Boletín Julio 2006

Observatorio
Geopolítica y Comunicación en Asia Central y el Cáucaso
ESTADOS UNIDOS LLEGA A UN ACUERDO CON KIRGUIZISTÁN PARA

CONTINUAR UTILIZANDO SU BASE AÉREA
Julio 2006 Tras la crisis diplomática entre los dos países a mediados de
julio, la administración estadounidense consigue pactar con
Bishkek su permanencia en suelo kirguiz.
Fuente: www.nytimes.com
Continúa en página 2
VARIOS PERIODISTAS UZBECOS REFUGIADOS EN SUECIA SE MANIFIESTAN

EN PROTESTA POR LA FALTA DE LIBERTAD EN SU PAÍS
Tras la masacre de Andijan en mayo de 2005, el gobierno de

Karimov recrudeció la represión contra los periodistas y medios
independientes. Después de un año, muchos continúan en el
exilio.
Fuente: www.ferghana.ru
MEDIOS DE COMUNICACIÓN EN KAZAJSTÁN: CONTROVERTIDA REFORMA LEGAL
Entre otras medidas, el decreto endurece las reglas para el

registro de nuevos medios de comunicación. La OSCE y otras
organizaciones han pedido a Nazarbayev que impida la entrada en
vigor del decreto.
Fuente: www.rferl.org
ARMENIA Y AZERBAIYÁN, AÚN LEJOS DEL ACUERDO SOBRE NAGORNO-

KARABAKH
Según el Grupo de Minsk, dos de las piezas clave para el acuerdo

de paz serían la retirada de las tropas armenas de los
territorios azeríes ocupados y un posible referéndum sobre el
estatus de Nagorno-Karabakh.
Fuente: www.eurasianet.org
ÍNDICE
-Relaciones internacionales...p.2
-Disputas territoriales...p.4
-Medios de comunicación...p.6
-Religión...p.7
-Derechos Humanos...p.8
-Cultura...p.9
-Medio ambiente...p.9
-Energía...p.10
Documentos adjuntos...p.11
Grupo de investigación en Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social

www.us.es/cico
Observatorio
Relaciones Internacionales
Titulares
Washington ponders ways to counter the rise of

the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
Eurasinet (15/06/06)
Us embassy resists Kyrgyz efforts

to expel american diplomats
Eurasianet (14/07/06)
Kyrgyzstan’s Undiplomatic Policy Shift

Institute for War and Peace Reporting (14/07/06)
U.S. Reaches Deal With Kyrgyzstan

for Continued Use of Air Base
The New York Times (15/07/06)
Asie centrale, gaz et dictateurs

Le Monde (29/06/06)
India: the new Central Asian player

→ Textos completos en
Documentos adjuntos, p. 11
El pasado 15 de junio, los miembros de la Organización de Cooperación de Shangai1

firmaron una declaración en la que reafirmaban su derecho a regular los asuntos de Asia
Central, lo que ha sido interpretado como un posicionamiento del sexteto en oposición a la
intervención de Estados Unidos en la zona. La declaración parecía concluir que los estados de
Asia Central seguirían caminos propios de desarrollo. “La diversidad de civilizaciones y el
modelo de desarrollo debe ser respetado y fomentado. Las diferencias de tradición cultural,
política y de sistema social, valores y modelos de desarrollo formados en el curso de la historia
no deben tomarse como pretextos para intervenir en los asuntos internos de otros países”,
establecía el acuerdo.
Durante la cumbre de la SCO, el presidente ruso Vladimir Putin expresó su apoyo al

derecho de Irán de desarrollar programas nucleares en beneficio de la población civil. Por su
parte, el presidente iraní Mahmoud Ahmadinejad apuntó la necesidad de crear una cooperación
regional más estrecha que les protegiese de la injerencia exterior.
1
La Organización de Cooperación de Shangai (SCO, por sus siglas en inglés), es una organización
intergubernamental fundada en Shangai el 15 de julio de 2000 por seis países: China, Rusia, Kazajstán,
Kirguizistán, Tayikistán y Uzbekistán. Los países miembros cubren un área de más de 30 millones de
km2, con una población de 1455 millones de habitantes (aproximadamente un cuarto de la población
mundial total). Los idiomas utilizados son el chino y el ruso.

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En efecto, según algunos analistas, la tendencia actual en la región de Asia Central es el

afianzamiento de lazos con los países vecinos, en detrimento de las relaciones con países
occidentales. Washington es la gran perjudicada en esto. Tras el desmantelamiento de las bases
militares norteamericanas en suelo uzbeco el pasado año, presentes allí desde la guerra de
Afganistán por su interés geoestratégico, y la presión ejercida el pasado verano por parte del
presidente kirguiz al gobierno norteamericano para que fijase una fecha de salida del país, este
mes de julio Washington ha visto peligrar su base de Kirguizistán, la única de la que dispone
actualmente en la región de Asia Central. El pasado 11 de julio, Bishkek anunciaba la expulsión
de dos diplomáticos estadounidenses, alegando que sus actividades en los últimos meses habían
supuesto una injerencia en los asuntos internos kirguises. La crisis diplomática estallaba pocos
días antes de la reunión entre Washington y Bishkek para acordar la continuidad de las bases
estadounidenses en el país asiático. Finalmente, se puso punto y final a la crisis con la firma de
un acuerdo, el 14 de julio, según el cual Estados Unidos mantendrá su base militar en
Kirguizistán (que sigue sirviendo de apoyo a las operaciones en Afganistán), debiendo retribuir
al gobierno kirguiz unos 150 millones de dólares durante el año próximo.
Además de Kirguizistán, pieza clave para la política estratégica estadounidense es

Kazajstán, país rico en petróleo y principal motor económico de la zona. La estrategia de
Estados Unidos se concreta en acciones como la visita oficial del pasado mayo a Kazajstán, en
la que el vicepresidente norteamericano, Dick Cheney, expresó su admiración por el desarrollo
económico y político del país asiático. Siguiendo esta línea, la administración estadounidense se
muestra a favor del ingreso de Kazajstán en la Organización Mundial del Comercio. Según
algunos analistas, el punto de mira de Washington está puesto en un fortalecimiento del lazo
Estados Unidos-Kazajstán, marco en el que Astana actuaría como fuerza de moderación en el
binomio Estados Unidos – Organización de Cooperación de Shangai.
Además de Estados Unidos, otro de los principales actores en la zona es la Unión

Europea. Para analistas como Alain Délétroz2, la Unión Europea actúa con doble rasero en su
política exterior en la zona. Por una parte, la Unión Europea se ha mostrado crítica con los
regímenes autoritarios de Asia Central. Ejemplo de ello fue la reacción ante la masacre de
Andijan (Uzbekistán) de mayo de 2005: cinco meses después, el Consejo de la Unión había
suspendido el acuerdo de cooperación con Uzbekistán, instituía un embargo sobre la venta de
armas al país y publicaba una lista de miembros de la autoridad uzbeca directamente implicados
en la masacre a los que se prohibía conceder visados para Europa. Sin embargo, por otra parte,
la Unión Europea mantiene relaciones comerciales con otro de los grandes regímenes
autoritarios, el de Saparmurat Niyazov, presidente de Turkmenistán, país cuyos recursos
energéticos llegan a Europa comercializados por el gigante ruso Gazprom.
Por otra parte, la India comienza a perfilarse como otro de los principales actores en la
región. La determinación de Nueva Delhi de establecer una base aérea en Tayikistán incluye
definitivamente al país en el “gran juego” de Asia Central. El origen del establecimiento de la
base india en suelo tayico puede encontrarse en el cierre del espacio aéreo pakistaní, que tuvo
lugar durante la crisis India – Pakistán 2001-2002, y en la resolución del gobierno indio de
sortear esta restricción tanto para vuelos comerciales como militares. La base en Tayikistán es,
así, una manifestación tangible de la determinación india de proyectar su poder hacia Asia
Central, objetivo político ya anunciado en 2003-2004. Se trata, además, de acceder a los
recursos energéticos de la zona, vitales para la India.
2
Alain Délétroz es vicepresidente de la sección europea de Internacional Crisis Group
(<www.crisisgroup.org>). Ha sido director de la Open Society Institute (Tashkent) y ha participado en el
Comité Internacional de Cruz Roja (Mosú).

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Observatorio
Un análisis señala:
La India necesita cimentar una posición fuerte en Asia Central si quiere llegar a ser un
poder regional importante. Aunque mucha de la atención de Nueva Delhi se ha dirigido hacia el
sudeste asiático y a desarrollar lazos con Irán y con los estados de Oriente Próximo, Asia Central
puede llegar a ser claramente un tapón entre la India y otros poderes regionales y tener cierta
influencia estratégica en la creciente competencia con Pakistán y China.3
La base india en suelo tayico sirve para ilustrar el modo en el que la agenda regional en
materia de seguridad está siendo militarizada. Después del movimiento estratégico de Estados
Unidos a la región tras el 11 S, la proliferación de bases extranjeras en Asia Central ha
aumentado, reevaluándose la región como una de las de mayor importancia geoestratégica.
Disputas territoriales
Titulares
Kyrgyz Border Guards Shoot Uzbek Shepherds
RFE/RL (30/06/06)
Azerbaijani hopes for peace dwindle

with Karabakh disclosure
En el valle de Ferghana, a finales del pasado mes de junio, la policía fronteriza kirguiz
disparaba y hería a dos pastores uzbecos. Según la policía, los pastores, que tenían su rebaño
pastando en suelo kirguiz, habían cruzado ilegalmente la frontera.
Este es un caso más de los tantos ocurridos en las fronteras no bien delimitadas del valle
de Ferghana. El valle presenta las mayores complicaciones en cuanto a disputas fronterizas de
toda Asia Central.4 En él se sitúan una miríada de “islas aisladas” consideradas como territorios
irredentos por las repúblicas que comparten esta zona (Uzbekistán, Tayikistán y Kirguizistán),
que tienen grandes intereses económicos en las vías de comunicación, ríos, reservas e industrias
de la zona.
3
“India stepping up diplomacy in Central Asia”. Stratfor. 09/08/02. Citado en DJALILI, Mohammad-Reza;
KELLNER, Thierry. La nueva Asia Central: Realidades y Desafíos. Barcelona: Edicions Bellaterra, 2003, p. 562.
4
“Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potencial”. International Crisis Group. Asia Report nº 33, 04/04/02
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1439&l=1>

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Las dificultades económicas, la presión demográfica, las disputas sobre el agua5 y la

degradación del medio ambiente se suman para hacer las relaciones entre los distintos grupos
étnicos que habitan el valle aún más delicadas.
En el Cáucaso, el conflicto de Nagorno-Karabakh, territorio que enfrenta a Armenia y

Azerbaiyán desde 1988, sigue abierto. Según ciertos analistas, la reciente revelación de algunos
detalles del borrador del acuerdo de paz ha levantado una ola de reacciones pro-guerra en
Azerbaiyán.
A finales de junio, uno de los dirigentes del Grupo de Minsk, cuerpo enmarcado en la
OSCE y encargado de la negociación, expuso que dos de las piezas clave para el acuerdo de paz
serían la retirada de las tropas armenas de los siete territorios azeríes ocupados y un posible
referéndum sobre el estatus de Nagorno-Karabakh.
Contrarios a la interpretación armena de que el referéndum debería celebrarse

únicamente en Karabakh, Bakú propondría que el voto sobre el estatus del territorio en conflicto
se llevase a cabo en todo Azerbaiyán, además de en el enclave disputado. El propio informe de
la OSCE no especifica las condiciones bajo las que podría hacerse el referéndum. Según
algunos analistas, un referéndum en Karabakh supondría la desmembración de Azerbaiyán, que
no podría aceptar esto.
El pasado 22 de junio, el presidente de Azerbaiyán, Ilham Aliyev, calificó el Proceso de

Praga (conversaciones regulares sobre el disputado enclave) de inefectivo. En julio, Aliyev
volvía a pronunciarse sobre el asunto afirmando que Armenia y Azerbaiyán están muy lejos aún
del acuerdo. El presidente asegura que la integridad del territorio azerí no es asunto de discusión
y que Karabakh no será nunca independiente. La única vía para evitar el enfrentamiento armado,
de acuerdo con el mandatario azerí, teniendo en cuenta el frágil régimen actual de cese el fuego,
sería que Armenia retirase sus tropas de Nagorno-Karabakh.
5
“Central Asia: Water and Conflict” International Crisis Group. Asia Report n°34, 30/05/02
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1440&l=4>
“Water could become major catalyst for conflict”. Eurasianet. 18/9/05
<http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/pp091805.shtml>

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Medios de comunicación
Titulares
Kazakhstani government moves
to reassert control on mass media
Kazakh President Signs

Controversial Media Bill
RFE/RL (05/07/06)
Journalists from Uzbekistan settle in

Sweden and even organize protest actions
Ferghana.ru (19/07/06)
Web site Tribune-uz.info suspended

Ferghana.ru (05/07/06)
Durante el mes de julio, un grupo de periodistas uzbecos independientes refugiados en

Suecia han organizado acciones de protesta contra la represión del gobierno de Karimov. Según
denuncian los medios independientes, tras la masacre de Andijan de mayo de 2005 ha tenido
lugar en Uzbekistán una campaña a nivel nacional contra los medios alejados de la línea oficial,
lo que ha resultado en un éxodo de periodistas del país durante este año. En 2005, las oficinas
uzbecas de RFE/RL, BBC e IWPR fueron cerradas. Numerosos corresponsales que informaron
de los sucesos de mayo de 2005 y los siguientes meses han venido saliendo del país por miedo a
represalias.
Por su parte, el medio electrónico independiente Tribune-uz anunció a principios de

julio el suspenso de su actividad. Expone el editor en su carta de despedida que el periódico
electrónico ha venido sufriendo desde mayo de 2005 el acoso de las autoridades.
Según Ferghana.ru, no quedan en Uzbekistán más que dos docenas de periodistas

independientes.
En Kazajstán, tras la muerte del líder opositor Altynbek Sarsenbayev en febrero de 2006
(en noviembre de 2005, un mes antes de las elecciones, fue asesinado otro líder opositor,
Zamanbek Nurkadilov), la presión hacia los medios de comunicación por parte del gobierno ha
continuado aumentando. El ministro de Información y Cultura, Yermukhamet Yertysbayev, ha
expresado en varias ocasiones que ciertos medios de comunicación han pasado los límites de la
libertad de expresión, entre ellos la cadena de televisión KTK. El ministro amenazó en mayo
con revocar la licencia de emisión a la cadena por alejarse de la línea oficial en cuanto a la
información sobre la muerte de Sarsenbayev. Bajo la presión internacional que siguió al
asesinato de Sarsenbayev, el control de los medios de comunicación se ha convertido para el
gobierno en una prioridad.

