Boletínseptiembre 07

Boletín mensual: SEPTIEMBRE 2007
http://www.observatorio-eurasia.blogspot.com/
TAJIKISTAN: IS PRESIDENT RAHMON’S GOVERNMENT ANTI-ISLAMIC?
More than 300 makeshift mosques have been closed recently by authorities in the Tajik capital,
Dushanbe, with some of those sites subsequently turned into beauty salons or police offices.
These and other clampdowns follow a government ban on Islamic head scarves -- hejab -- in
schools, compulsory tests for clerics, and a ban on the fundamentalist Mavlavi religious group.
Fuente: http://www.eurasianet.org
Continúa en p.4
GEORGIA VENTS FRUSTRATION WITH UN, OSCE
Georgian ire over recent statements coming out of the United Nations and the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe underscores the limits of Tbilisi’s long-standing strategy to
use international organizations as a counterweight to Russian influence in the conflict zones of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Fuente: http://www.eurasianet.org
Continúa en p.6
PUTIN'S GOVERNMENT RESHUFFLE ENDS WITH GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT AND

PLEASANT SURPRISES
President Vladimir Putin announced the names of ministers in the new Cabinet chaired by
Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov on September 24. The key ministers of the previous cabinet have
retained their positions, and all resignations are in no occasion connected with the appointment
of the new prime minister. In fact, the Cabinet now has the same structure as before. It was the
replacement of the prime minister that became the central intrigue.
Fuente: http://english.pravda.ru
Continúa en p.13
TURKMENISTAN: MEDIA REPRESSION CONTINUES, ONE YEAR AFTER JOURNALIST’S

DEATH
On June 18, 2006, the Turkmen Helsinki Foundation on Human Rights (THF) released a report
on a "new wave of arrests of civil activists." It said Turkmen security forces had arrested human-
rights activists Annagurban Amangylyjov, Yelena Ovezova, Sapardurdy Hajiyev, and RFE/RL
correspondent Ogulsapar Muradova. All of them were held for allegedly possessing banned
weapons.
Fuente: http://www.iwpr.net
Continúa en p.19
INDICE
Política..............................p.3
Economía…………...…...….p.16
Medios de comunicación............................p.17
Sociedad............................p.21
Boletín mensual: SEPTIEMBRE 2007 1

observatorioeurasia@gmail.com
El Observatorio Eurasia es un proyecto que se encuadra dentro de la línea de “Historia
de la propaganda y análisis de la comunicación política” del Grupo Interdisciplinario de
Estudios en Comunicación, Política y Cambio Social (COMPOLITICAS), y tiene como
principal objetivo el estudio, investigación y difusión de los principales fenómenos
políticos, culturales y comunicacionales que tienen lugar en el antiguo espacio soviético.
Coordinador
Miguel Vázquez Liñán
Responsable del número

Carmen Llano Pérez de la Lastra

POLÍTICA - Titulares
Osetia del Sur acusa a Georgia de preparar actos subversivos contra esa república
rebelde
http://sp.rian.ru (07/09/2007)
Tajikistan: is president Rahmon’s government anti-islamic?

http://www.eurasianet.org (08/09/2007)
Georgian president gains a shadow rival

Georgia vents frustration with UN, OSCE

Central Asia: is the region entering a new era of cooperation?

Scepticism over human rights plan

http://www.iwpr.net (24/09/2007)
Kyrgyzstan: a new bout of constitutional wrangling begins

Constitution May Result in Pliable Judiciary

Putin's government reshuffle ends with great disappointment and pleasant surprises
http://english.pravda.ru (27/09/2007)
Georgia president scorns accusers

http://news.bbc.co.uk (29/09/2007)
OSETIA DEL SUR ACUSA A GEORGIA DE PREPARAR ACTOS SUBVERSIVOS CONTRA

ESA REPÚBLICA REBELDE
RIA NOVOSTI, 07/09/2007, (http://sp.rian.ru)
Las autoridades de Osetia del Sur, república secesionista en el territorio de Georgia, acusan a este país
de desestabilizar la situación en la zona del conflicto georgiano-oseta.
"Osetia del Sur aprovecha todos los medios que tiene a su disposición para hacerle frente a los actos
subversivos de Georgia, que busca desestabilizar la situación en la zona del conflicto georgiano-oseta",
declaró el Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores de Osetia del Sur en un comunicado.
Los dirigentes de Osetia del Sur, según indica el documento, están convencidos de que la víspera del VI
Congreso Nacional de Osetia del Sur (18-19 de septiembre) y los festejos por el Día de la República (20
de septiembre), los servicios secretos de Georgia intensificarán su actividad subversiva en la zona del
conflicto.
"La cancillería de Osetia del Sur -dice el comunicado- considera que el atentado de esta mañana, en el
que resultó herido un vecino de Tsjinval, es otro testimonio de que el régimen georgiano no abandona sus
intentos de desestabilizar la situación en la zona del conflicto".
Testigos oculares comentan que en Tsjinval, capital de Osetia del Sur, un hombre de 24 años recibió
múltiples heridas cuando en sus manos explotó un teléfono móvil que había encontrado.

