Boletín mensual: ENERO 2007

http://www.observatorio-eurasia.blogspot.com/

GAZPROM MAKES THE GEORGIAN GOVERNMENT PAY

Tbilisi’s gas-price feud with Moscow has ended as it began -- with the Russian energy giant
Gazprom serving as Georgia’s chief supplier. But while Georgian government officials have
presented the deal as a temporary expedient until gas supplies from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz
field start to flow, a long-term solution to Tbilisi’s energy problems remains elusive.

Fuente: www.eurasianet.org/
Continúa en p.3

RUSSIA-BELARUS OIL BLOCKADE ENDS

Russia has resumed pumping crude oil to Europe via Belarus after a three-day halt in supplies.
Russian pipeline operator Transneft began oil flows to Germany and several East European
countries 0530 GMT.

Fuente: http://news.bbc.co.uk/
Continúa en p.5

CHANGE MAY BE ON THE WAY IN TURKMENISTAN

With three weeks to go until presidential elections in Turkmenistan, the campaign is raising
tantalizing hints of change coming to a country long ruled by one of the world's most bizarre
authoritarian leaders. Analysts suggest, however, that sweeping reforms are not in the works.

Fuente: http://news.corporate.findlaw.com/
Continúa en p.8

AZERBAIJAN’S CAMPAIG AGAINST FOREIGN TV TARGETS RUSSIA

An Azerbaijani government decision to ban Russian television channels from domestic

broadcast frequencies has caused lots of grumbling among television viewers in the Caucasus
nation.

Fuente: www.eurasianet.org/
Continúa en p.10

ÍNDICE

Economía...........................p.3
Elecciones Turkmenistán.........................p.10
Medios de Comunicación.........................p.13
El Observatorio Eurasia es un proyecto que se encuadra dentro de la línea de “Historia
de la propaganda y análisis de la comunicación política” del Grupo Interdisciplinario de
Estudios en Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social (COMPOLITICAS), y tiene como
principal objetivo el estudio, investigación y difusión de los principales fenómenos
políticos, culturales y comunicacionales que tienen lugar en el antiguo espacio soviético.

Coordinador
Miguel Vázquez Liñán

Responsable del número

Noemí Pérez Álvarez

Boletín mensual: ENERO 2007 2

http://www.observatorio-eurasia.blogspot.com/
observatorioeurasia@gmail.com
 ECONOMÍA - Titulares

Gazprom makes the georgian government pay

Eurasianet, 09/01/07
Russia-Belarus oil blockade ends
BBCNews.co.uk, 11/01/07

GAZPROM MAKES THE GEORGIAN GOVERNMENT PAY

Diana Petriashvili, 09/01/07 (Eurasianet.org)

Tbilisi’s gas-price feud with Moscow has ended as it began -- with the Russian energy giant
Gazprom serving as Georgia’s chief supplier. But while Georgian government officials have
presented the deal as a temporary expedient until gas supplies from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field
start to flow, a long-term solution to Tbilisi’s energy problems remains elusive.

Despite earlier pronouncements that it would refuse to purchase Russian gas in 2007, the Georgian
government decided December 22 to meet what President Mikheil Saakashvili termed Gazprom’s "political
price" of $235 per 1,000 cubic meters (tcm). Experts in Tbilisi saw the move as needed to ensure
adequate heating supplies during the winter season. According to agreements signed between Georgian
gas distributing companies and Gazprom, the latter will supply Georgia with 1.46 billion cubic meters of
gas, or approximately 80 percent of Georgia’s expected gas needs in 2007. In 2006, Georgia paid
Gazprom $110/tcm.

The situation is a near repeat of the choice Georgia faced in early 2006: to either pay a higher price for
Gazprom gas, or to suffer a cut-off of gas supplies. This time around, local gas distributors have stated
that fees for residential and business consumers will be increased in early 2007, but have not provided an
exact pricing structure. Presently, residents of Tbilisi pay 34 tetri (about 20 cents) per cubic meter of gas;
increased tariffs will be announced later in January, according to the Georgian National Energy Regulatory
Commission, which sets energy tariffs. Energy experts estimate that the new tariff could mean Tbilisi
residents will have to pay approximately 55 - 70 tetri (about 32 / 41 cents) per cubic meter of gas.
While one Tbilisi insurance company has introduced a policy to help existing customers handle the price
hike, no coordinated measures have yet been taken to assist hard-pressed residential consumers pay the
higher prices. Finance Minister Aleksi Aleksishvili stated on December 27 that the government will allocate
120 million lari (about $70 million) to local gas distribution companies to help them pay the increased
tariffs. The energy ministry’s budget will be increased to handle the subsidies, the minister told a news
briefing.

