his wife seemed to have had visited
>Kashmir for the first time before 1929. Though this visit was private in
>nature, yet as a great Muslim leader he felt concerned at the appalling
>conditions of the Kashmiris at that time too.
>The second visit of the Quaid-e-Azam was in 1936 during which he hinted to
>his first visit, saying that he had visited Kashmir ten years earlier too.
>In 1936 the Quaid-e-Azam addressed a meeting held in connection with
>Milad-un-Nabi, the birthday of the Holy Prophet (SAW) at the Mujahid
>Manzil, Srinagar. The Muslim Conference (at that point of time was led by
>Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas and Sheikh Abdullah) in welcome address to Jinnah
>appreciated his role as lover of Hindu-Muslim unity. Mr. Jinnah
>reciprocated the sentiments and said that the Muslims were in majority in
>Kashmir but it was their duty to ensure that the minority community that
>is, the Hindus of Kashmir would get justice and fair play at the hands of
>the majority community of Kashmir.
>Mr. Jinnah, who was once proclaimed as ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity,
>had been disillusioned by that time and in his speech regretted that some
>of the leaders of the majority community in British India had not been able
>to give such an assurance to the Muslim minority. That showed that the
>Quaid-e-Azam was not satisfied with the concept of Hindu-Muslim unity in
>British India.
>
>The Muslim Conference, which represented the Muslims of the State 1936, was
>converted into National Conference in 1939 as its leaders had come under
>the influence of Nehru. Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas, who had joined hand with
>Sheikh Abdullah in 1939 to found National Conference, realized his mistake
>within three years. He returned to the Muslim Conference, which had been
>revived by 14 other leaders from Jammu and Kashmir. Soon many others joined
>the revived Muslim Conference and once again it became a force to reckon
>with.
>
>The main and the last visit of the Quaid-e-Azam to the State of Jammu and
>Kashmir took place in 1944. During this visit he attended a reception by
>the National Conference headed by Sheikh Abdullah. Sheikh Abdullah had
>thought that with the help of Dogra administration and the active and
>crafty Hindus he would suppress the pro-Muslim League elements in the State
>and assure Mr. Jinnah that the Kashmiris, Hindus as well as Muslims, were
>believers in One Nation Theory of the Congress. A Hindu nationalist Jialal
>Kilam presented the address of welcome to the Quaid-e-Azam.
>
>The Quaid-e-Azam thanked the National Conference leadership for the right
>royal reception given to him but at the same time said that it was not a
>reception for his person, but to the All India Muslim League, the party of
>ten crore Muslims of India of which he was President. This annoyed the
>Hindu leader so much that he left the stage in distress.
>
>
>One Voice With Kashmir
>
>After the reception of the National Conference, the Quaid-e-Azam moved to
>Dalgate, Srinagar where the reception of the Muslim Conference and Kashmir
>Muslim Students Union was waiting for him. The Quaid spoke out his heart at
>this reception. His clarion call was "Oh ye Muslims, Our Allah is one, our
>Prophet (SAW) is one and our Quran is one, therefore, our voice and PARTY
>MUST BE ONE".
>
>In the Muslim Conference annual session at Muslim Park, Jamia Masjid, Mr.
>Jinnah was more explicit. He asked the Muslims of Kashmir to beware of the
>trap of secularism and nationalism of the Congress brand.
>
>The Quaid-e-Azam stayed in Kashmir for two months and a week, which showed
>his inveterate interest in the affairs of Kashmir and his belief that
>Kashmir is a jugular vein of Pakistan. While in Kashmir the Quaid-e-Azam
>also remained involved with All India politics. The talks between him and
>Mohan Lal Karam Chand Ghandi were initiated by C Rajagopalacharya when
>Jinnah was in Kashmir. During his stay in Kashmir the Quaid-e-Azam created
>an atmosphere of understanding and support for the Muslim Conference and by
>his departure the Whole State was resounding with his slogans and that of
>Pakistan.
>
>The Quaid-e-Azam was a principled constitutionalist and in his meetings he
>made it clear that the scheme of partition pertained to British India and
>as regards the States some additional formula would have to be envisaged.
>
>Regarding Srinagar visit of the Quaid-e-Azam in 1944, Alastair Lamb says "
>M.A. Jinnah, unlike Jawaharlal Nehru was extremely reluctant at this period
>of time to involve himself directly (or the Muslim League which he headed)
>in the internal affairs of the Princely State; such action would in his
>eyes have been constitutionally improper. (Page 97 Kashmir Disputed
>Legacy).
>
>The Quaid-e-Azam's interest in Kashmir is evident from the fact that he
>explained the significance of the name of Pakistan to Mountbatten on 17 May
>1947 as follows:
>
>"The derivation of the word Pakistan – P for Punjab; A for Afghan (i.e.
>Pathans NWFP); K for Kashmir; I for nothing because that letter was not in
>the word in Urdu; S for Sindh and Tan for the last syllable for
>Baluchistan".
>
>This explanation of the Quaid-e-Azam is contained in the official
>publication in the United Kingdom between 1980 and 1993 of the four final
>volumes of a selection of British documents relating to the Transfer of
>Power in India.
>
>According to Transfer of Power papers TEX No. 473 the whole word Pakistan,
>Liaquat Ali Khan then went on to say, meant "Pure Land". The name Pakistan
>it seems was devised by Chaudhry Rehmat Ali in 1933. Since then the K is
>the world always bore the same significance: it referred to Kashmir.
>
>Vital Links
>
>The logic behind the partition of the Indian Empire into Muslim and
>non-Muslim partition clearly suggested that Kashmir ought to go to
>Pakistan. Firstly the state of Jammu and Kashmir was a region with an
>overwhelming Muslim majority contiguous to the Muslim majority region of
>Punjab, which became part of Pakistan.
>
>Secondly the economy of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was bound up with
>what became Pakistan. Its best communication with the outside world lay
>through Pakistan and this was the route taken by the bulk of its exports.
>
>Third: The waters of the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab all of which flowed
>through Jammu and Kashmir territory, were essential for the prosperity of
>Agriculture life of Pakistan. From a strictly rational point of view, based
>on a study of culture and economy of the region, there can be little doubt
>that a scheme for the Partition of the Indian subcontinent as was devised
>in 1947 should have awarded the greater part of the State of Jammu and
>Kashmir to Pakistan. Thus Jammu and Kashmir is undoubtedly Jugular vein of
>Pakistan.
>
>The Indus known in the subcontinent as 'Sindh' is 1800 miles long and is
>thus amongst the principal rivers of the world. Rising in western Tibet at
>the height of 17000 feet, it cuts across the Laddakh range near Thangra and
>continues its northwesterly course between it and Zanskar range for about
>300 miles. Zanskar River joins it about 12 miles west of Leh. Before it
>enters Hazara, it has already traversed a distance of 812 miles. India has
>plans to divert the river at a proper point.
>
>The river Jhelum has its source in Verinag in southern Kashmir, at a height
>of nearly 6000 feet, where it begins in the shape of small stream but by
>the time it reaches Baramula town, a distance of 102 miles it assumes the
>shape of a big river on account of having joined by its more important
>tributaries Sindh and Lidder. The towns of Islamabad, Srinagar, Sopore,
>Do-ab-gal, Baramula, Uri and Muzaffarabad are towns at its bank in the
>State. The river passes through Woolar Lake where India plans to construct
>a barrage, which if completed will starve Pakistan's irrigated Lands. By
>the time Jhelum reaches Mangla it has a vertical fall of 4000 feet, which
>has been made use of by Pakistan by building a multiple purpose Dam
>Project.
>
>Chanab descends from Lahole in the Chamba range of the Himalayas. It takes
>leave of the mountains at Akhnoor in Jammu and Kashmir State. It enters
>Pakistan at Khairi Rihal in Gujrat District.
>
>At Salal, a place 7 miles from Reasi India has constructed a Dam. The Lake
>thus formed is being used not only for generation of electricity but also
>for irrigation purpose, which would reduce the quantity of water that flows
>in Pakistan. In times of War, it can be used to inundate large areas of
>Land in Sialkot, Gujranwala and Sheikpura. Parts of its water stands
>already diverted at Akhnoor to feed the Ranbir canal, which irrigates large
>areas in Jammu, Sambha and Ranbirsinghpura.
>
>Under the Indus Basin Treaty out of five rivers of the Punjab two rivers
>namely Jhelum and Chanab came to Pakistan's shared and three namely Ravi,
>Sutlej and Beas went to India's. But all the three Pakistan rivers (Indus
>included) either rise in or traverse the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the
>agriculture of the Punjab and Sindh to a great extent depends upon the
>melting snows of its mountains.
>
>The great Mangla Dam, so important to the economy of Pakistan, lies in the
>territory, which was once part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
>
>The valleys of the major Kashmiri Rivers, now so vital to the economy of
>Pakistan also provided until very recently the main lines of communications
>between the state and the outside world. The road to Srinagar started at
>Rawalpindi and followed the course of the Jhelum into the vale of Kashmir.
>The valley of upper Indus gave access to the hill State of Gilgit region.
>The Line of the beds of the rivers which created links between the western
>part of the Punjab (now Pakistan) and Kashmir also made communications
>between eastern part of (India) and Kashmir extremely difficult. The only
>road within the State of Jammu and Kashmir, for example, which linked Jammu
>(the winter capital of the State) with Srinagar (the Jammu capital)
>involves the crossing of Pir Panjal Range by means of Banihal Pass, over
>9,000 feet high and snow bound in winter the easiest route between Jammu
>and Srinagar lay through west (Pakistan) Punjab by way of Sialkot and
>Rawalpindi at the moment of Partition in 1947
> there existed but one road from India to Jammu, by way of Pathankot
>(which was again a tehsil of Gurdaspur District, a Muslim majority District
>with Pathankot tehsil having marginal Hindu majority); and this was then of
>poorest quality and much of it un-surfaced. Thus Kashmir has been described
>as the Jugular vein of Pakistan.
>
>Hindu Intrigues
>
>Krishna Menon wrote a private letter to Mountbatten on 14 June 1947 warning
>him with dire consequences for the future of Anglo-Indian relations, if the
>State of Jammu and Kashmir were permitted to go to Pakistan. The gist of
>the argument seemed to be that it might be perceived that British policy,
>while accepting abandonment of India, was to make Pakistan, strengthened by
>accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, into the eastern frontier of a
>British sphere of influence in the Middle East. Such development would not
>be at all popular in the newly independent India: and it might put at risk
>the extensive British interests there. It was essential n Menon's view that
>the State of Jammu and Kashmir be brought within the Indian fold.
>
>According to British Transfer of Power papers, Menon had asked Mountbatten
>not to keep this letter; it had however survived among the Mountbatten
>papers.
>
>About the same time Mountbatten requested Nehru to prepare a Note on
>Kashmir for him, which Nehru did. Nehru in the Note said: "Kashmir is of
>first importance to us because of the great strategic importance of the
>frontier state".