El Comité de Seguridad Estatal de Osetia del Sur, que investiga el incidente, ya había advertido a la
población de los posibles actos subversivos que está preparando Georgia contra la república
independentista.
FUENTE: http://sp.rian.ru/onlinenews/20070907/77390370.html
TAJIKISTAN: IS PRESIDENT RAHMON’S GOVERNMENT ANTI-ISLAMIC?
Farangis Najibullah, A EurasiaNet Partner Post from RFE/RL, 08/09/2007, (http://www.eurasianet.org)
More than 300 makeshift mosques have been closed recently by authorities in the Tajik capital, Dushanbe,
with some of those sites subsequently turned into beauty salons or police offices. These and other
clampdowns follow a government ban on Islamic head scarves -- hejab -- in schools, compulsory tests for
clerics, and a ban on the fundamentalist Mavlavi religious group.
Government scrutiny of mosques and religious activities has intensified all over the predominantly Muslim
republic of Tajikistan.
Authorities in the northern Sughd region have set deadlines for the operators of 350 mosques to get
proper licenses or face closure.
Registration Hampered By Bureaucracy
In the eastern Vanj district, authorities have banned the fundamentalist Mavlavi Islamic group, whose
practitioners have been accused of harassing locals.
Officials in the southern town of Kurgon-teppa have ordered 13 mosques there to present their registration
documents to local prosecutors for checking.
Kalandar Sadriddinov, an imam in a Kurgon-teppa mosque, told RFE/RL’s Tajik Service that authorities
have introduced a complicated procedure to register mosques. He said operators must get official
permission from many offices -- from the fire department to environmental authorities -- before even
applying for registration.
"We have to get permission from 12 agencies," said Sadriddinov. "And people in those agencies get
suspicious and nervous as soon as you mention ’mosque registration."
Sadriddinov said it took him more than seven months to finally register his mosque.
Mosques Converted Into Hair Salons
More than 300 unregistered mosques have been closed down in Dushanbe in the past two months.
The city mayor’s office says some of the old makeshift mosques will house hair salons, public baths, or
community centers. The office says that there are just 57 registered mosques in the city, which has well
over 500,000 inhabitants.
At least two of the unregistered mosque locations have been destroyed.
The mosque destructions were followed in late August by compulsory testing for clerics which resulted in
the expulsion of at least four imams who failed to pass the written exams.
Some prominent religious leaders in Tajikistan have criticized the official measures as "anti-Islamic," and
warned they could bring public discontent and unpredicted consequences.
But not everyone in Tajikistan shares that view.
Firuz Umarov is an expert on social and religious affairs at a state-run think tank, the Center for Strategic
Studies in Dushanbe. Umarov told RFE/RL that the government merely wants mosques to be registered
properly, like any other public institution.
Umarov says hundreds of mosques have been built illegally all over the country, and are ignoring basic
safety guidelines.
Umarov accused some politicians -- particularly the leaders of Tajikistan’s Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP)
-- of trying to link "everything" to politics.
"The main reason behind the registration of the mosques is that the government wants all existing rules
and laws to be obeyed," said Umarov. "Besides, the land is state property, so they should consult with the
authorities before building a mosque on that land. That’s the reason behind the registration."
It is believed that there are more than 3,000 mosques in Tajikistan, and authorities say most of them
operate without a license.
Fear Of Fundamentalism Or Fear Of Dissent?
Some Tajik experts say the increased scrutiny of mosques and imams is part of a battle against extremism
and possible threats to security.
But Hikmatulloh Saifullozoda, the head of the Dushanbe-based think tank Dialog, disagrees. He tells
RFE/RL that the authorities tougher stance has nothing to do with any fear of religious extremism or
terrorism.
Saifullozoda argues that the Tajik government is simply afraid of any type of regular public gathering,
regardless of people’s religious beliefs.
"The authorities are worried about the fact that many people gather every evening in mosques," says
Saifullozoda. "Because when so many people -- from different parts of society -- get together regularly, it is
impossible [to imagine] that they would never discuss the country’s political, social, and economic issues."
In Dushanbe, the mosque re-registration and compulsory tests for imams have not been universally
criticized, even among clerics themselves.
Many imams regard the measures as insulting and unnecessary. But others have said the government’s
decision is to some extent "understandable," because imams deal with hundreds -- if not thousands -- of
people on a daily basis.
Qori Shamsiddin, the imam of one Dushanbe mosque, says that as many as 4,000 people at a time come
to his mosque for prayers.
Many people stay on after evening prayers, listening to their imams’ lectures or sermons. Some discuss
personal problems with their local imams, or seek other kinds of guidance.
Shamsiddin says it is "a responsible job to be an imam," and he argues that "the authorities have to make
sure that only people with the proper education and knowledge get the job."
FUENTE: http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp090807.shtml
GEORGIAN PRESIDENT GAINS A SHADOW RIVAL
Molly Corso, 18/09/2007, (http://www.eurasianet.org)
Just call him the Elvis of Georgian politics. Many sightings, none confirmed. Since his departure from
Georgia’s public arena in late 2006, former defense minister Irakli Okruashvili has reportedly been a busy
man; setting up a political party, forming a parliamentary faction and even opening a party office. The one
thing that he has not done is corroborate any of it.
For many Georgian media outlets, though, the lack of confirmation does not seem to matter. In recent
weeks, there has been feverish speculation that the 34-year-old Okruashvili is preparing to emerge as an
opposition figure to President Mikheil Saakashvili.
The media buzz started this summer, when a pro-opposition Tbilisi daily published several unattributed
reports alleging that Okruashvili was planning to form a political party. The reported announcement date,
however, passed without the expected fanfare.
Recent political developments have helped revive speculation concerning Okruashvili’s intentions. Over
the past week, a flurry of media reports focused on the possible formation of a new parliamentary faction in
support of Okruashvili, who is not a member of parliament.
Meanwhile, Saakashvili on September 12 removed Mikheil Kareli, a close Okruashvili ally, as the
presidential representative to the Shida Kartli region. Some political analysts interpreted the president’s