Nonetheless, unlike during the 2006 gas crisis, government officials say that they now have an energy
fallback. In a December 22 news briefing, Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli announced that the decision to
buy Russian gas came as the result of "technical problems" at Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field, the Caspian
Sea gas source that Noghaideli had earlier proclaimed would slash Georgia’s reliance on Russian gas to
"20 percent or maybe 0 percent."

Reality has so far fallen far short of these projections. Initial plans to start pumping Shah Deniz gas to
Georgia on December 15 were at first postponed until December 20, and later until January 10.
Alexander Medvedyev -- deputy chairman of Gazprom’s board of directors and director general of
Gazprom Export Company -- said at a Moscow news conference that three contracts had been signed
between the Russian energy giant and Georgian gas distributing companies. Gazprom spokesperson
Sergei Kuprianov later stated that the deal came together suddenly. "We had no information regarding the
volumes of gas for Georgia on Friday [December 22] afternoon, but within several hours we learned that
three Georgian [gas distributing] companies signed contracts for gas supply," Kuprianov said in remarks
televised by the Russian ORT TV channel December 25.

One independent economic expert, however, maintains that Kuprianov’s remark emphasizes that
Georgian gas distributors, in effect, conducted no real negotiations with the Russian energy giant. The
apparent lack of talks with Gazprom, if true, should be viewed as a major policy blunder by the Georgian
government, commented economic analyst Giorgi Khukhashvili.

Boletín mensual: ENERO 2007 3

http://www.observatorio-eurasia.blogspot.com/
observatorioeurasia@gmail.com
"Authorities should have held real negotiations with Gazprom, and should’ve not made any radical public
statements refusing Russian gas," Khukhashvili said. Putting heavy emphasis on the Shah Deniz project
was also an error, Khukhashvili added. "[The authorities acted] as if Shah Deniz was constructed with the
purpose to provide Georgia with gas and to satisfy Georgia’s gas needs. The authorities seem not to
understand that the pipeline’s purpose is to supply gas to Europe."

Other local analysts share this view. By not setting up its own gas talks with Gazprom, the government
effectively passed the buck for any price hike, Giorgi Mchedlishvili, head of the Georgian Transition non-
governmental organization, commented in an earlier interview with EurasiaNet. Energy Minister Nika
Gilauri has not addressed this accusation, but both Gilauri and State Minister for Coordination of Reforms
Kakha Bendukidze have emphasized that price talks with Gazprom are the responsibility of private
companies alone.

Once Shah Deniz gas starts to flow, the government’s plan appears to be to shut off the Gazprom
supplies. However, it is not clear whether this will be possible. The Georgian International Energy
Corporation and Mtkvari Energy signed contracts with Gazprom for one year; KazTransGas-Tbilisi, the
Georgian capital’s gas distributor, signed a three-month contract. Khukhashvili, the economic analyst,
believes that the Russian company is unlikely to let Georgia switch to other suppliers during the contract
term.

After a series of meetings with Azerbaijani officials, Georgia reached an agreement to receive 1 million
cubic meters of non-Shah-Deniz gas from Azerbaijan daily for a total of 90 million cubic meters over three
months. The deliveries would stop as soon as Shah Deniz is put into operation. Officials believe that the
Shah Deniz supplies will become technically feasible by the end of January 2007.

In his December 29 statement, Prime Minister Noghaideli acknowledged that the expected volume makes
up only one-eighth of Georgia’s total daily consumption, but described the deal as "a very important
economic and political achievement."

Noghaideli said that the gas will be extracted "from other sources" apart from Shah Deniz in Azerbaijan,
but did not specify what the sources were. Georgia will pay Azerbaijan $120/tcm for the gas.
Azerbaijan is now engaged in its own gas dispute with Russia. Supplies of Gazprom gas to the Caspian
Sea state stopped on January 1, when Azerbaijan rejected Gazprom’s proposed price of $230/tcm. In
response, Azerbaijan shut off oil exports via the Russian-run Baku-Novorossisk pipeline, saying that it now
needed the shipments to produce fuel oil to run power stations formerly powered with Russian gas.

Turkey, Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s partner in the South Caucasus gas pipeline, is also expected to play a
role in resolving Georgia’s gas woes, though some confusion surrounds the specifics. According to
Georgian officials, President Saakashvili and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan reportedly
reached a deal in mid-December under which Turkey would give Georgia 800 million cubic meters of gas
in 2007 from its own take in the South Caucasus gas pipeline, which runs from the Shah Deniz field in
Azerbaijan. Turkish Energy Minister Hilmi Guler, however, later denied the report, saying that talks
between Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia about Shah Deniz were ongoing.

