Change 1 of FM 3-0 reflects our intention to take advantage of a “Campaign of Learning” across our Army toadapt our concepts, doctrine, and processes more frequently than in the past.Most of what was published in 2008 endures. Our emphasis remains on developing leaders and Soldiers forfull-spectrum operations. We continue to highlight both defeat and stability mechanisms and to stress that welive in an era of persistent conflict.To these enduring themes, we add several new and important ideas:
The future operational environment will be characterized by
combinations of regular,irregular, terrorist, and criminal groups who decentralize and syndicate against us and who possesscapabilities previously monopolized by nation states. These hybrid threats create a more
, and it is for these threats we must prepare.
We replace the command and control warfighting function with
. This changeemphasizes both “art” and “science” but places emphasis on the role of commanders in their respon-sibilities in full-spectrum operations with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinationalpartners. Mission command highlights the trust, collaboration, initiative, and co-creation of contextnecessary among leaders in decentralized operations. It mandates that systems and processes mustsupport and enable the leader’s responsibility to understand, visualize, decide, direct, lead, and assess.
Consistent with recent changes in FM 5-0, we add
as a leader’s cognitive tool to seek tounderstand complex problems before attempting to solve them.
allows the leader to understandand visualize before deciding and directing.
We “unburden” the term information operations and regroup tasks under two headings: inform andinfluence activities (IIA) and cyber/electromagnetic activities. This change allows us to “seeourselves” better both now and into the future.
We delete the Tennessee chart. This chart portrayed the spectrum of conflict (stable peace to generalwar) and operational themes (peace operations to irregular war to major combat operations). For atime, it contributed to our understanding of full-spectrum operations. However, it inadvertantlyestablished a false dichotomy regarding whether we must prepare for irregular warfare or for majorcombat operations. In the next revision of FM 3-0, we will sharpen our language regardingfull-spectrum operations. We will emphasize our Army’s capability to conduct both
wide area security
—the former necessary to gain the initiative and the latter necessaryto consolidate gains and set conditions for stability operations, security force assistance, andreconstruction. We must be capable of both and often simultaneously. That’s what defines us as trulycapable of full-spectrum operations. Moreover, in a competitive security environment, the kinds of threats we will confront in executing these two broad responsibilities are likely to be increasinglyindistinguishable.For this document to mean anything, it must come alive in classrooms, training centers, and officer andnoncommissioned officer professional developments. Learn from it, adhere to it, and continue to help usadapt it to the complex and competitive security environments in which we operate.Victory Starts Here!MARTIN E. DEMPSEYGeneral, U.S. ArmyCommanding GeneralU.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command