move as confirmation that a realignment of political forces is afoot. Kareli, long the target of smuggling
allegations, was removed after protesting the government’s decision to arrest several officials in the
regional center, Gori, on corruption charges. Saakashvili has described the move as an attempt to break
up a "clan" within the government.
"It is difficult to believe that the arrests were not politically motivated," commented Ghia Nodia, director of
the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development in Tbilisi. [Nodia also serves as the board
chair of the Open Society Georgia Foundation, which is affiliated with the Open Society Institute (OSI) in
New York. EurasiaNet operates under OSI auspices].
If Okruashvili "was not in real opposition to Saakashvili," the president likely would not have felt compelled
to remove Kareli, reasoned Malkhaz Matsaberidze, a professor of political science at Tbilisi State
University. Even so, the evidence that Saakashvili and Okruashvili are political opponents remains
circumstantial. "[R]emember that Saakashvili and Okruashvili have never publicly argued," Matsaberidze
said.
News coverage on the privately owned, but decidedly pro-presidential Rustavi-2 television channel
appeared to confirm that Saakashvili now regards Okruashvili as a political foe. Recent Rustavi 2 reports
vilified Kareli as "uneducated" and "unprofessional" Analysts believe the true target of these attacks was
Okruashvili. The station termed a subsequent meeting between Kareli and supporters, including the former
defense minister, as "conspiratorial" in nature. It also cautioned viewers darkly that "[t]he party does not
have a name, but its political surname is Okruashvili."
Amid all the speculation, Okruashvili has refrained from speaking publicly about his plans. Apart from a
brief wave to television cameras on the day of his meeting with Kareli, Okruashvili has generally eschewed
media attention.
The fact that the former minister broke with the government is a major factor in his present popularity,
Matsaberidze suggested.
"He left the government," Matsaberidze said, referring to Okruashvili’s November 2006 decision to resign
as the minister of economic development after being removed from the defense ministry. "He is seen as a
martyr of the government... There are a lot of people who are critical of the government and they see
Okruashvili as one of them."
FUENTE: http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav091807a.shtml
GEORGIA VENTS FRUSTRATION WITH UN, OSCE
Nina Akhmeteli, 20/09/2007, (http://www.eurasianet.org)
Georgian ire over recent statements coming out of the United Nations and the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe underscores the limits of Tbilisi’s long-standing strategy to use international
organizations as a counterweight to Russian influence in the conflict zones of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia.
With President Mikheil Saakashvili scheduled to address the UN General Assembly in New York on
September 26, Georgia’s troubles with the UN and OSCE could come into sharper focus. On September
6, Saakashvili responded to a recommendation by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon that Georgia move
a patriotic youth camp away from the border with Abkhazia, calling it "amoral and meager."
"We do not ask for such advice," Saakashvili retorted, in remarks broadcast by Georgian television. The
Georgian leader went on to question the effectiveness of efforts undertaken by the "UN and other
organizations" to promote lasting peace in Abkhazia, specifically in promoting the return of tens of
thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs). UN officials were not available for comment, though
facilitating IDP return is a long-stated goal of the organization.
Saakashvili will devote a considerable portion of his UN address to the situations in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, along with a mysterious missile incident an August, according to presidential spokesperson Dmitri
Kitoshvili.
State Minister for Conflict Resolution Davit Bakradze maintains that, despite its criticism of recent UN
comments, Tbilisi remains intent on securing more active UN participation in conflict resolution in the
breakaway Black Sea region. Tbilisi has been waging an aggressive campaign to have international
peacekeepers replace Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia. "We demand the same that we’ve always
demanded in recent years: to have more intense international policy and involvement," Bakradze told
EurasiaNet.
Officials in Tbilisi suggest Russian obstructionism has helped prevent international organizations from
intensifying peace-keeping and peace-building activities in the Caucasus. State Minister for Euro-Atlantic
Integration Issues Giorgi Baramidze believes that Russia’s veto power within the UN Security Council, and
its overall "strong position" within the organization, played a significant role in shaping the UN’s stance on
the patriotic youth camp.
Many government officials in Tbilisi are similarly convinced that Moscow influenced the OSCE to shy away
from pursuing an investigation into the August missile incident. In a September 6 report, the organization’s
special envoy, Miomir Zuzul, stated that it was "extremely difficult to have a clear picture" of the events
surrounding the August 6 event. A group of foreign experts determined that the missile was fired by a jet
that flew out of Russian territory. "Very often both the OSCE and the UN can’t say the truth that is evident
for many others," charged Baramidze.
Local analysts agree. "The OSCE has tense relations with Moscow and it tried to be politically correct
towards Russia,’ said Zurab Abashidze, vice-president of the Georgian Council on Foreign Relations.
Alexander Rondeli, president of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, maintains
that the Kremlin’s ability to block funding for OSCE programs also plays a role. OSCE officials did respond
to the criticism in time for this story.
One local observer argues that Tbilisi’s interests would be better served if it engaged in direct talks with
the de facto Abkhaz and South Ossetian leaderships, rather than waiting for international organizations to
take action. "Russia has a strong position in both international organizations and the only way for us to
neutralize Russia is to have bilateral negotiations with the other side of the conflict," said Shalva
Pichkhadze, chairman of Georgia for NATO, a non-governmental organization.
While dissatisfaction with the UN and OSCE seems to mount in Tbilisi, Georgians are increasingly hopeful
that national security will receive a boost from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In a September 18
interview with the daily Rezonansi (Resonance), Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili stated that the
administration believes "a political decision" will be made about Georgia’s NATO membership in time for
the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania.
"Further integration into NATO will be the best solution for conflict resolution," Bakradze, the state minister,
told a visiting delegation from NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly, news outlets reported. "And a MAP
[Membership Action Plan] for us will be a signal of political support."
The extent to which NATO’s own interests mirror Georgian expectations, however, remains a matter for
some debate within policy circles. To date, the Brussels-based alliance has walked a careful line. In April
2007, its Parliamentary Assembly stated that neither Russia nor the South Ossetian and Abkhaz separatist
leaders should be allowed to "thwart Georgia’s goals, particularly if Georgia is acting in good faith to
resolve the conflicts." Georgian officials naturally would like NATO to toughen its line. Bakradze, for
example, told the NATO Parliamentary Assembly delegation: "To have an institutional response to
Russia’s aggression is a matter of European security."
FUENTE:http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav092007a.shtml
CENTRAL ASIA: IS THE REGION ENTERING A NEW ERA OF COOPERATION?
Bruce Pannier, A EurasiaNet Partner Post from RFE/RL, 23/09/2007, (http://www.eurasianet.org)
Central Asia seems to have entered a new period of cooperation. Regional leaders are making official
visits to neighboring states at a rate not seen since the early days after the fall of the Soviet Union. What’s
driving this new dynamic?
The latest example is last week’s visit by Tajik President Emomali Rahmon to Kyrgyzstan.
"We touched on the difficult issue of territorial delimitation and spoke in favor of a calm resolution of the
issue that we inherited from history in a spirit of brotherhood, neighborly relations, in a constructive
atmosphere, with mutual respect for our interests," Rahmon said.
Some might say, "So what?" The Tajik president took a one-hour flight to visit the head of a neighboring
state. But it’s the first time Rahmon has paid an official state visit to Kyrgyzstan since the March 2005 Tulip
Revolution that brought Kurmanbek Bakiev to power.
And Bakiev was not the only Central Asian head of state Rahmon held talks with this month. Kazakh
President Nursultan Nazarbaev visited Tajikistan earlier this month with some good news for the Tajik
people.
"We agreed to establish a special investment fund of $100 million," Nazarbaev said. "The Kazakh side will
contribute its significant part. The fund will work for the benefit of the Tajik economy. I believe it will be
good support."
’Great Potential’
During the same trip, Nazarbaev also visited Turkmenistan to meet with that country’s new president,
Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov. The new Turkmen leader hinted that better days are ahead for
Turkmen-Kazakh relations.
"One of the priority aspects of our cooperation is the further intensification of bilateral trade and economic
relations," Berdymukhammedov said. "In this regard, we have great potential in the realization of large-
scale projects in the field of trade, energy, transportation, and telecommunications."
Nazarbaev’s visit to Ashgabat this month was actually the Kazakh president’s second trip to Turkmenistan
this year, something of a record for visits to Turkmenistan by a head of state. Nazarbaev was in
Turkmenistan in May when Russian President Vladimir Putin was visiting, and the three heads of state
signed an agreement on pipelines to export natural gas.
Uzbek Comeback
Uzbekistan has not been left out of this new era of cooperation either. Uzbek President Islam Karimov is
due to visit Tajikistan and Turkmenistan in October -- two countries that have often had very strained
relations with Uzbekistan.
Tajikistan for example, gets most its natural gas from Uzbekistan, but Uzbek authorities have used this as
leverage in relations with Tajikistan. When the Tajik government makes decisions that the Uzbek
government disagrees with, the gas supplies often are reduced or cut off entirely, though officially the
reason is always technical problems. Kyrgyzstan has experienced a similar problem with Uzbekistan.
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have been on bad terms almost since they became independent in 1991.
But more recently the Turkmen authorities blame the Uzbek government for helping would-be assassins
who allegedly tried to kill former Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov in November 2002.
The Uzbek Embassy in Ashgabat was searched at that time -- in defiance of international law -- and the
Uzbek ambassador to Turkmenistan was declared persona non grata shortly after the incident. In fact,
Karimov’s last official visit to Turkmenistan was nearly nine years ago -- in October 1998. The reason for
that visit was the advance of Afghanistan’s Taliban movement to the borders of Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan.
Of course, the leaders of the five Central Asian states do see each other when they attend various
meetings, like CIS gatherings or, in the case of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, at
summits of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
But while such summits may include security as a leading topic on the agenda, they do not do much to
promote regional cooperation in Central Asia. And prior to this busy month of visits, the leaders of the five
countries had been making fewer and fewer official visits to other Central Asian states.
Factors Behind Developments
Several factors could be driving this new era of cooperation in Central Asia.
The first is the change in leadership in Turkmenistan. Berdymukhammedov’s predecessor -- Saparmurat

Niyazov -- made Turkmenistan a very reclusive state. Niyazov did not commit his country to regional
groups like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or the now-defunct Central Asian Economic Union.
Niyazov also did not ever see any reason to talk about regional security.
When the Taliban movement’s forces seized control of Kabul in September 1996, Russia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan sent representatives to Almaty to discuss this threat to security.
Turkmenistan, buoyed by its status as a UN-recognized neutral state, chose not to attend that conference
or any regional security conference after that.

