Philosphy of Science

Contents
Preface Acknowledgements 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Science Teaching: The Role of History and Philosophy of Science Michael R. Matthews Does Science Teaching Need History and Philosophy of Science? Peter Slezak Teaching History and Philosophy of Science: Experience at IIT Kanpur P .R.K. Rao Multiculturalism in Science Education and the Question of Universalism. William W. Cobern & Cathleen C. Loving Varieties of Constructivism and their (Ir-)Relevance to Science Education Peter Slezak Social Constructivism and the Science Wars Peter Slezak Re-examining the Image of Science in the School Science Curriculum William W. Cobern Linking Science Pedagogy with History and Philosophy of Science Through Cognitive Science: A Proposal Amitabha Gupta Conceptual Change in the Learning of Science Stella Vosniadou iii v 3 21 39 51 71 85 111
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10 How did Galileo Discover the Law of Free Fall? An Epistemological Reconstruction of the Episode Nagarjuna G. 11 Introducing History of Science in Science Education: A Perspective from Chemical Education Prajit K. Basu 12 Multicultural Mathematics, Anti-racist Mathematics: What can that be? George Gheverghese Joseph
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2 13 Innite Series Across Three Cultures: Background and Motivation George Gheverghese Joseph 14 How should Euclidean Geometry be Taught? C. K. Raju 15 The Axiomatic Method: Its Origin and Purpose S. D. Agashe 16 Approaches to the Periodic Table Rudolf Kraus 17 Alternative Frameworks in Electricity A.B.Saxena 18 Common Mans Science Rakesh Popli 19 Attitude Towards Science: An Analysis Daya Pant 20 Emergence of Science Textbooks in TamilEncounter of Modern Science with Traditional Knowledge Forms T.V. Venkateswaran Index 227 243 263 281 291 303 321
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Science Teaching: The Role of History and Philosophy of Science

Michael R. Matthews
University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia. Email: m.matthews@unsw.edu.au
Science teachers contribute to the overall education of students, thus they need some moderately well-formed view of what education is, and the goals it should be pursuing. Teachers and administrators need some conception of an educated person, as this is the telos of their individual classroom teaching and policy development. Teachers need to keep their eyes on the educational prize, the more so when social pressures increasingly devalue the intellectual and critical traditions of education. The conviction that the learning of science needs to be accompanied by learning about science is basic to liberal approaches to the teaching of science. If students do not learn and appreciate something about scienceits history, its interrelations with culture, religion, worldviews, and commerce, its philosophical and metaphysical assumptions, its epistemology and methodologythen the opportunity for science to enrich culture and human lives is correspondingly minimised. If science is taught merely as a technical subject devoid of its cultural and philosophical dimensions, then the positive results of science education are less able to fructify in society. We have some inkling of this situation of lost cultural opportunities when we look at the purely technical teaching of the sciences in the former USSR where the wide-spread teaching of science did not appear, with a few courageous exceptions, to generate critical and independent thinking, in many parts of contemporary southern USA where racism and belief in creation science go hand-in-hand with sophistication in technical science, and perhaps in Japan where it seems that technical science is taught fairly well, but the scientic competence gained seems not to contribute very much to Japanese cultural understanding or philosophy (on this complex matter see Kawasaki 1996). The Science Literacy Crisis It is widely recognised that there is a crisis in Western science education. Levels of science literacy are disturbingly low. This is anomalous because science is one of the greatest achievements of human culture. It has a wonderfully interesting and complex past, it has revealed an enormous amount about ourselves and the world in which we live, it has directly and indirectly transformed the social and natural worlds, and the human and environmental problems requiring scientic understanding are pressing yet, disturbingly, students and teachers are deserting science. This ight from the science classroom by both teachers and students has been depressingly well documented. In the US in the mid-1980s it was estimated that each year 600 science graduates entered the teaching profession whilst 8,000 left it (Mayer 1987). In 1986, 7,100 US high schools had no course in physics, and 4,200 had no course in chemistry (Mayer 1987). In 1990 only four states required the three years of basic science recommended by the sobering 1983 report A Nation at Risk, the rest
Science Teaching: The Role of HPS
allowed high school graduation with only two years science (Beardsley 1992, p. 80). Irrespective of years required, seventy percent of all school students drop science at the rst available opportunitywhich is one reason why in 1986 less than one in ve high school graduates had studied any physics. In 1991 the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology and Government warned that the failings of science education were so great that they posed a chronic and serious threat to our nations future (Beardsley 1992, p. 79). And the American National Science Foundation charged that the nations undergraduate programs in science, mathematics and technology have declined in quality and scope to such an extent that they are no longer meeting national needs. A unique American resource has been eroded (Heilbron 1987, p. 556). The Second International Science Study indicated that the scientic knowledge of US citizens was among the lowest in the industrialised world (Anderson 1989). In the US, science illiteracy is disturbingly high among the educated classes. A 1986 survey of 1,000 college students in Connecticut, Texas, and California revealed that 58% believed in a literal Adam and Eve, and 25% thought that humans and dinosaurs once lived together (Harrold & Eve, 1987). A survey of US biology teachers estimated that 35% believe that psychic powers can be used to read other peoples minds, 30% per cent reject the theory of evolution, and 20% believe in ghosts (Martin, 1994, p. 359). In the UK, recent reports of the National Commission on Education and the Royal Society have both documented similar trends. One commentator has said that wherever you look, students are turning away from science . . .. Those that do go to university are often of a frighteningly low caliber (Bown 1993, p. 12). In Australia in 1989 science education programmes had the lowest entrance requirement of all university degrees. A 1991 study in New Zealand by the Ministry of Research, Science and Technology revealed how little citizens of that country knew and cared about science. The study (based on the US tests of Jon Miller) of 1012 representative adults showed that: Fully 90% were scientically illiterate, having less than a minimum understanding of the processes, terms and social impact of science. Only 13% were even attentive or interested in science, with an even smaller percentage of women in the sample being interested. Only 3% were both literate and interested; that is most of the 10 per cent who were scientically literate, were not interested in science! Overall there was a negative attitude to science. (MORST 1991, p. 4). There are complex economic, social, cultural, and systemic reasons for this rejection of science. These are beyond the scope of teachers to rectify. But there are also educational reasons for the rejection of science that are within the power of teachers and administrators to change. In 1989, for example, a disturbing number of the very top Australian school science achievers gave too boring as the reason for not pursuing university science. It is these curriculum and pedagogical failings that the history and philosophy of science (HPS) can help rectify.
Michael Matthews Science and Cultural Health
Studies of scientic illiteracy reveal a situation that is culturally alarming, not just because they indicate that large percentages of the population do not know the meaning of basic scientic concepts,1 and thus have little if any idea of how nature functions and how technology works, but because they suggest widespread antiscientic views, and illogical thought. The defense of science in schools is important, if not necessary, to the intellectual health of society. Pseudoscientic and irrational world views already have a strong hold in Western culture; antiscience is on the rise.2 Newspaper astrology columns are read by far more people than science columns; the tabloid press, with their Elvis sightings and Martian visits, adorn checkout counters and are consumed by millions worldwide each day. A 1991 Gallup Poll revealed that nearly half (47%) of all US citizens believe that human life began on earth just a couple of thousand years ago (Smith, Siegel & McInerney 1995). A study at one Canadian university found that a majority of students believed in astrology, extrasensory perception, and reincarnation; while another estimated that 11% of US citizens claim to have seen a ghost (Cromer 1993, p. 34). Surveys conducted over a three year period at the University of Texas revealed that 60 per cent of students thought that some people could predict the future by psychic powers, 35% believed in Black Magic, and the same percentage believed in ghosts. A recent survey by the Australian Institute of Biology of 4,225 rst-year biology students from 17 universities in all States showed that one in eight (12%) believed that God created man pretty much in his present form at one time within the last 10,000 years. Old-fashioned chemistry sets are no longer even marketed, while tarot cards and crystals are available on almost every street corner. When thought becomes so free from rational constraints, then outpourings of racism, prejudice, hysteria and fanaticism of all kinds can be expected. For all its faults, science has been an important factor in combating superstition, prejudice and ignorance. It has provided, albeit falteringly, a counterinuence to the natural inclinations of people to judge circumstances in terms of their own self-interest. It instills a concern for evidence, and for having ideas judged not by personal or social interest, but by how the world is; a sense of Cosmic Piety, as Bertrand Russell called it. These values are under attack both inside and outside the academy. When people en masse abandon science, or science education abandons them, then the world is at a critical juncture. At such a time the role of the science teacher is especially vital, and in need of all the intellectual and material support possible.
1 Jon D. Miller has conducted a series of large-scale studies on scientic literacy in the US. On the basis of ability to say something intelligible about concepts such as molecule, atom, byte, in 1985 he judged only 3% of high-school graduates, 12% of college graduates, and 18% of college doctoral graduates to be scientically literate. See Miller (1983, 1987, 1992.) 2 For discussion of the anti-science phenomena see Passmore (1978), Holton (1993), Gross & Levitt (1994), and Grove (1989).
International History, Philosophy and Science Teaching Group My work grows out of, and is a contribution to, the International History, Philosophy, and Science Teaching Group. This is a heterogenous group of teachers, scientists, educators, historians, mathematicians, philosophers of education and philosophers of science who have, since 1989, staged four international conferences3 and have arranged the publication of many special issues of academic journals devoted to HPS and science teaching.4 Some basic papers in the eld have been gathered together and published in my History, Philosophy, and Science Teaching: Select Readings (OISE Press, Toronto, and Teachers College Press, New York, 1990). These might be useful for further reading. The International History, Philosophy, and Science Teaching Group is also associated with a new journal devoted to the subject of this paperScience & Education: Contributions from the History, Philosophy, and Sociology of Science and Education.5 The Rapprochement between History, Philosophy, and Science Education In 1985 a paper was published titled Science Education and Philosophy of Science: Twenty-Five Years of Mutually Exclusive Development (Duschl 1985). This was an account of the missed opportunities and shortsighted curricular projects that resulted from the development of science education largely separate from the disciplines of history and philosophy of science. Pleasingly, in recent times there has been some rapprochement between these elds. The well-documented crisis in science education and analyses of its causes and remedies are resulting in both the theory and, importantly, the practice of science education becoming more informed by the history and philosophy of science. The present rapprochement between HPS and science education represents in part a renaissance of the long-marginalised liberal, or contextual, tradition of science education, a tradition contributed to in the last hundred years by scientists and educators such as Ernst Mach, Pierre Duhem, Alfred North Whitehead, Percy Nunn, James Conant, Joseph Schwab, Martin Wagenschein and Gerald Holton. The once-upon-atime widespread acceptance of this liberal view of science teaching can be attested to by a comment made in a popular science teacher education text written over sixty years
3 The proceedings of the 1989 Tallahassee conference are available in Hergret (1989, 1990); those of the 1992 Kingston conference are in Hills (1992); the 1995 Minneapolis conference in Finley et al. (1995). The 1999 conference was held in Pavia, Italy, and information can be obtained from Professor Fabio Bevilacqua, Dipartimento di Fisica, A. Volta, Universita di Pavia, Via A.Bassi 6, 27100 Pavia, Italy. The 2001 conference is being held in Denver, Colorado, USA and information can be obtained from William McComas, Program Chair School of Education, WPH 1001E University of Southern California Los Angeles, CA 90089-0031, USA Email: mccomas@usc.edu 4 The journal special issues include the following: Educational Philosophy and Theory 20(2), (1988); Synthese 80(1), (1989); Interchange 20(2), (1989); Studies in Philosophy and Education 10(1), (1990); Science Education 75(1), (1991); Journal of Research in Science Teaching 29(4), (1992); International Journal of Science Education 12(3), (1990); and Interchange 23(2,3), (1993). 5 The journal is published by Kluwer Academic Publishers, P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands. It is available at reduced rates through the international HPS & ST group (inquiries to the author).
Michael Matthews ago. The author, F.M. Westaway, writes that a successful science teacher is one who:
. . . knows [his/her] own subject . . . is widely read in other branches of science . . . knows how to teach . . . is able to express [him/her self] lucidly . . . is skillful in manipulation . . . is a logician . . . is something of a philosopher . . . is so far an historian that [he/she] can sit down with a crowd of [students] and talk to them about the personal equations, the lives, and the work of such geniuses as Galileo, Newton, Faraday and Darwin. More than all this, [he/she] is an enthusiast, full of faith in [his/her] own particular work. (Westaway, 1929, p. 3)
This is a nice sketch of the liberal, realist and contextual approach to the teaching of science that I advocate. If universities, and colleges of education, produced an abundance of such science teachers, many of the Western worlds science education problems would be diminished. The liberal tradition is characterized by a number of educational commitments.6 One is that education entails the introduction of children to the best traditions of their culture, including the academic disciplines, in such a way that they both understand the subject discipline, and know something about the disciplineits methodology, assumptions, limitations, history and so forth. A second feature is that, as far as is possible and appropriate, the relations of particular subjects to each other, and their relation to the broader canvas of ethics, religion, culture, economics and politics should be acknowledged and investigated. The liberal tradition seeks to overcome intellectual fragmentation. One part of the contribution of HPS to science teaching is to connect topics in particular scientic disciplines, to connect the disciplines of science with each other, to connect the sciences generally with mathematics, philosophy, literature, psychology, history, technology, commerce and theology. And nally, to display the interconnections of science and culturethe arts, ethics, religion, politicsmore broadly. Science has developed in conjunction with other disciplines, there has been mutual interdependence. It has also developed, and is practiced, within a broader cultural and social milieu. These interconnections and interdependencies can be appropriately explored in science programs from elementary school to graduate study. The result is far more satisfying for students than the unconnected topics that constitute most programs of school and university science. Courses in the sciences are too often, as one student remarked, forced marches through unknown country without time to look sideways. The routine topic of pendulum motion, for instance, when taught in such a way that includes consideration of its history and philosophy, results in the following kind of integrated learning experience for students. The science of pendulum motion connects with important topics in religion, history, philosophy and literature.7 Contributors to the liberal tradition believe that science taught from such a perspective, and informed by the history and philosophy of the subject, can engender understanding of nature, the appreciation of beauty in both nature and science, and the
6 There is a large literature on the theory and practice of liberal education. Peters (1966, chs. 1, 2) and Bantock (1981, ch. 4) are useful introductions. See also Dressel (1979) and Mark (1994). The contributions to Obler & Estrin (1962) focus on the contribution of science to a liberal education, as do the arguments in Holton (1973) and Schwab (1945). 7 For further details see Matthews (1999).
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RELIGION HISTORY

SCIENCE PHILOSOPHY LITERATURE
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PE
NDULU
MO
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1. The Design Argument 2. European Voyages of Discovery 3. Aristotelian Physics and Methodology
4. Romantic Reaction 5. Idealisation and Theory Testing 6. Industrial Revolution
Figure 1: HPS-informed curriculum. awareness of ethical issues unveiled by scientic knowledge and created by scientic practice. The liberal tradition maintains that science education should not just be an education or training in science, although of course it must be this, but also an education about science. Students educated in science should have an appreciation of scientic methods, their diversity and their limitations. They should have a feeling for methodological issues, such as how scientic theories are evaluated and how competing theories are appraised, and a sense of the interrelated role of experiment, mathematics and religious and philosophical commitment in the development of science. All students, whether science majors or others, should have some knowledge of the great episodes in the development of science and consequently of culture: the ancient demythologizing of the world picture; the Copernican relocation of the earth from the centre of the solar system; the development of experimental and mathematical science associated with Galileo and Newton; Newtons demonstration that the terrestrial laws of attraction operated in the celestial realms; Darwins epochal theory of evolution and his claims for a naturalistic understanding of life; Pasteurs discovery of the microbial basis of infection; Einsteins theories of gravitation and relativity; the discovery of the DNA code, and research on the genetic basis of life. They should, depending upon their
Michael Matthews
age, have an appreciation of the intellectual, technical, social and personal factors that contributed to these monumental achievements. Clearly all of these goals for general education, and for science education, point to the integration of history and philosophy into the science curriculum of schools and teacher education programmes. Teachers of science need to know something of the history and nature of the discipline they are teaching. James Conant in the early 1950s expressed this perennial undercurrent in science education when he said Being well-informed about science is not the same thing as understanding science . . . What is needed is methods for imparting some knowledge of the tactics and strategy of science (Conant 1951). Conant realised that understanding sciences local tactics (methods and processes of science), and the more global strategies (methodology and epistemology of science) required familiarity with the history of science, and some knowledge of the philosophy of science. For Conant, and the liberal tradition more generally, school science should be taught in such a way that it not only brings about scientic understanding, but also that it contributes to what is now called cultural literacy (Hirsch 1987). Philosophy and Technical Science Education The rapprochement between HPS and science education is not only dependent upon the virtues of a liberal view of science education: a good technical science education also requires some integration of history and philosophy into the program. Knowledge of science entails knowledge of scientic facts, laws, theoriesthe products of science; it also entails knowledge of the processes of sciencethe technical and intellectual ways in which science develops and tests its knowledge claims. HPS is important for the understanding of these process skills. Technicalor professional as it is sometimes calledscience education is enhanced if students know the meaning of terms that they are using and if they can think critically about texts, reports and their own scientic activity. Their abilities as scientists are enhanced if they have read examples of sustained inquiry, clever experimentation, and insightful hypotheses. The US science educators James Rutherford (now director of the AAAS Project 2061) and Joseph Schwab both stressed the importance of pupils acquiring skills in scientic method, but they recognised behind method lay important issues of methodology. Methodology is the theory of method, it is the explanation of why method works, of why particular methods results in scientic knowledge. The distinction is somewhat akin to that between a chef and someone who follows a cookbook recipe. The chef knows why water is added after our and baking powder to a cake mix, why certain ours but not others are used in sauces and so on. Following a cookbook does require its own skills and these are not to be minimised, but successful following of cookbooks does not make people chefs. Training in cookbook recipes is not the same as the education of a chef. The latter requires some understanding of why the recipes work, why the ingredients are chosen, what the alternatives could be and so on. Likewise competence in scientic method, processes and skillsmeasuring rolling balls, lighting bunsens, choosing equipment, drawing graphs, devising hypotheses, thinking of control conditions, locating errors, etc.are all important competencies and are not be to
minimised, but such competencies do not make students scientic; they do not make them any wiser about how these processes relate to the creation or testing of scientic knowledge. Method may not require philosophy but methodology does. And in as much as technical science education aims to develop an appreciation of both scientic method and methodology, then philosophy needs to be part of science education. Consider for instance common laboratory work. Students might conduct an experiment on bodies rolling down an inclined plane, or on the period of different length pendulums, or on the ratio of tall versus short pea plants in different generations of plants. These experiments might vary from, at the one end, routinised teacher directed cookbook following, to at the other end, genuine open inquiry experiments. In all cases there are important scientic method and process skills to be acquired; with the inquiry experiments requiring more of the cognitive skills of hypothesis generation and experimental design. But across the spectrum there are methodological questions that transcend the simple method skills. How does the data relate to the phenomena? How do descriptions relate to observations? What can be legitimately inferred from the data? How do singular statements (the experimental data) bear upon universal statements (supposed scientic laws)? In what circumstances can experimental data falsify hypotheses or laws? In what circumstances, if any, can data verify laws? How can data conrm laws? These questions all give rise to standard methodological issues about induction, falsication, theory dependence of observation, the epistemological status of theory, the ontological status of theoretical terms, and so on. These questions are the bread and butter of philosophy of science, and students can be encouraged to dine on them. Others have made the same point about logic and science education. A 1966 paper in The Science Teacher is titled Use Philosophy to Explain the Scientic Method (Berlin & Gaines 1966). An informative 1977 paper, drawing on Matthew Lipmans Philosophy for Children material, and published in Science Education is titled Philosophic Inquiry and the Logic of Elementary School Science Education (Wagner & Lucas 1977). The reasoning dimension of science competence has been recognised in curriculum documents. Ehud Jungwirth in a comprehensive study of the issue, lists a number of curriculum statements that make reference to critical-logical-analytical thinking skills (Jungwirth 1987). Alfred North Whitehead expressed this view of good technical education when, just after World War II, he said:
The antithesis between a technical and a liberal education is fallacious. There can be no adequate technical education which is not liberal, and no liberal education which is not technical: that is, no education which does not impart both technique and intellectual vision. (Whitehead 1947, p. 73)
A common occurrence in science classrooms is a child asking: If no one has seen atoms, how come we are drawing pictures of them? Such a child is raising one of the most interesting questions in philosophy of science: the relationship of evidence to models, and of models to reality. Good science teachers should encourage such questions and be able to provide satisfactory answers, or suggestions for further questions.
Michael Matthews
To reply I do not know, or because it is in the book is to forego the opportunity of introducing students to the rich methodological dimensions of science. Einstein caught this philosophical dimension of science when he once described physicists as philosophers in workmens clothes. Science teachers, as well as being competent in science, psychology, pastoral care, crisis management and everything else demanded of them, need also to be philosophers. Students commonly ask: Why are we studying this? How do we know this is true? Does this make sense to anyone? Teachers should take advantage of such questions to widen the intellectual horizons of their students, to give them a sense that there are many big issues about that deserve reection and consideration. Philosophy is not far below the surface in any scientic investigation. At a most basic level any text or scientic discussion will contain terms such as law, theory, model, explanation, cause, truth, knowledge, hypothesis, conrmation, observation and so on. Philosophy begins when students and teachers slow down the science lesson and ask what these terms mean and what the conditions are for their correct use. All of these concepts contribute to, and in part arise from, philosophical deliberation on issues of epistemology and metaphysics: questions about what things can be known and how we can know them, and about what things actually exist in the world and the relations possible between them. Students and teachers can be encouraged to ask the philosophers standard questions: What do you mean by ? and How do you know ? of all these concepts. Such introductory philosophical analysis allows greater appreciation of the distinct empirical and conceptual issues involved when for instance Boyles Law, Daltons model, or Darwins theory is discussed. It also promotes critical and reective thinking more generally. Lee Shulman, a US educational researcher and policy analyst, has developed this feature of the teachers role with his notion of Pedagogical Content Knowledge. Of this he has said:
To think properly about content knowledge requires going beyond knowledge of the facts or concepts of a domain. It requires understanding the structures of the subject matter . . . Teachers must not only be capable of dening for students the accepted truths in a domain. They must also be able to explain why a particular proposition is deemed warranted, why it is worth knowing, and how it relates to other propositions, both within the discipline and without, both in theory and in practice. (Shulman 1986, p. 9)
The abilities sought by Shulman are enhanced if teachers are interested in and familiar with the history and philosophy of whatever subject they are teaching. The US National Standards in Science Education group is urging teachers to ask themselves and their students not just what do we know in science, but how do we know what we know. These are routine methodological questions that lead into and are answered by the philosophy of science. Current Curriculum Proposals Integration of HPS and science education has been proposed recently by numerous government and educational bodies. Among these have been the American Association
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for the Advancement of Science in two of its very inuential reports Project 2061 (AAAS 1989) and The Liberal Art of Science (AAAS 1990); the British National Curriculum Council (NCC 1988); the Science Council of Canada (SCC 1984); the Danish Science and Technology curriculum, and in The Netherlands, the PLON curriculum materials.8 In these cases HPS is not simply another item of subject matter added to the science syllabus; what is proposed is the more general incorporation of HPS themes into the content of curricula. The American Association for the Advancement of Science, in its Project 2061 proposal, has written that:
Science courses should place science in its historical perspective. Liberally educated students the science major and the non-major alikeshould complete their science courses with an appreciation of science as part of an intellectual, social, and cultural tradition. . . . Science courses must convey these aspects of science by stressing its ethical, social, economic, and political dimensions. (AAAS 1989, p. 24)
The AAAS in its proposal for the reform of college science teaching, The Liberal Art of Science, recognises that science education is enriched, and is more faithful to its subject, if aspects of the interesting and complex interplay of science and philosophy can be conveyed in the classroom. It says:
The teaching of science must explore the interplay between science and the intellectual and cultural traditions in which it is rmly embedded. Science has a history that can demonstrate the relationship between science and the wider world of ideas and can illuminate contemporary issues. (AAAS 1990, p. xiv)
The advocates of a contextual approach to science teaching are not just educational dreamers. There has been a tradition of attempts to teach science in an HPS-informed or liberal manner. The strengths and weaknesses of these attempts can be examined. Perhaps the outstanding example was the Harvard Project Physics course developed for schools in the early 1960s by Gerald Holton, James Rutherford and Fletcher Watson. 9 Over sixty studies of the effectiveness of the program were published (Welch 1973) and these were all positive and encouraging. Measures such as retention in science, participation of women, improvement on critical thinking tests and understanding of subject matter all showed improvement where the Project Physics curriculum was adopted. Another example of a widely adopted HPS-inuenced course was the Yellow Version of the BSCS Biology course developed by John Moore and Joseph Schwab. 10
8 The British National Curriculum is documented in NCC (1988). It is discussed in Akeroyd (1989), Ray (1991), and Solomon (1991). The Danish curriculum in the History of Science and Technology is discussed in Nielsen & Nielsen (1988), and Nielsen & Thomsen (1990). In The Netherlands there has been a Physics in Society course since 1981 (Eijkelhof & Swager 1983), and since 1972 various materials generated by the PLON project have incorporated a HPS dimension (Project Curriculum Development in Physics, PO Box 80.008, 3508 TA Utrecht, The Netherlands). The Project 2061 proposals are contained in AAAS (1989) and republished in Rutherford & Ahlgren (1990); they are discussed in Stein (1989). A discussion of STS programmes and a guide to the literature can be found in McFadden (1989) and Yager (1993). 9 Fifteen per cent of US high school physics students were following this program at its peak, and it was widely used outside the US. The philosophy behind this program can be read in Gerald Holton (1978a), and in the symposium published in The Physics Teacher (1967, vol. 5 no. 2). Other evaluations of Harvard Project Physics can be found in Aikenhead (1974), Brush (1978, 1989), Russell (1981), and Welch & Walberg (1972). 10 This was rst published in 1963 and went through four editions up to 1980.
Michael Matthews Contributions of HPS to Science Education
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The inclusion of history and philosophy of science does not, of course, provide all the answers to the present science education crisisultimately these answers lie deep in the heart of culture and economics. But the history and philosophy of science has a contribution to make to the overall task of improving science teaching and learning. Aspects of this contribution might be itemized as follows: HPS can humanize the sciences and connect them to personal, ethical, cultural, and political concerns. There is evidence that this makes science and engineering programmes more attractive to many students, and particularly girls, who currently reject them. HPS, particularly basic logical and analytic exercisesDoes this conclusion follow from the premises? and, What do you mean by such and such?can make classrooms more challenging, and enhance reasoning and critical thinking skills. HPS can contribute to the fuller understanding of scientic subject matterit can help to overcome the sea of meaninglessness, as Joseph Novak once said, where formulae and equations are recited without knowledge of what they mean or to what they refer. HPS can improve teacher education by assisting teachers to develop a richer and more authentic understanding of science and its place in the intellectual and social scheme of things. This has a ow-on effect, as there is much evidence that teachers epistemology, or views about the nature of science, affect how they teach and the message they convey to students. HPS can assist teachers appreciate the learning difculties of students, because it alerts them to the historic difculties of scientic development and conceptual change. Galileo was forty years of age before he formulated the modern conception of acceleration, despite prolonged thought he never worked out a correct theory for the tides. By historical studies teachers can see what some of the intellectual and conceptual difculties were in the early periods of scientic disciplines. This knowledge can assist with the organization of the curriculum and the teaching of lessons. HPS can contribute to the clearer appraisal of many contemporary educational debates that engage science teachers and curriculum planners. Many of these debatesabout constructivist teaching methods, multicultural science education, feminist science, environmental science, inquiry learning, science-technology-society curricula and so forthmake claims and assumptions about the history and epistemology of science, or the nature of human knowledge and its production and validation. Without some grounding in HPS, teachers can be too easily carried along by fashionable ideas which later, sadly, seemed good at the time.
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There are various ways in which the interplay between science and philosophy can be conveyed: reading of selections from original sources; joint projects with history, social science, divinity or literature classes; dramatic reenactments of signicant episodes in the history of science; essays on selected themes; debates on topical matters; or lowlevel philosophical questioning about scientic topics being studied or practical work being conducted. All philosophy of science begins with analytical and logical matters: What does a particular concept mean? How do we know the truth of a proposition? Does a conclusion follow from the premises adduced? These analytic and logical questions and habits of thought can be introduced as early as preschoolas Matthew Lipman and the Philosophy for Children programs attestand they can be rened as children mature (Lipman & Sharp 1978). Susan Johnson and Jim Stewart (1991) provide a nice example of the incorporation of philosophy of science into a high school genetics course. They focus on the three Ps of science: problem posing, problem solving, and persuasion of peers. School courses in Science-Technology-Society (STS) are another area in which science courses connect with philosophy, particularly ethical and political philosophy. A 1990 Department of Education guide to STS education issued by the provincial government of Alberta, CanadaUnifying the Goals of Science Educationgives prominence to teaching about the nature of science. Its reading list includes the work of Hawking, Einstein, Holton, Kuhn, Latour, Polanyi and Ravetz. A recent list of common STS topics includes: abortion, AIDS, endangered species, genetic engineering, organ transplants, nuclear war, space exploration, and waste management (Rubba et al.1991). These STS courses in England, Holland, Canada, and the US11 deal explicitly with political and ethical issues involving notions such as justice, equality, the fair distribution of goods, responsibility and the likeall of which are claried by philosophical analysis, and by reference to the history of these ideas. Without philosophical input, STS courses run the risk of just repeating fashionable and shallow ideology about pollution, nuclear energy, conservation and so on. This was seen in the 1940s in Science for Consumers courses. Shallow views on these vital matters tend to be blown away at the rst gust of national- or self-interest that the student encounters upon leaving school. There is not, of course, a single HPS-informed view of science or of science education. There are two broad camps discernible in the literature: those who appeal to HPS to support the teaching of science, and those who appeal to HPS to puncture the perceived arrogance and authority of science. The second group stress the human face of science, the fallibility of science, the impact of politics and special interests, including racial, class and sexual interests, on the pursuit of science; they argue for skepticism about scientic knowledge claims. For this group, HPS shows that science is one among a number of equally valid ways of looking at the world, it has no epistemic privilege; its supposed privilege derives merely from social considerations and technological success. This group includes those inuenced by postmodernist philosophy, and certain sociologies of science.
11 See the two NSTA Yearbooks Redesigning Science and Technology Education (Bybee et al. 1984) and Science, Technology, Society (Bybee 1985), and their volume The Science, Technology, Society Movement (Yager 1993).
Michael Matthews Conclusion
13
There are many reasons why study of the history and philosophy of science should be part of preservice and in-service science teacher education programs. Increasingly school science courses address historical, philosophical, ethical and cultural issues occasioned by science. Teachers of such curricula obviously need knowledge of HPS. Without such knowledge they either present truncated versions of the curricula, or repeat uncritical gossip about the topics mentioned. Either way their students are done a disservice. But even where curricula do not include such nature of science sections, HPS can contribute to more interesting and critical teaching of science. Beyond these practical arguments for HPS in teacher education, there are compelling professional arguments. A teacher ought to know more than just what he or she teaches. As an educator, they need to know something about the body of knowledge they are teaching, something about how this knowledge has come about, how its claims are justied and what its limitations are. Teachers should have a feel for, or appreciation of, the tradition of inquiry into which they are initiating students. HPS fosters this. Education systems have a responsibility to identify and transmit the best of our cultural heritage. Science is one of the most important parts of this heritage. The history and philosophy of science allows science teachers to better understand their own social and professional responsibilities as part of a great tradition. References Aikenhead, G.: 1980, Science in Social Issues: Implications for Teaching, Science Council of Canada, Ottawa. Aikenhead, G. S.: 1974, Course Evaluation II: Interpretation of Student Performance on Evaluation Tests, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 11, 2330. Akeroyd, F.: 1989, Philosophy of Science in a National Curriculum, in D.E.Herget (ed.), The History and Philosophy of Science in Science Teaching, Florida State University, pp. 1522. American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS): 1989, Project 2061: Science for All Americans, AAAS, Washington, DC. Also published by Oxford University Press, 1990. American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS): 1990, The Liberal Art of Science: Agenda for Action, AAAS, Washington, DC. American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS): 1993, Benchmarks for Science Literacy: Draft, AAAS, Washington DC. American Physical Society (APS): 1986, Report of the Committee on Education - 1985, Bulletin of the American Physical Society 31(6), 10331034.
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Anderson, O.: 1989, The Teaching and Learning of Biology in the United States, International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement, New York. Bantock, G.: 1981, The Parochialism of the Present, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. Beardsley, T.: 1992, Teaching Real Science, Scientic American pp. 7886. Berlin, B. and Gaines, A.: 1966, Use Philosophy to Explain the Scientic Method, The Science Teacher 33(5). Biological Science Curriculum Committee (BSCS): 1992, Mapping and Sequencing the Human Genome: Science, Ethics and Public Policy, BSCS, Colorado Springs, CO. Blake, D.: 1994, Revolution, Revision, or Reversal: Genetics-Ethics Curriculum, Science & Education 3(4). Bown, W.: 1993, Classroom Science goes into Freefall, New Scientist pp. 1213. Brush, S.: 1969, The Role of History in the Teaching of Physics, The Physics Teacher 7(5), 271280. Brush, S.: 1989, History of Science and Science Education, Interchange 20(2), 6070. Bybee, R. (ed.): 1985, Science, Technology, Society, NSTA, Washington. Yearbook of the National Science Teachers Association. Bybee, R.W. Carlson, J. and McCormack, A. (eds): 1984, Redesigning Science & Technology Education, National Science Teachers Association, Washington DC. Cordero, A.: 1992, Science, Objectivity and Moral Values, Science & Education 1(1), 49 70. Cromer, A.: 1993, Uncommon Sense: University Press, New York. The Heretical Nature of Science, Oxford
Cross, R. and Price, R.: 1992, Teaching Science for Social Responsibility, St Louis Press, Sydney. Dressel, P.: 1979, Liberal Education: Developing the Characteristics of a Liberally Educated Person, Liberal Education 65(3), 313322. Duschl, R.: 1985, Science Education & Philosophy of Science Twenty-ve, Years of Mutually Exclusive Development, School Science and Mathematics 87(7), 541 555. Eger, M.: 1989, The Interests of Science and the Problems of Education, Synthese 80(1), 81106.
Michael Matthews
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Eijkelhof, H. and Swager, J.: 1983, Physics in Society: New Trends in Physics Teaching IV, UNESCO, Paris. Gross, P. and Levitt, N.: 1994, Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrels with Science, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. Nielsen, H. and Thomsen, P.: 1990, History and Philosophy of Science in the Danish Curriculum, International Journal of Science Education 12(4), 308316. Harrold, F. and Eve, R.: 1987, Patterns of Creationist Belief Among College Students, in F. Harrold and R. Eve (eds), Cult Archaeology and Creationism: Understanding Pseudoscientic Beliefs about the Past, University of Iowa Press, Ames. Herget, D. (ed.): 1989, The History and Philosophy of Science in Science Teaching, Florida State University, Tallahassee FL. Herget, D. (ed.): 1990, The History and Philosophy of Science in Science Teaching, Florida State University, Tallahassee FL. Hills, S. (ed.): 1992, The History and Philosophy of Science in Science Education, two volumes, Queens University, Kingston. Holton, G.: 1973, Physics and Culture: Criteria for Curriculum Design and Modern Science and the Intellectual Tradition, In his, Thematic Origins of Scientic Thought, Harvard University Press, Cambridge. Holton, G.: 1978, On the Educational Philosophy of the Project Physics Course, In his, The Scientic Imagination: Case Studies, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 284298. Holton, G.: 1993, Science and Anti-Science, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Husserl, E.: 1954/1970, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Northwestern University Press, Evanston. Johnson, S. and Stewart, J.: 1991, Using Philosophy of Science in Curriculum Development: An Example from High School Genetics, in M. Matthews (ed.), History, Philosophy, and Science Teaching: Selected Readings, OISE Press, Toronto, Ontario, pp. 201212. Jungwirth, E.: 1987, Avoidance of Logical Fallacies: A Neglected Aspect of Scienceeducation and Science-teacher Education, Research in Science & Technological Education 5(1), 4358. Kawasaki, K.: 1996, The Concepts of Science in Japanese and Western Education, Science & Education 5. Lipman, M. and Sharp, A. (eds): 1978, Growing Up with Philosophy, Temple University Press, Philadelphia.
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Mark, H.: 1994, What is a Liberal Education?, New Directions for Higher Education 85, 3136. Martin, M.: 1986, Science Education and Moral Education, Journal of Moral Education, Reprinted in M. Matthews (ed.), History, Philosophy and Science Teaching: Selected Readings, OISE Press, Toronto, 1991, pp. 102114. Martin, M.: 1994, Pseudoscience, the Paranormal, and Science Education, Science & Education 3(4). Matthews, M.: 1994, Science Teaching: The Role of History and Philosophy of Science, Routledge, New York. Matthews, M.: 1999, Time for Science Education: How Teaching the History and Philosophy of Pendulum Motion can Contribute to Science Literacy, Plenum Publishers, New York. Matthews, M. (ed.): 1991, History, Philosophy and Science Teaching: Selected Readings, OISE Press, Toronto. Mayer, J.: 1987, Consequences of a Weak Science Education, Boston Globe . McFadden, C.: 1989, Redening the School Curriculum, in D. Herget (ed.), The History and Philosophy of Science in Science Teaching, Florida State University, Tallahassee, pp. 259270. Miller, J.: 1983, Scientic Literacy: A Conceptual and Empirical Review, Daedalus, 112(2), 29-47. Miller, J.: 1987, Scientic Literacy in the United States, in E. David and M. OConnor (eds), Communicating Science to the Public, John Wiley, London. Miller, J.: 1992, The Public Understanding of Science and Technology in the United States, 1990, National Science Foundation, Washington DC. Ministry of Research Science and Technology (MORST): 1991, Survey of Attitudes to, and Understanding of, Science and Technology in New Zealand, Publication No.4, MORST, Wellington. Musschenga, B. and Gosling, D. (eds): 1985, Science Education and Ethical Values: Introducing Ethics and Religion into the Science Classroom and Laboratory, Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC. National Commission on Excellence in Education: 1983, A Nation At Risk: The Imperative for Education Reform, US Department of Education, Washington DC. National Curriculum Council (NCC): 1988, Science in the National Curriculum, NCC, York.
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Nielsen, H. and Nielsen, K.: 1988, History of Technology in Education - Why and How, in C. Blondel and P. Brouzeng (eds), Science Education and the History of Physics, pp. 5168. Nielsen, H. and Thomsen, P.: 1990, History and Philosophy of Science in the Danish Curriculum, International Journal of Science Education, 12(4), 308-316. Obler, P. and Estrin, H. (eds): 1962, The New Scientist: Essays on the Methods and Values of Modern Science, Doubleday, New York. Passmore, J.: 1978, Science and Its Critics, Rutgers University Press, Rutgers NJ. Peters, R.: 1966, Ethics and Education, George Allen and Unwin, London. Ray, C.: 1991, Science Education, Philosophy of Science, and Scientic Prejudice, Science Education 75(1), 8794. Rubba, P. et al.: 1991, The Effects of Infusing STS Vignettes into the Genetics Unit of Biology on Learner Outcomes in STS and Genetics: A Report of Two Investigations, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 28(6), 537552. Russell, T.: 1981, What History of Science, How Much and Why?, Science Education 65, 5164. Rutherford, F. and Ahlgren, A.: 1990, Science for All Americans, Oxford University Press, New York. Schwab, J.: 1945, The Nature of Scientic Knowledge as Related to Liberal Education, Journal of General Education, 3, 245-266. Reproduced in I. Westbury and N. Wilkof (eds), Joseph J. Schwab: Science, Curriculum, and Liberal Education, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1978, Science Council of Canada (SCC): 1984, Science for Every Student: Educating Canadians for Tomorrows World, Report 36, SCC, Ottawa. Shulman, L.: 1986, Those Who Understand: Knowledge Growth in Teaching, Educational Researcher 15(2), 414. Smith, M.U. Siegel, H. and McInerney, J.: 1995, Foundational Issues in Evolution Education, Science & Education 4(1), 2346. Solomon, J.: 1991, Teaching About the Nature of Science in the British National Curriculum, Science Education 75(1), 95104. Wagner, P. and Lucas, C.: 1977, Philosophic Inquiry and the Logic of Elementary School Science Education, Science Education 61(4), 549558. Welch, W.: 1973, Review of the Research and Evaluation Program of Harvard Project Physics, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 10, 365378.
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Welch, W. and Walberg, H.: 1972, A National Experiment in Curriculum Evaluation, American Educational Research Journal 9, 373383. Westaway, F.: 1929, Science Teaching, Blackie and Son, London. Whitehead, A.: 1947, Technical Education and Its Relation to Science and Literature, In his, The Aims of Education and Other Essays, Williams & Norgate, London. Yager, R. (ed.): 1993, The Science, Technology, Society Movement, National Science Teachers Association, Washington DC. Ziman, J.: 1980, Teaching and Learning about Science and Society, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Does Science Teaching Need History and Philosophy of Science?

Peter Slezak
University of New South Wales, Australia. Email: p.slezak@unsw.edu.au
The place of History and Philosophy of Science (HPS) in the science curriculum derives from the rationale for teaching science itself. The point is best appreciated by means of an illustration. We see one familiar rationale for teaching science in the remarks of Collins & Pinch (1992):
It is nice to know the content of scienceit helps one to do a lot of things such as repair the car, wire a plug, build a model aeroplane, use a personal computer to some effect, know where in the oven to put a souf` , lower ones energy bills, disinfect a wound, repair the kettle, avoid e blowing oneself up with the gas cooker, and much much more. (Collins & Pinch 1992, p. 150)
Such a utilitarian view of science has consequences not only for how science is taught, but also for how research is pursued. If seen primarily in terms of its usefulness, even this practical aspect of science may be jeopardised, for curiosity-driven research is not merely a dispensable luxury, but the very mechanism of scientic progress. Thus, the prosaic, pragmatic conception of science education of Collins and Pinch is a view which might be thought to leave out something important. It is no accident that this view of science and its value in the curriculum is articulated by sociologists who are among the foremost proponents of a constructivist and relativist conception according to which science is not to be understood in terms of its rational, intellectual, explanatory content but rather as a merely consensual, negotiated and culturally contingent convention based on interests and politics. This approach has been an avowedly deationist one, skeptical of the claims of science as a privileged form of knowledge and, therefore, concerned to demote it from its exalted status and unwarranted pretensions. The view of science as merely instrumentally useful, at best, is in keeping with a widespread anti-science sentiment, indeed hostility, which has fuelled the recent science wars (Gross & Levitt 1994). Laudan (1990, p. x) has scathingly described sociological relativist views as the most prominent and pernicious manifestation of anti-intellectualism in our time. The charge of anti-intellectualism points to the aspect of social constructivism which has the most direct pedagogical implications. Such metascientic, philosophical views will inevitably have some inuence on the teaching of science content. On such constructivist views (Ashmore 1993, Pinch & Collins 1984) there is no more warrant for teaching currently accepted science than discredited theories since there are no intellectual grounds to distinguish between them, only social and political ones (see Slezak 2000). At the opposite end of the spectrum, we may note an actual example of science teaching which is informed by a different outlook, namely, one which seeks to convey a picture of science as the highest achievements of the human intellect. Densmores (1995) text reconstructs the central argument of Newtons Principia and suggests what it means for a student to make the attempt to appreciate Newtons achievement:
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. . . one can feel the sense of adventure and intrigue, the challenge of solving the puzzle. It can be viewed as one views many games and puzzles people buy and play voluntarily for fun. It can be viewed as one views a good detective story: all the clues are there . . .. (Densmore 1995, p. xxxi)
This conception is in the spirit of those such as Jacob Bronowski (1960, 1964, 1978) who writes of science as the highest romantic adventure with intellectual, aesthetic and inspirational qualities equal to those of the arts. Indeed, beyond these, Bronowski has emphasized the fundamental moral dimension of science which echoes the values emphasized by Popper and other philosophers of science. The Inevitability of HPS in the Curriculum. The contrast between the foregoing views of science raises precisely the issue of whether or not it is possible to teach the content of science without explicitly addressing issues about science. I will suggest that HPS cannot be avoided in the science curriculum simply because some position on fundamental questions will be implicitly assumed even where it is not explicitly addressed. Arguably, therefore, it is better to address such conceptions openly as part of science teaching rather than to insinuate them tacitly. However, this, in turn, requires familiarity with the range of opinions and doctrines in the discipline of HPS. The value of a self-conscious concern with metascientic issues is attested by Einstein in the following remarks:
How does a normally talented research scientist come to concern himself with the theory of knowledge? Is there not more valuable work to be done in his eld? I hear this from many of my professional colleagues; or rather, I sense in the case of many more of them that this is what they feel. I cannot share this opinion. When I think of the ablest students whom I have encountered in teachingi.e., those who distinguish themselves by their independence of judgement, and not only by mere agilityI nd that they had a lively concern for the theory of knowledge. They liked to start discussions concerning the aims and methods of the sciences, and showed unequivocally by the obstinacy with which they defended their views that this subject seemed important to them. (Einstein 1916, quoted in Holton 1973)
As if responding directly to Collins and Pinch, Einstein adds:

. . . For when I turn to science not for some supercial reason such as money-making or ambition, and also not (or at least exclusively) for the pleasure of the sport, the delights of brainathletics, then the following questions must burningly interest me as a disciple of this science: What goal will and can be reached by the science to which I am dedicating myself? To what extent are its general results true? What is essential, and what is based only on the accidents of development? (Einstein 1916, quoted in Holton 1973)
Naive Philosophy of Science Just as people have a naive, intuitive, commonsense understanding of the physical world which is Aristotelian, so they have a naive meta-knowledge or commonsense conception of the nature of science itself. Thus, what philosophers have dubbed the pessimistic historical meta-induction is, in fact, the most widespread view among laypersons and the scientically illiterate. Echoing a popular skepticism, Laudan (1981, p. 232) has argued that a difculty for realism is the fact that the history of
Peter Slezak
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science offers a long list of successful theories which turn out to be wrong. Specically, they appear to be nonreferential with respect to central explanatory concepts and posits. Thus we no longer believe in the existence of crystalline spheres, bodily humors, phlogiston, caloric, vital forces or the luminiferous ether, inter alia. The pessimistic meta-induction is captured in Glymours (1992) observation:
Since all [scientic] theories in history have been false, . . . we should conclude that the methods of science do not generate true theories; hence our present scientic theories, which were obtained by the same methods, are false as well. (Glymour 1992, p. 126)
Even if knowing little else, everyone is aware that science is historically changeable. The important question, then, is what conclusions may be drawn from this undeniable fact about the history of science. For non-experts, the mutability of science seems to warrant a general belief in the need to remain open minded about miraculous or paranormal phenomena which are contrary to accepted scientic theories. Thus, for example, a standard popular response to skepticism about psychic phenomena is to cite the supposed lessons of the history of science and its ever changing body of beliefs. This lesson is taken to dictate an open-mindedness about unorthodox and even disreputable theories rather than dogmatic dismissal. This tolerance is allegedly inferred from earlier mistakes and is often justied with the slogan They laughed at Galileo too. However, an apt answer which has been given by skeptics is Yes, but they laughed at Bozo the clown too. Being unorthodox is not, in itself, a virtue. Recruited in this way as support for some currently unfounded pseudo-science, the argument from history is entirely vacuous despite being almost universally seen as self-evident. The insight is only the wisdom of hindsight, because it cannot provide grounds for deciding what to believe in any given case today. However difcult to explicate, warranted belief must be based on the usual considerations of evidence, explanatory coherence, comprehensiveness, elegance, and whatever other factors play a role. None of these are weighted differently in the light of the historical mutability of science. Based on past practice, knowing only that what we believe tomorrow will be different from what we believe today carries no specic implication or prescription for current beliefs. Nevertheless, generally deployed in this way, an inexplicit, naive philosophy of science is taken to warrant either credulity or global skepticism. Closed Mind or Open Mind? In his characteristically ironic way, Bertrand Russell (1925) has noted a well-known feature of education:
A certain percentage of children have the habit of thinking; one of the aims of education is to cure them of this habit. (Russell 1925, p. 378)
When faced explicitly as a question about the place of HPS in the curriculum, the issue of open-mindedness poses a seeming paradox. Undeniably, one of the central features of science emphasized by many scholars has been its critical nature. Popper
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(1963) has emphasized that the origin of science among the Presocratics was specifically founded in their inauguration of a tradition of critical inquiry as opposed to dogmatic acceptance of orthodoxy. The same moral has been emphasized by scholars such as Guthrie (1962) and Farrington (1961) who share Poppers view that the essence of the scientic enterprise was rst captured by these Milesian Greeks in their commitment to criticism as the means for improving and advancing our understanding of the world. For Popper, this theme of conjectures and refutations found expression in his doctrine of falsiability as the mark of science, distinguishing it from metaphysics or other pseudo-scientic inquiries. Thus, he asserts Criticism is the lifeblood of all rational thought (Popper 1974). In view of this widely held conception of science, an acute paradox is presented by T.S. Kuhn who writes:
To turn Sir Karls view on its head, it is precisely the abandonment of critical discourse that marks the transition to science. (Kuhn 1970b, p. 6)
For those wishing to teach science as an embodiment of rationality and critical thinking, it is important to reconcile this Popperian conception with Kuhns radically alternative picture of science as founded on dogmatism. In a famous essay The Essential Tension, Kuhn observes that:
. . . exclusive exposure to a rigid tradition has been immensely productive of the most consequential sorts of innovations. . . . each of [the natural sciences] acquired something like that technique [of rigid education] at precisely the point when the eld began to make rapid and systematic progress. (Kuhn 1959, pp. 229-231)
The dilemma for science educators arises from recognizing the divergence between the rhetoric and the reality of scientic practice. The theme of Kuhns essay is the tension between open and closed mindedness, that is, between convergent and divergent thinking . Divergent thinking is the exible or lateral thinking characteristic of creative discovery and innovation. Kuhn explains:
The basic scientist must lack prejudice to a degree where he can look at the most self-evident facts or concepts without necessarily accepting them, and, conversely, allow his imagination to play with the most unlikely possibilities . . . . . . divergent thinking [is] the freedom to go off in different directions, . . . rejecting the old solutions and striking out in some new direction. . . . gigantic divergences lie at the core of the most signicant episodes in scientic development. (Kuhn 1959, p. 226)
Kuhn notes that a common criticism of science education complains that it emphasizes narrow or convergent thinking at the expense of creative, divergent thinking. This criticism suggests We have attempted to teach students how to arrive at correct answers that our civilization has taught us are correct . . .. Outside the arts . . . we have generally discouraged the development of divergent thinking abilities, unintentionally. Kuhn acknowledges that this characterization of our educational practice is eminently just, but he askes whether it is equally just to deplore the product that results. Kuhn is pointing to the function of science education and textbooks as indoctrination, and to the crucial role of such indoctrination in the very success of science. In an ironic defence of dogmatism Kuhn explains:
Peter Slezak
But both my own experience in scientic research and my reading of the history of sciences lead me to wonder whether exibility and open-mindedness have not been too exclusively emphasized as the characteristics requisite for basic research. . . . normal research, even the best of it, is a highly convergent activity based rmly upon a settled consensus acquired from scientic education and reinforced by subsequent life in the profession. Let me try briey to epitomize the nature of education in the natural sciences . . .. The single most striking feature of this education is that, to an extent totally unknown in other creative elds, it is conducted entirely through textbooks . . . written especially for students. . . . There are no collections of readings in the natural science. Nor are science students encouraged to read the historical classics of their eldsworks in which they might discover other ways of regarding the problems discussed in their textbooks, but in which they would also meet problems, concepts, and standards of solution that their future professions have long since discarded and replaced. . . . These books exhibit concrete problem solutions that the profession has come to accept as paradigms, . . . Nothing could be better calculated to produce mental sets . . . Even the most faintly liberal educational theory must view this pedagogic technique as anathema. . . . Education in the natural sciences seems to have been totally unaffected by [attitudes encouraging divergent thinking, open-mindedness and creativity, innovation etc.]. . . . It remains a dogmatic initiation in a pre-established tradition that the student is not equipped to evaluate. (Kuhn 1959, pp. 228-229)
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Kuhns view reverses a traditional conception of science and how it should be taught. For example, on such a view one common picture of the Galileo affair is mistaken, since the orthodox Aristotelianism of the Catholic Church was not essentially different in its conservatism from that of science itself. History of Science as Subversive Conventional goals of science teaching have been articulated in authoritative and inuential policy documents as inductive generalization from data, a venerable conception seen in historical gures such as Herschel and Planck. However, such pronouncements, like other methodological doctrines, are impossible to reconcile with the actual practice of scientists themselves as revealed by the historical record. In this regard, history has a subversive effect in undermining widely held prejudices about science. Thus, for example, S. Brush (1974) writes:
Once it has been pointed out that in Galileos statement, I have discovered by experiment some properties of [motion], the words by experiment were added in an English translation and do not appear in the original Italian version, it is hard to maintain the traditional faith in Galileos empiricism. (Brush 1974, p. 1170)
Another distinguished historian of science remarks on Isaac Newton in the same vein:
If the Principia established the quantitative pattern of modern science, it equally suggested a less sublime truththat no one can manipulate the fudge factor quite so effectively as the master mathematician himself. (Westfall, quoted in Brush 1974, p. 1167)
Contrary to a naive empiricist views, Newtons approach is characterised by Densmore:

This attempt to give science a logically sound deductive basis constituted a radical departure from Francis Bacons inductive method, which was very inuential at the time [and more
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recently]. Bacon advocated collecting many and varied instances of the phenomena under study and trying to see patterns. By contrast Newton used minimal experimental data. . . . Everything was deduced, using mathematical demonstrations, from these few observation-based conclusions about how our world works. (Densmore 1995, p. xxi)
However, more surprising perhaps than Newtons failure to employ inductive methods is his commitment to quite radically different principles not usually thought compatible with scientic method. Thus, Newton writes in his Principia:
I had an eye upon such principles as might work with considering men for the belief of a Deity; and nothing can rejoice me more than to nd it useful for that purpose.
Evidently, Newtons goal was to demonstrate the dependence of matter on God. Westfall notes:
He sought as well to plumb the mind of God and His eternal plan for the world and mankind as it was presented in the biblical prophecies. (Westfall 1980, p. 105)
In the famous passages of the General Scholium of Book Three in Newtons Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, Newton not only utters his famous hypotheses non ngo, that is, his unwillingness to speculate about the occult causes of gravitational action at a distance. More remarkably, though rarely noted, is the fact that Newton also expresses a conception of a designer deity:
This most elegant arrangement of the sun, planets, and comets could not have arisen but by the plan and rule of an intelligent and powerful being. And if the xed stars be centers of similar systems, all these, constructed by a similar plan, will be under the rule of One . . . He governs everything, not as the soul of the world, but as lord of all things. And because of his dominion, he is usually called Lord God Universal Emperor . . . And from true absolute rule it follows that the true God is living, intelligent, or in the highest degree perfect. He is eternal and innite, omnipotent and omniscient; that is, he endures from eternity to eternity, and is present from innity to innity. He reigns over everything, and knows everything that happens or can happen. . . . The whole diversity of created things according to places and times could only have arisen from the ideas and will of a being existing necessarily. . . . And this much concerning God, to discourse of whom, at least from the phenomena, is the business of natural philosophy. (Newton, in Densmore & Donahue 1985)
Such passages in the midst of the scientic theorising require us to qualify preconceptions about what is the properly scientic part of Newtons work, and they serve to remind us of the arbitrariness of dismissing in retrospect those parts which we may now regard as pseudo-scientic or religious. These distinctions appear not to have been meaningful to Newton himself. This is of course, the lesson of Kuhns (1970) work. A further example is instructive. A common conception of science as driven by empirical data is amusingly illuminated by anecdotes about Einstein:
But you dont seriously believe, Einstein protested, that none but observable magnitudes must go into a physical theory? Isnt that precisely what you have done with relativity? I asked in some surprise. . . . Possibly I did use this kind of reasoning, Einstein admitted, but
Peter Slezak
it is nonsense all the same. Perhaps I could put it more diplomatically by saying that it may be heuristically useful to keep in mind what one has actually observed. But on principle, it is quite wrong to try founding a theory on observable magnitudes alone. In reality the very opposite happens. It is the theory which decides what we can observe. (Heisenberg 1971, p. 63) In the autumn of 1919, in the course of a discussion with a student, Einsteinnow aged 40handed her a cable which had informed him that the bending of light by the sun was in agreement with his general relativistic prediction. The student asked what he would have said if there had been no conrmation. Einstein replied, Then I would have to pity the dear Lord. The theory is correct anyway. (Pais 1994, p. 127)
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This last anecdote is interesting in part because the conrmation of the bending of light was cited by Karl Popper as the very exemplary case of falsiability. Einsteins attitude reveals how little scientists conform to Popperian conceptions of rationality. However, more forceful than such anecdote is the systematic study of episodes such as the famous Eddington expedition referred to in the story by Pais. Earman and Glymour (1980) reveal that the entire episode is a case study of Duhem-Quine adjustment of auxiliary hypotheses in order to save a favoured theory faced with recalcitrant evidence. They write:
The initial reception of special relativity in English speaking countries was almost uniformly hostile or disdainful. . . . One may imagine that in order to turn the tide of opinion the eclipse results must have been unequivocal. They were not. (Earman & Glymour 1980, p. 50) In truth, while some aspects of Eddingtons [1919] handling of the deection of light were in the nest traditions of science, others were not. As he confessed in Space, time and gravitation, he was not altogether unbiased. The bias showed in his treatment of the evidence: he repeatedly posed a false trichotomy for the deection results, claimed the superiority of the qualitatively inferior Principe data, and suppressed reference to the negative Sobral results. (His discussion of the red-shift was sometimes no better . . .) . . . all that was necessary to establish the red-shift prediction was a willingness to throw out most of the evidence and the ingenuity to contrive arguments that would justify doing so. . . . The red-shift was conrmed because reputable people agreed to throw out a good part of the observations. They did so in part because they believe the theory; and they believed the theory, again at least in part, because they believed that the British eclipse expeditions had conrmed it. Now the eclipse expeditions conrmed the theory only if part of the observations were thrown out and the discrepancies in the remainder ignored: Dyson and Eddington, who presented the results to the scientic world, threw out a good part of the data and ignored the discrepancies. This curious sequence of reasons might be cause enough for despair on the part of those who see in science a model of objectivity and rationality. That mood should be lightened by the reection that the theory in which Eddington placed his faith because he thought it beautiful and profoundand, possibly, because he thought that it would be best for the world if it were truethis theory, so far as we know, still holds the truth about space, time and gravity. (Earman & Glymour 1980, pp. 84-85)
Contextual Approach: Is Content Knowledge HPS-free? For the reasons indicated, there seems to be no alternative to a contextualist approach as advocated by Matthews (1992, p. 12) in which students learn about the nature of science simultaneously with learning the substantive content of science. In particular, the intention is not that HPS topics be extraneous, added on to science courses, or that HPS be substituted for content knowledge. Rather these themes should be integrated into the curriculum material itself as an intrinsic part.
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No one expects children to solve the realism/instrumentalism debate, nor should they learn catechism-like that there were fteen reasons why Galileo was right and the cardinals wrong. Rather they are expected to appreciate something of the intellectual issues that are at stake in these matters; to appreciate that there are questions to ask and to begin to think not just about answers, but what would count as answers, and what kinds of evidence would support our answers. (Matthews 1992, p. 14)
The understanding of content knowledge cannot be HPS-free because even learning the bare facts and theories of science inherently requires understanding such things as the evidential warrant for one theory and why it might be preferred over another, what counts as an explanation, refutation etc. For example, how else can one explain why evolution is to be preferred to creationism without some appeal to weight of evidence, explanatory force and other such concepts central to the philosophy of science? Not least of all, this example inevitably raises the issue of demarcation between science and pseudo-science which has been a central theme in the philosophy of science at least since David Hume and Immanuel Kant. The educational signicance of such philosophical questions is brought into sharp relief in the text-book and curriculum debates concerning creation science which have recently been revived in the USA (See Ruse 1988, Laudan 1988). Paradox of HPS in Science Teaching If, as just suggested, science cannot be taught as bare content, facts, theories and formulae without some implicit philosophical doctrine, an apparent paradox arises from the need to make such doctrine explicit. The theories of HPS are themselves controversial and changeable. The alternative to not teaching HPS explicitly seems to be that of teaching more or less controversial philosophical views which are themselves less secure than the science content itself. Thus, for example, teaching physics by integrating something of the history of Galileo confronts the difculty of nding a noncontroversial picture. Galileo has been seen in the following ways. William Whewell (1840) wrote
Galileo was an inductivist and empiricist with prepondering inclination towards facts, and did not feel, so much as some other persons of his time, the need of reducing them to ideas. (Quoted in Matthews 1992, p. 19)
David Brewster (1830) suggested Galileo was a Baconian inductivist, while Ernst Mach (1883) and the positivists suggest that Galileo did not supply us with a theory of the falling of bodies, but investigated, wholly without preformed opinions, the actual facts of falling. Alexandre Koyr (1939) claimed that Galileo was a Platonist who e invented some experiments, while Stillman Drake (1978) argued that Galileo was a patient experimentalist. Notoriously, Paul Feyerabend (1975) argued that Galileo was an anarchist, dadaist and propagandist with no method. Finally, Stillman Drake (1971) disputes a common view in claiming that Galileo fought not against religion or the church but against authority. In light of these diverse accounts, it would seem that HPS becomes something like Bertrand Russells parody of animal psychology:
Peter Slezak
Animals studied by Americans rush about frantically, with an incredible display of hustle and pep, and at last achieve the desired result by chance. Animals observed by Germans sit still and think, and at last evolve the solution out of their inner consciousness. (Russell 1960, p. 33)
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Matthews (1992) has characterised this as the hermeneutical problem which has important intellectual virtues, despite the inherent difculty:
The hermeneutical problem of interpretation in the history of science, far from being an embarrassment or impediment to the use of history, can be the occcasion to introduce students to the signicant questions of how we read texts and interpret events, to the complex problems of meaning: students know from their everyday life that people see things differently, the history of science is a natural vehicle for illustrating how this fact impinges on science itself. (Matthews 1992, p. 22)
A Role for History: The Bias of Science Textbooks Following the theme of his Essential Tension noted earlier, a new sensitivity to history giving rise to this hermeneutical problem was inaugurated by T.S. Kuhns (1970) landmark work The Structure of Scientic Revolutions which opened with observations on the role of history and, in particular, the function of science textbooks.
History if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or chronology, could produce a decisive transformation in the image of science by which we are now possessed. That image has previously been drawn, even by scientists themselves, mainly from the study of nished scientic achievements as these are recorded in the classics and, more recently, in the textbooks from which each new scientic generation learns to practice its trade. Inevitably, however, the aim of such books is persuasive and pedagogic; a concept of science drawn from them is no more likely to t the enterprise that produced them than an image of a national culture drawn from a tourist brochure or a language text. This essay attempts to show that we have been misled by them in fundamental ways. Its aim is a sketch of the quite different concept of science that can emerge from the historical record of the research activity itself. . . . historians confront growing difculties in distinguishing the scientic component of past observation and belief from what their predecessors had readily labeled error and superstition. The more carefully they study, say, Aristotelian dynamics, phlogistic chemistry, or caloric thermodynamics, the more certain they feel that those once current views of nature were, as a whole, neither less scientic nor more the product of human idiosyncrasy than those current today. If these out-of-date beliefs are to be called myths, then myths can be produced by the same sorts of methods and held for the same sorts of reasons that now lead to scientic knowledge. If, on the other hand, they are to be called science, then science has included bodies of belief quite incompatible with the ones we hold today. (Kuhn 1970a, p. 1)
Science & Subjectivity One reaction to Kuhns work was a concern about its irrationalism in portraying science as the product of psychological and social forces rather than the pure cognitive force of evidence and argument. I. Schefer wrote:
That the ideal of objectivity has been fundamental to science is beyond question. The philosophical task is to assess and interpret this ideal: to ask how, if at all, objectivity is possible. This task is especially urgent now, when received opinions as to the sources of objectivity in science are increasingly under attack. The notion of a xed observational given, of a constant descriptive language, of a shared methodology of investigation, of a rational community advancing its knowledge of the real worldall have been subjected to severe and mounting criticism from a variety of directions.
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The overall tendency of such criticism has been to call into question the very conception of scientic thought as a responsible enterprise of reasonable men. (Schefer 1967, p. 1)
This was undoubtedly an over-reaction to the work of Kuhn, though it seems amply warranted in relation to the more extreme sociological doctrines which saw their origins in Kuhns book. Acknowledging the non-rational elements in the science does not mean abandoning a conception of scientic thought as a responsible enterprise of reasonable men, but only the need for reconciling these elements into a more subtle and complex overall picture. Such a reconciliation is unquestionably a difcult and perhaps as yet unattained ideal. This poses a difcult question for the educator because the old verities and comforting stereotypes about science and its virtues appear to be false. How, then, can science be taught in a way which is consistent with its history and sensitive to its vagaries. Should the History of Science be Rated X? In view of the subversive nature of the history of science in the ways we have seen, one answer to the foregoing question offered ironically by S. Brush (1974) is censorship.
. . . young and impressionable students at the start of a scientic career should be shielded from the writings of contemporary science historians . . . [because] these writings do violence to the professional ideal and public image of scientists as rational, open-minded investigators, proceeding methodically, grounded incontrovertibly in the outcome of controlled experiments, and seeking objectively for the truth . . .. (Brush 1974, p. 1164) My point is that, if science teachers want to use the history of science, and if they want to obtain their information and interpretations from contemporary writings by historians of science rather than from the myths and anecdotes handed down from one generation of textbook writers to the next, they cannot avoid being inuenced by the kind of skepticism about objectivity which is now so widespread. . . . I do not know how science teachers are going to respond to the new historical interpretations. So far, most teachers seem to have ignored them. . . . I suggest that the teacher who wants to indoctrinate his students in the traditional role of the scientist as a neutral fact-nder should not use historical materials of the kind now being prepared by historians of science: they will not serve his purposes. (Brush 1974, p. 1170)
Realism vs Instrumentalism A striking feature of contemporary science is the way in which it evokes philosophical disputes essentially identical to those arising at the origins of modern science with the scientic revolution of the seventeenth century. Specically, we see this illustrated in a book by Jauch (1989) titled Are Quanta Real? Signicantly, the work is in the form of a Galilean dialogue which is particularly apt in view of the fact that the issues raised are identical with those at the heart of the Galileo affair. The issue between Cardinal Bellarmine and Galileo was centrally concerned with the literal interpretation of the Copernican heliocentric theory in view of the contrary teachings of Aristotle and the Bible. The question at the heart of contemporary quantum physics is remarkable for being identical with the one facing Galileos Copernicanism as we see in van Fraassens (in Cushing et al. eds. 1984, p. 171) question regarding quantum theory: He asks:
Peter Slezak
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How could the world possibly be the way physical theory says it is? For Bellarmine, as for quantum theorists today, the issue was the need to save the appearances and whether any further commitment to the literal claims of the theory was justied. This was, of course, the question raised in Osianders notorious preface to Copernicuss De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium of 1543. The correspondences of Bellarmine and Galileo reveal the same contrasting attitudes as those seen today (see appendix). We see the dilemma for Galileo raised in an acute form today at the very inception of quantum theory with Max Plancks treatment of Black-Body radiation in 1900. The classical Rayleigh-Jeans theory led to a distribution law for energies irreconcilable with observations and even with the niteness of the total energy of the radiation (the so-called ultra-violet catastrophe). Norton (1994) explains the problem arising from the fact that Plancks ad hoc model managed to save the appearances by what Planck himself regarded as physically meaningless mathematical tricks.
. . . [Plancks] discontinuity theory was by no means a popular theory, and understandably so. It required the falsity of a quite fundamental supposition of classical physics. The mere fact that the discontinuity [quantization] hypothesis saved the phenomena was certainly not sufcient to force its acceptance. Why should one not hope that the phenomena would be saved by some less traumatic variant of the classical theory that preserved continuity? (Norton 1994, p. 16)
In view of the experimental conrmation of the most counter-intuitive features of quantum theory including Bohrs predictions against those of Einsteins EPR thoughtexperiment, the difculties of accepting the literal meaning of quantum theory are hardly less today. As Feynman (1965, p. 129) has quipped, despite its unprecedented success, nobody understands quantum mechanics. By contrast with instrumentalism and related anti-realist doctrines, Putnam (1975, p. 73) has said that the positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy that doesnt make the success of science a miracle. However, one might rhetorically ask What success? Thus, the philosophers standard theoretical entity, the electron, serves to bring the difcult issues into relief. An afrmative answer to the question Are electrons real? is faced with the history sketched by Bain and Norton (1998):
For Thomson (1897), the electron was an electried particle obeying Newtonian dynamic. For Einstein (1905) the electron had instrinsic mass and relativistic dynamics; for Bohr (1910) the electron had a mix of classical and discrete properties; for Pauli (1925) the electron obeyed a non-classical exclusion principle; for Jordan and Wigner (1928) the electron was an excitation of a fermionic eld; for Wigner (1939) the electron had a spin 1/2 and was the irreducible representation of a Poincar group; for Glashow, Salam and Weinberg (1967) the electron e has massless left-handed and right-handed parts uniting to form a massive particle through interactions with a scalar Higgs eld; and the current standard model (1990) takes the electron to be a member of rst of three generations of similar leptonic particles related in a non-trivial way to three generations of hadronic quarks.
Anti-realism might be thought to follow from such a litany, but Hacking (1982) suggests that philosophers have placed too much emphasis on theory and not enough on experiment. Hacking explains:
No eld in the philosophy of science is more systematically neglected than experiment. Our grade school teachers may have told us that scientic method is experimental method, but histories of science have become histories of theory. (Hacking 1982, p. 248)
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No wonder that scientic antirealism is so permanently in the race. It is a variant on the spectator theory of knowledge [that is, Berkeleys idealism]. (Hacking 1982, p. 258) I proceed from experimental practice. . . . [From] an interest in real life physics as opposed to philosophical fantasy science. (Hacking 1982, p. 259) Once upon a time, it made good sense to doubt that there were electrons. . . . The best reason for thinking that there are electrons might have been success in explanation. But the ability to explain carries little warrant of truth. . . . Antirealism about any submicroscopic entities was a sound doctrine in those days. Things are different now. The direct proof of electrons and the like is our ability to manipulate them using well-understood low-level causal properties. (Hacking 1982, p. 256/258) . . . engineering, not theorizing, is the best proof of scientic realism about entities. (Hacking 1982, p. 258)
Of course, Hackings nal comment makes it difcult to see how one might ascribe reality to black holes which are hardly amenable to engineering in the way he seems to have in mind. Nevertheless, my concern here has been only to point to the ways in which the deepest questions of the history and philosophy of science bear directly on the manner and substance of science teaching. Toulmin (1970) has indicated the intimate intertwining in which, for example, both Planck and Mach had been inuenced in different ways by the philosophical ideas of Immanuel Kant. Toulmin suggests that the positivism of Mach worked its way into the very fabric of theoretical physics, shaping Bohrs interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Physics and philosophy have had a continuous relationship, but a uctuating one. . . . In certain periods, physical scientists have been content to acknowledge their partnership with philosophers, and even to see their own fundamental theories and methods as resting on metaphysical foundations. (Toulmin 1970, p. ix)
As Matthews notes:
If science has developed as a dialogue with metaphysics . . ., then to teach science as a soliloquy in which science just talks to itself and grows entirely by self-criticism is to impoverish the subject matter. (Matthews 1992, p. 36)
References Ashmore, M.: 1993, The Theatre of the Blind: Starring a Promethean Prankster, a Phoney Phenomenon, a Prism, a Pocket and a Piece of Wood, Social Studies of Science 23, 67106. Bain, J. and Norton, J.: 1998, What Should Philosophers of Science Learn from the History of the Electron?, unpublished manuscript. Boden, M. (ed.): 1994, Dimensions of Creativity, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. Boyd, R.: 1983, On the Current Status of Scientic Realism, Erkenntnis 19, 4590. Reprinted in Boyd, Gasper and Trout, eds. The Philosophy of Science, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1991, 195-222. Boyd, R. G. P. and Trout, J. (eds): 1991, The Philosophy of Science, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
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Brody, B. and Grandy, R. (eds): 1989, Readings in the Philosophy of Science, 2nd edn, Prentice-Hall. Bronowski, J.: 1960, The Commonsense of Science, Penguin Books, London. Bronowski, J.: 1964, Science and Human Values, Penguin Books, London. Bronowski, J.: 1978, The Visionary Eye, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. Brown, J.: 1991, The Laboratory of the Mind, Routledge, London. Brown, J.: 1994, Smoke and Mirrors: How Science Reects Reality, Routledge, London. Brush, S. G.: 1974, Should the History of Science be Rated X?, Science 183, 11641172. Capra, F.: 1975, The Tao of Physics, Bantam, New York. Collins, H. and Pinch, T.: 1992, The Golem: What Everyone Should Know About Science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Cushing, J.: 1998, Philosophical Concepts in Physics: The Historical Relation Between Philosophy and Scientic Theories, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Cushing, J. and McMullin, E. (eds): 1989, Philosophical Consequences of Quantum Theory: Reections on Bells Theorem, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame. Cushing, J.T. Delaney, C. and Gutting, G. (eds): 1984, Science & Reality, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame. Densmore, D.: 1995, Newtons Principia: The Central Argument: Translation, Notes and Expanded Proofs, Green Lion Press, Santa Fe. Drake, S.: 1957, Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo, Doubleday Anchor, New York. Duhem, P.: 1906/1962., The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, Athenaeum, New York. Earman, J. and Glymour, C.: 1980, Relativity and Eclipses, Historical Studies in the Philsophy of Science 11(1), 4985. Farrington, B.: 1961, Greek Science, Penguin Books, Middlesex. Feynman, R.: 1965, The Character of Physical Law, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Fine, A.: 1986, The Shaky Game, Chicago University Press, Chicago. Finocchiaro, M.: 1989, The Galileo Affair: A Documentary History, University of California Press, Berkeley. Fodor, J. A.: 1984, Observation Reconsidered, Philosophy of Science 51, 2343.
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Giere, R.: 1988, Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Giere, R. (ed.): 1992, Cognitive Models of Science, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. XV, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Glymour, C.: 1992, Realism and the Nature of Theories, in W. S. et. al. (ed.), Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs. Gorman, M.: 1992, Simulating Science: Heuristics, Mental Models and Technoscientic Thinking, Indiana University Press, Bloomington. Grim, P. (ed.): 1990, Philosophy of Science and the Occult, SUNY Press, New York. Gross, P. and Levitt, N.: 1994, Higher Superstition, Johns Hopkins, Baltimore. Guthrie, W. K. C.: 1962, A History of Greek Philosophy: The Earlier Presocratics and the Pythagoreans, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Hacking, I.: 1981a, Do we see through a microscope?, Philosophical Quarterly 62(4). Reprinted in B. Brody and R. Grandy eds., Readings in the Philosophy of Science, 2nd edition, Prentice-Hall, 1989, 29-43. Hacking, I.: 1982, Experimentation and Scientic Realism, Philosophical Topics, Vol. 13. 71-87, Reprinted in R. Boyd, P. Gasper & J.D. Trout eds., The Philosophy of Science, Bradford/MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1991, 247-260. Hacking, I. (ed.): 1981b, Scientic Revolutions, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Hanson, N.: 1958, Patterns of Discovery, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Heisenberg, W.: 1971, Physics and Beyond, Harper & Row, New York. Hirschfeld, L. and Gelman, S. (eds): 1994, Mapping the Mind: Domain Specicity in Cognition and Culture, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Holton, G.: 1973, Thematic Origins of Scientic Thought: Kepler to Einstein, Harvard Univerity Press, Cambridge. Holton, G.: 1978, The Scientic Imagination, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Hoyningen-Huene, P.: 1993, Reconstructing Scientic Revolutions: Thomas S. Kuhns Philosophy of Science, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Jauch, J. M.: 1989, Are Quanta Real? A Galilean Dialogue, Indiana University Press, Bloomington. Koestler, A.: 1972, The Roots of Coincidence, Hutchinson, London.
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Kuhn, T. S.: 1959, The Essential Tension, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientic Tradition and Change, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1977, pp. 225239. Also reprinted in R. Boyd, P. Gasper & J.D. Trout eds., The Philosophy of Science, Cambridge, Mass.: Bradford/MIT Press, 1991, 139 -147. Kuhn, T. S.: 1970a, The Structure of Scientic Revolutions, Chicago University Press, Chicago. Kuhn, T. S.: 1970b, Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?, in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Kuhn, T. S.: 1977, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientic Tradition and Change, Chicago University Press, Chicago. Lakatos, I.: 1978, The Methodology of Scientic Research Programmes, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Laudan, L.: 1981, A Confutation of Convergent Realism, Philosophy of Science 48, 19 48. Reprinted in Boyd, Gasper & Trout eds, 1991, 223-245, and in Leplin ed., 1984, 218-249. Laudan, L.: 1983, The Demise of the Demarcation Problem, in R. Cohen and L. Laudan (eds), Physics, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis, Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 111127. Laudan, L.: 1988, Science at the Bar - Causes for Concern (Reply to Ruse), in M. Ruse (ed.), But Is It Science?, Prometheus Books, Buffalo. Laudan, L.: 1990, Science And Relativism, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Leplin, J.: 1984, Scientic Realism, University of California Press, Berkeley. Margolis, H.: 1993, Paradigms and Barriers, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Matthews, M.: 1994, Science Teaching: The Role of History and Philosophy of Science, Routledge, New York. Matthews, M. (ed.): 1989, The Scientic Background to Modern Philosophy: Selected Readings, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis. Matthews, M. R.: 1992, History, Philosophy, and Science Teaching: The Present Rapprochement, Science & Education 1, 1147. Maxwell, G.: 1962, The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities, in H. Feigl and G. Maxwell (eds), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. III, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Reprinted in Brody and Grandy eds., Readings in the Philosophy of Science, 1989, 21-28. Miller, A.: 1986, Imagery in Scientic Thought, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
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Norton, J.: 1998, How We Know About Electrons, unpublished manuscript. Norton, J. D.: 1994, Science and Certainty, Synthese 99, 322. Pais, A.: 1994, Einstein Lived Here, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Pinch, T. and Collins, H.: 1984, Private Science and Public Knowledge: The Committee for the Scientic Investigation of the Paranormal and its Use of the Literature, Social Studies of Science 14, 52146. Popper, K.: 1963, Back to the PreSocratics, in Conjectures and Refutations, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, pp. 136-165. Popper, K.: 1974, Replies to my critics, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Karl Popper, Vol. 2, Open Court, La Salle. Putnam, H.: 1975, Mathematics, Matter and Method, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Ruse, M.: 1984, A Philosophers Day in Court, in A. Montague (ed.), Science and Creation, Oxford University Press. Ruse, M. (ed.): 1988, But Is It Science? The Philosophical Question in the Creation/Evolution Controversy, Prometheus Books, Buffalo. Russell, B.: 1960, An Outline of Philosophy, Meridian Books, Cleveland. Russell, B.: 1961, What I Believe, in R. Egner and L. Denon (eds), The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell, 1925, Simon & Schuster, New York. Salmon. M. Earman, J. Glymour, C. et. al. (ed.): 1992, Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs. Savage, C. (ed.): 1990, Scientic Theories: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. XIV, Minnesota University Press, Minneapolis. Schefer, I.: 1967, Science and Subjectivity, Bobbs Merrill, New York. Slezak, P.: 1996, Review of Paul Davies The Mind of God, Science & Education 5, 201 212. Slezak, P.: 2000, Radical Social Constructivism, NSSE Yearbook. forthcoming. Sorensen, R.: 1992, Thought Experiments, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Thagard, P.: 1988, Computational Philosophy of Science, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. Thagard, P.: 1992, Conceptual Revolutions, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Toulmin, S. (ed.): 1970, Physical Reality, Harper & Row, New York.
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Tweney, R.D. Doherty, M. and Mynatt, C. (eds): 1981, On Scientic Thinking, Columbia University Press, New York. van Fraassen, B.: 1976, To Save the Phenomena, Journal of Philosophy 73(18), 62332. Reprinted in Boyd, Gasper and Trout eds., 1991, 186-194. van Frassen, B.: 1980, The Scientic Image, Clarendon Press, Oxford. West, T.: 1991, In the Minds Eye, Prometheus Books, Buffalo. Westfall, R.: 1980, Never at Rest, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
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Teaching History and Philosophy of Science: Experience at IIT Kanpur

P .R.K. Rao
Formerly of Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur, India
As this book is about teaching and history, before I recall my fading memory traces of my experience of teaching history and philosophy of science at IIT (Indian Institute of Technology)-Kanpur, let me begin by reminding you of two cautionary remarks of George Bernard Shaw, Teaching, he said, is ineffective except in those instances in which it is superuous. Perhaps, there is an element of truth in the claim that our students learn inspite of us rather than because of us! About history, Shaw maintained that the only lesson that we can learn from history is that nobody learns from it. These two indictments, whatever their truth, can help moderate our, excessive enthusiasm for and expectations of innovations in science education. Moreover, nothing warrants the presumption that every civilized, vibrant nation must necessarily be also a scientically advanced nation. The kind of concerns and circumstances that prompted some of us at IIT Kanpur to introduce a programme of courses in history of science, scientic method, science and technology and its linkages with society are best captured by the observations of the rst and the last programme leaders of the KanpurIndo-American programme which helped establish IIT Kanpur with the participation of a consortium of nine leading American Universities. The rst programme leader, Normal Dahl had observed that IIT Kanpur has been an irrelevant factor in the industrial and social progress in India . . . a kind of isolated island of academic excellence but not part of the mainstream of Indias development. This assessment worried some of us for we were imbued with the idea that institutions like IIT Kanpur were set upto to be able to attend to the scientic and technological needs of the country. What distressed us even more and drove home our failure as educators was the telling observation of the last programme leader Mr. Oakely. He said that IIT Kanpur students face no technological background problems of adjustment in M.I.T., one of the foremost symbols of high-technology west, and the same students show considerable enthusiasm when, possibly for the rst time in their education, they are exposed to the ideas of growth of technology and its relation to percieved technological needs specic to a country. Science is a selective cognitive enterprise. The nature of that selectivity, to my mind, is succintly described by Hertz in the introduction to his book, Principles of Mechanics. We form images or symbols of objects such that the logically necessary consequences of those symbols or images are the same as the materially necessary consequences of the objects that correspond to the symbols or images. What is interesting in Hertzs account is the feature of the considerable freedom that exists in the formation of images or symbols of objects even as they must obey the above stipulated important limitation. In the cognitive enterprise called science, while we are necessarily performing, what Hans Jonas has called the primary ontological reduction of the actual objects of the
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Teaching HPS
world (as for example, point masses in place of extended physical objects in rigid body dynamics), there is no unique way of performing that primary ontological reduction. Earlier, successful scientic practices, cultural inuences, environmental pressures, socioeconomic factors etc., may contingently further constrain a particular scientic community in exercising the freedom involved in primary ontological reduction, but the existence of that freedom is the condition of possibility of what we understand by the term creativity. Our failure as teachers at IIT Kanpur consisted in not even sensitizing our students to the idea that science is a human and historical practice, let alone provoking them to draw on their creativity to perform such fruitful primary ontological reductions which will enable them to attend to the scientic and technological needs of the society to which they belong. Undoubtedly we have been quite successful in training our students to use established recipes in their chosen disciplines. But we have not even attended to the more important problem of orienting them so that they perceive a relevant segment of reality around them, perform novel primary ontological reductions, formulate the pertinent problems and solve them creatively. Our failure, it then appeared to us, can be traced, at least in part, to the situation in which not only lay man but also practicing scientists are so overwhelmed by the products of science that they pay scant attention to the processes by which the enterprise of science manufactures knowledge. One disastrous consequence of this lack of self-reexivity, particularly in a third world country like India, has been the gradual weakening of critical, social and political forces that could mediate between the requirements of autonomy of the expert scientic community and the developmental needs of the country. The above account should have made it clear that even in an institution like IIT Kanpur famous for its exibility in procedures it is not going to be easy to introduce new courses that do not fall within the framework of established disciplinary divisions. Fortunately for us, at that point of time there was a circular from the Ministry of Education which desired the introduction in IITs and other educational institutions courses devoted to historical practices in India related to temple architectures, ship-building, metallurgy and other indigeneous pre-industrial technologies. We took advantage of this particular circular and constituted a committee, with Prof. Mohini Mullick as the chairperson, to look into the possibilities of introducing courses in history and philosophy of science with particular reference to India. A few years later this course on History of Scientic Ideas was introduced as an open elective in the third year of the four year programme. We also conducted a ve day workshop in 1982 on the development of a curriculum in philosophy of science, history of science, science and technology and society. Based on the discussions which took place in that workshop we subsequently formulated some courses. We also made a largely unsuccessful effort to see that each instructor delivers some three to four lectures on the historical aspects of whatever subject he is teaching in a semester. Many faculty members thought it to be a waste of time particularly when they have so much syllabus to cover. As always, there are notable exceptions: Prof. Amitabh Ghosh who is currently the Director of IIT Kharagpur, and Prof. A.K. Biswas who used to offer a course on history of science in India.
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More often than not any effort to have faculty engagement with or study of any historical, philosophical aspects of science met with resistance. Responses varied from What is in it there for me? to Will it help me to publish more often? It was probably in 1982 that the course on History of Scientic Ideas was offered for the rst time IIT Kanpur. There were ve of us as instructors (Professors Mohini Mullick, A.P. Shukla, K.S. Gandhi, V.K. Jairath and myself) sharing eight lectures each and we had three students (two of them were students of physics and the third of computer science)! None of the instructors was a professional historian. I must confess that even today it is not clear to me whether it was a setback or an advantage. Perhaps it is both. On the one hand, we have the eminent scientist and equally well known historian of science, Truesdell, assuring us that it is the standard claim of scientists that most historians do not have sufcient grasp of science, itself to understand the facts rather than the mere circumustances of its history. On the other hand, we are alerted by the J.B. Cohen, that Professional historians are wont to complain of the attempts of the scientist whose approach to history often sufferes from the consequences of a purely scientic training. Kuhn, in his paper, The Relations between History and History of Science (Daedalus, Vol. 100, No. 2) discuss the problem of teaching of history of science. I am inclined to believe that the problem involved is more complex than one of teaching or of history or of science. We may remind ourselves of Kants famous injunction that history without philosophy is blind and philosophy without history is sterile. But we all know the consequences of riding two horses at the same time. The Nobel laureate poet, Czeslaw Milosz in his Charles Eliot Norton lectures at Harvard in 1982 summarized the situation thusas far as poets are concerned: Many learned books on poetry have been written, and they nd, at least in the countries of the west, more readers than poetry itself. This is not a good sign, even if it may be explained both by the brilliance of their authors and by their zeal in assimilating scientic disciplines which today enjoy universal respect. A poet who would like to compete with those mountains of erudition would have to pretend that he possesses more self-knowledge than poets are allowed to possess. What is the case with a poet is also in good measure the case with a scientist or a historian or in fact with any one who is engaged in making valid knowledge claims. The necessarily historical character of the knowledge system of science and the limited role that the individual practicing scientist plays in the production of cognitive goods by and large restricts the span of his philosophical, historical, ethical and social concerns in that production. This restriction of concerns not merely at the level of the individual practitioner of science but also at the level of knowledge claims of science detracts from the secular character of science in so far as it resists the critical examination of its own founding (un)concerns in its practices. And as long as this situation prevails, not only teaching of history of science will be plagued by charges of only attending to the mere circumustances if its history or to the counter-charges of the distorting consequences of a purely scientic training, but more importantly, the freedom available in performing primary ontological reductions that are comensurate with the philosophical, historical, ethical and social concerns cannot be pressed into service for the generation of knowledges that are genuinely liberating. The course, History of Scientic Ideas, has by now been offered for more than ten
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Teaching HPS
years by me and Prof. A.P. Shukla (See Appendix B for a topic outline of the course). The number of students who registered in the course at any given time never exceeded twenty ve. But one notable feature is that there always used to be a sizeable number of auditors, some times as many as the creditors of the course. It is interesting to know that between eighty to hundred thousand candidates appear in the joint entrance examination of the IITs and out of them about three hundred get admitted into each IIT. They are admittedly a bright lot but they are innocent of philosophy and ignorant of history. History to them is a boring chronology of events and philosophy a waste of time. Moreover, in their schools they are indoctrinated with received cannon of what science is. To break the consequent resistance on their part and sensitize them to the idea that science is a historical activity and there can be alternative creative punctuations of reality more adequate to the lived life-world than those of contemporary science, I used to resort to pedagogical-shock treatment, so to speak: I would circulate an excerpt from the famous preface of the book, Order of Things, by Michel Foucault (see Appendix D) in which he talks about a particular Chinese encyclopaedia in which animals are taxonomically ordered in ways that cannot even be conceived by many of us. Or I would distribute two excerpts on social order in early Hindu society, one by Ananda K. Coomaraswamy and another by Kosambi (see Appendix A). Both refer to the same empirical domain but each gives an interpretation which is antithetical to the other, Coomaraswamy interprets the entire social order in terms of the requirements of ritual sacrices. Kosambi, on the other hand, interprets the same social formation in terms of Marxist categories. I would invariably describe the episode in which Neils Bohr and Heisenberg went to the Kronberg Castle in Denmark. Here is what Bohr said as recapitulated by Heisenberg:
Isnt it strange how this castle changes as soon as one imagines that Hamlet lived here. As scientists we believe that a castle consists only of stones, and admire the way architects put them together. The stone, the green roof with its patina, the wood carvings in the church, constitute the whole castle. None of this should be changed by the fact that Hamlet lived here, and yet it is changed completely. Suddenly the walls and the ramparts speak a different language. The courtyard becomes an entire world, a dark corner reminds us of the human soul, we hear Hamlets To be or not to be. Yet all we really know about Hamlet is that his name appears in a thirteenth-century chronicle. No one can really prove that he really lived here. But everyone knows the questions Shakespeare had him ask, the human depths he was made to reveal, and so he too had to be found a place on earth here, in Kronberg.
I would draw on Carrs little book, What is History?, to drive home the idea that history is a continual dialogue of the present with the past and therefore historical truths are not frozen collection of facts but, like scientic truths, are eternally revisable in light of new evidence and new frameworks of interpretation. Sometimes, a little mischievously, I would ask the students to imagine what would have happened if the Michelson-Morley experiment (which rendered ether the emperors new clothes) were conducted before the earlier truth of geocentric theory was declared falsel in favour of the new thruth of heliocentric theory! There is another important aspect of the course which I would like to mention. I used to give on a regular basis reading assignments. Each student was asked to submit a written summary of the article assigned and argue for his/her agreements and
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disagreements with the epistemological or ontological or methodological or historical or realist/anti-realist claims explicitly or implicitly made by the author of the article. One of my favourites is the article on roots of atomic physics from the book, Physics and Philosophy, by Heisenberg. Another is the article, The Dematerialization of Matter, by N.R. Hanson. A third interesting paper, I often used to assign, is Nobel Laureate biologist, George Walds Innovation in Biology. Sometimes, to place in evidence the changing and the now discarded scientic vocabulary and the important role played by text-books in inuencing the cognitive orientation of future practitioners of science, I would assign for reading an eighteenth or nineteenth century scientic article or selection from a text-book. The main purpose of these assignments, as that of the course, is to let the student see for himself that whether or not science describes reality as it really is, as history of science demonstrates, it attempts to describe that reality by seeing it through a contingently chosen cognitive grid and that he and his relevant community can draw on their cognitive resources to choose another cognitive grid more suited to the life-world they belong to. Appendix C also includes a sample examination paper. I take advantage of its inclusion (the statement by Mazlish) to contest if not dispel the widespread belief that science and the church are in continuous conict. In point of fact what one nds from the history of science is that many men of the establishment of the church made signicant contributions to the enterprise of science in the latters formative years. The men of God believed that reason can be enlisted in support of faith which of course to them was of paramount importance. A word about student and faculty response to the course. The student reaction surveys always elicited a negative response to the idea of dropping the course from the curriculum. And more often than not they also expressed the view that there is a signicant change in their understanding of the nature of scientic activity and its place in society. More surprisingly, many faculty who were earlier on suspicious about the usefulness of this course based on whatever reports they probably got from others began to consider the course as conceptually interesting and rigourous. Finally, let me briey state my views on the importance of courses on history and philosophy of science in science education. I do not believe that teaching such courses will make the students more creative scientists. Firstly, we do not have, and, I believe, we can never have, an algorithm for transforming people into creative scientists or artists or whatever. When Gauss was once asked as to how he nally succeeded in proving a theorem the proof of which eluded him for several years he is supposed to have answered: By divine inspiration. An element of mystery must always envelop the creative act. Secondly, the kind of self-reexive, critical attitude that one develops through studies in history and philosophy of science, I suspect, dampens the bold, aggressive, adventurous asumption-making disposition that one asociates with creativity. What I have argued for in the previous pages is that study of history and philosophy of science suggests that doing science creatively involves performing a primary ontological reduction of the objects of the world and that there are no grounds for believing that only one such reduction is possible. If my claim is valid, study of history and philosophy of science enables us to recognize what it takes to be creative.
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It does not make us creative. For we may lack the requisite capacity to perform primary ontological reduction even though we know that is what we must do to be considered creative. Moreover, such recognition is not necessary for one to be creative. There can be other reasons for the importance of study of history and philosophy of science. Many of us as teachers have often encountered the situation in which a student who is admitted into, say, computer science programme considers that we are imposing an unnecessary burden on him when we prescribe a course on electromagnetic theory or chemistry. What is not recognized by him is that transporting ideas from one domain into another can sometimes help better understanding of ideas in the, latter domain and may even facilitate creativity. Transporting the familiar idea that all history is contemporary history may help recognize that scientic truths are not ahistorical truths. Above all, the study of history and philosophy of science can be an intellectually enriching experience in so far as that study allows us to see the limits of liberation that can be secured by the dominant knowledge system of our times. Indicating the limits of a subject taught is an important responsibility of the teacher as the German scientists and intellectuals of the second world war generation painfully realized. The post second world war commission for university reform in Germany came up with the following recommendation: Every lecturer in the university must have the ability: 1. To see the limits of his subject material in his teaching to make the students aware of these limits and to show them that beyond these limits forces come into play which are no longer entirely rational, but arise out of life and human society itself. 2. To show in every subject the way that leads beyond its own narrow connes to broader horizons of its own, I am inclined to believe that study of history and philosophy of science can help a teacher in his efforts to acquire those abilities. Appendix A 1. Hinduism by Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, Philosophical Library, New York The Social Order: Where there is agreement as to the nature of mans last end, and that the way by which the present and the paramount ends of life can be realised is that of sacricial operation, it is evident that the form of society will be determined by the requirements of the Sacrice; and that order (yatharthata) and impartiality (samadrsti) will mean that everyman shall be enabled to become, and by no mis-direction prevented from becoming, what he has it in him to become. We have seen that it is to those who maintain the Sacrice that the promise is made that they shall ourish. Now the Sacrice, performed in divinis by the All-worker (Visvakarma), as imitated here demands a cooperation of all the arts (visva karmani), for example, those of music, architecture, carpentry, husbandry and that of warfare to protect the operation. The politics of the heavenly, social and individual communities are governed by one and the same law. The pattern of the heavenly politics, is revealed in scripture and reected in the constitution of the autonomous state and that of the man who governs himself. In this man, in whom the sacramental life is complete, there is a hierarchy of sacerdotal, royal; and administrative powers, and a fourth class consisting of the
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43 physical organs of sense and action, that handle the raw material or food to be prepared for all; and it is clear that if the organism is to ourish, which is impossible if divided against itself, that the sacerdotal, royal and administrative powers, in their order of rank, must be the masters, and the workers in raw materials their servants. It is in precisely the same way that the functional hierarchy of the realm is determined by the requirements of the Sacrice on which its prosperity depends. The casted are literally born of the Sacrice. In the sacramental order there is a need and a place for all mens work: and there is no more signicant consequence of the principle, Work is Sacrice, than the fact that under these conditions, and remote as this may be from our secular ways of thinking, every function, from that of the priest and the king down to that of the potter and scavenger, is literally a priesthood and every operation a rite. In each of these spheres, moreover, we meet with professional ethics. The caste system differs from the industrial division of labor, with its fractioning of human faculty, in that it presupposes differences in kinds of responsibility but not in degrees of responsibility; and it is just because an organisation of functions such as this, with its mutual loyalties and duties, is absolutely incompatible with our competitive industrialism, that the monarchic, feudal and caste system is always pianted in such dark colors by the sociologist, whose thinking is determined more by his actual environment than it is a deduction from rst principles. The Aryans had little difculty in penetrating to within 50 miles of the Yamuna river. The thinner forest of the region could be burnt down. But the social organisation necessary for settling the land cleared by re went beyond the simple tribe. The lowest castefor caste had developed within the tribewas now called sudra possibly from the tribal name (e.g. the Oxydrakoi on the lower Indus who fought against Alexander). These were helots who belonged to the tribe or clan group as a whole in much the same manner as the tribal cattle, without the membership rights of the tribe as granted to the three upper castes. These three higher castes were properly recognised as Aryan and full members of the tribe: kshatriya (warrior and ruler), brahmana (brahmin priest), vaisya (the settler who produced all the food surplus by agriculture and cattle breeding). The word varna came to mean one of these four class castes, which constituted a class structure within such of the tribes as had reached advanced forms of property-holding and indulged in trade exchange on a sufciently large scale. This was not true of every single Aryan tribe, many of whom continued undifferentiated while others had only the arya-sudra (free v. helot) division. That the sudra was not bought and sold as in ancient Greece and Rome was due to no kindness on the part of the Indo-Aryans. It was simply that commodity production and private property had not developed far enough. The existence of the sudra caste had a peculiar effect upon later Indian society. Chattel slavery in the sense of classical European (specically Graeco-Roman) antiquity was never to be of any size or importance in the means and relations of production in India. The expropriable surplus could always be produced by
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Teaching HPS the sudra. The development of caste foreshadowed a general class society beyond the exclusiveness of a tribe. A few of the brahmins had begun to ofciate for more than one clan or tribe, which implied some type of relationship between several groups. A few brahmins at the other end of the economic scale had begun to advance into the dense forest to the east, in fairly small groups with their own cattle; sometimes even as individuals with no property and no arms for defence or hunting. Their harmlessness was obvious, and they were of the utmost importance in coming to terms with the food-gathering Naga savages of the forest, whom they often joined, or with whom they lived on friendly terms. Their sole protection was their poverty and manifestly innocuous nature. The traders, on the other hand, were convoyed at need by armed kshatriyas who would protect them against the aborigines (nishada). These kshatriyas grew into mercenary groups ready to ght in anyones service for hire. 2. Hinduism by D.D. Kosambi Without mincing words, the ritual books say: Like a vaisya . . . tributary to another, to be eaten up by another, to be oppressed at will . . .. Like a sudra . . . the servant of another, to be the primary producers, were to be enclosed between the two upper castes during the sacricial procession of the whole tribe, to make them submissive. After this the basic class nature of caste need hardly be doubted, though it was still class on a primitive level of production. The rst taxes were called bali because they were gifts brought to the chief at the sacrice by members of the tribe or clan. There was a particular ofcial known only at this transitional period, the king apportioner (bhaga-dugha). His job seems to have been the proper sharing out of the bali gifts among the tribal kings immediate followers, and perhaps assessment of taxes as well.
Appendix B Outline of the course on history of scientic ideas 1. Historical study as a means of understanding the nature of scientic mode of thinking and its place in life and society. Role of philosophy of science in the study of history of science; metatheoretic concerns. Brief accounts of scientic method: Inductivism; Falsicationism; Methodology of Research Programmes; Paradigmatic shifts and scientic revolutions, Science as an extended metaphor. 2. Greek Thought as the bed-rock of Western civilization or the fabrication of a myth. Ionian Nature-philosophy, Pythagoreanism, Eleaticiam, Atomism, Sophism, Platonism, Aristotelianism. Hellenistic Science: Mathematics, Astronomy, Mechanics. 3. Arab Ascendancy and Islamic Science: Brief outline of the contributions to philosophy, mathematics, astronomy, chemistry, medicine. 4. Middle Ages and European Intellectual Resurgence: Rediscovery of Greek Thought, Translation of Greek Texts, Aristotelian Scholasticism Interplay of Faith, Rea-
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45 son, Doubt, Criticism and Innovation. Copernican Revolution, Baconian empiricism, Galilean Platonism, Cartesian split of the Res Extensa and Res cogitans, Newton the last great magician, Newtonian Synthesis of the clockwork Universe, Mechanization of the World Picture, Leibnitzian Mathesis Universalis.
5. Nineteenth century as the Golden/Silly Age of Science; Development of Mathematics. Astronomical, Kinetic, Atomic, Energetic, Psychophysical, Statistical, Morphological, Genetic Views of Nature. Microcosm after the microscope, Macrocosm after the telescope, matter after the chemical Balance, life after vivisecton, Man after Darwin, Society after Marx, Psyche after Freud. Twentieth centurys Relativistic dethronement of common-sense, perceptions and Quantum mechanical mixed metaphors. Unity of Science vs Unity of Man. 6. From Plantocracy to Technocracy or the Historical Evolution of Institutions of Science: Mercantile Capitalism, Colonies & Plantations; Slave Trade and Saving the Heathens; Seed-beds of Science in Botanical Gardens and Monasteries. Scientistic Movements, Birth of Acadamies of Science and Technical Schools, Emergence of the Scientist and the rise of the Expert; Migration of Science from Italy to England to France to Germany to U.S.A. Innovating Innovation and Managers of Science and Technolgy. 7. Indian Science: Colonial, Nationalist and Post-Independence phases. Parasitic character of and lopsided institutionalization of Science. Peoples Science Movements. The question of Alternative Sciences. Text-Books Chalmers, A.F.: 1982, What Is This Thing Called Science?, University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, Qld. Dijkterhuis, E.J.: 1986, The Mechanization of the World Picture, tr. by C. Dikshoorn, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Merz, J.T.: 1903-1914, A History of European Thought in the 19th Century, W. Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh, London. Appendix C Sample Examination Paper Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur Science, Metascience, Society SE 862-History of Scientic ideas II Mid Semester Examination Time: 1 hour OPEN NOTES 11.3.86
Maximum length of answer for each question: 300 words
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In the Temple were, forged the hammers which destroyed the Temple. (A. France )
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Bacon, Galileo and Descartes can veritably be called the founders of the method of modern science. Identify the most important idea in each case, which became a foundation stone of Science and show how this self-same idea has become historically transformed into a better sapping science of its virality. Q.2.
The warfare of Science with theology in christendom . . . . . . is simply part of a continuing conict a conict which takes its rise from the contradictory nature of man: rational and irrational, creator of his own conditions, and conditioned by forces seemingly beyond his control. The tension generated by these warring elements is not a mere transient phase of mans existence: as long as he remains human, it will be his problem and his glory. When it ceases we will be no longer recording history, which by denition deals with human beings. (D. Mazlish)
Logic and reason have been put to service of christian dogma and study of nature and science, both simultaneously and, to the mutual exclusion of each other. Elaborate on this dynamical process by the historical development of European thought from 11th to the middle of 16th century, as a concrete example. Q.3. Every signicant institution, individual, or thought of the past, must be a product of the travails of its times. And we can benet by it only if we can currently relate its relevance and irrelevance with the present. Comment in this light on any four of the following: 1. Pythagoras 2. Aristotelian causality 3. Hellenistic Astronomy 4. Ishale at-Kindi 5. Brethren of sincerity 6. Newtonian synthesis Format of answers: You are expected rst to elaborate on the views propounded on these topics in the lectures, and then give reasons for your agreement or disagreement. Appendix D The Order of Things by Foucault, Preface, p. xv. This book rst arose out of a passage in Borges, out of the laughter that shattered, as I read the passage, all the familiar landmarks of my thoughtour thought, the thought that bears the stamp of our age and our geographybreaking up all the ordered surfaces and all the planes with which we are accustomed to tame the wild
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profusion of existing things, and continuing long afterwards to disturb and threaten with collapse our age-old distinction between the Same and the Other. This passage quotes a certain Chinese encyclopaedia in which it is written that animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classication, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very ne camelhair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like ies. In the wonderment of this taxonomy, the thing we apprehend in one great leap, the thing that, by means of the fable, is demonstrated as the exotic charm of another system of thought, is the limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of thinking that. References Carr, E.: 1974, What is History?, Penguin, London. Coomaraswamy, A.: Hinduism, Philosophical Library, New York. Foucault, M.: 1970, The Order of Things, Tavistock Publications, London. Hanson, N. R.: 1958, The Dematerialization of Matter. Heisenberg, W.: 1958, Physics and Philosophy, George Allen and Unwin Edition. Kuhn, T.: 1971, The Relations between History and History of Science, Daedalus 100(2). Wald, G.: 1958, Innovation and Biology, Scientic American 199, 100.
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Multiculturalism in Science Education and the Question of Universalism