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La oposición kazaja denuncia que una parte considerable de los medios de

comunicación se encuentra en manos de sectores cercanos al presidente Nursultan Nazarbayev.
Su hija, Dariga Nazarbayeva, controla el imperio mediático Khabar. El hijo de Nazarbayeva,
Nurali, de veintiún años, también controla un grupo de comunicación, Shahar, y el marido,
Rakhat Aliyev, tiene participación en el grupo Alma-Media.
El nuevo decreto sobre medios de comunicación aprobado el pasado mes de julio ha

venido a empeorar la situación, según sus críticos. Entre otras medidas, el decreto endurece las
reglas para el registro de nuevos medios de comunicación. La OSCE y otras organizaciones han
pedido a Nazarbayev que impida la entrada en vigor del decreto.
Religión
Titular
Uzbekistan: Another Protestant faces criminal charges
Forum 18 News Service (03/07/06)
→ Texto completo en
La carencia de libertad religiosa en Uzbekistán sigue siendo noticia. En la región de

Karakalpakstan, un ciudadano de religión protestante ha sido acusado con cargos criminales por
quebrantar la ley de organizaciones religiosas. Lepes Omarov, despedido en 2003 de la escuela
en la que trabajaba como profesor de educación física a causa de sus convicciones religiosas, se
enfrenta ahora a tres años de prisión.
El pasado 30 junio, un pastor protestante, acusado de cargos similares a los de Omarov,

tuvo que abandonar el país para evitar que le procesasen.
De acuerdo con Forum 186, grupos de protestantes uzbecos han venido sufriendo
presión por parte de las autoridades. De todas las regiones de Uzbekistán, Karakalpakstan es en
la que los protestantes se enfrentan a mayores obstáculos. Ni una sola iglesia protestante está
registrada oficialmente, lo que significa que toda su actividad es ilegal.
Recientemente, las autoridades uzbecas han endurecido su política hacia las minorías
religiosas no registradas a lo largo del país. En junio se introdujeron penas más duras en el
código penal y administrativo por la publicación, distribución o importación ilegal de libros
religiosos.
6
<www.forum18.org>

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Derechos Humanos
Titulares
UN agency appeals to Kazakhstan

not to deport arrested Uzbek refugee
UN News Centre (30/06/06)
Twelve fugitives returned to their native Andijan.

Eager to go home too, others fugitives
appeal to President Islam Karimov
Ferghana.Ru News Agency (19/07/06)
Turkmenistan: French media

watchdog protests detentions
RFE/RL (08/07/06)
Tras un año y dos meses de la cruenta matanza que tuvo lugar en la localidad uzbeca de
Andijan (Uzbekistán), doce de los fugitivos que consiguieron escapar y salvar sus vidas vuelven
ahora a su país. Los exiliados uzbecos, acogidos en Arizona, quieren regresar a su país natal,
donde dejaron familia y amigos. El traslado se ha hecho por mediación de la Embajada de
Uzbekistán en Washington. Según la agencia Ferghana.ru, no ha habido noticias hasta el
momento acerca del modo en que han sido recibidos en Uzbekistán.
También durante el pasado mes de julio, uno de los refugiados uzbecos residentes en
Kazajstán fue detenido por orden del gobierno de Karimov. La Agencia para los Refugiados de
las Naciones Unidas ha reaccionado pidiendo al gobierno de Kazajstán que no deporte al
refugiado.
De los cientos de uzbecos que salieron de su país el pasado año tras los sucesos de
Andijan, especialmente hacia Kirguizistán, la mayoría (unos 500) fueron evacuados por la
Agencia para los Refugiados de las Naciones Unidas en el mes de julio de 2005, tras ser
aceptados en distintos países del mundo para su realojo urgente. Tras más de un año de exilio,
numerosos ciudadanos uzbecos se encuentran aún refugiados en países limítrofes y temerosos
de regresar a su país por la posible represión.
Otra de las dictaduras de la zona, Turkmenistán, no ha mejorado en cuanto al respeto de

derechos y libertades. El presidente Saparmutat Niyazov ha cerrado en los últimos tiempos
numerosas instituciones de renombre, como la Academia de las Ciencias y la Academia de
Medicina, así como todas las bibliotecas rurales, ha prohibido la ópera, la música filarmónica y
el circo y ha establecido que una parte considerable de los programas educativos se dedique al
estudio del Ruhnama, “libro santo” escrito por él mismo. Turkmenistán es además uno de los
países peor situados por las organizaciones de derechos humanos en cuanto al respeto de
derechos y libertades. En la capital del país, Ashgabat, fueron detenidos sin cargos dos activistas
pro derechos humanos y un periodista a finales del pasado mes de junio. En protesta por ello, la
organización Reporteros sin Fronteras se manifestó el 7 de julio frente a la embajada de
Turkmenistán en París.
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Cultura
Titular
Central Asia: Silk Road revival grows as more sites protected
En los últimos años se ha experimentado un renacer del interés por el legado histórico
de la Ruta de la Seda. Teniendo en cuenta la importancia de este legado, diversos esfuerzos
internacionales se han puesto en marcha para proteger numerosos restos arqueológicos, desde
Turkmenistán hasta Kirguizistán. Tesoros de siglos pasados como los de Merv (Turkmenistán),
una de las ciudades más pobladas del mundo hacia mediados del siglo XII, o la arquitectura
islámica de Bujara y Samarcanda (Uzbekistán), se protegen y recuperan del deterioro que han
venido sufriendo. Algunos de estos lugares ya han sido calificados por la UNESCO, que trabaja
para recuperar muchos otros tesoros aún sumidos en un pésimo estado de conservación, con la
distinción de Patrimonio de la Humanidad.
En la recuperación de este legado participan con sus fondos muy distintos países:
Noruega, Italia, Suiza, Turquía y, muy especialmente, Japón, que ha contribuido con varios
millones de dólares.
En este contexto, se han puesto en marcha iniciativas como el Silk Road Project7,
proyecto destinado, desde 1998, a “arrojar luz sobre la contribución histórica de la Ruta de la
Seda a la difusión del arte y la cultura, a identificar las voces actuales que mejor representan
este legado cultural y a apoyar nuevas colaboraciones entre artistas”.
Por otra parte, la recuperación de los lugares de la Ruta de la Seda traerá consigo, si
duda, indudables beneficios económicos en forma de un aumento del turismo.
Medio ambiente
Titular
Kazakhstan: environmentalists say China misusing cross-border rivers
7
<www.silkroadproject.org>

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Energía
Titulares
Turkmenistan: the Achilles’ heel of European energy security
BTC security questions persist

Eurasinet (11/07/06)
Uzbekistan refuses to deliver natural gas to Tajikistan

Pravda.ru (20/07/06)

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Documentos adjuntos
Observatorio
Relaciones Internacionales
Título Washington ponders ways to counter the rise of the Shanghai

Cooperation Organization
Subtítulo ---
Entradilla ---
Autor Ariel Cohen
Fecha 15/06/06
publicación
Traducción ---
Títulos
Traducción ---
Entradilla
Cuerpo de texto Members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization during a June 15
summit forcefully asserted their right to regulate affairs in Central Asia. A
declaration signed by the heads of state of all six member states, including
Russia and China, is widely viewed as placing the group in direct
opposition to the United States in the regional geopolitical contest.
SCO leaders gathered in Shanghai, site of the group’s founding five years
ago. In the June 15 declaration, the SCO professed to be operating
according to "principles of openness, non-alliance and not targeting at any
third party." However, the text’s language left little doubt that the group
rejects the US democratization agenda, and hinted that member states
would consider acting in concert in an effort to reduce the United States’
geopolitical presence in Central Asia.
"The SCO will make a constructive contribution to the establishment of a

new global security architecture of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality
and mutual respect," the declaration asserted. "Threats and challenges can
be effectively met only when there is broad cooperation among all
countries and international organizations concerned. What specific means
and mechanisms should be adopted to safeguard security of the region is
the right and responsibility of countries in the region."
The statement went on to indicate that Central Asian states would follow
their own development paths. "Diversity of civilization and the model of
development must be respected and upheld. Differences in cultural
traditions, political and social systems, values and model of development
formed in the course of history should not be taken as pretexts to interfere
in other countries’ internal affairs."
Also at the summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed support

for Iran’s right to engage in peaceful nuclear research. Following a side
meeting with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who attended the
summit as an observer, Putin stated that "all countries in the world,
including Iran, have the right to fulfill their plans in the use of high
technologies for the benefit of their development," the Moscow News web
site reported. The Russian leader, however, added a caveat that nuclear
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research should be conducted "in a way to fully eliminate" international

concerns that Iran was striving to build a nuclear weapon. Putin also
announced that Iran was ready to negotiate on an international package
designed to prompt Iran to suspend its nuclear enrichment activities in
return for economic benefits. He indicated that Iran would soon makes its
views clear on a possible timeline for talks, the official RIA Novosti news
agency reported.
In a speech at the summit, Ahmadinejad called on regional states to tighten

cooperation. "We need a strong powerful organization [SCO] to protect us
from unreasonable outside interference," the Iranian leader said, plainly
referring to the United States.
Washington now confronts the likelihood the SCO states will try to put the
squeeze on the US geopolitical position in Central Asia. American
policymakers are currently working to develop a strategy to blunt the
SCO’s ability to influence regional developments.
Kazakhstan, an SCO member, figures prominently in the US strategic

calculus. Energy-rich Kazakhstan is Central Asia’s economic engine, and
thus wields considerable influence in any regional grouping of which it is a
member. Top Bush administration officials have courted the country’s
president, Nursultan Nazarbayev. For example, during an early May visit
to Kazakhstan, US Vice President Dick Cheney expressed admiration for
the country’s economic and political development.
The United States is also believed to be supportive of Kazakhstan’s efforts

to join the World Trade Organization. The hope in Washington is that
stronger US-Kazakhstani ties will encourage Astana to act as a force for
moderation within the SCO vis a vis the United States.
The United States, however, will have to show patience toward Astana.
Understandably, Nazarbayev is engaged in a balancing act between the
Bear, the Dragon, and the far-away American Eagle. He recently sent a
letter to Ahmadinejad calling attention to Kazakhstan’s decision to
voluntarily give up its nuclear stockpile after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, a gesture appreciated by the Bush Administration. At the same
time, Kazakhstani officials have expressed a desire to forge closer
economic relations with Iran.
So, what else can the United States do to counter the rise of the SCO? For
one, Washington should recognize that the SCO’s leading powers – China
and Russia – are extremely sensitive to the US presence in what has
traditionally been their sphere of influence. Washington should develop a
nuanced policy, using both words and actions, designed to reassure
Moscow and Beijing that the geopolitical competition in Central Asia is
not a zero-sum game.
American diplomats should also strive to convince Chinese officials that

Russia is trying to drag Beijing into the anti-American bloc, an action that
runs contrary to China’s long-term economic interests. In addition, US
officials should remind Beijing that unless Tehran is restrained, Iran is
likely to drive up world oil prices through pursuit of its aggressive policies,
especially its nuclear research program. China is experiencing a
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tremendous rise in energy consumption, driven by the country’s rapid

economic development. As a UN Security Council member, China could
play a key role in the possible imposition of sanctions against Iran, if
Tehran continues to defy the international community on the nuclear issue.
The oil price issue represents a wedge that the United States can use to
divide Russia and China. With its abundant yet hard-to-extract energy
reserves, Russia is a high-cost oil producer, and is thus interested in the
Middle East instability to keep oil prices high and its budget revenues
higher. А senior Putin foreign policy advisor told me that Russia
will quietly cheer more Middle East instability as oil prices may climb to
$90 a barrel or higher. China, on the other hand, has an almost insatiable
demand for energy so that it can maintain its present economic growth
pace. Thus, Beijing is interested in keeping the price of Middle East oil as
low as possible.
There are few levers available to Washington to influence Russian

behavior. Perhaps the best Washington can do is to remind the Kremlin of
the likely geopolitical repercussions of an aggressive, nuclear armed Iran.
Russia’s present support for Tehran could easily boomerang in the coming
years, and Moscow could come to see Tehran posing a geopolitical threat
to the Russian Federation’s southern flank. Iranian influence is already
making inroads into Azerbaijan, and Tehran is likely to intensify its
competition with Moscow for influence throughout the Caucasus and
Central Asia.
As US officials engage China and Russia, Washington should concurrently

continue building relationships not only with Kazakhstan, but also with
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Mongolia. Bush Administration strategists
believe that wealth creation, robust education strategies, and ethnic and
religious harmony will go a long way to stem the rise of radical Islam, and
thus take much of the steam out of the SCO.
As America is pursuing its "long war" on jihadi terrorism and ideology, it

can ill-afford a conflict with Russia and China in Eurasia. Thus,
Washington must explore ways to establish a dialogue with SCO, or risk
yet another humiliation in the hands of Moscow and Beijing.
Editor's Note: Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in Russian

and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Security at the Heritage
Foundation, and the author of Eurasia in Balance (Ashgate, 2005) and
Russia-Kazakhstan Energy Cooperation (GMB Publishing, 2006).
Medio Eurasinet
Enlace http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav061506.shtml
Fecha consulta 13/07/06 (17.45 h.)
Género period. Comentario
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Título Us embassy resists Kyrgyz efforts to expel american diplomats

Subtítulo ---
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Autor Deirdre Tynan
Fecha 14/07/06
publicación
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Cuerpo de texto Correction: In a story posted July 14 on Kyrgyz efforts to expel two US
diplomats from Bishkek, EurasiaNet misidentified the US deputy assistant
secretary of defense who traveled to Kyrgyzstan to negotiate an air-base
lease extension. The official who signed the new lease deal was US Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense James MacDougall.
A diplomatic row is developing in Kyrgyzstan, where the US Embassy is

resisting Bishkek’s effort to expel two American diplomats for supposedly
having "inappropriate" contacts with local non-governmental
organizations. The dispute has potentially far-reaching geopolitical
implications given that Kyrgyzstan is home to the sole remaining US
military base in Central Asia.
On July 11, Kyrgyz officials announced that the two US diplomats were no
longer welcome in Bishkek. A Kyrgyz Foreign Ministry statement said the
diplomats had engaged in "repetitive [acts of] interference in the interior
affairs of the state, incompatible with their diplomatic status and
recognized norms of international law." It added that the expulsion order
was "based on established fact."
The US Embassy in Bishkek is vigorously contesting the allegations as

"simply not true." An embassy statement asserted that the Kyrgyz action
was designed "to intimidate embassies and silence the voice of civil
society."
"The United States will continue to maintain contact with all sectors of
Kyrgyz society, including government officials, opposition, and leaders of
non-governmental and community organizations," it added.
According to local media reports, Kyrgyz secret services accumulated

extensive evidence of the two diplomats engaging in activities
incompatible with their status. The AKIpress news agency, citing sources
within the Kyrgyzstan’s security apparatus, identified the two American
diplomats and alleged they were CIA agents.
A US State Department representative on July 13 refused to identify the

diplomats in question, adding that they remained in Kyrgyzstan. On July
14, various reports stated that the diplomats had departed Kyrgyzstan.
Kyrgyz authorities moved to expel the diplomats on the eve on the second
round of negotiations between Kyrgyz and American officials on the
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renewal of a lease for the military base located in Manas, outside the
capital. Talks began in late May but were adjourned until July 12. The
nature of the negotiations has been closely guarded by both sides, although
President Kurmanbek Bakiyev has made no secret of the fact that Bishkek
is seeking a massive rent increase.
In recent days Kyrgyz Security Council Chair Miroslav Niyazov has met
with both US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense James MacDougall
and US Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan Marie Yovanovitch about the base and
the diplomats respectively.
Medio Eurasianet
Fecha consulta 19/07/06
Género period.
Observaciones ---
Título Kyrgyzstan’s Undiplomatic Policy Shift

Subtítulo Expulsion of US diplomats seen as a shift towards Moscow and away
from democracy
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Autor Taalaibek Amanov
Fecha 14/07/06
publicación
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Cuerpo de texto The expulsion of two American diplomats has created bewilderment in
Kyrgyzstan, a country that has maintained good relations with both the
United States and Russia for many years. But analysts suggest the move
reflects a general trend towards aligning the country with its former Soviet
allies, and away from the West.
Kyrgyzstan’s foreign ministry issued a statement on July 12 saying the

decision to expel the US diplomats was made on the basis of reliable
evidence from the intelligence agency which indicated that the two had
interfered in the country’s domestic affairs in a manner incompatible with
their status and with international law.
The previous day, when news of the expulsions was already in the air, the
US embassy in Bishkek issued a formal denial, saying it was “disturbed”
by the reports.
“Allegations that these official representatives have engaged in

inappropriate activities are simply not true,” said the statement.