A greater emphasis on diplomacy could have helped in this situation, continued Khukhashvili. "Georgian
officials created many awkward situations for their partners, Azerbaijan and Turkey," Khukhashvili said.
"Russia has many mechanisms to use against these countries, and Georgia should’ve understood it
properly."

President Mikheil Saakashvili, for his part, prefers to emphasize the positive. Speaking at the Georgian
cabinet’s final session for 2006 on December 30, Saakashvili hailed the work of the Energy Ministry,
terming the reported agreements with Turkey and Azerbaijan "historic." Azerbaijan’s decision to supply gas
to Georgia "[d]espite threats voiced by the Russian side," is "heroic," he told students at Tbilisi State
University on December 26.

Fuente: www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav010907.shtml

Boletín mensual: ENERO 2007 4

http://www.observatorio-eurasia.blogspot.com/
observatorioeurasia@gmail.com
RUSSIA-BELARUS OIL BLOCKADE ENDS

11/01/07 (BBCNews.co.uk)

Russia has resumed pumping crude oil to Europe via Belarus after a three-day halt in supplies.

Russia has resumed pumping crude oil to Europe via Belarus after a three-day halt in
supplies. Russian pipeline operator Transneft began oil flows to Germany and several
East European countries 0530 GMT.

Russia cut off supplies to Belarus on Monday, after claims Minsk had been illegally siphoning
off European nations welcomed the reopening of the key Druzhba pipeline but the International
Energy Agency said it had been a "grave" incident. 'Constructive resolution' The European
Union Energy Commissioner, Andris Piebalgs, confirmed that all supplies had been renewed
and called for "transparent and reliable" behaviour from producer nations and transit such as
Belarus.. German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinman welcomed Moscow's actions, saying
Russia had responded to its appeals for a "rapid, constructive resolution". Poland, which has
previously raised concerns over Russian's controls on energy supplies to the EU, it expected
other nations would be more receptive to its worries.

RUSSIAN OIL USERS*

Hungary - 83.5% of all oil supplies

Slovakia - 82.2%
Finland - 79.1%
Poland - 77.2%
Czech Republic - 49.3%
Belgium - 31.8%
Sweden - 29.4%
Germany - 26.2%
Netherlands - 25.3%
Italy - 18.1%
Austria - 16.8%
France - 11.4%
Denmark - 2.1%

*Source: Petroleum Economist magazine

International Energy Agency boss Claude Mandil said the supply cut-off undermined faith in
Russia an oil exporter and was "something that should never have happened". The dispute
between the two former Soviet countries came after Moscow forced Belarus to accept major
increase in the cost of gas supplies to the country in late December. Russia later imposed a
hefty duty on oil exports to Belarus, claiming its neighbour was costing it $4bn in lost revenues
each year. In retaliation, Belarus slapped a $45-per-tonne transit tax on oil shipments from
Russia, but withdrew it earlier on Wednesday after tense top-level government talks between
both sides. 'Destroyed trust' Russia had refused to pay the Belarusian tax, and demanded it be
cancelled in order for oil supplies through the pipeline to begin again. At its height, the dispute
hit Russian oil supplies to Germany, Poland, Ukraine and other Eastern European countries via
the Druzhba pipeline. The move by Russia to cut off supplies via the Druzhba pipeline - whose
name roughly translates as friendship - brought about widespread criticism across Europe.
German Chancellor and current European Union president Angela Merkel denounced the
pipeline closure as unacceptable and one that "destroyed trust" in Russia as an energy supplier.
The 2,500-mile-long pipeline has the capacity to ship more than 1.2 million barrels a day to
eastern and central Europe and typically works at close to full capacity.

Fuente: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/business/6248251.stm

Boletín mensual: ENERO 2007 5

http://www.observatorio-eurasia.blogspot.com/
observatorioeurasia@gmail.com
 ELECCIONES EN TURKMENISTÁN - Titulares

Turkmenistan: Test of the new leader’s reform commitment proves inconclusive

Eurasianet 31/01/07
Change may be on the way in Turkmenistan
Washington Post 19/01/07

TURKMENISTAN: TEST OF THE NEW LEADER’S REFORM COMMITMENT PROVES

INCONCLUSIVE

John Bennett, 31/01/07 (Eurasianet.org)

A litmus test of the new Turkmen leadership’s commitment to political change has proved
inconclusive. In what human rights advocates termed a politically motivated case, a Turkmen court
on January 31 convicted environmentalist Andrei Zatoka of possessing illegal weapons and
poisons. His three-year sentence, however, was suspended, and he was allowed to return home on
parole.