William W. Cobern Cathleen C. Loving
Western Michigan University, USA. Email: bill.cobern@wmich.edu
Texas A&M University. Email: cloving@tamu.edu
Introduction Is science universal? Only recently has this question been given any serious consideration at all. In the tradition of science as practiced in the West for the past 300 years and in the tradition of school science, the answer has been, Of course science is universal. As Richard Dawkins likes to put it, there are no epistemological relativists at 30,000 feet. But today some will say, Not so fast! Dawkins offers a brute denition of universality completely devoid of any nuance of understanding and equally devoid of relevance to the question at hand. No one disputes that without an airplane of fairly conventional description, a person at 30,000 feet is in serious trouble. The question of universality does not arise over the phenomena of falling. The question of universality arises over the fashion of the propositions given to account for the phenomena of falling, the fashion of the discourse through which we communicate our thoughts about the phenomena, and the values we attach to the phenomena itself and the various ways we have of understanding and accounting for the phenomenaincluding the account offered by a standard scientic description. In todays schools there are often competing accounts of natural phenomena especially where schools are located in multicultural communities. There are also competing claims about what counts as science. The purpose of our paper is to examine the denition of science put forward from multicultural perspectives in contrast to a universalist perspective on science, i.e., the Standard Account. We will argue that good science explanations will always be universal even if we do incorporate indigenous knowledge as scientic and broaden what is taught as science. What works best is still of interest to most and although we hate to use the word hegemonyWestern science would co-opt and dominate indigenous knowledge if it were incorporated as science. Therefore, indigenous knowledge is better off as a different kind of knowledge that can be valued for its own merits, that can play a vital role in science education, and can maintain a position of independence from which it can critique the practices of science and the Standard Account. Multicultural Perspectives on Science If there are different ways of accounting for a phenomena of nature then it is possible that some people will reject some of these accountsincluding the account offered by Western scienceand accept others. Gibson (1996) tells of a time when she was working at a rainforest scientic station on a South Pacic Island and a conversation
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she had with an indigenous Islander. The Islander commented that Westerners only think they know why the ocean rises and falls on a regular basis. They think it has to do with the moon. They are wrong. The ocean rises and falls as the great sea turtles leave and return to their homes in the sand. The ocean falls as the water rushes into the empty nest. The ocean rises as the water is forced out by the returning turtles. Is this Islander scientic because he has accurate knowledge of the ocean tides that affect his island? Is he unscientic because his explanation for tidal action is scientically inappropriate? Is science universal because the standard scientic account for tidal action applies to all local occurrences of tidal phenomena? Or, does one grant the obvious brute factuality of actual phenomenon but reject universalist claims for standard scientic accounts of actual phenomenon? Matthews well states the universalist perspective of the Standard Account:
Just as volcanic eruptions are indifferent to the race or sex of those in the vicinity, and lava kills whites, blacks, men, women, believers, non-believers, equally, so also the science of lava ows will be the same for all. For the universalist, our science of volcanoes is assuredly a human construction with negotiated rules of evidence and justication, but it is the behavior of volcanoes that nally judges the adequacy of our vulcanology, not the reverse. (Matthews, 1994, p. 182)
The undeterred critic, however, will still ask: Though the phenomenon are experientially universal, cant one argue that scientic accounts are not universal since such accounts are not universally accepted? The resolution of such questions hinges on the denition of science, including the concept of universality, and this resolution is of considerable importance for both educators and the public at large. When a discipline earns the title science it acquires the authority to promulgate truthful and reliable knowledge, control over education and credentials, access to money and manpower, and the kind of political clout that comes from possessing knowledge that is essential yet esoteric (Fuller, 1988, p. 177). In science education the denition of science is a de facto gate keeping device for what can be included in a school science curriculum and what cannot. A very large amount of money, for example, has been spent in the USA on litigating the question of whether or not creation science can be properly included as an aspect of school science (Nelkin, 1983; Overton, 1983). Moreover, if science is deemed universal it not only displaces scientic pretenders such as creation science, it as well displaces any local knowledge that conicts with it. Kawagley, Norris-Tull & Norris-Tull (1998, p. 134) argue that such a narrow view of science not only diminishes the legitimacy of knowledge derived through generations of naturalistic observation and insight, it simultaneously devalues those cultures which traditionally rely heavily on naturalistic observation and insight. The record is fairly clear. Around the globe where science is taught, it is taught at the expense of indigenous knowledge and this precipitates charges of epistemological hegemony and cultural imperialism. People feel passionately about these issues. The passions in the academy have run so high that the controversies have been dubbed the Science Wars (Nature, 1997). At school levels, the struggle is over multicultural approaches to science and science education within multicultural situations. Actions taken are at times extreme. In
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1987, the Portland Oregon School District published the African-American Baseline Essays, a set of six revisionist essays providing resource materials and references for teachers on the knowledge and contributions of Africans and African-Americans. The science baseline essay, written by Hunter Havelin Adams (1990), has serious problems, but it is widely distributed because of the current pressure on school districts to incorporate multicultural material into the classroom coupled with the dearth of this kind of material. Hundreds of copies of the Baseline Essays have been sent to school districts across the country and they have been adopted or are being seriously considered by school districts as diverse as Fort Lauderdale, Detroit, Milwaukee, Atlanta, Chicago, Prince George County, MD, and Washington, DC. Even more widely distributed is its predecessor, Blacks in Science: Ancient and Modern, edited by Ivan Van Sertima (1984). Vine DeLoria, who is involved with Indian science education through the American Indian Science and Engineering Society (AISES) has recently published a book entitled Red Earth, White Lies: Native Americans and the Myth of Scientic Facts (DeLoria, 1995). These supplements on multicultural science, expressly intended to raise the self-esteem of students, adopt a triumphalist approach to the material. That is, they present the achievements and the beliefs of the group described as superior and anticipatory to the achievements and beliefs of modern Western science. Thus, the Dogon of Mali supposedly studied Sirius B, which is invisible to the naked eye, hundreds of years ago. The Egyptians foreshadowed the Theory of Evolution thousands of years ago; the Egyptians also anticipated many of the philosophical aspects of quantum theory (Adams, p. 21), and they knew the particle/wave nature of light (p. 26). The Baseline Essays and similar publications represent a radical revisionist historiography of science and culture. There are other examples of multicultural materials for science education that are far less controversial. Books such as Robertta Barbas (1995), Science in the Multicultural Classroom: A Guide to Teaching and Learning and the Addison Wesley (1993) teachers guide, Multiculturalism in Mathematics, Science, and Technology: Readings and Activities bring culture into the science classroom for pedagogical purposes without rewriting history. The nature of science implicit in these books, however, represents a subtle change from standard accounts. Looking elsewhere, the question of how science is to be dened is brought into clear relief (e.g., Kawagley, Norris-Tull, & Norris-Tull, 1998; Snivley & Corsiglia, 1998). With specic reference to First Nations people in Canada and the Yupiaq people of Alaska, one nds that indigenous knowledge is reclassied as sciencebut not science according to the Standard Account and therein lies the controversy. Multiple Culture-based Sciences? The Standard Account of science can be called Western given its historic origins in Ancient Greek and European culture. Speculative thought about Nature, natural philosophy and later what became known simply as science have always been engaged with Western culture. The Western experience with science has been a long one and in a sense they have matured in consort, but not without trials. There has been, on the one hand, a disintegrating effect on traditional values and forms of representation, and, on the other hand, a progressive integration into the dominant culture . . . of the scientic
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mentalitythe values, content of knowledge and patterns of action which underlie ` scientic practice and are formed by it (Ladriere, 1977, p. 12). This disintegrating effect appears to have been recognized by Charles Darwin who late in life lamented:
I have said that in one respect my mind has changed during the last twenty or thirty years. Up to the age of thirty, or beyond it, poetry of many kinds . . . gave me great pleasure, and even as a schoolboy I took intense delight in Shakespeare. . . I have also said that formerly pictures gave me considerable, and music very great, delight. But now for many years I cannot endure to read a line of poetry: I have tried to read Shakespeare, and found it so intolerably dull that it nauseated me. I have also almost lost my taste for pictures or music . . . I retain some taste for ne scenery, but it does not cause me the exquisite delight which it formerly did. . . . My mind seems to have become a kind of machine for grinding general laws out of large collections of facts . . . (quoted in Owens, 1983, p. 38)
And of course the European Romantic poets echoed this lament (see Barber, 1963). Moreover, Europe was an expansionist culture, and European exploration, conquest and colonization of lands beyond Europe brought Western science to those lands and their inhabitants. In these parts of the world where Western science is experienced as a relatively new phenomena, the interaction of science with culture has taken a more violent form and the disintegrating effects have been much more sharply experienced (Ladri` re, 1977, p. 14). Indeed, colonial education designed for indigenous peoples e used science as the tool of choice to modernize and supplant indigenous culture. In the words of one colonialist: A literate nation is provided with the means for substituting scientic explanations of everyday eventssuch as death, disease, and disasterfor the supernatural, non-scientic explanations which prevail in developing societies . . . (Lord, 1958, p. 340). A more reective colonial teacher remarked, . . . In common with so many others, I used to think that we could get rid of Bantu stupidities by suitable talks on natural science, hygiene, etc., as if the natural sciences could subvert their traditional lore or their philosophy (Tempels, 1959, p. 29). The point is, the West judged the rest of the world by its own measure of choice, Western science and Western technology, and used education to enforce change on those societies found decient. According to Adas (1989, p. 4) European perceptions of the material superiority of their own cultures, particularly as manifested in scientic thought and technological innovation, shaped their attitudes toward and interaction with peoples they encountered overseas. Why? Because:
In the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, most European thinkers concluded that the unprecedented control over nature made possible by Western science and technology proved that European modes of thought and social organization corresponded much more closely to the underlying realities of the universe than did those of any other people or society, past or present. (Adas, 1989, p. 7)
Western scientists did have scientic interests in the rest of the world. Many areas of the globe became eld sites for the practice of Western science by Western scientists (Basalla, 1967). Darwins voyage on the Beagle is surely the best known example of Western scientic development derived from non-European eld work. When scientists occasionally took note of indigenous knowledge of Nature, that knowledge was distinctively labeled ethnoscience (e.g., Berlin, 1972; Behrens, 1989; Boster & Johnson,
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1989)never simply science. This is not to say that such indigenous knowledge was regarded as without value. There is a long tradition of Western science nding value in indigenous knowledge especially as an aide to pharmaceutical discovery (Linden, 1991). But, nding value in indigenous knowledge is not the same as conferring the title, science, and admitting indigenous knowledge of Nature to the Standard Account. In the 1990s, non-Western people and some scholars within the West began to formally and overtly resist this imperial Western attitude toward indigenous knowledge of Nature. This movement was abetted by the program for the social study of science, founded in the 1970s at Edinburgh (Bloor & Barnes, 1996), which argued that all science is socially contingent and culturally embedded. New epistemological perspectives such as multiculturalism (Stanley & Brickhouse, 1994), post colonialism (McKinley, 1997), and post modernism (Lyotard, 1995) rose to challenge the conventional Western wisdom on the relationship between science and culture and the Standard Account itself. In education Hodson (1993, p. 686) maintained that science curricula often portray science as located within, and exclusively derived from, a western cultural context. The implicit curriculum message is that the only science is western science. . . Dr. Thom Alcoze is Native American and a forestry professor at Northern Arizona University. In a taped interview for a science teacher development project (Smithsonian Institution, 1996b) he poignantly presented a different perspective on science.
Science is often thought of [pause] America has science. Mainstream America has science. And if you are a minority culture in this country you dont have science. We started looking for Indian science where science is expressed in Indian tradition. And found it with plants, starting off. Medicines. And of course the stereotype is well Indian medicine is just superstition and mumbo-jumbo, slight of hand, and basically its a witch doctor kind of thing [pause] a stereotype. A lot of strange noises and dancin and singin and a lot of shakin but thats all it is [pause] superstitious. Its not real. What we found out when we looked for facts, we found that even today in modern America there are over 200 medicines in the pharmacopoeia that we use that have direct origins in Native American medical practice. Yes, in fact Indian people did have science. They were using science all the time. They werent using scientic terminology. They did not publish in scientic journals [pause] thats kind of facetious at that time. But the issue of science then started to be redened in my denition of what science is all about when we started to see that science is just another word for nature.
Dr. Alcoze last sentence is of critical importance. He says, science is just another word for nature and therefore American Indians being greatly knowledgeable about Nature had scientic knowledge of their own. This idea is further developed in Kawagley et al., (1998, p. 134): We contend that no single origin for science exists; that science has a plurality of origins and a plurality of practices. They contend that there is no one way to do or think about science (p. 139). As their case in point, they contend that Yupiaq culture in southwestern Alaska holds a body of scientic knowledge and epistemology that differs from that of Western science (p. 133).
Much of Yupiaq scientic knowledge is manifested most clearly in their technology. One may argue that technology is not science. However, technology does not spring from a void. To invent technological devices, scientic observations and experimentation must be conducted. Yupiaq inventions, which include the kayak, river sh traps . . . represent technology that could not have been developed without extensive scientic study of the ow of currents in rivers, the
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ebb and ow of tides in bays, and the feeding, resting, and migratory habits of sh, mammals, and birds. (Kawagley et al., 1998, p. 136)
Science from this perspective refers to descriptive knowledge of Nature developed through experience with Nature. The denition of science used here is consistent with Ogawa (1995, p. 588) who refers to science simply as a rational perceiving of reality and which then allows him to argue for the existence of legitimate multi-sciences. The knowledge described above is from a domain of knowledge that Snively & Corsiglia (1998) call Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK). It is the descriptive ecological knowledge about Nature that First Nations peoples in Canada and Native Americas in the USA have acquired through long years of experience with their natural environment, and which has been vital to their survival. Snively & Corsiglia (1998) show that this knowledge can be quite insightful and has much to offer Western science. For example, they tell the story of a Nisgaa sherman in British Columbia who noticed that the Dungeness Crabs he typically harvested were exhibiting strange behavior patterns. The crabs were marching past the dock at the mouth of the Nass River, rather than staying in the deep water of Alice Arm (Snively & Corsiglia, 1998, p. 22). He grew concerned about possible industrial pollution of the Alice Arm waters from a nearby molybdenum mine and later his concerns were shown to be well founded. Given the life and practice of the Nisgaa this intuition should come as no surprise.
Among the Nisgaa, and among other aboriginal peoples, formal observation, recollection, and consideration of extraordinary natural events is taken seriously. Every spring members of some Nisgaa families still walk their salmon stream to ensure spawning channels are clear of debris and that salmon are not obstructed in their ascent to spawning grounds. In the course of such inspection trips, Nisgaa observers traditionally use all of their senses and pay attention to important variables: what plants are in bloom, what birds are active, when specic animals are migrating and where, and so forth. In this way, traditional communities have a highly developed capacity for building up a collective data base. Any deviations from past patterns are important and noted. (Corsiglia & Snively, 1997, p. 25)
Similar accounts obtain for people living traditional lives in many other regions of the world from Australia to Africa (see Warren, 1991 & 1997). Multicultural Science in the Classroom The reasons for including such examples of knowledge as part of the Standard Account or the reasons for expanding the denition of science under the Standard Account, have to do with education. Proponents of a multiplicity view of science argue that this will better serve the needs of students coming from diverse cultural backgrounds and will help to change the culturally corrosive effect that Western science has had on non Western cultures. The Harvard-Smithsonian Video Case Studies in Science Education (Smithsonian Institution, 1996a & 1996b) project on classroom science provides a glimpse of how this multicultural perspective on science can play out in a science classroom. The project produced videotape case studies of teachers. Each tape shows vignettes of a teacher teaching science interspersed with interview segments with the teacher and a science education expert. One of the case studies was done at an elementary school in Flagstaff, Arizona where the students come from American Indian
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Nature is viewed as sacred Humans are part of the web of life Humans should live in harmony with nature The entire world is viewed as being alive Technology should be low impact
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Figure 1: Native American views about nature (Simthsonian Institution, 1996b). and non-Indian families. Donna is a fth grade teacher and she has been teaching a unit on ecology. She also has drawn in her Native American students by collecting information on Indian culture. This information is publicly displayed on a large poster board in the classroom (see gure 1). Pointing to the poster board, the teacher speaks to her students.
Donna: We were talking earlier in here about looking at different cultures and nding ideas form cultures that might help us understand science better. Now, some of the traditional Native American views about nature are on this chart. Can you nd one [Native American view] that helps us to understand this cycle of decompositions? (Smithsonian Institution, 1996b)
At this point a number of students raise hands. The teacher calls on them to speak and she asks each student to explain the relationship of the Native American viewpoint to decomposition. Later, Donna is asked in an interview about the purpose of such activities.
Donna: My goal would be that all children would feel that they have a very important heritage. No matter what heritage they come from. And to be a scientist doesnt mean that you have to be any particular race or any particular gender or from any particular culture but that all people have contributed to the body of knowledge which we call science. (Smithsonian Institution, 1996b)
In this vignette, Donna has set a very nice stage with her Native American poster about views of nature. From here she can go on to have her class study what science has learned about ecological cycles, balances of nature, decomposition, etc. Loving (in press) and Cobern (1995a) offer similar views on using local culture to promote science learning. One would only hope that along the way, reference might be made back to the poster to see if science supports, ignores or rejects ideas from ones culture and what evidence there is to support that. In Donnas case above the controversial questions are about her meaning for the world science and will she lead her students to understand that there are different legitimate ways of thinking about Nature? Nature is viewed as sacred is one such legitimate way but it is not the way of science. Thus, we would want to know if Donna intends to help her students cognitively construct two different, though complementary, explanations for the same phenomena? Or, will the students learn the multiplicity view that all of this simply represents different forms of science?
56 The Universality of Science
As much as we support science teaching that is both informed by culture and sensitive to culture, the issues raised by TEK and multicultural perspectives on science must not be accepted uncritically. We say this not in defense of science and the Standard Account. We think that science has shown itself sufciently useful and remarkable to humanity that there will be no withdrawal of science from modern life. And, it is arguable that science would suffer little harm if, for the purposes of curriculum, TEK and similar domains of knowledge were declared scientic tomorrow. In contrast, such an action would actually be counterproductive with respect to the concerns people have about indigenous knowledge being shut out of science by the Standard Account. Before developing that thought, however, we clarify our meaning of the Standard Account and the case for universality. Dening the Standard Account Lovings (1991) Scientic Theory Prole gives a good indication of the breadth of philosophical views on the nature of science. Philosophers of science run the gamut from rationalist to naturalist, anti-realist to realist, and the many combinations within these ranges. Within the philosophy of science and scholarship on the nature of science resides the important question of demarcation. How can science be distinguished from other intellectual domains? How does science differ from (say) historiography or theology or philosophy? According to Gieryn, Bevins, and Zehr (1985, p. 392) the goals of demarcation are the (1) differentiation of a valued commodity uniquely provided by science, and (2) exclusion of pseudo-scientists . . . and these goals are important for scientists establishment of a professional monopoly over the market for knowledge about nature (also see Gieryn, 1983). The demarcation of science from other disciplines, however, is not easily accomplished. Laudan (1983, pp. 8-9) argues that,
philosophers have been regarded as the gatekeepers to the scientic estate. They are the ones who are supposed to be able to tell the difference between real science and pseudo-science. . . . Nonetheless, it seems pretty clear to many of us. . . that philosophy has largely failed to deliver the relevant goods. Whatever the specic strengths and deciencies of certain well-known efforts at demarcation . . . it can be said fairly uncontroversially that there is no demarcation line between science and non-science, or between science and pseudo-science, which would win assent from a majority of philosophers.
Though we do not wish to minimize the philosophical complexity of the issue to which Laudan refers, nor are we immune to the ideological inuences upon the Standard Account (Hesse, 1980), there is a pragmatic view to science broadly acceptable in the scientic community and described in accounts by scientists themselves, such as biologist Frederick Grinnell (1987) and physicist A.F. Chalmers (1982). In addition, science educators (Driver, Leach, Millar and Scott, 1996) who thoughtfully examined the range of philosophical, historical and sociological views of science were able to arrive at critical areas of consensus and were helpful in our Standard Account. The following is what we understand that denition of the Standard Account of science to be. In providing this denition we have kept in mind Laudans (1996, p. 24) point that
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what we need to provide is a way of distinguishing reliable knowledge claims from unreliable ones. 1.0 Science is a naturalistic, material explanatory system used to account for natural phenomena that ideally must be objectively and empirically testable. 1.1 Science is about natural phenomena. It is not about the things that humans construct such as economic systems nor is it about spiritual phenomena. Here we concur that TEK is about natural phenomena. 1.2 The explanations that science offers are naturalistic and material. It follows from point 1.1 that scientic explanations are not about the spiritual, emotional, economic, aesthetic, and social aspects of human experience. Snively & Corsiglia (1998) recognize that with respect to TEK this aspect of the Standard Account poses a problem even though TEK is about natural phenomena. They note that many scientists refuse to recognize TEK as science because of its spiritual base, which they regard as superstitious and fatalistic (p. 30). In response, they argue that spiritual explanations often incorporate important ecology, conservation, and sustainable development strategies (p. 30); but nevertheless, they still assert that the spiritual acquisition and explanation of TEK is a fundamental component and must be promoted if the knowledge system is to survive (Johnson, 1992 quoted in Snively & Corsiglia, 1998, p. 31). 1.3 Science explanations are empirically testable (at least in principle) against natural phenomena (the test for empirical consistency) or against other scientic explanations of natural phenomena (the test for theoretical consistency). Science involves collecting data (i.e., evidence) and a scientic explanation must be able to account for this data. Alternatively, science involves the testing of proposed explanations against data (Driver et al, 1996, p. 43). This concept is nicely captured by Duschl in an interview where he is commenting on the activities of some 1st graders. The 1st grade class are experimenting with sound. The children have some ideas about sound and they test some of these ideas using rubber bands stretched over geoboard pegs. About this episode, Duschl remarks:
When kids are given the same phenomena to observe, they see very different things. Their personal interpretations of the ideas are very different. And when we listen to the children in circle you can hear this and see it. This is an opportunity to get this consensus that we want, to get some discussion because the scientic ideas just arent any ideas. They are ideas grounded in evidence. (Smithsonian Institution, 1996a)
Duschl tells us that the scientic ideas just arent any ideas. They are tested ideas. They are tested either in the physical world following from point 1.2, or they are tested for theoretical consistency with other scientic explanations, which in turn were tested in the physical world. Moreover, scientic testing strives to be objective. In recent years this value in science has been derided as objectivism . . . a universal, value-free process (Stanley & Brickhouse, 1994, p. 389; also see Guba & Lincoln, 1989). Perhaps some people
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have overextended the concept of objectivity. In our view of the Standard Account, objectivity refers to the goal that experimental outcomes are not to be prejudged nor unreasonably constrained by prior belief, that data is collected fairly and accurately, and that research methods are executed with delity. Is it possible that TEK is tested knowledge? Borrowing a phrase form Sagan (1996, p. 251), Kawagley et al., (1998, p. 137) maintain that Yupiaq traditional knowledge reects an understanding of the natural world based on a massive set of scientic experiments continuing over generations. No one would doubt that the Yupiaq, along with every other group of people that ever lived, have and continue to engage in trial and error experimentation. People try different shampoos until they nd the one they like best but few would consider such experimentation scientic. It is not scientic but it is an effective and valuable process. Similarly, the building up of traditional knowledge through trial and error interactions with Nature has produced important knowledge. But, it lacks the formal, controlled features of scientic experimentation. 1.4 Science is an explanatory systemit is more than a descriptive ad hoc accounting of natural phenomena. Science seeks to parsimoniously explain how things work invoking only natural causes and these explanations are woven into a system of theoretical thought. Theories, however, are typically under-determined, that is they go beyond the available data and are therefore conjectural. Scientists chose between competing theories based on criteria such as accuracy of prediction, internal consistency and data consistency, breadth of scope (the more encompassing the theory, the more it is valued) simplicity and fruitfulnessall based, however, on human judgement (Driver et al., 1996). To this aspect of the Standard Account, the sociology of science adds that human judgment does not exist in a vacuum. It exists and is exercised within the context of social and cultural life. There is an inherently social aspect to all knowledge construction. Thus, for example, to understand how Darwin came to his formulation of evolution it is not sufcient to know about the voyage of the Beagle, his various observations, his knowledge of domestic breeding practices and the like. One must also take into account the cultural environment in which Darwin lived (Cobern, 1995a; Desmond & Moore, 1991). Moreover, it must be noted that scientic explanation (point 1.2) and scientic theory (point 1.4) represent two complementary levels of scientic knowledge (alternatively, the difference between what students think of as description and explanation in the theoretical scientic sensesee Horwood, 1988 and Matthews, 1994). The rst level is strongly related to direct human experience. Thus, for example, the location of salmon at any one time of the year can be explained in terms of the salmons lifecycle, where evidence relating to locality and lifecycle are both directly observable. This explanation has considerable creditability regardless of cultural variation. In contrast, credibility at the second level is much more culturally dependent. At the second level, scientic theory would further explain that lifecycle can be viewed as an idealized pattern of sequenced events that is applicable across a great many organisms. Here credibility depends on how accustomed people are to abstract scientic theorizing. In a different culture, people would nd it more credible to explain lifecycle
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as the purposeful course of life uniquely belonging to each creature. Horton (1994) has demonstrated that much of traditional African thought at the lower level does not differ substantially from scientic explanation. The signicant differences are at the secondary level with the webs of signicance (Geertz, 1973) that give meaning to those rst level explanations. Similarly, here is the fundamental problem with taking TEK as scienceTEK is embedded in a spiritual system of meaning that cannot easily be ignored, nor should it be ignored. 2.0 The Standard Account of science is grounded in metaphysical commitments about the way the world really is (e.g., see Burtt, 1967; Cobern, 1991 & 1995b). These commitments take the form of necessary (or rst order) presuppositions. They are not descriptive of what science is but what science presupposes about Nature. By themselves these necessary presuppositions are probably not sufcient motivation for any individual to be involved with science, hence any individual scientist or science teacher likely will have augmented these necessary presuppositions with other (secondary) presuppositions that are personally necessary. Our focus, however, is on the metaphysical minimum for science. 2.1 Science presupposes the possibility of knowledge about Nature. Realists view this as actual knowledgeHuman thinking holds the potential for recognizing and understanding the actual order and causality inherent in the phenomena of Nature. Idealists view this as instrumental knowledgeHuman thinking holds the potential for constructing viable understanding about the instrumental order and causality in the experience of natural phenomena. Roger Penrose and Stephen Hawking, respectively, are exemplars of the two positions (Hawking & Penrose, 1996). Closely linked to the possibility of knowledge are the presuppositions of order and causality. 2.2 Science presupposes that there is order in Nature. The fact that the orbit of the earth can be represented as a mathematical equation or that tidal action can be estimated within predictable limits of accuracy is evidence of order. Realists view this order as actual orderThere is order in nature. Idealists view this as instrumental orderHuman experience with Nature is amenable to ordered thinking about experience with Nature. Historically, presupposed order in Nature was profoundly important to the development of science in Europe. Gernet (1993-94), following the pioneering work of Needham (1969), notes the crippling effect the lack of this presupposition had on the development of Chinese science. 2.3 Science presupposes causation in Nature (Collingwood, 1940). For example, rain is causally linked with factors such as air temperature and humidity. Given enough water vapor in the atmosphere and the right air temperature, it is going to rain. Realists view this causation as actual causation. Cause and effect are inherent attributes of Nature. Idealists view this as instrumental causationCausal thinking is amenable with the human experience with Nature.
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3.0 Nevertheless, what ultimately qualies as science is determined by consensus within the scientic community. Thus, simply offering an idea which ts all these parameters will still not be science until judged so by the community of science. As we noted above, the problem is that there is no perfect account of science that clearly represents all of science, past and present, and just as clearly eliminates all endeavors that scientists do not consider to be science. In the nal analysis a human judgment must be made. However, the community of scientists is a community that requires that scientic knowledge be made public and withstand public scrutiny and testing. Thus, in the long run there can be no conspiracies to include or exclude any domain of thought. The Universality of Science Much of the multicultural literature on science seems to be saying that the problem with the Standard Account is that it is taken to be the only account of science. It is an exclusive and universally appropriate account. But we wonder if this really is the bone of contention among multiculturalists? Is it the alleged universality of science or is it the intellectual exclusiveness of science according to the Standard Account? We ask this because the post-colonialist arguments rejecting the universality of science seem to be arguments more about the exclusivity of science. It seems to us that even if the denition of science were broadened to include what is now excluded one would still have a universal science. Indeed, if there is no universal concept of science then how can anything be either included or excluded as science? It can be instructive to consider a different type of example altogether. Around the globe football is a widely recognized sporting game. We in America have a game called football but it is signicantly different from what the rest of the world calls football. In fact, the rest of the world for the sake of clarity refers to the American game as American football to distinguish it from real football. With enough political agitation and economic clout those of us Americans who resent this form of marginalization could possibly get the rest of the world to broaden its denition of football. The term football still is universal (we now all agree that the game of football includes the varieties played in the USA and elsewhere) but it now has a new meaning that is general enough to include what many previously took to be two rather distinct games. Undoubtedly, there are other games played with a ball and the feet. If the proponents of these games agitate as successfully as did the American footballers, where will the process end? In our opinion, this is anti-reductionism made absurd and the end result is that everyone loses. Diversity is lost. Meaning is lost. Communication is lost. We thus conclude that the real difculty multiculturalists have with the Standard Account is not its claim to universality, but its exclusiveness. Though technically difcult to accomplish, conceptually the Standard Account could be broadened by simply getting a consensus in the science community for the rewriting of the denition of science in a more inclusive form. Then one could have Maori science or First Nations science, (or for that matter, Christian science and Islamic science, etc.) just as football could be broadened to include American football. We could be even more inclusive by simply taking science to be knowledge of Naturebut one needs to
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reconsider why would anyone want to do any of these things? Early in this article we quoted from Kawagley et al (1998, p. 134) on the relationship between the Standard Account and indigenous knowledge:
such a narrow view of science not only diminishes the legitimacy of knowledge derived through generations of naturalistic observation and insight, it simultaneously devalues those cultures which traditionally rely heavily on naturalistic observation and insight.
We see in this statement that some people are troubled about the dominant intellectual position that modern Western science has come to hold in the public square. It is a position of dominance that tends to disenfranchise competitors. One way for competitors to regain that franchise is to oust Western science. Another way to regain access to the public squareand this is the approach many multiculturalists appear to be takingis to get ones ideas included in the denition of the dominant player, in this case Western science or the Standard Account. If such a thing were to ever happen it would be a pyrrhic victory for indigenous knowledge. The new additions to science (TEK or any other form of indigenous knowledge) would soon face serious negative consequences. They would rst lose their distinctiveness as a form of thought as they became absorbed by the dominant discourse of science, that is the Standard Account. They would lose because the new additions would inevitably be taken as mere tokens of cultural inclusiveness rather than as serious participants in the discourse of science. This tokenism would be reinforced by the inability of the new additions to compete where Western science is strongesttechnical precision control, creative genius and explanatory power. And, the new additions would lose by being co-opted into the cultural chauvinism scientism now holds in much of modern life. Snively & Corsiglia (1998) rightfully question where is the wisdom in science? As an incorporated part of science, that critique and challenge would be much more difcult to make. The Problem of Scientism The problem facing TEK and other forms of indigenous knowledge, as well as other domains of knowledge such as the arts and literature and religion, is the problem of scientismthe cultural hegemony science. The problem is not that science dominates at what it does best: the production of highly efcacious naturalistic understanding of natural phenomena. The problem is that too often science is used to dominate the public square as if all other discourses were of lesser value. This is a hierarchic view of knowledge with science placed at the epistemological pinnacle (see gure 2). For example, the National Academy of Science out of fear over religious incursions in school science issued this statement:
In a nation whose people depend on scientic progress for their health, economic gains, and national security, it is of utmost importance that our students understand science as a system of study, so that by building on past achievements they can maintain the pace of scientic progress and ensure the continued emergence of results that can benet mankind. (NAS, 1984, p. 6)
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Natural Sciences
Social Sciences
Other Knowledge Domains
Figure 2: Epistemological pyramid. More recently the International Council of Scientic Unions (ICSU) endorsed a similar perspective in the Proposed ICSU Programme on Capacity Building in Science (ICSU, 1996). The document epigram equates the global gap of well-being with the global imbalance of science and technology development. The ICSU intends to:
demonstrate to the world that having the capacity to understand and use science is economically, socially and culturally protable. Indeed, the very habitability of the planet will depend on global popular consensus. As such, the spread of scientic culture, of scientic ways of thinking, and of knowledge is tied to the fate of humanity. (p. 1)
About these statements we can say, of course, few people question the productive role that science has played in the development of modern life including medicine and contributions to good health, nor the economic gains due to technical innovations grounded in science (though the relationship between science and technology is not nearly so straightforward as these statements from the science community suggest). These claims by NAS and ICSU, however, are vastly overstated and singularly onesided. Good health, economic well being and national security depend on many things only one of which is science. Moreover, as important as science surely is, it does not have an uncontested claim to be the most important of these many factors. Curiously, though the National Academy of Science and the ICSU appear eager to accept credit for good technological innovations there is no parallel acceptance of technological disasters. If the science community wants credit for developing high yield grains that ease food shortages, how can the same community refuse credit for DDT? Something is wrong with this portrayal of science (we might even say betrayal of science). Garrard and Wegierski (1991, p. 611) suggest an explanation:
It can be argued that technology and scientic positivism constitute the dominant ideology of Western civilization today. Technology has indeed become, as Heidegger noted, the metaphysics of our age, a totalistic form of secular religion ultimately incompatible with the existence of rival, non-technological assumptions, beliefs, or thought systems.
The problem for TEKas well as for so many other domains of knowledgeis not the exclusivity of science as per the Standard Account but the transmogrication of science as scientism in the public square.
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When there is a gatekeeper and you persuade the gatekeeper to let you in, although you may have inuenced the gatekeeper you have also conceded his legitimacy as gatekeeper. Similarly, getting TEK into the school curriculum as science does not address the fundamental problem that led to the devaluing of TEK and other forms of indigenous knowledge in the rst place. The task for educators is to develop curricula that value knowledge in its many forms and from its many sources. Therefore bringing TEK into the science classroom is an excellent thing to do. It offers students a chance to see how the practice of science can benet from the insights of another domain of knowledge. It helps students see that some of the insights from science can be arrived at by other epistemological pathways. And, it helps students see what is unique about sciencewhat science can do that other domains of knowledge cannot do. We therefore reject positions of scientic and epistemological relativism. Not all thoughts are equal. Not all ways of thinking are parallel. But life is a complicated affair and the skillful navigation of life requires a diverse repertoire of thought and reason. And what is essential for a suburbanite American to understand about Nature will not be satisfactory for a Nisgaa sherman living in a very different world. Thus, what we value is the best thinking for a given situation and the wisdom to change ones thinking when situations change. We advocate epistemological pluralism and the ability to wisely discriminate amongst competing claims. This last point is important because the issues of life typically cross epistemological categories. It is not always obvious in the public when a problem does or does not call for a scientic solution. Should the USA spend four billion dollars to build a Super Collider? The scientic answer is probably yes since the Collider would help make important advances in physics. But, America is not building the Super Collider because science was out bid by the competing discourse of economics. In other situations we may nd other domains of knowledge acting in consort with science. Snively & Corsiglia (1998) give a number of examples of ecologists and biologists proting from the TEK of indigenous people. The Native American Forestry Program at Northern Arizona University (1997) provides another example where science and traditional knowledge work in consort. In other situations, however, science rightly precipitates and inuences cultural change. Consider the following situation. At a recent NARST session a researcher read the script of dialogue between an Australian Aborigine and a health care worker indicating totally different perspectives regarding the value and use of high-protein foods. The food is valued as nutrition, especially for children, in the West and valued as gifts in adult relationships to the Aborigines. The result of the latter perspective is continued high infant mortality for children under two years of age despite health care workers careful use of Socratic methods to dignify the alternate views while educating the Aborigines. From the perspective of traditional Aboriginal life, that of a hunter/gatherer culture, the elevated social and political status of the elders makes their health critical to the success of the tribe. From that perspective they were correct to reject the science-based position. However, cultures cannot maintain a status quo in the face of environmental change and expect to survive. The fact that the
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researcher was involved with an education program for Aboriginal peoples indicates that the researcher knew this fully well. Thus in this case the possible cultural changes precipitated by science education regarding young childrens need for high protein food are likely to be in the groups long term best interests. The unfortunate fact of this last example is that the researcher represented the Aboriginal rationale for distributing the best food to important adults as equally scientically valid as is a distribution based on conrmed nutritional value and nutritional need at various stages of human physical development. But if all explanations are mistakenly valorized as scientically valid (and there is no attempt at understanding the best scientic explanations), we are reduced to relativism of the worst kind. Privileging what knowledge is of most worth in science class is not the same as denying the value of other forms of knowledge (Loving, 1997). What is at issue here is the learning of when scientic knowledge should be appropriated over other competing domains of knowledge because it is the best knowledge available for the particular situation. Conclusion Our position in this article is that science can be dened with sufcient clarity so as to maintain a coherent boundary for the practical purposes of school science curriculum development. That boundary excludes most forms of indigenous knowledge, if not all, just as it excludes art, history, economics, religion, and many other domains of ` knowledge. Being exclusive, however, does not confer science with any privilege vis- avis other domains. Science is properly privileged only within its own domain for that is where its strength lies. When TEK and other forms of indigenous knowledge are devalued it is not because of the exclusive nature of the Standard Account of science. It is because someone is involved in the scientistic practice of extending scientic privilege from its proper domain in science and technology into other domains. The solution is to resist this scientistic practice by emphasizing throughout schooling the concept of epistemological pluralism, bearing in mind that pluralism,
is not relativism. . . Pluralism is the civil engagement of our differences and disagreements about what is most importantly true. Against the monism that denies the variety of truth, against the relativism that denies the importance of truth, and against the nihilism that denies the existence of truth, we intend to nurture a pluralism that revives and sustains the conversation about what really matters, which is the truth. (First Things, 1995, p. 12)
Bearing also in mind that truth is never under the sole proprietorship of any single domain of knowledgenot even science. References Adams, H.H.I.: 1990, African and African-American Contributions to Science and Technology, Multnomah School District, Portland Public Schools, Portland, OR. Adas, M.: 1989, Machines as the Measure of Man: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York.
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Addison-Wesley: 1993, Multiculturalism in Mathematics, Science, and Technology: Readings and Activities, Addison-Wesley, New York. Albanese, A., Neves, M. C. D. and Vicentini, M.: 1997, Models in Science and in Education: A Clinical Review of Research on Students Ideas about the Earth and its Place in the Universe, Science & Education 6(6), 573590. Barba, R. H.: 1995, Science in the Multicultural Classroom: A Guide to Teaching and Learning, Needham Heights, Allyn and Bacon, MA. Barber, B.: 1963, Tension and Accommodations Between Science and Humanism, American Behavioral Scientist (7), 38. Basalla, G.: 1967, The Spread of Western Science, Science 156, 611622. Behrens, C. A.: 1989, The Scientic Basis for Shipibo Soil Classication and Land Use: Changes in Soil-plant Associations with Cash Cropping, American Anthropologist 91(1), 83100. Berlin, B.: 1972, Speculations on the Growth of Ethnobotanical Nomenclature, Language in Society I, 5186. Bloor, D. and Barnes, B.: 1996, Scientic Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Boster, J. S. and Johnson, J. C.: 1989, Form and function: A comparison of expert and novice judgments of similarity among sh, American Anthropologist 91(4), 866 888. Burtt, E. A.: 1967, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science, Routledge and K. Paul, London, UK. Chalmers, A. F.: 1982, What is This Thing Called Science?, University of Queensland Press, Victoria, Australia. Cobern, W. W.: 1991, World View Theory and Science Education Research, NARST Monograph No. 3, National Association for Research in Science Teaching, Manhattan, KS. Cobern, W. W.: 1995a, Belief and Knowledge: Unnecessary Conict in the Science Classroom, in F. Finley (ed.), Proceedings of the History and Philosophy of Science and Science Teaching, HPSST, Minneapolis, MN. Cobern, W. W.: 1995b, Science Education as an Exercise in Foreign Affairs, Science & Education 4(3), 287302. Collingwood, R. G.: 1940, An Essay on Metaphysics, Oxford University Press, London.
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Corsiglia, J. and Snively, G.: 1997, Knowing Home: Nisgaa Traditional Knowledge and Wisdom Improve Environmental Decision Making, Alternatives Journal 32(3), 22 27. DeLoria, V.: 1995, Red Earth, White Lies: Native Americans and the Myth of Scientic Facts, Scribner, New York. Desmond, A. and Moore, J.: 1991, Darwin - The Life of a Tormented Evolutionist, Warner Books, New York. Driver, R., Leach, J., Millar, R. and Scott, P.: 1996, Young Peoples Images of Science, Open University Press, Buckingham, GB. First Things: 1995, Putting rst things rst, First Things (51), 1113. Fuller, S.: 1991, Social Epistemology, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indianapolis. Garrard, G. and Wegierski, M.: 1991, Oh Canada? an Essay on Canadian History, Politics, and Culture, The World & I 6(1), 589613. Geertz, C.: 1973, The Interpretation of Culture, Basic Books, New York. Gernet, J.: 1993-1994, Space and Time: Science and Religion in the Encounter between China and Europe., Chinese Science 11, 93102. Gibson: 1996, Personal Communication. Gieryn, T. F.: 1983, Boundary-work and the Demarcation of Science from Nonscience: Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists, American Sociological Review 48(6), 781795. Gieryn, T. F., Bevins, G. M. and Zehr, S. C.: 1985, Professionalization of American Scientists: Public Science in the Creation/Evolution Trials, American Sociological Review 50(3), 392409. Grinnell, F.: 1987, The Scientic Attitude, Westview Press, Boulder, CO. Guba, E. G. and Lincoln, Y. S.: 1989, Fourth generation evaluation, Sage, Newbury Park, CA. Hawking, S. W. and Penrose, R.: 1996, The Nature of Space and Time, Scientic American 275(1), 6065. Hesse, M.: 1980, Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, IN. Hodson, D.: 1993, In search of a rationale for multicultural science education, Science Education 77(6), 685711.
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Horton, R.: 1994, Patterns of Thought in Africa and the West, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. Horwood, R. H.: 1988, Explanation and Description in Science Teaching, Science Education 72(1), 4149. International Council of Scientic Unions (ICSU): 1996, Proposed ICSU Programme on Capacity Building in Science, Author, Batavia, IL. Kawagley, A. O., Norris-Tull, D. and Norris-Tull, R. A.: 1998, The Indigenous Worldview of Yupiaq Culture: Its Scientic Nature and Relevance to the Practice and Teaching of Science, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 35(2), 133144. Ladri` re, J.: 1977, The Challenge Presented to Cultures by Science and Technology, e UNESCO, Paris, France. Laudan, L.: 1983, The Demise of the Demarcation Problem, in R. Lauden (ed.), The Demarcation Between Science and Pseudo-science, Vol. 21, Virginia Tech Center for the Study of Science in Society, Working Papers, Blacksburg, VA, pp. 735. Laudan, L.: 1996, Beyond Positivism and Relativism, Westview Press, Boulder, CO. Linden, E.: 1991, Lost Tribes, Lost Knowledge, TIME 138(12), 4656. Lord, E.: 1958, The Impact of Education on Non-scientic Beliefs in Ethiopia, Journal of Social Psychology 47, 339353. Loving, C. C.: 1991, The Scientic Theory Prole: A Philosophy of Science Models for Science Teachers, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 28(9), 823838. Loving, C. C.: 1997, From the Summit of Truth to the Slippery Slopes: Science Educations Journey Through Positivist-postmodernist Territory, American Educational Research Journal 34(3), 421452. Loving, C. C.: 1998, Cortes Multicultural Empowerment Model and Generative Teaching and Learning in Science, Science & Education 7, 533552. Lyotard, J. F.: 1995, Toward the Postmodern, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, NJ. Matthews, M. R.: 1994, Science Teaching: The Role of History and Philosophy of Science, Routledge, New York. McKinley, E.: 1997, Science Education from the Margins: The Uneasy Selfhood of a Postcolonial Woman, Adelaide, Australia. Paper presented at the annual meeting of ASERA. National Academy of Sciences: 1984, Science and Creationism: A View from the National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC.
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Nature: 1997, Science Wars and the Need for Respect and Rigour, Nature 385(6615), 373. Needham, J.: 1969, The Grand Titration, George Allen & Unwin, London. Nelkin, D.: 1983, Legislating Creation in Arkansas, Society 20(2), 1316. Northern Arizona University: 1997, Native American Forestry Program, School of Forestry, Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff, AZ. Ogawa, M.: 1995, Science Education in a Multiscience Perspective, Science Education 79(5), 583593. Overton, W. R.: 1983, The Decision in McClean v. Arkansas Board of Education, Society 20(2), 312. Owens, V. S.: 1983, Seeing Christianity in Red & Green as Well as in Black & White: Propositional truth is not the Whole Truth, Christianity Today 27(13), 3840. Sagan, C.: 1995, The Demon-haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark, Random House, New York. Smithsonian Institution: 1996a, Case Study: Ingrid, Author, Cambridge, MA. Smithsonian Institution: 1996b, Case Study: Donna, Author, Cambridge, MA. Snively, G. and Corsiglia, J.: 1998, Rediscovering Indigenous Science: Implications for Science Education, CA. Paper presented at the National Association for Research in Science Teaching, San Diego. Stanley, W. B. and Brickhouse, N. W.: 1994, Multiculturalism, Universalism, and Science Education, Science Education 78(4), 387398. Tempels, P.: 1959, Bantu Philosophy, Presence Africaine, Paris, FR. Tranlsated by C. King. Van Sertima, I.: 1984, Blacks in Science: Ancient and Modern, Transaction Books, New Brunswick, NJ. Warren, D. M.: 1991, Using Indigenous Knowledge in Agricultural Development. World Bank Discussion Paper No. 127, The World Bank, Washington. Warren, D. M.: 1997, Conservation of Indigenous Knowledge Serves Conservation of Biodiversity, Alternatives Journal 23(3), 2627.
Varieties of Constructivism and their (Ir-)Relevance to Science Education

Peter Slezak
University of New South Wales, Austrialia. Email: p.slezak@unsw.edu.au
Introduction The post-modernist affectation in the title, referring to the (ir-)relevance of constructivism, is intended to reect the ambiguities which prevail under this broad heading and their varied implications. Despite these unclarities, the doctrines under this heading enjoy an extraordinary popularity among educators. Paul Cobb (1994, p. 4) has referred to the fervor that is currently associated with constructivism and Paul Ernest has written:
In the past decade or two, the most important theoretical perspective to emerge in mathematics education has been that of constructivism. . . . Ironically the attacks on radical constructivism . . . which were perhaps intended to fatally expose its weakness, served as a platform from which it was launched to widespread international acceptance and approbation. (Ernest 1995)
In an important clarication of the varieties of constructivism, D.C. Phillips (1997, p. 152) has noted that Arguably it is the dominant theoretical position in science and mathematics education and he remarks:
Across the broad elds of educational theory and research, constructivism has become something akin to a secular religion. (1995, p. 5)
Phillips distinguishes the sociological form of constructivism from the psychological variety. The psychological variety of constructivism is a theory of individual mental activity principally championed by Ernst von Glasersfeld (1995) and its origins can be seen in Kant, Berkeley and Piaget, among others. There is a third variety of constructivism which deserves to be clearly distinguished from the others, namely, the constructive empiricism of van Fraassen (1980) which has received no attention among educationalists, though it has been among the most important recent views in the philosophy of science. This doctrine is a form of anti-realism or instrumentalism whose provenance can be traced by at least as far as Osianders notorious preface to Copernicus De Revolutionibus and the Galileo affair, and still a major issue in the philosophy of science. The educational implications of these doctrines are markedly different, and in this article I will be concerned to draw these out clearly. First, I will suggest that, despite its overwhelming inuence among educationalists, the radical constructivism of von Glasersfeld has absolutely no pedagogical consequences at all. By contrast, the sociological variety of constructivism at the centre of the recent Science Wars has the most dramatic, and largely unnoticed, implications for education, to be discussed in the following article. Finally, van Fraassens constructive empiricism has importance
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Constructivism and Science Education
for educators as a part of the broader role of history and philosophy of science in any sound science curriculum, discussed in the paper Does Science Teaching Need HPS? (See the article on page ??.) Radical Constructivism: Epistemology, Education and Dynamite Ernst von Glasersfeld has remarked To introduce epistemological considerations into a discussion of education has always been dynamite (quoted in P. Ernest 1995, p. xi). I am concerned to give an analysis of the explosive mixture. A symptom of the problem may be seen in the remarkable range of philosophical issues raised in the educational literature. These include extremely abstruse, esoteric questions whose relevance to any practical or theoretical problem in education is surely doubtful. Thus, among the topics discussed are Berkeleyan idealism, Cartesian dualism, Kantian constructivism, Popperian falsiability, Kuhnian incommensurability, Quinean underdetermination, truth, relativism, instrumentalism, rationalism and empiricism, inter alia. By seemingly plausible increments, we are led from the classroom to the most arcane problems of metaphysics.
Education Learning Psychology Knowledge Epistemology Metaphysics.
Thus, Gergen (cited in Steffe & Gale eds. 1995, p. xii) sees certain lapses in Cartesian epistemology and the mind-body split, though the concievable bearing of this on educational matters remains obscure. Likewise Steffe (1995, p. xiii) contrasts various constructivist approaches with the Cartesian model, suggesting that they differed from the Cartesian model in viewing knowledge in a nondualistic manner so as to avoid to mind-body split of endogenic (mind-centred) and exogenic (reality-centred) knowledge (1995, p. xiii). In passing, we might note that the mind-body split is a different issue from that of the objective reality of a mind-independent world, though Steffe seems to conate these. Unfortunately, Steffe also neglects to explain how Cartesian dualism might have the slightest bearing on science teaching, or anything else for that matter. As a card carrying materialist, like most philosophers today, I doubt that I am a better teacher for that reason. Some of my best friends are dualists, and great teachers. Not least, Descartes own exemplary foundational contributions to modern science and mathematics were hardly inhibited by his alleged lapses. Such examples suggest that we might be highly suspicious of constructivist claims of von Glasersfeld and Gergen, among others, suggesting that for 2,500 years since the origin of science in ancient Greece, we have been somehow seriously misguided in our conceptions of knowledge and science (see von Glasersfeld in Steffe & Gale eds. p. 6). Thus, von Glasersfeld suggests that his conception of constructivism arose out of a profound dissatisfaction with the theories of knowledge in the tradition of Western philosophy and he has suggested that adopting his constructivism could bring about some rather profound changes in the general practice of education (1989, p. 135). His radical recommendation is: Give up the requirement that knowledge represents an independent world (in Steffe & Gale eds. pp. 6-7). This is, of course, Berkeleys notorious idealism and undoubtedly a radical proposal. However, despite
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these extravagant claims, we will see that the educational recommendations which von Glasersfeld actually offers are rather modest. Commonsense Realism The prominent role of such metaphysical problems in the educational literature is perplexing in a way which goes beyond the intrinsic puzzles of the issues themselves. Undoubtedly, the issue of realism remains a central one in philosophy, though even here an important warning has been recently voiced by Hilary Putnam (1994) in his Dewey Lectures. Putnam notes that The besetting sin of philosophers seems to be throwing the baby out with the bathwater as each new generation or fashion ignores the insights of earlier periods. In particular, concerning the disputes over realism, Putnam says that it is important to nd a way to do justice to our sense that knowledge claims are responsible to reality without recoiling into metaphysical fantasy (1994, p. 446). The responsibility proposed by Putnam is a familiar, commonsense, naive realism. It is surprising enough that philosophers need to be reminded not to lose sight of commonsense realism. That educationalists need the same advice is somewhat harder to explain. Like Berkeley, Kant is explicitly cited by von Glasersfeld as one of the sources for his constructivism, though it is instructive to ponder how one might derive educational implications from the Critique of Pure Reason. Kants transcendental idealism as an attempt to nd an alternative to a pure phenomenalism is an unlikely basis for pedagogical theory or instructional interventions. Piagets Construction of Reality? von Glasersfeld sees important consequences following from a persons cognitive isolation from reality. However, Kants idea that knowledge of the world and of the self are two aspects of the same schema is not a denial of the objective reality of a mind-independent world as von Glasersfeld appears to think. Kants idea is also expressed by Piaget, clearly acknowledging a knowable objective world beyond our sense-data. Despite being chargeable with at least irting with idealism (Boden 1979, p. 79), Piaget (1975) says that his epistemological position is very close to the spirit of Kantianism (Insights and Illusions of Philosophy, p. 57)both in its constructivism and in its sensitivity to the need to avoid Berkeleyan idealism. Thus Margaret Boden writes:
Piaget is aware that as a constructivist he must be careful to avoid idealismor, to put it another way, that he must answer the sceptics challenge that perhaps all our so-called knowledge is mind-dependent illusion. He tries to buttress his commonsense realism by appealing to the biological basis of knowledge. (Boden 1979, p. 79)
Piaget himself explains clearly:

. . . So to attribute logic and mathematics to the general coordinations of the subjects actions is not an idealistic overestimation of the part played by the subject; it is a recognition of the fact that, while the fecundity of the subjects thought processes depends on the internal resources of the organism, the efcacy of those processes depends on the fact that the organism is not independent of the environment but can only live, act, or think in interaction with it. (Piaget 1971, p. 345)
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Although the title of Piagets (1955) book The Construction of Reality in the Child is suggestive of the constructivist doctrines which von Glasersfeld has championed, Piagets own text leaves little doubt about the signicant difference between these two. Thus, while von Glasersfeld is at pains on every occasion to emphasize the unknowability of reality and the need to abandon notions of objectivity and truth, Piaget by contrast, writes in an altogether different mood. The conclusion of his book is titled The Elaboration of the Universe and he asks how the world is constructed by means of the instrument of the sensorimotor intelligence. In particular, Piaget speaks of the shift from an egocentric state to one in which the self is placed . . . in a stable world conceived as independent of personal acitivity (p. 395). Elsewhere Piaget explains:
. . . the universe is built up into an aggregate of permanent objects connected by causal relations that are independent of the subject and are placed in objective space and time. Such a universe, instead of depending on personal activity, is on the contrary imposed on the self . . .. (p. 397) . . . During the earliest stages the child perceives things like a solipsist who is unaware of himself as a subject and is familiar only with his own actions. But step by step with the coordination of his intellectual instruments he discovers himself in placing himself as an active object among the other active objects in a universe external to himself. (p. 397)
Thus Piaget is quite unselfconscious in speaking about the existence of an independent reality:
Accommodation of mental structures to reality implies the existence of assimilatory schemata. . . . Inversely, the formation of schemata through assimilation entails the utilzation of external realities to which the former must accommodate . . .. (p. 398)
He explains that the dual processes of assimilation and accommodation lead to a shift from egocentrism to an objectivity and enables the subject to go outside himself to solidify and objectify his universe . . . (p. 402). Elsewhere Piaget writes:
The theory of knowledge is therefore essentially a theory of adaptation of thought to reality, even if in the last analysis this adaptation (like all adaptations) reveals the existence of an inextricable interaction between the subject and the objects of study. (1972, p. 18)
The problem is that of determining how knowledge comes to terms with the real world, and therefore what relationships obtain between subject and object (ibid, p. 6). These are ways of talking which von Glasersfeld has emphatically repudiated, and so it is evident that his version of constructivism is quite different from Piagets. The Philosophical Urge von Glasersfeld has explicitly drawn his constructivist stance from what he takes to be the insights of Berkeley and Kant. He says Berkeleys insight
. . . wipes out the major rational grounds for the belief that human knowledge could represent a reality that is independent of human experience. (von Glasersfeld 1995, p. 34) . . . Kants transcendental philosophy . . . is a purely rational analysis of human understanding and provides a model that is in many ways fundamental to the constructivist orientation. (von Glasersfeld 1995, p. 39)
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von Glasersfeld is evidently suffering from what Rorty (1979) has called the philosophical urge, namely, to say that assertions and actions must not only cohere with other assertions and actions but correspond to something apart from what people are saying and doing . . . (1979, p. 179). By contrast, in the spirit of Putnams (1994) second naivet , Rorty says that a Quinean naturalism questions whether, once we e understand . . . when and why various beliefs have been adopted or discarded, there is something left called the relation of knowledge to reality left over to be understood (1979, p. 178). Aside from the question of its possible bearing on pedagogy, von Glasersfeld is evidently led into his Berkeleyan worries by failing to distinguish questions of epistemology from questions of metaphysics. That is, he conates questions concerning the reliability of knowledge with the question of metaphysical realism. In the following quotation we see the former concern in the rst paragraph and the latter, quite different concern in the second:
In most departments of psychology and schools of education, teaching continues as though nothing had happened and the quest for immutable objective truths were as promising as ever. For some of us, however, a different view of knowledge has emerged, . . . This view differs from the old one in that it deliberately discards the notion that knowledge could or should be a representation of an observer-independent world-in-itself . . .. (von Glasersfeld 1989)
Again, we see a non-sequitur from a concern about the reliability of knowledge to idealism:
The existence of objective knowledge . . . has been taken for granted by educators. Recent developments in the philosophy of science and the historical study of scientic accomplishments have deprived these presuppositions of their former plausibility. Sooner or later, this must have an effect on the teaching of science. . . . I am presenting an alternative theory of knowing that takes into account the thinking organisms cognitive isolation from reality. (von Glasersfeld 1989, p. 121)
Any solution to our cognitive isolation from reality is unlikely to help solve the problem of objective knowledge since the arguments for realism are not the same as arguments for this latter problem. That is, the epistemological problem of objective knowledge is left untouched by recoiling into the metaphysical fantasy of Berkeleyan idealism. Rather, the current philosophical answer to the epistemological problem is the acknowledgement that there is no absolutely certain foundation. Instead, philosophers settle for a fallibilistic naturalism captured in Quines epigraph from Neurath:
Wie Schiffer sind wir, die ihr Schiff auf offener See umbauen mussen, ohne es jemals in einem Dock zerlegen und aus bestend Bestandteilen neu errichten zu k nnen. (Otto Neurath, quoted o as epigraph in Quine 1960)
That is, we are like the sailor who must repair his ship while sailing in it. The entire ship may be rebuilt, but only one plank at a time. von Glasersfelds concerns about metaphysics are addressed in Quines following remarks:
Ontological questions, under this view, are on a par with questions of natural science. (Quine 1961a, p. 45)
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. . . our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body. (Quine 1961a, p. 41) Hence it is meaningless, I suggest, to inquire into the absolute correctness of a conceptual scheme as a mirror of reality. Our standard for appraising basic changes of conceptual scheme must be, not a realistic standard of correspondence to reality, but a pragmatic standard. (Quine 1961b, p. 79)
Charitably construed, von Glasersfelds concerns may be seen as expressingif not a post-epistemological view as he is pleased to call it, or a successor epistemology as Gergen (p. 23) says,the familiar epistemological position of Quine himself. von Glasersfelds notion of viability seems best understood as a coherentist position concerned with what he calls the goal of a coherent conceptual organization of the world as we experience it, (Steffe & Gale eds. p. 7) and the goal of constructing as coherent a model as possible of the experiential world (ibid, p. 8). It is in this sense that we may acknowledge that von Glasersfelds words need not be construed as an idealism or solipsism as they have often been taken. Instead, they can be read as a Quinean holism and fallibilism. It is in the spirit of von Glasersfelds constructivism and in keeping with his insistence on rejecting an unknowable ontological reality to read his remarks as a Quines holism since this seems to be the sense of some of von Glasersfelds remarks. Thus he says: I claim that we can dene the meaning of to exist only within the realm of our experiential world and not ontologically. (ibid, p. 7). The talk of ontology is misleading and confusing here, however, because, following Quine, our ontological commitments are ipso facto the posits of our theories and have nothing to do with an inaccessible, unknowable reality lying beyond our experience, our theories or the veil of ideas. It is this repeated emphasis on an inaccessible or unknowable reality by von Glasersfeld which warrants the repeated charge of idealism. Direct Objects of Knowledge von Glasersfeld is victim to a notorious problem in philosophy concerning the direct objects of perception and knowledge. This is the problem of the veil of ideas which seems to intervene between the mind and the world and which has posed the difculty for philosophers at least since the Cartesians, Malebranche and Arnauld, through Locke and Berkeley and the sense-data theories of A.J. Ayer in the 20th Century. In psychology, too, the problem has given rise to Gibsons ecological or direct realism as a response to traditional representationalist theories (see Slezak 1999). We see this clearly in von Glasersfelds articulation of his doctrines:
. . . it is this construction of the individuals subjective reality which, I want to suggest . . . should be of interest to practitioners and researchers in education . . . One of Vicos basic ideas was that epistemic agents can know nothing but the cognitive structures they themselves have put together. . . . God alone can know the real world . . . In contrast, the human knower can know only what the human knower has constructed. (von Glasersfeld 1989) For constructivists, therefore, the word knowledge refers to a commodity that is radically different from the objective representation of an observer-independent world which the mainstream of the Western philosophical tradition has been looking for. Instead, knowledge refers to conceptual structures . . .. (von Glasersfeld 1989, p. 123)
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It is precisely this idea that we know only our own ideas or conceptual structures directly rather than the world which is the source of the traditional puzzle. Putnam (1994) provides a succinct diagnosis of this disastrous idea:
. . . our difculty in seeing how our minds can be in genuine contact with the external world is, in large part, the product of a disastrous idea that has haunted Western philosophy since the seventeenth century, the idea that perception involves an interface between the mind and the external objects we perceive. (Putnam 1994)
Besides this disastrous idea, the conation of the metaphysical problem of realism with epistemology is encouraged by much post-modern post-positivist post-epistemological writing. Thus, for example, in their recent book Barnes, Bloor and Henry (1995) deny their own idealism, but accuse all their sociogical constructivist colleagues of this charge (see Slezak 1997, 2000). Nevertheless, despite being explicitly repudiated by Bloor, as by von Glasersfeld, such disavowals are not quite enough to exculpate them since there are grounds for seeing a confusion in their writings between idealism and fallibilism. They reject the external world when they evidently wish to reject absolute, infallible truth claims. Whatever may be the educational interest in these matters, von Glasersfeld is at least in good philosophical company. His worry about the gap between thought and reality mediated by ideas is the familiar one posed by Locke and Malebranche and, more recently, by John McDowell (1994) in his signicantly titled work Mind and World. However, in the present context, whatever the philosophical merits of von Glasersfelds concerns, the question is how these bear on any issue of conceivable educational interest. Epistemology or Pedagogy? ` Apropos this very issue, at a meeting von Glasersfeld was explicitly asked whether constructivism is to be understood as an epistemology or pedagogy. His answer is most revealing for what it fails to say. von Glasersfeld responded by restating the formula of Berkeley: . . . there is no way of checking knowledge against what it was supposed to represent. One can compare knowledge only with other knowledge (1993, p. 24). The questioner is unlikely to have found this answer satisfying. Other questions sought to clarify the differences between constructivism and idealism. Again, von Glasersfelds answer is rather unhelpful, simply re-iterating that we can only know what our minds construct and that the real world remains unknowable and that I could be one of Leibniz monads (1993, p. 28). Teachers might wonder how this could help them in the classroom. When pressed on this question concerning the implications of contructivism for a theory of instruction, von Glasersfeld suggests that there are many. These include the following: It is . . . crucial for the teacher to get some idea of where they [the students] are, that is, what concepts they seem to have and how they relate them (1993, p. 33). This inference seems a modest recommendation which is far from the rather profound changes promised. Similar platitudes are typical:
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Asking students how they arrived at their given answer is a good way of discovering something about their thinking. (1993, p. 33) Whatever a student says in answer to a question (or problem) is what makes sense to the student at that moment. It has to be taken seriously as such, regardless of how odd or wrong it might seem to the teacher. To be told that it is wrong is most discouraging and inhibiting for the student. (1993, p. 33) If you want to foster students motivation to delve further into questions that, at rst, are of no particular interest (from the students point of view), you will have to create situations where the students have an opportunity to experience the pleasure inherent in solving a problem. (1993, p. 33)
We may assume that such profundities are what K. Tobin (1993) has in mind when he refers to constructivism as A paradigm for the practice of science education. Tobin has his own deeply insightful contributions to offer:
A most signicant role of the teacher, from a constructivist perspective, is to evaluate student learning. In a study of exemplary teachers, Tobin and Fraser found that these teachers routinely monitored students in three distinctive ways: they scanned the class for signs of imminent off task behavior, closely examined the nature of the engagement of students, and investigated the extent to which students understood what they were learning. If teachers are to mediate the learning process, it is imperative that they develop ways of assessing what students know and how they can represent what they know. (Tobin & Tippins 1993, p. 12; emphasis added)
In brief, good teachers make sure students pay attention and understand the lesson! Inevitably one wonders how differently a teacher might do things if not operating from a constructivist perspective. From the Metaphysical to the Mundane We have seen von Glasersfeld promise:
. . . if the theory of knowing that constructivism builds up on this basis were adopted as a working hypothesis, it could bring about some rather profound changes in the general practice of education. (von Glasersfeld 1989, p. 135)
Elsewhere he has suggested that taken seriously radical constructivism is a profoundly shocking view which requires that some of the key concepts underlying educational practice have to be refashioned. Among these profoundly shocking recommendations he suggests the following:
. . . students will be more motivated to learn something, if they can see why it would be useful to know it. Teaching and training are two practices that differ in their methods and, as a consequence, have very different results. . . . rote learning does not lead to enlightenment. . . . in order to modify students thinking, the teacher needs a model of how the student thinks. Students should be driven by their own interest. . . . talking about the situation is conducive to reection. To engender reective talk requires an attitude of openness and curiosity on the part of the teacher, a will to listen to the student . . .
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These are all undoubtedly sound recommendations, though hardly deserving to be regarded as profoundly shocking. Indeed, such platitudes are characteristic of constructivist instructional advice, though they are typically dressed up in a gratuitous technical jargon which serves only to hide their banality. Thus, it is instructive to subject an example to careful analysis. Driver et al. (1995) writes:
. . . learning science involves being initiated into scientic ways of knowing. Scientic entities and ideas, which are constructed, validated, and communicated through the cultural institutions of science, are unlikely to be discovered by individuals through their own empirical inquiry; learning science thus involves being initiated into the ideas and practices of the scientic community and making these ideas and practices meaningful at an individual level. The role of the science educator is to mediate scientic knowledge for learners, to help them make personal sense of the ways in which knowledge claims are generated and validated, rather than to organize individual sense-making about the natural world. (Driver et al. 1995, p. 6)
A critical reading of the foregoing passage reveals it to reduce without remainder to the following:
Learning science involves learning science. Individuals cannot rediscover science by themselves. So, the role of teachers is to teach.
Consider the rst sentence of Driver et al. . . . learning science involves being initiated into scientic ways of knowing. The ring of plausibility, if not profundity, in this assertion derives from its being pure tautology. Learning science presumably means, or may be paraphrased as, being initiated into scientic ways of knowing. Likewise their remark that The role of the science educator is to mediate scientic knowledge for learners is like saying that the role of the butcher is to mediate animal products for consumers or the role of the bus driver is to mediate automotive vehicular transportation for commuters. Their assertion is merely a circumlocution for saying that the role of teachers is to teach. It is perhaps tedious to pursue this analysis in exhaustive detail, but the illustrations serve to indicate a widespread tendency to recast truisms in pretentious polysyllabic jargon to create a supercial illusion of deep theory. Tobin and Tippin (1993) provide another typical illustration:
Constructivism suggests that learning is a social process of making sense of experience in terms of what is already known. In that process learners create perturbations that arise from attempts to give meaning to particular experiences through the imaginative use of existing knowledge. The resolution of these perturbations leads to an equilibrium state whereby new knowledge has been constructed to cohere with a particular experience and prior knowledge. (Tobin & Tippins 1993, p. 10)
Translation: Students sometimes learn new things.

A most signicant role of the teacher, from a constructivist perspective, is to evaluate student learning. In a study of exemplary teachers, Tobin and Fraser found that these teachers routinely monitored students in three distinctive ways: they scanned the class for signs of imminent off task behaviour, closely examined the nature of the engagement of students, and investigated the extent to which students understood what they were learning. If teachers are to mediate the learning process, it is imperative that they develop ways of assessing what students know and how they can represent what they know. (Tobin & Tippins 1993, p. 12)
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Translation: Good teachers make sure students pay attention and understand the lesson. Tobin and Tippins conclude their article with the following remarks:
. . . it is our contention that constructivism is an intellectual tool that is useful in many educational contexts. . . . We do not claim that use of constructivism as a referent is the only way to initiate changes of . . . a comprehensive and signicant scope, but from our experience we can assert that constructivism can assume a dialectical relationship with almost every other referent in a process that culminates in a coherent world view consisting of compatible referents for action. (Tobin & Tippins 1993, p. 20)
Translation: Constructivism is consistent with some other theories. Constructivist buzz-words serve to give an air of profundity but all have ordinary synonyms which reveal the platitudinous nature of the assertions they are used to make. These include the following list: mediating discursive practices meaning-making co-construction of knowledge cultural tools negotiation of meaning in social interaction negotiating community of discourse appropriating meaning dialogic interaction process representations enculturation appropriating social construction interventions symbolic realities perturbations
Thus we can see how we might render an ordinary phrase in a more impressive manner: Instead of merely saying talking among teachers and students we can say the discursive practices that support the coconstruction of scientic knowledge by teachers and students (Driver et al. 1994, p. 9). Instead of saying simply that teachers explain new ideas we can say the teachers role is characterized as that of mediating between students personal meanings and culturally established mathematical meanings of wider society (Cobb 1994b, p. 15). Rather than the truism that teachers and students exchange ideas we can say speaking from the sociocultural perspective, [we] dene negotiation as a process of mutual appropriation in which the teacher and students continually coopt or use each others contribution (Cobb 1994b, p. 14). Where someone might wish to say only that students gure things out for themselves in class with others, a more impressive rendering would be learning is characterized by the subjective reconstruction of societal means and models through negotiation of meaning in social interaction and students interactive constitution of the classroom microculture (Cobb 1994b, p. 15). Learning through lessons in school is better rendered as students subjective reconstruction through teachers and students interactive constitution of the class-room microculture (Cobb 1994b, p.15). And saying that students learn different things at different times may be recast as Rather than successive equilibrations, . . . learning may be better characterized by parallel constructions relating to specic contexts (Cobb 1994a, p. 7). The following dictionary may be helpful for translating between constructivese and English.
Slezak
Constructivese cultural apprenticeship neutralizing a perturbation personal construction and meaning making the mediation process involving intervention and negotiation with an authority community of discourse communities characterized by distinct discursive practices appropriate experiential evidence, cultural tools and conventions of the science community dialogic process discourse practices unbroken contingent ow of communicative interaction between human beings the way in which novices are introduced to a community of knowledge through discourse in the context of relevant tasks The discursive practices in science classrooms differ substantially from the kids in school practices of scientic dont do the argument and enquiry that same thing take place within various as scientists communities of professional scientists engagement off task behaviour experiential constraints of the ever-present socio-physical context English learning learning something new understanding teaching
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group different groups scientic data and theories talking talking talking talking in class
kids in school dont do the same thing as scientists
paying attention not paying attention the real world
Between Metaphysical and Mundane Though intended to be entertaining, the foregoing analysis has a serious purpose. It is in the venerable tradition of C.W. Mills (1959) expose of Talcott Parsons pretentious grand theory. Mills reduced long passages of Parsons sociological verbiage to a brief platitude. Here, too, the serious question raised is whether there is any substance behind the mystication of jargon-ridden polysyllabic prose, or whether, in Orwells (1946)
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phrase, it merely gives the appearance of solidity to pure wind. I have suggested that the psychological variety of radical constructivism has little to offer between the metaphysical and the mundane. References Barnes, B. Bloor D. Henry, J.: 1996, Scientic Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Boden, M.: 1979, Piaget, Fontana, London. Cobb, P.: 1994a, Constructivism in Mathematics and Science Education, Educational Researcher 23(7). Cobb, P.: 1994b, Where Is the Mind? Constructivist and Sociocultural Perspectives on Mathematical Development, Educational Researcher 23(7), 1320. Driver, R. Asoko, H. Leach, J. Mortimer, E. and Scott, P.: 1994, Constructing Scientic Knowledge in the Classroom, Educational Researcher 23(7), 512. Ernest, P.: 1995, Radical Constructivism: A Way of Knowing and Learning, The Falmer Press, London. Preface by Series Editor, E. von Glasersfeld. McDowell, J.: 1994, Mind and World, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. Mills, C.: 1959, The Sociological Imagination, Oxford University Press, New York. Orwell, G.: 1946, Politics and the English Language, The Penguin, 1946, Essays of George Orwell, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1984. Phillips, D.: 1995, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: The Many Faces of Constructivism, Educational Researcher 24(7), 512. Phillips, D.: 1997, How, Why, What, When, and Where: Perspectives on Constructivism in Psychology and Education, Issues in Education 3(2), 151194. Piaget, J.: 1955, The Construction of Reality in the Child, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. Piaget, J.: 1971, Biology and Knowledge, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh. Piaget, J.: 1972, Psychology and Epistemology: Towards a Theory of Knowledge, Penguin, Harmondsworth. Piaget, J.: 1975, Insights and Illusions of Philosophy, Meridian Books, New York. Putnam, H.: 1994, Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses: An Inquiry Into the Powers of the Human Mind, The Journal of Philosophy XCI(9), 445517. The Dewey Lectures at Columbia University 1994. Quine, W.: 1960, Word and Object, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
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Quine, W.: 1961a, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, From a Logical Point of View, Harper, New York. Quine, W.: 1961b, Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis, From a Logical Point of View, Harper, New York. Rorty, R.: 1979, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Slezak, P.: 1997, Review of Barnes, Bloor & Henry: Scientic Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis, Metascience 11, 4452. Slezak, P.: 1999, Situated Cognition: Empirical Issue, Paradigm Shift or Conceptual Confusion?, in J. Wiles and T. Dartnall (eds), Perspectives on Cognitive Science, Ablex Publishing Corporation, Stamford. Slezak, P.: 2000, Radical Social Constructivism, in D. Philips (ed.), National Society for the Study of Education (NSSE) Yearkbook, Forthcoming. Steffe, L.: 1995, Title, Publisher. Steffe, L. and Gale, J. (eds): 1995, Constructivism in Education, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., New Jersey. Tobin, K. (ed.): 1993, The Practice of Constructivism in Science Education, AAA Press, Washington D.C. Tobin, K. and Tippins, D.: 1993, Constructivism as a Referent for Teaching and Learning, in K. Tobin (ed.), The Practice of Constructivism in Science Education, AAA Press, Washington D.C., pp. 321. van Fraassen, B.: 1980, The Scientic Image, Oxford University Press, Oxford. von Glasersfeld, E.: 1989, Cognition, Construction of Knowledge, and Teaching, Synthese 80, 121140. von Glasersfeld, E.: 1993, Questions and Answers about Radical Constructivism, in K. Tobin (ed.), The Practice of Constructivism in Science Education, AAA Press, Washington D.C. von Glasersfeld, E.: 1995, Radical Constructivism: A Way of Knowing and Learning, The Falmer Press, London.
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Social Constructivism and the Science Wars

Peter Slezak
University of New South Wales, Australia. Email: p.slezak@unsw.edu.au
The dispute concerning Social Constructivism has emerged from being an isolated and esoteric epistemological debate among relatively few academic scholars to being a notorious public scandal. Challenges to traditional conceptions of science which severely polarised philosophers, historians and sociologists have erupted into heated public disputesthe so-called Science Wars. The issues at stake concern the most fundamental questions about the nature of science, and these controversies have become prominent in educational literature where a variety of constructivist doctrines have become entangled (see Phillips 1997b and Matthews 1998). If social constructivist doctrines are correct, the implications for science education are revolutionary. On these views, knowledge is merely a consensus upon arbitrary convention; and education involves not learning as a cognitive process of reason and understanding, but merely conformity to power and political interests. There could be no more fundamental challenge to education than the one posed by social constructivism, since it purports to overturn the traditional conception of knowledge. The selfadvertising grandiosely proclaims: The foundations of modern thought are at stake here (Pickering 1992). A major battle in these Science Wars has been fought over the book Higher Superstition by Paul Gross and Norman Levitt (1994), which brought the polemics surrounding social constructivism to wide popular attention. Adding piquancy and greater public attention to social constructivism was the fallout from the Sokal Hoax . Unwittingly, the editors of the journal Social Text published a spoof article written in post-modernist style by the mathematical physicist Alan Sokal without realizing that it was deliberate nonsense (Sokal and Bricmont 1997). In their different ways, the Sokal article and the Gross and Levitt book exposed what they claim to be the bankrupt, fraudulent and pernicious nature of social constructivism in a broad variety of post-modern guises. The colourful epithets and purple prose conveyed the enormity of what Gross and Levitt call the post-modernist game of intellectual subversion (1994, p. 85) and philosophical styrofoam (1994, p. 98). Even in the more sober academic literature there had been outrage about social constructivism going well beyond normal intellectual disagreement. The disputes in the technical journals have been characterised by ad hominem assaults of an unusual ferocity. For example, Mario Bunge (1991) described most of the work in the eld as a grotesque cartoon of scientic research. In a similar vein, the philosopher David Stove (1991) called these doctrines a form of lunacy which is so absurd, that it eludes the force of all argument (1991, p. 31), a philosophical folly and a stupid and discreditable business whose authors are beneath philosophical notice and unlikely to benet from it. In his scathing remarks, Stove describes such ideas as an illustration
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of the fatal afiction and corruption of thought in which people say bizarre things which even they must know to be false. Larry Laudan (1990b, p. x) who has been among the rst philosophers to make systematic critical analyses of social constructivism, has characterized this rampant relativism as the most prominent and pernicious manifestation of anti-intellectualism in our time. Laudans charge of anti-intellectualism points to the source of concern for educators. Ideas or Ideology? Pedagogy or Propaganda? In important clarications of the varieties of constructivism, D.C. Phillips has noted that Arguably it is the dominant theoretical position in science and mathematics education (1997b, p. 152) and he remarks Across the broad elds of educational theory and research, constructivism has become something akin to a secular religion (1995, p. 5). Phillips (1997b) distinguishes the sociological form of constructivism of interest here from the psychological variety and observes: It is the work of the social constructivists that had drawn the most dramatic attention in recent years; clearly they have touched a raw nerve (1997b, p. 154). As Phillips notes elsewhere, the reason for this is that There is a lot at stake. For it can be argued that if the more radical of the sociologists of scientic knowledge . . . are right, then the validity of the traditional philosophic/epistemological enterprise is effectively undermined, and so indeed is the pursuit of science itself (1997a, p. 86). The doctrines of social constructivism take scientic theories to reect the social milieu in which they emerge and, therefore, rather than being founded on logic, evidence and reason, beliefs are taken to be the causal effects of the historically contingent, local context. Accordingly, if knowledge is the product of external factors rather than internal considerations of evidence and reason, then it is an illusion to imagine that education might serve to instil a capacity for critical thought or rational belief. Education becomes indoctrination and ideas are merely conformity to social consensus. Before examining these doctrines in detail, it is worth observing a symptomatic view of education and its goals arising from social constructivism. Where traditional views see scientic knowledge as a source of insight, creativity and aesthetic pleasure, sociologists see something less exalted. Instead of fostering independent thought and the pleasures of intellectual curiosity, science is offered as having a mere utilitarian, pragmatic value, at best. Thus, Collins and Pinch (1992) writing specically on science education in schools suggest It is nice to know the content of scienceit helps one to do a lot of things such as repair the car, wire a plug, build a model aeroplane . . . (1992, p. 150). To be sure, science has such practical uses, but this prosaic view seems to leave out something essentialnamely, the intellectual dimension, the role of the creative mind in providing an understanding of the world. Instead of conceiving of science education as fostering such intellectual values as understanding and critical thinking, Collins and Pinch recommend that a science education should attend to the social negotiation, myths and tricks of frontier science as the important thing (1992, p. 151). The relativism of social constructivist theories makes it impossible for teachers to offer the usual intellectual grounds for distinguishing science from nonsense. Since
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the rational virtues of theories are taken to be irrelevant to their status, one cannot complain that some views are false or implausible or otherwise lacking rational, cognitive merit. For example, one cannot teach that Soviet Lysenkoism or Hitlers racialism were perversions of scientic truth. Their very success in winning consensus counts as exemplary scientic achievement according to social constructivist doctrines. What is Social Constructivism? A few special difculties must be faced in attempting to characterise the eld of social constructivism. First, in the years since its recent re-invention and promotion by the Edinburgh School, (Bloor 1976, Barnes 1974a, 1974b) there has been a fragmentation among various factions which cannot be traced in detail here. Second, the history of these changes is clouded by the questionable tactics of the constructivists. Nevertheless, the original, fundamental ideas must be understood despite having become obscured in its more recent manifestations (Woolgar 1988). David Bloors (1976) small book Knowledge and Social Imagery launched the socalled Edinburgh Strong Programme in the sociology of scientic knowledge (SSK), and the appeal of this work was its iconoclastic approach to old-fashioned theories. Bloor self-consciously hoped to displace traditional philosophy and epistemology. In brief, the sociological enterprise announced the rejection of the very idea of science as a distinctive enterprise. This effacing of any distinction between science and other institutions is summarized by S. Woolgar (1988) as the rejection of the following traditional core assumption:
The persistent idea that science is something special and distinct from other forms of cultural and social activity . . . Instead of treating them as rhetorical accomplishments, many analysts continue to respect the boundaries which delineate science from non-science. (Woolgar 1988, p. 26)
On this view, not only is the very distinctiveness of science merely some kind of propaganda victory, a further assumption to be rejected is the curiously persistent view that the objects of the natural world are real, objective and enjoy an independent preexistence (Woolgar 1988, p. 26). In place of the traditional misconceptions about science and the independent pre-existence of the world, social constructivism proposed an amalgam of idealism and relativism according to which scientic theories are merely ctions, the product of social forces, interests and other contingent, historical aspects of the milieu in which they arise. That is, scientic theories are not explanatory or descriptive of the world, but are rhetorical accomplishments by some community of discourse and constituted entirely by social consensus. Even scientic discovery is a matter of interpretative practice, and genius has no bearing on the pattern of discovery in science (Brannigan 1981. See the discussion in Slezak 1989.) These are not merely radical or even revolutionary claims. They can only be described as extravagant doctrines which might be expected to require compelling arguments. In the absence of any arguments, sociologists had a ready explanation for the predictable incredulity of philosophers. Foreshadowing the provocation of later works, Bloors preface to the rst edition of his book already hints darkly that the
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inevitable resistance by philosophers to his doctrines will be due, not to their unargued absurdity, but to uncomfortable secrets that they would wish to hide. Bloor asserts that his approach to science from a sociological point of view encounters resistance because some nerve has been touched. He announces his bold intention to despoil academic boundaries which contrive to keep some things well hidden (Bloor 1976, p. ix). Bloor was right about some nerve having been touched, though he misdiagnosed the nature of the irritation. He devotes an entire chapter of his landmark book to a kind of psychoanalysis of his opponents by speculating about the sources of resistance to the Strong Programme which he attributes to hidden, indeed primitive, motives involving the fear of sociologys desacralizing of science and its mysteries. One might suggest alternative reasons for the resistance to his sociological doctrines, but Bloor sees only repressed impulses concerning the sacred and the profane leading to a superstitious desire to avoid treating knowledge naturalistically (Bloor 1976, p. 73). Bloor imagines that the threatening nature of any investigation into science itself has been the cause of a positive disinclination to examine the nature of knowledge in a candid and scientic way (1976, p. 42). However, this disinclination to examine knowledge and the need to keep it mystied through fear of desecration is difcult to reconcile with the fact that every philosopher since Plato has been centrally concerned with the problem of knowledge and its justication. The inordinate space devoted to such fatuous speculations signies the pre-eminent place they occupy in the social constructivist enterprise as a substitute for serious, or indeed any, philosophical analysis. Knowledge As Such: Contexts, Contents and Causes In his manifesto, Bloor had declared that the central claims of the Strong Programme he launched were beyond dispute (1976, p. 3), and Barnes begins an article asserting that in the short time since its advent developments have occurred with breathtaking speed and the view that scientic culture is constructed like any other is now well elaborated and exemplied (Barnes 1981, p. 481). This level of self-congratulatory hyperbole has prompted Thomas Gieryn (1982, p. 280) to comment upon these defences and re-afrmations as expressions of hubris and exaggerations passing as fact. Gieryn (1982, p. 293) has suggested that the radical ndings of the new sociology of science are new only in a ctionalized reading of antecedent work. In particular, Robert Mertons article on The Sociology of Knowledge (Merton 1957) had specically enunciated the central doctrine of the Strong Programme:
The Copernican revolution in this area of inquiry consisted in the hypothesis that not only error or illusion or unauthenticated belief but also the discovery of truth was socially (historically) conditioned. . . . The sociology of knowledge came into being with the signal hypothesis that even truths were to be held socially accountable, were to be related to the historical society in which they emerged. (Merton 1957, p. 459)
Although it had appeared in different guises before in Hegel, Marx, and Durkheim, the radical idea at the heart of the Strong Programme was to go beyond those sociological studies which stopped short of considering the actual substantive content, the ideas, of
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scientic theories as an appropriate domain for sociological investigation. Previously, sociological studies paid attention only to such things as institutional politics, citation patterns and other peripheral social phenomena surrounding the production of science, but had not ventured to explain the cognitive contents of theories in sociological terms. Since this crucial point has been obscured, its importance for appreciating subsequent developments cannot be overstated. The opening sentence of Bloors book asks Can the sociology of knowledge investigate and explain the very content and nature of scientic knowledge? (Bloor 1976, p. 1)that is, knowledge as such, as distinct from the circumstances of production. The alleged failure of previous sociological studies to touch on the contents of scientic belief was portrayed by Bloor as a loss of nerve and a failure to be consistent (1976, p. 8). Karl Mannheim, for example, is characterised as failing to extend his approach from knowledge of society to the knowledge of nature. The relativist challenge derives from this thorough-going application of the sociological principle which seeks to explain the hitherto exempted knowledge claims. The ambitions of Bloors program are explicit, for he complains that previous sociologists, in a betrayal of their disciplinary standpoint have failed to expand and generalise their claims to all knowledge: . . . the sociology of knowledge might well have pressed more strongly into the area currently occupied by philosophers, who have been allowed to take upon themselves the task of dening the nature of knowledge (Bloor 1976, p. 1). Causes and Case Studies The extensive body of case studies repeatedly invoked by sociologists to answer their critics has been taken to establish the thesis that the contents of scientic theories and beliefs have social causes, in contradistinction to psychological ones. The causal claim concerns such things as connections between the gross social structure of groups and the general form of the cosmologies to which they have subscribed (1976, p. 3). That is, the cognitive content of the beliefs is claimed to be causally connected with immediate, local aspects of the social milieu. Of this general thesis, Bloor asserts The causal link is beyond dispute. Indeed, Bloor (1981) and Shapin (1979) were evidently unable to believe that anyone might question the causal claims of the Strong Programme except on the assumption that they must be unfamiliar with the extensive literature of the case studies. However, in a parallel with Durkheim and Mauss (1903/1963), the claims of social determination of beliefs are all the more extraordinary in view of the failure of these case studies to support them. Critics have challenged precisely the bearing of these studies on the causal claims, and so repeatedly citing the burgeoning literature is to entirely miss the point. Of course, scientic discoveries have always necessarily arisen in some social milieu or other. However, establishing a causal connection requires more than merely characterising the social milieu. These more stringent demands have not been met anywhere in the voluminous case studies in the SSK literature. Thus, although Steven Shapin has acknowledged that the task is the renement and clarication of the ways in which scientic knowledge is to be referred to the various contextual factors and interests which produce it, (1979, p. 42) and that we need to ascertain the exact nature of
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the links between accounts of natural reality and the social order, nevertheless his much-cited case study of phrenology offers only a variety of anthropological approaches leading at best to a postulation of homologies between society and theories which may serve as expressive symbolism or perhaps function to further social interests in their context of use. This argument falls far short of demonstrating the strong claims of social determination, for it is a truism to assert, as Shapin does, merely that Culture [taken to include science] is developed and evaluated in particular historical situations (1979, p. 65). Shapin undertakes to refute the accusations of empirical sterility by a lengthy recounting of the considerable empirical achievements of the sociology of scientic knowledge (1982, p. 158). But he is simply begging the question with his advice that one can either debate the possibility of the sociology of scientic knowledge or one can do it. Casting more horoscopes does not address concerns about the causal claims of astrology. When is a Cigar Just a Cigar? The local, historical determination of scientic theories entails that theories would have been different had the social milieu been different. We are inevitably led to ask: Would Einstein have theorised E = mc3 , or would Newton have enunciated an inverse cube law of gravitation, had their societies been different? The model of such empirical studies was Formans (1971) much-cited work which attributes the development of quantum physics to the prevailing milieu in Weimar Germany. However, in the same vein, we might inquire: Did G dels Incompleteness theorem arise from some o lacunae in the Viennese social order of 1930? This example invokes the same suggestive metaphorical connections adduced by social constructivist case studies. There is, at best, a kind of afnity claimed between the social context and the contents of the theory in question. Thus, Shapin cites homologies between society and nature and sees theories as expressive symbolism which can be exploited to serve social interests. Given the tenuous nature of such homologies between theories and the Zeitgeist, the distinction between parody and serious claims is difcult to discern. Shapins Rorschach homologies between theory content and social context recall the Freudian interpretation of dreams which involved a similar decoding of an allegedly symbolic connection. Likewise, sociology pretends to disclose the hidden meaning underlying our scientic theories. We may have imagined that 19th century theories of phrenology were about the brain, but they were really expressing a social experience and about the differentiation and specialization [in the social order] perceived by the bourgeois groups (Shapin 1979, p. 57). G dels Incompleteness theorem, too, undoubto edly expresses a collective longing for wholeness and fulllment among the Viennese intelligentsia. However, in the spirit of Freuds famous remark one is tempted to ask: When is a cigar just a cigar? The Social Construction of Social Constructivism It is instructive to look at a recent, authoritative and sympathetic statement of social constructivism in a book whose co-authors include two of its foundersScientic
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Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis by Barnes, Bloor and Henry (1996). As founders of the eld, these authors are uniquely well qualied to offer the book to anyone seeking a text in the sociology of scientic knowledge. However, borrowing earlier words of one of its authors, this sociological enterprise appears to contrive to keep some things well hidden (Bloor 1976, p. ix). A study of the index is revealing. Georg Cantor, innite cardinal numbers and the continuum hypothesis get several entries whereas social constructivism and the Strong Programme get none at all. In view of the status of the Strong Programme, being the radical new approach proclaimed with great fanfare as revolutionizing the study of science and epistemology, its omission is revealing. The Duhem-Quine thesis, mentioned en passant in an obscure footnote, gets no index entry either, though the book is an extended essay on the alleged consequences of this philosophical doctrine. Other omissions from the index are equally curious. The truth of the teleological view of rationalist philosophers was originally presented by Bloor (1976) as entailing the falsity of the sociological programme. The teleological view takes beliefs to be explained by reasons. This rationalist view is taken by Bloor to be diametrically opposed to the sociological account of belief since only the latter is supposed to ascribe causes to beliefs. In the second edition of his foundational text, Bloor (1991) has reafrmed his commitment to the tenets of the original Programme. Thus, in view of the decisive, foundational status of this diametrical opposition, as we will see presently, it is striking that this issue, too, has disappeared without trace in more recent accounts. This re-writing of history makes it impossible to understand both the social constructivist doctrines themselves and the scandal they have generated. However, failure to mention a vital, potentially refuting, doctrine is illuminated by certain judicious and unacknowledged changes in the text of the second edition of Bloors book (see Slezak 1994). The following questions encapsulate some of the fundamental issues on which the disputes about social constructivism have centreda kind of diagnostic class test for Social Studies of Science 101: 1. What is the Edinburgh Strong Programme in the sociology of scientic knowledge, what were its central tenets, and what was its self-proclaimed, radical novelty regarding the content of scientic theories? 2. What is the esential characteristic doctrine of social constructivism and what is its relation to rationalist, teleological and psychologistic approaches of traditional epistemology? How are the latest views in the sociology of science related to their earlier formulations twenty years ago? 3. What is the Duhem-Quine thesis of underdetermination of theory by evidence? How does it relate to the theory-laden nature of observation? What follows from these theses for the determinants of theory-choice in science? 4. What kinds of empirical evidence have been offered as support for the theories of the sociology of scientic knowledge and how exactly do they bear upon the claims? Are theory contents caused by social contexts?
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Social Constructivism 5. Which epistemological stance does the new sociology of science adopt? (a) Realism (d) All of the above (b) Idealism (e) None of the above (c) Relativism
6. What are the scope and limits of sociological approaches to science in relation to individual psychology? As indicated, students who might wish to use the latest book of Barnes, Bloor and Henry as a text to study for the foregoing test would fail. These questions cannot be answered by a conscientious study of the book, though any teacher would recognise them as elementary ones basic to understanding the eld. Cryptic references to issues such as the rationalist philosophies against which the entire sociological enterprise was directed are left entirely unexplained and so the innocent reader will not be able to understand or assess the current claims. These failings might indicate only that the book is an inadequate text, which would not be unusual. However, the lapses and omissions appear to disguise a shift from vital doctrines which have become untenable. Idealism The book begins encouragingly, if somewhat mystifyingly for the newcomer, by acknowledging the existence of reality. This admission will undoubtedly be comforting to those harbouring doubts about the matter, but it arises at all only through certain naive confusions. For their part, Barnes, Bloor and Henry are concerned to distance themselves from thosewe are to assume othersociologists who they say Occasionally . . . may have given this impression of denying the existence of tables and chairs. Nevertheless, they admit that most other sociology of knowledge is, in fact, idealist. In repudiating this stance these authors emphasize their own contrasting naturalistic view, but on such good authority, then, idealism must be regarded as a central philosophical issue for the understanding of social constructivism. Notwithstanding these authors disclaimers, warrant for the charge of idealism against them too arises partly from their own misconceptions regarding the rationalist theories they oppose and partly from the social constructivism to which they remain rmly committedactually an amalgam of idealism and relativism. An unavoidable temptation towards idealism arises from the sociologists desire to deny that science describes an independent world. Consequently, the opposing rationalist philosophy of science has been seen as committed to a metaphysical realism involving access to absolute truth about a world behind appearances. While science attempts to discover the nature of an independently existing reality, this concern is not a metaphysical thesis about some Kantian things-in-themselves. It is simply the truism that we take our best theories literally to be talking about something. The reaction to the ordinary practice of science as some kind of philosophical error requiring sociological remedy is simply a mistake, since the virtues and status of science as an enterprise are independent of such metaphysical questions. Realists and idealists alike can enjoy the fruits of scientic knowledge. Specically, whether or not scientic theories are
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socially constructed is an issue to be determined by arguments entirely independent of idealism. Nevertheless, Barnes et al. offer their own naturalist stance as the contrast with idealism, but their naturalism is simply a demand for empirical explanation in terms of causes. However, Berkeley, like all other idealists, was an empiricist in good standing in this sense, and one can be an idealist at the same time as being committed to empirical, naturalistic science. Idealism is a metaphysical doctrine concerning the overall status of our scientic theories as such, and not a specic approach to explanation within the overall enterprise like naturalism. The dispute concerning idealism is entirely indifferent to any debate about the practices of empirical inquiry as such and, therefore, asserting credentials as naturalistic does not even amount to a plea of innocent to the charge of idealismmuch less grounds for acquittal. Revealing comments support the charge of idealism despite their disavowals. Barnes et al. (1996, p. 48) point out that it is not the existence of nature which accounts for certain behaviours and that attention to nature will not adjudicate the merits of our theories and classications. Of course, if appeal to nature, meaning empirical evidence, cannot adjudicate our theories, it is not clear what would do so. We see here the social constructivist dogma that scientic theories are somehow unconstrained by the way things are in the world. However, Barnes et al. are confusing the supposed indirectness of our knowledge of the world, its inaccessibility beyond the veil of ideas, with the bearing of empirical evidence on our scientic theories. Stressing the former kind of inaccessibility does not establish the latter kind. This is precisely to confuse idealism with relativism. The declaration of Barnes et al. that they are not idealists, then, is paradoxical since it poses the following dilemma: Which reality is the one the sociologists profess to believe in? Do they believe in an inaccessible Kantian ding an sich after all? Or do they believe in the rationalists world as conveyed by our true (i.e. best) theories? In wishing to deny the former, they end up denying the latter and, thereby, become idealists as well as relativists. In brief, their needless entanglement in such notorious problems is symptomatic of sociologists absurd pretensions to overthrow the subject that used to be called philosophy (Bloor 1983). Relativism Despite characterising their book as focussed on basic foundations, Barnes et al. explain that it gives little prominence to such issues as relativism. Indeed, this prefatory mention of relativism is the only one in the book. However, even more than idealism, relativism has been the central, distinctive theoretical doctrine of social constructivism and the source of most dispute. Neglecting to discuss it is like a text on evolution professing to concentrate on basic foundations and choosing to give little prominence to natural selection. The authors recent reticence about their own central doctrines is a telling feature of their work (Barnes and Bloor 1982). Relativism is the claim that knowledge has no warrant beyond belief acceptance itself. It is often a non-sequitur from the recognition that there is no absolute certainty. However, given that there can be no absolutely secure knowledge, the alternative to relativism is fallibilism: the idea that reliable knowledge is possible through revision
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and improvement. Relativism is at the heart of social constructivism because the supposed absence of constraints of independent reality is assumed to leave no other grounds for adjudicating claims. Specically, the freedom from a constraining reality is taken to warrant appeal to a sociological account of theory acceptance. Relativism, then, is the spurious assumption that there can be nothing more to say about the goodness of our theories if one cant meaningfully compare them to an independent, inaccessible reality. However, the question of realism has been the subject of a vast philosophical literature, and both sides of this dispute accept the rational force of evidence and the usual considerations of explanatory virtue such as comprehensiveness, coherence and simplicity as grounds for rational theory choice. Thus, Cardinal Bellarmines instrumentalism did not involve a challenge to the intellectual merits of Galileos Copernicanism as such. More recently, van Fraassens (1980) celebrated constructive empiricism is concerned to save the phenomena without postulating a hidden underlying reality, but this does not entail rejection of the usual rational considerations governing theory choice. Social constructivists mistakenly conclude that the inaccessibility of things in themselves behind the veil of our theories (whatever this might mean) precludes saying anything sensible about their cognitive virtues. However, rationalist talk of observation, conrmation, evidence and truth etc., is within the sociologists own preferred framework on our side of the veil, as it were, according to which, as Bloor says, all we have and all we need are the theories themselves. Indeed, Bloors view could be a version of Quines (1960) well-known metaphor of the fabric or web of our knowledge, also articulated in his famous epigram from Neurath concerning the sailor quoted on page ??. That is, we are inescapably dependent on our theories even as we seek to revise them. But, in terms of the metaphor, what counts as a repair of our boat is not a matter of arbitrary convention; social constructivism wants to scuttle it. Theory Choice: Underdetermination of Theory by Evidence One consideration, above all, has been widely taken to warrant the appeal to sociological factors in the explanation of scientic theory choice. An attempt is made to exploit the so-called Quine-Duhem thesis concerning the underdetermination of theory by evidence (Laudan 1990a). The thesis means that there can be no direct inference from observational data to any particular theory since there must be indenitely many theories equally compatible with the same empirical evidence. Therefore, other considerations must be invoked to explain the preference of scientists for one theory over another which is equally consistent with the observational or experimental data. However, a non-sequitur from this thesis has become a foundational tenet of social constructivism. Thus, when distilled to its essence, Bloors (1976) manifesto involves a spurious inference from underdetermination to social construction. However, underdetermination is neutral among the various alternative resources which might be invoked to explain theory choice beyond conformity with the evidence. It has to be shown independently why it might be social factors rather than some others (say, astrological) which are the operative ones in determining theory choice among the possible alternatives consistent with the evidence.
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Setting the pattern for subsequent discussions, Bloor relies on this issue as the central thesis of his book. Evidently no argument is thought necessary for this nonsequitur and Bloor gives none. In view of the foundational status that this book and this argument have acquired, the situation is sufciently peculiar to deserve emphasis: The problem with Bloors discussion and the general reliance on this doctrine in social constructivism is not merely that the arguments are weak or open to challenge in some way. Rather, no arguments of any kind are offered whatsoever. C. Boorse (1975) has pointed out that the underdetermination of theories by all possible observational evidence does not make them indistinguishable on other criteria such as simplicity, fecundity, coherence, comprehensiveness, explanatory power, and so on. These are, of course, the kinds of rational considerations typically invoked by the rationalist or teleological account. Part of the problem may have arisen from an excessively literal construal of theory choice which cannot be considered as an actual selection among equivalent available alternatives. Historians, above all, should recognise that the problem is typically to nd even a single theory that is consistent with the observations. Accordingly, what is termed choice is more appropriately described as the psychology of scientic invention or discoverythe subject of a burgeoning research literature (Langely, Simon et al. 1987; Tweney, Doherty & Mynatt 1981; Gorman 1992; Giere 1992). Consensus as Conventional Social constructivism rests on this idea that alternative theory choices are not only available, but equally good. Of course, this is the claim for the conventional character of science and is the locus of sociological relativism. Barnes et al. assert, Conventions could always be otherwise . . . (Barnes, Bloor & Henry 1996, p. 154), presumably entailing that knowledge might have been negotiated differently had the local interpretive milieu been different and, thereby, inviting the facetious question about Newtons inverse cube law. Indeed, undaunted by its absurdity, Barnes et al. embrace precisely such a paradoxical idea even in the case of arithmetical laws (Barnes, Bloor & Henry 1996, p. 184). However, on their own account, given the underdetermination of theory by evidence, the sociologists must be committed to the possibility of a consensus settling on a vast range of possible laws via the contingent, collective accomplishment of fact production by local cultural traditions. Unconvincingly, Barnes et al. suggest that the consensus on 2 + 2 = 4 is due merely to pragmatic reasons connected with the organization of collective action and the fact that it is probably easier to organize than a different convention such as 2 + 2 = 5. The fact that it might also be easier to believe is somehow not considered relevant. Impartiality Merton, like Mannheim, argued that theories judged to be correct and founded on rational considerations are not in need of sociological explanation in the way that false and irrational theories are. In this sense, traditional conceptions relegated sociology to the dross of science, to its residue of false and irrational beliefs. Bloors revival of
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the Durkheimian view was explicitly rescuing sociology from this ignominious role by asserting the appropriateness of sociological explanations for all of science regardless of evaluative judgements such as truth and falsity, rationality and irrationality, success or failure. Our own cosmology and science in general, like those of the Zuni, were to be shown as reections of the social milieu. Bloors complaint is directed at asymmetrical approaches such as Imre Lakatoss rational reconstruction of episodes in the history of science which sought to explain correct scientic theories as products of reasoned thought and, therefore, not requiring resort to sociological explanations. Bloor regards this approach as having the effect of rendering science safe from the indignity of empirical explanation (Bloor 1976, p. 7), but for Lakatos only sociology was to be excluded from accounts of successful science since good reasons are a species of explanation themselves. Analogously, veridical perception does not need explanation in the same way as misperception or illusion. We do not ordinarily seek explanatory causes in the case of normal veridical perception, not because we assume that there is no scientic explanation, but because we assume it to be of a certain general sort. Thus, we dont explain normal vision, but seek the cause of failure such as the inuence of alcohol, disease and so on. In the same way, we do not seek to explain why the train stays on the tracks but only why it fails to do so. Again, this asymmetry does not mean that we believe there is no cause or no explanation for the train staying on the tracks. However, this is the absurd view which Bloor imputes to rationalist philosophers such as Lakatos. Notice that Bloor takes Lakatos to hold that a rational reconstruction of beliefs implies that they are thereby shown to lack empirical explanation altogether (Bloor 1976, p. 7). In his Knowledge and Social Imagery (1976), Bloor characterized the autonomy view he is opposing:
One important set of objections to the sociology of knowledge derives from the conviction that some beliefs do not stand in need of any explanation, or do not stand in need of a causal explanation. This feeling is particularly strong when the beliefs in question are taken to be true, rational, scientic or objective. (Bloor 1976, p. 5)
Elsewhere Bloor characterizes the opposing view as the claim that nothing makes people do things that are correct but something does make, or cause, them to go wrong and that in the case of true beliefs causes do not need to be invoked (1976, p. 6). Bloor intends to make an absolute distinction between the teleological view which inclines its proponents to reject causality (1976, p. 10) on the one hand, and the causal viewthat is, the sociological approach of the Strong Programme. On Bloors own account, the viability of the Strong Programme rests on the tenability of this dichotomy and, in particular, the falsity of the teleological model. There could be no more crucial issue for the constructivist programme. L. Laudan (1981) has characterized Bloors acausal attribution to philosophers as an absurd view which cannot plausibly be attributed to any philosopher at all. In particular, the approach of Lakatos does not deny the existence of causes in cases of rationally held beliefs, but only assumes that reasons are themselves a species of cause (see Phillips 1997a). However, in a remarkable passage, Bloor (1981) responded to Laudan by attempting to deny these patent and quite explicit earlier intentions. Bloors
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discomfort was understandable, since the entire edice of the Strong Programme rests on this claimed opposition. Indeed in the second edition of his book, in the crucial section on the Autonomy of Knowledge dealing with the problem of causation, we discover certain judicious changes to the original text whose rationale is clearly to avoid the criticisms made by Laudan (see Slezak 1994). It must be noted that these alterations to the original text are somewhat difcult to reconcile with Bloors prefatorial assertion that attacks by critics have not convinced me of the need to give ground on any matter of substance and, therefore, he says I have resisted the temptation to alter the original presentation of the case for the sociology of knowledge apart from minor spelling and stylistic changes (Bloor 1991). Bloors predicament, if not his tactic, is understandable since his statement of the conditions under which the programme retains its plausibility left no room for compromise and no way out. Bloor had declared forthrightly:
There is no doubt that if the teleological model is true then the Strong Programme is false. The teleological and causal models, then, represent programmatic alternatives which quite exclude one another. (Bloor 1976, p. 9)
If the rationalist teleological autonomy view is not the acausal, anti-empirical strawman that Bloor imagined, then its merits need to be confronted seriously. However, this means nding a way to reconcile social constructivism with the full weight of considerations from cognitive science. This, in turn, means trying to downplay or expunge the hostility to internal, mental or psychological accounts of rational belief which was a central part of the social constructivist programme. Social Constructivism as Born-again Behaviourism The purported causal connection between ideas and social context is a version of stimuluscontrol theory akin to that of Skinnerian Behaviourism and, not suprisingly, in his later work Bloor (1983) explicitly endorses such notorious theories. In characterising opposing rationalist or teleological views, quoting Wittgenstein, Bloor refers to explanations which postulate mental states as infected by the disease of psychologism (1983, p. 6). Bloors frontal assault on the explanatory force of mental states is an intrinsic part of the defence of the radically alternative sociological approach to explaining science, but this bold stance left his programme vulnerable to a case on the other side whose strength he had greviously underestimated. For example, Bloors programme depends on rejecting the reality of mental states such as images. However, this position is thirty years and a major scientic revolution too late (see Kosslyn 1980, 1994; Slezak 1995). The pattern is consistent and instructive. Thus, Bloor has dismissed Chomskys review of Skinners Verbal Behaviour with a passing footnote, and a reference to it as the fashionable, standard criticism of behaviourism (Bloor 1983, p. 191). But this reveals only a failure to comprehend its signicance. One might have expected some indication of the weaknesses of the review and why this merely fashionable criticism is to be ignoredparticularly since neither Skinner himself nor other behaviourists replied to it. In fact, the Chomsky review is generally regarded as having precipitated the downfall of the tradition of behaviourism in psychology. Bloors cavalier
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handwaving is rather more misleading than these comments suggest. Chomskys ideas foreshadowed in this review became the foundations of the dramatic developments of the Cognitive Revolution (see Gardner 1987). Bloors failure to indicate the magnitude and import of these developments is comparable to defending Creationism today by dimissing the Origin of Species as merely fashionable and failing to let ones readers know anything of modern biology founded on Darwins theory. Newtons Principia as Conditioned Response Since behaviourism is a doctrine concerning psychology, it is at rst sight suprising that it has been recruited to the cause of social constructivism. However, behaviourism serves Bloor as an ally, since it denies the explanatory role of internal mental states and is thereby in diametrical opposition to the rationalist or teleological point of view which the Strong Programme is also battling. If scientic beliefs are to be construed as the causal effects of an external stimulus, they are precisely analogous to Skinnerian respondents or operants and, therefore, science is the result of conditioning or Thorndikes Law of Effect. In short, the deep insight of social constructivism is that Isaac Newtons Principia is to be explained as something like a rats bar-pressing in response to food pellets. Bloors (1991) protest that his views are entirely consistent with cognitive science cannot be taken seriously and can be asserted at all only because Bloor now pretends that the sociological thesis at stake is merely whether or not there are social aspects to science. This position is signicantly different from the claim that knowledge is socially constructed and constituted. This weak and uncontroversial thesis is not the original doctrine propounded whose inconsistency with cognitive science was evident from the accompanying assault on the postulation of mental states. The very blandness of this claim for social inuences testies to the misrepresentation of the debate. The truism that there are social dimensions to science would hardly have generated the opposition and controversy evoked by the Strong Programme. Signicantly, Bloors sociological colleagues have reacted differently: their vehement attacks on cognitive science and articial intelligence have been both telling and more ingenuous. Their strenuous attempts to discredit the claims of cognitive science in effect acknowledge the threat posed to the central sociological doctrines (see Slezak 1989). Indeed, H.M. Collins (1990) among others, has been explicit on this point, seeing the claims of articial intelligence (AI) as a crucial test case for the sociology of scientic knowledge (Slezak 1991a). Revolt Against Reason Recent social constructivism is essentially the same doctrine characterised in an earlier generation by Karl Popper (1966) as the revolt against reasona rejection of certain ideals of truth and rationality which, however difcult to explicate, are nonetheless central to the Western heritage. Popper saw the same tendencies in Hegel which he bitterly denounced as this despicable perversion of everything that is decent (1966, p. 49). There can be little doubt about the close afnities between Hegels doctrines and
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those of social constructivism: Popper observes that for Hegel, History is our judge. Since History and Providence have brought the existing powers into being, their might must be right . . . (1966, p. 49). The unmistakable parallel is seen in their essentially similar answers to Poppers fundamental question who is to judge what is, and what is not objective truth? He reports Hegels reply that The state has, in generalto make up its own mind concerning what is to be considered as objective truth and adds: With this reply, freedom of thought, and the claims of science to set its own standards, give way, nally to their opposites (1966, p. 43). Hegels doctrine expressed in terms of the State is essentially the same idea that political success is ipso facto the criterion of truth. As we will see presently, precisely this idea is resuscitated in Latour and Woolgar, Pinch and Collins and the entire enterprise of contemporary social constructivism. The idea is a historical relativism according to which truth is merely political and dependent on the Zeitgeist or spirit of the age. It is a view which Popper charges with helping to destroy the tradition of respecting the truth (1966, p. 308, fn 30) and his discussion of Hegels bombastic and mystifying cant is striking in its aptness to recent sociology of science, echoed by Gross and Levitt, Laudan and Stove, among others. Popper warns against the magic of high-sounding words and the power of jargon to be found in doctrines which are
. . . full of logical mistakes and of tricks, presented with pretentious impressiveness. This undermined and eventually lowered the traditional standards of intellectual responsibility and honesty. It also contributed to the rise of totalitarian philosophizing and, even more serious, to the lack of any determined intellectual resistance to it. (1966, p. 395)
Laboratory Life Under the Microscope Perhaps most obvious cause for such concern is another foundational classic of social constructivism, Laboratory Life by Latour and Woolgar (1979). This work is selfconsciously subversive, rejecting the rules of logic and rationality as a merely coercive orthodoxy (Woolgar 1988) and has the avowed goal of deating the pretensions of science both in its knowledge claims and in its claims to the possession of a special method. Among its iconoclastic goals, the book professes to penetrate the mystique, (Latour & Woolgar 1979, p. 18) dissolve the appearances and reveal the hidden realities of science-in-the-making at the laboratory workbench. This study proposes to give an expos of the internal workings of scientic activity (1979, p. 17). e Discovering certain puzzling questions concerning the nature of science, Latour and Woolgar conclude that there is no such thing. In their celebrated work they declare that all of science is merely the construction of ctions (1979, p. 284). Latour explains the insights emerging from the new discipline:
Now that eld studies of laboratory practice are starting to pour in, we are beginning to have a better picture of what scientists do inside the walls of these strange places called laboratories . . . The result, to summarize it in one sentence, was that nothing extraordinary and nothing scientic was happening inside the sacred walls of these temples. (Latour 1983, p. 141) . . . the moment sociologists walked into laboratories and started checking all these theories about the strength of science, they just disappeared. Nothing special, nothing extraordinary, in fact nothing of any cognitive quality was occurring there. (Latour 1983, p. 160)
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Needless to say, the implications of such insights must be revolutionary, not least of all for science education, the foregoing remarks being approvingly quoted in a teachers journal in an article recommending a radical new vision of the reality of the scientic process (Gough 1993). For constructivists, science education is presumably only socialization into power, persuasion and propaganda. Rather than learning as a cognitive process involving reasoning, logic and understanding, education involves merely the observance of arbitrary practices and political interest. Although Latour and Woolgar do not explicitly address the questions of most direct interest to educators as such, their characterization of science clearly suggests the appropriate role of the teacher. Each text, laboratory, author and discipline strives to establish a world in which its own interpretation is made more likely by virtue of the increasing number of people from whom it extracts compliance. (Latour & Woolgar 1986, p. 285) On this conception, presumably the function of science teacher is that of principal agent for the extraction of compliancemore like camp commandant than traditional instructor. Constructing the World The state government of Indiana in the last century considered a bill which would have conveniently legislated the value of the mathematical constant to be exactly 4. This effort is a paradigm, if rather literal, example of negotiating or legislating the truth. Sociologists could only complain on the grounds that the bill did not gain a majority among legislators. As a fa on de parler, the thesis of constructing facts has a sensible c reading according to which the theory or description of a substance, are settled upon and perhaps even socially negotiated in a certain sense. However, playing on the words, one can also choose to construe such banalities as something more paradoxical and seemingly profoundnamely that objects and substances themselves did not have an independent existence and were socially constructed. In like manner, one might say that Copernicus removed the earth from the centre of the universe, but asserting this literally would be an attempt at humour or evidence of derangement. Nevertheless, it is just this sort of claim for which the work of Latour and Woolgar has been acclaimeda dening text in the genre of ethnomethodology of science. Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande/Academics The authors own description of their project in Laboratory Life reads more like a parody than a serious inquiry. Upon entering the Salk Institute for a two-year study Professor Latours knowledge of science was non-existent; his mastery of English was very poor; and he was completely unaware of the existence of the social studies of science (1986, p. 273). It is from this auspicious beginning that the revolutionary insights into science were to emerge. These apparent liabilities are portrayed as a unique advantage, since he was thus in the classic position of the ethnographer sent to a completely foreign environment (1986, p. 273). However, the idea that the inability to understand ones human sub-
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jects is a positive methodological virtue is surely a bizarre conception. For Latour and Woolgar, however, it is intimately connected with their doctrine of inscriptions. The meaninglessness of the traces, spots, points and other recordings is a direct consequence of Latours admitted scientic illiteracy. Predictably enough, from the perspective of complete ignorance, all these meaningful symbols are indiscriminable and must, therefore, be placed in the category of unintelligible markingsinscriptions. Avoiding the possibility of understanding their subjects behaviour is justied on the grounds that, just as the anthropologist does not wish to accept the witch-doctors own explanations, so one should remain uncommitted to the scientists rationalizations. The absurdity of such an attitude follows from the simple failure to appreciate the difference between understanding the native and believing him. Persuasion by Literary Inscription and Achieving Objects by Modalities It is from a point of view of ignorance and incomprehension that Latour will rely on a simple grammatical technique in order to discern the true signicance of the papers: Activity in the laboratory had the effect of transforming statements from one type to another (1986, p. 81). Specically, the rationale of the laboratory activities was the linguistic exercise of transforming statements in various ways in order to enhance their facticity. Thus, we see how Latour and Woolgar arrive at their constructivist conclusions. They explain a laboratory is constantly performing operations on statements (1986, p. 86) and it is through this process that a fact has then been constituted (1986, p. 87) by social negotiation and construction. In short, the laboratory must be understood as the organisation of persuasion through literary inscription (1986, p. 88). These are the grounds on which we must understand their claims that substances studied in the lab did not exist prior to operations on statements (1986, pp. 110, 121). An object can be said to exist solely in terms of the difference between two inscriptions (1986, p. 127). Poison Oracles and Other Laboratory Experiments From the meaninglessness of the inscriptions and his revelation that the scienticity of science has disappeared (Latour 1983, p. 142). Latour is led inexorably to a nave but nagging questionnamely, if nothing scientic is happening in lab oratories, why are there laboratories to begin with and why, strangely enough, is the society surrounding them paying for these places where nothing special is produced? (1983, pp. 141-2).
. . . in the back of his mind there remains a nagging question. How can we account for the fact that in any one year, approximately one and a half million dollars is spent to enable twenty-ve people to produce forty papers? (Latour & Woolgar 1979, p. 70)
This question is undoubtedly a deep mystery if one systematically refuses to understand the meaningfulness of the inscriptions on these papers. From this vantage point, Isaac Newtons notebooks would be indiscriminable from random y droppings undoubtedly an important lesson for the science classroom.
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On the analogy of anthropologists refusal to bow before the knowledge of a primitive sorcerer (1979, p. 29). Latour and Woolgar refuse to accept the authority of our best science, saying We take the apparent superiority of the members of our laboratory in technical matters to be insignicant, in the sense that we do not regard prior cognition . . . as a necessary prerequisite for understanding scientists work (1979, p. 29). Ironically, though rejecting our best science in this way, they happily countenance the magical transformation of physical substances into inscriptions. However, more than being an absurd affectation, their irreverent approach amounts to an arrogance that elevates ignorance to a methodology. Since prior cognition, is not necessary for understanding a scientists work, Latour and Woolgar see themselves as competent to adjudicate the merits of advanced scientic theories. These astonishing anti-intellectual ideas defy comment and should not require serious response. Equally, the corrosive educational values implied in such an outlook should be obvious. This affectation of an Evans-Pritchard among the Azande is anthropological strangeness in a rather different sense of the term: no anthropologist was ever so strange. Given his method, Latour naturally nds the activities in the laboratory incomprehensible. Unwilling to allow his incomprehension to become a liability, it becomes the deep insight of Laboratory Life. The behaviour of the scientists not only appears meaningless, it is meaningless. In their conclusion, Latour and Woolgar reveal that A laboratory is constantly performing operations on statements . . . , (1979, p. 86) and the activities of the laboratory consist in manufacturing traces, spots and points with their inscription devices. The production of papers with such meaningless marks is taken to be the main objective of the participants in essentially the same way that the production of manufactured goods is the goal of any industrial process. This is the view of science as sausage factory. There is some unintended irony where Latour and Woolgar take their own confusion to be typical and presumptuously extrapolate their own predicament asking Is there any essential distinction between the nature of our own construction and that used by our subjects? (1979, p. 254). To their rhetorical question they say: Emphatically, the answer must be no (1979, p. 254). Based on their own experience, it is not difcult to see why Latour and Woolgar might arrive at the conclusion that science is a more or less arbitrary construction and negotiation with ctions and that nothing of any cognitive quality was occurring in scientic laboratories. Derridadaism: Readers as Writers of the Text A measure of the perversity of this work is the fact that in the new edition of their book, Latour and Woolgar tell us that laboratory studies such as their own should, after all, not be understood as providing a closer look at the actual production of science at the workbench, as everyone had thought, since this view would be both arrogant and misleading, (1986, p. 282) by presuming some privileged access to the real truth about science that will emerge from a more detailed observation of the technical practices. Instead, Latour and Woolgar explain that their work recognizes itself as the construction of ctions about ction constructions (1986, p. 282). This is the textualism of Derrida combined with a much-vaunted reexivity. They continue:
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. . . all texts are stories. This applies as much to the facts of our scientists as to the ctions through which we display their work (1986, p.284). Their own work, then, just like all of science, has no determinate meaning since It is the reader who writes the text (1986, p. 273). Here we see a deconstructionist affectation that conveniently serves to protect Latour and Woolgar against any criticism. Where Bloor professes to adhere to the usual principles of scientic inquiry, Latour and Woolgar engage in a game which Lehman (1991) has aptly called Derridadaism. They evade criticism by adopting deconstructionist double-talk and affecting a nihilistic indifference to the cogency of their own thesis. In keeping with the principle of reexivity, they embrace the notion that their own text (like the science they describe) has no real meaning, being an illusory, or at least, innitely renegotiable concept (Latour & Woolgar 1986, p. 273). Reecting on the controversies surrounding their work, Latour and Woolgar observe that defenders and critics alike have engaged in this futile spectacle in which they have debated the presumed intentions of the authors. This spectacle is, of course, just the exercise of scholarly criticism. Latour and Woolgar now reveal that the real meaning of a text must be recognised as illusory and indeterminate. The question of what the authors intended or what is reported to have happened are now very much up to the reader. This Rorschach inkblot view of their own work is undoubtedly correct in one sense, if only because Laboratory Life is in many respects incoherent and unintelligible. For example, some of the diagrams offered as explanatory schemas are impossible to decipher. It is sobering to consider how science teaching might be conducted in accordance with this model of scholarship. Balance of Forces Though implications of social constructivism are not drawn out by the authors, they are close to the surface and not difcult to discern. Thus, once Latour and Woolgar reject the intrinsic existence of accurate and ctitious accounts per se, the only remaining criterion for judgement is judgement itself. . . . the degree of accuracy (or ction) of an account depends on what is subsequently made of the story, not on the story itself (1986, p. 284). There are no grounds for judging the merits of any claim besides the modalizing and demodalising of statements, a purely political question of persuasion, propaganda and power. Thus they suggest that the very idea of plausibility of any work, including their own, is not an intellectual or cognitive question, but simply a matter of political redenition of the eld and other such transformations involving shift in the balance of forces. In particular, the current implausibility of their own theory is only due to its relative political disadvantages rather than the lack of any intellectual merits (1986, p. 285). One could hardly nd a more open endorsement of the doctrine that Might is right. Education: Truth as Power There could be no more fundamental challenge to education than the one posed by these approaches, since their radical claims purport to overturn the entire edice and
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foundations of our scientic knowledge. Thus, a leading partisan of the sociology of scientic knowledge has suggested that no less than The foundations of modern thought are at stake here (Pickering 1992, p. 22). All sides of the dispute may agree on this, at least. Social constructivist writings exemplify discourse that George Orwell (1946) desribed as giving an appearance of solidity to pure wind and that is largely the defence of the indefensible. Orwells essay Politics and the English Language warned that such language is like a cuttlesh squirting out ink prevents clear, critical thinking and, thereby, the capacity to see through ideological mystication. Orwell sees the proper use of language as an instrument for expressing and not for concealing or preventing thought, and he argued that subverting this function will have a deleterious effect by producing a reduced state of consciousness, the anaesthesia of a portion of ones brain. The bearing of social constructivist doctrines on these educational questions is starkly brought out in Chomskys remarks:
It is the responsibility of intellectuals to speak the truth and to expose lies. This, at least, may seem enough of a truism to pass without comment. Not so, however. For the modern intellectual, it is not at all obvious . . .. (Chomsky 1969, p. 257)
Chomsky goes on to quote Martin Heidegger who remained a card-carrying Nazi even after the Second World War. In a pro-Hitler declaration, echoing social constructivist ideas, Heidegger asserted truth is the revelation of that which makes a people certain, clear and strong in its action and knowledge. Chomsky remarks ironically that it seems for Heidegger it is only this kind of truth that one has a responsibility to speakthe truth which comes from power. In the same vein, we have seen Latour and Woolgar assert that the success of any theory is entirely a matter of, not persuasion, but politics and power, extracting compliance. On this theory a repressive totalitarian regime must count as a model of scientic success. Concerns with the revolt against reason are also seen expressed by Christopher Norris (1992) who writes of Baudrillard as among those located in the wider fashion for pragmatist, anti-foundationalist or consensus-based theories of knowledge (1992, p. 16). Baudrillard appllies the constructivist, contextualist, inscriptionalist approach and concludes that the 1991 Gulf War did not happen: There is no reality behind the discourse concerning the Gulf War. History, like science, is a ctive construct. Norris writes of the intellectual and political bankruptcy of doctrines which lead to such conclusions. Mertonian Norms: The Ethos of Science On such a theory, it is impossible to distinguish fairness from fraud in science, since, after all, both are ways of constructing ction. In the absence of the usual distinctions, the scientist who fraudulently manufactures his evidence cannot be meaningfully distinguished from the honest researcher whose data are also constructed, albeit in different ways. The problem arises from social constructivists rejection of the famous
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Mertonian norms of universalism, communism, disinteredness and organized skepticism which constitute the ethos of science (Merton 1942). Merton described these as institutional imperatives, being moral as well as technical prescriptions,that affectively toned complex of values and norms which is held to be binding on the scientist. As Merton observes, these institutional values are transmitted by precept and example, presumably in the course of the scientists education. It is difcult to see how someone committed to the social constructivist view can either teach or conduct science according to the usual rules in which truth, honesty and other intellectual and ethical measures of worth are taken seriously. Facticity and Maintaining Ones Position In articulating the same political view of scientic claims, constructivist authors stop short of openly encouraging cheating and other forms of dishonesty in science, but there can be no mistake about the clear entailments of their theory. Thus, when examining a dispute concerning the claims of parapsychology or astrology, Pinch and Collins (1984) draw attention to symmetries in the attempts of opponents to maintain their commitmentsin one case to orthodox science and, in the other, to the paranormal. However, from the standpoint of scrupulous sociological neutrality or impartiality regarding the intellectual merits of the case on each side, there can be no way to discriminate the relative merits of the arguments and evidence itself. In the case study, both sides make questionable attempts to protect their favoured theory against contrary evidence and, indeed, the scientists apear to have been less than completely forthright about some disconrming evidence. Pinch and Collins wish to generalise from this example to a thesis about science as a whole by construing it as a typical case, that is, as evidence of the way in which public scrutiny removes the mystique of science and exposes its socially constructed, negotiated character. Such expos serves to dissolve the facticity of the claims. e Pinch and Collins are unwilling to see such episodes as anything other than the way science always operatesnot because all scientists are dishonest, but because the very distinction relies on being able to discriminate fact from ction. When the scientists nally admit their error and revise their earlier stance in the light of falsifying evidence, they are ridiculed by Pinch and Collins for their grandiose, mythical pretensions and for appearing to adopt a mantle of almost Olympian magnanimity (1984, p. 536). The scientists are reproached for failing to re-appraise their understading of scientic method and to learn about its active characterthat is, the way in which facts, previously established by their presentation in the formal literature [sic], can be deconstructed (1984, p. 538) by public scrutiny of the informal, behindthe-scenes reality of science. Remarkably, however, Pinch and Collins suggest that the right lesson about science was that, provided they had been prepared to endorse the canonical model in public while operating in a rather different way in private, they could have maintained their position (1984, p. 539). In other words, if they had been even more dishonest, they would have been rightin the only sense of right possible, that is, they would have maintained their position. The status or facticity of a claim is just a matter of how the claim is publicly presented (1984, p. 523) and the literature
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can either construct or dissolve the facticity of the claims. If we drop the jargon, their point is simply that truth is what you can get away with. Heidegger would be impressed. Altering the Grounds of Consensus: Afrmative Action? In practice, through the feigned suspension of judgement, social constructivism has led to a tacit, or even explicit, advocacy of discredited or disreputable pseudo-science. Pinch (1993) and Ashmore (1993) go so far as to defend the supposed merits of unorthodox and rejected theories on the grounds of equity. Not least, this policy includes the case of fraud since it is to be seen as an attributed category, something made in a particular context which may become unmade later (Pinch 1993, p. 368). Ashmore proposes a radical skepticism concerning the expos of notorious cases of misguided science such e as that of Blondlots N-rays. Amid the usual jargon-laden pseudo-technicality, such an approach amounts to promoting the alleged scientic merits or deserts of such discredited cases. Thus, Pinch writes of making plausible the rejected view (Pinch 1993, p. 371) and Ashmore is prefectly explicit: To put it very starkly, I am looking for justice!in a rhetorically self-conscious effort to alter the grounds of consensus (1993, p. 71). Again, the educational implications for the curriculumshould hardly need drawing out. The impartiality defended by social constructivism has come to mean something like afrmative action for bullshit (in H. Frankfurts (1988) technical use of this philosophical term). Writing on the Science Wars in India, Meera Nanda (1997) discusses the direct political consequences of such epistemological egalitarianism. Specically, she is concerned with the way in which social constructivist doctrines give legitimacy to various ethno-sciences such as Hindu ways of knowing in opposition to Western, Eurocentric, Northern science. Nanda expresses increasing unease [with] the transnational alliance that has emerged around the idea that the rationality of modern science encodes Western and imperialistic social-cultural values. She echoes the concerns we have already seen expressed by Popper, Chomsky and Norris:
But when science is joined to culture at the hip in the constructivist fashion, it also opens the door to the so-called enthno-scienceHindu science, Islamic science, third world womens sciencewherein scientic rationality is subordinated to the forms of life of different communities. When the existing social values are allowed to decide the validity of knowledge, knowledge loses whatever power it has to critique these often oppressive values. . . . The oppressed Others do not need patronizing afrmations of their ways of knowing, as much as they need ways to challenge these ways of knowing. They do not need to be told that modern science is no less of a cultural narrative than their local knowledges, for they need the ndings of modern science, understood as transcultural truths, in order to expose and challenge local knowledges. (Nanda 1997)
Conclusion: Education as Intellectual Self Defence To the extent that the doctrines we have seen encourage the anaesthesia and reduced state of consciousness of which Orwell spoke, teachers have a special responsibility to foster clear thinking. The extent to which citizens can think independently and critically has immense consequences for our lives and very survival. In the spirit of
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Orwells concerns, Chomsky (1969) has documented the extent to which elite culture, the so-called intellectuals and the education system, perform a crucial propaganda function fostering necessary illusions and, thereby, serving the interests of privilege and power. In the face of such forces, he suggests that what is needed is the kind of intellectual self-defence that has always been the ideal of a liberal education.
. . . Traditionally the role of the intellectual, or at least his self image, has been that of a dispassionate critic. Insofar as that role has been lost, the relation of the schools to intellectuals should, in fact be one of self-defence. (Chomsky 1969, p. 251)
References Ashmore, M.: 1993, The Theatre of the Blind: Starring a Promethean Prankster, a Phoney Phenomenon, a Prism, a Pocket and a Piece of Wood, Social Studies of Science 23, 67106. Barnes, B.: 1974a, Interests and the Growth of Knowledge, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. Barnes, B.: 1974b, Scientic Knowledge and Sociological Theory, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. Barnes, B.: 1981, On the Hows and Whys of Cultural Change, Social Studies of Science 11, 48198. Barnes, B. and Bloor, D.: 1982, Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowledge, in M. Hollis and S. Lukes (eds), Rationality and Relativism, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 2147. Barnes, B., Bloor, D. and Henry, J.: 1996, Scientic Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Bloor, D.: 1976, Knowledge and Social Imagery, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. Bloor, D.: 1981, The Strengths of the Strong Programme, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 11, pp. 199213. Reprinted in J. R. Brown (ed.) Scientic Rationality: The Sociological Turn, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1984, p. 85. Bloor, D.: 1983, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge, Columbia University Press, New York. Bloor, D.: 1991, Knowledge and Social Imagery, 2nd edn, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Boden, M.: 1979, Piaget, Fontana, London. Boorse, C.: 1975, The Origins of the Indeterminacy Thesis, Journal of Philosophy 72, 369887.
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Brannigan, A.: 1981, The Social Basis of Scientic Discoveries, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Bunge, M.: 1991, A Critical Examination of the New Sociology of Science, Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21(4), 52460. Chomsky, N.: 1969, American Power and the New Mandarins, Penguin, Harmondsworth. Collins, H.: 1990, Articial Experts: Social Knowledge and Intelligent Machines, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. Collins, H. and Pinch, T.: 1992, The Golem: What Everyone Should Know About Science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Durkheim, E. and Mauss, M.: 1903, Primitive Classication. Translated and edited with introduction by R. Needham, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1963. Forman, P.: 1971, Weimar Culture, Causality and Quantum Theory 1918-1927, in R. McCormmach (ed.), Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences, University of Philadelphia Press, Philadelphia, pp. 1115. Frankfurt, H.: 1988, On Bullshit, The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Gardner, H. E.: 1987, The Minds New science: A History of the Cognitive Revolution, Basic Books, New York. Giere, R. (ed.): 1992, Cognitive Models of Science: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. XV, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Gieryn, T.: 1982, Relativist/Constructivist Programmes in the Sociology of Science: Redundance and Retreat, Social Studies of Science 12, 279297. Gorman, M.: 1992, Simulating Science: Heuristics, Mental Models and Technoscientic Thinking, Indiana University Press, Bloomington. Gough, N.: 1993, Laboratories in Schools: Material Places, Mythic Spaces, The Australian Science Teachers Journal 39, 2933. Gross, P. and Levitt, N.: 1994, Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and its Quarrels with Science, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. Kosslyn, S.: 1980, Image and Mind, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. Kosslyn, S.: 1994, Image and Brain: The Resolution of the Imagery Debate, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. Langley, P. Simon, H.A. Bradshaw, G.L. and Zytkow, J.M.: 1987, Scientic Discovery: Computational Explorations of the Creative Process, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
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Latour, B.: 1983, Give Me a Laboratory and I Will Raise the World, in K. KnorrCetina and M. Mulkay (eds), Science Observed: Perspectives on the Social Study of Science, Sage, New York. Latour, B. and Woolgar, S.: 1979, Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientic Facts, Vol. 11, Sage, London, pp. 173198. Reprinted in J.R. Brown (ed.), Scientic Rationality: The Sociological Turn, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1984. Laudan, L.: 1990a, Demystifying Underdetermination, in C. W. Savage (ed.), Scientic Theories: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. XIV, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Laudan, L.: 1990b, Science and Relativism, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Lehman, D.: 1991, Signs of the Times: Deconstruction and the Fall of Paul de Man, Simon & Schuster, New York. Matthews, M. R. (ed.): 1998, Constructivism in Science Education: A Philosophical Examination, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht. Merton, R.: 1942, Science and Technology in a Democratic Order, Journal of Legal and Political Sociology 1. Reprinted as Science and Democratic Social Structure, in his Social Theory and Social Structure, Free Press, New York, 1957. Merton, R.: 1957, The Sociology of Knowledge, Social Theory and Social Structure, Free Press, New York. Nanda, M.: 1997, The Science Wars in India, Dissent, Winter 44(1). Norris, C.: 1992, Uncritical Theory: Postmodernism, Intellectuals and the Gulf War, Lawrence & Wishart, London. Orwell, G.: 1946, Politics and the English Language, The Penguin, 1946, Essays of George Orwell, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1984. Phillips, D.: 1995, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: The Many Faces of Constructivism, Educational Researcher 24(7), 512. Phillips, D.: 1997, How, Why, What, When, and Where: Perspectives on Constructivism in Psychology and Education, Issues in Education 3(2), 151194. Phillips, D.: 1997a, Coming to Grips with Radical Social Constructivisms, Science & Education 6(1-2), 85104. Pickering, A.: 1992, Science as Practice and Culture, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Pinch, T.: 1993, Generations of SSK, Social Studies of Science 23, 363373.
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Pinch, T. and Collins, H.: 1984, Private Science and Public Knowledge: The Committee for the Scientic Investigation of the Paranormal and its Use of the Literature, Social Studies of Science 14, 521546. Popper, K.: 1966, The Open Society and Its Enemies,Volume 2, Hegel and Marx, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. Quine, W.: 1960, Word and Object, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. Shapin, S.: 1979, Homo Phrenologicus: Anthropological Perspectives on an Historical Problem, in B. Barnes and S. Shapin (eds), Natural Order: Historical Studies of Scientic Culture, Sage, London. Shapin, S.: 1982, History of Science and Its Sociological Reconstructions, History of Science 20, 157211. Slezak, P.: 1989, Scientic Discovery by Computer as Empirical Refutation of the Strong Programme, Social Studies of Science 19, 563600. Slezak, P.: 1991a, Articial Experts, Social Studies of Science 21, 175201. Slezak, P.: 1991b, Bloors Bluff: Behaviourism and the Strong Programme, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 5(3), 241256. Slezak, P.: 1994, The Social Construction of Social Constructionism, Inquiry 37(2), 139 157. Slezak, P.: 1995, The Philosophical Case Against Visual Imagery, in P. Slezak, T. Caelli and R. Clark (ed.), Perspectives on Cognitive Science, Ablex, Norwood. Sokal, A. and J. Bricmont, J.: 1997, Intellectual Impostures, Prole Books, London. Stove, D.: 1991, The Plato Cult and Other Philosophical Follies, Basil Blackwell, Oxford. Tweney, R. Doherty, M. and Mynatt, C. (eds): 1981, On Scientic Thinking, Columbia University Press, New York. van Fraassen, B.: 1980, The Scientic Image, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Woolgar, S.: 1988, Science: The Very Idea, Tavistock Publications, London.
Re-examining the Image of Science in the School Science Curriculum