>
>Nehru concluded: "If any attempt is made to put Kashmir into the Pakistan
>constituent assembly there is likely to be much trouble because the
>National Conference is not in favor of it and the Maharaja's position would
>also become difficult. The normal and obvious course appears to be for
>Kashmir to join the constituent assembly of India. This will satisfy both
>the popular demand and Maharaja's wishes. It is absurd to think that
>Pakistan would create trouble, if this happens.".
>
>Mountbatten disliked the prospect of independence for the State of Jammu
>and Kashmir after the Transfer of Power. While publicly declaring that
>Maharaja was perfectly entitled to accede either to Pakistan or India, he
>personally favored a solution where Maharaja left the decision to Sheikh
>Abdullah's National Conference as Nehru's note suggested, Sheikh Abdullah
>would surely opt for India.
>
>Sheikh Abdullah along with Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas was in prison. So the
>first important thing was to get him released. For this Nehru himself was
>keen to go to Kashmir. It was with great difficulty that Mountbatten was
>able to dissuade him on the ground that Nehru must " really look to his
>duty to the Indian people as a whole. There were four hundred million in
>India and only four million in Kashmir". It was rather irresponsible of the
>future Prime Minister of India, Mountbatten observed, to spend so much time
>on what was but one of the many grave problems confronting him.
>
>Mountbatten himself did visit Srinagar but was unable to persuade the
>Maharaja to discuss serious matters. Alastair Lamb has however, interpreted
>the record on the discussion as implying that the Maharaja would be well
>advised to join India if he entertained any hope of retaining his position
>in the State. The Congress would keep him on his throne. Mr. Jinnah and his
>Muslim League would make sure that his subjects brought about his
>overthrow.
>
>Jawaharlal Nehru, was however, disappointed that Mountbatten had been
>"unable to solve the problem of Kashmir" for he observed, "that the problem
>would not be solved until Sheikh Abdullah was released from the prison". It
>was eventually agreed that Mohan Das Karam Chand Ghandi should go to
>Kashmir in Nehru's place to take up the "question of Sheikh Abdullah" and
>Mountbatten wrote to Maharaja to pave the way.
>
>Incidentally Ghandi's visit was not the only visit to the Maharaja by
>leading personalities of Indian side on the eve of the Transfer of Power.
>There were Kashmir excursions by Acharya Kriplani, the then President of
>Congress and the Sikh rulers of Patila, Kapurthala and Faridkot States of
>East Punjab which had decided to accede to India. Kapurthala was of course,
>a State with a Muslim majority (at least until the massacre that
>accompanied Partition) and a non-Muslim ruler. Jinnah desired to visit
>Kashmir but Maharaja did not agree. There is no evidence of consultation
>with Jinnah on Kashmir by Mountbatten as record shows with Nehru.
>
>Mountbatten Bias
>
>According to official British Transfer of Power papers Mountbatten had told
>the Nawab of Bhopal and the Maharaja of Indore on 4 August 1947, the state
>of Jammu and Kashmir was so placed geographically that it could join either
>dominion, provided part of Gurdaspur District was put into East Punjab by
>the Boundary Commission- in other words only by giving Gurdaspur to India,
>would the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir be presented with a free chance; to
>give Gurdaspur to Pakistan was effectively to guarantee that the State of
>Jammu and Kashmir would sooner or later fall to that dominion.
>
>
>The geographic and economic links between Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan
>were better than those with India, particularly if in the actual process of
>Partition the Gurdaspur District of Punjab with Muslim majority were
>awarded to Pakistan. A Pakistani Gurdaspur would mean that direct Indian
>land access to the State (which was by no means ideal even across the
>Gurdaspur District) would have to be through Kangra District of Punjab (now
>in Himachal) over extremely difficult terrain provided foot hill of the
>Himalayas by either direct into Jammu or by way of Pathankot tehsil of
>Gurdaspur District (where there was a small Hindus majority) if that tehsil
>alone went to India; and all this would involve new roads which would take
>considerable time to construct.
>
>The theory of partition was that all Muslim Majority districts contiguous
>to the Muslim core of Punjab would go to Pakistan. In the event, with the
>awarding of three out of four tehsils of Gurdaspur District to East Punjab
>(that is to say the part of Punjab, which was to be Indian) the accession
>to India of the State of Jammu and Kashmir became a practical as opposed to
>theoretical, possibility. Because two of these tehsils Batala and
>Gurdaspur, were with significant Muslim majorities (only Pathankot tehsil
>then had a small Hindu majority) this award seemed to go against the basic
>spirit of Partition; and the Gurdaspur decision has consequently been the
>subject of a great deal of discussion. Mountbatten has been accused,
>particularly in Pakistan, of deliberate intent to favor the interests of
>India over these of Pakistan.
>
>Within Pakistan there has been a persistent consensus both among the elites
>and the masses that the Boundary Commission led by Cyril Radcliffe in 1947
>has been responsible for most of the India-Pakistan discords with Kashmir
>leading the list. Pakistanis have maintained all along that last minute
>changes were made in the Boundary Award under manipulation by Mountbatten
>and their associates to suit the Indian geo-strategic imperatives. The
>cession of Muslim majority areas in Ferozepur and Gurdaspur areas (in
>former eastern Punjab) to India at the last moment have always been
>perceived in terms of India's long time designs on Kashmir itself. Even
>long after Radcliffe's Award, such question were raised not only in
>Pakistani and British press but, as the contemporary classified official
>documents reveal, inter-departmental concerns dogged the officials in
>British Foreign Office, Commonwealth Relations Office and their High
>Commissions in South Asia. In a luncheon meeting arranged by
> Mountbatten for Radcliffe and attended by Lord Ismay, a close confidant
>of the Viceroy, drastic changes were made in the Boundary Award. Rao Ayer,
>the Assistant Secretary to the Commission, the Maharaja of Bikaner and V.P.
>Menon played a crucial role in influencing the British official decisions
>at this juncture, denying Pakistan Muslim majority areas in Gurdaspur and
>Ferozepur Districts Menon, to the knowledge of all, was the trusted
>confident of Vallabhai Patel and enjoyed closer access to the viceroy whose
>personal antagonism to Jinnah was publicly known.
>
>
>On Menon's being confidant of the both Patel and Mountbatten Chaudhry
>Mahamood Ali in his book Emergence of Pakistan, has observed: "If a Muslim
>officer had been in V.P. Menon's position was known to maintain contact
>with Jinnah, no Viceroy could have tolerated it without laying himself open
>to the charge of partisanship; in any case, the Congress would have made it
>impossible for such an officer to continue in that position". This has also
>been endorsed by Alan Cambell- Johnson in "Mission with Mountbatten".
>
>
>A senior Muslim official himself had seen an early version of the map in
>Ismay's office in Delhi, which had shown those areas already within India,
>even before the Award was made public. Radcliffe's Secretary, Christopher
>Beaumont, in a detailed expose in February 1992, has further provided first
>hand substance to such long-held suspicion.
>
>
>Radcliffe had prepared his Award about the distribution of territories of
>the Punjab between India and Pakistan by 8 August 1947 by which tehsils of
>Ferozpur and Zira were allotted to Pakistan. This was done on the basis of
>population ration – Ferozepur with 55 percent Muslim and Zira with 65
>Percent Muslim, but it was Mountbatten's support for a strong
>post-independence India against a weakened Pakistan, which made Mountbatten
>to pressurize Radcliffe to give these two tehsils to India so that India
>have access to Kashmir. British historian Andrew Roberts comes to believe
>that "Mountbatten's action over delaying the announcement of Radcliffe
>Award after 9 August indicate of him guilty of the errant folly as well as
>dishonesty". He pleads in his book that Mountbatten deserved to be
>court-martialled on his return to London".
>
>Pakistan Day Celebrated In Srinagar
>
>Many Pakistanis, and not only the leaders like M.A. Jinnah and Liaquat Ali
>Khan, once they appreciated the implications of the Award by Radcliffe
>Commission of the three eastern tehsils of Gurdaspur District to India,
>felt profound sense of betrayal. It was understandable that some of them
>should begin to contemplate unorthodox and unofficial course of action.
>
>
>While Poonch formally became an integral part of Jammu and Kashmir State in
>1935-36, its Muslim inhabitants (some 380,000 out of a total 420,000)
>resented the change and never reconciled themselves to being subjects of
>that State an attitude, which was to be of great significance in 1947.
>Traditionally the people of Poonch had little indeed to do with their
>neighbors in the vale of Kashmir across the Pir Panjal Range, and even less
>with Jammu: their links had always been across the Jhelum, particularly in
>the Hazara District of NWFP.
>
>
>Large number of men from Poonch (mainly Sudhans from Sudhnuti tehsil) had
>served in the British Indian army during the War; and Poonch men (Poonchis)
>also constituted the strength of the Jammu and Kashmir State Forces; in
>1947 the Jagir of Poonch may have contained as many as 60,000 ex-servicemen
>who could provide a formidable nucleus for any resistance to the Maharaja.
>In June 1947 there began in Poonch a "no tax" campaign which rapidly
>developed into a secessionist movement from the state greatly reinforced
>throughout much of Poonch (and in Srinagar as well) when on 14 and 15
>August people tried to celebrate "Pakistan Day" (which coincided with
>Kashmir Day which had been observed since 1931) in defiance of Maharaja's
>orders by displaying Pakistan flags and holding public demonstrations.
>Martial Law was introduced. About two weeks after Transfer of Power there
>were major clashes between the State Troops in this case and Poonch crowds
>resulting in large number of casualties.
>
>Standstill Agreement
>
>On 12 August 1947 the new Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir State, Janak
>Singh proposed by telegram a Stand Still Agreement both with Pakistan and
>India. Pakistan agreed on 15 August. India procrastinated, arguing that the
>matter needed to be negotiated by an official from the State sent to Delhi.
>No such official was dispatched for this purpose- no Standstill Agreement
>ever concluded. The Indian response was certainly a departure from the
>procedure, which Mountbatten had earlier indicated and it suggested that
>Indian policy after Independence was going to set out in hitherto uncharted
>waters.
>
>The Maharaja confronted with growing internal disorder (including a full
>scale rebellion into the Poonch region of the State), sought Indian
>military help without, if at all possible, surrendering his own
>independence.
>
>
>On 25 October 1947, before the Kashmir crisis had fully developed and
>before Indian claims based on so-called Maharaja's accession to India
>(which is alleged to have had been signed on 26 October 1947) had been
>voiced, Nehru in a telegram to Attlee, the British Prime Minister, declared
>that:
>
>"I should like to make it clear that (the) question of aiding Kashmir... is
>not designed in any way to influence the State to accede to India. Our
>view, which we have repeatedly made public, is that (the) question of
>accession in any disputed territory must be decided in accordance with the
>wishes of the people, and we adhere to this view".
>
>
>An instrument of Accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India is alleged to have
>been signed by Maharaja on 26 October 1947 and the acceptance of this
>Instrument was made by Governor General of India on 27 October 1947.
>
>Another pair of documents consists of letter from the Maharaja to
>Mountbatten dated 26 October, 1947 in which Indian military aid is sought
>in return for accession to India (on terms stated in an allegedly enclosed
>Instrument) and the appointment of Sheikh Abdullah to head the interim
>government of State; and a letter from Mountbatten to the Maharaja dated 27
>October, 1947 acknowledging the above and noting that, once the affairs of
>the State have been settled and law and order is restored "the question of
>the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people".