But Berdymukhammedov has placed a priority on developing better relations with his Central Asian
neighbors, a fact that is not only noticed but was rewarded with an invitation as an observer to the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Bishkek in August.
Berdymukhammedov’s government is promising even more cooperation with its Central Asian neighbors,
including energy exports to energy-starved Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
Another factor drawing the Central Asian states closer together is Kazakhstan’s emergence as the regional
economic powerhouse. Revenues from oil and natural gas exports are finally starting to drive
Kazakhstan’s economy upward, and with this extra money the Kazakh government and Kazakh
businesspeople are investing huge sums in neighboring Central Asian countries.
There is now Kazakh investment in hydropower projects, oil and gas pipelines, banks, and other ventures
in all of Central Asia. Nazarbaev’s trips to Turkmenistan and Tajikistan this month were as much about
trade and economic cooperation as they were about political cooperation.
One more factor compelling the five Central Asian countries toward deeper cooperation is the international
community’s increasing familiarity with the region.
Sensing Growing Importance?
Central Asia was barely on the map for most people until the last few years. The willingness of the five
countries to cooperate with U.S.-led efforts in Afghanistan helped bring new attention to the region, and
the vast energy resources the region possesses kept that attention on Central Asia after those countries’
role in the Afghan operation began to diminish.
But now, any number of foreign suitors are arriving in Central Asia, seeking energy supplies, metals, or
merely some political influence in a strategically important area of the world that is the border between the
worrisome states of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran to the south, China to the east, and Russia and
Europe to the west. The five leaders of Central Asia may now be sensing the region’s growing importance
and a need to coordinate their approaches to various would-be regional players.
One small example is oil and natural gas exports. If Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan can agree
on a price for gas that suits them all, they could avoid a potentially nasty competition that might see all
reducing prices to outsell their neighbors, with a corresponding loss in profits.
If all this seems logical, then it must be mentioned that historically the region has a horrible record of
cooperation. Until the area fell under the domination of the Soviet Union, it was never divided along ethnic
lines. There were khanates and emirates in Central Asia and where a person lived -- not who they were
ethnically -- was all that was important. A person was either a citizen of the Khivan or Kokand Khanate or
the Bukharan Emirate and whether they were Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Tajik, Kazakh or Turkmen made little
difference. But these khanates and emirates rarely cooperated, even in the face of a common threat.
Tsarist Russia had little trouble in subduing them one at a time in the latter part of the 19th century. The
Soviet plan to divide the region into republics based on titular nationalities was intended to further divide
the people of Central Asia, and even today that policy seems to have succeeded. For more than a decade
the five Central Asian states tended to seek help from outsiders instead of seeking it from their neighbors.
FUENTE:http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp092307.shtml
SCEPTICISM OVER HUMAN RIGHTS PLAN
IWPR, 24/09/2007, (http://www.iwpr.net)
The Turkmen government has introduced a national human rights programme that looks more like an
attempt to improve the country’s image than to improve the situation on the ground.
On September 15, a government interdepartmental human rights commission held its first session in
Ashgabat. The commission was set up three weeks ago by presidential decree.
Its head, Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov, has said the commission’s job is to prepare reports on
Turkmenistan’s observance of its international human rights obligations, to monitor domestic legislation to
ensure it complies with international conventions, and to produce a new National Human Rights
Programme.

Turkmenistan has signed up to more than 90 international conventions and accords on human rights since
it joined the United Nations in 1992. But the Turkmen authorities have repeatedly come under fire from the
UN for ignoring their obligations and failing to submit national reports to the relevant committees. For
example, it has not reported to the UN committee on human rights since 1998, on economic, social and
cultural rights since 1999, and torture since 2000.
The administration of the late president Saparmurat Niazov, who died in December, did not allow human
rights investigators into the country and refused to let the International Committee of the Red Cross and
Amnesty International inspect its jails.
In its 2007 World Report published in January, Human Rights Watch said the persecution of human rights
activists and independent journalists, the repression of people deemed “enemies of the state”, restrictions
on movement, religious persecution, ethnic discrimination and breaches of prisoners’ rights were ongoing.
Tajigul Begmedova, head of the Turkmen Helsinki Foundation, an émigré group based in Bulgaria, says
violations of human rights have been “so flagrant that the government had to react somehow”. Since it was
not going to dismiss large numbers of officials for human rights abuses, the government has set up this
commission to gently acknowledge that there is a problem and to be seen to be addressing it.
“This is part of the government’s policy of promoting Berdymuhammedov abroad as a new type of
Turkmen leader,” she said.
An NBCentralAsia analyst in Ashgabat agrees, predicting that the authorities may launch a major
international campaign to the effect that human rights are fine in Turkmenistan.
However, he says the real human rights situation is unlikely to improve in the near future. For that to
happen, the government would have to demonstrate a genuine will to change, for example abolishing
restrictive laws and tearing up the black lists which determine who can or cannot leave the country and
where they can get jobs.
“Turkmen towns effectively have a curfew, and anyone who breaks the rules is detained by the police.
How can we talk about improving human rights in conditions like these?” he asked.
FUENTE: http://www.iwpr.net/?p=btm&s=b&o=338939&apc_state=henb
KYRGYZSTAN: A NEW BOUT OF CONSTITUTIONAL WRANGLING BEGINS
Daniel Sershen, 26/09/2007, (http://www.eurasianet.org )
After a quiet summer, Kyrgyzstan once again is experiencing political turbulence. As has been the case
since the country’s Tulip Revolution in 2005, the bickering centers on the question of where to draw the
line on executive authority.
The latest bout of political wrestling began September 14, when the country’s highest court invalidated two
packages of constitutional amendments passed amid street protests in late 2006. President Kurmanbek
Bakiyev responded days later by announcing yet another set of constitutional reforms that would be put to
a referendum on October 21, a move some in the opposition decried as a power grab.
Bakiyev’s proposal would expand parliament from 75 to 90 members, all of them elected by party affiliation
rather than geographic district as in the past. Party blocs in parliament would have the chance to appoint
the prime minister, who would then assemble a cabinet.
Many who were critical of the power accumulated by former President Askar Akayev had pushed for such
changes. But Bakiyev’s draft would simultaneously strengthen the president’s powers of appointment and
dismissal, something few constitutional reformers had envisioned.
Although opposition street demonstrations in November 2006 initially pressured the president to accept a
reduction in his powers, pro-Bakiyev lawmakers restored many of them the following month. Kyrgyzstan’s
Constitutional Court invalidated both moves, citing the fact that parliament never gave the court a chance
to comment, as required by the operative 2003 constitution.
Addressing parliament on September 19, Bakiyev presented his latest amendments as a compromise to
end the wrangling.