William W. Cobern
Western Michigan University, USA. Email: bill.cobern@wmich.edu
Introductory Remarks My task is to address the question of how the scientic community views the public understanding of science and whether there needs to be a re-conceptualization of the challenge to foster the public understanding of science, and also whether there is a need to re-examine assumptions. I am compelled to begin by acknowledging a debt to an important book, Inarticulate Science, written by Edgar Jenkins and his colleagues at Leeds. Inarticulate Science is an outstanding contribution on the concept of the public understanding of science and I think of my contribution today on this topic as a footnote. My perspective is somewhat different in that I have school settings in mind rather than adult learning (also see Lewenstein, 1992). I want to address the question of how the science community should think about the public understanding of science with respect to what happens in schools; and by school I mean K-12 school plus the undergraduate science education of non-science university majors. Also, I make my remarks from a cultural perspective in that I think it is important to think about how scientic ideas contribute to and inuence the worldviews we construct for ourselves. Specically, I am interested in science as an aspect of different systems of meaning that people construct for making sense of their worlds: An aspect of meaning because science is not the entire ball game except for a few people who chose to elevate science to the level of metaphysics; different systems because even among scientists there are differences as to how science is used in the construction of meaning. I also want to preface my remarks by noting that I am of course speaking from my experiences as an American science educator. What is happening in the USA, however, does not appear to be unique (see Gaskell, 1996; Sjberg, 1996). For example, several industrial nations including Norway are involved in the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (National Research Council, 1996) for what appear to be the same reasons. UNESCO is promoting Project 2000+ which has a parallel form in the USA. The slogan Science for All can be heard worldwide; but, I also think that given the enormous size of the American scientic and education establishments along with publishing interests that what happens in the USA can hardly go unnoticed or unfelt. Nonetheless I will be at pains not to appear overtly Yankee-centric. The structure of my remarks will be as follows. I begin with a celebration of science but then move on to discuss what concerns the scientic community has about the public. From here I address the key problematic element within the scientic community itself, the epistemology of scientic positivism. This epistemology creates considerable
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difculties for the community of science within the public square.1 Finally, I begin with the end. Let me say at the onset where I am headed. Yes, the science community does need to re-conceptualize the challenge and re-examine its assumptions about the public understanding of science. The science communitys historic perspective on the public is grounded in the legitimate interests of science; but, the promotion of the public understanding of science needs to be grounded in the publics legitimate interests in science. The distinction between the prepositions of and in is crucial and I owe this insight to physicist Martin Eger (1989). Egers distinction is similar to Zimans (1984, 1991, 1992) science insiders and outsiders, which was also adopted by Jenkins (1992) and Layton et. al. (1993). A Celebration of Science What is the scientic community? Ask a scientist and he or she is likely to say that the community of science is composed of the science departments and science laboratories at universities and research institutions. This community surely includes scientic journals and professional societies and meetings. We might also be able to agree that university science textbooks serve as a kind of unofcial canon for the scientic community. Above all these, the people we call scientists form the scientic community. I do not think it is helpful to think of science as something separate from the people who construct, write about, teach or learn scientic knowledge. Regarding the scientic community, we live at a time when that community nds itself in the throes of considerable angst. It is an angst not only about the publics apparent lack of scientic understanding but also about an apparent lack of public esteem for science and scientic ways of thinking. Paradoxically this angst is being endured at the same time that government agencies are pursuing another round of science education reforms for the improvement of science learning. In the USA, the National Science Teachers Association (NSTA) and the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) have proposed new science curriculum frameworks. There is a new set of national science standards promoted by the National Academy of Science (NAS) and endorsed by both NSTA and AAAS. NAS and AAAS are organizations clearly within the boundaries of the scientic community and though NSTA is a teachers organization, it is an organization closely related to the community of science. Hence the efforts of these organizations strongly reect the interests of the scientic community. Yet there is this angst evident by the recent spate of literature scientists and fellow travelers have written to explore the problem of anti science (e.g., Bishop, 1995; Crease, 1089; Durant, 1990; Dyson, 1993; Gross & Levitt, 1993; Holton, 1993; Ruse, 1994; Theocharis & Psimopoulos, 1987). That this literature strikes a resonant chord within the community of science is evident from the laudatory reviews and letters to the editor published in the mainline scientic press. My position will be that the angst is well founded but the description of the problem is wholly wrong headed. To paraphrase the words of Pogo, a famous
1 The term public square is a metaphor based on the concept on a town square and was coined by Neuhaus (1984).
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cartoon character, the science community should be saying we have met the enemy and he is us! This seems a very negative remark but I am not launching another round of science bashing. In fact I want to move quickly now to a celebratory stance. There is much in science to celebrate. I personally cannot think of a time when I was not interested in science. Typical of many students I do not remember much science being taught in my elementary grade classrooms. What I remember is the power and the wonder of the Pacic Ocean to the west of our home and the majesty of the Sierra Nevada mountains to the east. I recall the fascination of ight whether the ight of birds or of airplanes. I remember being glued to the television set through the great events of the Apollo missions. From junior high school on I do remember my science classes. Not because my science teachers were exceptional. They were not. I do not recall ever having a science teacher I would call an exceptional teacher whereas I clearly recall a high school English teacher who was a superb teacher. As research has shown, there are students who seem almost naturally drawn to science; and it appears to matter little what happens in school science, these science enthusiasts continue inexorably along the scientic pathway (see Costa, 1993, 1995). School science is a de facto natural selection device for screening the majority of students out of science (West, 1996). I admit to having mixed feelings about my experiences as a university student but more than anything else that has to do with the time period. It was the late sixties the height of the Vietnam Warand it was difcult to be a university student at a time of national crisis. But if I think only of my science studies I have to say it was a heady experience. Take for example the long laborious and grueling hours spent in a Drosophila laboratory working out genetic arrangements and chromosomal structures for fruit ies. To my friends in other disciplines this was certainly the best example of a silly and boring use of ones time. I can only describe the experience as heady because we were actually working out the physical mechanisms that made the particular fruit y look the way it did. And then to actually photograph the chromosomes, what a thrilling experience! A year later we took the next step and actually extracted DNA. Again, what a thrilling experience not only to know nature at such a fundamental level, but to touch nature at such a fundamental level. At the time of these experiences we also met some of the great stars of scientic research. I had the honor of studying biology with Paul Saltman and physical chemistry with Stanley Miller. We had guest lectures by Gunther Stent and Max Delbr ck. Who needs Mel Gibson when you have o just been to a lecture by Linus Pauling? Perhaps this is hyperbole but these experiences lend themselves to positive exaggerationat least for the science enthusiast. Indeed, the heroic stories of scientic investigations were almost as good as any lm. One story that has long fascinated me is the story of identifying the DNA synthesis enzyme because it seemed the perfect example of Karl Poppers conjectures and refutations. In 1957 Arthur Kornberg isolated a polymerase enzyme from Escherichia coli bacteria that would synthesize DNA in vitroconjectured and conrmed. Well, conrmed yes; but was the conjecture true? John Cairns was a doubter and he set about searching countless quantities of E. coli bacteria attempting to nd a mutant strain of E. coli lacking Kornbergs enzyme but still capable of reproducing itselfthat
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is, replicating its own DNA. His attempt at refutation was successful and Kornbergs enzyme though originally conrmed as a DNA synthesis enzyme turned out to have a different function in the natural setting of a cell. Perhaps this a minor story in the history of biology but the broader history of molecular genetics can take on epic proportions. One of the best accounts of this history is suggestively titled, The Eighth Day of Creation (Judson, 1979). The less than subtle allusion is of course to the Bibles account of the seven days of creation. The stories of scientic success were important beyond their explicit purpose of teaching scientic concepts. The stories bolstered student condence in science. For example, when we did those DNA extraction experiments, the truth is that we students only understood portions of what was being done. If any of us had been vigorously pressed to answer how we knew that sticky stuff on the glass rod was really DNA, we would have struggled to answer. We knew in part but much else we accepted on the basis of scientic authority vested in the professor and laboratory instructor. Why wouldnt we? We had heard the stories. It never occurred to us that we had faith in science and scientists. Several years later the basis for that faith was dramatically reafrmed for me. My wife and I were expecting our rst child. As it happened, Alex was born several weeks pre-mature and suffered from fetal respiratory distress syndrome. Upon birth his lungs had not opened fully and the fetal duct that allows blood to bypass the lungs of an unborn baby had failed to close at birth. We were living in San Diego at the time and Alex was immediately transferred from the hospital of his birth to the University of CaliforniaSan Diego teaching hospital. This hospital had a neonatal research ward where one of the specialty interests by Gods grace happened to be fetal respiratory distress syndrome. Perilous days followed but Alex pulled through with no lasting ill effects. Had he been born only a few years earlier and with this syndrome, he would not have lived through his rst twenty-four hours. Why wouldnt I acknowledge the authority of science? The excitement I felt as a student of science and the power I witnessed with my sons full recovery are grounded in the powerful ideas and methods that science has uniquely contributed to our culture in the 20th century. Cultural historian O.B. Hardison remarked that no examination of modern culture can exclude the inuence of science and technology, and one that underestimated their inuence would be irresponsible (1989, p. xi). There is cultural capital in science that properly belongs to everyone. The science community will endorse this perspective and this is what science for all should at the least be about. The science community, however, is not always so noble. For example, the National Academy of Science in its attempt to ward off religious incursions in the public square told American science teachers:
In a nation whose people depend on scientic progress for their health, economic gains, and national security, it is of utmost importance that our students understand science as a system of study, so that by building on past achievements they can maintain the pace of scientic progress and ensure the continued emergence of results that can benet mankind. (1984, p. 6)
The fact that this statement so blithely ignores the complex and ambiguous relationship between science and technology and between science and economic development
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(Drori, 1996), casts doubt on the Academys sincerity. Indeed some would see in this statement an attempt by the science community to protect its privileged status to control the discourse in certain segments of the public square, particularly the schools. Lynda Birke (1990) asks whether the drive to educate the public about science is merely an exercise in public relations and labor recruitment. Who will really benet? For a protable discussion of these questions see Bishop (1995), Goodstein (1995), and Kevles (1995). Anti Science Sentiment Setting aside the contentious question of motive, the science community in its desire that the public understand and esteem science nds itself concerned with the alleged low levels of public scientic literacy. There is no point in once again rehearsing well known statistics (see Yager et. al., 1996) except to say that Science & Engineering Indicators-1996 has very recent American data and the 1996 National Research Council report has comparative data on industrial nations. Sufce it to say, the scientic community which is largely responsible for nancing surveys of public scientic literacy is not very happy with the gures. Nor has it been for a very long time. Layton et. al. (1993, p. 8) report that, by the opening of the twentieth century laments were common about the failure of science to be assimilated into the common understanding. What distinguishes the last twenty years is a slow rise in what the scientic community has called anti-science and irrationality. Science & Engineering Indicators-1996, funded by the National Science Foundation (USA), is an important document on the current status of American science and engineering. The writers chose to highlight the fact that about 40% of Americans express much condence in the science community which is higher than condence placed in the US Supreme Court. The other side of this fact, however, is that 60% of Americans are less than condent in the science community. Some 30% are less than sure that the benets of scientic research outweigh the harmful results and a full 10% view science as more harmful than benecial. These statistics, strikingly inconsistent with Americas status as a scientic giant, have been fairly steady since the late 1970s when the eminent historian of science Lynn White (1979, p. 73, emphasis added) asked:
Why has the level of antagonism toward science so clearly risen in our society during the past decade or so, to a point where many professionals feel not only angered at the mixed public appreciation of their efforts but also threatened by declining support of their researches?
To which he answered,
The problem is public alienation. For a variety of reasons a signicant part of the general public has become distrustful of those goals, values and methods [of science].
Whites article appeared in the inaugural issue Science 80 which was a magazine published by the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) for the specic purpose of improving the American publics understanding of science. Through the 1980s, however, the science community perceived continued outbreaks of dissatisfaction with science in the form of anti-evolutionism and spiritualism (Holton,
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1992). In the 1990s scientists found that anti-science was no longer conned to K12 schools and unscientic parents. Anti-science had infected the very institutions of rationality, the universities. This perception motivated Gross and Levitt to write their book, Higher superstition: The Academic Left and its Quarrels with Science, published in 1993. Two years later, Gross and Levitt working with the New York Academy of Sciences brought together,
about 200 worried scientists, doctors, philosophers, educators, and thinkers. . . [because] there is a growing danger, many said, that the fabric of reason is being ripped as under, and that if scientists and other thinkers continue to acquiesce in the process, the hobbling of science and its handmaidensmedicine and technology among themseems assured. (Browne, 1995, p. E2, emphasis added)
The meeting was titled, The Flight from Science and Reason. Those committed to ripping reason asunder included feminists such as Sandra Harding (1993) who raises questions about the nature of objectivity in science. They include Mole Asante (1992) and Ivan Sertima (1987) who are proponents of Afrocentrism and concepts of African rationality. There are multiculturalists in general (e.g., Grant, Sleeter, & Anderson, 1986). Still worse are the strong proponents of the social study of science such as Bruno Latour (1987) and Steve Fuller (1991) who advocate a social constructivist view of scientic knowledge. Worst of all the offending academics are the critical theorists such as Henry Giroux who writes about critical pedagogy (e.g., Giroux & McLaren, 1989) and the literary critic Stanley Fish who is the editor of the radical cultural studies journal, Social Text. Can science get any respect? asked Kevin Finneran (1996, p. 95), editor of Issues in Science and Technology. One would hope so but in the same year that Higher Superstitions was published, the eminent physicist Freeman Dyson published, Science in Trouble, in which he commented that attacks against science are likely to become more bitter and more widespread in the future. . . (1993, p. 524, emphasis added). Perhaps with that ominous prediction in mind, one scientist recently attempted to deliver a knock out punch to the radical social constructivists. Alan Sokal is a physicist at New York University and he wrote a manuscript titled, Transgressing The Boundaries: Towards A Transformative Hermeneutics Of Quantum Gravity (1996b), which he submitted to Social Text for review and possible publication. Subsequently Social Text published the article only to have Sokal within days of the publication announce that the article was a hoax. Sokal had submitted a nonsense manuscript which by its acceptance for publication exposed the radicals as academic charlatans, in his opinion of course. In his own words:
For some years Ive been troubled by an apparent decline in the standards of intellectual rigor in certain precincts of the American academic humanities. But Im a mere physicist: if I nd myself unable to make head or tail of jouissance and diff rance, perhaps that just reects my e own inadequacy. So, to test the prevailing intellectual standards, I decided to try a modest (though admittedly uncontrolled) experiment: Would a leading North American journal of cultural studieswhose editorial collective includes such luminaries as Fredric Jameson and Andrew Rosspublish an article liberally salted with nonsense if (a) it sounded good and (b) it attered the editors ideological preconceptions? The answer, unfortunately, is yes. (Sokal, 1996a, p. 1)
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I doubt that Sokal landed a knock out punch but there is no doubt about the ruckus that ensued.2 Moreover, Sokal may not respect the people at Social Text but he must worry about them and other radical social constructivists. Why else would he even give them a second thought? Indeed, what has happened to the scientic community that one of its distinguished members nds enemies in academe that must be combated in such a non academic fashion? This is a question that will surely occupy the sociologists of science for sometime to come. Scientic Positivism I do not disagree that there are extremes of social constructivism antithetical to science and to the celebration of science that I have offered. To some extent Alan Sokal has done all scholarship a favor by exposing the excesses of extremist social constructivism. One should also be concerned that legitimate criticism of the scientic community not be lost in these intellectual skirmishes involving extreme positions. It is in the scientic communitys best interests to heed legitimate criticism. If scientists willingly join the cultural debate about science, science can grow in stature (Finneran, 1996, p. 96). If they do not, the scientic community will by default afrm Martin Heideggers quip that scientists do not think. As I tried to convey in my celebration of science, science can be exhilarating. It is exhilarating to realize that one can know so much about the natural world and to feel that one can discover so much more. Earlier I also hinted that the scientic community should look within itself as the community considers the current problems with the public and science. Along with being exhilarating, science is also seductive. It can seduce one to the na`ve materialism that what one knows by science is fundamental reality, when in fact the debates over the nature of scientic knowledge with respect to ontological realism are as current today as they ever were (see, e.g., Hawking & Penrose, 1996). Science can also be deceptive. It can deceive one into thinking that one has privileged knowledge. Indeed, the cultural point of discussion that I think is most crucial is the point of epistemological position. How should the scientic community seek to position science with respect to other domains of knowledge in the public square? For the better part of the 20th century that question has been answered by a philosophy of logical positivism which sought to banish metaphysics from philosophy, because its theses cannot be rationally justied (Holton, 1992, p. 45) leaving sense perceptions as the only admissible basis of human knowledge and precise thought. In philosophy, positivism is yesterdays news, a failed project (Walsh, 1967), but what might be called scientic positivism (Gilmer, 1995) or colloquial positivism hangs on. Scientic positivism roughly represents a classical view of realism, philosophical materialism, strict objectivity, and hypothetico-deductive method. Though recognizing the tentative nature of all scientic knowledge, scientic positivism imbues scientic knowledge with a Laplacian certainty denied all other disciplines, thus allowing the
2 Those interested in this strange affair should consult website <http://www.nyu.edu /gsas/dept/physics/faculty/sokal/index.html> for a full account including plus Sokals original article. Moreover, the University of Kansas held a conference in 1997 devoted to the topic of, Science and its critics: A meeting to promote dialogue between the two cultures, where Sokal was the featured speaker.
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Figure 1: Epistemological pyramid. scientic community to make an a priori status claim with regard to knowledge. Thus the scientic community projects in the public square a pyramid view of epistemology (gure 1) with the natural sciences, of course, occupying the top most position. This view of scientic knowledge has long been endemic in the schools (Duschl, 1985; Nadeau & Desautels, 1984; Settle, 1990; Smolicz & Nunan, 1975) and is what gives rise to the cultural critics charge of hegemony (Cobern & Aikenhead, in press; Harding, 1993). Though philosopher of science Michael Ruse was speaking specically of evolutionary biologists, I think his remark is too often apropos of the general scientic community: Scientists tend to treat evolution as a kind of religion. . . . Evolutionists tend to be as fervent true Believers as Creationists. . . (Ruse, 1993, p. 353). The term true believer was made popular by the blue collar philosopher Eric Hoffer (1966) whose book titled, The True Believer, investigated the nature of mass movements. Science has the characteristics of a mass movement and:
It can be argued that technology and scientic positivism constitute the dominant ideology of Western civilization today. Technology has indeed become, as Heidegger noted, the metaphysics of our age, a totalistic form of secular religion ultimately incompatible with the existence of rival, nontechnological assumptions, beliefs, or thought systems. (Garrard & Wegierski, 1991, p. 611)
Unfortunately, this ideology couples the science community with what I call the Four Western Imperatives of the late 20th century: 1. The Imperative of NaturalismAll phenomena can ultimately and adequately be understood in naturalistic terms. 2. The Scientistic ImperativeAnything that can be studied, should be studied. 3. The Technocratic ImperativeAny device that can be made, should be made. 4. The Economic ImperativeMaterial well being is the highest good. Further discussion of these statements is beyond the scope of my topic. What I want to point out is that these imperatives lead to a blinkered view of life that fosters
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a cynicism that soon gives way to longing. Moreover, with regard to science, the rst two imperatives cut the very ground from beneath science. Philosopher Hendrick Hart (1980, p. 6) observed that the positing of the ultimacy of rationality unmasks itself as a belief which cannot be rationally justied . . . Indeed, in our times belief in reason is increasingly characterized as a commitment to reason which itself lacks rational grounds. Similarly, in our times belief in science is increasingly characterized as a commitment to science which itself lacks rational grounds. And, that claim to epistemological privilege has not gone unnoticed. The radical relativism that so severely vexes people like Sokal, Gross, and Levitt is a classic case of having sown to the wind, one now must reap the whirlwind. In other words, the radical social constructivists have simply turned empiricisms searing analysis back upon the scientic community itself; and the more the scientic community protests this ill treatment, the more vulnerable it looks. The Deconstruction of Science The problem of scientic positivism cannot fairly be attributed to the science community on the whole. Many scientists staunchly reject the notion that science can be properly understood in the terms of scientic positivism. The proponents of scientic positivism, however, such as Richard Dawkins and Francis Crick are a very vocal bunch. If we are to believe Dawkins then we need to understand that the universe is essentially pointless and we as mature adults better get used to the idea and get on with our lives. Crick offers his astonishing hypothesis as an explanation for this pointlessness:
The Astonishing Hypothesis is that You, your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules. (1994, p. 3)
These ideas resonate with the fashionable nihilism found in certain segments of modern western culture. Given this view of science, E.A. Burtts comments of 1967 become prophetic:
The world that people thought themselves living ina world rich with colour and sound, redolent with fragrance, lled with gladness, love and beauty, speaking everywhere of purposive harmony and creative idealswas crowded now into minute corners of the brains of scattered organic beings. The really important world was a world hard, cold, colourless, silent, and dead; a world of quantity, a world of mathematically computable motions in mechanical regularity. (1967, pp. 238-239)
To better understand the radical social constructivist critique of science, it is instructive to take what has happened in science as an analogy of what has happened in literary studies. Figure 2 depicts the traditional concept of hermeneutic interpretation. A literary text is taken as the product of its authors intentions. Thus, there is an obviously direct interaction between author and text. A reader of the text attempts to understand the authors intent. This involves a direct interaction with the text (reading the text) and an indirect interaction with the author. The interaction with the author must be indirect because our interaction with the author is mediated by the text. In
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Figure 2: The deconstruction of text. so far as we are able to assume that the author is sane, we can approach the text as something meaningful that can communicate to the reader ideas that the author intended. Of course, authors with greater writing talent will be better communicators. Similarly, there is a tradition of hermeneutics in natural philosophy that is depicted in gure 3. Nature may be taken as a meaningful whole either because there is a Creator of the whole (as in theistic traditions) or for other transcendent values one holds about Nature. Nature understood holistically expresses itself in a myriad of natural phenomena. The Natural Philosopherwho is our modern day scientistinteracts directly with natural phenomena through his or her studies and indirectly with Nature as a whole. The assurance that Nature transcends the experience of natural phenomena is as well the assurance that natural phenomena are deeply meaningful. They have meaning that transcends the brute facts of experience. But literary studies have changed. Many modern day literary critics will tell you that the purpose in reading a text is not primarily to understand the authors intent but to deconstruct the text, as shown in gure 4. In modern literary interpretation, the text is considered the product of social forces that impinged upon the writer of the text. The reader of the text, thus, attempts to understand not the writers intent (as if there actually were an author), but to understand the social forces that acted upon the author (who is more writer than author). Rather than an indirect interaction with an author who directly communicates intention through his or her text, there is an indirect interaction with the social forces. Hence, the text must be deconstructed rather than simply readthe words cannot be taken at face value (see gure 5). Similarly, in recent years science has become an act of deconstruction as shown in gure 6, at least as science is portrayed by the scientic positivists. There is no Nature as Naturethat is, no holistic understanding of a meaningful Naturehence all that is available to humans are the brute observations of natural phenomena.
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Figure 3: The hermeneutic circle of natural philosophy. What we call Nature is merely the experience of natural phenomena. Scientic meaning proceeds from the deconstruction of natural phenomena and the re-representation of our experiences of natural phenomena as a naturalistic conceptual system. The arresting point about this is that Nature as an inherently meaningful concept is separated from any meaningful relationship with natural phenomena; hence, the situation is analogous to the separation of author and text in radical literary criticism. Hence, rather than looking to natural phenomena as a way to understand Nature and to Nature as the guarantor for the essential rationality of our endeavors to understand Naturewhich would be the traditional scientic perspectivewe are left with only the scientic re-representation of our experiences of natural phenomena. Without Nature as our guarantor, science itself is open to deconstruction as depicted in gure 7. The radical sociologist of scientic knowledge thus attempts to understand not the intent of scientic knowledge as written by an author (author as scientist), but to understand the social forces that acted upon the scientist (as a writer) resulting in the scientic text. It is my assertion that the reasons that have brought us to the deconstruction of science have to do with the inordinate inuence of scientic positivism on the academic and public perception of science. What is needed at the school level, is an alternative understanding of science. An Alternative View of Science and the Public Yes, the science community does need to revamp its conceptualization of the publics understanding of science if the public is to be well served and if science is to prosper. We can begin, however, with a celebration. 1. We can afrm that science is part of the cultural heritage that belongs to all people. The exhilaration that I felt as a student of science should be available to
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Figure 4: The deconstruction of text. all who wish to avail themselves of it. The benets to my family should be benets available to all; that is, all who wish to avail themselves of these benets. 2. Science is part of the cultural heritage that belongs to all people, but it is not the sole constituent of that heritage, neither is there any consensus on its rank ordered position in that heritage. Historian O.B. Hardison (1989, p. 70-71) noted that, The science of the late twentieth century asks man to understand himself in the light of his own reason detached from history, geography, and nature, and also from myth, religion, tradition, the idols of the tribe, and the dogmas of the father. This request is an invitation to alienation. Doing this not only places science at the top of the epistemological pyramid (gure 1), it removes science from the pyramid. Science has powerful ideas such as the conservation of energy, homeostasis, ecological systems, change through time, uniformity, and empirical-experimental inquiry. There are also other powerful ideas such as freedom, democracy, rule of law, human dignity, moral rectitude, social solidarity, and transcendence. What the scientic community must understand about people, is that science along with history, art, language, technology, and religion are pendants on a wonderfully intricate mobile of everyday thought, touch one and the rest tremble and change position in sympathy (Hardison, 1989, p. xiv). 3. There are legitimate differences between the interests of science and publics interest in science. These differences will preclude any consensus on sciences rank ordered position in our cultural heritage. The template for school science through undergraduate education, however, has traditionally served the interests of science. In science education it is common to hear of the scientic pipeline (gure 8). This is a metaphor for a ow system that delivers scientists and science re-
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Figure 5: The deconstruction of text. lated graduates; and, as such, this is a system where the educational experiences of the many are dictated by the needs of a very few. Even when interdisciplinary science curricula are adopted, they often continue to serve the interests of science. These curricula acknowledge that students have other disciplinary interests but do so for the purpose of manipulating those interests to meet the traditional objectives of science education. Thus, these other disciplinary interests become paths to science and the paths are clearly secondary to the destination, which is science. Moreover, one is likely to nd that the destination, science, will occasionally critique those other disciplinary paths and starting points. For example, we may hear that the starting point is very distant from science and it will be difcult to build this path but the community of science and science teachers must try for the good of the learners and for the public. What is not an option is the critique of science by those other disciplinary interests that science education is manipulating. This is a problem against which the Science-Technology-Society curricula are making some inroads. 4. Moreover, the publics variable interests in science will inevitably lead to different conceptualizations and valuations of science. Earlier I mentioned that being a student during the height of the Vietnam war. Many of my friends had a very different valuation of science because of what they perceived as an unholy alliance between the community of science and a military-industrial complex that developed and produced weapons. The rhetoric of value neutrality was not tenable when the science community having taken credit for such things as the Green Revolution now denied any responsibility for Agent Orange and the like. Thus they place a low value on science and sometimes a negative value. There are, however, more common examples than this one. In a recent study researchers talked with ninth graders about their views on nature. The objective
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Figure 6: Science as deconstruction. was to gain insight on the extent to which science was used in everyday thinking (Cobern, Gibson & Underwood, 1995).3 One of the students, Ann, spoke of nature as something one can know about through science.
Ann: Nature is knowable. . . We can learn to understand many things about nature through personal experience, school and science. Science itself provides us with technology which in turn increases our scientic knowledge. Technology helps provide us with many wants which, of course, increases our pleasure. It also uses resources. (ATG.n6, Narrative in Cobern et al., 1995, p. 24)
This appreciation of science, however, is not where her discussion with the researchers began. Note the emphasized words.
Ann: To me, nature is beautiful and pure because it is Gods creation. Nature provides both aesthetic and emotional pleasure and I need it for self renewal. I like to go where you cant see any inuence by man. When Im out in nature I feel calm and peaceful. It is a spiritual feeling and it helps me understand myself . . . This leads me to ask questions that Id like to nd answers to. The pleasure I get from nature is enhanced by the mysteries I see in it. (ATG.n6, Narrative in Cobern et al., 1995, p. 24, emphasis added)
Anns conceptualization of the natural world has signicant aesthetic and religious elements. Nature in her view is something friendly that you can joyously be part of. Now consider Mr. Hess. He is Anns physical science teacher and he who sat for the same research interview as did Ann. He began his discussion in marked contrast to Ann.
3 The
research was funded by a National Science Foundation grant (RED # 9055834)
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Figure 7: The deconstruction of science.