>
>Fake Instrument of Accession
>
>The recent research based on the material in archives and sources as the
>memoirs of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India and Prime Minister
>Jammu and Kashmir at that time Mehar Chand Mahajan and the recently
>published correspondence of Jawaharlal Nehru and V.P. Menon's account (The
>Integration of Indian States) prove beyond any shadow of doubt that these
>two documents (a) the Instrument of accession and (b) the letter of the
>Maharaja to Mountbatten could not possibly have been signed on 26 October
>1947. By that time Maharaja had fled from the capital and during October
>26, 1947 he was traveling by road from Srinagar to Jammu. His Prime
>Minister, M.C. Mahajan who was negotiating with government of India and
>senior Indian official concerned in the State matter V.P. Menon were still
>in New Delhi where their presence was noted by many observers. There was no
>communication between New Delhi and the traveling maharaja. Menon and
>Mahajan set out by air from New Delhi to Jammu at about
> IO A.M. on 27 October and the Maharaja learned from them for the first
>time the result of his prime minister's negotiations in New Delhi in the
>early afternoon of that date. The earliest possible time and date for their
>signature would have been the afternoon of 27 October 1947.
>
>With regard to exchange of letters between Maharaja and Mountbatten, the
>former seeking military aid and the latter acknowledging the same and
>promising plebiscite, Alastair lamb says " It seems more than probable,
>both were drafted by Government of India before being taken to Jammu on 27
>October 1947 (by V.P. Menon and Jammu and Kashmir Prime Minister M.C.
>Maharan whose movements, incidentally, are correctly reported in the London
>Times of 28 October, 1947) after the arrival of Indian troops at Srinagar
>field. The case is very strong, therefore, that the document i.e.
>Maharaja's letter to Mountbatten was dictated to the Maharaja".
>
>Government of India published two documents namely Maharaja's letter and
>Mountbatten's reply on 28 October 1947. But the far more important
>document- the alleged Instrument of Ascension was not published until many
>years later, if at all. It was not communicated to Pakistan at the outset
>of overt Indian intervention in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, nor was it
>presented in facsimile to the United Nations in early 1948 as part of
>Indian reference to the Security Council. The 1948 White Paper in which
>Government of India set out its formal case in respect to the State of
>Jammu and Kashmir does not contain the Instrument of Accession as claimed
>to have been signed by the Maharaja. Instead, it reproduces an unsigned
>form of Accession such as, it is implied, the Maharaja might have signed.
>
>Alastair Lamb writes: "To date no satisfactory original of this Instrument
>as signed by the Maharaja has been produced; though a highly suspect
>version, complete with the false date 26 October 1947, has been circulated
>by the Indian side since the 1960's. On the present evidence it is by no
>means clear that the Maharaja ever did sign an Instrument of Accession.
>There are, indeed, grounds for suspecting that he did no such thing".
>
>Indian Intervention & Pakistan's Response
>
>Indian official intervention was decided on 26 October 1947 and a massive
>airlift was immediately organized to fly two infantry battalions into
>Srinagar. Over 100 Dakota transport aircraft were assembled at various
>airfields around Delhi. Obviously this airlift had to have been product of
>much planning which had been started weeks before. There were surely
>contingency plans somewhere in the Indian army. The operation in the State
>of Jammu and Kashmir presented grave logistical problems particularly in
>winter. Publication of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel correspondence leaves one
>in no doubt whatsoever that he and his associates had been involved in
>military planning about Kashmir for more than a month before the operation
>which could have had hardly escaped the notice of senior British military
>officers.
>
>
>On the other hand, when, late on 27 October 1947 the Quaid-e-Azam
>instructed Pakistani troops to go into the State of Jammu and Kashmir to
>try and restore order he was frustrated by the acting Commander in Chief of
>Pakistan Army Lt. Gen. Sir Douglas Gracey. By the same token, it would be
>seen that British Commanders on the Indian side adopted Nelsoniasn approach
>to Indian preparations for intervention in Kashmir.
>
>
>Instead of carrying out orders of the Quaid-e-Azam Gracey telephone to the
>Supreme Commander Field Marshal Auchinleck in Delhi for instructions. On
>this Auchinleck flew to Lahore on 28 October. As a result of Auchinleck's
>intervention the Quaid-e-Azam invited Mountbatten and Nehru to Lahore the
>next day to discuss Kashmir crisis. The invitation was accepted on
>telephone and departure of Mountbatten and Nehru was announced in the
>afternoon of the same day but four hours after the acceptance it was also
>declared that the trip had been cancelled. This meeting was then fixed for
>1 November 1947, which was also not attended by Nehru. Mountbatten,
>however, came to Lahore on this appointed date. The Quaid-e-Azam in his
>three and a half-hour meeting with Mountbatten argued "that the accession
>was not bona fide, since it rested on violence and fraud and would thus
>never be accepted by Pakistan".
>
>
>Quaid-e-Azam impressed upon Mountbatten the need for arranging plebiscite
>in Kashmir under the joint auspices of Governments of India and Pakistan, a
>proposal to which Mountbatten showed agreement just to put before the
>Indian cabinet.
>
>
>Next day Mountbatten flew to New Delhi from Lahore and placed the proposal
>before the Indian cabinet. Nehru however, planned a different strategy. In
>a radio broadcast on 2 November 1947 Nehru declared that the Government of
>India " are prepared when peace and order have been established in Kashmir
>to have a reference held 'not under arrangements to be made by Government's
>of India and Pakistan", (as advised by the Quaid-e-Azam), but "under
>international auspices like the United Nations".
>
>
>The full Indian presentation was sent to the United Nations on 31 December
>and put before the Security Council the next day. Since then the Kashmir
>dispute is on the agenda of the United Nations. The world body has passed
>numerous resolutions calling for holding UN supervised plebiscite to let
>the people of Jammu and Kashmir decide their destiny. Both India and
>Pakistan had accepted the UN resolutions. India's founding father Nehru had
>pledged more than once not to go back on it "as a great nation". Pakistan
>and people of Jammu and Kashmir State are demanding implementation of these
>resolutions, which India claims to have become redundant with the passage
>of time.
>
>Mountbatten's breach of trust and Nehru's devious policy had an adverse
>effect on the Quaid-e-Azam's health. At the time of Partition he had been
>confident of Kashmir's accession to Pakistan because of its Muslim
>population and geographical situation. At a public reception at Lahore the
>Quaid-e-Azam said: "We have been victim of a deep-laid and well-planned
>plot executed with utter disregard for the elementary principles of
>honesty, chivalry and honor".
>
>Jugular Vein
>
>In May 1948 the Quaid-e-Azam moved to Ziarat for rest where he remained
>under medical treatment of a team of doctors including Dr. Riaz Ali Shah
>till his death in September 1948. According to Dr. Riaz Ali Shah's Diary
>(Publishing House, Bull Road publication 1950) the Quaid-e-Azam was stated
>to have said, "Kashmir is the Jugular vein of Pakistan and no nation or
>country would tolerate its Jugular vein remains under the sword of the
>enemy".
>
>
>Not only the Jugular vein of Pakistan but also that of Kashmiri community
>in particular has been under the sword of the enemy for the last fifty
>years. In fact the people of the Indian occupied Kashmir have been pushed
>to the wall to have this realization. Those who supported the States
>accession to India or remained indifferent at that time now stand
>disillusioned. The people of Kashmir particularly the Muslim majority were
>gradually subjected to economic strangulation. In early years India did
>pump huge funds for development of the occupied State to show to the world
>that rapid economic progress was taking place in the area. Several welfare
>schemes were launched including free education from primary and
>post-graduate level. This gave temporary satisfaction to both classes of
>people namely pro-accession and anti-accession. The former saw in it
>vindication of their stance. The latter thanked Pakistan for keeping the
>Kashmir issue alive forcing India to siphon more and more money to
> Kashmir.
>
>
>Simultaneously with spending funds in the State of Jammu and Kashmir
>cultural and economic onslaught was let loose in full swing. Hindi was
>introduced in almost all-educational institutions; in some it was
>compulsorily taught. Roads and institutions were re-christened after the
>name of Indian leaders. Wherever there was resistance from the local
>population, the move was temporarily suspended. Islamabad town founded by
>Islam Khan, a Subedar of Mughal King in 1640, and known for sulphurous
>springs and black fish was re-christened as Anantnag (plenty of springs).
>The local population resisted the official change in the town's name. All
>shops and private buses plying to and from the town carried Islamabad
>signboard. But post Office took pains to correct the mail address to
>Anantnag. Local people however, persistently post their letters with
>Islamabad address.
>
>
>Indian economic tentacles were spread to the farthest corner of the State
>by opening offices of State Bank of India (which is like National Bank of
>Pakistan). On the roadside one could see signboards of IFFECO (Indian
>farmer's cooperative organization for marketing) and All India handicraft
>Board.
>
>
>Economic domination by non-Muslim and non-kashmiris mounted. In 80's in
>Srinagar alone 42,000 Muslim families had mortgaged their immovable
>property to Indian banks at as high rate as 20 percent interest. The Indian
>banks were liberal in advancing loans for non-productive ventures but very
>niggardly in case of economically feasible projects. Within years the
>borrowers were deprived of their belongings through court decrees.
>
>
>No commercial article reached the consumers without passing through
>non-Muslim and non-kashmiri agencies. Export business had been monopolized
>by non-Muslims and non-kashmiris. In 80's except for one Muslim firm namely
>Indo-Kashmir Carpet, six other exporters licensed to export carpets from
>Kashmir were non-Muslim, non-kashmiri firms.
>
>
>The original industries for which Kashmir was known for namely carpet-
>manufacturing, fruit cultivation, wood carving, embroidery and paper mache
>had gone in quandary. After occupation Indian Government made it a point to
>recruit all leading skilled labor as instructors to train persons in
>Himachal Pradesh in the same trade. Thus industries like embroidery and
>fruit cultivation had gradually centered in Himachal Pradesh. With closure
>of short land routes leading to Pakistan after Indian occupation, fresh
>fruits of Kashmir could not reach markets. Kashmir type carpets started to
>be manufactured in Amritsar (Punjab) and Mirzapur (UP). Wood carving on
>Kashmir pattern had been started in Saharanpur (U.P). Himachal, Saharanpur
>Mirzapur and Amritsar products elbowed out the Kashmiri products from
>market on account of being cheaper because of less transport expenses.
>Patterns of Kashmiri artcraft were fed into Indian machines to make
>Kashmiri handicrafts uneconomical.
>
>
>Tourism remained the only industry in the field till the resistance
>movement was afoot in late 90's. The clientele was largely Hindu from
>India. This too posed a cultural threat to Kashmiris. Guides and attendants
>would say "Nomaskar" with folded hands lest they should be deprived of
>their tips'. In 90's a Muslim guide was asked what was his name, he replied
>'X,Y,Z". He did not disclose his name and faith till he found that his
>addressed was a Muslim.
>
>
>Even the National Conference elements who supported accession to India in
>early years are now disillusioned and repentant in their hearts of heart.