"The main conclusion drawn from the two-year process of constitutional reform is that it is necessary to put
an end to all this," Bakiyev said in his speech, broadcast on state television. None of the proposed
changes, he said, "were invented in Government House. Every line includes the opinion of people,
including the opinion of the opposition, the opinion of experts, and the work of several working groups. I
am only using my right to submit this opinion to a referendum."
Citizens will also vote on a proposal that seeks to codify the constitutional changes. Elections for
parliament under the new party-list system may come as early as late 2007. Analysts predicted that
Kyrgyzstan’s many small political parties would need to consolidate ahead of the polls. During his speech,
Bakiyev himself said he wished to establish a party to contest the elections, although he later clarified that
he would support, rather than lead, any pro-presidential union.
Some parts of the opposition criticized Bakiyev’s proposals. "If we accept the constitution proposed by the
president of Kyrgyzstan, we will receive a strong head of state who could become a dictator over time,"
said opposition member of parliament Temir Sariyev at a public forum on September 24, according to local
news agency 24.kg.
But the pair of opposition lawmakers who initiated the suit against the previous versions of the constitution,
Kabai Karabekov and Melis Eshimkanov, supported the court’s decision. Eshimkanov also spoke out in
favor of Bakiyev’s constitutional draft.
According to Tamerlan Ibraimov, Director of Kyrgyzstan’s Center for Political and Legal Studies, "the last
step by the president is a well-planned move to strengthen his own position, making use of a situation
where the opposition is alienated and cannot oppose his actions."
The referendum would most likely pass regardless of its content, Ibraimov continued, given public
dissatisfaction with politics and the likelihood of falsification. "The referendum has always been used in
Kyrgyzstan as an instrument for the advancement of [the authorities’] interests under cover of the people’s
name," he said.
Analysts disagreed on how the change in the way parliament is elected – and the potential strengthening
of Kyrgyzstan’s party system that might follow – stacked up against the numerous, if less visible,
adjustments in favor of the executive.
Under Bakiyev’s proposal, some appointment powers remain subject to a standard system of checks and
balances. But the president retains the authority outlined in the December constitution to directly appoint
officials responsible for defense and security, as well as to dismiss any member of government outright.
He would add internal affairs and foreign relations as new areas falling under his direct supervision, and
gain greater leverage in appointing local judges.
Despite these increases in the president’s power, professor of political science Zainidin Kurmanov felt
Bakiyev’s proposal was "a step forward." He cited the benefit of the switch to a party system in parliament,
combined with the simple fact that this could mark the end of Kyrgyzstan’s long-running battle over
constitutional reform.
Constitutional lawyer Almaz Esengeldiyev was more critical, noting that the new draft gave the president
the ability to set up parallel power structures, which would allow the establishment of an entire "shadow
government."
"The true government [under the prime minister] would be some kind of puppet, while in reality the
government will be in the hands of the president," he said.
Esengeldiyev and other members of civil society also criticized the speed with which the referendum was
called and the lack of public input into Bakiyev’s draft. The forum at which Sariyev spoke, which included
prominent civic leaders as well as the opposition, ended with a resolution calling on the president to
postpone the referendum to allow for extensive public debate.
The opposition has yet to announce a more coordinated response. Recent street demonstrations,
particularly those led by former prime minister Feliks Kulov in April, failed to achieve a critical mass of
public support. On September 25, Kulov declared the dissolution of the loose opposition coalition he had
assembled for the protests, the United Front. He said he planned to contest the expected parliamentary
elections as the leader of his own party, Ar-Namys.
There remains a possibility that rising prices for basic necessities such as bread and gas might motivate
the average person to take to the streets. But the tangible public disillusionment with politics made this
unlikely, analysts said.

According to Kurmanov, it was high time to put an end to the issue of constitutional reform. "We’ve been
discussing for two and a half years – two and a half years," he said. "People are tired – even the politicians
are tired."
FUENTE: http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav092607.shtml
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=bkz&s=b&o=337985&apc_state=henb
CONSTITUTION MAY RESULT IN PLIABLE JUDICIARY
IWPR, 26/09/2007, (http://www.iwpr.net )
The president will end up having too much control over the courts if Kyrgyzstan votes to adopt his new
constitution on October 21, say NBCentralAsia analysts.
In an annual address to the nation on September 19, President Bakiev announced a referendum on a new
constitution, setting the date for October 21 and putting forward the version he would like to see approved.
The move followed a September 14 ruling by the Constitutional Court that the current constitution, dating
from December 2006, and also its immediate predecessor adopted the previous month, were null and
void.
According to the December version of the constitution, judges at all levels and also the prosecutor general
could be appointed and dismissed only with parliament’s assent.
Bakiev’s draft, however, gives the president powers to dismiss the prosecutor general and to initiate
criminal proceedings against local judges without consultation.
As before, the appointment and dismissal of judges sitting in the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court
will require parliamentary approval.
NBCentralAsia analysts warn that the judiciary could end up being even less independent than it was
before if the constitution is passed.
Parliamentarian Kanybek Imanaliev believes the president is trying to appropriate the powers of the
judiciary.
“The article [allowing the president] to dismiss the prosecutor general is one more step towards
authoritarianism. Тhe prosecutor general has oversight over legislation and must be independent – but
now he’ll be reliant on the president,” said Imanaliev.
The constitution envisages that the president will appoint and dismiss local judges based on
recommendations from the National Council for Public Justice, which draws its members from the
legislature, executive and judiciary as well as groups outside government. The deputy speaker of
parliament, Kubanychbek Isabekov, fears that the president will be in a position to pressure this council.
“The way it will work is that the president appoints the judges himself,” said Isabekov. “Their nomination by
the National Council for Public Justice will really be a fiction.”
Another member of parliament, Iskhak Masaliev, disagreed with the other commentators interviewed by
NBCentralAsia, and argued instead that the Bakiev draft represents an improvement on all preceding
versions of the constitution when it comes to ensuring the independence of the judiciary. He thinks the
document accords a reasonable degree of power to the president.
“No one can be independent from society, so obviously some dependence remains,” he said. “For
instance, there is the question of funding for the judiciary. Any government is going to have a regulatory
relationship with the courts to some extent,” he said.
FUENTE:
http://www.iwpr.net/index.php?apc_state=hENbbkg338967&s=o&o=m=h&l=EN&s=b&p=bkg&o=339080