Mr. Hess: Nature is orderly and understandable. The tides and the rotation of the earth, the seasons and so forth are examples of order in nature. That the planets and the stars are governed by physical forces and any deviations are simply because we have not yet discovered the other part of natures orderliness. According to chaos theory even things that appear to happen randomly have patterns. I think that everything has patterns. . . . As a science teacher I feel that with enough scientic knowledge all things are understandable . . . . I think that the more we understand about matter itself, and the more we know about how to make things, the more predictable nature will be. Scientic or reductionistic thinking is very powerful. I feel that once we know enough about the minutia of the world, breaking it down by using the scientic method, scientists tearing it apart and analyzing the parts of nature and seeing how they interact, that we will be able to predict just about anything about nature. (WWC.t6, Narrative in Cobern et al., 1996, emphasis added)
In contrast to Ann, her science teachers conceptualization of nature showing the integration of scientic themes is essentially monothematic. It is classical scientic positivism and could hardly differ more from his student, Ann. Figure 9 is a generalized concept map of Nature drawn from interviews with high school science teachers and college science professors. Although our studies show marked differences between biologists and physicists (Cobern et al., 1996), they are consistent with respect to the centrality of science in their thinking. The ninth grade students of our studies and the non science college majors showed substantial variability in their conceptualizations of nature and integration of scientic themes and concepts. Figure 10 is a generalized concept map of Nature drawn from interviews with students and shows the extent of variation. Occasionally one nds a student who talks very much like a science teacher or professor. Most do not, but this does not mean that the students are unscientic. For example, it is possible to have an aesthetically oriented view of life that incorporates scientic thinking. Not aesthetics manipulated for the purposes of science, however. I have in mind Pythagorean viewpoint where the artistic
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Figure 8: The science education pipeline. person would value learning science because of the beauty and elegance of its representations. Near the end of Keplers Harmony of the World (1619) he wrote, I thank thee, Lord God and Creator, that you have permitted me to see the beauty of your work and creation. J.B.S. Haldane in this century wrote:
As a result of Faradays work you are able to listen to a wireless. But more than that, as a result of Faradays work, scientically educated men and women have an altogether richer view of the world. For them, apparently empty space is full of the most intricate and beautiful patterns. So Faraday gave the world not only fresh wealth but fresh beauty.
Benoit Mendelbrots pioneering work with fractal geometry is another area of science and mathematics where aesthetic elements have blurred traditional disciplinary boundaries. My own view is that the different conceptualizations of science should be encouraged; and in addition to the aesthetic, these could be economic, religious, contemplative, environmentalist and others. 5. The community of science can help itself by engaging the public in good-faith discussions about these different conceptualizations and valuations of science. By good-faith I mean that the scientic community does not presume that it holds a privileged position in the discussion. For example, a typical scientist to use a Kuhnian term is a puzzle-solver who looks at a scientic solution with the pride of mastery as if to say, Here is an important natural phenomenon and I know how it works! The scientist should not assume, however, the moral neutrality of his or her discovery. During the Vietnam era, and I think this continues today, the public is very interested in the moral implications of scientic work. The Human Genome Project or fetal tissue research are only two of many examples. In a very informative study Tobias (1990) found that for some well educated people, science lacks interest because it appears to them that scientists do not ask important questions such as about the morality of what they do. 6. An important point of discussion especially with respect to school science, is the compatibility of science with very different perspectives. It is important to
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Figure 9: A scientists view of nature. acknowledge that not all ideas and worldviews that people hold will be compatible with science. It is also important to recognize that learning science in even the most enlightened of settings will bring about change. The important question is about when change is warranted and when it is not. Concluding Remarks So, yes, the scientic community does need to re-conceptualize the challenge and reexamine its assumptions about the public understanding of science. The scientic communitys historic perspective on the public is grounded in the legitimate interests of science; but, the promotion of the public understanding of science needs to be grounded in the publics legitimate interests in science. Professor John Polkinghorne, president of Queens College, Cambridge, who is a physicist and Anglican priest, recently made the following remarks in Scientic American:
Everyone has a metaphysicsa worldviewjust as all people speak prose, whether they are aware of it or not. Science can and should contribute to that worldview, but it should by no means monopolize it. Unless you are one of those biologists so ushed with the recent success of your discipline that you are moved to claim that science is all, you will want to locate scientic understanding within a wider view of knowledge that gives equally serious consideration to other forms of human insight and experience. (Polkinghorne, 1996, p. 121, emphasis added)
It is time that the science community and school science education began to do just this: to locate science within a broader view of knowledge.
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Figure 10: Non-scientists views of nature. References Asante, M.K.: 1992, Kemet, Afrocentricity & Knowledge, Africa World Press, Inc., Trenton, New Jersey. Birke, L.: 1990, Selling Science to the Public, New Scientist 127(1730), 4044. Bishop, J. M.: 1995, Enemies of Promise, The Wilson Quarterly 19(3), 6165. Browne, M. W.: 1995, Scientists Do a Slow Bunsen Burn, The Arizona Republic pp. E2 E3. Burtt, E. A.: 1967, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science, Routledge and K. Paul, London, UK. Champagne, A.: 1996, Scientic Literacy: What Does it Mean - and How May we Get There? Perspectives from Reviews of Initiatives and Efforts in the US, Science, Technology and Citizenship .
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Cobern, W. W. and Aikenhead, G.: 1998, Culture and the Learning of Science, in B. Fraser and K. G. Tobin (eds), The International Handbook on Science Education, Part Two, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, pp. 3952. Cobern, W. W., Gibson, A. T. and Underwood, S. A.: 1995, Everyday Thoughts About Nature: An Interpretive Study of 16 Ninth Graders Conceptualizations of Nature. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the, National Association for Research in Science Teaching, ERIC #ED381401, San Francisco, CA. Cobern, W. W., Gibson, A. T. and Underwood, S. A.: 1996, The Different Worlds of Biology and Physics Science Teachers. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the National Association for Research in Science Teaching. Costa, V. B.: 1993, School Science as a Rite of Passage, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 30(7), 649668. Costa, V. B.: 1995, When Science is Another World: Relationships Between Worlds of Family, Friends, School, and Science, Science Education 79(3), 313333. Crease, R. P.: 1989, Top Scientists must Fight Astrology - Or All of Us will Face the Consequences, The Scientist 3(5), 9 & 11. Crick, F.: 1994, The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientic Search for the Soul, Scribners, NewYork. Drori, G. S.: 1996, Science for National Development: Myth and Reality in the Globalization of Science. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, New York. Durant, J.: 1990, The Art of Science, The Listener 123(3150), 1415. Duschl, R. A.: 1985, Science Education and the Philosophy of Science: Twentyve Years of Mutually Exclusive Development, School Science and Mathematics 85(7), 541555. Dyson, F. J.: 1993, Science in Trouble, American Scholar 62(4), 513525. Eger, M.: 1989, The Interests of Science and the Problems of Education, Synthese 81(1), 81106. Finneran, K.: 1996, Can Science Get Any Respect?, Issues in Science and Technology 13(1), 9596. Fuller, S.: 1991, Social Epistemology, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indianapolis. Garrard, G. and Wegierski, M.: 1991, Oh Canada? An Essay on Canadian History, Politics, and Culture, The World & I 6(1), 589613.
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Linking Science Pedagogy with History and Philosophy of Science Through Cognitive Science: A Proposal
Amitabha Gupta
Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay, India. Email: ag@hss.iitb.ernet.in
Introduction The curriculum for science education at present both at the school and the post-school levels emphasizes narrow specialization of only technical material. All the cognate subjects in the curriculum are arranged horizontally and the students move through schools and colleges vertically from level to level of successive stages of specialization. The teaching materials of the program are structured in a hierarchical order mainly around narrower and still narrower technical content as the student moves up at higher levels. This is considered to be undesirable. In what follows I would like to rst argue for integrating science education with philosophy, history and sociology of science with the help of cognitive science, secondly, suggest a model of integration, and nally, illustrate the model with two examples. Section 1 deals with issues relating to narrow science education programmes that currently exist, the misconceptions about science that may arise from such science education programmes, and a possible model for science studies that may remedy it. Section 2 suggests that science studies based on a straight forward Philosophy and History of Science may get entangled in unnecessary controversies/debates and fail to integrate the technical content and the insights into scientic practices. The section rst identies two such conventional debates in science studies and discusses one debate, viz., whether scientic knowledge is the creation of the individual scientist or a product of society, and offers a possible resolution by adopting the cognitive-historical approach. In Section 3 the same is done for another debate, viz., whether scientic knowledge is objective or subjective. The discussions on both the debates shows how Cognitive Science and Case Study based approach can act as unifying factors. This is illustrated with the help of examples of scientic work illustrated with two case studies: one on scientic experiment and the other on introduction of new concepts and a scientic law. 1 The Paradoxical Nature of the Conventional Science Education Programme The consequences of this narrow, isolated, fact-oriented science education are as follows: i. Although the teachers and the textbooks of science mostly claim to stick to facts and to exclude idle philosophic talk, they end up creating misconceptions precisely about these facts, may be not by deliberate instruction but by implication.
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Science Pedagogy through Cognitive Science Philipp Frank4 has given examples of textbook formulation of laws of physics, e.g., the law of inertia, and shown that in that formulation no physical facts whatsoever can be logically derived from the law, and the law is inapplicable to any actual situation in the physical world. This means that textbook formulation often is not physical but purely metaphysical.
ii. It is true that valid scientic knowledge is often intuitive, the acquisition or assessment of which is based on practical experience in learning science, research, and active participation in scientic work and scientic community. It has been said that valid science is what is recognised as valid by scientists and can seldom be identied as a formal logical property of scientic discourse. And yet those who enter into a scientic career in which their earlier fact-oriented training is not derived from any exposure to the actual processes of creative scientic work and research, may have no personal experience of the fundamental importance of the mistakes, groping and criticisms in the generation of new and reliable knowledge or the importance of inventive imagination or of the limitations and uncertainties of the so-called scientic methods. The reason for this is that our fact-oriented science education program has lost contact with living experience of scientic work and research, since it has been turned into a banking system, in which the teachers deposit a certain amount of factual knowledge with the students and retrieve it during the examination essentially treating the student as no more than a memory bank. iii. Finally, as a consequence of increasingly narrowing hierarchical arrangement of factual content and rigid standards of valid scientic knowledge or proof, a student of science forms the opinion that the scientic view is the only legitimate view, ignoring all questions concerning its scope and the legitimacy of other alternatives. Since in his narrow and exclusive science education the student is taught to treat only science as valid he naturally makes an inference that it must be valid in other regions as well. The irony of the present science education program is that whereas it really intends to impart nothing but facts and to remain neutral regarding any attempts to incorporate discussions about science, it creates, in the process of teaching, a vacuum. The inuence of the isolated technical scientic content on the total attitude of the student towards science forces him to ll up this vacuum. In the absence of any conscious provision for providing an over-view of science and thereby protecting students from narrow blinkers or nave euphoria just as much as from the false and hostile ideas about science, this vacuum is lled up by many misconceptions. As a result, myths about science abound and a mystique of science prevails.
4 Frank, P.: 1961, The Place of the Philosophy of Science in the Curriculum of the Physics Students, in Modern Science and Its Philosophy, Collier Books, New York, 224-252.
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Misconceptions about Science Implicit in Conventional Science Education Programme
What are some of these misconceptions? First, science is claimed to provide absolute truth, completely objective and pure description, and, therefore, should be considered the only authority for belief and the only source of reliable knowledge. The overemphasis on mathematical and formal aspect of science, the authoritarian manner in which scientic knowledge is imparted, and the total absence in science education of initial doubt, the element of surprise, inventive imagination, creative criticism lend credence to the belief that scientic knowledge is absolute. The manner in which scientic experiments are conducted in a school or college laboratory shows that an experiment on, say, Boyles law, amounts merely to observe a series of values of the pressure and volume of the gas, which can be plotted on a nice smooth curve conrming a mathematical relationship between relevant variables. Accounts of Boyles own experiment could give a contrary picture. Besides, the absolute knowledge view of science has been reinforced by another widespread misconception that there exists a master procedure or method underlying all scientic work and the successful application of this unique infallible method is what validates scientic knowledge. P.W. Bridgman, J.B. Conant and many other practicing scientists have claimed that science is what scientists do and the search for the Method is futile as there are not one but many methods. Secondly, science education conveys the impression that science is hard, objective, and value free as opposed to humanistic studies that are soft, subjective, and valueladen. Reacting to this many have argued that science dehumanises, that the consequences owing from science are preponderantly evil, trivial or false by comparison with what can be derived from other sources, such as poetic insight, religious revelation, mystical experience or self-knowledge. This polarization of attitudes is the basis of C.P. Snows two cultures and Holtons Distinction between the New Apollonians and the new Dionysians. There are two aspects of this: (a) this polarization is simple minded and misconceived, augmented, on the one hand, by the way science is taught obstinately, scornfully, neglectful of all the humanistic issues that arises within their domain and humanists, on the one other hand, exhibit corresponding scorn and neglect for science; and (b) the myth of value-freedom and objectivity of scientic knowledge has been questioned by the sociologists of knowledge. The works of Kuhn, Merton, Bloor, Barnes and others have emphasised the role the scientic community plays in the production of scientic knowledge: the invisible colleges, the peer review, authority, consensus, norms and recognition of the scientic community. Thirdly, a widespread impression, which prevails among many students and practitioners of science, is that science possesses a unique world picture, an overall scientic representation, such as the mechanistic world picture or materialism, i.e., the world picture that all phenomena are by-products or epiphenomena of the ultimate constituents of matter. The belief in such a world picture makes the scientist condent that science can provide valid answers to all questions since they follow from the same source, i.e., a single, unique world picture. History of science has exploded the myth of such a world picture. Moreover, we know that even if it exists it does not show up in
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our science education since it is totally fragmented to provide such a unied view. Fourthly, since Bacon in 16th century the view that knowledge is power has turned science into a means to gain control over nature. Consequently, many subscribe to the nave eupheria that all our problemsdisease, poverty, and hungercan be done away with by the deliberate application of scientic knowledge. This belief is the basis for massive investment in science and technology. However, this faith is somewhat misplaced as it is impossible to calculate the relevance of any particular fundamental research to any particular human need, e.g., the work of Faraday and Maxwell on electromagnetism could hardly have been predicted to lead to phenomenal development of electrical and electronic industries. Therefore, the whole question of how to guide science towards solution of practical problems will remain open and quite unanswerable. These inuential myths about science, direct products of the narrow, isolated, and over-specialised science education, may be given a common name, i.e., scientism. Of course, the origins of scientism can be traced back to the rise of modern science in the 17th century with its fundamental insistence on the value of scientic methods of investigation and argument. Based on it, the pioneers of modern science were able to make a break-through in their attempts to understand nature, when approaches other than science were dominant. In recent times, however, science has taken a more dominant place in every sphere and scientism has assumed a more extreme, threatening and doctrinaire form with blind belief in the success of technical scientic knowledge and an addiction to science. 1.2 Empirical Evidences and the Need for Removing the Misconceptions There is some evidence, based on at least two empirical studies5 , that the current science education programs, by concentrating on objectivity and validity of science, by its disciplinary specialization and fragmentation, by glorifying the rational, mathematical and analytic aspects without any reference to intuitive, imaginative, subjective aspects, do project the doctrine of scientism as the ofcial image of science. The fact of the matter is that while designing science curricula, the inuence of the technical scientic content on the total attitude of the student towards science itself cannot be ignored. From the point of view of a good educational strategy, it is important to make sure that students and those concerned with the promotion of science do acquire the appropriate standards and norms of scientic practice, and not wrong intellectual habits and false standards of scientic proof. Moreover, whenever scientic knowledge and technology are hoped to be twin pillars of social transformation, the base for science is dangerously weak if the vision concerning the place and scope of science among students and practitioners of science is narrow. Yet, it is not clear how it can be achieved without some self understanding of science, i.e., without making a conscious and deliberate effort to critically discuss science, rather than learning it
5 (i) Mead, M. & Metraux, R.: 1956, Image of the Scientist among High-School, Students, Science, 126, 384-390. (ii) Ahlgren, A. & Walbery, M.J.: 1973, Changing Attitudes Towards Science Among Adolescents, Nature, 254, 187-190.
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merely by rote. Current science education program stubbornly repudiates any such responsibility leaving it totally to chance and intuition. As a result some have pleaded forcefully that science education programs will produce better educated science students if they are taught a little less science as such, and a little more about science. Thus the main objective of integrating teaching and learning of science with teaching about science or understanding science will be (i) to display the developing character of scientic endeavour by incorporating historical awareness, and (ii) to foster a critical attitude on the part of the learner. 1.3 Current Approaches to Science Studies In the recent past systematic and rigorous disciplines have evolved with a view to create understanding of science, such as History of Science, Philosophy of Science, Sociology of Science. Here one must guard oneself against the possibility of falling into the trap of any of the exclusive disciplinary approaches. Integration of understanding science with science education program will be effective only if the starting point is living science itself. The philosophical and historical discourse must emanate from this source. Understanding of science will continue to remain poor if we add to the traditional presentation of science some philosophic spice or ice topping, rather than giving to the presentation of a given scientic topic itself a philosophic or historical or sociological orientation. We have to make use of the philosophic, historical and sociological insights that have grown up on the soil of science. Constituent disciplines of the Science Studies, such as Philosophy of Science, History of Science and Sociology of Science, themselves have grown into vast disciplines and many issues in them are unresolved. 1.4 A proposal: Cognitive Science Based Model for Integration The task will be to argue our way to a provisional model for analyzing the process of scientic development such that the model will facilitate integration of the traditionally conicting tasks of teaching science and understanding of science. The model for analyzing the process of scientic development that I would like to propose is based on the evolutionary growth of knowledge approach of Toulmin, Shapere, Lakatos and Laudan. It is a model in the sense of developing a theoretical pattern showing the interrelations of different questions and concepts based on cognitive, historical and critical awareness. This approach is often called cognitive-historical. The model requires that for an improved understanding of scientic ideas one must know the conditions under which it originated, the questions, which it answered, and the functions it was created to serve. The model will present the world of science, as a scientist knows it by enabling the student of science to put appropriate kind of thinking cap, to use Butterelds expression, so that the student becomes a participant in the scientists quest for understanding nature. In order to do this the model will retrace the steps and describe the processes by which certain end results or nished ideas in science are seen to emerge. However, while retracing the steps the model will combine
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intellectual-social-historical and technical material. The continuity and change that are characteristic of an evolving intellectual tradition must be related to the processes of transmission by which scientic ideas in question are passed from one generation of scientists to the next. The starting point of this enterprise must be scientic concepts, activities (such as observation, experiment etc.), or actual problems that the scientist encounters. Both Conant and Toulmin have shown how the process of scientic development can be seen as an organic (not so much as a quantitative) growth process of investigations yielding ideas, which in turn provide material for new investigations, out of which emerge further ideas. Problems leading to introduction of new concepts and solutions, which in turn giving rise to new problems, whose solutions pose new problems again and lead to the generation of further concepts, and so on. The most distinctive feature of this dialectic sequence of observation and ideas/concepts in the scientic tradition/domain is that the men who carry it in any particular generation regard the ideas to which their training exposes them in a sufciently critical spirit, i.e., in a spirit of innovation by a desire to build up a more adequate, detailed, and/or elegant synthesis of the knowledge transmitted to them, in a spirit of genuine, rst hand curiosity. Thus the critical question that will be raised, according to Toulmin, at a specic time in the course of scientic development will take the form:
. . . given that concepts c1 , c2 , . . ., are in some respect inadequate to the explanatory needs of the discipline, how can we modify/extend/ qualify them, so as to give us the means of asking more fruitful empirical or mathematical questions in this domain?6
The model of scientic development, i.e., the pattern of responses given to the above question if one examines the history of a scientic discipline, can be specied by the Darwinian Theory of evolution, Toulmin7 draws the following analogy as described by the Table 1 below:
6 Toulmin, S.: 1974, Rationality and Scientic Discovery Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, K. Schaffner & R. Cohen (eds.), D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 394. 7 Toulmin, S.: 1972, Human Understanding, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1, 121-123, 135-144
Gupta Organic Evolution Species Individual organisms Units of variation Units of effective modication Mechanism of selection Mutant forms within the population at t1 These t1 variants dominant within the population at t2 Differential reproductive pressure Conceptual Change Scientic discipline
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Unit of study comprised of
Concepts, methods, aims Conceptual variants within the discipline at t1 Those t1 variants dominant within the discipline at t2 Need for deeper understanding
Table 1: Evolution: Organic and Conceptual Following the above analogy Toulmin maintains that conceptual development within a scientic discipline is a natural selection imposed by disciplinary pressure on a set of conceptual variants. Understanding science or scientic concepts will result from seeing the conceptual evolution in the analogy of the question and answers regarding the phylogeny and ecology of biological evolution. This is exhibited in the following Table 28 : Evolution of species Phylogeny Ecology From what By what succession of sequence of precursors has responses to this species environmental descended? pressures did the species acquire its present form? A tree of descent Application of theory of natural selection Conceptual evolution HS PS From what By what succession of sequence of precursor responses to concepts has disciplinary this set of pressure did concepts this set of descended? concepts arise? A History of a scientic discipline A rational reconstruction of scientic growth
Question
Answer
Table 2: Conceptual evolution Thus, understanding of science, in the sense of adequacy or fruitfulness of scientic ideas, can be obtained, according to Toulmins evolutionary model, by seeing in how
8 Toulmin, S.: 1974, Rationality and Scientic Discovery, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, K. Schaffner & R. Cohen (eds.), D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 402-3.
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many ways novel scientic ideas or concepts may, in conditions of its introduction, be better adapted than its predecessors or rivals. For example, the merits of the Copernican revolution can be understood precisely in this way. Its merits did not lie in its simplicity in comparison with the Ptolemaic system. According to Toulmin the Copernican system was better adapted to the new conceptual framework that was emerging i.e. the celestial dynamics of Kepler, Brahe and nally Newton. The attempts to create understanding of science by Conant, (in terms of tactics and strategies of science), by Lakatos, (in terms of Methodology of Scientic Research Programme (MSRP)), and by Laudan (in terms of judgements embodying preferred intuition), are similar, for all to invoke the notion of evolution and its variants (such as change, growth, progress) without explicit reference to biological evolution. Nevertheless, the evolutionary model may provide a basis for integrating teaching of science and understanding science/teaching about science without falling into the trap of any of the exclusive disciplinary approach. 2 Two Debates There are two basic debates in the current literature in Philosophy of Science and Socio-Historical studies in science: the rst debate concerns the agency responsible for the construction of scientic knowledge: whether it is the creation of the individual scientist or a product of society. the second debate relates to the nature of scientic knowledge: whether it is objective or relative to a conceptual perspective, and I shall review these debates and show that a closer attention to the underlying cognitive issues help us to resolve them. 2.1 Debate 1: Construction of Scientic KnowledgeIndividual or the Social The debate centers around the issue regarding the agency that is responsible for the production of scientic knowledge: whether it is a product of society or the creation of the individual scientist. Many researchers in science studies have viewed, mistakenly I believe, that the rise of cognitive science is a vindication of the individualistic explanations of scientic knowledge and an attempt to reduce social to the individual. 2.1.1 Sociology of Knowledge The proponents of sociology of knowledge (e.g. Bloor 1976, 19839 , Brown 1984, 1989, Barnes 198210 , Collins 198511 ,) have eschewed the psychological and cognitive studies
9 Bloor, D.: 1976, Knowledge and Social Imagery, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, Bloor, D.: 1983, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge, Columbia University Press, New York. 10 Barnes, B.: 1982, T.S. Kuhn and Social Science, Macmillan, London. 11 Collins, H.M.: 1985, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientic Practice, Sage, Beverley Hills.
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of science and claimed that scientic knowledge is entirely a product of social interactions and inuence. Latour and Woolgar (1986) have proposed a ten-year moratorium on cognitive explanations of science. For them what matters is the communication and interrelations among the scientists based on public documents. These documents clearly exist outside the mental representation of individual scientists. They are the shared property of the scientic community and public embodiment of scientic theories. Latour and Woolgar showed how in the laboratory the inscription devices (i.e. initial records that are harder to read and more open to attack are transformed by the experimenter later into published transcripts that become powerful weapons in arguments) and external representations or documents exert inuence on other scientists. Latour (1987) 12 examines the function scientic texts, diagrams, schematic representations etc. fulll in creating understanding within a scientic community. He calls these public embodiments immutable and combinable mobiles that in the process of scientic communication often mutate and facilitate an improved or different understanding. The anti-cognitivism of Latour and Woolgar (1979)13 and Collins is shared by Downes (1993). He accuses the cognitivists of cognitive individualism and claims that they subscribe to the thesis that a sufcient explanation for all cognitive activities can be provided by an account of autonomous individual cognitive agents. He nds that the cognitivists are guilty of reducing social explanations to psychological explanations. According to the sociologists of scientic knowledge, the reductionism of the social to psychological is not possible for various reasons: i. Durkheim showed that social facts are irreducible and have an existence of their own. Following this idea, Downes distinguishes three levels of the social aspects of science and claims that each has an independent existence and none can be reduced to psychology: (a) scientic documents, particularly classics, as Kuhn, Latour and Woolgar showed, have an independent, external existence, provide a paradigm for the individual scientist and inuence his problem solving approach. (b) social interactions among scientists, as can be found in complex laboratories, are based on cooperation where individual scientist is not entirely responsible for the nal scientic outcome, and (c) much of the decision making processes of the individual scientist are guided by external social considerations and inuences, e.g., decisions regarding what funding agency to approach, how to formulate the research proposal so that it would be acceptable, the choice of the research project, the journal and conference where the research paper is to be published or presented. ii. Collins (1990) gives the following reasons for which he claims that science is social: (a) the routine servicing of scientic belief reveals that it is the scientic group which determines how an individual scientist checks the validity of
12 Latour, B.: 1987, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society, Open University Press, Milton Keynes. 13 Latour, B. & Woolgar, S.: 1979, Laboratory Life, Sage, Beverly Hills and London.
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Science Pedagogy through Cognitive Science beliefs. The hypothesis formulated by an individual scientist is communicated to another who may reply by communicating additional evidence, counter-evidence, alternative hypothesis or rebuttal. This may help in assessing the validity of the hypothesis, (b) the assessment of the validity of the hypothesis may result from communication, debate and nally in the form of social consensus arrived at by a scientic community that no further change is necessary, and (c) transmission of new experimental skills require apprenticing with an experienced researcher, a face-to-face interaction, some form of social exchange and communication based often on visual representations. This mode of communication is radically different from transmission of information by simply reading text-books or journal articles. Thus, according to Collins the persuasive force of experiments resides outside the conduct of the experiment itself. It resides in the judgements made by other scientists about the quality of the experiment. Of course, any experiment can be challenged because of technical competence with instruments and data analysis, theories of instrumentation, correctness of computation and interpretations, theoretical plausibility. However, acceptance or rejection of a result ultimately rests outside the experiment itself in the evaluative judgements made by groups of experts.
iii. Social phenomena are far too complex and the reduction of sociology to psychology does not seem to be tractable. No reduction has been carried out fully. 2.1.2 The Cognitive Turn in Science Studies
The so-called cognitive turn in science studies has resulted due to the following important realizations: i. that both the words science (which comes from the Latin word sciencea meaning knowledge) and the word cognition (co = together, gnocere = knowledge) have knowledge in common. Science is taken to be a major paradigm of a knowledgeproducing enterprise and Cognitive Science studies the underlying mechanisms responsible for the production, acquisition and deployment of knowledge, including scientic knowledge. ii. that the exclusively a priori, speculative and normative approach to traditional epistemology is to be replaced by an empirical and naturalistic approach treating cognitive activities and phenomena as natural phenomena. The traditional epistemology has undergone radical changes as it became apparent that an important resource for a naturalistic account of knowledge is Cognitive Science. iii. these mechanisms presuppose that the human mind or articial intelligent devices can function based only on representational structures and processes that operate on them to produce new structures. These structures may include linguistic expressions, concept trees, schemas, cognitive maps, mental models, diagrams, visual images etc.
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In the traditional epistemology, Kant for example, provided such an account of the underlying mechanism for the possibility of scientic knowledge by adopting a speculative and apriori approach. Kant asked the question as to what sort of mechanism would make mathematical and natural scientic knowledge possible and gave a description of such a mechanism. In the 1950s, Kuhn and Hanson used psychological ideas, particularly from the Gestalt school, in order to explain certain phenomena in scientic observation. However, due to the progress made in Cognitive Science since 1950s there is a better understanding of the cognitive mechanisms involved in many scientic activities and practices. A survey of the relevant literature shows that the Cognitive Science based approach complements the traditional historical approach (both internal and external), the sociological approach, and the philosophical concern for the epistemology of science, by providing an enriched understanding of how scientists generate and evaluate scientic ideas. For example, the volume, (No. XV), entitled Cognitive Models of Science, published in 1992 by R.N. Giere14 in the series Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science presented the work of psychologists, historians, researchers in Articial Intelligence and philosophers who had employed ideas and methodologies from Cognitive Science in order to study the underlying cognitive mechanisms for explaining and understanding scientic practices. Moreover, there are major studies on scientists and scientic theories from the cognitive point of view. A few examples of such studies may be mentioned here. Darden has identied the cognitive strategies that contributed toward the development of Mandelian genetics. Giere has used psychological and sociological ideas to improve our understanding of the recent developments in geology and physics. Based on the case study on plate tectonics, Solomon shows how certain cognitive heuristics play a crucial role in scientic decision making. Nersessian has drawn on ideas from cognitive psychology to help understand the developments in electro-magnetic theories made possible by the contributions of Faraday, Maxwell and Einstein. Churchland has discussed the nature of theories and explanations from the perspective of computational neuroscience. Thagard has used computational and cognitive theories to help understand the structure and growth of scientic knowledge. 2.1.3 A False Dichotomy Many historians and researchers of science studies feel that the dichotomy between cognitive and sociological, or the internal and the external history is a false one. Shapin (1982) and Nersessian argue that undoubtedly sociological insights and methods have enriched our understanding of science, but the concern of science studies is not to gure out what discipline in science studies is most fundamental and support the reductionist position. The concern rather is to provide a better understanding of the nature of scientic thinking by integrating the individual and group level of knowledge production practices. Nersessian says:
14 Giere,
R.N., (ed.): 1992, Cognitive Models of Science, Univserity of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
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As to the question of what factors are or are not pertinent to historical explanation, we need to keep in mind that history is an empirical subject. It should not adopt a priori a position on what is the essential level of analysis for an historical understanding of science.. . . What factors are or are not salient in specic historical cases remains an open and largely empirical question
The understanding of the complexities and the limitations of cognitive activities of the individual scientist is as important in our historical understanding of the processes and products of science as the constraints imposed on them by society. We must admit that after all science is a product of the interaction of the human mind with the world as well as with other humans and also the most cerebral among other human activities and enterprises. We need an account of how and what cognitive activities of the individual scientists contribute to the construction of scientic knowledge as well as the manner in which such constructions are constrained by society. Hence, cognitive and social-historical analyses are reciprocal. There is no need for sacricing one for the other. An integrated approach to the understanding of certain scientic practices can demonstrate that the dichotomy between individual and the social is false and need to be corrected. The scientic practices that can illustrate the integrative approach are: scientic experiment (including thought experiment), scientic reasoning (including analogical reasoning), model building and representation (imagery and visual representation), theory change. We will discuss only one example of the scientic practice in terms of this integrative approach, viz., scientic experiment. 2.1.4 Scientic Experiments Although the nal products of scientic experiments, viz., the observational data and the generalization or law are universally acknowledged as important, the process of experimentation by which new interpretation is given, meaning is made and the experimenters practices are revealed, is a largely neglected aspect of science. Studies on scientic experiments collected by J.B. Conant in Harvard Case Histories in Experimental Science (1984), Rom Harre in Great Scientic Experiments (1981), and David Gooding, Trevor Pinch and Simon Schaffer (eds.) in The Uses of Experiment - Studies in the Natural Sciences (1989) have somewhat mitigated this neglect. Examples of experiment can be cited in the science of antiquity. Empedocles of Akragas in Sicily (c. 450 BC) is said to have made an experiment with clepsydra to demonstrate the effect of air pressure. Duhem, Randal and Crombie have isolated and studied an important medieval methodological tradition, from the 13th into 17th century, elaborated rules for drawing sound conclusions from experiment and observation. Jean Buridan and Nicole Oresme belonged to this tradition. Another tradition of experiment views the experimenter as a reader of the Book of Nature. According to this tradition experiments should be looked upon as scriptural interpretation provided the experimenter hits upon the appropriate language and technique of reading. This tradition found its most celebrated articulation in Galileo who regarded Nature as a divinely authored book written in the language of mathematics. This tradition often takes experiments as premediated and is also
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identied with what is known as the Platonic-Pythagorean tradition or the deductive, or sometimes the mathematico-experimental (according to a 17th century tradition) or the hypothetico-deductive tradition. However, there is an essential and qualitative difference between the older forms of experiment and those carried out in science since 17th century. This is due to the emergence of the so-called Baconian sciences. For Bacon knowledge is not an end in itself and it provides us power over nature. However, nature does not voluntarily reveals its secrets. We can gain knowledge by coercing nature to answer our questions. The role of experiment is essentially to constrain nature and force nature due to the forceful intervention of the experimenter to show how it behaves under previously unobserved, often non-existent, conditions. Bacons book Novum Organum gives a systematic account and his attitude towards experiment. This inuenced The New Philosophy or Experimental Philosophy enshrined in the Charter and advocated by the Royal Society. This tradition is often identied with the inductive tradition. The social aspect of experiment relates to the fact that experiments are powerful resources for persuasion, argumentation and conviction. The experimenter is always conscious of the third party, other than nature and himself, and directs his efforts to establish a particular reading of nature and its behaviour as more valid than others. The cognitive aspects of experiment include the active, rather than the passive role, the experimenter plays in realizing the phenomena or producing a novel phenomenon by instrumental manipulation. However, this cognitive role of experiment, which was used to learn how to manipulate and represent new aspects of nature, gradually changed to the epistemologically signicant role in which experiment was used to defend theoretical claims about nature. The relation between the experiment and epistemology is quite close and can be seen clearly when we raise the question as to what makes an experiment, or a set of experiments, believable. Franklin (1989) enumerates a number of experimental strategies or arguments designed to establish the validity of an experimental result or observation. They are: i. looking at the same phenomena with different pieces of apparatus, ii. prediction of what will be observed under specied circumstances, iii. regularities and properties of the phenomena themselves which suggest they are not artifacts. Hacking (1983) calls this intervention where the predicted observation increases our belief in both the proper operation of the apparatus and in its results, iv. properties of the phenomena as validitions of an existing theory, v. explanation of observations with an existing accepted theory of the phenomena, vi. elimination of alternative explanations, vii. calibration and experimental checks for validating results and providing a numerical scale for the measurement of the quantity involved,
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viii. statistical validation (combined with theoretical predication). Nickles (1989) demonstrates how experiment enables the empirical justication of theory. In the received view in philosophy of science the context of discovery and discovery arguments were eliminated from the logicality of justication. Nickles introduces and makes a case for generative justication, i.e., the use of empirical knowledge to support theories, which include that knowledge, or using what is known to construct new experimental trials. He argues that the generative justication is different from the consequentialist or hypothetico-deductive methodologies. Nickles claims that the body of taken-for-granted knowledge, embodied in skills, instruments etc. is necessary to the construction of evidential arguments. The received view also claims that knowing how to produce a phenomenon or datum is irrelevant to showing that it is the case. Nickles concept of generative justication closes the gap between knowing how and knowing that. Gooding (1990) enriches our understanding of how representations the scientists construct, often with the help of experiments, correspond to the way things really are. Gooding, in a series of articles since 1980, grapples with the problem of how to access and unravel the procedural knowledge a scientist has which may shed light on his experimental practices. This leads him to investigate the role of experimental practice in conceptual innovation. Goodings concept of experimental map is an effort to construct graphical representations that depict sequences of experimental procedures acting on physical and conceptual objects. The maps display how experimentation provides multiple possible pathways between goals and solutions of the scientist. Gooding has applied the mapping technique to uncover the procedural knowledge Faraday had from Faradays experimental practices, laboratory records, which revealed the cognitive and social dimensions of Faradays experimental practices. Goodings experimental maps are similar to the analytical tools used by the cognitive scientists known as think-aloud protocols. These are the records of every verbalizable thought a subject had during a problem-solving task. Faradays record keeping and his diaries and the detailed autobiographical narration in Keplers Astronomia Nova approximate to think-aloud protocols. 2.1.5 A Case Study: Galileos Experiment with Freely Falling Bodies
The Case Study of Galileos experiment on freely falling motion illustrates the following: i. what were the generative justications provided by Galileo for his claim (the socalled Distance Theorem) that
. . . the distances traversed during equal intervals of time by a body falling from rest, stand to one another in the same ratio as the odd numbers beginning with unity?
ii. Galileo was aware of the fact that observation of vertically falling bodies involved difculties, as the motion would be very fast. Hence for the purpose of understanding the nature of vertical motion based on experiment, it would be necessary
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to slow down the motion on an inclined plane. However, Galileo felt the necessity of justifying as to whether the slowed down motion on the inclined plane and the vertical motion of freely falling bodies are the same and whether the same law would hold for both the motions. iii. the question of the reliability of the experiment allegedly performed by Galileo and Galileos resolution of the problem of the reliability and epistemic justication of the knowledge claim regarding the law of freely falling bodies. 2.1.5.1 Controversy about Galileo as an Experimentalist Controversy about Galileo as an Experimentalist Galileos so-called inclined plain experiment construed as providing generative justication for the law of freely falling bodies shows that Galileo was not an inductivist. He was not what Ernst Mach represents him to be, i.e., Galileo as a strict experimentalist. Mach claims that modern experimental science was born with Galileo as he
. . . did not stop with the mere philosophical and logical discussions, but tested it by comparison with experience15
Thus Galileo was considered the father of modern observational and experimental methods. As opposed to this Aristotle saw the experiments performed, but would not believe the evidence of experience, although in Biology Aristotle was a down-to-earth, hard-boiled realist. Galileo himself seems to be responsible for this impression as he sometimes uses the word experience/experiment (e.g. in the statement at the beginning of Two New Sciences) in a way that one would be led to the traditional picture of Galileo that he was the founder and earliest successful practitioner of modern experimental science. Or Galileo was the man who relied on experiment and Aristotle was one who denied the validity of experience. This is bolstered by the image of Galileo confounding his Aristotelian adversaries at Pisa and experimentally disproving Aristotelian dynamics by dropping weights of various sizes from the Leaning Tower. History of Science, however, dispels these misconceptions based on anecdotes/traditional pictures/historically nave attitudes. It instills a sense of historical skepticism, makes us more cautious about relying on facts as one has not yet the time to check some of these episodes closely. It also urges the need for more accuracy in the description of the creative part of the scientic work/intellectual development and growth of science/the part relating to the process rather than the nal product. 2.1.5.2 Historically Sensitive Account Historically Sensitive Account Historically sensitive account Galileos role as an observational/experimental scientist reveals that a. Galileo was hardly an extreme empiricist; he was much addicted to
15 Mach,
E.: 1960, The Science of Mechanics, translated by T.J. McCormack, Open Court, La Salle, 135.
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. . . thought experiment in which he imagined what the consequences would be if one did so and so16 .
The thought experiments of Galileo are particularly well described by Buttereld in his book. Within the ancient and medieval traditions many experiments on close scrutiny turn out to be thought experiments. A thought experiment is the construction in mind of potential experimental situations the outcome of which could safely be foretold from previous knowledge or everyday experience. b. the so-called experiments taken as generative justication would provide an altogether different view of Galileo as an experimentalist. Generative justication includes (i) the body of taken-for-granted knowledge which is embodied in the prevailing instrumentations, skills, etc. necessary for the epistemological warrant of the experiment and (ii) the persuasive force which often resides outside the conduct of the experiment. c. Some of Galileos experiments were re-enacted by his contemporaries. In the case of the ball on the inclined plane, Galileos contemporary, Father Mersenne, actually tried it in the hope of duplicating Galileos conrmation of the supposed exact direct proportion between the square of the time and the displacement in the uniformly accelerated motion. But he failed to nd such a t. Mersenne contradicts the accuracy of Galileos claim that
. . . the times of descent, for various inclinations of the plane, bore to one another precisely the ratio which . . . had been predicted . . . Also . . . there was no appreciable discrepancy in the results. (Two New Sciences, p. 179)
Galileo also claimed that the measurement of time was so accurate