Zatoka’s arrest in mid-December came just days before the unexpected death of Turkmenistan’s former
dictator Saparmurat Niyazov. Since then, the country’s interim leader, Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov,
has repeatedly voiced a desire to implement some reforms to improve conditions in the totalitarian system
built by Niyazov. Prior to the start of the trial, which lasted just a few hours, human rights advocates
portrayed Zatoka’s case as a bellwether of Berdymukhammedov’s sincerity. The verdict, however, did not
provide a clear-cut answer.

"It’s unquestionably a positive step that Andrei was released," said Erika Dailey, director of the
Turkmenistan Project at the New York-based Open Society Institute. "But by charging him with serious
crimes, keeping him largely incommunicado, and terrorizing him with threats of lengthy incarceration in
appalling conditions, the new leadership has shown itself to be no better than Niyazov in its treatment of
civil society, which is very little indeed." [EurasiaNet, like the Turkmenistan Project, operates under OSI’s
auspices].

Dailey characterized Turkmen officials’ handling of the Zatoka case as a face-saving measure, designed to
appease Western governments while still furthering the government’s primary goal of muzzling all forms of
dissent. "The criminal charges against him were aimed at discrediting and intimidating independent
thinkers like him," Dailey said. "So even if Andrei is now at home, rather than in prison, the damage is
done -- to others who are working in their private capacity to improve life in Turkmenistan, and to building
trust with the interim authorities."

Given Turkmenistan’s abundance of natural gas, the United States and European Union are hopeful that
Berdymukhammedov -- who is widely expected to be confirmed as the new president in a special election
scheduled for February 11 -- is serious about undertaking a gradual opening of Turkmen society. Such a
thaw would provide an opportunity for US and EU leaders to engage Turkmen officials more closely, and
possibly entice Ashgabat to shift its gas-export orientation, which is currently focused on Russia.

As Zatoka’s case underscores, it is too soon to say if Berdymukhammedov will fulfill Western hopes for
change. "Things haven’t yet changed for the better," Dailey said. "The judiciary continues to carry out
political will [and] the police continue to function as the enforcers of the state security structures."

Zatoka, a dual citizen of Turkmenistan and Russia, was arrested at the airport in his hometown of
Dashoguz on December 17. He was planning to fly to Ashgabat and on to Moscow, where he was to join
his family and attend meetings of the Socio-Ecological Union. Zatoka was initially charged with violating
public order, a misdemeanor offense. Following a search of his house, performed after
Berdymukhammedov assumed the interim presidency, authorities pressed the criminal charges for
unlawful acquisition or possession of a weapon and unlawful possession of poisonous substances,
specifically snake venom. He faced a maximum sentence of eight years in prison.

Boletín mensual: ENERO 2007 6

http://www.observatorio-eurasia.blogspot.com/
observatorioeurasia@gmail.com
Zatoka has been a leading environmental activist in the post-Soviet states. As a co-founder of the
Dashoguz Environmental Club, he promoted conservation and protection of Turkmenistan’s environment.
Before starting the Club in 1992, Zatoka worked in Kaplankyr State Park for 10 years.

Dailey reported that she had spoken to Zatoka by telephone following the January 31 trial. In a
conversation most likely monitored by Turkmen authorities, Zatoka told Dailey that he was relieved to
avoid going to prison. He characterized the trial as "cordial" and the presiding judge as "accommodating."
He also joked that his time in pre-trial detention had provided a welcome respite from his normal routine.
"At home, I sit in front of the computer all day. [In jail], I had time to take care of myself," Dailey quoted
Zatoka as saying.

As the trial approached, rights activists emphasized the link between Berdymukhammedov’s words
concerning reform and the government’s deeds. Kate Watters, Executive Director of Crude Accountability,
on whose board of directors Zatoka sits, said the trial was "an opportunity for the government to show that
it is shifting from Niyazov’s form of rule to respect for the rule of law and human rights." Niyazov’s death
helped focus international attention on Zatoka’s fate. Dozens of civic, environmental and human rights
organizations around the world dispatched messages of concern to Turkmenistan authorities, the United
Nations and the European Union, among others.

Dailey suggested continuing pressure from rights groups could help encourage Berdymukhammedov to
follow through on his reform pledges. "Andrei’s case is one out of thousands in Turkmenistan," she said.
"We hope that the international community will now be emboldened to insist that Andrei’s parole become
the standard, and that reason and justice will prevail in the cases of those arbitrarily detained and arrested
in Turkmenistan."