PUTIN'S GOVERNMENT RESHUFFLE ENDS WITH GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT AND
PLEASANT SURPRISES
Pravda, 27/09/2007, (http://english.pravda.ru)
President Vladimir Putin announced the names of ministers in the new Cabinet chaired by Prime Minister
Viktor Zubkov on September 24. The key ministers of the previous cabinet have retained their positions,
and all resignations are in no occasion connected with the appointment of the new prime minister. In fact,
the Cabinet now has the same structure as before. It was the replacement of the prime minister that
became the central intrigue.
It was anticipated that a shift might take place in the government this autumn several months before
presidential election and election to the State Duma in Russia. Some experts expected that President
Putin would promote his successor to presidency to let him get well prepared for governmental work and
presidency. But Vladimir Putin acted in a different way. With the view of keeping the entire of formal and
informal authority in the country the president replaced one technical government with another one with a
politically heavier figure of Viktor Zubkov at head. According to Vladimir Putin, the previous government
was getting ineffective in view of coming elections, and many of the ministers were anxious about their
future employment rather than about their responsibilities. The explanation suggests that the new
government has been probably formed for a short period of time, and its key figures may retain their
positions when a new president comes to power and the structure of the cabinet in general will be
renewed. Vladimir Putin also stated that the administrative reform in the framework of which he said the
previous cabinet had functioned was unfit for Russia. But in fact the reform was simply profane. Also, it
took a long period of time to make personnel and structural decisions with no information published about
them at all which in its turn created a big intrigue about a prospective government. Viktor Zubkov claims
that the role of the government will be changed. He has made efforts to represent himself as a politically
strong figure able to manage the government and take it out from the president’s manual control. All the
above factors implied that the new government would be considerably renewed.
Vladimir Putin announced two days ago at a session of the government that the cabinet was just slightly
changed and the rotation of ministers was a technical thing.
Minister for economic development and trade German Gref resigned after he several times declared he
was going to retire to the business sphere. The liberal minister did not fit the new economic policy of
Russia that means a more active role of the government, emergence of state corporations and increase of
governmental assets in competitive spheres, all the things to which German Gref always objected. In other
words, he quitted because he did not want to work in a technically weak government, and the government
does not need the too strong minister with his heavy political weight. Liberal economist Elvira Nabiullina
has taken his place. The new female minister can be an ideological successor to Gref’s line and at the
same time she has no political weight yet.
The resignation of Minister for Social Development and Health Mikhail Zurabov is connected with the
coming elections. Within the past time the minister has become an object of people’s dislike and
indignation because of the cash-for-benefits welfare reform conducted in Russia in 2005 and the program
for selling medications at a reduced price for people with low incomes. The United Russia party several
times suggested dismissing the minister but the president would not get rid of the minister who positioned
himself as an extremely essential official. Former deputy minister of finance Tatyana Golikova (she is also
wife of industry and energy minister Viktor Khristenko) has taken Zurabov’s place. By the way, it seems to
be a stable tradition in Russia to appoint a woman head of the social department.
The third resignation in the cabinet is connected with failure of minister for regional development Vladimir
Yakovlev. The minister was appointed to the position in 2003 after he retired from the post of
St.Petersburg governor and actively participated in an election campaign of Valentina Matvienko who later
became the governor of the city instead of him. Political observers state that Vladimir Yakovlev was not
able to cope with his responsibilities and it was quite logical that he has been dismissed. Presidential
plenipotentiary in Russia’s south federal district Dmitry Kozak has been appointed minister for regional
development. It is said that the scope of the department’s responsibilities will be increased taking into
consideration Kozak’s considerable political weight. It was clear that Dmitry Kozak would be back to
Moscow sooner or later as he is known as one of the most effective and most loyal to the president
functionaries. His activity in the sphere of regional policy was rather successful.
Advancement of Alexey Kudrin to the position of vice-premier has become the only surprise of the recent
cabinet reshuffling. And the fact is even more important than the replacement of the prime minister. This
promotion means that the president approves of Kudrin’s tough budgetary policy that could be under the
threat of frustration in case of the minister’s resignation. Kudrin’s appointment is also a serious blow for
Viktor Zubkov as it is known that both are in competitive terms. Last spring, the minister of finance
announced resignation of Zubkov from the position of the financial intelligence chief. That resignation put
an end to the struggle for control over the banking sphere between the Ministry of Finance and Russia’s
Central Bank.
It is important that the newly appointed prime minister was not allowed to form a cabinet of his own, and
the government he now heads has the structure that President Putin approves. It is likely that Viktor
Zubkov was not an active participant of forming the new government. So, it seems that Viktor Zubkov will
perform the role of the president’s envoy in the government but not a real leader. In other words, Viktor
Zubkov has got a cabinet formed by the previous prime minister and consisting of officials having free
access to the president.
President Putin has once again demonstrated that he is the key figure in Russia’s political life and shocked
the society with his unpredictable decision. But this time the situation differs from all previous situations of
the sort. It is highly likely that Putin had to seriously deviate from the scenario he had planned to
implement together with appointment of a new prime minister. He gave up the idea of replacement of the
cabinet to avoid a misbalance in his circle and also because he did not want the cabinet to grow too
strong. The president preferred stability to effectiveness at the hard period of coming elections. Earlier
President Putin did not plan to appoint Viktor Zubkov prime minister and even wanted to make him a
senator in the upper chamber of the parliament. The hesitation in making important strategic decisions
reveals that Vladimir Putin is getting less confident of his actions and can not foresee what consequences
they may have. At that, influential figures of his circles are always eager to benefit from the situation.
FUENTE: http://english.pravda.ru/russia/kremlin/97837-putin_government-0
GEORGIA PRESIDENT SCORNS ACCUSERS
BBC, 29/09/2007, (http://news.bbc.co.uk)
President Mikhail Saakashvili of Georgia has for the first time spoken about allegations levelled at him by
his former defence minister.
Irakli Okruashvili accused Mr Saakashvili of leading a corrupt government and ordering the murder of
political opponents.
Mr Saakashvili branded the allegations as "unpardonable lies".
He came to power in 2004 with promises to fight corruption and develop genuine democracy in Georgia.
Mr Saakashvili returned from New York, where he had delivered at speech at the United Nations, to
confront the allegations levelled at him by Mr Okruashvili.
"Okruashvili and everybody else knows that all the things he said about me and about the country's
leadership are unpardonable lies," Mr Saakashvili said.
He insisted that one of the main principles of his life was the fight against corruption.
Opposition protests
After the former defence minister made his accusations he was arrested on charges of corruption.
Mr Saakashvili defended the move, saying anyone who broke the law would get what they deserved.
But the former minister's allies insist his arrest was intended to silence a powerful opponent.
On Friday, several thousand people protested against the arrest, and against President Saakashvili's
government.
On Saturday a number of leading opposition parties have united on Saturday to form a movement called
the Salvation Front.
It is aimed at creating what they describe as an electoral revolution in Georgia to oust Mr Saakashvili, who
they accuse of being authoritarian.

But the Georgian authorities insist this is not a threat because peaceful protests are normal in any
democratic country.
Mr Saakashvili was swept to power after the "Rose revolution" - the massive street demonstrations which
led to the collapse of President's Eduard Shevardnadze's regime in 2003.
FUENTE: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7019845.stm

ECONOMÍA - Titulares
Russian court orders oil tycoon Khodorkovsky to remain at Siberian prison

http://english.pravda.ru (28/09/2007)
RUSSIAN COURT ORDERS OIL TYCOON KHODORKOVSKY TO REMAIN AT SIBERIAN

PRISON
Pravda, 28/09/2007, (http://english.pravda.ru)
A Russian court ordered imprisoned oil tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky to stay in a Siberian jail for another
three months, the latest setback in his lawyers' fight to get him transferred to Moscow in connection with a
new investigation.
A district court in the city of Chita ruled Friday that Khodorkovsky must remain in custody there to prevent
him from "obstructing the investigation and hiding criminal evidence," the site said.
Lawyers for Khodorkovsky, who is serving an eight-year prison sentence after a politically charged trial,
have fought for his transfer from the Chita region on the Chinese border to Moscow amid a money-
laundering investigation prosecutors opened in February.
In March, a district court in Moscow rejected a decision by prosecutors to base the new investigation in
Chita, and ordered that Khodorkovsky and his business partner Platon Lebedev, who faces similar
charges, be moved to Moscow. That decision was upheld in April, but Khodorkovsky was never
transferred.
In July, his lawyers filed suit against two state prosecutors, accusing them of ignoring the court decision.
Khodorkovsky, once Russia's richest man, was arrested in 2003 amid a tax inquiry that eventually put the
oil company he founded, OAO Yukos, into state hands. He was convicted in 2005 of fraud and tax evasion
and has been serving his sentence in the Chita region, about 4,700 kilometers (3,000 miles) east of
Moscow.
The trial and tax probe were widely seen as a Kremlin-driven campaign to punish Khodorkovsky for
challenging President Vladimir Putin and to boost state control over the lucrative oil industry.
The latest charges involve accusations that Khodorkovsky and Lebedev stole property worth US$34.3
billion (EUR24 billion) from Yukos subsidiaries.
Khodorkovsky has denied the new charges, calling the case a "shameful farce." His legal team has long
insisted the company's business structure was legal and meticulously audited by foreign consultants to
meet international standards.
FUENTE: http://english.pravda.ru/russia/97895-khodorkovsky-0

MEDIOS DE COMUNICACIÓN- Titulares
TV, Radio Need Less Censorship, Not Better Technology