that the deviation between two observations never exceeded one-tenth of a pulse-beat
Such accuracy was not possible because of (i) the difculties in the synchronization of the rolling ball and the timing device, especially when time is being measured by certain crude devices used at that time such as water-clock or pulse-beat, and (ii) friction and rotational inertia. Lane Cooper17 also casts doubt about Leaning Tower experiment. To be sure, Galileo did make observations and performed rough checks of his results, but the experimental method and inductive method of the new science was really, from the historical point of view, the creation of the new generation of scientists, including such heroic experimentalists as Robert Boyle, Robert Hook and Isaac Newton (especially his work on Optics) and the members of the Royal Society.
17 Cooper, 16 Buttereld,
H.: 1949, Origins of Modern Science, Macmillan, 71. L.: 1935, Aristotle, Galileo and the Tower of Pisa.
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Instead, Galileo belonged to the Platonic-Pythagorean (Idealist) Tradition: This tradition is associated with the assumption that (a) the underlying reality is that of number, (b) abstraction and idealization is inevitable in understanding Nature, and (c) mathematics must be applied to the understanding of the physical phenomena. This is in clear opposition to the Aristotelian tradition, which created a clear cleavage between mathematics and physics. Galileos adherence to the Platonic-Pythagorean tradition is evidenced by his own statement that the Book of Nature is written in the language of mathematics. To the question whether the ship experiment was really been done, Salviati (the spokesman of Galileo) replied
I without experiment [experience] am certain that the effect will follow as I tell you, because it is necessary that it should, (Dialogue concerning Two Chief World Systems)
Alexaneder Koyre18 emphasized Galileos mathematical as opposed to his experimental method. Koyre attacked the traditional empiricist interpretation of Galileo and subscribed to Galileos modied empiricism or tempered rationalism, i.e., Galileo did thought-experiment in the course of developing his theories, and referred to experience primarily a nal check in order to be sure that he hadnt gone wildly astray. For it is thought pure unadulterated thought, and not experience sense-perception, as until then, that gives the basis for the new science of Galileo Galilie (M & M, p. 13). Giorgio de Santillana also supports the same view. He says19 : Galileo uses facts only as a check, as discriminator between necessary and wishful arrangement. According to William R. Shea20 :
Galileos Platonic conception of scientic procedure implies a predominance of reason over mere experience. While Colombo and Lagalla constantly appeal to untutored experience, Galileo calls upon mathematics to interpret nature. The crucial distinction no longer lies between mental and factual, but between mathematical and crudely empirical. Experimentsbe they mathematical or realare equally valid if they are set up in accordance with the requirements of mathematics
2.1.5.4 Galileos Technique of Geometric Representation and Modeling Galileos Technique of Geometric Representation and Modeling The mathematics Galileo used consisted of Euclids geometry and Eudoxus equality of ratio. Galileo did not use the notation v as s/t since be believed that no arithmetical operation, such as division, can be performed between two inhomogeneous physical quantities. Galileo represented both time and distance in terms of line segments. For him it did not make any sense to divide one line segment by another. Moreover, following his precursors Galileo represented uniform and uniformly accelerated motion in terms of rectangle and triangle respectively.
Alexaneder, Etudes Galieenes (1938), Metaphysics and Measurement, (1968) Santillana, G.: 1968, Reections on Men and Ideas, 175. 20 Shea, W.R.: 1972, Galileos Intellectual Revolution, 155
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Nor could Galileo have formulated the equations s = v0 t + 1/2at2. This is because of the fact that he did not have the advantage of using the concept of instantaneous motion as calculus was not available to him. Instead Galileo went on to show that ratios of displacement from rest vary as the ratios of squares of the corresponding time intervals. He states this in the form of a Theorem. The geometrical representation of the Theorem is as follows: HL : HM :: AD 2 : AE 2 (where HL and HM are line segments representing distance and AD and AE representing time). He proves the theorem geometrically using results of similarity of triangle and equality of ratios. Galileos lineage to the Platonic-Pythagorean tradition is evident in his attempt (a) to represent physical problems in terms of geometry and resorting to arithmetical modeling in terms of ratios, (b) deduce the results in the form of proof in the framework of Euclids geometry and Eudoxus equality of ratio, and (c) interpret the conclusions thus arrived at back to the physical world. 2.1.5.5 Galileos Brand of Empiricism Galileos Brand of Empiricism Nevertheless there has been a resurgence of interest in Galileos empiricism based on discovery of historical evidence in Galileos manuscript S. Drake, R.H. Naylor, Thomas Settle21 , showing that he did, in fact, perform some experiments. These reports of what Galileo actually says he did are attempts to comprehend the methodology he is reputedly so famous for having developed. One important aspect of this methodology has to do with experiments and what Galileo thought they accomplished and what they actually mean. It is one thing to ask whether or not he dropped the steel balls from the Tower of Pisa, it is quite another to ask why he would have thought it important to do so just in case he ever did22 . 2.1.5.6 Abstraction & Idealization in Galileo Abstraction & Idealization in Galileo Without any shred of doubt Galileo resorted to abstraction and idealization. In thinking away the resistance of air to the motion of the falling body, Galileo explicitly introduces idealization into scientic thought. He recognizes that progress can be made in understanding nature without immediately dealing with natural phenomenon in all their actual detail and complexity; that renements can be developed subsequently through successive approximation. The bulk of our study of in physics is conned to such simplied and idealized situations. One can hardly put the justication in clearer terms than Galileo himself did:
21 Drake,
S., Galileos Experimental Conrmation of Horizontal Intertia: Unpublished Manuscripts, ISIS Naylor, R.H., Galileos Simple Pendulum Naylor, R.H., Galileo: The search for the Parabolic Trajectory; Naylor, R.H., Galileo: Real Experiment & Dialectic Demonstration. Settle, T., Galileos use of Experiment as a tool of Investigation, A Experiment in the History of Science 22 Shea, W.R.: 1972, Galileos Intellectual Revolution
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As to perturbations arising from the resistance of the medium, this is . . .. Considerable and does not, on account of its manifold forms, submit to xed laws and exact description. Thus if we consider only the resistance which the air offers to motions studied by us, we shall see that it disturbs them all and disturbs them in an innite variety of ways corresponding to the innite variety in form, weight, and velocity of the projectiles . . .. Of these properties . . . innite in number . . .. It is not possible to give any exact description; hence in order to handle this matter in a scientic way, it is necessary to cut loose from these difculties; and having discovered and demonstrated the theorems in the case of no resistance, to use them and apply them with such limitations as experience will teach. . . . Just as the computer who wants his calculations to deal with sugar, silk and wool must discount the boxes, bales and other packing, so the mathematical scientist, when he wants to recognize in the concrete the effects which he has proved in the abstract, must deduct the material hindrance, and if he is able to do so, I assure you that things are in no less agreement than arithmetical computations. The errors, then lie not in the abstractness, not in geometry or physics, but in a calculator who does not know how to make a true accounting.
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2.1.5.7 The Role of Experiment & Observation in Galileos Science The Role of Experiment & Observation in Galileos Science Galileo, carrying forward the work of the medieval thinkers, constructed a kinematical theory in his Discourses and Mathematical Demonstrations Concerning Two New Sciences Pertaining to Mechanics and Local Motion (1638), which bears similarity to that of the Axiomatic structure in Euclidean geometry. The central question in the rivalry between Aristotelian and Platonic-Pythagorean traditions in Galileos thought is the role of the abstract mathematics and idealization, and its relation to the role of sense perception and practical experience. Galileos thought on this issue has led many scholars (e.g. Koyre, Burtt, Drake, Settle) to debate his afliation either to Platonism or to empiricism and experimental science: i. Galileo did not belong to the experimental tradition in which (a) conditions would be articially created to show how nature would behave under previously unobserved, often previously non-existent circumstances, e.g., vacuum created by air pump, (b) the experimental conditions could be manipulated to coerce nature to answer questions; what Francis Bacon described as twisting the lions tail. ii. Galileo also differed from the Greeks who performed experiments with inated pigs bladder that resist compression or experiment with clepsydra and pipette as direct evidence for the corporeality of air. iii. For Galileo experiments are designed to test already formulated hypothesis in order to make it more evident, rather than deriving the hypothesis on the basis of experimental data. Thus, for Galileo, the job of observation/experience and experiment is to render his basic mathematical principles immediately evident. 2.1.5.8 Quotations from Galileo on his Views on Experiment Quotations from Galileo on his Views on Experiment Ex Suppositione: Conditions under which a mathematical denition will be veried in nature to a determinate degree of approximation
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Believe me, if I were again beginning my studies, I should follow the advice of Plato and start with mathematics, a science which proceeds very cautiously and admits nothing is established until it has been rigidly demonstrated.
Starting with Denitions, Axioms Galileo proved two Theorems which were essentially numerical:
(a) In Uniformly Accelerated Motion the spaces D1 , D2 , D3 . . . which are traversed in successive time interval bear to one another the ratio 1,3,5,7,. . . i.e. odd numbers. (The Distance Theorem), (b) The spaces described by a body falling from rest with Uniformly Accelerated Motion are to each other as the squares of the time intervals. (Time Square Law).
Galileo, then, claims that without experiment this formulation is correct and says:
No, and I do not need it, as without any experience I can afrm that it is so, because it cannot be otherwise, it is necessary that it should.
Then goes on to show that the law thus obtained yield, on interpretation, empirically testable predictions in terms of direct measurement.
The request which you as a man of science, make, is a very reasonable one; for this is a customand properly soin those sciences where mathematical demonstrations are applied to natural phenomena, as is seen in the case of perspective (optics) astronomy, mechanics, music, and others where the principles, once established by well-chosen experiments, become the foundations of the entire superstructure. I hope therefore it will not appear to be a waste of time if we discuss at considerable length this rst and most fundamental question upon which hinge numerous consequences of which we have in this book only a small number placed by the Author, who has done so much to open a pathway hitherto close to minds of speculative turn. So far as experiments go they have not been neglected by the Author; and often, in his company, I have attempted in the following manner to assure myself that the acceleration actually experienced by falling bodies is that above described.
2.1.5.9
Conclusions Regarding Galileos Attitude to Experiments and their Implications for Science Education Conclusions Regarding Galileos Attitude to Experiments and their Implications for Science Education Since antiquity experiments formed an integral part of scientic activities. However, our notion of experiment during this period underwent radical changes (Section 2.1.4 above). Galileo adopted a very special approach to experiment. According to the Received View Galileo was the father of modern experimental science. The specic nature of his approach to experiment is not clearly spelled out in our discussion of Galileo in the text books. The Case Study here removes some of these misconceptions and enables us to get a better understanding of Galileos attitude towards experiment based on Toulmins
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notion of conceptual evolution and Nickles notion of generative justication. For Galileo the purpose experiment, such as the incline plane experiment, was not to nd the law in its original discovery, but simply to make certain that in fact uniform acceleration as Galileo described may actually occur in nature. So far as Galileo was concerned, the truth of his law of falling bodies (i.e., V t) was guaranteed by its exemplication of the simplicity of nature (what Holton calls a Thematic Presupposition) and the relations of integers, and not merely by a series of experiments or observations. Galileo used empirical knowledge to support theories already arrived at and justied through some other means). The Case Study also demonstrates that the notion of generative justication resolves the conict between individual versus social origin of ideas and effects unication by looking at both the sources. It is also cognitive-historical as the Table 3 below shows:
History of Science: Succession of precursor concepts & Philosophy of Science: Responses to disciplinary pressure---a rational reconstruction techniques and social determinants Concept Formation Techniques Epistemic Justification & Reality Rational: Metaphysical Empirical/ Platonicexperimental Pythagorianism Social: Inheritance of concepts & techniques from the precursors of Galileo Individual: Concepts & techniques developed by Galileo Classification Definition of Uniform of Motion & Nonuniform motion Geometric representation & shift from Aristotelian qualitative to quantitative analysis Discovery & Proofs of Mean-Speed & Distance Theorems
Organizing the concepts inherited in an axiomatic framework & constructing proofs therein Geometric representation & Modeling Hypothesis: V t
Justifying the definitions & hypothesis on the principle of simplicity
Galileo's experiment was designed to test already formulated hypothesis
Incline Plane Experiment
Table 3: Generative Justication Account of Galileos Experiment on Freely Falling Bodies The cognitive-historical Case Study based on generative justication account of Galileos experiment on freely falling bodies has the following implications for science education. The Case Study i. provides the students a more accurate view about the role Galileo assigned to experiment in his scientic work by removing some of the misconceptions about Galileos notion of experiment, ii. emphasizes the importance of modeling and representation in science education. Piaget and his followers (e.g. McKinson and Renner (1971), A.B. Arons (1990))
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Science Pedagogy through Cognitive Science observed the gap in the early education in mastering reasoning involving ratios that poses serious impediments to learning science. This gap is especially evident while dealing with comparisons of inhomogeneous physical quantities, such as distance and time, acceleration and time or mass and volume. The Case Study shows that Galileos analysis of uniformly accelerated motion in terms of ratio and its geometric representation was more natural than sudden introduction of the relevant algebraic formula, and
iii. attempts to resolve the conict between individual versus social origin of scientic ideas with the help of Toulmins notion of conceptual evolution and Nickles notion of generative justication. 3 3.1 Debate 2 The Debate Relating to the Nature of Scientic Knowledge: Whether it is objective or relative to a conceptual perspective
It is said that before philosophy of science took what is sometimes called the cognitive turn (mentioned in 2.1.2 above), it was preceded by two phases, viz., the so-called linguistic turn emphasizing on objectivity and rationality of scientic knowledge and the socio-historical turn (mentioned in 2.1.1 above) highlighting the relativistic socio-historical nature of scientic knowledge (also called the conceptual perspective approach) 3.1.1 Linguistic Turn For several decades Philosophy of Science was dominated by the logical empiricist approach, which had two main aspects: (i) the claim that scientic theory involves a double language, i.e., an observation language and a theoretical language, and the later could be translated completely in terms of the former by reducing the theoretical terms contained in the theoretical language to the observational terms of the former language denoting sensations. (ii) the main problem in philosophy of science is to search for an appropriate method and logic of justication and conrmation of scientic laws and theories and not how they are arrived at in the rst place. The main objective of the logical empiricists was to investigate how, using only the techniques of formal logic, scientic knowledge could be linked with sense experience. The epistemological underpinning of the logical positivistic view was to provide a strong foundation to science by claiming that the observation sentences are the ones which precisely provide this foundation as they are the direct expressions of given experience, and hence, are certain, indubitable, incorrigible reports of the empirical world. All other knowledge is logically derived from them. The item (i) above explains the objectivity and realism of scientic theory and knowledge and (ii) accounts for scientic rationality.
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153 Socio-historical Turn: Relativistic Conceptual Perspective Approach to Philosophy of Science:
The relativistic socio-historical view was advocated very forcefully by Hanson, Kuhn and Feyerabend. The role of the conceptual perspective on the epistemology of science is signicant as it determines the class of legitimate problems, delimits the standards for their acceptable solution, and species the epistemic grounds involved in the historical and sociological factors responsible for the discovery, development and acceptance or rejection of scientic theories. The main emphasis within the relativistic socio-historical view on Philosophy of Science was to study of the internal and external historical factors responsible for theory change and the epistemological and ontological theories that provide justication for such changes. Thus, Philosophers of Science began to pay more attention to historical and psychological factors that inuence scientic work and practices. On the other hand, the historians of science derived more inspirations from the work of the sociologists, subscribing to the claim that scientic knowledge is a social product. Their investigation of the social context of science for the proper understanding of scientic practices gave the discipline of historiography of science a sociological turn. However, in contrast with a static model of human knowledge of the logical positivists the proponents of the conceptual perspective and the socio-historical view of science provided a dynamic account of scientic knowledge. 3.1.3 False Dichotomy Again: Unending Controversies The socio-historical approach to the evolving nature of scientic knowledge takes the canons for evaluating what to admit as scientic knowledge not only as relative to a given conceptual perspective, but also as variable from one historical period to another. Although the canons of rationality and justication change and are relative, but the conditions characterizing the nature of knowledge, as spelled out in the Logical Positivistic view on Knowledge, i.e., construing knowledge as justied true belief, remain the same. In spite of its role in exposing the deciencies of a static, ahistorical and extreme empirical nature of scientic knowledge of the Logical Positivists and replacing it by a more historically sensitive account of scientic knowledge based on an analysis of actual scientic practices, the conceptual perspective approach led to an extreme epistemic relativism. The epistemic view turned out to be so permissible as to accept anything as knowledge as long as any science permits it to enter into its domain and to take any change in the canons leading to corresponding change in what counts as knowledge. This goes against the very basic notion of science as an enterprise providing objective knowledge where the central aim of science is to nd out how the world really is.
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Science Pedagogy through Cognitive Science Epistemic Norms and the role of the Cognitive-ecological Factors in the Acquisition of Knowledge: Naturalization of Epistemology and the Demise of the Inferential Justicatory Account of Knowledge
The recent developments indicate that a viable epistemology of science not only needs to take into account the actual scientic practices as revealed by socio-historical studies, but also establish linkages with Cognitive Science and its programme of naturalization of epistemology. This may provide a way out of the impasse due to subjectivism and relativism to which the Conceptual Perspective analysis reduced the contemporary philosophy of science and its epistemology. The historical account of the development of science show that despite sceptical warnings the success of scientic investigations enabled us to gather much useful knowledge about the universe. This is what impressed our philosophical forebears, such as Locke and Kant, who were concerned with the task of understanding the nature of science as a paradigmatic knowledge-yielding enterprise that is concerned with employing conceptual devices aimed at discovering how the world really is and the characteristic regularities of the real world. In view of the new sceptical onslaughts, such as Gettier type paradoxes and riddles of induction this task has assumed new importance. 3.2.1 Cognitive Processes and Ecological Factors If one of the goals of epistemology is to account for the way science comes to have knowledge of how the world really is, then one must pay more attention to the cognitive processes, including the ecological factors, involved in acquiring this knowledge. An understanding of the nature of epistemic norms will remain incomplete as long as it is not integrated into a more comprehensive account of the cognitive and ecological factors and their interactions that form part of the functioning of the epistemic agent. Only in the recent past more attention is being paid to the role of the cognitive and ecological factors in such important issues in philosophy of science as scientic observation/experiment, formation of concepts and categorization, model building and theory change. This section attempts to provide an outline of this approach and its relevance to the formulation of epistemic norm. 3.2.2 Scientic Knowledge and Naturalization of Belief and Knowledge: The InteractionInformation Theoretic Account of Observation and Belief/Knowledge
The cognitive, ecological, interactive and information theoretic approach, advocated, among others, by Goldman23 , Dretske24 , Barwise and Perry25 , J.R. Anderson26 , J.J. Gibson, may be construed as denial of the justicatory account of knowledge (involving the
23 Goldman, 24 Dretske,
A.I.: 1986, Epistemology and Cognition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Fred: 1981, Knowledge and the Flow of Information, MIT Press/Bradford, Cambridge, Mass. 25 Barwise, J. & Perry, J.: 1983, Situations and Attitudes, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 26 Anderson, J.R.: 1990, The Adaptive Character of Thought, Hillsdale, Erlbaum, NJ. Anderson, J.R.: 1991, The adaptive nature of human categorization, Psychological Review, 98, 409-429 Anderson, J.R.: 1991, Is human cognition adaptive?, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 14, 471-517
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base statement and inductive inferential view). Epistemic acts, such as observation, according to this view, is said to involve successive type of states or situations where information ows from one type of state or situation to another. Thus, in observation the information that x is P, where x and P are features of the physical world is carried from the object to the sense organs or receptors through a process of interaction between the two. This interaction relation leading to information ow is based on a nomic regularity/constraint holding between state or situation type where one involves the other, e.g. the fact that the X-ray has such and such a pattern carries information about/involves/indicates that Jackie has a broken leg. 3.3 The Issue of Appropriate Framework for Representing Information The dominating view on representing information, belief and knowledge has been variously called the language centered, propositional or symbolic/syntactic view. In the context of Cognitive Science and AI, this view has been endorsed by Fodor 27 , Pylyshyn28 and Newell and Simon29 . The theses of language of thought or mentalese and physical symbol system hypothesis forcefully articulated the language centered, propositional or symbolic syntactic view on representing information, belief and knowledge. This language centered, propositional or symbolic/syntactic view is faced with several difculties : i. the symbol grounding problem: How can the meanings of the meaningless symbol tokens, manipulated solely on the basis of their arbitrary shapes be grounded or connected up with the world in the right way? ii. the frame problem: Assuming that an intelligent agent is capable of planning and problem solving and given the fact that she is acting, can we specify in symbolic formalism what changes and what remains constant in the particular domain? Classical symbolic systems are monotonic, whereas planning and problem solving invariably involve new experience and change. iii. the problem of induction: Mere symbolic representation does not lend itself easily to model judgements of similarity and to identify projectible predicates that denote natural kinds. Both Goodman and Quine taught us that these issues are intimately related to the problem of induction. The basic problem with systems using propositional and symbolic representation is that they are disjoint from non-symbolic system (i.e. the world). Hence, there must be some point where the information from the world is presented in symbolic form.
J.A.: 1981, Representations, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Z.: 1984, Computation and Cognition, Bradford/MIT Press, Cambridge,MA. 29 Newell, A. & Simon, H.: 1976, Computer Science as Empirical Inquiry: Symbols and Search, CACM, 19, 113-116
28 Pylyshyn, 27 Fodor,
156 3.3.1 Two Important Issues There are two important issues here:
i. how a system using propositional or symbolic representation takes in information from a non-symbolic world? This is what S. Harnad30 called the Symbol Grounding Problem. ii. how does a cognitive system distinguish and grasp non-logically the predicates that denote natural kinds or natural properties, which represent things that exist in reality, make the scientic laws describe the processes that actually take place in nature or scientic induction possible? 3.3.2 Conceptual Space Approach as a Framework for Representing Information: An Information Theoretic Approach to Observation and Concept Formation
Many cognitive scientists31 claim that symbolic and cognitive structures are perceptually grounded. This, however, involves an analysis of (a) what role the information at the sub-symbolic level play in the explanation of in various epistemic, knowledge acquisitive and cognitive acts, such as observation, and (b) how (a) lead to formation of concepts and categories, which nally give rise to formulation of knowledge at the linguistic level. J.J. Gibson32 and David Marr33 (especially while dwelling on his rst two modules, viz., Primal Sketch and 2 1/2 D) provided an analysis of 3.3.2. (a) mentioned above with specic reference to visual information. Gibson offers an analysis of optical information in which appearance in the sense of the way things are is directly given in visual information and not inferred. Therefore, his view is sometimes called Theory of Direct Perception (TDP). TDP comprises of two separate investigations: one involves examining the perceiving organism, the other concentrates on the what of perception, examining the visible world external to the organism. Gibson terms the latter inquiry Ecological optics, which involves nding environmental properties that can be uniquely and invariantly specied in the structure of the reected ambient light in the form of an optic array. The structure of the reected ambient light depends upon the structure of the surface of the perceived object. Unlike
30 Harnad, 31 Johnson,
Chicago, Ill. Lakoff, G.: 1987, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill. Langacker, R.W.: 1987, Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, 1, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA. 32 Gibson, J.J.: 1950, The Perception of the Visual World, Houghton Mifin, Boston Gibson, J.J.: (1966), The Senses Considered as Perceptual System, Houghton Mifin, Boston Gibson, J.J.: 1979, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, Houghton Mifin, Boston 33 Marr, David: 1982, Vision, Freeman, San Francisco
S.: 1990, The Symbol Grounding Problem, Phisica D 42, 335-346. B.: 1987, The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Cognition, University of Chicago Press,
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the radiant light from a light source, the structure of the reected ambient light is responsible for the perception of distance, depth, motion etc. For Gibson the structure of the reected ambient light does not carry/convey information, it is information. The job of the perceptual system is merely to pick up the information by orienting, adjusting, resonating and tuning to the light input. Thus Gibson treated the problem of perception as that of recovering from sensory information valid properties of the external world. However, as Marr points out, Gibsons analysis is incomplete. Gibson failed to realize the fact that the detection of physical invariant, like image surfaces, is exactly and precisely an information-processing and cognitive problem. Secondly, Gibson vastly underrated the sheer difculties of such detection. Marr, then, goes on to provide an elaborate analysis of how the information provided at the Primal Sketch and 2 1/2D levels lead to identication and categorization of 3-D objects as we ordinarily recognize them. 3.3.3 Gardenfors Notion of Conceptual Space The analyses of Marr and Gardenfors appear to be complementary to each other and are relevant to 3.3.2. (b) mentioned above. Peter Gardenfors34 offers an answer to the second issue by suggesting a hybrid three tier cognitive system with (a) sub-conceptual, (b) conceptual and (c) higher symbolic level. For the traditional empiricist thinkers, such as Locke and Hume, the bridge between the external world and mind was provided by impressions, ideas and associations between them. Marr also accepts a three level analysis in which sub-conceptual level of primal sketch and 2 1/2D plays an important role in modeling perceptual knowledge. Gardenfors, however, introduces a nonlinguistic and non-logical way of representing information and knowledge in terms of his theory of Conceptual Space in which the objects of the representation no longer form a language or have even a propositional structure. Gardenfors treats his knowledge representation framework as cognitive and bases it on analogical representation. He treats this as an alternative to linguistic, propositional or Fregean representation and shows its drawbacks. For Gardenfors conceptual space is a cognitive entity, which he claims is ontologically prior to any form of language. A conceptual space is a set of pre-linguistic quality dimensions that are closely connected to what is produced by our sensory receptors. Typical example of quality dimensions is color, length, weight, temperature, time etc., which represent various qualities of objects by assigning properties to them and specifying relations between them. Each quality dimension has a geometrical, topological or metrical or just an ordering structure, rather than syntactic or logical structure, as in symbolic models, or associations, as in connectionist model. Gardenfors quality dimensions are psychological dimensions and not scientic or theoretical ones. For example, he distinguishes the psychological interpretation of hue
P.: 1990, Induction, conceptual spaces and AI, Philosophy of Science, 57, 78-95 Gardenfors, P.: 1991, Framework for Properties: Possible World vs. Conceptual Spaces, Acta Philosphica Fennica, 49, 383-407 Gardenfors, P.: 1992, Three Levels of Inductive Inference Lund University Cognitive Studies, 9
34 Gardenfors,
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in terms of the color wheel and the scientic or theoretical interpretation in terms of wavelengths of light. However, for him the quality dimension precedes and provides the basis for symbolic and conceptual representation. How does Gardenfors notion of conceptual space grasp non-logically the predicates that denote natural kinds or natural properties, which represent things that exist in reality and also make induction possible and distinguish them from other properties? 3.3.4 How are the Basic Projectible Predicates get Established? Gardenfors makes a constructive use of his notion of conceptual space and uses it as a basis for formulating a new criterion of what a property is. He goes on to represent a property as a region in a conceptual space. And denes a natural property as representing a space which is convex in the following sense: if a pair of points a and b are in the region, then all points between a and b are also in the region. This denition of natural properties makes them perceptually grounded, i.e., for these properties there is a direct link between the convex region of the conceptual space with its quality dimensions and perception. According to Gardenfors the predicates green and grue differ from each other, because green designates a property that can be represented in a convex region, while grue cannot be represented by a convex region, because the predicate grue involves both color as well as time dimensions (i.e. an object has the property grue, if it is examined before time t and determined to be green, or it is not examined before time t and it is blue). 3.3.5 Natural Properties, Similarities and Induction Gardenfors contends that the projectible predicates are the predicates, which designate natural properties and that only these predicates make inductive inferences possible. He also goes on to dene a relation of comparative similarity in terms of a conceptual space by letting two objects count as more similar to each other the closer their set of properties is located in the underlying conceptual space. Gardenfors claims that humans generally agree as to which properties are the projectible ones. This suggests that humans have close to identical psychological conceptual spaces. The evolutionary theory and natural selection explain why our way of identifying natural properties accords so well with the external world as to make our inductions tend to come out right and demonstrate that our inductive capacities are dependent on the ecological circumstances under which they have evolved. 3.4 Case Study on Galileo: The Cognitive-historical Aspects of Science My intention in the Case Study on Galileo is not to demonstrate that the current ideas on properties, projectible predicates and concept formation are present in Galileos work. That would amount to doing, what Buttereld called, whig history. What I would, however, like to show is that Galileo was concerned with the problem of the t between his law abstractly arrived at within an axiomatic framework
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by providing a geometric representation of the physical problem and the physical phenomenon he was investigating. He resolved this by making a distinction between primary and secondary qualities and insisting that the law must be couched only in terms of primary qualities, and appealing to certain thematic presuppositions, e.g. simplicity, while justifying his choice of a hypothesis or law. The new science Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) was involved in developing was confronted with many methodological, epistemological and metaphysical issues. He says:
My purpose is to set forth a very new science dealing with a very ancient subject. There is, in nature, perhaps nothing older than motion, concerning which the books written by philosophers are neither few nor small; nevertheless I have discovered by experienza some properties of it which are worth knowing and which have hitherto not been either observed nor demonstrated. Some supercial observations have been made, as, for instance, that the free motion [naturalem motum] of a heavy falling body is continuously accelerated; but to just what extent this acceleration occurs has not yet been announced . . . (Italics mine)
In relationship with Galileos scientic claim contained in the last sentence in the quote there are several cognitive/epistemological questions How do we know?, Why do we believe in something?, What is the evidence for?, How did Galileo develop the scientic concepts?, How did he go on to justify the introduction of a concept ? Another set of partly scientic, partly sociological problems arises with regard the validation and acceptance of scientic theories. Moreover, there are the metaphysical problems concerning reality of entities that transcend our senses or the assumption of certain properties that can form the basis for doing science, e.g. in Galileos case, the primary qualities. Understanding what Galileo contributed goes much beyond the law of freely falling motion and the concept of uniformly accelerated motion he formulated or being able to calculate how fast the stone falls when we drop it from a certain height. Understanding the ingredients of his scientic inquiry and imagination must form an integral part, not as additional material to the calculation, but as issues intrinsically arising out of the understanding and presentation of the technical material in order to develop the capacity for abstract reasoning based on practice and experience, problems relating to relevant concept formation, modes of appropriate reasoning/thinking, perceiving relationships. This effort may include removing certain misconceptions. From this point of view Galileos main achievements were welding together the works of the anti-Aristotelians of the past two centuries or so and develop a Philosophy of Science by raising certain methodological issues. presenting a consistent, reasonable conceptual scheme that was descriptive rather than teleological, i.e. he was not concerned with nal causes.
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Science Pedagogy through Cognitive Science The Methodological Issues Raised by Galileo
Galileos concern with the t between an abstract mathematical theory and its apparently arbitrary denitions and facts that they are designed to explain. He asks the question: How does an abstract mathematical theory and its apparently arbitrary denitions t the facts? Fruitful insight as to what was Galileos answer can be derived from what Galileo himself emphasizes in his approach: Galileo was acutely conscious about the fact that he was dening new concepts and not discovering objects. He was concerned that the denition should best t the natural phenomena. In the Discourses and Mathematical Demonstrations Concerning Two New Sciences he says:
Since all denitions are arbitrary, I may . . . be allowed to doubt whether such a denition as above, established in an abstract manner, correspond to and describe that kind of accelerated motion which we meet in the nature in the case of freely falling bodies. . . . some have imagined helices and conchoids as described by certain motions which are not met within nature and have very commendably established the properties which these curves possess in virtue of their denitions, but we have decided to consider the phenomena of bodies falling with an acceleration such as actually occurs in nature and to make this denition of accelerated motion exhibit the essential features of observed accelerated motions.
Galileo formulates his hypotheses regarding the nature of motion rst and then goes on check them in terms of experiments and not the other way around. 3.4.2 Galileos Solution Galileo was looking for an answer to the same problem we discussed in the Section 3.3 above. Galileos solution to this problem is based on i. his belief in one of the metaphysical/thematic Presuppositions, viz., simplicity of nature. Galileo invokes this in the following way:
. . . in the investigation of naturally accelerated motion we were led, by hand as it were, in following the habit and custom of nature herself, in all her various other processes, to employ only those means which are most common, simple and easy. For I think no one believes that swimming or ying can be accomplished in a manner simpler or easier than that instinctively employed by shes and birds. When . . . I observe a stone initially at rest falling from an elevated position and continually acquiring new increments of speed, why should I not believe that such increases occur in a manner, which is exceedingly simple and rather obvious to everybody? If now we examine the matter carefully, we nd no addition or increment more simple than that which repeats itself always in the same manner. (Emphasis mine)
Proceeding on this principle of simplicity in nature Galileo considers two hypotheses which are both simple, viz. (1) V T (2) V D: speed increase in proportion to distance traveled.
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He rejects (2) on grounds that are not completely sound (as he thinks that this simple assumption leads to an inconsistency, while the other does not) and adopts (1), largely because he has the deeply rooted hunch that it is correct. ii. Galileos distinction of qualities: Galileo makes a distinction between: Primary qualities: those qualities which admit of systematic quantitative description relative to a scale, e.g. distance, length, shape, size, time, position . . .. Secondary qualities: those qualities, which exist only in the mind of the perceiver, e.g. taste, odour, sound, colour, etc. In IL SAGGIATORE Galileo writes:
I think that these tastes, odors, colors, etc., on the side of the object in which they seem to exist, are nothing else than mere names, and hold their residence solely in the sensitive body; so that if the animal were removed, every such quality would be abolished and annihilated. Nevertheless, as soon as we have imposed names on them, particular and different from those of the other primary and real accidents, we induce our selves to believe that they also exist just as truly and really as the latter.
Galileos criterion of demarcation and the criterion of acceptability. Galileo withdraws the attention of science from the realm of unquantiable secondary qualities, i.e., he restricts the scope of science to assertions about primary qualities and their relation alone, and excludes taleological explanation from the range of permissible discourse in Science. Consequently, Aristotelian explanation of freely falling bodies in terms of natural motion towards natural place does not qualify as scientic explanation, because it fails to explain the phenomenon. According to Galileo, it is not a bona de sceintic explanation to claim that a motion takes place in order that some future state may be realized. 3.4.3 Conclusion
A review of the second debate, the survey of the recent work on concept formation in Cognitive Science and the Case Study of Galileo provide evidence that go on to show that the information about the way the world is and theorizing about it may lead to objective claims regarding the world provided the processes of the formation of concepts involve an account of (a) the interaction between the features of the physical world and the cognizer, and (b) the information about the features of the world is represented and revised in a frameworks which also includes the sub-symbolic level. Galileos answer to the problem was based on (i) his belief in one of the Thematic Presuppositions, viz., simplicity of nature, (ii) his classication of properties in terms of primary (quantiable) and secondary qualities, and his demand that scientic concepts are articulated in terms of primary qualities alone, and (iii) his abandonment of the secondary qualities as well as teleological explanations.
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Science Pedagogy through Cognitive Science Final Remarks on the Implications of the Case Studies for Science Education Programme
The Case Studies on Galileo that I have chosen may appear to be antiquirian. This is deliberate. Galileos scientic writings and scientic work are instructive in more sense than one. It provides a rich context for many important pedagogical issue, such as introduction and proper understanding of new concepts, distinction between observation and inference, model building and mathematical representation, formulation of hypothesis, laws and their linkages to observation and thematic presuppositions, the question of justication, etc. The standard textbook presentation of Galileos kinematics suppresses the intellectual history, the context and the process of scientic inquiry by hurrying through the nal product in the form of the laws he formulated. As a result it fails to use this signicant episode at an early stage of science with relatively simple subject matter as an illustration of various facets of modern scientic thought and inquiry. Our science pedagogy would be immensely richer by incorporating an examination of such intellectual dimensions and putting a little less emphasis on technical science. Pedagogy of science ostensibly enables the students to also learn strategies and tactics of problem solving and generating representations of scientic knowledge. The Received View on the cognitive processes involved in such procedures, such as induction or linear conception of experimental discovery, appears to be highly decient (Nersessian, 1989 and Gooding, 1989). The Cognitive-historical and generative justication approaches discussed above in the case studies can provide different realistic exemplars of scientic problem solving. Thus, the standard laboratory experience can be supplemented by incorporating such exemplars, which will give students an opportunity to examine other problem solving procedures or to develop their own insights into constructing or changing representations of conceptual structures in science.
Conceptual Change in the Learning of Science

Stella Vosniadou
University of Athens, Greece. Email: svosniad@compulink.gr
Why is Science Learning Difcult? Cognitive science and science education research has shown that students have a great deal of difculty understanding science concepts. This applies even to students who perform above average in terms of test scores and teacher evaluations, and even after many years of science instruction (e.g., diSessa, 1993). In addition to the difculty of understanding, science learning seems to be accompanied by misconceptions. Misconceptions have been noted in practically all subject areas of science. Hundreds of misconceptions enough to ll out tens of volumes have been reported in the literature. 1 How can we nd out why science learning is so difcult? For many years now, researchers in this area have realized the need to pay more attention to the actual content of the pupils ideas, and to understand how these ideas develop in order to formulate a coherent theoretical framework for guiding research in science education (see for example, Driver and Easley, 1978, Novak, 1977). It is only on the basis of such a developmental theory that we can make informed decisions about the design of science curricula as well as about instruction. In this paper I will argue that cognitive developmental research can provide rich descriptions of the knowledge that students have about science at different ages and about how this knowledge changes. I will describe some of the ndings regarding the processes of conceptual change in science derived from research in my lab and will draw their implications for instruction. I hope that in the process the readers will nd some answers to the question: Why is science learning difcult? The Conceptual Change Approach A few years ago I attended a workshop on the topic of learning and teaching science. The workshop was composed mostly of researchers and teachers in science education and a few developmental psychologists who did research on the development of science concepts. I was very surprised to discover that main theoretical framework that guided the science educators teaching and research was basically an empiricist framework. What I mean by an empiricist framework is the idea that learning science involves mainly the enrichment of prior experiences. According to this framework, knowledge is continuous, it develops from concrete to abstract, and is mainly characterized by enrichment. What we need to do when we teach science is expose children to rich hands-on experiences. Through these experiences they are going to eventually learn science.
1 See the Proceedings of the First and Second International Seminars on Misconceptions in Science and Mathematics edited by J.D. Novak (1987) and Helm, Hugh and Novak (1983).
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In this framework there is no realization that childrens initial knowledge, based on their every day experiences may stand in the way of understanding the currently accepted scientic ideas. The conceptual change approach to be described below is a very different approach. More specically, the following claims are being made about the process of learning science. i. The human mind has developed, through evolution, specialized mechanisms to pick up information from the physical and social world. This results in very quick and efcient learning that starts immediately after birth. Some kinds of things are easy to learn, not because what is learned is less complex but because human beings are prepared through evolution for this kind of learning. This seems to apply to the learning of language and to intuitive physics. Intuitive physics is the knowledge about the physical world that develops early in infancy and allows children to function in the physical environment. ii. Learning which is acquired early in life and which is not subject to conscious awareness and hypothesis testing can stand in the way of learning science. This happens because scientic explanations of physical phenomena often violate fundamental principles of intuitive physics, constantly conrmed by everyday experience. After all, the currently accepted scientic explanations are the product of a long historical development of science characterized by revolutionary theory changes that have totally restructured our representations of the physical world. iii. Conceptual change is required in the learning of many science concepts (and not only science). This is because the initial explanations of phenomena in the physical world are not unrelated and fragmented but are organized in an intuitive framework theory.2 That constrains the process of acquiring further knowledge about the physical world and can cause misconceptions. Many misconceptions can be explained as synthetic models formed by individuals in their effort to assimilate new scientic information into their framework theory. The change of the framework theory is difcult because it represents a coherent explanatory system based on everyday experience and is tied to years of conrmation. From a conceptual change point of view the questions that are important to answer are questions such as the following: What is the nature of initial conceptual structures? Are they actually organized in a coherent theoretical framework? If so, how do these theoretical frameworks change? How is conceptual change achieved? In the pages that follow I will argue that children do have an initial, intuitive, framework theory about the physical world. I will argue that this theory has content. I will describe this content in terms of presuppositions, beliefs, and mental models. I will also argue that this framework theory has a structure and I would describe this structure in terms of framework theories and specic theories. Another issue I would
2 The term theory is used to denote a causal explanatory framework. We do not claim that framework theories are similar to those of scientists and we further assume that they are not available to conscious awareness and hypothesis testing.
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like to raise here is the issue of metaconceptual awareness. It appears that young children have conceptual structures that are relatively well organized but they are not metaconceptually aware of the knowledge that they have. By that I mean that they are not aware of the actual beliefs and presuppositions that constrain the knowledge acquisition process, neither do they recognize that these beliefs are hypotheses subject to falsication. This is a very important difference between childrens theories (to the extend that we can call them theories) and scientic theories. When we come to conceptual change, I will tell you about synthetic models and what they are. Finally, I will pay a lot of importance to the sequence in which concepts are acquired in a given subject-matter area. The Observational Astronomy Research Project Let me give you a general description of the kind of research that my colleagues and I have been doing. We started this research when I was in the United States, at the University of Illinois, with William Brewer. We investigated elementary school childrens understanding of observational astronomy. The studies that we did were about the shape of the earth, about the day and night cycle, explanations of the seasons and of the weather, and of the phases of the moon/explanations of the phases of the moon. We tried to understand how childrens knowledge in this area changes during the elementary school years (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992, 1994). We also conducted a great deal of cross-cultural research. I had a student, at that time, Ala Samarapungavan, who came to India to do a study of Indian children (Samarapungavan, Vosniadou, & Brewer, 1997). I did several studies in Greece, while a student in anthropology from the University of Illinois went to Samoa and collected data from children there (Vosniadou, 1994). Other people took our questionnaire and did studies in Australia, England, Germany, etc. The methodology we use is that of a clinical interview in which children are asked questions from a pre-designed questionnaire. The children are also asked to make drawings and/or play dough models, or select among ready made physical models. We pay a lot of attention to the distinction between factual and generative questions. A factual question is a question like What is the shape of the earth? and a generative question is a question like If you were able to walk for many days would you be able to reach the end of the earth? Is there an end to the earth? The difference between the two types of questions is the following. Factual questions can be answered if the children have memorized in a supercial way information taught at school. It is possible however that children do not really understand the information taught at school. When children say that the day/night cycle happens because the earth turns around its axis, do they really understand this explanation? Do they know what its implications are? Or is it the case that they have memorized the explanations given in school without really understanding them. The generative questions try to nd this out. Generative questions ask children to think about situations to which they have not been exposed in the regular school. We present them with a new, productive problem that they have to solve. If they have really understood the scientic explanation, then
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they can give a scientic answer. For example, if they have understood how the day and night cycle happens through the earths rotation, they can provide scientically correct answers to questions like What do we need to do in order to make it day time always in Bombay? It is possible, however, that when we ask children the generative question mentioned above they say things like the following: you need to make the moon disappear or you must have the sun in the sky all the time. The kinds of answers we get from the factual questions are very different from the kinds of answers we get from the generative questions. On the basis of childrens responses we try to understand childrens representations, or their mental models. We are interested in nding out whether children use the same mental representation to answer all the questions in a consistent fashion. Indeed we have found that it was possible to account for approximately 85% of the childrens responses on the basis of the consistent use of one of a small class of mental models of the earth (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992) and of the day/night cycle (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1994). In the case of the shape of the earth we have identied six different kinds of mental models held by elementary school children (in our American sample). These models represent the intuitive view of the earth as a at, supported rectangularly-shaped physical object, the scientic view of the earth as a physical unsupported, astronomical object, as well as a number of intermediate views (see gure 1). Most of the children in our sample used mental models of the earth that showed a combination of intuitive and scientic views. We have identied four such mental models: the disc earth, the dual earth, the hollow sphere and the attened sphere. According to the disc earth, the earth is both round and at and has an end or edge from which people can potentially fall. In the dual earth, children think that there are two earths: a at one on which we live and a spherical one which is a planet in the sky. The children who believe in the hollow sphere model think that the earth is spherical outside but the people live on at ground inside the earth. Finally, according to the attened sphere, the people live on the outside of the earth but on attened pieces of ground. If we examine all these representations, we see that they have some things in common. What they have in common is that they all try to incorporate on the one hand the information that the earth is spherical, coming from instruction, and on the other hand, the information they receive from everyday observation that the earth is at and people live on top of this at earth. They represent an attempt to synthesize initial, intuitive beliefs about the earth with currently accepted scientic information. For this reason we have called them synthetic models. We have explained the formation of synthetic models by assuming that childrens understanding of the scientic concept is constrained by certain beliefs or presuppositions that have their origins in their intuitive framework theory. One is the belief that the earth is basically at, and the other is the belief that the objects on the earth need to be supported, otherwise they will fall down. We know from psychological studies that even 6-7 month old infants understand that when you drop an object it will fall on the ground. This evidence has been interpreted to indicate that young infants form an elementary up-down gravity concept.
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Scientific Model Sphere
Flattened Sphere
Hollow Sphere (a) (b)
Synthetic Models
Dual Earth
Disc Earth
Initial Models
Rectangular Earth
Figure 1: Mental models of the earth. If it is indeed the case that children hold a belief in up-down gravity then we wonder how this belief can make it difcult for them to understand how people on the outside of a spherical earth live without falling down! I have looked at the curricula used to teach astronomy in Greece and in the United States and I have never found any attempt to explain to young children how it is possible for people to live on the spherical earth without falling, or how it is possible for the earth to be spherical and at at the same time. Information regarding the spherical shape of the earth is introduced by the teachers in the classroom in a straightforward, factual manner. Often, a globe is used, or sometimes the teachers show a picture of the globe in a book, or a picture of the earth as we see it from the moon. Teachers usually believe that it is very easy to understand that the earth is spherical and that the concept of a spherical earth does not really require any explication. So there is no explanation provided to children of how it is possible for the earth to be spherical and at at the same time, despite the fact that our everyday perception is of a at earth. And there is no attempt to say anything about gravity and to explain how it is possible for people to live on the spherical earth without falling down. Gravity is a concept addressed later on when children are taught about mechanics, not in the
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context of observational astronomy. What I am trying to say is that the kind of instruction we give to children is inadequate. It does not provide explanations to the legitimate questions that the children may have, assuming that they have formed a representation of the earth on the basis of their everyday experience. Teachers of science and curricular designers do not take into consideration that children may have formed such possible initial representations of the earth. They think (based on the empiricist framework described earlier) that since children have not been instructed in science, they do not know anything about the earth. They also think that the concept of a spherical earth is such a simple and easy to understand concept. I remember that when we started these studies we actually wondered whether we would nd any children who will have a conception of the earth different from the spherical one. We were so immersed in this tradition ourselves and I remember we had to go to preschoolers to nd out that they indeed believed the earth to be at. In an attempt to explain these ndings we came to the idea of an intuitive framework theory of physics. The idea is that from very early on children construct a framework theory of physics that contains the ontological presuppositions that dene what is a physical object and how physical objects move in space. So you would nd here the information that physical objects are solid and stable, that the space is organised in the direction of up and down, and that physical objects fall down when we drop them. The framework theory also contains some epistemological presuppositions like the presupposition that things are as they appear to be (appearance is reality). So the idea is that such a framework theory of physics is formed very early on and forms the basis of our physical knowledge. Obviously, we have a great deal of physical knowledge, otherwise we would not be able to move around in the physical world. It is further assumed that the framework theory constrains the way we interpret observations such as that the ground extends along the same plane over a great distance, that the sky is located above the ground, that the sun, the moon, and the stars are in the sky, and that there is ground or water below the ground. The interpretations of such observations are used to form intuitive theories, about the earth, the day/night cycle, the seasons, etc. We make a distinction between presuppositions that belong to the framework theory and beliefs that belong to more specic-theories. We think this distinction is important because it can explain why some beliefs are easier to change than others. For example, it is not very difcult to change the belief that the earth is supported by ground, or that the earth does not move, or even that the earth is at. But, it appears that it is very difcult to change the up/down gravity presupposition and the organization of space in terms of the direction of up and down. These presuppositions constrain childrens understanding and explain synthetic models in which the earth is represented as round or spherical but where the people live on its top or inside it. To summarize, the results of our experiments showed a relatively small number of the mental models of the earth, that could be grouped into initial, synthetic and scientic. The synthetic models are constrained by certain underlying presuppositions, such as that the organization of space is in terms of the direction of up and down
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1. The sun goes down, on the ground, behind mountains, and the moon comes up.
2. The sun goes down, to the other side of the earth, and the moon comes up.
3. The earth rotates in an up/down direction. The moon and sun are located at opposite sides.
4. The earth rotates in an east/west rotation. The sun and moon are located at opposite sides.
Figure 2: Mental models of the day/night cycle. and that gravity pulls physical objects down to the ground. These two presuppositions seem to be the main barriers to childrens understanding of the spherical shape of the earth. If our hypotheses are correct, it means we need to pay particular attention to such presuppositions, when we teach the shape of the earth. If we deal with these presuppositions we have a better chance of being more successful in teaching children the spherical shape of the earth. Before nishing I would like to say that teachers are not aware of the ideas and misconceptions that students have. Usually science is taught in a factual way, where teachers explain the scientic view and then ask a few questions to see if the scientic explanation can be repeated. Sometimes teachers are really afraid to ask too much. Because in some areas like science they feel themselves insecure about their knowledge of science. They do not want to raise any questions because they feel they might not be able to answer. The communication that goes on in the classroom is very supercial. It is a big problem in science education that the teachers are not well trained in science themselves and this affects their ability to teach science. There is an additional point I would like to make here. I would like to show you the importance not only of presuppositions, like the up/down gravity or the organization of space in terms of up/down, but also of the particular representations or mental models that the students have. When new information comes in, it is often interpreted in terms of some kind of a situation model, a mental representation which is formed at the time (based on prior knowledge) to help the individual incorporate the new information to the knowledge base. These mental representations can exert important inuence on learning of science. The gure 2 shows various explanations of the day/night cycle. The rst explanation (1) is in terms of the sun going down, hiding behind the mountains, and the moon
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going up. When you look at this explanation of the day and night cycle, usually night is interpreted by the sun either going down, or hiding behind the mountains or clouds and at the same time the moon coming up or getting out of the clouds. The sun and the moon are associated. The sun creates the day and the moon creates the night. So the sun goes down when the moon comes up. If the childs representation of the earth is that it is a at earth supported by ground, then of course they cannot understand the explanation of the day/night cycle in terms of the earths rotation. Sometimes we tell them that the earth moves but the way they understand the earths movement is like an up/down motion similar to what you get in an earthquake. They cannot understand the rotational movement if they do not have representation of the earth as a sphere in space. As we can see here, the representation of the earth, constrains the kinds of explanations of the day/night cycle that can be formed. We have not found even a single child who had a at representation of the earth and also gave a scientic representation of the day/night cycle. Children who had at representation of the earth gave us initial, non-scientic, explanations of the day and night cycle. But some of the children who had formed spherical representations of the earth also gave us initial explanations. We have interpreted this evidence as indicating that the change from a at to a spherical earth shape is a necessary, but not sufcient condition for the scientic explanation of the day/night cycle. It is only when you have spherical types of representations of the earth that more advanced scientic explanations of the day/night cycle, that assume the earth to be rotating or the sun to be revolving round the earth, can take place. As I said, the representation of the earth imposes additional constraints on how one understands the day/night cycle. Let us now see how the two different representations of the earth as a sphere and as a hollow sphere affect explanations of the day/night cycle. When children have formed a spherical representation of the earth, then they can understand that the earth can rotate. However, they usually interpret rotation as an up/down rotation rather than a left/right rotation around the earths axis. So the usual explanation of the day/night cycle, even in the children who have understood that the earth rotates, assumes that the earth rotates in a up/down fashion. Usually, the sun is supposed to be located at the top and the moon is located at the bottom of the earth. You can understand that this is a very easy transition from the previous representation where the sun and moon went up and down. All you have to do is to make the earths movement circular. You can see how easy it is to go from the previous representation to this representation once your idea of the shape of the earth changes. So the sun is now up there, and the moon down below the earth, and it is not that the sun and the moon that go up and down, but it is the earth that moves in a circle. When we are up here it is day and when we go down it is night and when it is night it is always dark in the sky where the moon is present. This is a nice synthetic model. This is a prevalent explanation of the day and night cycle by the children who suppose to understand the scientic explanation. Now let us examine the children who have a hollow sphere model of the earth. How do you explain the day and night cycle if you think that we are inside a hollow
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sphere and when the earth and the moon are supposed to be located on top of you? These children interpret the earths rotation to be an east/west rotation. Obviously, these children do not interpret the rotation as up/down, since they do not know about the earths gravity and they think that people will fall down if they are outside the earth. So their model is one of sideways i.e. east/west rotation rather than up/down rotation. As the earth rotates, people go from the place that is day, where the sun is located, to the place where is night, where the moon is located. This is the model of the day/night cycle found in many of the explanations of the children with a hollow sphere model. They often try their best to take into consideration all the physical data that they have at their disposal. When we point out to them that their explanations are inconsistent, they try to repair the inconsistencies. They try to formulate explanations that are empirically adequate and they get disturbed by logical inconsistency. We see a lot of sensitivity to the issues of empirical adequacy and logical consistency even in elementary school children. We also looked at the geocentric and heliocentric models of the solar system. The younger children think that the earth is located at the centre and the sun is revolving around the earth (when they understand revolution). The older children believe in heliocentric model. We have not found that there is particular difculty in changing from a geocentric to a heliocentric model of the solar system. What we have found is that children have a great deal of difculty in understanding the shape of the earth. Once they understand the spherical shape of the earth and something about gravity, then they do not have a great deal of difculty in creating heliocentric models of the solar system. To sum up: I started by telling you about science education research, and how research in science education is basically interested in instruction, how we cannot have a theory of instruction before we understand some of the more basic things about conceptual development, how concepts are organised, and how conceptual change takes place. I mentioned some of the results from the studies on conceptual change in observational astronomy. Still, developmental research focuses mainly on internal process and not on the environmental variables that promote activity and cognitive change. In order to be able to have the theory of instruction, we need to bridge the developmental and science education approaches, inorder to produce a theoretical base for a theory of learning and of instruction. We need to understand what are the environmental variables that promote the kind conceptual change mentioned above. References diSessa, A.: 1993, Toward an epistemology of physics, Cognition and Instruction 10, 105225. Driver, R. and Easley, J.: 1978, Pupils and Paradigms: A Review of literature related to concept development in adolescent science students, Studies in Science Education 5, 6184.
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Helm, H. and Novak, J.: 1983, Proceedings of the International Seminar: Misconceptions in Science and Mathematics, Department of Education, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. Novak, J.: 1977, An Alternative to Piagetian Psychology for Science and Mathematics Education, Science Education 61, 453477. Novak, J.: 1987, Proceedings of the Second International Seminar: Misconceptions and Educational Strategies and Mathematics, Vol. II, Department of Education, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. Samarapungavan, A. Vosniadou, S. and Brewer, W.: 1996, Thinking about the earth, the sun and the moon: Indian Childrens Cosmologies, Cognitive Development 11, 491521. Vosniadou, S.: 1994, Capturing and Modeling the Process of Conceptual Change, Learning and Instruction 4, 4569. Vosniadou, S.: 1998, From Conceptual Development to Science Education: A Psychological Point of View, International Journal of Science Education 20(10), 12131230. Vosniadou, S. and Brewer, W.: 1992, Mental Models of the Earth: A Study of Conceptual Change in Childhood, Cognitive Psychology 24, 535585. Vosniadou, S. and Brewer, W.: 1994, Mental Models of the Day/Night Cycle, Cognitive Science 18, 123124. inputnagarjun2.tex
Introducing History of Science in Science Education: A Perspective from Chemical Education

Prajit K. Basu
University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad, India. Email: pkbsh@uohyd.ernet.in
In this paper I argue that it is as yet unclear whether history of science can play a role in science education. I argue that whether history of science may or may not be relevant for science education is a complex question and does not lend itself to an easy answer. It is also an empirical issue whether history of science is effective in science education. I also point out that there are certain reasons to think that one cannot use history of science across the board to enhance science education. What I am going to do is to rst quickly enumerate the questions that arise in the context of science education. One of them is that science education is an umbrella term which means it is quite ambiguous and it needs to be sorted out. For my own edication I have sorted it out for myself and I show that delineating various meanings of science education tends to show that the role of history of science in science education should be questioned even more threadbare. Next, I look at the general argument that history and philosophy of science play an important role in science education. Again, I try to show that the argument is not very straight forward, and we do not have really a knocked down argument in favour of the claim that history of science can play a signicant role in science education. Thirdly, I look at certain concepts in chemistry and explore whether history and philosophy of science can play any role in the instruction of those concepts in the classroom situation. 1 Varieties of Science Education. Straight forwardly science education will depend upon rst answering the question: What should we include in science? Should we include both natural sciences and social sciences? Can we include history? Because history used to be a part of sciences or natural philosophical concerns long time ago. In fact, as E.H. Carr points out, history is included in sciences in all European languages except in English.1 Lastly, should one include philosophy? After all natural sciences were known as philosophy a couple of hundred years ago. Philosophy is supposed to be mother of all sciences. Now, this brings us to the question of demarcation that how will one decide what should be included in science? How does one separate out science part from the non-science part? And the question is can philosophy help? It is indeed a bit ironic that one has to take help of philosophy to settle the issue whether science can be separated out from the other non-science intellectual endeavours when one is wondering whether philosophy is a part of science or not. This attempt to disambiguate science from other non-science endeavours has been addressed by scholars, and there have been claims that it would
1 Carr,
E. H.: 1974, What is History? Penguin, London, p. 56.
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be possible to separate out science from the non-science in terms of method. Science is supposed to follow a method. It is this method which characterises science, and disambiguates it from non-science. However, the last (almost) 50 years of work in philosophy of science clearly brings out that it is remarkably difcult to really pin down a single method which informs science. This raises the possibility that there may be various kinds of methods that are employed in science, by the scientists, and there may even be a problem of plurality of methods based on discipline specicity. Now this is so much for what to include in science and what to exclude, and the problems in deciding, therefore, science from the non-science aspect. There is also the problem that science is taught from secondary to high school, to college, to university and so on. This implies that science is introduced slowly over a period of time and hence there is some kind of gradation of content. This gradation of content, it seems to me, is indicative of certain demands. Keeping aside the issue about the specic scientic content that is involved in this gradation and how to achieve it and what is to be introduced at what level of instruction, I think the demand at one level can be understood as: Do we need science education for all school students, and do we need science education for all college students, and should methods of science or scientic investigation be part of science education? Finally, to put it a bit more contentiously, I shall use C.P. Snows example that there exists an almost an unbridgeable gap between scientists and the non-scientists. Snow used the example of second law of thermodynamics to make the point that the non-scientists have no idea whatsoever about this law. So, the question then is should we expect that all the non-scientists know the content of the second law of thermodynamics, or, take the more recent example: What are Bucky balls? The questions raised above highlight that there are problems regarding what we expect the students at different levels to know. This, in turn, will have repercussions on how and what should be introduced in different stages of science education. The next is the question about science being a cultural enterprise. Here there are two aspects. One is that of the scientic community (the smaller cultural group). The scientic community has its own cultural norms regarding how to do science, what constitutes good science, and what constitutes bad science and so on. I will outline some of these later on when I come to chemical education. The second aspect is that science as a cultural enterprise is embedded in the wider society or wider culture. To the extent it is a part of the wider culture it will interact with the larger society in various ways and the Science, Technology, and Society issues become important. The question then is should these also be included in science education curriculum? Last but not least, I think science education itself is a cultural enterprise. It might be seen in the wider society as a certain kind of cultural initiation. Besides, in the classroom situation, it is well known by now that students come with their own conceptions and ideas. It is also equally well known how counter-intuitive some of the scientic ideas or concepts of science are. If there is a counter-intuitive aspect in scientic ideas, then, of course, these concepts will not match with the life world domain concepts that the students bring to the classroom. So, there is an attempt in science education which needs to be perhaps sensitive to the fact that science education is an attempt to replace the world view of the students, which they get from their
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cultural milieu. These students come to the science classrooms with their own ideas, and there is an entirely different culture (of unintuitive scientic ideas) that she/he has to confront. How will these two cultures match or interact? It is a question that science educators must worry about.2 2 Role of History and Philosophy of Science in Science Education Having made these preliminary remarks, I now go on to the question about the role of history and philosophy of science in science education. I wish to begin with a set of arguments offered by both the protagonists and the antagonists because that will highlight the issue sharply. The protagonists point is that history and philosophy of science does give a better picture of science than what is given in the textbook. A textbook, at any level of science education, at present, often gives the students an erroneous picture of scientists destroying all the irrational and old ideas and establishing new ideas. It does not bring out the fact about science being a kind of human enterprise, or about science being a social and cultural enterprise. But history and philosophy of science can begin to give the students a better picture. The modern textbooks will not tell the students about plurality of methods. It will almost indoctrinate the students that there is one and only one method that is employed in science. It is not surprising that any undergraduate student who has gone through school education claims that there is one and only one method called scientic method. All these ideas can be gotten rid of, at least the claim is, through introduction of history and philosophy of science in science education. Students, through the help of historical episodes and philosophical arguments, will be able to understand that some of these ideas about the method in science are highly problematic. Now once people have a better picture of what science is all about, then they can decide on their own what science can do and what science can not do. This means that they understand what the limitations of science are. They do not anymore expect science to solve each and every problem of their lives or of the life of other individuals of society at large. They know where to stop. This will indeed be a huge gain, if students come out of the classrooms with this realization although it is not clear that this will indeed be the major outcome of the instruction. Secondly, introduction of history and philosophy of science will improve actual science education or science instruction in classroom and laboratory. And here the way things are supposed to work is that students basically follow the scientists in the conceptual conicts and within that course discover with them. Now I know that discovery learning of certain sorts has been discredited long time ago. But here what I have in mind is that the kind of discovery that students do with the scientists is to recognize that scientists of the olden times had faced a whole lot of difculties in their work. The difculty could arise either in clarifying a concept, or having claried the concepts to an extent, how to design experiments. The difculty could also arise from the open ended nature of the results of the experiments designed and the kind of cultural conicts the scientists had gone through as they had tried to see the bearing
2 Solomon,
J., and Addinell, S.: 1983, Science in Social Context, Hateld, Oxford.
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of the evidence on the hypothesis and so on. Sometimes, in this process, the scientists might have reached a blind alley. They had retracted their steps, had gone back and thought about it and so on. This process is a messy affair. As the students get to know those, and follow the scientists in their footsteps to what might be called the appropriate or more correct theory or understanding the students discover as it were along with the scientists. So, the students are in the position of the scientists taking similar steps and they are facing the problem that the scientists were facing. This way of learning, if this is how students do actually learn, will, perhaps, undermine their faith in nave inductivism, which means the students will recognize that scientists do not go out and make observations, and directly induce the results. Even if they take a not very complicated experiment, they look at the observation, and they may not see that this must be the relation between the properties that they have been looking for. So this lack of obvious relation between the observations made during the course of an experiment and the relation among properties they may be attempting to establish does undermine that the theories or hypotheses in science are directly induced from the observations. I use the example of Antoine Lavoisiers arguments to elaborate the above position a little more. Lavoisiers thesis about compound nature of some chemical substance is a sophisticated position and this position tells us something insightful when one has a complicated argumentation or complicated experiment going on. A lot of things happen in science besides doing an experiment or thinking about the concepts. So, consider Lavoisiers four experiments which are supposed to establish the compound nature of water.3 It seems to me, as I went through the descriptions of these arguments, that these (were, and still) are difcult experiments to do. In fact, these were indeed very difcult experiments to do in the eighteenth century and these were not unproblematic at that time. Very respectable scientists at that time, including Joseph Priestley, found all kinds of problems with these experiments. Yet, there is something to be said about the way Lavoisier presented his arguments and the way he presented the results of his experiments. Let me dramatize it, before I show what was interesting about Lavoisiers argument. It is well known that, according to Lavoisier, a compound is classied as acidic if it had oxygen in it as a chemical constituent. This is because the word oxygen (more correctly oxygene) means acidic principle. So, any compound, at least binary, that has oxygen is acidic. Yet Lavoisier failed to realize that water is not acidic. Water contains oxygen and it is not acidic and to top it all, if one looks ahistorically, Joseph Priestley over and over again pointed out that if water is synthesized, a little bit of acid could always be detected in it.4 Now, with the hindsight it can be explained why that acid is there. It is there simply because chemical substances, including elements, in the eighteenth century, could not be puried completely. So, since water was synthesized by Lavoisier by burning oxygen and hydrogen together in a vessel, and these gases could not be puried completely there was always a bit of nitrogen and carbon dioxide in the vessel. Carbon dioxide continued to remain there and the nitrogen became nitric oxide and a
4 Priestley, 3 Lavoisier,
A.: 1965, Elements of Chemistry, trans. R. Kerr, Dover Publications, New York. J.: 1799, On the Phlogistic Theory, New York Medical Repository 2, 383-387.
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little bit of acid was also synthesized by dissolution of these oxides in the water that was synthesized by the combination of oxygen and hydrogen. It is easy to see how the situation can become muddy. Lavoisier could have said that the presence of acid proved his case. Water is a bit acidic because it contains oxygen. Yet he is so driven by his own idea that water is a compound and if pure elements are used in the experiment of synthesizing water from its constituents, then the reactants will contain only pure hydrogen and pure oxygen. If these are put together and heated water should be formed. He was more interested to point out that the acidity that one would detect, in synthesized water, was because of impurity and not because water by itself could be an acid. What he could have said that water was a very mild acid. Although scientists had not realized that water was an acid, but it indeed was. Anyway, the heart of the problem is that Lavoisiers belief was that if pure elements (for him elements are like particles or made up of particles) were made to go through certain kinds of reactions then only a certain kinds of compounds would be produced. This is of course based on scientists accepting Lavoisiers understanding of the principle of conservation of mass, principle of chemical elementarity, or principle of chemical simplicity. So, underlying Lavoisiers arguments is the idealization of the reaction protocols and this aspect of idealization is something that Michael Matthews brings out in his argument, where he talks about Galileos experiments with pendulum.5 Clearly, one can never get the kind of results that Galileo had reported. One really cannot get those kinds of pure results. One needs to idealize. And what Lavoisier did was to idealize and tried to show what an ideal chemical experiment would look like, and drew conclusions from those experiments. Now, if we go back to this question about science instruction and if we look at or if we follow let us say Lavoisier in his trails, we will realize what kind of arguments that the protagonists, for introducing history of science in science education, are employing. What we need to do in order to do good science like Lavoisier or Galileo is to be able to idealize in the right kind of context. It seems to me that this is a bit too much to expect from high school students. If the students are put in the kind of conict that Lavoisier went through and are asked here you are at this stage: How will you proceed and should you not idealize now, should you not think that the atoms are pure things and when are they pure and you put them together will they behave in such and such way. I think that is a bit too much to ask. For secondary science education at least at 7-8th standard when the idea of water as a compound is introduced it is a tall order at least or at best, and at worst it will not lead to the kind of expectations that history and philosophy of science is supposed to bring out in science instruction. There is another argument of the antagonists. This is a well known argument (H)istory of science is an academic discipline. If we include in history of science what academic historians actually produce, the science students may not do justice to the material that the historians have produced. If they do justice to the material, no initiation to the paradigm based understanding and research is possible, where a paradigm is understood in the way Thomas Kuhn had employed the term in his book The Struc5 Matthews, M. R.: 1992, History, Philosophy, and Science Teaching: The Present Rapprochement, Science and Education, 1, 11-47.
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ture of Scientic Revolutions. This is basically the heart of the argument that Kuhn, 6 Martin Kline,7 or Steven Brush8 has given. So, they conclude from this that either history of science is not useful to train scientists or history of science will lead to situation where it will not be possible to train scientists. So if someone is good in interpreting history of science well, (s)he will not feel like doing science. The claim is that to do science after having gured out that scientists do all kinds of stuff is a tall order. At least it will begin to inhibit students from pursuing science, or it will not serve the purpose of introducing scientic concepts through history of science. There is a reply of course. Michael Matthews, as a major protagonist, claims that one needs to introduce history of science in moderation5. It is not advisable to take the research outputs of the historians of science and introduce that directly into high school science curriculum. The point is well taken. However, it seems to me the counter reply involves a certain kind of pragmatism. This pragmatism implies that the question, What should be the outcome of science learning? needs to be rst answered. In science instruction there are some expectations at the end of instruction, and what these expectations are need to be answered. It is not the same question as what was actually the process of growth in science. If these two questions are different, then it is a completely and totally empirical question whether the answer to the second question has any bearing on the answer to the rst. This is I think one point or one area where the pragmatists or the people who suggest moderation in introducing history of science in science education either fail to recognize or havent satisfactorily addressed. 3 History of Chemistry in Chemical Education So much for general science education, and the role of history and philosophy of science in science education. Now, I address specic question about chemical education. Taking the last concern in the section above rst, I rst look at the response to the question: What is the aim of chemical education? Here is what M. J. Frazer claims is the general aim of chemistry should be like:9 to prepare students for professional career in science especially in chemistry, to contribute to general education using chemistry as an instrument and to inform future citizens of the country of the nature and the role which chemistry plays in everyday life. I shall dispose of the rst aim with some preliminary remarks since I wish to enquire the role of history of chemistry/science in achieving the other two aims at this
6 Kuhn, T. S.: 1977, The Essential Tension: Tradition and Innovation in Scientic Research, in his The Essential Tension, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 225-239. 7 Klein, M. J.: 1972, Use and Abuse of Historical Teaching in Physics, in, S.G. Brush and A.L. King, (eds.), History in the Teaching of Physics, University Press of New England, Hanover. 8 Brush, S. G.: 1974, Should the History of Science be Rated X?, Science, 18, 1164-1172. 9 Frazer, M. J.: 1975, Up-to-date and Precise Learning Objectives in Chemistry, New Trends in Chemistry, The UNESCO Press, Paris, IV, 43-53.
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stage. I shall take up the role of history of science in achieving the rst aim in some detail in the next section. It may be seen that the rst point is related specically to those students who will become chemists and the last two to more like chemistry for citizens. Before I make the preliminary remarks regarding the rst aim, I introduce two other lists that tend to document in more detail what are the expectations of a course in chemistry. Some of these courses are under the rubric of chemistry for citizens. One list is organized after taking a poll among chemistry educators, as to what should a course of chemistry for citizens at the secondary school level aim to achieve.10 These aims include: 1. to assist the overall development and maturation of the student, 2. to show that science is a human activity and is a part of cultured persons world view, 3. to provide an indication of the way scientists work by seeing relations between concepts and validating these by empirical tests, 4. to instil an awareness of the profound and far reaching consequences of the uses and abuses of science, 5. to show the historical continuity of the growth of science, 6. to generate a liking for science, and 7. to develop the facility for critical and unbiased observation. It may be seen from the above list that there is not much emphasis in terms of the objectives which require introducing lessons in terms of introducing STS. There is something in the 4th point which is aimed at achieving an awareness of the profound and far reaching consequences of uses and abuses of the science. Otherwise the list underscores that there is or should be some attempt to introduce what may be called the nature and method of science. There is an attempt to show the continuity of growth of science and there by alerting them to science being a historical process. Then the 6th one is interesting in that it takes that chemical education should attempt to generate a liking for science and that is where the ideology for science education comes in. The 7th point says that chemical education should develop the facility for critical and unbiased observation. I am not sure what kind of unbiased observation one will generate in chemical contexts. It is an aim which may be unattainable unless an account of unacceptable biasedness is spelt out, argued for, and already in place. I now take up the last list which is much more extensive and hence is more illuminating. This list is prepared from the information sought from the research chemists in USA.11 I rst enumerate the list before taking up some of these in the rest of my paper.
10 Idem. 11 Billing,
D. E., Private Communication, referred in footnote 9 above, p. 52.
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1. To develop and sustain an interest in science and in chemistry as a central, supporting and challenging area of study 2. To develop a working knowledge of, and favourable attitude towards, scientic methods of investigation, using chemistry as an example 3. To encourage the exercise of curiosity and creative imagination, and an appreciation of the role of such speculation in the selection and solution of problems, the construction of hypotheses, and the design of experiments 4. To develop the ability to see, and the habit of looking for, inter-relationships between individual phenomena, principles, theories, philosophies or problems 5. To develop an appreciation of scientic criteria and a concern for objectivity and precision 6. To develop an understanding of the fundamental and unifying principles underlying the behaviour of atoms, ions and molecules, and an ability to apply these principles to real problems involving materials in various physical and biological conditions 7. To develop the skills, knowledge and habits required for the safe, efcient and thoughtful manipulation of chemicals and apparatus in common laboratory procedures 8. To develop condence and skill in the quantitative formulation of problems and in the treatment of data 9. To develop in the student the ability and predisposition to think logically, to communicate clearly by written and oral means, and to read critically and with understanding 10. To promote the students understanding of science, technology, economic and sociological factors in modern society, and of the contributions they can make to improve material conditions and to widen mans imaginative horizons and his understanding of the universe 11. To encourage the applications of chemical knowledge and skills to problems which are of importance to the community, in particular the optimum use of natural resources 12. To provide an opportunity for the development of the students motivation and social maturity, including an appreciation of his own limitations in relation to a career choice which will be fruitful to himself and to society 13. To develop the students understanding of the structure, values and procedures of chemical industry, and the chemists professional role in such a situation
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14. To develop a knowledge of, and familiarity with the use of, important sources of chemical information 15. To make the student aware of the limitations of his disciplines and their methods and to provide opportunities for him to understand, make and criticize value judgements 16. To cope with individual differences in the abilities and interests of students, so as to ensure the optimum development of each students potentialities for achievement and satisfaction and 17. To draw upon staff interests and expertise in such ways that the teaching is challenging and satisfying This extensive list brings out some of the aims of chemistry courses and it is possible to see that the list tries to achieve a range of expertise for chemistry learners. There are efforts to introduce students to aspects of philosophy of science, the idea(s) of method in science in general and in chemistry in particular. The interdisciplinary nature of chemistry is another objective that is supposed to be achieved through chemistry instruction. There are a few which underscore the relations between science, technology, and society. The last two are more close to the problems of day to day learning of teaching chemistry. One interesting aim included in the list is that the students must be able to understand the limitations of science in solving a wide ranging problems and make value judgements. I think that goal is quite laudable although hardly satised by any course in chemistry. I wish to start with the rst aim in the list above. It claims that one of the goals of courses in chemistry should be to develop and sustain an interest in science and in chemistry as a central, supporting and challenging area of study. There have often been complaints that chemical education has fostered memorization of facts and very many of them at that. As a result chemistry courses have been rather boring and have driven good students away from chemistry. While responding to this challenge, various curricula reforms were brought about in all areas of science including chemistry. The courses developed by CHEM study, in USA, Nufeld Foundation, in UK, and the Scottish Education Department, in UK, were intended to improve learning through science. There were much more emphasis on understanding the principles of chemistry and less emphasis on remembering facts. However, chemists began to complain soon that the students continue to have poor understanding of chemistry. An interesting and pioneering article by R. J. Gillespie,12 written in 1977, and quoted somewhat approvingly by M. Chastrette and C. N. R. Rao,13 in 1992, emphasized that chemistry training requires remembering facts. Otherwise, there would be embarrassing response from students, like Silver Chloride (AgCl) is a green liquid. More substantively, Gillespie argues that, the principles that are taught in introductory courses are not a part of
R. J.: 1977, IUPAC International Newsletter on Chemical Education, (6) M., and Rao, C. N. R.: 1992, New Trends in Chemistry Teaching: An Overview Giving Examples of Innovative Projects, New Trends in Chemistry Teaching, The UNESCO Press, Paris, VI, 9-14.
13 Chastrette, 12 Gillespie,
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chemistry.14 Thermodynamics, Kinetic Theory, and Quantum mechanics are areas of physics that have proved particularly useful in chemistry. These theories are useful since these explain chemical facts and help understand the phenomena in chemistry. This raises the question: What is chemistry? I now deal with this question briey before I get on with my task to look at the aims of chemistry and whether history of chemistry/science can full these aims. It has been argued that chemistry is a central science.15 Now it is unclear in what sense is it a central science. The notion of centrality has been viewed in more than one way by chemists and scholars. Chemistry may be taken to be conceptually central because it is conceptually networked with a variety of other disciplines. Often chemistry is viewed this way because of its strong links with physics and biology. This, however, does not mean that chemistry is foundationally central. In fact the present wisdom is that (most of) chemistry is, in principle, reducible to physics. Yet another kind of centrality is possible. It has been argued that chemical change, or lack of it, is so much a part of everything with which we come in contact and everything we do, it is in a very real sense the central science. Besides this what are the interesting features of chemistry? Gillespie argues that chemistry is the science of various forms and their transformations. In other words, it is the science of properties and reactions of substances. He claims that
The preparations of new substances and their study of properties is one of the main activities of the chemist whether (s)he is an industrial chemist preparing new semiconductors or new drugs or an academic chemist preparing new compounds simply to nd out how a previously unexplored combination of element behaves.16
To quote Gillispie again,