Fuente: http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav013107.shtml

Boletín mensual: ENERO 2007 7

http://www.observatorio-eurasia.blogspot.com/
observatorioeurasia@gmail.com
CHANGE MAY BE ON THE WAY IN TURKMENISTAN

Bagila Bukharbayeva, 19/01/07 (Associated Press Writer)

ALMATY, Kazakhstan - With three weeks to go until presidential elections in

Turkmenistan, the campaign is raising tantalizing hints of change coming to a country
long ruled by one of the world's most bizarre authoritarian leaders. Analysts suggest,
however, that sweeping reforms are not in the works.

The Feb. 11 elections to fill the post held by Saparmurat Niyazov for two decades until his Dec.
21 death are being watched with interest by both Russia and the West because of
Turkmenistan's immense natural gas reserves and its status as a stable country in a troubled
region, bordering both Iran and Afghanistan. Six candidates are running, including the acting
president. They have been speaking to campaign meetings in packed halls, promising
improvements in the country's quality of life, and their remarks are reported in detail on
television and in newspapers. But there, the resemblance to elections in most countries ends.

The campaign events are well-attended because authorities pressure people to go, Turkmens
say. The media reporting on the meetings are all under tight state control. The candidates
themselves all had to be approved by Turkmenistan's highest legislative body, and all pledge
ultimate fealty to the principles of Niyazov, whom they call "Turkmenbashi" or "Father of All
Turkmen."
Not only are there no opposition candidates, but Turkmenistan doesn't allow any opposition
parties at all. "There is little likelihood that it's going to be like a real election," said Sean
Roberts, a Central Asian affairs fellow at Georgetown University. "But there is definitely much
more discussion of real problems in Turkmenistan during this election campaign than anyone
has seen in the past 10 years."

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe aims to send a small team of experts
to follow the election, but will not mount a full observation mission because of lack of time to
prepare. A report by the OSCE's Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights noted that
this will be Turkmenistan's first presidential election with more than one candidate. "While these
new developments are welcome indications of a recognition that the electoral process serves as
the basis for democratic government, and merit support, they are no guarantee for a competitive
election," the report said.

Niyazov led Turkmenistan during its last years as a Soviet republic. Once it became
independent following the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, he kept the country largely
isolated while establishing a pervasive cult of personality. His philosophical writings are required
reading in schools and he claimed anyone who read them three times a day was guaranteed a
place in heaven. He banned opera and ballet and denounced lip-synching. His image was on
every bill and coin, and statues of him were erected throughout the country, including a golden
one in the capital of Ashgabat that rotated to follow the sun's path. Interim President Gurbanguli
Berdymukhamedov is promising to continue in Niyazov's path and his program mentions no
political reforms at all. Yet he promises agricultural, education and pension reforms, support of
private entrepreneurship and unrestricted Internet access _ a serious rolling back of Niyazov's
policies.

Underscoring U.S. interest, Evan A. Feigenbaum, deputy assistant secretary of state for South
and Central Asian affairs, met with Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov and others during a four-
day visit that ended Sunday, discussing issues including trade, democracy, human rights and
security cooperation, the U.S. Embassy in Ashgabat said.

Some of Berdymukhamdeov's campaign pledges have been repeated by other candidates, who
include a deputy oil and gas minister and four provincial officials. Berdymukhamedov is seen as
the all-but-certain winner; even Turkmenistan's elections chief has publicly endorsed him.

Boletín mensual: ENERO 2007 8

http://www.observatorio-eurasia.blogspot.com/
observatorioeurasia@gmail.com
Niyazov maintained a Soviet-style state controlled economy, using the bulk of revenues from
natural gas exports to expand the energy sector. He funded prestige projects such as palaces,
amusement parks, luxury hotels and an artificial lake in the desert. The real state of the
Turkmen economy has been hard to assess because Niyazov kept economic statistics secret.
In recent years, Niyazov dramatically cut social programs, slashing pensions and abolishing
them altogether for 100,000 elderly Turkmens. He closed most hospitals outside the capital and
cut compulsory education from 10 to nine years. Roberts said that those cuts indicated that the
economy was in "dire straits," and Berdymukhamedov has no choice but to start addressing the
problems. Arkady Dubnov, a Russian Central Asia analyst, said any seeming signs of
democratic change to accompany economic reforms should not be overestimated: "They are
part of a political elite created by Niyazov, they cannot be democrats."