>In early 80's a National Conference stalwart admitted: " We had apprehended
>that by merger with Pakistan, Kashmir culture would be eroded under Punjab
>domination as the Punjabis are of aggressive temperament. But now we feel
>that Kashmiri culture was to go anyway and our Islamic character would
>undoubtedly have the Hindu impact. But now that the mistake had been done,
>its rectification will depend on time and circumstances. " If ballot had
>been allowed to have a free play Kashmiris would have kept their separate
>identity intact. But that was not so be so. There may be no immediate
>reaction on the surface but after fifteen years or so, Kashmir will be a
>base for Pakistan provided Pakistan is intrinsically strong at that time",
>he said after regaining self-confidence.
>
>
>As the Kashmiris are keen to keep their religion and cultural ethos intact,
>the Hindu minority backed by Indian government is equally enthusiast about
>not letting the Muslim influence spread in areas where Muslims are not in
>majority, say Jammu and Laddakh. Administrative arrangements are often made
>at the instance of Indian Government so that Hindu majority areas, even at
>district and tehsil level get as much free hand as possible.
>
>
>In recent years Laddakh Hill Council was constituted to give them an
>internal autonomy. Hindu Pundits of Kashmir valley also staged a drama of
>leaving their hearths and homes to shift to Jammu to give communal color to
>the ongoing struggle for the right to self-determination by the people of
>Jammu and Kashmir.
>
>
>Jammu also has been getting more autonomous as compared to the past. There
>used to be one Director Education for the entire Jammu and Kashmir State.
>Now there are two full-fledged Directors of Education separately in charge
>of Jammu and Kashmir with separate funds of equal amount.
>
>A chairman of Jammu and Kashmir State Public Service Commission had to quit
>his job, as he did not oblige to recruit a certain percentage of Hindu
>teachers irrespective of their low merit for appointment in State schools.
>Sheikh Abdullah had been told by Indian Government that certain percentage
>of Hindus had to be taken for recruitment as schoolteachers. When a Muslim
>and Kashmiri Chairman was not obliging he was replaced by a Sikh to do the
>needful.
>
>Similarly there was no longer any Director of Health for the State. Instead
>there were two Deputy Directors separately in charge of Jammu and Kashmir.
>May be the State is ultimately divided into three separate administrative
>units- Kashmir, Jammu and Laddakh as Indian Punjab was divided into
>Himachal Pradesh, Haryana and Punjab to save Hindu areas from Sikh
>domination.
>
>Even in the Kashmir valley the Muslim police officers are kept debarred
>from training in arms handling. The Muslim personnel may be promoted to the
>rank of Deputy Superintendent of police but his subordinate Hindu sepoy
>would be trained to handle arms while he would remain deficient in this
>field.
>
>Jammu, culturally and linguistically, is more akin to Himachal Pradesh then
>to Kashmir valley. The atmosphere of the valley is so different that Hindu
>tourists returning from Kashmir start feeling at home as soon as they cross
>Banihal tunnel (now named as Jawaharlal tunnel) and similarly Muslims on
>entering into Kashmir valley by crossing the tunnel feel a sense of
>familiarity.
>
>In 80's this scribe was stationed at New Delhi as A.P.P. correspondent and
>used PTI (Press Trust of India and Indian counterpart of A.P.P) office for
>functioning. A friendly PTI Staffer had been seen in office for a week or
>so in a summer month. On return he said he had been to a hill station. On
>being asked whether he had gone to Kashmir, he candidly stated, "Who would
>go to Kashmir? Hatred for us is writ large in the eyes of Kashmiris.
>Militancy had not surfaced by that time.
>
>Autonomy
>
>Sheikh Abdullah is stated to have had a dream of internal autonomy for
>Jammu and Kashmir within India. This unrealistic dream could never come
>true and indeed did not. But in the process of dreaming Sheikh Abdullah put
>the jugular vein of the entire Kashmiri community under the sword of Hindu
>India. He walked out of prison to become the so-called Prime Minister of
>Jammu and Kashmir. His honeymoon with Nehru ended soon and he again went to
>jail in 1953. And for the rest of his life he had been unsuccessfully
>clamoring for pre-1953 status for the State of Jammu and Kashmir, which was
>never restored.
>Till 1953 a special permission was required for Indians to enter Kashmir.
>Till 1953 accession was considered to be conditional. In 1953 India claimed
>the fraudulent accession of Jammu and Kashmir to be final. Till 1953 the
>chief executive of Jammu and Kashmir was called Prime Minister and not the
>chief minister.
>
>During his chief minister-ship Sheikh Abdullah did keep senior civil posts
>in the state to be held by Kashmiris and projected this as decentralization
>policy. But this was more for his personal convenience rather than by
>conviction or a matter of policy. Kashmiri bureaucrats obviously desired
>not to be transferred outside the State. Thus they were more submissive and
>willing to do any dirty job for the chief minister while Indian
>Administrative Service officers consulted Delhi before executing any
>apparently extraordinary orders from the chief minister.
>
>
>As regards Article 370 of the Indian constitution giving special status to
>the State of Jammu and Kashmir, it has been amended so many times that it
>has lost the import it was intended for. Autonomy had been consistently
>eroding. Earlier this year Hindu nationalist party BJP won parliamentary
>polls in India with election promises to do away with whatever was left of
>Article 370 for the State of Jammu and Kashmir, repealing personal Law for
>Muslims in India, constructing Rama temple in place of Babri Mosque pulled
>down by Hindu fanatics seven years back in Ayodhya and making India a
>nuclear weapon state. Within 40 days of coming into power of BJP, India
>with a series of underground nuclear tests had already become the sixth
>nuclear power state in the world with BJP redeeming one of the pledges.
>
>
>Sheikh Abdullah had returned to power in Jammu and Kashmir State in 1976,
>of course, without winning anything extra for state subjects or repairing
>any damage done to the State's autonomy. His duplicity was more than
>exposed. In Jammu and Kashmir he was described at clever and cunning man
>and his slogan of State's self-assertion as mere stunt.
>
>Demographic Changes
>
>The people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir however, remained one and
>determined to resist any attempt to destroy their distinct Muslim entity.
>The restrictions imposed by the late Maharaja on granting state subject
>certificate to any outsider remained in force on paper but with scant
>respect by the powers that be. In early 80's Dr. Mehboob Beg, son of Afzal
>Beg who had founded Inquilabi National Conference after falling apart form
>Sheikh Abdullah in 1976, alleged that 1500 domicile certificates were
>issued over signatures of Sheikh Abdullah chief Minister alone. The number
>of the subjects certificates issued at tehsil level was immensely large.
>This had upset the ratio of population of Muslims vis a vis non-Muslims.
>Corruption was rampant in the state and the entire administration from top
>to bottom was involved in it. Dr. Mehboob, physician by profession had left
>his job to step into his father's shoes.
>
>
>The Congress (I) circles alleged that Sheikh Abdullah and his family
>members were rolling in millions. There was hardly a metropolitan place in
>India where Sheikh or his family members did not own real estate, mostly in
>form of picture houses.
>
>
>Through various factors, the complexion of population was changing in the
>State to the disadvantage of the Muslims. According to early 80's census
>figures the growth rate in Muslim population was dwindling as compared to
>Hindus, According to official explanation more Muslims were taking to
>family Planning.
>
>The census (1981) figures were as follows:
>
>
>Kashmir Valley------27 Lac (Including Hindus)
>Jammu ---------------- 24 Lac (there is a Muslim belt in Jammu too)
>Laddakh---------------3 lac.
>
>
>Thus the population of Kashmir valley was equal to that of Jammu and
>Laddakh put together. So the Muslims have only a thin edge majority.
>
>
>While attempts were being made to save as many Hindus from Muslim cultural
>influence, an effort was also being made to cut cultural moorings of the
>Muslim. Well to do persons particularly upstart families were taking to
>western type of education, which in any case take the young generation away
>from its cultural heritage.
>
>New inscription mostly in Hindi were being put on the tombs of old Muslim
>saints to say that they had equal followings among Muslims and Hindus in a
>bid to appease and attract Hindu tourists and at the same time inculcate
>among Muslims a feeling that they had no separate spiritual heritage. A
>Muslim Malik teamed up with Hindu Pundits to organize "Charri Mubrarak' and
>Amar Nath cave pilgrimage and share the offerings. Hindi was replacing Urdu
>in many educational institutions to be taught along with Kashmiri language.
>The intention was that with the passage of time Urdu disappears and its
>elimination might cause a communication gap between Kashmiris and
>Pakistanis.
>
>Ploy of Resettlement Bill
>
>A private bill Jammu and Kashmir Grant of Permit for Resettlement
>(Permanent Return to the State) Bill 1980 piloted by Abdul Rahim Rathor was
>adopted by the Indian occupied Jammu and Kashmir legislature with the
>support of the ruling National Conference. This was an enabling provision
>to grant for permit for resettlement in the State of any person who had
>been a State subject and migrated to the territories now forming Pakistan
>(it did not apply to Azad Kashmir) between March 1947 and May 14, 1954.
>Ostensibly it was intended to give a deceptive impression to the general
>public that there were many Kashmiri Muslims who had migrated to Pakistan
>were but now being repentant and dissatisfied with living conditions in
>Pakistan and wanted to return to the State, which was still paradise on
>Earth. Indeed it was a camouflage in the sense that under its garb the
>motive was to give permit of residence to those Hindu migrants from
>Pakistan at the time of Independence and from other places in
> India subsequently to offset Muslim majority complexion of the state.
>
>
>According to the some Srinagar citizens the real purpose of the bill was to
>distribute the property left by Muslims in Jammu among favorites of Sheikh
>Abdullah. The evacuee property had already been given to Hindus and lacks
>of rupees were being received by way of rent and the Bill aimed at finally
>distributing the booty among the favorites.
>
>
>A provision of the Bill lay down that the applicant for resettlement was to
>take an oath of allegiance to the Constitution of India and to undertake to
>faithfully observe the laws of the State and India.
>
>
>In early 80's militancy was not visible on surface, yet the youth looked
>conscious and determined to fight their own battle. They admitted that
>Pakistan had done its outmost for them and had suffered in return. The
>people in the valley were on the whole Islam-loving and pro-Pakistan. It
>was a privilege to parade as a Pakistani. They love you. Every body would
>offer you a cup of tea. You do not have to introduce yourself. Their just
>coming to know that you are a Pakistani was enough. Even not very bold
>persons would come to whisper in your ear: We know you. We are pleased to
>see you here. They did not wait to be introduced or to introduce themselves
>and would disappear in the crowd.
>
>
>An attendant in a tourist bungalow said, "We too were very keen on
>Pakistan. Probably it was not our luck to be Pakistanis". Love for Islam is
>inexhaustible. On occasion of Shab-e-Bara't mosques were full for the
>entire night for what they called "Shab" which included Zikar, Naatkhwani
>and Waaz.
>
>In early 80's too there was massive Indian military presence in the State.
>But even bus drivers were bold enough to defy military officer's
>instructions. The bus driver that drove the scribe and family members from
>Srinagar to Jammu ignored the signals of a military sergeant on a bridge
>and later talked to him with his head high.