Azerbaijan: jailed journalist seeks pardon

Turkmenistan: media repression continues,one year after journalist’s death

TV, RADIO NEED LESS CENSORSHIP, NOT BETTER TECHNOLOGY
IWPR, 03/09/2007, (http://www.iwpr.net )
Installing hi-tech equipment in Turkmenistan’s television and radio stations will not improve programme
quality as long as the authorities continue to keep journalists on a short leash and censor their work, say
NBCentralAsia media-watchers.
On August 17, President Gurbanguly Berdymuhammedov pointed out that there was “a great deal of
unfinished work” to do in the media. He said radio news programmes often put out unchecked information,
the artistic content of television programmes “leaves a lot to be desired”, and neither radio nor television
employs modern technological or journalistic methods.
Berdymuhammedov has been highly critical of the media since assuming office in February, and he has
sacked two culture and media ministers in succession.
So far the president has focused his attention on technology rather than programme content. He has
issued orders to build a 470 metre high television tower in Ashgabat, making it one of the tallest in the
world, and the government has already signed a 3.5 million US dollar deal with a British company, Eurasia
Trans Ltd, to supply video editing equipment.
However, NBCentralAsia media watchers say that the president has missed the mark, as no amount of
new technology will improve the quality of radio and television programmes in Turkmenistan as long as the
authorities continue to enforce strict censorship.
The state currently runs one national radio station and four television channels, which all broadcast in the
Turkmen language.
Each TV channel fills around 17 hours of airtime a day, with 10 per cent of this dedicated to home news, a
quarter to feature films and cartoons and the rest to music and propaganda programmes which are
frequently repeated.
All media heads and chief editors are personally appointed by the president and all printed, audio and
video material is censored by the Committee for the Protection of State Secrets in the Press, which comes
under the government.
“The state is not ready to give [journalists] any freedom. There is harsh censorship in all media outlets,
which is no good for freedom and creativity,” said one journalist from Ashgabat.
University journalism courses were banned in 1997 by the late president Saparmurat Niazov, and most
journalists now working in Turkmenistan were either trained during the Soviet era or taught themselves.
A media-watcher based in the country says that there are simply not enough skilled journalists available to
bring domestic broadcasting up to modern standards.
“Television needs to develop new programmes and new production ideas, but who’s going to do it? The
TV people joke that they have more cameras than people,” he said.
FUENTE: http://www.iwpr.net/?p=btm&s=b&o=338313&apc_state=henb

AZERBAIJAN: JAILED JOURNALIST SEEKS PARDON
Mina Muradova, 14/09/2007, (http://www.eurasianet.org)
Facing a fresh charge of tax evasion, jailed Azerbaijani newspaper editor Eynulla Fatullayev has petitioned
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev for a pardon and appealed to the European Court of Human Rights for
a ruling on his case.
Fatullayev, editor of the now-closed Realny Azerbaijan and Azeri-language Gùndalik Azarbaycan
newspapers, was arrested in April 2007 on charges of slander, and accused of "insulting" the Azerbaijani
people. The case began after Realniy Azerbaijan published a statement by an Armenian army officer who
said that Armenian forces had kept open an exit corridor for civilians during the 1992 Khojali massacre in
Nagorno-Karabakh.
The most recent charge against the journalist, tax evasion, came on September 4, after questioning of
Realny Azerbaijan and Gùndalik Azarbaycan staff by the Ministry of National Security agents. The ministry
claims that Fatullayev concealed 242,522 manats (roughly $279,000) from Realny Azerbaijan’s income.
The charge is the third against the newspaper editor. In July, the ministry accused Fatullayev of inciting
ethnic and religious hatred, and charged him with terrorism.
Fatullayev defense attorney Isakhan Ashurov told EurasiaNet that preliminary investigations into the
terrorism and tax evasion charges have now ended, and that the cases are being transferred to the Court
on Serious Crimes for consideration. If found guilty, the journalist would face a potential five to eight years
in prison on the terrorism charges and six months in prison on the tax evasion charges, Fatullayev’s
attorneys say.
Fatullayev was sentenced to 30 months in prison in April on the original slander charges. In late August,
the Supreme Court of Azerbaijan rejected an appeal.
Within the Azerbaijani legal system, a presidential pardon has now become Fatullayev’s last option for
release from jail.
In a September 9 appeal, the journalist asked for a pardon from President Aliyev "because the criminal
proceedings which were instituted against him were unfair and ungrounded," Ashurov told EurasiaNet. The
likelihood of Fatullayev receiving that pardon, however, is unknown.
In a September 7 press conference in Baku, the Council of Europe’s visiting commissioner for human
rights, Thomas Hammarberg, said that he had discussed the imprisonment of seven Azerbaijani journalists
with government officials, but did not receive a clear response about future intended actions. Hammarberg
said that he had also asked President Aliyev to issue a pardon for the journalists. President Aliyev’s office
could not be reached for comment.
In early August, one senior presidential administration official, however, dismissed the contention that
"bringing some individuals to trial" constitutes media repression.
"There is no reason for concern," said Ali Hasanov, head of the administration’s political policy department,
APA news agency reported. "The guarantors of the freedom of speech are the state and the president. In
the future, we will take actions to increase state care for the media."
Parliamentarian Vagif Samedoglu, a member of the Council of Europe’s Commission on Human Rights,
told APA news agency on September 11 that the next presidential pardon decree is not expected before
the end of September.
Meanwhile, Fatullayev’s attorney is appealing in the international arena. After the Supreme Court bid
failed, an appeal was submitted to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg on September 10,
Ashurov said. The lawyer claims that an "exceptional measure of punishment" was used against
Fatullayev by ordering his arrests on grounds of alleged terrorism, while he was already under arrest on
the original charges.

The seven journalists in jail currently in Azerbaijan have sparked rising concern from international
organizations. All of the reporters are in prison on charges of "defamation" or "incitement." All work for non-
government-controlled or pro-opposition media outlets.
On September 6, the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) issued a statement that
called on the government to stop the "persecution" of Fatullayev. "Not content with having locked up
Eynulla Fatullayev, the Azerbaijani authorities are now attempting to throw away the key by piling up
politically motivated criminal charges against him," said CPJ Executive Director Joel Simon.
In a June 2007 report to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Permanent Council,
Representative on Freedom of the Media Miklñs Haraszti urged that the seven journalists be released and
that "persecution of the remaining independent media" stop. The OSCE has also pushed for changes that
would make libel, defamation and verbal insults civil rather than criminal code violations. A draft law on the
topic has been under consideration in parliament since late 2006.
FUENTE: http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav091407a.shtml
TURKMENISTAN: MEDIA REPRESSION CONTINUES, ONE YEAR AFTER JOURNALIST’S

DEATH
Oguljamal Yazliyeva, 16/09/2007, (http://www.eurasianet.org)
On June 18, 2006, the Turkmen Helsinki Foundation on Human Rights (THF) released a report on a "new
wave of arrests of civil activists." It said Turkmen security forces had arrested human-rights activists
Annagurban Amangylyjov, Yelena Ovezova, Sapardurdy Hajiyev, and RFE/RL correspondent Ogulsapar
Muradova. All of them were held for allegedly possessing banned weapons.
The 58-year-old Muradova -- a former member of the THF -- had been reporting on deteriorating social
conditions in Turkmenistan. At that time of her arrest, she had worked for RFE/RL for only three months.
After her arrest, it was reported that Turkmen security agencies had earlier cut her telephone line and put
her house under constant surveillance.
According to the Turkmen Helsinki Foundation, she also was followed by security-service agents and
placed on video surveillance for 20 days before her arrest. Despite such pressures, Muradova continued
performing her job as a journalist.
Black Day
September 14, 2006, became a black day on the calendar for Muradova’s family, which includes three
children and grandchildren.
Turkmen Security officials informed the family that Muradova had died and claimed her death was from
natural causes. However, people who saw her body say it showed signs of Muradova having been
severely beaten.
One year later, there has been no thorough investigation into the circumstances that led to Muradova’s
sentencing in a closed trial and her death in custody in prison. Her death is a tragic example of the overall
human-rights condition in Turkmenistan.
Censorship Of Media Continues
Longtime authoritarian Turkmen leader Saparmurat Niyazov died three months after Muradova, in
December 2006, yet there has been little change in the bleak status of press freedom in Turkmenistan.
Unfortunately, strict censorship of information and of the news media -- which is almost completely
controlled by the state -- continues. Journalists for RFE/RL’s Turkmen Service -- who provide the only
source of independent information in the country -- are regularly subjected to threats and harassment by
the authorities.