Fuente: http://news.corporate.findlaw.com/ap/i/629/01-19-2007/eac9003f10eb1b67.html

Boletín mensual: ENERO 2007 9

http://www.observatorio-eurasia.blogspot.com/
observatorioeurasia@gmail.com
 MEDIOS DE COMUNICACIÓN - Titulares

Azerbaijan’s campaign against foreign TV targets Russia

Eurasianet 31/01/07
Russia ties with Azerbaijan reach new loss
Eurasianet 25/01/07

AZERBAIJAN’S CAMPAIGN AGAINST FOREIGN TV TARGETS RUSSIA

Mina Muradova, 31/01/07 (Eurasianet.org)

An Azerbaijani government decision to ban Russian television channels from domestic broadcast
frequencies has caused lots of grumbling among television viewers in the Caucasus nation.

In early January, Azerbaijan’s National Television and Radio Council announced plans to take two state-
run Russian television channels -- ORT (Channel 1) and RTR-Planeta -- off the air. Both channels, as well
as a privately run Turkish channel, STV, will lose their signal on July 1. The council switched off another
privately owned Turkish channel, Kanal D, on January 3. Together, the four television channels provide the
bulk of foreign television news content available to Azerbaijanis without subscribing to a cable or satellite
service.

The decision is not the first to target foreign broadcasters. As of January 1, the British Broadcasting Corp.,
Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty were banned from domestic Azerbaijani airwaves.
Some domestic stations have been targeted as well. After a strong domestic and international outcry, a
controversial ban on independent television and radio broadcaster ANS was lifted in December 2006. The
station’s license is expected to come up for review again in early February.

Already, residents say they are feeling the effects of the NTRC’s latest move to tighten up broadcast
regulations. "Which channels will we watch now?" complained 43-year-old Baku resident Sanubar
Allahverdiyeva, who bought a satellite dish as soon as Kanal D lost its broadcast frequency. "The quality of
Azerbaijani television leaves much to be desired."

As elsewhere in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, television dominates local media. About 88 percent
of the population of Baku and 93 percent of the population outside of the capital consider television to be
their main source of information, according to the 2006 report of the International Foundation for Election
Systems.

With the quality of Azerbaijani programming widely seen as lacklustre, though, the Turkish and Russian
channels that broadcast on Azerbaijan’s national frequencies had carved out large shares of Azerbaijan
viewers seeking entertainment and news.

In justifying their action, Azerbaijani officials have emphasized both a need to follow global practices for
television broadcasting regulations and to defend the domestic market. "National frequencies in Azerbaijan
should belong only to local channels," the Turan news agency reported Council Chairman Nushiravan
Maharramli as saying. Allowing foreign channels to broadcast on regular television frequencies, he noted,
"would be against the law, international practice, and the interests of local TV channels." Instead, foreign-
owned channels wishing to broadcast in Azerbaijan can turn to satellite or cable television, he added.

One media activist believes that the NTRC’s actions might give some cable companies a hefty chunk of
the television market. "The work of the NTRC is not transparent. It has allowed some cable companies to
work in local television, but we do not know who they are and what kind of services they are providing,"
commented Rashid Gadjili, director of the Baku-based Internews Institute of Media Rights. (Internews
receives funding from the Open Society Institute. EurasiaNet operates under the auspices of OSI-New
York). Gadjili added that demand for satellite dishes has also considerably increased, with "some families
even buying two dishes for Russian and Turkish channels."

Boletín mensual: ENERO 2007 10

http://www.observatorio-eurasia.blogspot.com/
observatorioeurasia@gmail.com
The daily newspaper Echo reported that the NTCR has given operating licenses to 10 cable TV
companies, but only half of them are actually providing services. According to the report, Azerbaijan
currently has 25,000-30,000 cable subscribers. It added that the NTCR reportedly hopes the number of
cable subscribers will double within six months.

While foreign news broadcasts on satellite or cable networks are standard practice in the West,
Azerbaijan’s decision comes with a catch. If Russia allows Azerbaijan’s state-run AzTV to broadcast free-
of-charge within Russia, the same courtesy will be extended to ORT and RTR-Planeta, according to
officials in Baku. A similar deal has already been extended to Turkey’s state-run TRT channel. Failing that,
the two Russian channels could sign up with an Azerbaijani cable broadcaster, NTCR Chairman
Maharramli has said.

Russia, already mindful of past spats with Azerbaijan over gas, has hedged its response. At a January 18
press conference, Russian Ambassador to Azerbaijan Vasiliy Istratov characterized the NTCR decision as
Azerbaijan’s "sovereign right." He added that ORT and RTR-Planeta are "ready for talks with the
Azerbaijani Ministry of Communications, the NRTC and local television channels."

Allowing Azerbaijani channels to broadcast their programs on Russian channels in return for a fee might
be one solution to the stand-off, Istratov added. "Mutually acceptable solutions can be found, if there is a
mutual desire," he said. An earlier statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry expressed hope that the
dispute would be resolved "legally" and "in the spirit of partnership."