>
>He probably defied the traffic signal in a bid not to waste time since I
>had told him that we were to catch Jhelum Express train the same evening at
>Jammu for Delhi.
>
>In spite of the heavy odds created by landslides on the main road and
>diversions, the driver reached Jammu well in time for the train. At Jammu
>he saluted me and said "Saab aap ka khadim hen, aap ke kam khadim hen,
>Pakistan ke ziada khadim hen" (we are your servants, More of Servants to
>Pakistan that to you).
>
>
>The people of Kashmir are engaged in a heroic resistance struggle and have
>lain down and continue to lay supreme sacrifices to relieve jugular vein of
>Pakistan and that of their own from enemy's sword as willed by the
>Quaid-e-Azam.
>
>
>May Almighty Allah bless them with success- Ameen.
>
>Jinnah and Kashmir The Quaid-e-Azam thanked the National Conference
>leadership for the right royal reception given to him but at the same time
>said that it was not a reception for his person, but to the All India
>Muslim League, the party of ten crore Muslims of India of which he was
>President. This annoyed the Hindu leader so much that he left the stage in
>distress.
> Introduction
>
>The Quaid-e-Azam is believed to have visited the State of Jammu and Kashmir
>at least thrice. According to Mr. Justice Yusuf Saraf, author of "Kashmiris
>Fight for Freedom" the Quaid-e-Azam and his wife seemed to have had visited
>Kashmir for the first time before 1929. Though this visit was private in
>nature, yet as a great Muslim leader he felt concerned at the appalling
>conditions of the Kashmiris at that time too.
>The second visit of the Quaid-e-Azam was in 1936 during which he hinted to
>his first visit, saying that he had visited Kashmir ten years earlier too.
>In 1936 the Quaid-e-Azam addressed a meeting held in connection with
>Milad-un-Nabi, the birthday of the Holy Prophet (SAW) at the Mujahid
>Manzil, Srinagar. The Muslim Conference (at that point of time was led by
>Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas and Sheikh Abdullah) in welcome address to Jinnah
>appreciated his role as lover of Hindu-Muslim unity. Mr. Jinnah
>reciprocated the sentiments and said that the Muslims were in majority in
>Kashmir but it was their duty to ensure that the minority community that
>is, the Hindus of Kashmir would get justice and fair play at the hands of
>the majority community of Kashmir.
>Mr. Jinnah, who was once proclaimed as ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity,
>had been disillusioned by that time and in his speech regretted that some
>of the leaders of the majority community in British India had not been able
>to give such an assurance to the Muslim minority. That showed that the
>Quaid-e-Azam was not satisfied with the concept of Hindu-Muslim unity in
>British India.
>
>The Muslim Conference, which represented the Muslims of the State 1936, was
>converted into National Conference in 1939 as its leaders had come under
>the influence of Nehru. Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas, who had joined hand with
>Sheikh Abdullah in 1939 to found National Conference, realized his mistake
>within three years. He returned to the Muslim Conference, which had been
>revived by 14 other leaders from Jammu and Kashmir. Soon many others joined
>the revived Muslim Conference and once again it became a force to reckon
>with.
>
>The main and the last visit of the Quaid-e-Azam to the State of Jammu and
>Kashmir took place in 1944. During this visit he attended a reception by
>the National Conference headed by Sheikh Abdullah. Sheikh Abdullah had
>thought that with the help of Dogra administration and the active and
>crafty Hindus he would suppress the pro-Muslim League elements in the State
>and assure Mr. Jinnah that the Kashmiris, Hindus as well as Muslims, were
>believers in One Nation Theory of the Congress. A Hindu nationalist Jialal
>Kilam presented the address of welcome to the Quaid-e-Azam.
>
>The Quaid-e-Azam thanked the National Conference leadership for the right
>royal reception given to him but at the same time said that it was not a
>reception for his person, but to the All India Muslim League, the party of
>ten crore Muslims of India of which he was President. This annoyed the
>Hindu leader so much that he left the stage in distress.
>
>
>One Voice With Kashmir
>
>After the reception of the National Conference, the Quaid-e-Azam moved to
>Dalgate, Srinagar where the reception of the Muslim Conference and Kashmir
>Muslim Students Union was waiting for him. The Quaid spoke out his heart at
>this reception. His clarion call was "Oh ye Muslims, Our Allah is one, our
>Prophet (SAW) is one and our Quran is one, therefore, our voice and PARTY
>MUST BE ONE".
>
>In the Muslim Conference annual session at Muslim Park, Jamia Masjid, Mr.
>Jinnah was more explicit. He asked the Muslims of Kashmir to beware of the
>trap of secularism and nationalism of the Congress brand.
>
>The Quaid-e-Azam stayed in Kashmir for two months and a week, which showed
>his inveterate interest in the affairs of Kashmir and his belief that
>Kashmir is a jugular vein of Pakistan. While in Kashmir the Quaid-e-Azam
>also remained involved with All India politics. The talks between him and
>Mohan Lal Karam Chand Ghandi were initiated by C Rajagopalacharya when
>Jinnah was in Kashmir. During his stay in Kashmir the Quaid-e-Azam created
>an atmosphere of understanding and support for the Muslim Conference and by
>his departure the Whole State was resounding with his slogans and that of
>Pakistan.
>
>The Quaid-e-Azam was a principled constitutionalist and in his meetings he
>made it clear that the scheme of partition pertained to British India and
>as regards the States some additional formula would have to be envisaged.
>
>Regarding Srinagar visit of the Quaid-e-Azam in 1944, Alastair Lamb says "
>M.A. Jinnah, unlike Jawaharlal Nehru was extremely reluctant at this period
>of time to involve himself directly (or the Muslim League which he headed)
>in the internal affairs of the Princely State; such action would in his
>eyes have been constitutionally improper. (Page 97 Kashmir Disputed
>Legacy).
>
>The Quaid-e-Azam's interest in Kashmir is evident from the fact that he
>explained the significance of the name of Pakistan to Mountbatten on 17 May
>1947 as follows:
>
>"The derivation of the word Pakistan – P for Punjab; A for Afghan (i.e.
>Pathans NWFP); K for Kashmir; I for nothing because that letter was not in
>the word in Urdu; S for Sindh and Tan for the last syllable for
>Baluchistan".
>
>This explanation of the Quaid-e-Azam is contained in the official
>publication in the United Kingdom between 1980 and 1993 of the four final
>volumes of a selection of British documents relating to the Transfer of
>Power in India.
>
>According to Transfer of Power papers TEX No. 473 the whole word Pakistan,
>Liaquat Ali Khan then went on to say, meant "Pure Land". The name Pakistan
>it seems was devised by Chaudhry Rehmat Ali in 1933. Since then the K is
>the world always bore the same significance: it referred to Kashmir.
>
>Vital Links
>
>The logic behind the partition of the Indian Empire into Muslim and
>non-Muslim partition clearly suggested that Kashmir ought to go to
>Pakistan. Firstly the state of Jammu and Kashmir was a region with an
>overwhelming Muslim majority contiguous to the Muslim majority region of
>Punjab, which became part of Pakistan.
>
>Secondly the economy of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was bound up with
>what became Pakistan. Its best communication with the outside world lay
>through Pakistan and this was the route taken by the bulk of its exports.
>
>Third: The waters of the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab all of which flowed
>through Jammu and Kashmir territory, were essential for the prosperity of
>Agriculture life of Pakistan. From a strictly rational point of view, based
>on a study of culture and economy of the region, there can be little doubt
>that a scheme for the Partition of the Indian subcontinent as was devised
>in 1947 should have awarded the greater part of the State of Jammu and
>Kashmir to Pakistan. Thus Jammu and Kashmir is undoubtedly Jugular vein of
>Pakistan.
>
>The Indus known in the subcontinent as 'Sindh' is 1800 miles long and is
>thus amongst the principal rivers of the world. Rising in western Tibet at
>the height of 17000 feet, it cuts across the Laddakh range near Thangra and
>continues its northwesterly course between it and Zanskar range for about
>300 miles. Zanskar River joins it about 12 miles west of Leh. Before it
>enters Hazara, it has already traversed a distance of 812 miles. India has
>plans to divert the river at a proper point.
>
>The river Jhelum has its source in Verinag in southern Kashmir, at a height
>of nearly 6000 feet, where it begins in the shape of small stream but by
>the time it reaches Baramula town, a distance of 102 miles it assumes the
>shape of a big river on account of having joined by its more important
>tributaries Sindh and Lidder. The towns of Islamabad, Srinagar, Sopore,
>Do-ab-gal, Baramula, Uri and Muzaffarabad are towns at its bank in the
>State. The river passes through Woolar Lake where India plans to construct
>a barrage, which if completed will starve Pakistan's irrigated Lands. By
>the time Jhelum reaches Mangla it has a vertical fall of 4000 feet, which
>has been made use of by Pakistan by building a multiple purpose Dam
>Project.
>
>Chanab descends from Lahole in the Chamba range of the Himalayas. It takes
>leave of the mountains at Akhnoor in Jammu and Kashmir State. It enters
>Pakistan at Khairi Rihal in Gujrat District.
>
>At Salal, a place 7 miles from Reasi India has constructed a Dam. The Lake
>thus formed is being used not only for generation of electricity but also
>for irrigation purpose, which would reduce the quantity of water that flows
>in Pakistan. In times of War, it can be used to inundate large areas of
>Land in Sialkot, Gujranwala and Sheikpura. Parts of its water stands
>already diverted at Akhnoor to feed the Ranbir canal, which irrigates large
>areas in Jammu, Sambha and Ranbirsinghpura.
>
>Under the Indus Basin Treaty out of five rivers of the Punjab two rivers
>namely Jhelum and Chanab came to Pakistan's shared and three namely Ravi,
>Sutlej and Beas went to India's. But all the three Pakistan rivers (Indus
>included) either rise in or traverse the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the
>agriculture of the Punjab and Sindh to a great extent depends upon the
>melting snows of its mountains.
>
>The great Mangla Dam, so important to the economy of Pakistan, lies in the
>territory, which was once part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
>
>The valleys of the major Kashmiri Rivers, now so vital to the economy of
>Pakistan also provided until very recently the main lines of communications
>between the state and the outside world. The road to Srinagar started at
>Rawalpindi and followed the course of the Jhelum into the vale of Kashmir.
>The valley of upper Indus gave access to the hill State of Gilgit region.
>The Line of the beds of the rivers which created links between the western
>part of the Punjab (now Pakistan) and Kashmir also made communications
>between eastern part of (India) and Kashmir extremely difficult. The only
>road within the State of Jammu and Kashmir, for example, which linked Jammu
>(the winter capital of the State) with Srinagar (the Jammu capital)
>involves the crossing of Pir Panjal Range by means of Banihal Pass, over
>9,000 feet high and snow bound in winter the easiest route between Jammu
>and Srinagar lay through west (Pakistan) Punjab by way of Sialkot and
>Rawalpindi at the moment of Partition in 1947
> there existed but one road from India to Jammu, by way of Pathankot
>(which was again a tehsil of Gurdaspur District, a Muslim majority District
>with Pathankot tehsil having marginal Hindu majority); and this was then of
>poorest quality and much of it un-surfaced. Thus Kashmir has been described
>as the Jugular vein of Pakistan.