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The embassy noted that the two diplomats were said to have had
“inappropriate contact” with leaders of Kyrgyz non-government
organisations, NGOs, but said the mission would not now refrain from
engaging with non-government as well as government actors.
“This can be seen as an attempt to intimidate embassies and silence the

voice of civil society. The United States will continue to maintain contact
with all sectors of Kyrgyz society, including government officials,
opposition, and leaders of non-governmental and community
organisations,” said the statement.
An anonymous source in the National Security Service confirmed to IWPR

that the agency believed it had “strong evidence” against the US officials.
“If this were not the case, we would not have caused this uproar,” said the
source. “The US embassy has reacted quite sensitively to these facts, as it’s
grown used to treating us as an under-developed country and ignoring our
domestic interests.”
The row has come as a surprise to many, since Kyrgyzstan has steered a
careful diplomatic course between the US and Russia over the 15 years it
has been independent. The policy was set by President Askar Akaev, who
was in power throughout those years until he was ousted in the popular
revolution of March 2005.
It seemed initially that Akaev’s successor, Kurmanbek Bakiev, would not

shift significantly from that course, as he was brought to power in a wave
of pro-democracy protests similar to those seen earlier in Ukraine and
Georgia, where the mood was positive towards the West and much less so
towards Moscow.
But Bakiev soon indicated that he was seeking Russian backing, perhaps to
demonstrate that his revolutionary administration was no threat to the
Central Asian region, where Moscow’s influence remains strong.
Last summer, Bakiev pressed the US to set a date for leaving the military
airbase that Akaev had sanctioned to help the international “war on terror”
coalition conduct operations in Afghanistan. The government later
backtracked and simply demanded a lot more money in rent and other
payments.
When Akaev was president, US and other international support kept the
NGO sector in Kyrgyzstan more vibrant and active than anywhere else in
Central Asia, and civil society groups were a major force in the protest
movement that brought the current government to power.
Unsurprisingly, Kyrgyz NGOs reacted with outrage and concern at the idea
that having contact with the US embassy was in some way suspicious.
“This is an ill-considered act by the authorities. It does serious damage to

Kyrgyzstan’s international relationships. Our country will lose out badly
from this scandal,” Tolekan Ismailova, head of the Civil Society Against
Corruption group, told IWPR.

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Asiya Sasykbaeva, who heads the Interbilim organisation, said, “All NGOs
contact the embassies of various countries, and no one can forbid us from
doing this, as we live in a free country. One gets the impression that the
authorities are trying to intimidate civil society representatives to make us
less critical of the leadership.”
Edil Baisalov, the president of the Coalition for Democracy and Civil
Society, added, “This smacks of the Cold War and is clear proof that the
current authorities are trying to build an authoritarian regime in our
country.”
Sasykbaeva’s and Baisalov’s group were among a number of NGOs that

put out a joint statement on July 14 demanding that the authorities make
public the accusations made against the two American diplomats, since no
facts or evidence had been offered so far. They said the government was
engaged in a “campaign to discredit the non-government sector, a
barefaced attempt to portray us as fifth columnists”.
The two main officials concerned with human rights sided with the NGOs.
Tursunbek Akunov, who chairs the Kyrgyz president’s commission for

human rights, told IWPR, “This is a short-sighted act by the Kyrgyz
foreign ministry which threatens to disgrace our country among the
international community. For 15 years, the US government has provided
substantial material and moral support to the development of democracy in
Kyrgyzstan. American diplomats have never done anything bad to
Kyrgyzstan, and they supported the revolution of March 24 last year.”
Ombudsman Tursunbai Bakir Uulu said, “Contacts with NGO leaders are
not sufficient reason to expel diplomats from the country. If there is
evidence that an NGO was preparing a coup or had openly received money
for political actions, and this is proven, then it would be understandable.”
Commentators interviewed by IWPR suggested that the Bakiev

administration was using the expulsions both to enhance its relationship
with Moscow and to curb western support for NGOs which are now seen
as troublesome. The overall outcome, they said, was an ill-advised lurch
away from the US.
“This act was carried out with the knowledge of the Kyrgyzstan president,
who finds it difficult to navigate between the US, China and Russia, and
will probably now choose a close union with the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation members,” said opposition deputy Melis Eshimkanov.
“The reason given for expelling the diplomats - inappropriate contacts with
NGO leaders - shows that this regime is going to have new rules which are
far removed from democracy.”
Political analyst Nur Omarov said the move was a “grave foreign policy
mistake”.
“The Kyrgyzstan leadership should have used other means – a warning or

note – but not immediate expulsion of diplomats. This is the first time this
has happened in Kyrgyz diplomacy,” he said.
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“It is a sure signal that the leadership is not ready to continue developing
the democratic reforms to which they themselves committed after March
2005. This is an unfortunate decision which will undermine the regime’s
standing at home and abroad.”
The shift in foreign policy is likely to become more apparent over coming
months, but in the very short term, one irritant in Kyrgyz-US relations has
been smoothed out. The two governments issued a statement on July 14
saying they had finally reached agreement on the continued used of the
airbase, with the US planning to provide Kyrgyzstan with 150 million US
dollars in total assistance and compensation over the next year.
Although the talks had been protracted, the diplomatic incident does not
seem to have reflected a breakdown in negotiations.
If the initial US statement on the expulsions said “it is difficult to see how
the expulsion of US diplomats without grounds would serve the long-term
interest of Kyrgyzstan”, the joint document on the airbase deal concluded
by underlining the strength of Kyrgyz-US relations. “The decision…
should be viewed in the context of the larger, robust bilateral relationship,”
it said.
There was no talk in the statement of when the US-led coalition might
leave the base.
Medio IWPR
Enlace http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=322277&apc_state=henfrca322275
Género period. Reportaje
Observaciones ---
Título U.S. Reaches Deal With Kyrgyzstan for Continued Use of Air Base
Subtítulo ---
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Autor Thom Shanker
Fecha 15/07/06
publicación
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Cuerpo de texto WASHINGTON, July 14 — The United States and Kyrgyzstan signed an
agreement on Friday to allow American and coalition military aircraft to
continue using a Kyrgyz air base to support operations in Afghanistan,
government officials said.
The Kyrgyz government had threatened to evict American and coalition

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airplanes — mostly refueling and transport craft — from the base, at

Manas, if the United States did not sign an agreement to pay higher rent
and service fees.
An official statement issued in Kyrgyzstan, a former Soviet republic,

announcing the resolution of the issue did not say how much the United
States would pay for continued use of the base.
“The United States will compensate equitably the Kyrgyz government and
Kyrgyz businesses for goods, services and other support of U.S.
operations,” Sean McCormack, the State Department spokesman, said on
Friday.
He said the United States expected to provide more than $150 million in
total assistance to Kyrgyzstan — in the form of general aid as well as
compensation for the air base — over the next year, pending approval by
Congress.
The deal was signed in Kyrgyzstan on Friday by James C. MacDougall, the

deputy assistant secretary of defense for Eurasia, and the Kyrgyz security
council secretary, Miroslav Niyazov.
Access to the airfield became more important after neighboring Uzbekistan

last July ordered the United States to leave a base there that had been a hub
for operations in Afghanistan.
The specific reason for the expulsion was a United Nations operation to
spirit out refugees who had fled an uprising in Uzbekistan in May 2005.
But tensions with the United States had boiled over after Washington
criticized the violent government crackdown on demonstrators in the city
of Andijon.
An official statement issued in the Kyrgyz capital, Bishkek, after the talks
on Friday said the United States had contributed more than $850 million to
support democracy, economic development, aid projects and security in the
Kyrgyz Republic since its independence from the Soviet Union.
Medio The New York Times
Enlace http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/15/world/asia/15military.html?_r=2&ore
f=slogin&oref=login
Género period. Noticia
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Título Asie centrale, gaz et dictateurs

Subtítulo ---
Entradilla ---
Autor Alain Délétroz
Fecha 29/06/06
publicación
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Cuerpo de texto L'UE met les droits de l'homme sous le boisseau, réserves énergétiques
obligent...
L'Asie Centrale, de par ses ressources naturelles et sa situation

géostratégique au coeur de l'Eurasie, devrait mériter une plus grande
attention des décideurs européens. Or elle reste à l'écart des choix
politiques de l'Union européenne et de ses Etats membres. Les dictateurs
de cette région peuvent prospérer en paix sans que les Européens n'osent
leur exprimer clairement et efficacement leur désapprobation.
Le 13 mai 2005, le président d'Ouzbékistan, Islam Karimov, faisait donner

la troupe sur une foule qui manifestait à Andijon, l'une des grandes villes
du Fergana, dans l'est du pays. Bilan selon le gouvernement : 167 morts ;
les organisations de défense des droits de l'homme, quant à elles, en
dénombrent plus de 700. Depuis, la répression s'est abattue sur la ville afin
de faire taire les témoins de ces événements. Toutefois, malgré la terreur
imposée, il apparaît de plus en plus probable que le gouvernement ouzbek
doive un jour répondre de ce bain de sang. Le régime a bel et bien fait
ouvrir le feu à la mitrailleuse lourde sur une foule descendue dans la rue,
non pour exiger l'établissement d'un Etat islamiste en Asie centrale, mais
pour demander à être entendue par son gouvernement.
Le Conseil de l'Union européenne a le mérite d'avoir alors réagi avec

détermination : en octobre 2005, l'Union suspendait l'accord de
coopération avec l'Ouzbékistan, instituait un embargo sur la vente d'armes
envers ce pays et publiait une liste interdisant aux membres des autorités
ouzbekes directement impliquées dans la tragédie d'Andijon l'octroi de
visas pour l'Europe. Le président Islam Karimov n'était pas sur la liste, ce
qui permettait à l'Ouzbékistan de sauver la face et à la diplomatie
européenne - relayée à Tachkent par les quelques pays de l'Union qui y
tiennent ambassade, dont la France - de réclamer pour le moins que les
procès des émeutiers soient équitables. Un an plus tard, le gouvernement
d'Ouzbékistan a condamné plus de 200 personnes impliquées dans les
événements d'Andijon dans des conditions de jugement calamiteuses. Tous
les condamnés ont signé des aveux, souvent obtenus sous la torture.
Mais l'Union européenne s'est contentée, dans les conclusions de son

dernier conseil des ministres des affaires étrangères, d'exprimer sa "
préoccupation " sur la détérioration du respect des droits de l'homme dans
ce pays. Tout le monde sait que l'Allemagne ménage Islam Karimov afin
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de maintenir sa base militaire dans le sud du pays, qu'elle considère comme

vitale pour ses troupes engagées dans les opérations de maintien de la paix
en Afghanistan. La Realpolitik poussée à ces extrêmes a déjà un résultat
tangible : les gouvernements de la région ont vite compris que l'Europe est
un géant aux pieds d'argile.
L'Asie centrale compte un autre dictateur ubuesque : Saparmurat Niyazov,

" père de tous les Turkmènes " et " prophète ". Avec lui encore, l'Union
européenne s'illustre par son manque de vision et de politique à long terme
: au vu de prétendus signes de progrès dans la gestion du dictateur
turkmène, elle n'hésite pas à lui proposer un accord de coopération
intermédiaire.
Pourtant, Le Turkménistan représente un cas presque unique au monde de

régression sociale programmée par le gouvernement. Saparmurat Niyazov
y a réduit l'éducation obligatoire à neuf années ; une part significative des
programmes scolaires est consacrée désormais à l'étude de la Ruhmana, ce
nouveau " livre saint " écrit par le président ; et les étudiants du supérieur
sont envoyés aux champs ou en usine durant deux années de leur cursus
universitaire, qui s'en voit ainsi sérieusement écorné. Le nouveau "
prophète " a fait fermer nombre d'institutions de renom qui ne convenaient
plus à son bon plaisir : l'Académie des sciences et l'Académie de médecine,
par exemple, ainsi que toutes les bibliothèques rurales. Il interdit également
l'opéra, le cirque, la musique philharmonique.
Mais le dictateur des sables est assis sur d'importantes réserves de gaz, ce
qui lui donne une grande autonomie. Le géant énergétique russe Gazprom
lui achète un gaz bon marché qui est ensuite pompé dans les gazoducs vers
l'Europe et revendu dans l'UE aux prix du marché. L'Union semble croire
naïvement qu'en courtisant le tyran elle pourra obtenir quelques
concessions dans le domaine énergétique, alors que Saparmurat Niyazov a
déjà vendu tout ce qu'il avait à vendre.
Il est regrettable que la commission des affaires étrangères du Parlement

européen se soit déjà prononcée favorablement sur cet accord intérimaire.
Comment comprendre cet empressement à courtiser un tyran en Asie
centrale quelques mois après que l'UE s'est montrée, avec raison,
intraitable avec le dictateur de Minsk ? Y aurait-il deux poids, deux
mesures entre les tyrannies proches de nos frontières européennes et les
dictatures lointaines bien approvisionnées en hydrocarbures ? Le vote du
Parlement européen sur cet accord avec M. Niyazov est programmé pour la
première semaine de juillet et il est temps que nos élus se ressaisissent.
Plusieurs parlementaires français ont déjà commencé à alerter leurs pairs,
afin de les mettre en garde sur les conséquences d'un vote positif du
Parlement.
L'Union européenne manque de stratégie politique à l'égard de l'Asie

centrale. La nomination par M. Javier Solana d'un représentant spécial pour
la région est certes bienvenue, mais ce dernier tarde à produire une
stratégie. Il devient urgent, pourtant, que l'Europe se dote, dans cette
région, d'une politique cohérente et fidèle à ses principes fondateurs : la
défense de la démocratie et des droits de l'homme.
Medio Le Monde

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Enlace http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0@2-3232,36-789234,0.html
Fecha consulta 20/07/06 (19:00 h.)
Género period. Artículo
Observaciones ---
Título India: the new Central Asian player

Subtítulo ---
Entradilla ---
Autor Stephen Blank
Fecha 26/06/06
publicación
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Cuerpo de texto India’s move to establish an air base in Tajikistan is adding a new wrinkle
to the geopolitical struggle unfolding in Central Asia. Some of India’s
strategic interests coincide with those of the United States, but others
appear to encourage stronger Indian-Russian ties. As a result, geopolitics in
Central Asia stands to become more complicated.
Reports began circulating in April that the Indian air base at Ayni (also
called Farkhor) in Tajikistan was operational. Both Indian and Tajik
officials issued immediate denials, but they did admit that India had been
renovating the base since 2002. Moreover, Russian sources confirmed that
indeed such a base existed and that it was co-located with the Russian air
base at Ayni, which is part of Russia’s own determined drive to rebuild its
military presence and capabilities in Central Asia.
When fully operational, the Indian base is expected to host between 12-14
MiG-29 fighter bombers, according to various reports. India’s intention to
open its first base located on foreign soil was first reported in 2002. At that
time, some reports claimed, that the Ayni facility was already operational,
and, therefore, could have been used for operations against either Islamic
militants operating in Central Asia or Pakistan. Indeed, the origins of this
base lie in Pakistan’s closure of its air space to India during their crisis of
2001-02, and India’s resolve to get around this restriction for both its
commercial and military aircraft, while also gaining an ability to strike in
Pakistan’s rear.
The potential implications of this base go far beyond the Indo-Pakistani

rivalry on the subcontinent. First of all, the Ayni base is a tangible
manifestation of India’s move to project its power in Central Asia, a policy
goal formally enunciated in 2003-04. It not only signifies India’s
determination to play a role in Central Asian security, but its genuine
ability to do so.