"The actions by the government taken against journalists who candidly express their views once again
shows that there is no way for freedom of expression in Turkmenistan," said Hanamov Nurmuhammet, the
leader of the Republican Party in exile. "Once again, it shows that authorities want to destroy independent
journalists. It emphasizes the fact that free media and free expression is banned in the country."
In an interview with RFE/RL’s Turkmen Service, Jean-Francois Julliard, a news editor at Reporters Without
Borders (RSF) said, "Countries like Turkmenistan don’t want a free press, don’t want the journalists to be
able to speak freely and to criticize freely their governments."
He added: "This is the reason why in a lot of countries -- including Central Asian countries and
Turkmenistan -- the authorities try to do their best to control the press, to control the independent media,
and to try to shut down the critical voices."
However, there are some very small signs of change in the liberalization of Turkmen society.
On August 9, President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov approved the pardon and release of 11 political
prisoners. Additionally, Turkmenistan plans to release more than 9,000 convicts in line with a massive
amnesty on the occasion of the "Night of Omnipotence" during the holy month of Ramadan. Many are
hopeful that all journalists, prisoners of conscience, and human-rights activists currently imprisoned in
Turkmenistan will be released.
Elsa Vidal, the head of the Europe desk at RSF, said in commenting on a letter sent by RSF Secretary-
General Robert Menard to Berdymukhammedov on August 17 that: "The important thing for us is that we
need to show that we are closely witnessing what is happening in Turkmenistan and that we want to bring
support to any step Mr. Berdymukhammedov is willing to take to change the regime into a more
democratic sort of state."
Never Forgotten
Muradova was a brave woman who dedicated her life to the struggle for freedom of expression. And her
name will not be forgotten. In May, RSF and the mayor’s office of the French town of Bayeux inaugurated
a memorial for journalists killed on the job. Muradova’s name was engraved on the stone pillar next to the
names of other journalists killed in 2006.
RFE/RL Director of Broadcasting Michele DuBach, who attended the ceremony, remembered Muradova
by saying, "Ogulsapar Muradova wanted to make difference. She was a journalist, a mother, and a
grandmother. Indeed, [her reporting] did make a difference in Turkmenistan, but she paid a price."
FUENTE: http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp091607.shtml

SOCIEDAD- Titulares
Kazakhstan: moving forward with plan to replace cyrillic with latin alphabet
KAZAKHSTAN: MOVING FORWARD WITH PLAN TO REPLACE CYRILLIC WITH LATIN

ALPHABET
Paul Bartlett, 04/09/07, (http://www.eurasianet.org)
Even as Kazakhstan maintains close economic and political ties with Russia, Astana is moving ahead with
plans to replace Cyrillic script with the Latin alphabet. A feasibility study prepared over the summer
proposes that the alphabet change be phased in over a 12-to-15-year period.
President Nursultan Nazarbayev revived the possibility of an alphabet switch last fall, requesting that the
Ministry of Education and Science examine the experiences of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan, which have all changed to Latin letters. The ministry’s proposed action plan is based primarily
on the model used in Uzbekistan. It calls for a six-step program, outlining cost estimates for retraining the
country’s workforce to read Latin script, and changing signs on streets and public buildings. The overall
cost of switching is estimated at $300 million.
Some experts believe the final cost could be much higher. The ministry report, for example, provided no
estimate for the cost of changing official documents and re-printing official forms and materials. The
publishing sector could also assume substantial costs connected with changing equipment.
Along with the usual arguments for alphabet change, in particular promoting the country’s integration into
the global economy, officials have argued that a Latin alphabet could help Kazakhstan forge a more
cohesive national identity, moving it out from under Russia’s shadow.
"Switching the Kazakh alphabet to Latin means for Kazakhs changing the Soviet (colonial) identity, which
still largely dominates the national consciousness, to a sovereign (Kazakh) identity," the report stated.
"Among the many arguments in favor of switching the Kazakh alphabet to Latin, boosting the national
identity of the Kazakh people is the main and decisive one."
This explicit statement marks a break with Kazakhstan’s earlier, low-key approach to discussing the switch
to Latin. While Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan acted quickly after the 1991 Soviet collapse to
embrace Latin script, Kazakhstan took a more cautious route: it did not want to alienate its large Russian-
speaking population. In addition, officials felt that with the country in the grip of economic crisis in the early
1990s, changing the alphabet at that time was not a fiscally justifiable move.
The report pulls no punches in identifying the Cyrillic alphabet as being a major barrier to developing a
Kazakh national identity: "It [Cyrillic] facilitated and facilitates the orientation of the Kazakh national
consciousness towards the Russian language and Russian culture. As a result, Kazakh identity as such
remains largely undefined. On this level, moving to Latin will make it possible to form a clearer national
identity for Kazakhs."
Another reason for the switch is linked to the representation of the sounds of the Kazakh language. "In
many cases the phonetic nature of Kazakh is not shown according to Cyrillic script," Professor Kobey
Khusayn, director of the Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Linguistics, told EurasiaNet in an interview. As a
result, he said, certain Kazakh sounds are not properly represented and this leads to difficulties with
correct pronunciation. The introduction of Cyrillic in 1940 was "imposed from above" for ideological
reasons, he added, with no consideration of how this alphabet suited the Kazakh language.
The plan for switching to Latin will have a five-year preparatory stage, during which the practicalities will be
worked out. The next step will see publications being printed using the new alphabet, alongside the
existing one for the initial changeover period, and the working-age population will be trained in using the
new script. Teaching materials using Latin will be introduced into the country’s school system. The final
phase will be the consolidation of Latin as the Kazakh language in Cyrillic fades from public use.

Kazinform, the state news agency, has already set a precedent for the use of Latin for Kazakh: it offers a
newswire using both the Latin and Cyrillic alphabets for the Kazakh language, with the Latin version aimed
at non-Russian-speaking ethnic Kazakhs in countries such as China, Mongolia and Iran.
The switch to Latin is unlikely to be a problem for the younger generation in Kazakhstan. Many school
children already study foreign languages, such as English and German, and are thus familiar with Latin
letters. However, older members of society may need to be targeted in order to ensure that they do not get
left behind in the changeover.
With the country awash with petrodollars from its booming energy sector, financing the switch should not
be a problem. It remains to be seen, however, whether officials will retain the political will to press ahead,
given that the measure could cause disruption at home, and seems likely to vex one of Kazakhstan’s key
allies, Russia.
FUENTE: http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav090407.shtml


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Boletín mensual: SEPTIEMBRE 2007

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