>
>Hindu Intrigues
>
>Krishna Menon wrote a private letter to Mountbatten on 14 June 1947 warning
>him with dire consequences for the future of Anglo-Indian relations, if the
>State of Jammu and Kashmir were permitted to go to Pakistan. The gist of
>the argument seemed to be that it might be perceived that British policy,
>while accepting abandonment of India, was to make Pakistan, strengthened by
>accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, into the eastern frontier of a
>British sphere of influence in the Middle East. Such development would not
>be at all popular in the newly independent India: and it might put at risk
>the extensive British interests there. It was essential n Menon's view that
>the State of Jammu and Kashmir be brought within the Indian fold.
>
>According to British Transfer of Power papers, Menon had asked Mountbatten
>not to keep this letter; it had however survived among the Mountbatten
>papers.
>
>About the same time Mountbatten requested Nehru to prepare a Note on
>Kashmir for him, which Nehru did. Nehru in the Note said: "Kashmir is of
>first importance to us because of the great strategic importance of the
>frontier state".
>
>Nehru concluded: "If any attempt is made to put Kashmir into the Pakistan
>constituent assembly there is likely to be much trouble because the
>National Conference is not in favor of it and the Maharaja's position would
>also become difficult. The normal and obvious course appears to be for
>Kashmir to join the constituent assembly of India. This will satisfy both
>the popular demand and Maharaja's wishes. It is absurd to think that
>Pakistan would create trouble, if this happens.".
>
>Mountbatten disliked the prospect of independence for the State of Jammu
>and Kashmir after the Transfer of Power. While publicly declaring that
>Maharaja was perfectly entitled to accede either to Pakistan or India, he
>personally favored a solution where Maharaja left the decision to Sheikh
>Abdullah's National Conference as Nehru's note suggested, Sheikh Abdullah
>would surely opt for India.
>
>Sheikh Abdullah along with Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas was in prison. So the
>first important thing was to get him released. For this Nehru himself was
>keen to go to Kashmir. It was with great difficulty that Mountbatten was
>able to dissuade him on the ground that Nehru must " really look to his
>duty to the Indian people as a whole. There were four hundred million in
>India and only four million in Kashmir". It was rather irresponsible of the
>future Prime Minister of India, Mountbatten observed, to spend so much time
>on what was but one of the many grave problems confronting him.
>
>Mountbatten himself did visit Srinagar but was unable to persuade the
>Maharaja to discuss serious matters. Alastair Lamb has however, interpreted
>the record on the discussion as implying that the Maharaja would be well
>advised to join India if he entertained any hope of retaining his position
>in the State. The Congress would keep him on his throne. Mr. Jinnah and his
>Muslim League would make sure that his subjects brought about his
>overthrow.
>
>Jawaharlal Nehru, was however, disappointed
that Mountbatten had been
>"unable to solve the problem of Kashmir" for he observed, "that the problem
>would not be solved until Sheikh Abdullah was released from the prison". It
>was eventually agreed that Mohan Das Karam Chand Ghandi should go to
>Kashmir in Nehru's place to take up the "question of Sheikh Abdullah" and
>Mountbatten wrote to Maharaja to pave the way.
>
>Incidentally Ghandi's visit was not the only visit to the Maharaja by
>leading personalities of Indian side on the eve of the Transfer of Power.
>There were Kashmir excursions by Acharya Kriplani, the then President of
>Congress and the Sikh rulers of Patila, Kapurthala and Faridkot States of
>East Punjab which had decided to accede to India. Kapurthala was of course,
>a State with a Muslim majority (at least until the massacre that
>accompanied Partition) and a non-Muslim ruler. Jinnah desired to visit
>Kashmir but Maharaja did not agree. There is no evidence of consultation
>with Jinnah on Kashmir by Mountbatten as record shows with Nehru.
>
>Mountbatten Bias
>
>According to official British Transfer of Power papers Mountbatten had told
>the Nawab of Bhopal and the Maharaja of Indore on 4 August 1947, the state
>of Jammu and Kashmir was so placed geographically that it could join either
>dominion, provided part of Gurdaspur District was put into East Punjab by
>the Boundary Commission- in other words only by giving Gurdaspur to India,
>would the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir be presented with a free chance; to
>give Gurdaspur to Pakistan was effectively to guarantee that the State of
>Jammu and Kashmir would sooner or later fall to that dominion.
>
>
>The geographic and economic links between Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan
>were better than those with India, particularly if in the actual process of
>Partition the Gurdaspur District of Punjab with Muslim majority were
>awarded to Pakistan. A Pakistani Gurdaspur would mean that direct Indian
>land access to the State (which was by no means ideal even across the
>Gurdaspur District) would have to be through Kangra District of Punjab (now
>in Himachal) over extremely difficult terrain provided foot hill of the
>Himalayas by either direct into Jammu or by way of Pathankot tehsil of
>Gurdaspur District (where there was a small Hindus majority) if that tehsil
>alone went to India; and all this would involve new roads which would take
>considerable time to construct.
>
>The theory of partition was that all Muslim Majority districts contiguous
>to the Muslim core of Punjab would go to Pakistan. In the event, with the
>awarding of three out of four tehsils of Gurdaspur District to East Punjab
>(that is to say the part of Punjab, which was to be Indian) the accession
>to India of the State of Jammu and Kashmir became a practical as opposed to
>theoretical, possibility. Because two of these tehsils Batala and
>Gurdaspur, were with significant Muslim majorities (only Pathankot tehsil
>then had a small Hindu majority) this award seemed to go against the basic
>spirit of Partition; and the Gurdaspur decision has consequently been the
>subject of a great deal of discussion. Mountbatten has been accused,
>particularly in Pakistan, of deliberate intent to favor the interests of
>India over these of Pakistan.
>
>Within Pakistan there has been a persistent consensus both among the elites
>and the masses that the Boundary Commission led by Cyril Radcliffe in 1947
>has been responsible for most of the India-Pakistan discords with Kashmir
>leading the list. Pakistanis have maintained all along that last minute
>changes were made in the Boundary Award under manipulation by Mountbatten
>and their associates to suit the Indian geo-strategic imperatives. The
>cession of Muslim majority areas in Ferozepur and Gurdaspur areas (in
>former eastern Punjab) to India at the last moment have always been
>perceived in terms of India's long time designs on Kashmir itself. Even
>long after Radcliffe's Award, such question were raised not only in
>Pakistani and British press but, as the contemporary classified official
>documents reveal, inter-departmental concerns dogged the officials in
>British Foreign Office, Commonwealth Relations Office and their High
>Commissions in South Asia. In a luncheon meeting arranged by
> Mountbatten for Radcliffe and attended by Lord Ismay, a close confidant
>of the Viceroy, drastic changes were made in the Boundary Award. Rao Ayer,
>the Assistant Secretary to the Commission, the Maharaja of Bikaner and V.P.
>Menon played a crucial role in influencing the British official decisions
>at this juncture, denying Pakistan Muslim majority areas in Gurdaspur and
>Ferozepur Districts Menon, to the knowledge of all, was the trusted
>confident of Vallabhai Patel and enjoyed closer access to the viceroy whose
>personal antagonism to Jinnah was publicly known.
>
>
>On Menon's being confidant of the both Patel and Mountbatten Chaudhry
>Mahamood Ali in his book Emergence of Pakistan, has observed: "If a Muslim
>officer had been in V.P. Menon's position was known to maintain contact
>with Jinnah, no Viceroy could have tolerated it without laying himself open
>to the charge of partisanship; in any case, the Congress would have made it
>impossible for such an officer to continue in that position". This has also
>been endorsed by Alan Cambell- Johnson in "Mission with Mountbatten".
>
>
>A senior Muslim official himself had seen an early version of the map in
>Ismay's office in Delhi, which had shown those areas already within India,
>even before the Award was made public. Radcliffe's Secretary, Christopher
>Beaumont, in a detailed expose in February 1992, has further provided first
>hand substance to such long-held suspicion.
>
>
>Radcliffe had prepared his Award about the distribution of territories of
>the Punjab between India and Pakistan by 8 August 1947 by which tehsils of
>Ferozpur and Zira were allotted to Pakistan. This was done on the basis of
>population ration – Ferozepur with 55 percent Muslim and Zira with 65
>Percent Muslim, but it was Mountbatten's support for a strong
>post-independence India against a weakened Pakistan, which made Mountbatten
>to pressurize Radcliffe to give these two tehsils to India so that India
>have access to Kashmir. British historian Andrew Roberts comes to believe
>that "Mountbatten's action over delaying the announcement of Radcliffe
>Award after 9 August indicate of him guilty of the errant folly as well as
>dishonesty". He pleads in his book that Mountbatten deserved to be
>court-martialled on his return to London".
>
>Pakistan Day Celebrated In Srinagar
>
>Many Pakistanis, and not only the leaders like M.A. Jinnah and Liaquat Ali
>Khan, once they appreciated the implications of the Award by Radcliffe
>Commission of the three eastern tehsils of Gurdaspur District to India,
>felt profound sense of betrayal. It was understandable that some of them
>should begin to contemplate unorthodox and unofficial course of action.
>
>
>While Poonch formally became an integral part of Jammu and Kashmir State in
>1935-36, its Muslim inhabitants (some 380,000 out of a total 420,000)
>resented the change and never reconciled themselves to being subjects of
>that State an attitude, which was to be of great significance in 1947.
>Traditionally the people of Poonch had little indeed to do with their
>neighbors in the vale of Kashmir across the Pir Panjal Range, and even less
>with Jammu: their links had always been across the Jhelum, particularly in
>the Hazara District of NWFP.
>
>
>Large number of men from Poonch (mainly Sudhans from Sudhnuti tehsil) had
>served in the British Indian army during the War; and Poonch men (Poonchis)
>also constituted the strength of the Jammu and Kashmir State Forces; in
>1947 the Jagir of Poonch may have contained as many as 60,000 ex-servicemen
>who could provide a formidable nucleus for any resistance to the Maharaja.
>In June 1947 there began in Poonch a "no tax" campaign which rapidly
>developed into a secessionist movement from the state greatly reinforced
>throughout much of Poonch (and in Srinagar as well) when on 14 and 15
>August people tried to celebrate "Pakistan Day" (which coincided with
>Kashmir Day which had been observed since 1931) in defiance of Maharaja's
>orders by displaying Pakistan flags and holding public demonstrations.
>Martial Law was introduced. About two weeks after Transfer of Power there
>were major clashes between the State Troops in this case and Poonch crowds
>resulting in large number of casualties.
>
>Standstill Agreement
>
>On 12 August 1947 the new Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir State, Janak
>Singh proposed by telegram a Stand Still Agreement both with Pakistan and
>India. Pakistan agreed on 15 August. India procrastinated, arguing that the
>matter needed to be negotiated by an official from the State sent to Delhi.