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At the same time, the Ayni base represents a major element in India’s
efforts to promote stability in Afghanistan, and to enhance New Delhi’s
ability to contain Islamic terrorism both in South Asia and Central Asia.
India obviously will not accept being confined to an exclusively South
Asian geo-strategic role any longer.
But India’s determination to project power throughout Central Asia is not

just for military purposes. Access to Central Asian energy is vitally
important for India. New Delhi seeks access to Kazakh oil and gas and
involvement in "mega-projects," such as a pipeline from Iran-Afghanistan-
Pakistan-India, and another linking Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-
India. Either or both of these pipelines would substantially improve India’s
reliable access to energy supplies, while encouraging better Indo-Pakistani
relations.
In addition, India wants to develop a new power grid that integrates

Central Asian states with those of the subcontinent, an idea that has
received strong backing from the United States of late. While India would
use a new grid to enhance its overall economic profile in Central Asia,
Washington sees the project as a way to counter the growing economic and
political influence of Russia and China in Central Asia.
The importance of India’s Ayni base does not end here. Its appearance
suggests that India’s long-standing strategic ties with Russia remain on a
sound footing. This, of course, could complicate New Delhi’s power-grid
plans, as Moscow is unlikely to be supportive of any project that
diminishes its regional political or economic influence. It is unclear how
far India is willing to push to realize its power grid plan. In the strategic
sphere, India and Russia share a common enemy in Islamic terrorism, and
India needs Russian energy as much as Russia needs Indian diplomatic
support and arms deals. At present, the US government is maintaining a
low-key approach toward India, refraining from applying pressure on New
Delhi to make a decision. Indeed, as President George W. Bush’s visit to
India in April underscored, Washington seems intent on using carrots
rather than sticks to sway New Delhi.
At the same time, it will be interesting to see what Pakistan and China
make of India’s actions. Pakistan is still turning a blind eye to Taliban
organizing in Afghanistan, and China is still selling it much weaponry and
providing significant diplomatic support. Although both India and Pakistan
are observers in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China is
undoubtedly wary of the Indian presence at Ayni. Moreover, Indian policy
intellectuals continue to view China as a strategic rival in Central Asia, as
well as closer to home. Thus, India’s power-projection ambitions are in a
certain sense directed toward China.
Finally, India’s Ayni base helps illustrate one of the ways in which the
regional security agenda is being militarized. The proliferation of foreign
bases in Central Asia, it ought to be stressed, predates 9/11 and the US
strategic move into the region. The presence of so many bases is prompting
a far-ranging reevaluation of the region’s geo-strategic importance.
Not only is Moscow ensconced in numerous bases, either through bilateral

arrangements or via the Collective Security Treaty Organization, China too
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is seeking military facilities, reportedly in Kyrgyzstan, and for sure in

Uzbekistan. India’s base, seen in this context, is merely the latest example
of foreign governments’ thirst for military bases. The base at Ayni tells us
that not only is another major player throwing down a marker in the so
called new Great Game, the game itself is becoming larger, deeper, and
ever more intense.
Medio Eurasianet
Enlace http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav062606a.shtml
Observaciones ---
Disputas territoriales
Título Kyrgyz Border Guards Shoot Uzbek Shepherds

Subtítulo Authorities in Tashkent say Kyrgyz border guards illegally entered
Uzbekistan today and shot and wounded two Uzbek shepherds.
Entradilla ---
Autor RFE/RL
Fecha 30/06/06
publicación
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Títulos
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Entradilla
Cuerpo de texto In comments carried by a pro-government information website, a
spokesperson for the Uzbek State Border Protection Committee said the
incident took place in the Ferghana region.
The spokesperson said the wounds sustained by the two shepherds are not
life-threatening.
Kyrgyz Border Guard Service spokeswoman Salkyn Abdykarieva, in turn,

told RFE/RL's Kyrgyz Service it is the Uzbek shepherds who illegally
crossed the border, triggering the incident.
"There has been an incident between border guards and about 20 Uzbek
citizens who illegally had their herd graze on Kyrgyz territory," she said.
"In response to the demands of the border guards to take hold of their herd
and leave Kyrgyzstan, the trespassers became aggressive and started
throwing stones at the border guards."
Abdykarieva said the border guards shot two of the Uzbek trespassers in
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the leg as they were trying to seize their weapons.
Border incidents are common in Central Asia as state borders are often not
properly delineated.
Medio RFE/RL
Enlace http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/06/CDE473D2-8DD5-4CDB-
A397-7D643191BE77.html
Observaciones ---
Título Azerbaijani hopes for peace dwindle with Karabakh disclosure

Subtítulo ---
Entradilla ---
Autor Shahin Abbasov y Khadija Ismailova
Fecha 13/07/06
publicación
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Títulos
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Entradilla
Cuerpo de texto The sudden disclosure of details from a draft peace agreement on the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has sparked a surge in pro-war sentiments in
Azerbaijan, analysts say, amid a growing conviction that negotiations with
Armenia serve little purpose.
The tone for Azerbaijan’s official reaction was set on June 22 when
President Ilham Aliyev, addressing military school graduates, termed the
so-called "Prague process" of regular talks about the disputed enclave
"ineffective." The remarks followed a statement from the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Minsk Group, the body charged with
mediating negotiations, and a Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty interview
with US Minsk Group co-chair Matthew Bryza that identified an Armenian
troop withdrawal from the seven occupied Azerbaijani territories and a
possible referendum on Karabakh’s status as among the key points of a
proposed framework agreement. The disclosure was reportedly made in an
attempt to prompt public discussion about the plan.
In an early July interview with the Turkish newspaper Jumhirriyet,

however, Aliyev went on to stress that no agreements had ever been
reached between the two sides. "Armenia and Azerbaijan are very far from
agreement. There are some proposals from the Minsk Group co-chairs, but
their last statement disclosed only a few of these proposals."
Bryza’s assertion that an agreement now depends on Aliyev and Armenian

President Robert Kocharian alone has been interpreted as a sign that the
international community itself recognizes that mediation of the talks has
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reached a stalemate.
"The style of the disclosure by the co-chairs. . . clearly demonstrated that

the issue is not resolved at all, and that the co-chairs would be happy to
escape responsibility for any future development such as a resumption of
war," Ilgar Mammadov, an independent political analyst in Baku,
commented. (Ilgar Mammadov serves on the board of the Open Society
Institute Assistance Foundation-Azerbaijan. EurasiaNet operates under the
auspices of the Open Society Institute in New York.)
Mammadov, however, argued that the perceived failure should come as no

surprise. He suggested that the Armenian and Azerbaijani, deep down,
aren’t interested in talking to each other. "In November 2005, Mr.
Kocharian had to survive a critical constitutional referendum, and Mr.
Aliyev had to do the same with his first parliamentary elections. They both
needed Western support at the polls, and, therefore, since January 2005
they pretended that progress was being made at the negotiations," said
Mammadov. "The co-chairs understood their motives, but still accepted the
game in the hope of making use of it. They failed."
The proposed referendum on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, however,

has nonetheless stirred particular concern among both government officials
and the general public. Contrary to Armenia’s interpretation that such a
referendum would be held in Karabakh alone, Azerbaijanis contend that
the vote on the territory’s status must be held nationwide in Azerbaijan
proper as well as in the disputed enclave. The OSCE statement itself does
not specify the conditions under which any referendum would be held.
"Everybody understands that any referendum conducted only in Nagorno-

Karabakh will result in the dismemberment of the country and Azerbaijan
cannot accept that," commented Eldar Namazov, president of the For
Azerbaijan Public Forum, a Baku-based non-governmental organization,
and a former advisor to the late President Heydar Aliyev.
In his interview with Jumhuriyet, Aliyev dismissed as misleading

Armenian discussion of the proposed referendum as a quid pro quo for a
withdrawal from the seven Azerbaijani territories that border on Nagorno-
Karabakh. "Armenia sometimes talks about unreal things. Meanwhile, the
reality is that Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity is not a topic for discussions
and Nagorno-Karabakh will never get independence," he said.
Talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan, "together with all of Azerbaijan,"

about Karabakh’s status, can only begin after Azerbaijani residents return
to the enclave, Aliyev continued. "The future will show how much time is
needed for such negotiations."
Local experts cotend that the co-chairs’ statements on the Karabakh talks
have fanned pro-war sentiment in Azerbaijan. "The popular argument in
Baku is that if a reality created by force is acceptable, then we should
create one favorable to Azerbaijan whenever the opportunity appears,"
Mammadov said.
According to Aliyev, the only way to avoid war over Karabakh is for
Armenia to withdraw from the occupied territories without preconditions.
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"War must not be ruled out. There is a fragile cease-fire regime, no

security measures are provided at the front-line. There are no countries
separating us, no peacekeeping troops. Thus, an ‘unpleasant incident’ can
appear at any time," he told Jumhirriyet.
Azerbaijan’s opposition, its political position considerably diminished after

the November 2005 parliamentary elections, has also expressed readiness
to take up arms for Nagorno-Karabakh. Ali Kerimli, leader of the Popular
Front Party of Azerbaijan (PFPA), one of the country’s largest opposition
parties, has pledged to be at the front line himself if war breaks out. "I will
be at the front and will call on my supporters to take part in the liberation
war," he said. According to Kerimli, in 1997 Azerbaijan’s opposition
parties signed a joint memorandum that they would cooperate with all
political parties if war occurs in Nagorno-Karabakh.
In keeping with that approach, the PFPA, in a rare show of solidarity with
the government, also supports Aliyev’s refusal to compromise on
Karabakh. "The international community will put pressure on the
Azerbaijani leadership, demanding that it accept these principles [in the
draft framework agreement]. But the Azerbaijani opposition, even though
the government always saw us as enemies. . .must support the authorities
to stand up to this pressure," Kerimli told the news site Day.az on July 10.
Meanwhile, a series of mysterious fires in the occupied territories, which

first broke out in early June, has further fueled a sense of building conflict.
Armenian officials have denied that the fires were deliberately set, while
the Azerbaijani foreign ministry has published photos taken from space
that it alleges show entire villages burning.
Some Azerbaijanis, especially in the region of Agdam, close to the

frontline, interpret the blazes as a sign that Armenian troops will soon
withdraw. "They do it because they want us to find only burned villages
when we go back to our homes," commented Alesger Mammadli, a Baku-
based lawyer originally from Agdam region.
Medio Eurasianet
Género period.
Observaciones ---

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Medios de comunicación
Título Kazakhstani government moves to reassert control on mass media

Subtítulo ---
Entradilla ---
Autor Joanna Lillis
Fecha 19/05/06
publicación
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Títulos
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Entradilla
Cuerpo de texto Kazakhstani media outlets are facing pressure from the government, as
officials move to increase control over broadcasters, some of which played
prominent roles in the factional mudslinging that followed opposition
leader Altynbek Sarsenbayev’s murder. Among the clampdown targets is
the media empire associated with President Nursultan Nazerbayev’s
daughter, Dariga.
Information and Culture Minister Yermukhamet Yertysbayev is leading the

government campaign, frequently complaining that mass media outlets are
abusing freedom of speech guarantees. In early May, for example, he
threatened to revoke the broadcasting license of the KTK television
channel. After Sarsenbayev’s murder, "KTK has been exerting
considerable pressure on the leadership of the country," Yertysbayev said
in an interview published by the Epocha newspaper. "Why should a private
TV channel try to rule the country, to make personnel changes?"
"Everything that is broadcast on KTK is a blatant violation of the country’s

constitution, which says that citizens have the right to receive reliable
information," Yertysbayev added.
A statement issued May 11 by the Congress of Kazakhstan’s Journalists

called for Yertysbayev’s resignation. The group accused Yertysbayev of
having an authoritarian style and of trying to restore censorship in
television programming. Yertysbayev responded by accusing the congress
of illegal activity. "I strongly recommend to journalists not to become
pawns in a political game of my opponents," he was quoted as saying by
the Interfax-Kazakhstan news agency.
The first signs that the government would get tough with broadcast outlets
came just weeks after Sarsenbayev’s murder in February. Yertysbayev
announced in March that a new working group would prepare a report for
Nazarbayev on media competitiveness, and within two months it would put
forward proposals to modernize state broadcasting.
Three weeks later, the media overhaul began with the unceremonious
sacking of Kazakhstan state television channel boss Galym Dosken. The
move prompted a walk-out by journalists at the channel, which is 100-per-

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cent state owned. They were enraged by what they said was the minister’s
heavy handedness. Yertysbayev could not see what all the fuss was about.
"A normal staff rotation has taken place," he told journalists on April 21.
"In Kazakhstan only one person has guaranteed work up to December 2012
– that is the country’s president."
However, the staff was not convinced, and over 100 journalists handed in
their resignations. The private KTK channel pointed to political rivalries as
the key to the controversy, questioning whether Dosken’s closeness to
Imangali Tasmagambetov, the powerful mayor of Kazakhstan’s
commercial capital Almaty, was the real catalyst for his removal.
"According to one theory, the reason for Galym Dosken’s firing was his
friendship with the mayor of Almaty. Minister Yertysbayev did not so
much want to change the management as to get rid of a protégé of Imangali
Tasmagambetov," KTK commented. Tasmagambetov – a former prime
minister - is an influential figure tipped as a potential presidential
successor.
In a May 3 appearance in parliament, Yertysbayev, a close political

associate of Nazarbayev’s, claimed a shake up at the Kazakhstan channel
was needed because its staff contained "members of a certain religious
tendency with a most disputable link to Kazakh traditions and classic
Sunni Islam, and still more with the policy of the state." Yertysbayev was
referring to a nationalist religious group known as the "Sufis." Much of late
has been made over this movement in the Kazakh press, which uses the
term loosely to denote a religious group promoting Kazakh values and the
use of the Kazakh language over Russian.
Reports that the "Sufi" movement was prevalent at the Kazakhstan channel
have been in circulation for some time. Observers point to the
predominance of Kazakh-language broadcasting over Russian as an
indication that the channel pursues a nationalist agenda. However, channel
officials say they are simply catering for a national audience, including the
rural Kazakh-speaking areas that other channels do not reach. Yertysbayev
insisted that religious extremism was a problem at the channel. "It is no
secret to anyone that the company’s former management permitted specific
religious tendencies to exert an unreasonably strong influence on the state
channel," he told the Vremya newspaper.
Such statements have prompted former staff at the channel to launch a

lawsuit against Yertysbayev, claiming their right to freedom of worship
has been infringed. They also plan to sue him for libel over comments
made about their professional skills.
In late April, Yertysbayev turned his attention to the powerful Khabar

media group, which was founded 10 years ago by Dariga Nazarbayeva.
What Yertysbayev had in mind was total control, or as he put it in
parliament on May 3; "one hundred-percent state control over the Khabar
joint-stock company."
Yertysbayev invoked geopolitics to justify the move. "As a minister and as

a citizen I am aware of information security matters for Kazakhstan,
located between Russia, China and the Muslim world, and I think the state
should dominate," the Kazakhstan Today news agency quoted him as
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saying.
Days after his announcement, a new chairman of the board was in place -
Maulen Ashimbayev, the deputy head of the presidential administration. It
was clear the minister meant business. The state currently owns 50 per cent
plus one of the Khabar group’s shares. Yertysbayev has pledged to use
legal means to take over the remaining shares, owned by two legal entities
whose identities have not been revealed.
Although Nazarbayeva resigned as chairwoman of the Khabar media group

to stand for parliament in 2004, she stated in an interview with the Karavan
newspaper this April that she still has links with it – and it is this
association that many see as the main motivation for the state takeover
attempt. Accusations that Khabar, which controls a host of media outlets,
has been monopolizing the media market go back several years. While
serving as media minister in 2004, Sarsenbayev, the murdered opposition
leader, was one of those leveling monopolization charges against Khabar,
which ended up successfully suing him for libel.
In the polarized world of Kazakh media, political interest groups have been
accused of using affiliated news outlets to achieve their own ends. Critics
have also suggested that too many media outlets have become concentrated
in the hands of the president’s family. Earlier this year, for example,
Nazarbayeva’s 21-year-old son, Nurali, became head of the Shahar media
group, which controls the youth-oriented Hit TV. The move prompted
speculation that a media dynasty was in the making. Reports have linked
Nazarbayeva’s husband, Deputy Foreign Minister Rakhat Aliyev, to the
Alma-Media group, whose holdings include Kazakhstan’s most widely-
read newspaper, Karavan, and the KTK channel.
While Nazarbayev had the full support of his daughter, the Khabar group’s
grip on the media may have been of no concern to the presidential
administration. Now, however, times seem to be changing. Recent reports
suggest that relations between Nazarbayev and his daughter have cooled
since Sarsenbayev’s killing, with observers suggesting that Dariga’s
perceived role in the media war that followed the murder may have
incurred the wrath of her father.
Under pressure domestically and internationally following Sarsenbayev’s

killing, the government has woken up to the power of the media in shaping
public opinion – and the importance of who controls media outlets.
Stamping the state’s authority on the media has suddenly become a top
priority.
Medio Eurasianet
Enlace http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/eav051906.sht
ml
Fecha consulta 12/07/06 (01:00 h)
Género period.
Observaciones ---