Russian television broadcasts in Azerbaijan have been regulated by a 1995 inter-governmental

agreement, which gave either side the right to cancel the deal with at least six months notice. The
Azerbaijani government declined to renew the agreement upon its expiration in early January.

Turkey’s outgoing ambassador, Turan Morali, has taken a less diplomatic stance, arguing that the
government should not decide questions of broadcast rights. "Azerbaijan and Turkey are fraternal
countries, but such issues should be resolved by the TV companies themselves, not by the governments,"
local media outlets quoted him as saying in early January.

Independent political analyst Leyla Aliyeva believes that the NTRC’s decision is "most likely" related to
Gazprom’s recent decision to double the price for gas delivered to Azerbaijan to $235 per 1,000 cubic
meters. At the same time, Aliyeva believes a desire to retaliate against Moscow’s recent restrictions on
foreign labor migrants in Russia may also have played a role. The restrictions would hit Azerbaijanis
particularly hard. "[I]t’s a way to achieve two goals: First, to show to Russia that Azerbaijan is quite an
independent country and, on the other hand, to prevent the transmission of alternative information sources
on the country’s territory," Aliyeva said.

Another Baku-based political analyst, Rasim Musabayov, considers the Council’s decision correct, and
argues that the NTRC’s action conforms to international practice. "There is no ground to dramatize the
situation and speak about the deterioration of relations with Russia," he commented.

Meanwhile, Azerbaijani viewers, bemoaning the quality of local channels, are making their own
preparations. "I do not know what is the reason for making such a decision, whether it’s political or not, but
anyway ordinary viewers will be harmed," said Rena Guliyeva, a 28-year-old secondary school teacher in
Baku. "I grew up with Russian TV and my family watches mainly these channels." For Guliyeva, as well as
for hundreds of other Azerbaijanis, the solution is plain: Save money and buy a satellite dish.

Fuente: www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav013107.shtml

Boletín mensual: ENERO 2007 11

http://www.observatorio-eurasia.blogspot.com/
observatorioeurasia@gmail.com
RUSSIAN TIES WITH AZERBAIJAN REACH NEW LOWS

Sergei Blagov, 25/01/07 (Eurasianet.org)

Less than a year ago, in February 2006, Russian President Vladimir Putin traveled to Baku to
launch the Year of Russia in Azerbaijan. Now, not even one year after the conclusion of this official
celebration of Russian culture, both Azerbaijan and Russia find themselves in a bitter dispute over
energy, labor migration, and other issues.

Most recently, Moscow has attempted to allay Azerbaijani concerns about its intentions by acting as an
"honest broker" in promoting dialogue between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the breakaway territory of
Nagorno-Karabakh, and pledging to become a guarantor for any peace settlement reached. Yet progress
on this front has been slim. Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov and his Armenian
counterpart Vardan Oskaryan met in Moscow on January 23, but the meeting led to no concrete results,
with both sides only agreeing to continue to talk.

Meanwhile, the problem areas between Moscow and Baku continue to multiply. Energy disputes command
center stage. Baku’s blunt refusal in December 2006 to import Russian gas following energy giant
Gazprom’s decision to hike gas prices for Azerbaijan marked a sharp acceleration in the worsening of
relations between the two states.

In an apparent bid to stop Azerbaijani gas exports to Russian sparring partner Georgia, Gazprom more
than doubled gas prices for Azerbaijan while leaving gas prices for Armenia unchanged. Russian
companies now exercise near-complete control over the Armenian energy sector. The Azerbaijani
leadership took the move as an affront. In a December 23, 2006 interview with the Moscow radio station
Ekho Moskvy, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said that Azerbaijan would not be "subject to commercial
blackmail."

A pre-existing contract between Azerbaijan and Gazprom, signed in 2004, that provided for the annual
sale of 4 billion cubic meters of gas to Azerbaijan until 2009 at the price of $52 per 1,000 cubic meters
motivated Baku’s discontent. Despite the agreement, Gazprom’s asking price has climbed steadily over
the past few years, to reach the current $235 per 1,000 cubic meters. On January 15, Ali Hasanov, head of
the public and political department of the presidential administration, lashed out at Russia as an
"unreliable" partner. By failing to uphold its contract with Azerbaijan, Hasanov said, Russia "did not act as
a gentleman."