>No such official was dispatched for this purpose- no Standstill Agreement
>ever concluded. The Indian response was certainly a departure from the
>procedure, which Mountbatten had earlier indicated and it suggested that
>Indian policy after Independence was going to set out in hitherto uncharted
>waters.
>
>The Maharaja confronted with growing internal disorder (including a full
>scale rebellion into the Poonch region of the State), sought Indian
>military help without, if at all possible, surrendering his own
>independence.
>
>
>On 25 October 1947, before the Kashmir crisis had fully developed and
>before Indian claims based on so-called Maharaja's accession to India
>(which is alleged to have had been signed on 26 October 1947) had been
>voiced, Nehru in a telegram to Attlee, the British Prime Minister, declared
>that:
>
>"I should like to make it clear that (the) question of aiding Kashmir... is
>not designed in any way to influence the State to accede to India. Our
>view, which we have repeatedly made public, is that (the) question of
>accession in any disputed territory must be decided in accordance with the
>wishes of the people, and we adhere to this view".
>
>
>An instrument of Accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India is alleged to have
>been signed by Maharaja on 26 October 1947 and the acceptance of this
>Instrument was made by Governor General of India on 27 October 1947.
>
>Another pair of documents consists of letter from the Maharaja to
>Mountbatten dated 26 October, 1947 in which Indian military aid is sought
>in return for accession to India (on terms stated in an allegedly enclosed
>Instrument) and the appointment of Sheikh Abdullah to head the interim
>government of State; and a letter from Mountbatten to the Maharaja dated 27
>October, 1947 acknowledging the above and noting that, once the affairs of
>the State have been settled and law and order is restored "the question of
>the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people".
>
>Fake Instrument of Accession
>
>The recent research based on the material in archives and sources as the
>memoirs of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India and Prime Minister
>Jammu and Kashmir at that time Mehar Chand Mahajan and the recently
>published correspondence of Jawaharlal Nehru and V.P. Menon's account (The
>Integration of Indian States) prove beyond any shadow of doubt that these
>two documents (a) the Instrument of accession and (b) the letter of the
>Maharaja to Mountbatten could not possibly have been signed on 26 October
>1947. By that time Maharaja had fled from the capital and during October
>26, 1947 he was traveling by road from Srinagar to Jammu. His Prime
>Minister, M.C. Mahajan who was negotiating with government of India and
>senior Indian official concerned in the State matter V.P. Menon were still
>in New Delhi where their presence was noted by many observers. There was no
>communication between New Delhi and the traveling maharaja. Menon and
>Mahajan set out by air from New Delhi to Jammu at about
> IO A.M. on 27 October and the Maharaja learned from them for the first
>time the result of his prime minister's negotiations in New Delhi in the
>early afternoon of that date. The earliest possible time and date for their
>signature would have been the afternoon of 27 October 1947.
>
>With regard to exchange of letters between Maharaja and Mountbatten, the
>former seeking military aid and the latter acknowledging the same and
>promising plebiscite, Alastair lamb says " It seems more than probable,
>both were drafted by Government of India before being taken to Jammu on 27
>October 1947 (by V.P. Menon and Jammu and Kashmir Prime Minister M.C.
>Maharan whose movements, incidentally, are correctly reported in the London
>Times of 28 October, 1947) after the arrival of Indian troops at Srinagar
>field. The case is very strong, therefore, that the document i.e.
>Maharaja's letter to Mountbatten was dictated to the Maharaja".
>
>Government of India published two documents namely Maharaja's letter and
>Mountbatten's reply on 28 October 1947. But the far more important
>document- the alleged Instrument of Ascension was not published until many
>years later, if at all. It was not communicated to Pakistan at the outset
>of overt Indian intervention in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, nor was it
>presented in facsimile to the United Nations in early 1948 as part of
>Indian reference to the Security Council. The 1948 White Paper in which
>Government of India set out its formal case in respect to the State of
>Jammu and Kashmir does not contain the Instrument of Accession as claimed
>to have been signed by the Maharaja. Instead, it reproduces an unsigned
>form of Accession such as, it is implied, the Maharaja might have signed.
>
>Alastair Lamb writes: "To date no satisfactory original of this Instrument
>as signed by the Maharaja has been produced; though a highly suspect
>version, complete with the false date 26 October 1947, has been circulated
>by the Indian side since the 1960's. On the present evidence it is by no
>means clear that the Maharaja ever did sign an Instrument of Accession.
>There are, indeed, grounds for suspecting that he did no such thing".
>
>Indian Intervention & Pakistan's Response
>
>Indian official intervention was decided on 26 October 1947 and a massive
>airlift was immediately organized to fly two infantry battalions into
>Srinagar. Over 100 Dakota transport aircraft were assembled at various
>airfields around Delhi. Obviously this airlift had to have been product of
>much planning which had been started weeks before. There were surely
>contingency plans somewhere in the Indian army. The operation in the State
>of Jammu and Kashmir presented grave logistical problems particularly in
>winter. Publication of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel correspondence leaves one
>in no doubt whatsoever that he and his associates had been involved in
>military planning about Kashmir for more than a month before the operation
>which could have had hardly escaped the notice of senior British military
>officers.
>
>
>On the other hand, when, late on 27 October 1947 the Quaid-e-Azam
>instructed Pakistani troops to go into the State of Jammu and Kashmir to
>try and restore order he was frustrated by the acting Commander in Chief of
>Pakistan Army Lt. Gen. Sir Douglas Gracey. By the same token, it would be
>seen that British Commanders on the Indian side adopted Nelsoniasn approach
>to Indian preparations for intervention in Kashmir.
>
>
>Instead of carrying out orders of the Quaid-e-Azam Gracey telephone to the
>Supreme Commander Field Marshal Auchinleck in Delhi for instructions. On
>this Auchinleck flew to Lahore on 28 October. As a result of Auchinleck's
>intervention the Quaid-e-Azam invited Mountbatten and Nehru to Lahore the
>next day to discuss Kashmir crisis. The invitation was accepted on
>telephone and departure of Mountbatten and Nehru was announced in the
>afternoon of the same day but four hours after the acceptance it was also
>declared that the trip had been cancelled. This meeting was then fixed for
>1 November 1947, which was also not attended by Nehru. Mountbatten,
>however, came to Lahore on this appointed date. The Quaid-e-Azam in his
>three and a half-hour meeting with Mountbatten argued "that the accession
>was not bona fide, since it rested on violence and fraud and would thus
>never be accepted by Pakistan".
>
>
>Quaid-e-Azam impressed upon Mountbatten the need for arranging plebiscite
>in Kashmir under the joint auspices of Governments of India and Pakistan, a
>proposal to which Mountbatten showed agreement just to put before the
>Indian cabinet.
>
>
>Next day Mountbatten flew to New Delhi from Lahore and placed the proposal
>before the Indian cabinet. Nehru however, planned a different strategy. In
>a radio broadcast on 2 November 1947 Nehru declared that the Government of
>India " are prepared when peace and order have been established in Kashmir
>to have a reference held 'not under arrangements to be made by Government's
>of India and Pakistan", (as advised by the Quaid-e-Azam), but "under
>international auspices like the United Nations".
>
>
>The full Indian presentation was sent to the United Nations on 31 December
>and put before the Security Council the next day. Since then the Kashmir
>dispute is on the agenda of the United Nations. The world body has passed
>numerous resolutions calling for holding UN supervised plebiscite to let
>the people of Jammu and Kashmir decide their destiny. Both India and
>Pakistan had accepted the UN resolutions. India's founding father Nehru had
>pledged more than once not to go back on it "as a great nation". Pakistan
>and people of Jammu and Kashmir State are demanding implementation of these
>resolutions, which India claims to have become redundant with the passage
>of time.
>
>Mountbatten's breach of trust and Nehru's devious policy had an adverse
>effect on the Quaid-e-Azam's health. At the time of Partition he had been
>confident of Kashmir's accession to Pakistan because of its Muslim
>population and geographical situation. At a public reception at Lahore the
>Quaid-e-Azam said: "We have been victim of a deep-laid and well-planned
>plot executed with utter disregard for the elementary principles of
>honesty, chivalry and honor".
>
>Jugular Vein
>
>In May 1948 the Quaid-e-Azam moved to Ziarat for rest where he remained
>under medical treatment of a team of doctors including Dr. Riaz Ali Shah
>till his death in September 1948. According to Dr. Riaz Ali Shah's Diary
>(Publishing House, Bull Road publication 1950) the Quaid-e-Azam was stated
>to have said, "Kashmir is the Jugular vein of Pakistan and no nation or
>country would tolerate its Jugular vein remains under the sword of the
>enemy".
>
>
>Not only the Jugular vein of Pakistan but also that of Kashmiri community
>in particular has been under the sword of the enemy for the last fifty
>years. In fact the people of the Indian occupied Kashmir have been pushed
>to the wall to have this realization. Those who supported the States
>accession to India or remained indifferent at that time now stand
>disillusioned. The people of Kashmir particularly the Muslim majority were
>gradually subjected to economic strangulation. In early years India did
>pump huge funds for development of the occupied State to show to the world
>that rapid economic progress was taking place in the area. Several welfare
>schemes were launched including free education from primary and
>post-graduate level. This gave temporary satisfaction to both classes of
>people namely pro-accession and anti-accession. The former saw in it
>vindication of their stance. The latter thanked Pakistan for keeping the
>Kashmir issue alive forcing India to siphon more and more money to
> Kashmir.
>
>
>Simultaneously with spending funds in the State of Jammu and Kashmir
>cultural and economic onslaught was let loose in full swing. Hindi was
>introduced in almost all-educational institutions; in some it was
>compulsorily taught. Roads and institutions were re-christened after the
>name of Indian leaders. Wherever there was resistance from the local
>population, the move was temporarily suspended. Islamabad town founded by
>Islam Khan, a Subedar of Mughal King in 1640, and known for sulphurous
>springs and black fish was re-christened as Anantnag (plenty of springs).
>The local population resisted the official change in the town's name. All
>shops and private buses plying to and from the town carried Islamabad
>signboard. But post Office took pains to correct the mail address to
>Anantnag. Local people however, persistently post their letters with
>Islamabad address.
>
>
>Indian economic tentacles were spread to the farthest corner of the State
>by opening offices of State Bank of India (which is like National Bank of
>Pakistan). On the roadside one could see signboards of IFFECO (Indian
>farmer's cooperative organization for marketing) and All India handicraft
>Board.
>
>
>Economic domination by non-Muslim and non-kashmiris mounted. In 80's in
>Srinagar alone 42,000 Muslim families had mortgaged their immovable
>property to Indian banks at as high rate as 20 percent interest. The Indian
>banks were liberal in advancing loans for non-productive ventures but very
>niggardly in case of economically feasible projects. Within years the
>borrowers were deprived of their belongings through court decrees.
>
>
>No commercial article reached the consumers without passing through
>non-Muslim and non-kashmiri agencies. Export business had been monopolized
>by non-Muslims and non-kashmiris. In 80's except for one Muslim firm namely
>Indo-Kashmir Carpet, six other exporters licensed to export carpets from
>Kashmir were non-Muslim, non-kashmiri firms.