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Título Kazakh President Signs Controversial Media Bill

Subtítulo Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbaev has signed into law a
media bill that critics say tightens government control over the media.
Entradilla ---
Autor AP
Fecha 05/07/06
publicación
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Títulos
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Entradilla
Cuerpo de texto Provisions in the new law tighten registration rules for new media outlets
and, for example, ban editors whose organizations are closed down from
working as editors for three years.
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and other

organizations had called on Nazarbaev to veto the bill, which was
approved by parliament last week.
Medio RFE/RL
Enlace http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/07/4EBC9491-B59F-4381-94C8-
1531E2922B0F.html
Observaciones ---
Título Journalists from Uzbekistan settle in Sweden and even organize

protest actions
Subtítulo ---
Entradilla ---
Autor Aleksei Volosevich
Fecha 19/07/06
publicación
Traducción ---
Títulos
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Entradilla
Cuerpo de texto Sitting at a street cafe, we sip a weak beer (some local brand) and watch
pretty blondes cycling by.
"Sweden is a country of cyclists," Kudrat Babadjanov said.
Babadjanov has been in Sweden since February when he and several other
Uzbek journalists were granted political asylum in this country. The

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nationwide campaign against independent media outlets that followed the

massacre in Andijan resulted in a journalistic exodus from Uzbekistan.
Bureaus of RL/RFE, BBC, and office of IWPR - foreign media outlets
employing a great deal of local correspondents - were closed in
Uzbekistan. Lots of correspondents who had spoken up on what was
happening in the country left Uzbekistan for fear of arrest or reprisals.
"Hirelings like notorious Galima Buharbayeva made their reports from the
den of gunmen," pro-government newspaper Pravda Vostoka wrote in May
2005. "How much longer are we expected to tolerate these provocations?
We have a saying in Uzbekistan "Pichok sujakka tegdi" [The knife cuts to
the very bone - Ferghana.Ru]. This can't be allowed to go on, and this
whole bunch of journalists should be sent to some other country. Let them
look for "war and peace" over there. We should also show on TV channels
photos of the journalists who wouldn't even balk at using the people's woes
and blood to promote their interests..."
It became clear to Uzbek correspondents of IWPR that these were not

empty threats. Tulkin Karayev was arrested on charges of hooliganism and
thrown behind the bars for ten days. He was eventually released and
detained again two days later. The journalist spent five hours in a police
station only to have his papers confiscated from him. Knowing all too well
that another arrest might end in imprisonment for years, Karayev left the
country altogether.
IWPR correspondent and Uznews.net editor Babajanov was told in no

uncertain terms that he should leave the country or stay on and face the
music. Alerted by the reprisals taking place all over Uzbekistan, Babajanov
moved to Kyrgyzstan.
Other Uzbek journalists also escaped and ended up in this Central Asian
country. Granted the status of refugees, they eventually made it to the third
countries - Great Britain, Germany, the Czech Republic, Sweden. Five
Uzbek journalists ended up in Sweden - Matljuba Azamatova, Karayev,
Yusuf Rasulov, Babajanov, and Zokirjon Ibragimov.
Attending a seminar for journalists in Sweden not long ago, this

correspondent met with his Uzbek colleagues.
As it turned out, all of them are quite all right. From the standpoint of an
ordinary citizen of Uzbekistan, Sweden is truly a Promised Land...
Karayev, Rasulov, and Babajanov live in the town of Timro. They have
everything - apartments, money, language-learning facilities, and even an
opportunity to integrate into Swedish society. Rasulov even bought a car.
In short, everything is fine and dandy from this point of view. And yet, the
men remain restless.
"We belong there, in Uzbekistan," Karayev explained.
There is more to life than material well-being. They find life in Sweden
boring. These men find problems of their native country interesting but that
is not something they can discuss with the Swedes, particularly since they
do not speak the Swedish language. They long for communications and the
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feeling that they are doing something worthwhile. Free journalism in

Uzbekistan is something dangerous and thrilling. These men are like deep-
water fish brought to the surface. No pressure, no struggle they are used to
- and life becomes boring...
The men remain journalists even in the comfortable Sweden. They publish
the newspaper Erk [Freedom] in the Russian and Uzbek languages, they
post articles in Internet, and arrange sporadic protest actions. One of these
actions dedicated to the first anniversary of Andijan took place in the town
of Kalmar where this correspondent was attending the seminar at the
moment.
It was Saturday, the day when the Swedes were out in force - shopping,
taking strolls, listening to street musicians. Uzbek journalists stood out
against the background of the atmosphere of gaiety but not too much. It
took them some time at first to choose a place for their placards "Stop the
violence", "Remember victims of Andijan", etc. They eventually settled
not far from the podium where a local store organized a show of dresses.
Pretty models parading on the podium nearby, the journalists unrolled their
posters and took a stand right there and then.
The Swedes were mostly interested in sexy models. Whenever they

glanced at the Uzbeks, it was more with surprise rather than interest. It did
not prevent the Uzbeks from phoning someone from Ozodlik with a report
that the protest action was successfully under way.
"Where is it - Uzbekistan?" someone asked.
"Uzbekistan is a country bordering on Afghanistan," this correspondent

explained.
It took the girl a moment or two to digest the information.
"Oh, I know! Uzbekistan - Ben Laden," she finally said with a smile.
Several young Uzbeks from Andijan were sighted nearby. (They were
from the group of 400 or so fugitives that made it to Kyrgyzstan, were
given asylum there, and thus fomented an Uzbek-Kyrgyz conflict.) They
kept their distance from Karayev, Rasulov, and Babajanov and disappeared
when informed that my colleague and me were going back to Uzbekistan
right after the seminar.
BBC correspondent Azamatova also came to Kalmar and also kept her
distance. Azamatova is fairly skeptical of Erk and its leader Muhammad
Salikh. She lives in Stockholm. She was initially given an apartment in
some small township too but turned up in the capital of Sweden a couple of
months later. Grants from the government enable her and her children to
live without thinking of their daily bread.
Azamatova misses Uzbekistan too but she is more pragmatic. She is

convinced that her children themselves are not going to want to go back
soon enough. They are children, adaptation is easy for them.
Not so adults who find beginning from scratch immeasurably more

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difficult. Particularly since their mentality - so different from Swedish - is

fairly set in the moulds of ingrained values, priorities, and prejudices.
IWPR correspondent Ibragimov turned up when our stay in Sweden was

approaching its end. He was also granted political asylum in Sweden.
Ironically, Ibragimov had attended a similar seminar for journalists in
Kalmar several years ago and decided to come over and see his tutors now.
According to Ibragimov, there are about 30 fugitives from Andijan in
Kalmar. They are quite tight-lipped as a rule.
It may be added that our colleagues and fugitives from Andijan are not the
first Uzbeks who found political asylum in Sweden. Former correspondent
of INTERFAX Abdurashid Sharipov came here more a decade ago. Some
unidentified criminals all but killed him in Tashkent when he wrote a piece
on suppression of student riots in the capital of Uzbekistan in 1992.
The Uzbek authorities might have decided for a change to do without

drastic measures against the journalists who nevertheless left the country.
The regime might have decided just to frighten them sufficiently to
persuade to depart of their own volition. Tashkent got it. There are but two
dozens of Western and independent journalists nowadays in Uzbekistan
(no more), the largest country of Central Asia.
Medio Ferghana.ru News Agency
Enlace http://enews.ferghana.ru/detail.php?id=634653465346.59,1449,4833402
Observaciones ---
Título Web site Tribune-uz.info suspended

Subtítulo ---
Entradilla ---
Autor Ferghana.Ru News Agency
Fecha 05/07/06
publicación
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Títulos
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Entradilla
Cuerpo de texto Web site of the independent Tribune-uz.info posted a statement of its chief
editor and prominent journalist Alo Hodjaev. Hodjaev informed readers of
the independent Internet newspaper that no more issues were to be
expected. "No, I do not know for how long," Hodjaev wrote. "Believe me,
this decision was forced on us, and our reasons are valid indeed. There will
be no comments, so do not bother asking for any please. There will be no
answers. Or, rather, life itself will give the answer."
The first issue of the independent newspaper appeared in December 2003.

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In the course of these last 2.5 years the newspaper featured a great deal of
news, pieces, letters, and other materials from Uzbekistan and other
countries in Russia, Uzbek, and English.
The newspaper concentrated on both information and analysis. "This is

what we perceived as our civil and professional duty of patriots," Hodjaev
wrote.
Uzbek Internet-providers made Tribune-uz.info unavailable in May 2005.

What experts Ferghana.Ru approached for comments are convinced that
disappearance of Tribune-uz.info from the information field deals a hard
blow at the independent media outlets providing uncensored information.
Medio Ferghana.ru
Observaciones Declaración del Editor de Tribune-uz, Alo Khodjaev, en
http://www.tribune-uz.info:
Dear visitors of our website, readers and correspondents!
There are thousands of you, and this demonstrative fact has inspired us a
lot. Our website has been running since December 2003, and over this
period we have published more than 8,000 news, articles, letters and other
materials by authors from Uzbekistan and other countries, in Russian,
Uzbek and English languages.
We are far from highly evaluating our modest activity, but we can say for
sure that our materials have had an objective, truthful, balanced and
constructive character. We followed only one aim – to help readers
understand the uneasy peculiarities of the internal and foreign policies of
our state.
This is why, apart from news, we paid a lot of attention to critical analyses
and recommendations, because this is what we consider a civic and
professional duty of journalists and real patriots.
Unfortunately, the authorities look at the activity and purpose of mass
media in a different way. It is not incidental that our website has been fully
blocked since May 2005, limiting the rights of our citizens to freely access
information allowed by the laws of Uzbekistan.
Our website has been the only such publication that has regularly
published translations into Russian of the most important articles from the
Uzbek press, which express today’s official ideology of our state. There is
a lot to be sorry about.
Starting from today, our website is suspending its activities. I have no idea
yet as to how long this will last. Believe me, there are serious grounds for
such decision. There will be no additional comments to this decision, and I
ask you not to ask any questions. There will be no answers. Time will
bring answers.
Respectfully and thankfully,

Alo Khodjaev
04.07.2006 07:53

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Religión
Título UZBEKISTAN: Another Protestant faces criminal charges

Subtítulo ---
Entradilla In Muinak in Karakalpakstan region – where all Protestant activity is
banned – local Protestant Lepes Omarov faces up to three years’
imprisonment on criminal charges for “breaking the law on religious
organisations”. The duty officer at the police station told Forum 18 News
Service that Omarov was released by the police after several hours’
detention in late June after signing “an undertaking not to leave the
country”. Forum 18 has also learnt that Pentecostal pastor Dmitry
Shestakov from Andijan has fled Uzbekistan to escape criminal charges
also lodged in June in retaliation for his church work. In Kuvasai in
Fergana region, the NSS secret police have questioned the 11-year-old son
of the Vitkovsky couple in whose home a Baptist church meets. The
Church’s services have repeatedly been raided in recent months and a
judge threatened Viktor Vitkovsky with imprisonment on 27 June. He and
his wife were due in court on 3 July.
Autor Igor Rotar, Forum 18 News Service
Fecha 03/07/06
publicación
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Cuerpo de texto Criminal charges were launched against a second Protestant in Uzbekistan
in late June in punishment for religious activity, Forum 18 News Service
has learnt. Lepes Omarov - who is from the town of Muinak in the north-
western region of Karakalpakstan – faces charges under Article 216-2 of
the criminal code, which punishes “breaking the law on religious
organisations” with up to three years’ imprisonment. A Protestant source
told Forum 18 from Tashkent on 29 June that Omarov’s only “crime” is
that he failed to conceal his religious convictions and spoke to his fellow-
believers about religious matters. Meanwhile, Protestant sources told
Forum 18 on 30 June that Dmitry Shestakov, a Protestant pastor from
Andijan [Andijon] in eastern Uzbekistan against whom criminal charges
were lodged earlier in June in retaliation for his church work, has had to
flee the country to evade prosecution.
Omarov was detained in his home in Muinak and taken for questioning to
the local police station, Protestant sources told Forum 18. During a search
of his home, Christian literature that had been legally imported into
Uzbekistan was seized.
Murad, the duty officer at Muinak’s police department who refused to give
his full name, confirmed to Forum 18 on 30 June that a criminal case had
been brought against Omarov under article 216-2. However, Murad
maintained that Omarov had been released by the police after several hours
after signing “an undertaking not to leave the country”.