Nor are the tensions related to gas alone. Earlier in January, the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijani
Republic (SOCAR) suspended pumping oil via the Baku-Novorossiisk oil pipeline for three months, arguing
that the oil was needed to provide fuel for electricity plants previously powered by gas. (The state-run
Azerbaijani International Operating Company reportedly continues to funnel crude via this pipeline,
however.) Azerbaijan had earlier planned to funnel about 1.1 million tons of oil via the Baku-Novorossiisk
pipeline in the first quarter of 2007, including some 240,000 tons by SOCAR.

One of the few bright spots for Russia in this area is electricity. Earlier in January, the Azerbaijani energy
company Azarenerji and the Russian United Energy Systems (RAO UES) signed an agreement that kept
electricity imports at 2006 levels.

The energy dispute, however, could have implications for security ties between the two countries as well a
sensitive area for Russia as Azerbaijan considers closer ties with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
On January 19, Zahid Oruj, a member of the Azerbaijani parliament’s security and defense committee,
said that the legislature would reconsider Russia’s lease of the Daryal radar station in Azerbaijan’s Gabala
region in response to the gas price hike. "Russia’s energy policy makes it necessary to reconsider the
issue," the Azerbaijani APA news agency reported Oruj as saying.

Russian officials, however, have indicated they are not concerned by Azerbaijani suggestions to review the
Gabala agreement, saying that their lease agreement lasts until 2012.

Another issue, labor migration to Russia, could carry similarly heavy economic consequences for
Azerbaijan. Baku has made little secret of its uneasiness about Russia’s recent decision to ban migrant
workers from being employed in marketplaces. The decision would go into effect in April 2007.

Boletín mensual: ENERO 2007 12

http://www.observatorio-eurasia.blogspot.com/
observatorioeurasia@gmail.com
Millions of Azerbaijanis live and work in Russia, many of them employed in the sale of fruits, vegetables
and various consumer items in city markets. Their money is a major source of income for their extended
families in Azerbaijan.

Seizing on the issue, the opposition Yeni Musavat newspaper wrote on January 15 that the numbers of
migrants returning from Russia could rival even the thousands of ethnic Azeri refugees who swarmed into
Azerbaijan in the early 1990s and late 1980s, as a result of the conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-
Karabakh. In a front-page commentary, the paper predicted that hundreds of thousands of illegal
Azerbaijani immigrants could be deported from Russia, with as many as 50,000 to 70,000 Azerbaijanis
leaving in February and March, the daily wrote.

One militant nationalist organization, the Karabakh Liberation Organization, has gone even further,
accusing the Russian authorities of trying to deport all Azerbaijani nationals from Russia. The group has
urged the Azerbaijani authorities to take measures to stop what it described as the "mass violation" of
Azerbaijani nationals’ rights in Russia.

The Russian government has not yet responded to the charge or to how its migration policy would affect
Azerbaijanis working in Russia.

The Azerbaijani government, however, has already moved to stave off possible consequences of such a
flood of returning migrants. On January 13, the Azerbaijani State Commission, chaired by Deputy Prime
Minister Yagub Eyubov, approved financing for an action plan to assist Azerbaijani migrants.

Any attempt Russia may make to address these problem areas, however, may soon be largely dependent
on Azerbaijani media outlets to reach an Azerbaijani audience. The Azerbaijani National Broadcasting
Council has announced plans to cut off broadcasts of Russia’s Channel One and Rossiya stations within
Azerbaijan by July 2007 in response to the lack of Azerbaijani television programs broadcast in Russia.

Meanwhile, adding to the dispute, as relations sour between Baku and Moscow, Russia’s traditionally
strong ties with Azerbaijani arch-enemy Armenia appear to be growing still stronger. Armenia has
welcomed an aggressive influx of Russian investment recently into its energy, aluminum and
communication sectors. [For details, see the Eurasia Insight archive].

At a January 24 meeting in the Black Sea town of Sochi between Armenian President Robert Kocharian
and Russian President Vladimir Putin, the two leaders announced plans for further investment. (The
meeting came a week after a "private" visit by Kocharian for "informal" talks with Putin in Moscow.)
President Putin said that Moscow hoped that Russia would become Armenia’s top foreign investor by
March 2007.

"There is no single issue unresolved or no pressing issue on the agenda," the state-run ITAR-TASS news
agency reported Putin as saying of Moscow’s ties with Armenia.

By contrast, with Azerbaijan, unresolved and pressing issues alone prevail. Moscow’s attempt to secure
Azerbaijani support in its campaign against Georgia proved a risky gamble. And one that, for now, at least,
the Kremlin appears to have lost.

Fuente: www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav012507.shtml

Boletín mensual: ENERO 2007 13

http://www.observatorio-eurasia.blogspot.com/
observatorioeurasia@gmail.com