>
>
>The original industries for which Kashmir was known for namely carpet-
>manufacturing, fruit cultivation, wood carving, embroidery and paper mache
>had gone in quandary. After occupation Indian Government made it a point to
>recruit all leading skilled labor as instructors to train persons in
>Himachal Pradesh in the same trade. Thus industries like embroidery and
>fruit cultivation had gradually centered in Himachal Pradesh. With closure
>of short land routes leading to Pakistan after Indian occupation, fresh
>fruits of Kashmir could not reach markets. Kashmir type carpets started to
>be manufactured in Amritsar (Punjab) and Mirzapur (UP). Wood carving on
>Kashmir pattern had been started in Saharanpur (U.P). Himachal, Saharanpur
>Mirzapur and Amritsar products elbowed out the Kashmiri products from
>market on account of being cheaper because of less transport expenses.
>Patterns of Kashmiri artcraft were fed into Indian machines to make
>Kashmiri handicrafts uneconomical.
>
>
>Tourism remained the only industry in the field till the resistance
>movement was afoot in late 90's. The clientele was largely Hindu from
>India. This too posed a cultural threat to Kashmiris. Guides and attendants
>would say "Nomaskar" with folded hands lest they should be deprived of
>their tips'. In 90's a Muslim guide was asked what was his name, he replied
>'X,Y,Z". He did not disclose his name and faith till he found that his
>addressed was a Muslim.
>
>
>Even the National Conference elements who supported accession to India in
>early years are now disillusioned and repentant in their hearts of heart.
>In early 80's a National Conference stalwart admitted: " We had apprehended
>that by merger with Pakistan, Kashmir culture would be eroded under Punjab
>domination as the Punjabis are of aggressive temperament. But now we feel
>that Kashmiri culture was to go anyway and our Islamic character would
>undoubtedly have the Hindu impact. But now that the mistake had been done,
>its rectification will depend on time and circumstances. " If ballot had
>been allowed to have a free play Kashmiris would have kept their separate
>identity intact. But that was not so be so. There may be no immediate
>reaction on the surface but after fifteen years or so, Kashmir will be a
>base for Pakistan provided Pakistan is intrinsically strong at that time",
>he said after regaining self-confidence.
>
>
>As the Kashmiris are keen to keep their religion and cultural ethos intact,
>the Hindu minority backed by Indian government is equally enthusiast about
>not letting the Muslim influence spread in areas where Muslims are not in
>majority, say Jammu and Laddakh. Administrative arrangements are often made
>at the instance of Indian Government so that Hindu majority areas, even at
>district and tehsil level get as much free hand as possible.
>
>
>In recent years Laddakh Hill Council was constituted to give them an
>internal autonomy. Hindu Pundits of Kashmir valley also staged a drama of
>leaving their hearths and homes to shift to Jammu to give communal color to
>the ongoing struggle for the right to self-determination by the people of
>Jammu and Kashmir.
>
>
>Jammu also has been getting more autonomous as compared to the past. There
>used to be one Director Education for the entire Jammu and Kashmir State.
>Now there are two full-fledged Directors of Education separately in charge
>of Jammu and Kashmir with separate funds of equal amount.
>
>A chairman of Jammu and Kashmir State Public Service Commission had to quit
>his job, as he did not oblige to recruit a certain percentage of Hindu
>teachers irrespective of their low merit for appointment in State schools.
>Sheikh Abdullah had been told by Indian Government that certain percentage
>of Hindus had to be taken for recruitment as schoolteachers. When a Muslim
>and Kashmiri Chairman was not obliging he was replaced by a Sikh to do the
>needful.
>
>Similarly there was no longer any Director of Health for the State. Instead
>there were two Deputy Directors separately in charge of Jammu and Kashmir.
>May be the State is ultimately divided into three separate administrative
>units- Kashmir, Jammu and Laddakh as Indian Punjab was divided into
>Himachal Pradesh, Haryana and Punjab to save Hindu areas from Sikh
>domination.
>
>Even in the Kashmir valley the Muslim police officers are kept debarred
>from training in arms handling. The Muslim personnel may be promoted to the
>rank of Deputy Superintendent of police but his subordinate Hindu sepoy
>would be trained to handle arms while he would remain deficient in this
>field.
>
>Jammu, culturally and linguistically, is more akin to Himachal Pradesh then
>to Kashmir valley. The atmosphere of the valley is so different that Hindu
>tourists returning from Kashmir start feeling at home as soon as they cross
>Banihal tunnel (now named as Jawaharlal tunnel) and similarly Muslims on
>entering into Kashmir valley by crossing the tunnel feel a sense of
>familiarity.
>
>In 80's this scribe was stationed at New Delhi as A.P.P. correspondent and
>used PTI (Press Trust of India and Indian counterpart of A.P.P) office for
>functioning. A friendly PTI Staffer had been seen in office for a week or
>so in a summer month. On return he said he had been to a hill station. On
>being asked whether he had gone to Kashmir, he candidly stated, "Who would
>go to Kashmir? Hatred for us is writ large in the eyes of Kashmiris.
>Militancy had not surfaced by that time.
>
>Autonomy
>
>Sheikh Abdullah is stated to have had a dream of internal autonomy for
>Jammu and Kashmir within India. This unrealistic dream could never come
>true and indeed did not. But in the process of dreaming Sheikh Abdullah put
>the jugular vein of the entire Kashmiri community under the sword of Hindu
>India. He walked out of prison to become the so-called Prime Minister of
>Jammu and Kashmir. His honeymoon with Nehru ended soon and he again went to
>jail in 1953. And for the rest of his life he had been unsuccessfully
>clamoring for pre-1953 status for the State of Jammu and Kashmir, which was
>never restored.
>Till 1953 a special permission was required for Indians to enter Kashmir.
>Till 1953 accession was considered to be conditional. In 1953 India claimed
>the fraudulent accession of Jammu and Kashmir to be final. Till 1953 the
>chief executive of Jammu and Kashmir was called Prime Minister and not the
>chief minister.
>
>During his chief minister-ship Sheikh Abdullah did keep senior civil posts
>in the state to be held by Kashmiris and projected this as decentralization
>policy. But this was more for his personal convenience rather than by
>conviction or a matter of policy. Kashmiri bureaucrats obviously desired
>not to be transferred outside the State. Thus they were more submissive and
>willing to do any dirty job for the chief minister while Indian
>Administrative Service officers consulted Delhi before executing any
>apparently extraordinary orders from the chief minister.
>
>
>As regards Article 370 of the Indian constitution giving special status to
>the State of Jammu and Kashmir, it has been amended so many times that it
>has lost the import it was intended for. Autonomy had been consistently
>eroding. Earlier this year Hindu nationalist party BJP won parliamentary
>polls in India with election promises to do away with whatever was left of
>Article 370 for the State of Jammu and Kashmir, repealing personal Law for
>Muslims in India, constructing Rama temple in place of Babri Mosque pulled
>down by Hindu fanatics seven years back in Ayodhya and making India a
>nuclear weapon state. Within 40 days of coming into power of BJP, India
>with a series of underground nuclear tests had already become the sixth
>nuclear power state in the world with BJP redeeming one of the pledges.
>
>
>Sheikh Abdullah had returned to power in Jammu and Kashmir State in 1976,
>of course, without winning anything extra for state subjects or repairing
>any damage done to the State's autonomy. His duplicity was more than
>exposed. In Jammu and Kashmir he was described at clever and cunning man
>and his slogan of State's self-assertion as mere stunt.
>
>Demographic Changes
>
>The people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir however, remained one and
>determined to resist any attempt to destroy their distinct Muslim entity.
>The restrictions imposed by the late Maharaja on granting state subject
>certificate to any outsider remained in force on paper but with scant
>respect by the powers that be. In early 80's Dr. Mehboob Beg, son of Afzal
>Beg who had founded Inquilabi National Conference after falling apart form
>Sheikh Abdullah in 1976, alleged that 1500 domicile certificates were
>issued over signatures of Sheikh Abdullah chief Minister alone. The number
>of the subjects certificates issued at tehsil level was immensely large.
>This had upset the ratio of population of Muslims vis a vis non-Muslims.
>Corruption was rampant in the state and the entire administration from top
>to bottom was involved in it. Dr. Mehboob, physician by profession had left
>his job to step into his father's shoes.
>
>
>The Congress (I) circles alleged that Sheikh Abdullah and his family
>members were rolling in millions. There was hardly a metropolitan place in
>India where Sheikh or his family members did not own real estate, mostly in
>form of picture houses.
>
>
>Through various factors, the complexion of population was changing in the
>State to the disadvantage of the Muslims. According to early 80's census
>figures the growth rate in Muslim population was dwindling as compared to
>Hindus, According to official explanation more Muslims were taking to
>family Planning.
>
>The census (1981) figures were as follows:
>
>
>Kashmir Valley------27 Lac (Including Hindus)
>Jammu ---------------- 24 Lac (there is a Muslim belt in Jammu too)
>Laddakh---------------3 lac.
>
>
>Thus the population of Kashmir valley was equal to that of Jammu and
>Laddakh put together. So the Muslims have only a thin edge majority.
>
>
>While attempts were being made to save as many Hindus from Muslim cultural
>influence, an effort was also being made to cut cultural moorings of the
>Muslim. Well to do persons particularly upstart families were taking to
>western type of education, which in any case take the young generation away
>from its cultural heritage.
>
>New inscription mostly in Hindi were being put on the tombs of old Muslim
>saints to say that they had equal followings among Muslims and Hindus in a
>bid to appease and attract Hindu tourists and at the same time inculcate
>among Muslims a feeling that they had no separate spiritual heritage. A
>Muslim Malik teamed up with Hindu Pundits to organize "Charri Mubrarak' and
>Amar Nath cave pilgrimage and share the offerings. Hindi was replacing Urdu
>in many educational institutions to be taught along with Kashmiri language.
>The intention was that with the passage of time Urdu disappears and its
>elimination might cause a communication gap between Kashmiris and
>Pakistanis.
>
>Ploy of Resettlement Bill
>
>A private bill Jammu and Kashmir Grant of Permit for Resettlement
>(Permanent Return to the State) Bill 1980 piloted by Abdul Rahim Rathor was
>adopted by the Indian occupied Jammu and Kashmir legislature with the
>support of the ruling National Conference. This was an enabling provision
>to grant for permit for resettlement in the State of any person who had
>been a State subject and migrated to the territories now forming Pakistan
>(it did not apply to Azad Kashmir) between March 1947 and May 14, 1954.
>Ostensibly it was intended to give a deceptive impression to the general
>public that there were many Kashmiri Muslims who had migrated to Pakistan
>were but now being repentant and dissatisfied with living conditions in
>Pakistan and wanted to return to the State, which was still paradise on
>Earth. Indeed it was a camouflage in the sense that under its garb the
>motive was to give permit of residence to those Hindu migrants from
>Pakistan at the time of Independence and from other places in
> India subsequently to offset Muslim majority complexion of the state.
>
>
>According to the some Srinagar citizens the real purpose of the bill was to
>distribute the property left by Muslims in Jammu among favorites of Sheikh
>Abdull