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Omarov and other Protestants in Muinak have long faced pressure from the
authorities. A former school sports teacher, Omarov was dismissed in July
2003 because of his religious affiliation after rejecting pressure by a local
ideology official for him to renounce his beliefs as a Protestant.
Of all the regions in Uzbekistan, Karakalpakstan is where Protestants face

the most problems. Not one Protestant church is registered in the region
(which means – under Uzbekistan’s harsh restrictions on religion – that all
their activity is therefore illegal) and Protestants in the region are subjected
to systematic persecution from the authorities.
Moreover, Muinak, with its population of 5,000, presents more difficulties

for its inhabitants, including Christians, than anywhere else in
Karakalpakstan. A former seaport, the town is now 100 kilometres (60
miles) from the Aral Sea following an ecological disaster. Unemployment
has reached 80 per cent, and the standard of living here is lower than
almost anywhere in Central Asia. Some believe this may account for the
relatively strong Protestant community in the town, which has several
dozen members.
Persecution of local Christians by the authorities is particularly acute, even

by Uzbek standards. For example, in January 2003 police burst into a
private home, where two local Christians were reading the Bible. The
Protestants were taken to the police station and subjected to torture – for
example the police put gas masks on them and cut off their air supply – in
a bid to force them to admit that they had been preaching to each other.
Local Protestant students in the regional capital Nukus have long been
singled out for pressure.
However, it seems likely that the persecution of Omarov is not simply an

initiative on the part of the local authorities, but represents deliberate state
policy. Recently the Uzbek authorities have hardened their policy towards
unregistered religious minority communities across the country, despite an
absolute denial of this to Forum 18 from the head of the government’s
Religious Affairs Committee, Shoazim Minovarov.
Pastor Shestakov, who led the officially-register Full Gospel Pentecostal

Church in Andijan, faces between ten and twenty years in prison if found
guilty of treason charges apparently lodged against him by the Andijan
regional Prosecutor’s Office, though the final charges prosecutors lodged
remain unclear. After the charges were lodged, Shestakov went into hiding
to evade arrest.
Baptists from an unregistered Council of Churches congregation in the

town of Kuvasai in Fergana [Farghona] region close to the border with
Kyrgyzstan reported on 1 July that during June the authorities “again
repeatedly came to services” without presenting any documentation. “They
conducted videofilming of services, wrote down the names of all those
present and threatened to close down the church,” local Baptists
complained to Forum 18. Lyubov Vitkovskaya, in whose home the church
meets, was several times summoned to a judge and to an investigator.

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On 13 June her 11-year-old son was taken with her husband Viktor
Vitkovsky to an interrogation by officers of the National Security Service
(NSS) secret police. Also present were police officers and the director of
the son’s school. The son was forced to write a statement about the internal
life of the church, including who led church meetings and where any
guests came from. On 27 June Vitkovsky – who attends church meetings
but is not a church member - was stopped on the way home from work and
told he could come to the town court to collect back Christian literature
confiscated earlier. However, at the court he was subjected to a 90-minute
interrogation by the judge, who threatened that he could face criminal
charges and be imprisoned.
The Vitkovskys were summoned to appear at court on 28 June but, as local

Baptists told Forum 18, a group of church members accompanied them at
the appointed time to the court, only to be told that the hearing had been
postponed until 3 July.
The church has been facing mounting pressure in recent months. It was
raided during church services in April and May, and Vitkovskaya was
fined in May.
About a dozen Protestant congregations are reported to have been stripped

of registration across Uzbekistan this year, while pressure is also mounting
on Jehovah’s Witnesses and Muslims.
Penalties under the Criminal and Administrative Codes were introduced in

June for publishing, distributing or importing “illegal” religious literature
of any sort, adding to already tight censorship of religious literature.
All the evidence is that the authorities have launched a multi-faceted war
against religious minorities and are trying to prevent potential missionary
activity from foreigners. The rector of the National University of
Uzbekistan, Ravshan Ashurov, issued an order prohibiting teachers of the
University from attending any events organised by foreign organisations,
embassies or their representatives without the written permission of the
rector or foreign department of the University.
Foreign non-governmental organisations with a religious affiliation or

which the authorities suspect of having a religious affiliation have been
closed down or subjected to close scrutiny. Jehovah’s Witness and
Protestant foreigners have also been expelled from Uzbekistan as part of
the crackdown.
Medio Forum 18
Enlace http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=807
Observaciones ---

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Derechos Humanos
Título UN agency appeals to Kazakhstan not to deport arrested Uzbek

refugee
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Autor UN News Centre
Fecha 30/06/06
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Cuerpo de texto Expressing concern about an Uzbek refugee arrested by Kazakh security
agents last week in the capital Almaty, allegedly at the request of
Uzbekistan, the United Nations refugee agency today appealed to the
Government not to deport him but to allow the agency access and provide
further information.
The Uzbek refugee, who has been living in Kazakhstan for seven years
with his family, has been in prison since his arrest on 24 June; during this
time, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has not had
access to him despite repeated requests over the past six days.
“The refugee has managed to call his wife, who said he reported that
Uzbekistan had allegedly asked for his arrest. Kazakhstan would decide
about his deportation within 10 days, he told his wife,” UNHCR
spokesman Ron Redmond told a news briefing in Geneva.
“UNHCR strongly encourages Kazakhstan to continue to adhere to

international protection principles and we appeal to the Government not to
deport this refugee and to allow us immediate access to him.”
Mr. Redmond said that the UNHCR office in Kazakhstan had been told by
the authorities that it must wait until an internal investigation on the case is
completed.
The Uzbek refugee arrived in Kazakhstan in 1999 fearing persecution

because of his practice of Islam outside of the Uzbek State-run mosques.
He obtained a Kazakh residence permit in 2003 and first came to UNHCR
in 2005 to ask for refugee status following a visit to his house by Kazakh
security agents. He reported that all of his family’s identity documents had
been confiscated.
“After a thorough status determination procedure, UNHCR recognised the

Uzbek as a refugee in June 2006. This procedure included a confirmation
from Kazakh authorities that no criminal charges or cases had been filed
against him,” said Mr. Redmond.

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Kazakhstan is a signatory to the 1951 Convention on refugees and has

always been committed to its international obligations. In July 2005,
Kazakhstan arrested an Uzbek human rights activist upon the request of
Uzbekistan, but released him and put him into the care of UNHCR. This
decision came at a time when neighbouring countries had been coming
under strong pressure from Uzbekistan to return Uzbek asylum seekers and
refugees.
Hundreds of Uzbeks fled their country last year, mostly to Kyrgyzstan,

after security forces in the eastern city of Andijan opened fire on
demonstrators. Most of the 500 or so who fled to Kyrgyzstan were
evacuated out by UNHCR in July after being accepted for urgent
resettlement elsewhere.
The Uzbek Government claimed fewer than 200 people were killed in the
unrest in Andijan last May. However, more than 450 of the Uzbek refugees
subsequently provided testimony to the UN Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) regarding the events of 13
May 2005 and an OHCHR report in July concluded that based on
consistent, credible testimony, military and security forces committed
grave human rights violations that day.
Medio UN News Centre
Enlace http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=19059&Cr=&Cr1=
Observaciones ---
Título Twelve fugitives returned to their native Andijan. Eager to go home

too, others fugitives appeal to President Islam Karimov
Subtítulo ---
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Autor Galima Buharbayeva (Germany, Ferghana.Ru News Agency)
Fecha 19/07/06
publicación
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Cuerpo de texto They barely escaped with their lives a year ago, fleeing the regular army in
Andijan. They begged the authorities of Kyrgyzstan and the UN not to
send them back to Uzbekistan where torture and prosecution were waiting
for them. They were given asylum in foreign countries and a chance to
begin a new life.
Andijan fugitives want to go home now. They are as desperate as they

were fleeing the massacre on May 13, 2005.
The twelve who returned to Uzbekistan last Thursday lived in Arizona,

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US. According to one of the fugitives who remained in Arizona, their

return was arranged with the help from the Embassy of Uzbekistan in
Washington.
The Embassy confirms that twelve fugitives returned home but declines
comment.
Bahtijer Ibragimov, advisor to the Uzbek ambassador, only said that

"embassies and consulates of the Republic of Uzbekistan must help all
fellow countrymen who found themselves abroad and seek help and
support."
No information is available at this point on how the fugitives were received

in Uzbekistan or if they met with their families yet.
The so called Arizona Group may be the first but not the last group of
fugitives from Andijan bent on going home.
All fugitives currently residing in Germany appealed to President Islam

Karimov via BBC, RL/RFE, and VOA a fortnight ago.
Pleading innocent and claiming they had dreamed of going home ever
since the first day of their exile, authors of the appeal pledged their
readiness to return to Uzbekistan and continue working for the sake and in
the name of their native country.
Nurillo Mahmudov, 60, is one of the fugitives in Germany. He is the father

of Nasibillo Maksudov, one of the 23 businessmen in Andijan whose trial
sparked the uprising. According to Mahmudov, his son had been arrested
in Kazakhstan, turned over to the Uzbek authorities, and jailed.
Asked why the fugitives would want to go home again, Mahmudov replied
that very many had families in Andijan.
Jadgoroi Yuldasheva, the wife of Akrom Yuldashev accused of

organization of Akromija, was granted asylum in the United States.
Yuldasheva says she likes America but wants to go to Uzbekistan where
she has the husband and two daughters.
Yuldashev himself has been in prison for over six years now. She has not
seen him for two years and does not even know if he is alive. "Children
and their safety are any mother's first thought and instinct," Yuldasheva
said blaming herself. "We were in a such a state of shock that day,
however, that we forgot all about children."
Emigration is a deliberate and conscious choice for many people who leave
their native countries with families in tow. With fugitives from Andijan,
however, it is different. These people merely went outdoors one fine day -
and ended up so far from home.
"And you still have faith in Karimov and his clemency?" - "We'd like to."
"We hope he will not have us prosecuted or anything," Mahmudov said.

"That's where we belong - over there, with our children."
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In the meantime, the fugitives say that they are not yet back to normal after
what they were through on May 13.
Robert Templer, Director of ICG Asian Programs, said he understood the

fugitives' feelings but harbored doubts concerning wisdom of their decision
to go home.
According to Templer, the office of the UN Supreme Commissar for

Refugees and offices of other international organizations were closed in
Uzbekistan. It follows that the UN and the international community cannot
keep an eye on the ex-fugitives now or on how the authorities treat them.
"Nobody will be able to help them," Templer said.
Templer is convinced that not even the return of some fugitives will benefit
the Uzbek authorities who probably expect to use it for the purposes of
propaganda. "That several people chose to go back does not change
anything," Templer shrugged. "It does not change what happened in
Andijan in May 2005 or the attitude of the international community to the
massacre."
Sociologist Bahodyr Musayev from Tashkent was stunned to hear of the

fugitives' appeal to Karimov. He is convinced that making appeals to the
very man who ordered the demonstration mowed down in the first place is
a height of absurdity.
The fugitives' return to Uzbekistan left everyone speechless in Geneva

where the UN High Commissariat for Refugees is quartered. Its official
Andrej Mahecic claims the UN was not consulted.
"Had they come to us, we'd have given them an account of the actual state
of affairs in Uzbekistan and our best estimate of how safe going there
again would be," Mahecic said.
The UN High Commissariat for Refugees is still trying to extricate four

fugitives from the detention cell in the Osh region of Kazakhstan. Several
more fugitives are in Romania, awaiting asylum in the third countries.
All in all, the UN High Commissariat for Refugees has already found new
homes for 434 fugitives out of 439 that made it from Uzbekistan to
Romania.
Now that a wholly new life is offered them, these people are asking for the
leave to go home to Uzbekistan. It only proves that they are not terrorists at
all - and that the government that ordered the demonstration dispersed was
firing at its on people. It also proves that the tragedy of Andijan is not over
yet.
Medio Ferghana.ru
Observaciones ---

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Título Turkmenistan: French media watchdog protests detentions

Subtítulo ---
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Autor RFE/RL
Fecha 08/07/06
publicación
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Cuerpo de texto The media watchdog Reporters Without Borders (RSF) held a
demonstration July 7 in Paris at the Turkmen Embassy to press for the
release of two human rights activists and a RFE/RL journalist who are
being held in custody in Ashgabat.
The protest began in the morning with the participation of about 50

activists and RSF members.
They chanted: "Freedom for Turkmenistan! Freedom for Turkmenistan!

Freedom for Turkmenistan!"
"We were supposed to meet the first secretary of the Turkmen

Embassy...unfortunately he is not here -- he hasn’t come or he is hiding
behind his curtains so we cannot talk with him."
Human Rights Demononstration
Some held posters with the photos of detained rights activists Annakurban
Amanklychev and Sapardurdy Khajiev, as well as RFE/RL Turkmen
Service correspondent Ogulsapar Muradova.
Others had banners protesting the violations of freedom of expression in

Turkmenistan.
The country is described by media watchdog groups and human rights

organizations as one of the worst in the world in terms of respect for
human rights and press freedom.
One banner read: "You don’t often hear about Turkmenistan because those
who would like to talk about it are in prison."
Detainees Still Not Charged
Amanklychev, of the Bulgarian-based Turkmen Helsinki Foundation

(THF); RFE/RL’s Turkmen Service correspondent Muradova; and Khajiev
-- the brother-in-law of THF Chairwoman Tajigul Begmedova -- were
arrested between June 16 and June 19.
Officially, no charges have been brought against them. But authorities

claim the THF is part of a conspiracy to destabilize the country.

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Several rights groups have expressed fear that they could be at risk of
being physically abused in their Ashgabat prison cells.
Several other human rights organizations and media groups have also
called on Turkmen authorities to release the three people.
The Amnesty International representative for Europe, Thamar Bourand,

attended today’s protest and told RFE/RL that Turkmen authorities have so
far not reacted.
"We expect all the people who have been arrested to be released; it’s
highly probable that they have been tortured, they must be freed
immediately," she said. "We haven’t received any response to our demands
but I think the mobilization of public opinion is the only defense and attack
possible against this terrible regime of [Turkmen President Saparmurat]
Niyazov."
Turkmen Officials Don’t Show
RSF Secretary-General Robert Menard also told RFE/RL that his group is
seriously concerned about the detained rights activists and RFE/RL
correspondent.
He said Turkmen Embassy officials did not show up at a scheduled

meeting July 7.
"We were supposed to meet the first secretary of the Turkmen Embassy in
Paris," Menard said. "He had confirmed this meeting -- unfortunately he is
not here -- he hasn’t come or he is hiding behind his curtains so we cannot
talk with him."
Menard added that RSF will continue to press for the release of
Amanklychev, Muradova, and Khajiev.
Call for International Support
"We are going to increase the pressure; this demonstration is a first step,
there will be more," he said. "French authorities are ready to mobilize
themselves, we are going to grasp the international community, we are not
going to stay [inactive], it’s too dangerous. We know that there are cases of
maltreatment; we know that there is torture. So we have to mobilize
ourselves and we will continue doing it."
RSF says the international community must "react urgently to protect

freedom of expression in Turkmenistan." RSF has called upon the leaders
of the Group of Eight most-industrialized nations -- who will be meeting in
Russia next week, to help secure the release of the detainees.
On July 4, the World Association of Newspapers sent a letter to Turkmen

President Niyazov calling for the release of Muradova and the detained
human rights activists, and for all charges against them to be dropped.
Medio Eurasianet

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Enlace http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/pp070806.shtm
l
Fecha consulta 08/07/06 (21 h.)
Género period.
Observaciones ---
Cultura
Título Central Asia: Silk Road revival grows as more sites protected
Subtítulo ---
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Autor Richard Solash (RFE/RL)
Fecha 09/07/06
publicación
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Cuerpo de texto If we could somehow blow away the centuries-deep sand that today covers
the ancient tracks of the Silk Road, we would see amazing things. We
would see caravans of up to 6,000 camels moving slowly, day by day,
across the vast distances separating China and Europe. Each kilometers-
long caravan carries as much as a large merchant sailing ship of its time
and along the routes, great cities of trade and learning flourish. Today, this
ancient world is gone but its historical importance is increasingly
recognized. And now, new international efforts are under way to protect
the legacy of the Silk Road, from Turkmenistan to Kyrgyzstan.
In Turkmenistan, the archeological treasures of Merv, a city by some

estimates believed to be the world’s most populous in the mid-12th
century, are safe.
So, too, is the Islamic architecture of Bukhara and Samarkand in

Uzbekistan.
These are some of the riches of the Silk Road that are already protected by
their inclusion in UNESCO’s World Heritage List -- a grouping of
hundreds of sites that are officially recognized for their cultural
importance.
Saving History from Extinction
But for each Silk Road site on the list, there are others that are
conspicuously absent.

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"There are also a number of sites which were not yet ready to go onto the
World Heritage List because of their [poor] state of conservation, says
UNESCO World Heritage Center representative Francis Childe. "Cities,
for example, like Otrar, an extraordinary archeological site in south
Kazakhstan; Krasnaya Rechka in Kyrgyzstan in the Chui Valley. These
sites were very badly neglected in Soviet times."
Childe and his colleagues have been working for nearly a decade on these
and other sites to save them from decay and bring them up to the physical
condition necessary for nomination to the World Heritage List.
The efforts are supported by funding from Norway, Italy, Switzerland, and
especially Japan, which has contributed several million dollars to
conservation projects in Central Asia. Additionally, Turkey has sponsored
a number of projects, contributing funds directly to the region’s
governments.
In the future, Childe hopes to also receive monetary support from the
wealthy Persian Gulf states, which he would like to channel to places like
Afghanistan, where the need is particularly acute.
"A part of what we have been doing is to conserve these sites which were
excavated in late Soviet times, were then opened to the elements, [and
were] in danger of disappearing completely and totally from the face of the
earth within the next 10 or 15 years [due to decay]," Childe says.
International Expertise
Often, the actual work of physically restoring damaged buildings is as

international as the sources of funding. Conservation experts from Europe
and the United States are brought in to work with local specialists and
craftsmen, teaching them the skills necessary to preserve and restore the
sites.
As a result, cities such as Otrar may soon be receiving the World Heritage
List status that they deserve.
Childe says that UNESCO representatives and regional officials will meet
in Samarkand from October 9 to 14 to prepare the official nomination of
many new sites.
"The member states themselves -- the Tajiks, the Kazakhs, the Kyrgyz, and
so on -- will come to an agreement on which sites they wish to identify
from their country, see what needs to be done in terms of their
conservation and their nomination, in order that we might present a kind of
a global Silk Road nomination for all of the Silk Road sites or at least for a
series of Silk Road sites from Central Asia, perhaps some time as early as
2008," Childe says.
Rediscovering Historical Identities
But aside from their architectural and archeological value, the Silk Road
sites also represent a chance for the people of Central Asia to rediscover
their identities.
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This, Childe says, proves that preservation of the Silk Road does not only
mean respecting the past, but also means looking toward the future of
Central Asia.
"In Central Asia in Soviet times, the ethic groupings, if you will, of most of
the Central Asian states basically lost their historical identity," he notes.
"They were as much as told, "you weren’t developed until the USSR was
formed, you were nomads, you had no archeological sites, you had no
history," and so on -- which simply wasn’t true.
"So in part, the restoration and conservation of these great archeological

sites is a way to give back the Kazakhs their own history, to give back the
Kyrgyz their own history, to give back the Tajiks their own history and
their own cultural identity," Childe says.
Economic Benefits
The Silk Road countries could also derive substantial economic benefits
from the rediscovery of their cultural legacies. Inclusion on the World
Heritage List is likely to translate into a sizeable boost in tourism.
According to Childe, the city of Otrar had approximately 8,000 or 9,000

visitors per year before his team began work on the site. Today, he
estimates that figure to have risen to 100,000 visitors per year -- a number
which should only increase if Otrar gains list status.
And the Silk Road, which for so long provided a stage for intercultural
exchange, may be able to re-adopt this function as well.
"These [sites] can eventually become motors for local economic

development, but also [can act as] an exchange of experience between
peoples," Childe says.
"The Central Asian ex-Soviet republics remained completely isolated and

cut off for more than a hundred years, and now that they’re opening up
again, they’re as interested to see people coming from America and from
Japan and from Australia as the people in those countries are to go and
actually visit them," he adds. "So there’s an economic potential there, but
there’s also a real potential for genuine human understanding and
interchange."
Childe’s UNESCO team is presently working on some 12 sites across

Central Asia and in China, with a budget of some $7 million.
Medio Eurasianet
l
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Medio ambiente
Título Kazakhstan: environmentalists say China misusing cross-border

rivers
Subtítulo ---
Entradilla ---
Autor Gulnoza Saidazimova (RFE/RL)
Fecha 16/07/06
publicación
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Entradilla
Cuerpo de texto Environmentalists in Central Asia and Russia are concerned about China’s
use of water from the Ili and Irtysh rivers. Both rivers originate in China
and flow into Kazakhstan, while the Irtysh continues on into Russia. China
has been using more and more of the water as the population grows in
China’s western provinces. Officials in Beijing say they plan to divert
more water from both rivers to develop the oil industry in western China.
The plan seems to be fueling tension between the two countries.
Environmentalists warn that China’s overuse of the river water may lead to
an ecological catastrophe for Kazakhstan.
Kazakh environmentalists say the country’s environmental safety and

water security are at risk.
The problem lies in China’s use of two rivers -- the Ili and the Irtysh --
both of which begin in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
(XUAR), which borders Kazakhstan.
More People, More Water
In an effort to fight separatism by the Uyghurs, who are Turkic-speaking

Muslims, Beijing announced a "Go West" policy in 2000 that has led to
many hundreds of thousands of Han Chinese being resettled in the XUAR,
vastly increasing the population in the province.
Meanwhile, Beijing is exploring for oil fields in the country’s west as

fields in China’s northeast are producing less oil and extraction is
becoming more expensive.
Amid China’s thirst for oil, the oil fields in Xinjiang are virtually
untouched. The Turpan field, one of three large fields, is estimated to have
10 billion tons of oil. But the fields are deep in the desert and development
will require people and equipment, the kind of development that requires
water.
Mels Eleusizov, the head of Kazakhstan’s Tabighat (Nature) movement

and a former presidential candidate, tells RFE/RL that China’s use of the

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Ili and Irtysh rivers raises concerns.
"Those lands are semideserts like [those in] Kazakhstan," he said. "They
demand lots of water. [China] is developing irrigation [and] industry there.
The population has been rising. Respectively, more water will be extracted
from the two rivers that begin in China -- the Ili and the Irtysh. The
decrease of water is a serious problem [for Kazakhstan]."
Lake Balkhash
The Irtysh River rises in China’s Altay Mountains, where it is called the
Black Irtysh, before crossing into Kazakhstan. It then flows into Lake
Zaisan and to the Russian city of Omsk, eventually joining the Ob River.
The Ili River rises in Xinjiang and also flows into Kazakhstan, terminating
in Lake Balkhash. It is one of Balkhash’s three main sources that provide
80 percent of the lake’s water.
Balkhash is the 16th largest inland lake in the world and the second largest
in Central Asia. A great source of fish, Lake Balkhash also provides water
for irrigation and government infrastructure, including hydropower,
supplying electricity for towns in southern Kazakhstan.
Its water level, however, has declined since the 1960s due to increased
usage.
Another Aral Sea?
Eleusizov says that because of China’s overuse of the two rivers, Lake
Balkhash may have a fate similar to that of the Aral Sea -- which has been
turned into a deadly desert and caused an ecological catastrophe.
Yet Beijing still intends to divert waters from the Ili and Irtysh.
One project is the Black Irtysh-Karamai canal in the XUAR. The 22-meter
wide, 300-kilometer long canal is to carry water from the upper Irtysh
River to an oil-rich region close to the Uyghur town of Urumqi.
Eleusizov says the diversion of that water will have tragic implications for
the environment.
"Even if China will take only 15 percent of the water from the two rivers,
there will be a new ’Aral’ -- Lake Balkhash," Eleusizov said. "Then there
will be more harm. There will be ecological refugees. We’ll have a lifeless
desert here. A great catastrophe is ahead of us. It will be worse than Aral."
Russian environmentalists share Kazakh experts’ concerns.
Aleksei Yablokov is the president of the Center for Ecological Policy of

Russia and also a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He tells
RFE/RL from Moscow that China’s overuse of water from the Irtysh has
already affected some Russian regions.

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Russia Impacted as Well
"Russian environmentalists and authorities have long been monitoring the

situation around Irtysh with growing alarm," Yablokov said. "China has
intensively increased use of the Black Irtysh for irrigation. Now, the
amount of water flowing [into Russia] seems to be half as much as [it used
to be]. It has effected not only Kazakhstan, but also Russia."
Among the negative impacts is the Ob River becoming nonnavigable in the

Siberian city of Omsk.
Officials in Beijing, however, say that they consider all of the

environmental implications of water projects on the Ili and the Irtysh
rivers.
Earlier this year, the Chinese government announced the first-ever

moratorium on fishing in the Ili River. China’s Xinhua news agency
reported on May 18 that 20 tons of fish were put in the Ili. The report also
said that the XUAR administration has increased forest protection in order
to prevent soil erosion along the two rivers.
Eleusizov and Yablokov, however, say that their concerns have fallen on
deaf ears as China as well as officials in Kazakhstan and Russia have been
reluctant to discuss the problem.
Murat Auezov, a former Kazakh ambassador to China, tells RFE/RL that

he has little hope that officials in Beijing will change the country’s water
policies.
"The subject is very serious," Auezov said. "It is not the first year that we
have discussed it. [It can’t be solved swiftly] because such a grandiose
phenomenon as China is involved."
Environmentalists also say that the international community should put

pressure on Beijing. Eleusizov and Yablokov add, however, that that won’t
be easy as China is not a participatory to the 1992 United Nations
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
International Lakes. Kazakhstan and Russia ratified it in 2001 and 1993,
respectively.
Medio Eurasianet
l
Género period.
Observaciones ---

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Energía
Título Turkmenistan: the Achilles’ heel of European energy security

Subtítulo ---
Entradilla ---
Autor Daniel Kimmage (RFE/RL)
Fecha 04/07/06
publicación
Traducción ---
Títulos
Traducción ---
Entradilla
Cuerpo de texto In the wake of the "gas war" between Russia and Ukraine in early 2006,
and the brief interruption it caused in supplies to Europe, the world awoke
to the increasing importance of Central Asian natural gas for European
energy security. After all, the bulk of the natural gas that Ukraine imports
through Russia comes from Turkmenistan.
Now, with international ratings agency Fitch warning that the elements are
in place for a "perfect storm" of an energy crisis, news comes on June 30
that talks between Turkmenistan and Ukraine over an independent
agreement for gas supplies in the fourth quarter of 2006 have bumped up
against the issue of transit through Russia. The previous day, Turkmenistan
and Russia’s state-controlled Gazprom broke off talks on late-2006
shipments to Russia amid Turkmen threats to cut off supplies in
September. Is the storm fast approaching?
Ukrainian Fuel and Energy Minister Ivan Plachkov arrived in Ashgabat on

June 29, as Turkmenistan and Gazprom both reported that negotiations
between Gazprom Chairman Aleksei Miller and Turkmen President
Saparmurat Niyazov were "broken off." Gazprom’s press release stated
that the breakdown occurred after the sides "failed to reach an agreement"
over Turkmenistan’s insistence that Gazprom pay $100 per 1,000 cubic
meters for 2007 shipments and additional 2006 shipments. Until now,
Gazprom has paid $65 per 1,000 cubic meters of Turkmen gas.
Turkmenistan’s official TDH news agency reported that Turkmenistan will
finish deliveries of a previously contracted 30 billion cubic meters (bcm) at
$65 per 1,000 cubic meters by September. After that, Turkmenistan
threatened, it will halt shipments to Russia.
Feeling the Effects in Kyiv
The Gazprom-Turkmenistan price tiff had direct implications for Ukraine,

which consumes 76 bcm of gas a year but produces only 20 bcm. It
imports the remainder, with 41 bcm in Turkmen imports planned for 2006.
The January compromise that ended the Russian-Ukrainian gas showdown
set up a complex scheme for Ukrainian imports. Ukraine buys gas at $95
per 1,000 cubic meters from Rosukrenergo, a Swiss-registered trading
company owned half by Gazprom and half by two Ukrainian businessmen.
Rosukrenergo buys gas from Gazprom, which sells the trader a mixture of

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Russian gas at over $200 per 1,000 cubic meters and much cheaper Central
Asian gas (primarily Turkmen, with lesser quantities from Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan).
For Ukraine, the upside of the January compromise was the final price of
$95 per 1,000 cubic meters, lower than prices elsewhere in the former
Soviet Union (outside Russia and Belarus) and far lower than the EU
average price of $240 per 1,000 cubic meters. And price matters -- analysts
forecast a grim fate for Ukraine’s energy-intensive chemical industry if the
price of gas edges above $100, and tough times for the metal industry if it
goes higher. Which brings us to two significant downsides of the January
compromise: 1) its reliance on cheap Central Asian gas, and 2) its
susceptibility to renegotiation after six months.
Both downsides were soon evident. In May, Kazakhstan, which is slated to

ship 8 bcm to Russia in 2006, garnered a price hike from $50 to $140 per
1,000 cubic meters, "Vedomosti" reported on June 22. On May 22,
Gazprom Deputy Chairman Aleksandr Ryazanov announced that the rising
price of Central Asian gas could increase Ukraine’s purchase price to $130,
according to the Economist Intelligence Unit. On June 20, Turkmenistan’s
Foreign Ministry announced that it planned to raise the price of gas for
Gazprom in the second half of 2006 from $65 to $100 per 1,000 cubic
meters. Ryazanov told a press conference the same day that he envisaged
Ukraine paying $150-$160 per 1,000 cubic meters by the end of the year.
Tricky Spot
In the Ukrainian-Turkmen talks on June 30, the Turkmen side noted that it
will complete deliveries of the 30 bcm it has contracted to Russia by
September. Then it offered Ukraine an independent deal for the fourth
quarter of 2006 at $100 per 1,000 cubic meters, turkmenistan.ru reported.
But the offer came with a catch beyond the expected price hike: Ukraine
must arrange transit for the gas -- presumably in the quantity of
approximately 10 bcm -- through Russia on its own. The Ukrainian side
will now return to Kyiv for consultations, and negotiations with Ashgabat
will be continued later, turkmenistan.ru reported.
The failed talks between Gazprom and Turkmenistan on June 29,

inconclusive negotiations between Ashgabat and Kyiv on June 30, current
lack of an agreement to ensure Ukraine’s supplies through the end of the
year, and the Turkmen threat to cut off shipments in September if its rising
price demands are not met are, in the best light, tough bargaining in the
extreme; in the worst, they represent a step toward a new gas crisis. For
now, the episode lays bare the shifting sands on which Ukraine’s gas
supply rests.
Those shifting sands led Jeffrey Woodruff, director of the energy group at
ratings agency Fitch, to warn on June 27 that the problems besetting the
Turkmenistan-Ukraine gas nexus had "the makings of a perfect storm,"
Reuters reported. The specific elements Woodruff had in mind were
Turkmenistan’s threat to raise prices and the knock-on effect for Ukraine,
Russian allegations that Ukraine was failing to refill underground storage
tanks at sufficient rates, and rumblings in Ukraine of the need to
renegotiate the knotted deal with Rusukrenergo. Woodruff stressed that
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"any of the events in isolation could be enough to spark new supply

interruptions in Europe, but all of them colluding near the beginning of the
G8 summit on energy security seems unbelievable."
The root of Europe’s vulnerability is that Ukraine remains the conduit for
80 percent of the gas shipments the continent receives from Russia. And as
the events of January demonstrated, if Ukraine experiences a shortfall,
Europe does, too.
Systemic Problem
The underlying problem is the fragility of the entire framework for keeping
Ukraine supplied with Turkmen gas, the essential component shielding
Ukraine’s economy from a potentially lethal price hike. What’s worse, the
fragility has multiple causes. For starters, Ukraine’s economy is ill suited
to withstand higher gas prices even as those prices are rising. And
Ukrainian oil and gas company Naftohaz Ukrayiny is financially strapped,
with a $60 million debt to Turkmenistan for 2003-05 shipments and,
according to Gazprom, arrears of $370 million for 2006 shipments as of
June 15 (although Gazprom Deputy Chairman Ryazanov said that he
expected Ukraine to pay that debt down to $100 million by July 1, and
Ukraine has apparently promised to make good on its $64 million debt to
Turkmenistan in September).
Moreover, with prices in Western Europe well over $200 per 1,000 cubic
meters, Turkmenistan’s desire to receive more than $65 per 1,000 cubic
meters is natural. And Russia, which controls the only pipelines capable of
delivering Turkmen gas to Ukraine, has made it clear that it plans to seek
price increases across the board in the former Soviet Union, even from ally
Belarus.
Against this challenging backdrop, political conflict in Ukraine -- where

the formation of a coalition government has stalled amid parliamentary
infighting -- has hampered the government’s ability to fashion a unified
negotiating position. Rocky relations between Russia and Ukraine are
another impediment. Both elements have been on full display of late.
Yuliya Tymoshenko, the expected prime minister in Ukraine’s nascent
ruling coalition, announced on June 22 that Ukraine must review existing
gas deals and "build new agreements on a friendly basis with the Russian
Federation, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan." Gazprom
spokesman Sergei Kupriyanov warned the next day of a "new gas crisis"
and charged that Tymoshenko’s statements "once again confirm that
Ukraine is the weak link in the system of gas suppliers to Europe," AP
reported. Days later, amid continued wrangling in Ukraine’s parliament,
Ukrainian Fuel and Energy Minister Ivan Plachkov told Kyiv’s Channel 5
that there was, in fact, no need to renegotiate the January 4 deal with
Russia over Turkmen gas.
The Niyazov Factor
Yet another factor is Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov, who enjoys

nearly unlimited power and has used it to indulge in such megalomaniacal
whimsy as the construction of a huge golden statue of himself that rotates
to face the sun at all times. In late December, Niyazov signed a deal with
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Ukraine to supply 40 bcm in 2006 at $50 per 1,000 cubic meters in the first
half of the year and $60 in the second. Days later, he signed another
contract with Gazprom at a higher price, and that deal eventually served as
the basis for the arrangement with Rusukrenergo that has seen Ukraine pay
$95 per 1,000 cubic meters thus far in 2006. The contract with Ukraine
was never implemented.
The deal that was implemented -- involving Turkmenistan, Russia, the

Swiss-registered Rosukrenergo, and Ukraine -- drew fire for its murk and
middlemen. In an April 2006 report on the Turkmen-Ukraine gas trade,
NGO Global Witness documented a history of business practices that can
charitably be described as highly unorthodox culminating in the creating of
Rosukrenergo. Global Witness also reported that 75 percent of
Turkmenistan’s hard-currency revenues from gas sales go into shadowy
extra-budgetary funds controlled by Niyazov. The report concluded that
the January 4 contract that resolved the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute, and
ended the interruption of supplies to Europe, "does not guarantee any
security for any substantial period of time." Global Witness stressed that
"the tangled maze of companies described in this report is hardly a solid
foundation for a trade of such commercial and geostrategic importance."
Gazprom on Its Guard
And then there is Kremlin-controlled Gazprom, which jealously guards the

only pipelines that can ship Turkmen gas to Ukraine. Before he arrived in
Turkmenistan, Ukrainian Fuel and Energy Minister Plachkov had said that
he hoped to negotiate with Turkmenistan under the original, late-December
contract that set a price of $50 per 1,000 cubic meters in the first half of
2006 and $60 in the second. But Turkmenistan’s Foreign Ministry
announced on June 30 that Gazprom, citing limited pipeline capacity,
refused in December to provide a license for the transport of gas through
Russia under the Turkmen-Ukraine contract.
It is precisely such a license that Turkmenistan has now proposed that

Ukraine try to negotiate with Russia, turkmenistan.ru reported. What’s
more, Turkmenistan "is ready to review the issue of gas shipments to
Ukraine in 2007 if the Ukrainian side receives a license for its transit."
The negotiating ploy here seems clear -- to put the ball in Gazprom’s court,
letting Russia decide whether or not it wants to imperil a possible
Turkmen-Ukrainian gas deal. And the timing is dramatic, with Russia set
to host a G8 summit on energy security in only two weeks’ time.
Yet the waters of the Turkmen-Ukraine gas trade have never been muddier.
For one, the 2007 shipments Turkmenistan is now "ready to review" were
thought to have been promised to Russia under a 2003 "contract of the
century." But as previous experience with Turkmenistan has shown,
contracts are not the final word. That belongs to Niyazov -- who is only
one factor among the many enumerated here, all of which are coming into
play as Europe, which receives one-fifth of its gas through Ukraine,
watches and wonders about the winter ahead.
Medio Eurasianet
Enlace http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/pp070406.shtml

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Género period.
Observaciones ---
Título BTC security questions persist

Subtítulo ---
Entradilla ---
Autor Alexandros Petersen
Fecha 11/07/06
publicación
Traducción ---
Títulos
Traducción ---
Entradilla
Cuerpo de texto Touted as the biggest official event in Turkey’s history, the July 13 launch
of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline marks the long-awaited
completion of a project that is as much about geopolitics as energy. But
amid the celebrations, questions persist about pipeline security.
The stakes are sizeable. Stretching 1,760 kilometers, with eight pumping
stations and 101 block valves, BTC is the second longest pipeline in the
world. The $4-billion project, completed a year later than originally
expected, is projected to have a daily capacity of 1 million barrels.
The BTC runs through difficult and dangerous territory. Not only does the
route pass through forbidding mountains and remote locales, including
over 14 seismic faults, but it runs dangerously close to the region’s frozen
conflicts and hotspots: Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, the North
Caucasus, Abkhazia, Armenian enclaves in southern Georgia, and the
restive Kurdish regions of southeastern Turkey. The region has
experienced an episode of sabotage as recently as January, when
suspicious explosions in North Ossetia cut off gas and electricity supplies
to Georgia. The pipeline also faces threats on the local level. Despite
reimbursement and reinstatement of the land from the British Petroleum-
led BTC consortium, locals staged frequent blockages during construction,
and illegal tapping attempts were found even before oil began to flow in
May 2005.
Faced with a host of potential threats, the BTC consortium has

implemented stringent security measures. While there is substantial, tell-
tale infrastructure above ground, such as block valves, devices which
change the oil’s flow direction, the pipeline itself is buried at least a meter
underground along virtually the entire route. Once the land above is
reinstated, the pipeline right-of-way should look the way it did before
construction, making it difficult for potential saboteurs to find its exact
location. Large, above-ground structures, such as pump stations, have
elaborate security measures, from concrete blast walls to closed-circuit

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cameras and armed guards.
These measures may look impressive on paper, but their effectiveness is

questionable. A three-week research trip to Georgia and Azerbaijan by this
observer found that the rush to finish laying the pipeline had often resulted
in security systems that were either not well thought out or badly
implemented.
In one instance, a pump station had been surrounded by security cameras,

but the flood lights supposed to complement them had been installed
behind the cameras, negating their purpose. Blast walls, although able to
prevent truck bombs, are useless against much more likely mortar or
grenade attacks. Two layers of reinforced gates are useful to protect the
entrance to the facility, but only if they are kept closed. In many cases,
local staff flouts security procedures for the sake of expediency. British
Petroleum (BP) security personnel have had to begin the re-installation of
security measures after the pipeline’s completion.
The pipeline route is also extensively monitored and patrolled. Sensors

along the entire length allow for any disruptions to be immediately spotted
on a constantly monitored digital map of the pipeline. In addition, a joint
agreement between the BTC consortium and the Azerbaijani, Georgian and
Turkish governments facilitates patrolling arrangements. Georgia has gone
a step further, signing a bilateral agreement with BP to allow for
complementary security arrangements. BP field security teams regularly
check above-ground facilities and the company employs local Georgians to
patrol the entire right-of-way on horseback. The conglomerate additionally
is operating an extensive community relations program, aiming to maintain
a strong rapport with residents living along the route. These residents could
form a first line of defense for the pipeline by potentially alerting officials
to any suspicious activity. In addition, the agreement provides for patrols
by units of Georgia’s new 700-member Strategic Pipeline Protection
Department (SPPD), outfitted, trained and funded by BP.
To date, BP has been less involved in security measures for the two other
BTC host countries. Azerbaijan has not signed a similar bilateral security
agreement with BP, but talks are continuing. Turkey has not indicated that
it is interested in such an agreement, preferring to let its armed forces
handle pipeline security.
Long hailed for its geopolitical significance, the BTC pipeline is likely to
take on additional prominence in 2007 when Kazakhstan begins
transporting 3 million tons of oil this year via the conduit. President
Nursultan Nazarbayev is expected to be among those leaders attending the
July 13 ceremony in Ceyhan, according to reports.
While energy security will reportedly feature in talks among leaders of the
host countries, opportunities for fresh energy deals will most likely not be
missed, either. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, who left for
Ceyhan on July 11, is expected to discuss with Turkish Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdogan the prospect of buying an additional 2 billion cubic
meters of gas from the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline "at reduced prices,"
the Azerbaijani news agency Trend reported.

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In addition to Saakashvili, Nazarbayev and Azerbaijani President Ilham

Aliyev, the Ceyhan ceremony on July 13 is expected to attract four foreign
ministers, 16 energy ministers and two deputy prime ministers, Trend
reported. Deputy Energy Secretary Jeffrey Clay Sell will head the US
delegation, according to the White House.
Medio Eurasinet
Enlace http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav071106.shtml
Observaciones ---
Título Uzbekistan refuses to deliver natural gas to Tajikistan

Subtítulo ---
Entradilla ---
Autor Pravda.ru
Fecha 20/07/06
publicación
Traducción ---
Títulos
Traducción ---
Entradilla
Cuerpo de texto Western Tajikistan, including the capital Dushanbe, the town of
Tursunzade and several major factories have been cut off from gas supplies
since Wednesday, said Odiljon Salimjonov, a representative of the state
gas distributing company Tajikgaz.
Officials of the Uzbek state gas transport company Uztransgaz said on a

government Web site Thursday that the supplies were stopped after
"repeated warnings" over what they said was Tajikistan's US$7.3 million
debt for gas delivered this year.
Salimjonov, however, said that as of June 1 the Tajik debt amounted to

US$3 million.
Both sides said that after the gas cut, Tajikistan blocked the gas pipeline
that goes through a stretch of Tajik land to deliver gas to eastern Uzbek
regions. Uztransgaz said the move was illegal and demanded the transit be
resumed.
Under a US$40 million contract between the two ex-Soviet republics

Uzbekistan is to supply Tajikistan with 730 million cubic meters of natural
gas in 2006.
Uztransgaz said it already delivered to Tajikistan nearly a half of that

amount but has been paid only US$11.5 million.
Tajikistan, one of the poorest post-Soviet countries, heavily depends on

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Uzbek gas deliveries.

Medio Pravda.ru
Enlace http://english.pravda.ru/news/world/20-07-2006/83424-Uzbekistan-0
Observaciones ---

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Observatorio

Geopolítica y Comunicación en Asia Central y el Cáucaso

ESTADOS UNIDOS LLEGA A UN ACUERDO CON KIRGUIZISTÁN PARA

VARIOS PERIODISTAS UZBECOS REFUGIADOS EN SUECIA SE MANIFIESTAN

Tras la masacre de Andijan en mayo de 2005, el gobierno de

MEDIOS DE COMUNICACIÓN EN KAZAJSTÁN: CONTROVERTIDA REFORMA LEGAL

Entre otras medidas, el decreto endurece las reglas para el

ARMENIA Y AZERBAIYÁN, AÚN LEJOS DEL ACUERDO SOBRE NAGORNO-

Según el Grupo de Minsk, dos de las piezas clave para el acuerdo

Grupo de investigación en Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social

Washington ponders ways to counter the rise of

Us embassy resists Kyrgyz efforts

Kyrgyzstan’s Undiplomatic Policy Shift

U.S. Reaches Deal With Kyrgyzstan

Asie centrale, gaz et dictateurs

India: the new Central Asian player

El pasado 15 de junio, los miembros de la Organización de Cooperación de Shangai1

Durante la cumbre de la SCO, el presidente ruso Vladimir Putin expresó su apoyo al

Grupo de investigación en Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social

En efecto, según algunos analistas, la tendencia actual en la región de Asia Central es el

Además de Kirguizistán, pieza clave para la política estratégica estadounidense es

Además de Estados Unidos, otro de los principales actores en la zona es la Unión

Grupo de investigación en Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social

Azerbaijani hopes for peace dwindle

Grupo de investigación en Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social

Las dificultades económicas, la presión demográfica, las disputas sobre el agua5 y la

En el Cáucaso, el conflicto de Nagorno-Karabakh, territorio que enfrenta a Armenia y

Contrarios a la interpretación armena de que el referéndum debería celebrarse

El pasado 22 de junio, el presidente de Azerbaiyán, Ilham Aliyev, calificó el Proceso de

Grupo de investigación en Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social

Kazakh President Signs

Journalists from Uzbekistan settle in

Web site Tribune-uz.info suspended

Durante el mes de julio, un grupo de periodistas uzbecos independientes refugiados en

Por su parte, el medio electrónico independiente Tribune-uz anunció a principios de

Según Ferghana.ru, no quedan en Uzbekistán más que dos docenas de periodistas

Grupo de investigación en Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social

La oposición kazaja denuncia que una parte considerable de los medios de

El nuevo decreto sobre medios de comunicación aprobado el pasado mes de julio ha

La carencia de libertad religiosa en Uzbekistán sigue siendo noticia. En la región de

El pasado 30 junio, un pastor protestante, acusado de cargos similares a los de Omarov,

Grupo de investigación en Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social

UN agency appeals to Kazakhstan

Twelve fugitives returned to their native Andijan.

Turkmenistan: French media

Otra de las dictaduras de la zona, Turkmenistán, no ha mejorado en cuanto al respeto de

Grupo de investigación en Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social

BTC security questions persist

Uzbekistan refuses to deliver natural gas to Tajikistan

Grupo de investigación en Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social

Título Washington ponders ways to counter the rise of the Shanghai

"The SCO will make a constructive contribution to the establishment of a

Also at the summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed support

research should be conducted "in a way to fully eliminate" international

In a speech at the summit, Ahmadinejad called on regional states to tighten

Kazakhstan, an SCO member, figures prominently in the US strategic

The United States is also believed to be supportive of Kazakhstan’s efforts

American diplomats should also strive to convince Chinese officials that

tremendous rise in energy consumption, driven by the country’s rapid

There are few levers available to Washington to influence Russian

As US officials engage China and Russia, Washington should concurrently

As America is pursuing its "long war" on jihadi terrorism and ideology, it

Editor's Note: Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in Russian