The student who never goes into doing any more chemistry, never gets an opportunity to see the application of the principles of any real chemistry. (S)he never learns what chemistry is about. (S)he never learns anything about the fascination of making something new, something that has been never made before: The synthetic aspect of chemistry. It is one of the aspects of chemistry that distinguishes it from biology, from physics, and from other sciences. 17
I shall return to the issue of synthesis in the next section. The second list enumerated above subsumes the aims in the rst list and is more akin to an elaboration of items and 2 and 3 in the more extended third list. As mentioned above, when we look at the list of aims mentioned against courses on Chemistry for Citizens, we see that students are expected to internalize certain philosophical views about science. This is supposed to be part of the result of a good chemical/science education. A. J. Harrison points out quite appropriately that although research scientists think navely that whatever they produce in the laboratory are ready for market, an array
14 Gillespie, R. J.: 1981, Chemistry: Fact or Fiction?, New Trends in Chemistry Teaching, The UNESCO Press, Paris, V, 35-40. 15 Newbold, B. T.: 1981, Chemical Education: The Current Challenging Scene, New Trends in Chemistry Teaching, The UNESCO Press, Paris, V, 22-28. 16 Gillespie, R. J.: 1981, Chemistry: Fact or Fiction?, New Trends in Chemistry Teaching, The UNESCO Press, Paris, V, 36. 17 ibid.
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of organizations mediate between the research scientists and the consumer. 18 Some of these organizations include political/planning establishments, industrial groups, judiciary, trade unions, consumer protection groups etc. A smooth liasion among these various groups may as well depend upon persons with chemical/scientic training to be members of these organizations and recognize the role of chemistry/science in bringing about material difference to the society. In order to achieve these goals, the chemical education must have a social dimension. This, however, may not mean that the general concepts of chemical systems and chemical change are not within the grasp of the public. It implies instead that there is no reason why chemistry courses should be more difcult than a course in history. 19 The success will be measured by the attitudes of the individuals towards themselves. Have they grown in their condence to extend their knowledge at the level of public media? The emphasis is not whether they have only learnt certain techniques. The social dimension is also captured by recognizing that learning of chemistry should go hand in hand with its social application. The third social dimension is the social nature of chemical discovery. Here, one may try to introduce through the study of chemistry and of discoveries within it, Mertonian social attributes attending the practices of chemistry within a scientic community. A good way to achieve that will be to introduce institutional history.20 A wider social history may also alert students to the national, political, military, and industrial demands leading to orienting scientic work in specic directions. This is one reason why history of chemistry/science may become useful to chemistry/science education. It has been argued that science provides opportunities for students to practice or use some of the more obvious processes such as hypothesizing, observing and recognizing patterns. However, many other subjects can provide equally good opportunities. To the future citizens, the skills which are most important may be least specic to science. Thus the philosophy of science training is claimed to be possible without explicitly introducing philosophy of science. 4 History of Chemistry and Chemical Education We can now get on with our attempts to answer the question about history of chemistry and how this history might help chemical/science education. As mentioned above, chemistry has been called a central science. Although the conceptual centrality is doubtful, not much depends upon that one way or the other. Often chemical phenomena are best understood or explained by appealing to chemical categories. This allows the chemists to get on with their jobs. The common chemical concepts are generally of high complexity since objectphenomenon relations in chemistry are generally quite intricate. Some of the examples of basic chemical concepts include chemical species, reaction mechanism, structure, conformation, stoichiometry or non-stoichiometry,
18 Harrison, A. J.: 1981, Chemical Education and the Expectations of Society, New Trends in Chemistry Teaching, The UNESCO Press, Paris, V 19-21. 19 Idem., p. 20. 20 Fensham, P.: 1981, Social Content in Chemistry Courses, New Trends in Chemistry Teaching, The UNESCO Press, Paris, V, 31-34.
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and chemical equilibrium. Equally basic and fundamental concepts in chemistry are those of element, mixture, and compound. It is worth exploring whether history of chemistry can help understand these three basic concepts easily and accurately. And I turn to that question next. 6-7 standard students are introduced this very elementary notion of distinction between element, mixture and compound. Anyone who has gone through 6-7 standard books developed by the National Council of Educational Research and Training, India, is expected to understand what these concepts are. Yet it turns out that students have remarkable difculty in understanding the distinction and in applying the same in not so straightforward instances. This I gured out only two days ago in this workshop. I am thankful to the two teachers who have pointed this to me that the teachers or the students who will become teachers and are enrolled in the B.Ed. program have shown a remarkable inability to distinguish between a mixture and a compound, or an element and a compound. Suppose we wish to look at the distinction between the three concepts mentioned above. The modern denition of a chemical element is that its atoms are of the same kind. A mixture is dened by a sleight of hand as that which is neither an element nor a compound. A compound is a result of a combination of at least two atoms, one each belonging to two disparate elements. This seems to be one place where history of chemistry may be expected to intervene since the history of the seventeenth and the eighteenth century chemistry is rich with attempts made by the chemical philosophers, of those days, to develop a set of criteria to disambiguate these concepts from each other while attempting to disambiguate these objects of chemical investigation from those of mechanical investigations. That gets to me thinking, that can I use the historical attempts by the chemists of the 17th and the 18th centuries starting from Robert Boyle up until Pierre Macquare when they tried to establish disciplinary autonomy of what might be called chemical philosophy from mechanical philosophy? Basically the attempt is to demarcate chemistry from physics. Because physics was in some sense more professionalised at that time and chemistry was not, and because the chemical philosophers felt that they did chemical philosophy in its own terms and they were very good at it, and hence could as well claim some kind of disciplinary autonomy. But if one wants to claim some kind of disciplinary autonomy, then (s)he must show that chemical elements, chemical composites like mixtures, and chemical composites like compounds are different from what might be called physical particles or mechanical particles, and mechanical composites. Now how do we go about doing it. About 150 years of philosophical and theoretical analyses were pressed into service starting form Boyle and until Macquare.21 These attempts by the European chemical philosophers show that these distinctions are tied to the notion of chemical and physical (mechanical) properties and the distinction between them, and to the notions of chemical and physical (mechanical) operations and the distinctions between them. And these attempts were circular, and the chemists had to get on with their jobs in spite of the lack of this
21 Basu, P. K.: 1996, Disciplinary Autonomy of Chemical Philosophy: A Philosophical Dilemma of the 17th and the 18th Century Chemical Philosophers, Presented in Annual Australasian Association of History, Philosophy, and Sociology of Science Meeting, Auckland.
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resolution. The picture hence is not pretty. It does not help to introduce the historical debate to clarify the distinction among the concepts. The history of chemistry here is not much of help. This shows that if we want to bring to bear this 150 years of debate into the classroom, no matter how much we want to impose on the history it will not lead to a very pretty learning/instruction situation. It will rather be a murky event for the teachers as well as for the students. The debate, however, will be of enormous help for junior college or undergraduate college level students in a different sense. It can show very clearly how scientists attempt to develop analytical arguments to clarify the concepts they use. The sophisticated use of reasoning, appeal to empirical observations relevant for the case in hand are examples which can help train students to develop a critical and analytical inclination. But given that the above chemical concepts are introduced at the 7th standard science curriculum, situation is not conducive to introduce these philosophical and methodological intricacies. I now come to another example which seems to resist introduction of history of science by the very nature of the endeavour itself. It may be remembered that chemists agree that synthesis of materials constitute an important aspect of chemistry. If chemical synthesis is a part of chemical education, then one needs to ask whether it can be historically packaged for teaching. The reasons for apprehension or question may be because of the nature of the enterprise itself. Chemical synthesis, be it organic or inorganic, in liquid state, gaseous state, or solid state, requires that materials of certain kind are made to react to make a desired product. Of course, there are situations where scientists start a reaction without a specic product in mind. Historically there have been various synthetic routes developed to arrive at a desired end. These developments occurred through the application of specic knowledgethermodynamic, reaction rates, stereochemistry or geometry of the starting materials or of product(s), modes of interaction among the reactants. Yet these knowledge claims are in some sense a reasonable guide at best. Their status is not that of a theory or a law explaining or predicting phenomena. That much is obvious since failure of a synthesis process in a new situation is not a serious evidence against these laws. I think that the logic of the situation is somewhat different. I am going to rely on Ian Hackings argument that experimenting or synthesising is a kind of intervening.22 New phenomena or materials are created in laboratory under carefully controlled conditions. Control of initial and boundary conditions (maintenance of relatively closed systems) is crucial to the emergence of the regularities underlying various synthetic processes. However, this practical mediation makes the practical application of the regularities problematic. The chemists design a synthetic compound for it to perform a desired function. They want to be assured that the compound will perform that function. But this can happen if the boundaries of the system can be dened and xed. But in a new synthesis that is rarely the case. Now I want to begin to answer why that is so. If we remember that at times the regularities arrived at or the laws cannot be expressed in a straight forward fashion in terms of a universal generalization, then we realize that these statements of reg22 Hacking,
I.: 1983 Representing and Intervening, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
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ularities may contain a ceteris paribus clause. These are like P is a Q,other things being equal. The explanations and predictions using these laws are somewhat shaky. This is because the condition, other things being equal, may not obtain. This is what is underscored, in the case of synthesis, by pointing out that the boundaries of the system are not dened and xed. The real world is complex and hence the conditions involving the occurrence of P may be complex enough not to let Q happen. There are two ways of getting around this. One way is to modify the real world environment to the extent that it mimics the environment of the laboratory with the dened boundary conditions which result in the regularity of if P then Q. So, basically what we do is, if we have a synthetic route and we want to apply it to a new context, then what we need to be able to do is as simple as change and modify the context in such a way that we can run our synthesis. The other is to mimic the environment of the world in the laboratory, which means to be able to say that here we have a complex situation and we need to mimic this in the context of our synthetic route.23 That may be an expensive affair since the world would keep changing and mimicking these variations in the laboratory may not be viable. So the option in this case is then to take the law of nature or the regularity of the world and attempt to modify the world. This attempt to modify the world may not always be possible and given that seldom it is one law of nature or regularity that is involved in the synthetic procedure, the open ended nature of synthesis and the lack of viability and efcacy of various laws or regularities in various situations becomes apparent. This open ended nature of chemical synthesis is apparent when you look at the synthesis of some of the recent materials specially the superconducting materials like one, two, three super conductors (Y Ba2 Cu3 O7 ), and Bucky ball, the C-60 molecule. Although both are designer materials, the actual synthesis of which required extraordinary manipulations of the environment, and was assisted by a certain degree of chance. If the expectation is that these ideas of chemical synthesis may be introduced historically in science instruction, and these ideas will help in conceptual learning of students regarding the nature of synthesis, it is not clear how that will be possible. In the context of actual instruction in chemical synthesis through history, it is unclear whether the instruction will give the students the correct picture. This is because even if we learn how a certain kind of compound can be transformed into another kind of compound, the next time a student wants to make anything new, and chemical synthesis is all about making something new, the old information is never enough. One has to be much more innovative to realize that one has to keep changing the environment of the world such that the new synthetic law or new synthetic regularities can play out their role and it is here I claim that historical lessons might not be of help. However, there are some methodological lessons that one can draw from discussing the history of synthesis of chemical compounds. One of these is to make the students realize that synthesis is an open ended endeavor and whenever it comes to employing chemical synthesis ideas in a new context one needs to be able to control the world in a new environment. These are some of the tips that one can give. Chemical synthesis is something that is taught at 11th or 12th standard. And it is unclear whether at that
23 Latour,
B.: 1987, Science in Action, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
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level history of chemical synthesis can be employed to help science instruction in this area. In general conclusion, I become a bit more provocative by pointing out that science education has a very strong cultural aspect. I come to that conclusion to an extent due to the fact that when you look at the way the colonial science was introduced into the Indian context it was to train the natives in moral issues. For the British, natives were immoral. For those natives the colonizers needed to teach certain kinds of science like arithmetic or geography and not anything else.24 The understanding was that the natives would become morally equipped having gone through the training. This is not to blame the British as such. Because the British tried to do on a similar line something to themselves. In the 19th century BAAS introduced chemical analysis as part of the chemical curriculum so as to give students some kind of mental training so that they become logical.25 Now, the idea of introducing chemical analysis is because one can use that method of chemical analysis to introduce what might be called a hypotheticodeductive mode of reasoning. So, if one has a hypothesis that sodium metal burns with a yellow ame, then one can predict that a salt containing sodium atom will test positive in a ame test. Now one can do a qualitative test. If the colour of the ame is yellow, hypothesis is conrmed and if the colour is something else, then the hypothesis is disconrmed. Since scientic knowledge is acquired and justied by this method, people at large will be better off using this method in their daily life since they can all be scientic in their outlook. And a citizen who is scientic is an asset to a countrys well being. Thus, mental training is a part of a larger game plan to have people with superior ability. So what one has to realize is that science education has this kind of game plan in some form or the other.
K.: 1997, Political Ideology of Education, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 42. D., Davey, A., and Jenkins, E. W.: 1986, Science for Specic Social Purposes (SSSP): Perspectives on Adult Literacy, Studies in Science Education, 13, 27-52.
25 Layton,
24 Kumar,
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Multicultural Mathematics, Anti-racist Mathematics: What can that be?

George Gheverghese Joseph
University of Manchester, UK. Email: george.joseph@man.ac.uk
At a Conservative party conference, the then British Prime Minister, Ms. Margaret Thatcher said: Children who need to know how to count and multiply are being taught anti-racist mathematics, whatever that be. The background to Prime Ministerial outburst is quite interesting, and I would like to believe that I had a part in it. A week earlier, I addressed a conference of mathematics teachers from inner city schools. The inner cities are where you nd some of the most deprived areas of Britain, and where teaching could be quite difcult. These are concentrations of ethnic minority populations, particularly people of Asian and Afro-Carribbean origins. And for some reason they unusually decided to televise snippets of that talk, and particularly a question that I was asked as to what I thought of multicultural mathematics. To tell you the truth, my interest or knowlege of multicultural mathematics at that time was still in its embryonic stage. I thought it was a good thing, and certainly if it was tied up with history which had tended to neglect or devalue the contributions of large sections of the world populations to the subject. I tried to bring in history into my classroom teaching, both at the school level as well as at the university level. I remember once being absolutely amazed by how students, reacted when I introduced Non-Euclidean geometry using history. Groups of students who previously found it totally irrelevant, probably half of them sleeping, suddenly woke up. So we were trying at the conference to nd out what would engage the school children of the inner city schools. It was around the time that Nelson Mandela was in the news. If I remember correctly, a musical jamboree had been organised in his honour. So somebody then asked how, using South Africa as an example, would one teach mathematics. So I suggested that one way may be to split up the class into three groups, blacks, whites and coloureds according to the proportion in the three groups in South Africa, divide the area of the classroom according to the share of the land available to the three groups and get each group to stand in the area allocated to them. The result was a huge concentration of students representing blacks in a relatively small area with hardly much space for them to stand and a lot of room for the students representing the whites. The coloured (consisting mainly of Indians and mixed race) were mainly concentrated into towns since there were restrictions during the apartheid on their owning land elsewhere. One of them asked me would this be anti-racist? So I said we could call it anti-racist mathematics. What I was trying to show there was that for mathematics to be relevant to most people, it should engage with peoples preoccupations, with peoples concerns and interests. It does not really matter what is the subject that you take up but you have to make it sufciently interesting for the students. For example, a group of youngsters
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Multicultural Mathematics, Anti-racist Mathematics

Sicily Hellenistic world Jund-i-Shapur (Persia) China
Toledo (Spain)
Cordoba (Spain)
Baghdad (Iraq) Cairo (Egypt)
India
Figure 1: An alternative trajectory for the Dark Ages. may be interested in the shapes and designs of the hubs on the wheels of cars. This could offer some good examples of symmetry. In a way for many, mathematics is seen as so remote, so irrelevant and so dull that they get turned off by the subject from their young days, resulting in mathphobia. At the same conference, a black teacher asked me whether there was any mathematics in Africa before the colonial period. The question was revealing for underlying it was a view of mathematics which we had consciously and subconsciouly imbibed of considering it unthinkable that Africans could produce mathematical knowledge. The view had fostered the myth that mathematics was a civilizing gift that Europe had brought to the colonies, a Promothean spark that in time would enable the backward natives to penetrate the secrets of science and technology and enter the world. I asked the teacher to tell me what he meant by mathematics. He was surprised when a distinction was made between Mathematics (with a capital M) and mathematics (with a small m). Mathematics with a capital M is a seminal discipline that some of us make a living from and mathematics with the small m is what most of people understand as mathematics and most people use as mathematics. There is a difference between them. Mathematics with a small m is and has been a universal activity. No society, however small or remote, has ever lacked the basic curiosity and number sense that is part of the global mathematical experience. The need to record information that gave birth to written language also brought forth a variety of number systems, each with its own strengths and peculiarities. Why is this so difcult to accept and so often ignored? What I am going to argue is that (putting in as provocative a fashion as possible), the answer lies in the nature of Eurocentrism. European mathematics had played a considerable role in the self-consciouness of Europe, its perception of itself as the greatest of cultures. It appropriated the contributions of non-Western cultures while simultaneously making them invisible. The traditional view of the way mathematics developed takes the form of a unilinear trajectory. Mathematics begins in Greece around 600 BC and end around 400 AD. One then has the Dark Ages, followed by
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Greece
Hellenistic world
Europe and her cultural dependencies
Mesopotamia
Dark Ages, but Greek learning kept alive by the Arabs
Renaissance
Figure 2: A modied Eurocentric trajectory. the Renaissance which was partly a result of the discovery of Greek learning. After that, devolopment of mathematics restarts and continues in Europe and her cultural dependencies. This is what I have described elsewhere as classical Eurocentric trajectory. But there were already problems with this unilinear trajectory as early as rst few decades of the century. The work of scholars such as Neugebauer showed us higher level of mathematics in Mesopotamia and Egypt and the debt owed by the early Greeks to these civilisations. The trajectory is now a little more complex. There is some recognition of Egypt and Mesopotamia. And a growing recognition of the Arabs but mostly as custodians of Greeks learnings, that is those who kept Greek learning alive before it was discovered by Europe. Even within this modied trajectory there is no recognition of other mathematical traditions, for example, written traditions such as Chinese, Indian or Mayan (in Central America). But it is the notion of a stagnant period called the Dark Ages that poses serious problems. Even European historians would now have doubts about characterising a period by such a name. However, historians of mathematics continue to subscribe to this outdated notions. In any case, the areas which were under darkness does not include any area outside the Euroasian peninsula which has come to be referred to as the separate continent of Europe. In the rest of the Asiatic and part of the African world as well as the American continents, there were considerable developments going on. Scientic knowledge was being transmitted across cultures, the catalyst being the Islamic civilisation of the 9th to the 14th centuries (Figure 1). I will refer to this mathematical tradition as Arab, since the texts and communication of that period took place in Arabic. There were contributions coming through from the Hellenistic world, India and later China. Centers of learning changed from Jund-i-Shapur (important even before the rise of Islam) to Baghdad, and then to Cairo and later Cordoba and Toldeo in Spain. Some recent evidence indicates that there was a movement later to North and West Africa (Magrheb). I wish I knew at the time of the conference of mathematics teachers from inner city schools which I mentioned earlier what I know now. I could have provided a better answer to the teacher who asked me about mathematics in Africa.
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Indian Brahmi numerals, c. 300 BC Indian Gwalior numerals, c. AD 500 Western Arabic, or Gobar, c. 950 Eastern Arabic, c. 800 European apices, c. 1000 European (Durer), c. 1500
Figure 3: The evolution of present-day numerals. When one goes on to consider the nature and range of inuences that went into the making of Arab mathematics during the period of the so-called Dark Ages, one has a very rich picture of multiculturalism in mathematics (Figure 1). There are the Egyptian and Babylonian inuences going into the formation of classical Greek mathematics, the mathematics associated with names such as Thales and Pythagoras. We then have a growing divergence between the classical Greek and Hellenistic traditions where the latter is associated with names such as Euclid, Apollonius, Archimedes and Diophantus where new inuences from Egyptian and Babylonian traditions make themselves felt in Alexandria on the African continent. There are links between Hellenistic and Persian traditions, where the transmissions are not necessarily through books or written records but through trade and travel where the silk route must have played an important role. And when we come to the inuences on Arab mathematics, the transmission of ideas from India becomes more important from around 850 AD. This is clearly illustrated in the evolution of our number system (Figure 3). The Figure shows the genesis of our number system, starting with the Indian Brahmi system or possibly some Chinese variant, the introduction of zero, the establishment of a full positional system, the evolution of East and West Arab numerals, and the transmission across Spain and Sicily westwards to Europe. A parallel movement eastwards from India to Indo-China and South East Asia (Java, Sumatra). The similarities between the Gwalior system of representing numbers to our own numerals are sufcient for us to call our system Indo-Arab numerals or even Indian numerals. So far I have been concentrating on a manifestation of Eurocentrism that takes the form of omissions and appropriation. There is also another manifestation of Eurocentrism which may be described as exclusion by denition. In this case, you are excluding certain mathematical traditions by the way you dene mathematics. Such an exclusion is justied on the grounds that the traditions have not either been inuential in the evolution of modern mathematics or because it appears strange or because some mathematicians (with a big M) consider that they do not satisfy the litmus test of what is mathematics, notably the presence of proof. By this form of deprivation, you are excluding some of the earliest representations
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Figure 4: One of the earliest representations of numbers in a cave. of numbers and space. On our travels around Tasmania, we came across the following drawings in a cave situated on a remote beach. It has been dated to period around 35,000 BC (Figure 4). The intriguing question is: Did these drawing represent early numbers? Some of their shapes are strangely reminiscent of early Mesopotamian numerals. There is a pattern and consistency in the representation. We do not know what they are but would it be unreasonable to assume that they are numerical symbols? Let me take another case which I have discussed in The Crest of the Peacock. The Ishango bone (Figure 5) and the latest dating of it in a new edition by Marshak puts it around 18,000 BC. This is something I wish I knew about when asked whether there was any mathematics in Africa. There have been all sorts of speculations about what it was used for and what the representation on it signify. It is interesting to note that the numbers represented at the bottom are prime numbers from 10 to 20. Another row shows a form of duplication going on: 3, 6, 4, 8, 5, 10. The most plausible explanation given by Marshak is that the bone is in fact a lunar calendar. The numbers in each row adds up to 30. Was such a calendar important? Here, we should look at the calendars in terms of the habitat and livelihood of the Ishango people. The bone was found near Lake Edward on the borders of Zaire and Zambia. The Ishango were probably some of the earliest people we know of who were both agriculturists and food-gatherers/hunters. During the dry season they would come down the hills to the lake to catch sh, hunt animals who came to drink water and gather sea food. Near the end of the dry season they would move to the hills where they would plant crops and live on their produce. There is sufcient archaeological evidence to support this conjecture. The calendar would therefore be an important necessity to follow this life style. Now I would describe this bone as a mathematical artefact since it was not merely keeping tallies of kills etc which you nd with some of the earlier bones, but it is
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Figure 5: The Ishango bone. a conceptual device useful for keeping account of the passage of time and synchronising with economic activities of the inhabitiants. Now consider another form of device which some have questioned about its mathematical worth (Figure 6). The Figure is of an Inca Quipu (1400 AD). The Inca Empire occupied an area which constitute the present-day Peru in South America. The drawing is taken from a a book written by a Spanish commentator around the time of the Spanish conquest. It is a fairly complex device for storing all sorts of information. Numerical information could be stored using a positional number system with the help of various types of knots, mainly consisting of gure of 8 knots, single knots and long knots. In the illustration given, and on one of the strings, you will notice one small knot represents one thousand, then a space followed by 3 Ss represent 300, 5 Ss represent 50 and 1 represents a unit. When taken together, the number represented in our notation is 351. Each main cord is the sum of the numbers represented in the subsidary cords and the sum of all main cords would give you the number in the top cord. This is quite a complex system of retaining the information. There is a whole population census kept on strings that looks like a cleaning mop. On that mop you have the information about population by age, by sex and by two different ethnic groups with sub-totals and main totals all still distinguishable. There are over 400 quipus in the Berlin museum itself with other collections in London, Paris and the United States. There are hardly any in Peru. Consider another example from the same continent, the Mayan civilisation who on the eve of the Spanish conquest of 1519-1520 occupied over 300,000 square kilometres and covered present-day Belize, central and southern Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras. The Mayans had a highly developed numeration system (Figure 7). Incidentally, when people say that the Indians were the only group to discover zero, this is not correct because the Mayans also had a zero within a positional number system. The Mayans used a vigesimal (or base 20) system and their symbol for zero looked like an egg shell. Their positional system was irregular in that after units, 20 s, instead of 400, they had 360 (i.e., 18 x 20). This irregularity may have been a result of their using a number system for calendrical and astronomical purpose (Figure 8). As a result, their system lacked the main strength of the Indian system of being able to multiply or divide by 10 by adding or removing one of the zeroes from the right hand side of the number. They had other systems of number representation, including face numerals (Figure
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Figure 6: An Inca ofcial holding the quipu. Inca abacus can be seen at the bottom left. 9). Well worth showing children who are taken aback that boring numbers can be represented by interesting and somewhat frightening facial representations. You could have face numerals side by side with the bar and dots. A question often asked is who is the earliest known woman mathematician? In many histories of mathematics, the name of Hypatia crops up. But to provide some alternative names, I would suggest Gargi, an early Indian woman astronomer and an unknown mathematical scribe who is present in a Mayan representation (Figure 10). Look at the person at the top right corner. How do you know that the person was a mathematician? The Mayans had different way of representing mathematical scribes. A common mode was to represent a human form with a mathematical document identied by dots and dashes (or Mayan numerals) under his/her armpit. It dates back to the beginning of common era. It is interesting in that drawing that a deity is represented as giving out the knowledge, coaxed by some of his human attendants. In the middle of the illustration you see the knowledge being collected and being analyzed. The stone
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= (1 x 7200) + (18 x 360) + (5 x 20) + 0 = 13780
Figure 7: Mayan numerals. section shows you face numerals and basically tells the dates on a Mayan calendar. It is a highly sophisticated system. The question often asked is whether all these examples constitute mathematics. I would say that it is mathematics with a small m. These were people who were thinking in mathematical terms and in some cases using it for specic purposes, for constructing calendars, keeping numerical records or embellishing myths. When talking about myths, we have probably one of the earliest evidences in a recorded book from China called Chou Pei (Figure 11). Students nd this interesting. Ask them to count the circles on the right and they soon discover it is a magic square of order 3. Here is a more recent example of ethnomathematics, probably still in use in some bazaars in Africa, Middle East and Persia (Figure 12). The background is that in certain shops, when purchasing a carpet which entails a heavy outlay, you may agree on terms whereby you pay the shop keeper in instalments. Assume that you have agreed on the total cost of the carpet (principal), the rate of interest charged per month (r) and the number of months over which payments have to be made (n). The shop keeper can tell you very quickly what this mothly installment is. A student of mine carried out a comparative study of the method we would use in modern mathematics with the traditional method used by the shop keeper. Also under what circumstances would the two methods be equal, i.e. when would M be M ? The rest of it is straight forward maths where you expand a particular power series retain the rst three terms and doing that you get equation(4). You then carry out the substitutions shown in the above gure. It is very clear if you did not have a calculator the traditional method would be quite simple compared to the modern method where you have to calculate (1 + r) n . Consider the example where n = 24 month, p = $3000 and the annual r = 12% you would nd that both methods produce answers very close to one another: traditional method, M = $140 per month and by modern method M = $141.22 per month. So here is the case where (some people call it ethnomathematics) the mathematics prevalent in the market place is worth studying seriously. This is a problem that could be set for senior classes. It is a useful corrective to students who are slightly contemptous of old fashioned methods when they can fall back on their calculating machines. My nal example is taken from a group in the United States who you would not normally associate with mathematical aptitudes, i.e, the African slaves who were forced to work on cotton plantations in the South. Thomas Fuller was such a slave. He was brought to Virginia at the age of 14 after being forcibly transported from his birth place in West Africa and became well known as a calculating prodigy. At the age of 70 he was tested to see how quickly he could do mental sums. He was asked the number
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Long-count introduction glyph (glyph of the deity who is patron of the month Cumku on the sacred calendar)
9 baktuns 9 x 18(20)3 = 1 296 000 days 0 tuns
17 katuns 17 x 18(20)2 = 122400 days 0 uinals
0 kins
13 Ahau (day on the sacred calendar reached by counting forward the total number of days on the long-count calendar from the starting point of the Mayan calendar)
Figure 8: A Mayan calendar. of seconds in a year and a half and gave the correct answers in two minutes. He was then asked the number of seconds a man has lived since his birth. He gave the correct answer: 70 years 17 days and 12 hours (which was presumably his age at the time). Asked a third problem, his answer took almost ten minutes, at least partly because the problem was not stated correctly initially. Fuller was used by the anti-slavery groups to counter the argument that the Africans were incapable of thinking. The main plank of the pro-slavery position was that Africans were hardly human at all. They could not handle abstract subjects such as mathematics and science. Incidentally, that was quite a common view of black people. The political philosopher, David Hume (who is seen even today as the epitome of rational thought), also had his own pseudo philosophy relating to black people justifying them being treated differently. We would very rarely come across Humes racist views in a political science book today just as Marxists never talk about Karl Marxs views about blacks. There are four dimensions to the interests in Fuller. These are calculation prowess (i.e. a comparison between different mental prodigies), psychological (i.e., an interest in abnormal mentalities) and liberatory (which I mentioned earlier as means of countering the inferiority argument) relating to blacks. But very few people, as far as I know, until the study by Paulus Gerdes and John Fauvel, discussed the cultural dimension. The question is: Where did Thomas Fuller learn to calculate? There were obviously no
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Figure 9: Mayan head variant numerals. schools for slaves. The methods he learnt must have been something which was part of his culture. We know that he originated from an area which had fairly sophisticated methods of computation involving considerable mental work. The Yoruba method of multiplication is an interesting and in some cases an efcient method. So the cultural argument could be quite important in this context. The last strand of my talk relates to a point I alluded to earlier. There is a widelyheld view that non-European mathematical traditions, however ingenious are their computations and algorithms, lack an essential litmus test of good mathematics and that is a concept of proof. To provide a clear focus to the discussion, let us concentrate on Indian mathematics. When certain historians distinguish between mathematical traditions of India and West, they normally characterise the Indian tradition being algebraic, empirical and having no rigorous proofs compared to Western (especially Greek) which is characterised as geometric, abstract or anti-empirical and having rigorous proofs. Let me illustrate this with a quotation from Morris Kline:
There is much good procedure and technical facility but no evidence that they considered proof
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Figure 10: Mayan representation of mathematicians.

at all. They had rules, but apparently no logical scruples. Moreover, no general methods or new viewpoints were arrived at in any area of mathematics. It is fairly certain that the Hindus (i.e., the Indians) did not appreciate the signicance of their own contributions. The few good ideas they had, such as separate symbols for the numbers, were introduced casually with no realisation that they were valuable innovations. They were not sensitive to mathematical values. (Morris Kline, 1972, p. 190)
I have taken Morris Kline as an illustration. I could take examples from other authors as well, including G.E.R. Lloyd. But Kline is sufcient. Now I think Klines view is based on a complete misconception. How did this misconception arise? Partly because of the way that one sees the sources of Indian mathematics. When we look at Aryabhatas Aryabhatiya we have merely statements of results. Proofs are often found in commentaries. If you study the Bhaskara-Is commentary on Aryabhatiya, it provides both esh to Arybhatas cryptic verses as well as demonstrations. Now the Western tradition, probably following on Greek tradition, has in the same text both the statement of results as well as the proofs. Commentaries do not serve the same function as in Indian mathematics. Remember, this is a tendency that runs right through Indian mathematics upto Srinivas Ramanujan. Ramanujans lost notebooks contain a number of results which has provided lifes work to a number of mathematicians. That did not mean that there were no proofs at all. Proofs have different purposes: Psychological: To convince the student. Success depends on notation, a way in which an arguement is formulated, organised and presented. Social and Cultural: Proofs are social and cultural artefacts. How a proof works, depends on how its intended audience come prepared to follow it. For instance, the claims made by proofs about mathematical objects are culturally determined. For example, consider the difference between Euclidean vs Navajo (or Indigenous Australian) view of space. How space is viewed is an important element in proof.
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Figure 11: Magic squares in China. Logical: A Greek preoccupation: In Greek tradition, proof quite often concentrated just on logical elements. Within the Indian tradition, demonstration or Upapatti (as it is known) primarily depends on the audience you are aiming at. Clearly you use different proofs for different audience. The important thing is that you have to convince a student and also have to look at the background of the student to nd out what they are coming with. This is the reason that Euclidean geometry never received a receptive audience in India at all before the coming of modern mathematics. There were various attempts especially in Moghul times to introduce Euclidean geometry to Indian mathematics but the attempts failed. Just to illustrate this let me take an example that has been discussed by M.D. Srinivas.
Say what is the hypotenuse of a plane gure, in which the side and upright are equal to 15 and 20? Show the upapatti underlying the usual mode of computation. The upapatti follows: It is two-fold, one ksetragata (geometric) and the other avyaktya (algebraic). The geometric demostration must be shown to those who do not understand the algebraic one. (Bhaskaracharyas Bijaganita)
Look at the Pythagorean theorem which is very familiar to everyone. This is taken from Bhaskracharyas Bijaganita. The Figure asks that what is the hypotenuse of a plane gure in which the side and the upright are equal to 15 and 20? Show the Upapatti underlying the usual mode of computation. Then he goes on to say that you have 2 different ways of demonstration.
One is the geometric demonstration for the people who have a strong visual sense and they would be convinced by seeing and that is called Ksetragata. The other is the algebraic one. It is important you show the right proof to the right people depending which is the one that they understand best. The geometric is not shown to the algebraic and vice versa.
Joseph
Let P = Prinicpal; N = Number of Months; r = montly interest rate M = Monthly Payment (using popular calculation) M = Monthly Payment (using modern calculation) and I = Interest M = 1 [P + I ] N So M =1 P +1 PNr 2 N M= r (1+r)N P (1+r)N - 1 M? rP M= 1 1(1 + r)N (3) where N I = 1P [12r] 2 12 (1) (POPULAR)
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And
(2)
(MODERN)
WHEN IS M Rewrite (2) as
Expand
1 as a power series and retain first three terms (1 + r)N 1 (1 + r)N 1 - Nr + 1 (N + 1)Nr2 2 (4)
Substitute (4) in (3) and simplify: M P N (1 - q) where 1 1-q q = 1 (N + 1)r 2 1+q (5) (6)
For small q (0 < q < 0.5), Substitute (6) in (5) to get:
1 P + 1 P(N + 1)r 2 N
for large N and small r
Example: N = 24 months, P = $3000, Annual r = 12% M = $140 per month M = $141.22 per month
Figure 12: Popular calculation. To conclude, the general tenor of my argument may be summed up in the following way. Why is Eurocentrism an aspect that should be taken into account by anybody who wants to use history in the teaching of mathematics? And I put it in the following terms. Eurocentrism has prepared us to consider it unthinkable that the non-European could produce mathematical knowledge. It fostered the myth (referring to the time of colonisation) that mathematics was a civilizing gift that Europe got through the colonies. The Promothean spark that in time would enable backward native to penetrate the secrets of science and technology to enter the modern world. There was a savage counterpart created to the western minds. There was an imperial ideology legitimising the traditional mathematical development as a purely European product. Even after the demise of Europe, the prejudices concerning the origins of mathematics and science have been especially difcult to come back as they are still very functional to the legitimation of the economic and the political supremacy of the western powers in the contemporary world. This is putting it in a very provocative fashion. I will end with a personal story. Around the time that South Africa became independent, I was invited by the African National Congress to advise on the restructuring of the mathematics curriculum par-
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ticularly for the black universities but also for the schools. I found two very interesting factors at work. First, I was amazed to nd that in the black universities students could complete a degree in mathematics without studying calculus. When one asked why this was so, the answer was that under Apartheid, calculus was seen as too abstract for the blacks. And this was a seriously-held view! Second, in some of the white universities, black students could take courses under strictly controlled circumstances. I was surprised at the conference to come across a number of mathematics teachers who held diploma in biblical studies. What had presumably happened was that some of the white universities actually taught them mathematics but ended by giving them diploma in biblical studies. A number of people knew what a diploma in biblical studies meant and it is possible that some of the government ofcials had connived in perpetrating this fraud. But as long as there was no threat of students being taught such subversive subjects as mathematics, nobody complained. So, when people tell me there is no politics or culture in mathematics, this sentiment has a hollow ring in the context of South Africa or even an inner city school in England. References Joseph, G.: 2000, The Crest of the Peacock: Non-European Roots of Mathematics, 2nd edn, Princeton University Press. Nelson, D. Joseph G.G., W. J.: 1993, Multicultural Mathematics, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Innite Series across Three Cultures: Background and Motivation

George Gheverghese Joseph
University of Manchester, UK. Email: george.joseph@man.ac.uk
The subject of the essay is innite series across cultures, I will concentrate mainly on the non-mathematical aspects relating to it. Two powerful tools contributed to the creation of modern mathematics in the seventeenth century: the discovery of the general algorithms of calculus and the development and application of innite series techniques. Many of you have been introduced to calculus, (i.e., the general algorithms of calculus consisting of differentiation, integration and other techniques) and probably know that the names normally associated with the development of that stream are Newton and Leibniz. The other stream was the discovery and applications of innite series and again the European names that are associated with it are Mercator, Wallis, Gregory, Newton and Leibniz (Figure 1). These two streams of discovery reinforced each other in their simultaneous development because each served to extend the range of application of the other. However, what is less known is that the origin of the analysis and derivations of certain innite series, notably those relating to the arctangent, sine and cosine, was not in Europe, but an area in South India which now falls within the state of Kerala. From a region covering less than a thousand square kilometres north of Cochin and during the period between the fourteenth and sixteenth century, there emerged discoveries in innite series that predate similar work of Gregory, Newton and Liebniz by at least 200 years. There are a number of questions worth asking about the activities of this group of mathematicians/astronomers (from now on referred to as the Kerala School) apart from technical ones relating to the mathematical content of their work. In this talk I will consider specic questions relating to the social landscape in which the Kerala School developed, the mathematical motivation underlying their interest in a particular series, the arctan series (and its special case, the pi series). To provide a cross-cultural context, I will compare the Kerala work with those in China during the eighteenth century and only briey mention the European work of the seventh century since it has had adequate exposure in the literature. Let us begin with a brief introduction to the chronology, the actors and subject matter of Indian mathematics (Figure 2). Some of the earliest texts in Indian mathematics were the Sulbasutras. These were essentially manuals for surveyors containing instructions constructing sacricial altars (vedi) and locating sacred res (agni) that had to conform to certain shapes and measurements if they were to be effective instruments of sacrice. In trying to construct a circular altar equal to the area of a square altar, the sulbkaras (i.e., the authors of these manuals of which three were important, namely Baudhyana, Apastamba and Katyayana) came across the problem of what we would now describe as the incommensurability of pi. And in constructing a square altar
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General Algorithms of Calculus (Newton and Liebniz)
Innite Series
CREATION OF MODERN MATHEMATICS (17th C)
Discovery and Applications of Infinite Series (Mercator, Wallis, Gregory, Newton and Liebniz)
Figure 1: Origin of calculus. double the area of another square altar, they came across the problem of the incom mensurability of 2. Here we have the beginnings of an Indian preoccupation with these two magnitudes which surfaces in a different form later in Kerala mathematics. However, a more direct inspiration for Kerala mathematics were the works of Aryabhata and his commentator, Bhaskara-I (Figure 3). In 499 AD (i.e., 1500 years ago) at the age of 23, Aryabhata, composed his seminal text Aryabhatiya. An Arabic translation of the text entitled Zij al-Arjabhar was made around 800 AD. The inuence of the astronomical and mathematical ideas in the text, both inside and outside India cannot be overestimated. His inuence prevailed at least in Kerala for about a thousand years. When we talk about the Kerala work we have in mind the period from about the birth of Madhava (c. 1350 AD) to about 1600 after which there are texts but they are not important (Figure 4). What the Figures 2 and 3 indicate is that the history of Indian mathematics is a very long one and so is the history of numeracy among its inhabitants. Being a conference on science education, Figure 5 may be of special interest. It goes back to a period around 300 BC and is from a Jaina text called Sthananga Sutra. The topics starred were the ones taught to everyone and consisted of patiganita, kalasavrna, rajju and possibly rasi as well. The other topics, namely yawat-tawat, varga, ghana, vargavarga, vikalpa constituted more advanced mathematics. What it shows is a society which valued numeracy and the skills of calculation were present among many of its people. The story of the discovery of Kerala mathematics sheds some fascinating light on the character of the historical scholarship of the period. In 1832, Charles Whish read a paper to a joint meeting of the Madras Literary Society and the Royal Asiatic Society in which he referred to ve works of the period, 1450-1850: Tantrasamgraha (A Digest of Scientic Knowledge) of Nilakantha (1444-1545), Yuktibhasa (An Exposition of the Rationale) of Jyesthadeva (. 1500-1610), Kriyakramakari (Operational Techniques) of Sankara Variyar (c. 1500-1560) and Narayana (c. 1500-1575), Karanapaddati (A Manual of Performances in the Right Sequence) of Putumana Somayajin (c. 1660-1740)
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1800 1700 1650 1550 1500 1450 1400 1350 Madhava (1340 - 1425) 1300 Putamana Somayaji (1660 - 1740) Achuta Pisharoti (1550 - 1621) Jyesthadeva (1530 - 1610) Narayana and Sankara Variar (b. c. 1500) Chitrabhanu (1474 - 1550) Nilakantha (1444 - 1543) Damodara (b. 1410) Paramesvara (1380 - 1460) Karanpaddati Sankara Varman (1800 - 1838) Sadratanamala
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Yuktibhasa Kriyakramakari Tantrasamgraha Aryabhatiyabhasya
Figure 2: Indian mathematics: Kerala school. and Sadratnamala (A Garland of Bright Gems) of Sankara Varman (1800-38) (Figure 6). An important feature of the last four texts is their claim to have derived their main ideas from Madhava (c. 1340-1425) and Nilakantha who are referred to as acharyas (or teachers). It is possible that Madhava wrote a comprehensive treatise on astronomy and mathematics, including sections on innite series. And it is probably to the contents of this text that others who came after him refer to in such glowing terms. Such a work remains to be discovered. These authors form part of a tradition of continuing scholarship in Kerala over a period four hundred years from the birth of Madhava in 1340 to the probable death of Putumana Somayajin in 1740. In the present state of knowledge of source materials it is difcult to assign many of the developments to any particular person. The results should be seen as produced by members of a school as it were, spread over several generations (Figure 7). Now what did their work consist of? Let me give you a avour by quoting from Jyesthadevas Yuktibhasa. This is a literal translation and relates to the arctan series with the contents in the brackets inserted for purposes of clarity. Note that capital Sine (Cosine) are sometimes called Indian sine (cosine) and is the product of radius and our sine (cosine).
The product of given Sine and the radius divided by the Cosine is the rst result. From the rst (and then the second, third, . . . etc.) results, obtain (successively) a sequence of results by taking the square of the Sine as the multiplier and the square of the Cosine as the divisor. Divide (the above results) in order by the odd numbers 1, 3, 5, . . . etc. to get the (full sequence of) terms. From the sum of the odd terms, subtract the sum of the even terms. (The result) becomes the arc. In this connection, it is laid down that the (Sine) of the arc of (that of) its complement, whichever is smaller, should be taken here (as the given Sine); otherwise, the
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-3000 Harappan Period -1500 -1000 -500 Year 0 500 1000 1500 Kerala Period Vedic Period Baudhayana Apastamba Satapatha Brahmana Sulbasutras Weights and Measures
Innite Series
Jaina and Buddhist Period Aryabhata Brahmagupta Bhaskara I Mahavira Bhaskara II Madhava Nilakantha Jyesthedeva
Sthananga Sutra Bakhshali Manuscript Aryabhatiya Brahmasphutasiddhanta Aryabhatiyabhasya Ganitasarasamgraha Lilavati
"Classical" Period
Tantrasamgraha Yuktibhasa
Figure 3: Chronology of Indian mathematics.

terms, obtained by the (above) repeated process will not tend to a vanishing magnitude.
There are a couple of interesting features about the Yuktibhasa. First, its most reliable version is in Malayalam and not Sanskrit. This is an important point since practically all major texts on Indian mathematics or astronomy were written in Sanskrit. Second, there is no translation in English of the text available yet. This is unfortunate, but the reason is simple. We require someone with an unusual combination of skills to produce a good translation: someone conversant with old Malayalam (very different from the present Malayalam), someone with knowledge of technical Sanskrit, some one with a reasonable knowledge of mathematics and preferably astronomy and someone who possesses what I would describe as mathematical imagination. I would like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to Professor K.V. Sarma, who has a good modicum of all these skills and who has over the last forty years with a single-minded devotion and hard work brought to us the treasures of Kerala mathematics and astronomy. Whenever I present seminars in different places and different continents on Kerala mathematics, I am asked is there any Yuktibhasa available for them to read, and I say they have to know Malayalam since there was a modern Malayalam translation fty years ago! If the quotation of Jyesthadeva is put in modern notation, it becomes quite straight forward. I will not go into the technical mathematics of this expression. But what we have here is the well known arctan series, usually known as the Gregory series named after James Gregory, a Scottish mathematician, who studied the series in 1671. In my book, The Crest of the Peacock, I have argued that it should be called the MadhavaGregory series, since it has been attributed by a number of members of the Kerala School to their founder, which would then predate its rst appearance with a detailed derivation three hundred years before Gregory. There is another aspect to the Yuktibhasa which is interesting. As the very name
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-3000 Harappan Period -1500 Vedic Period -1000 -500 Year 0 500 "Classical" Period 1000 Kerala Period 1500 2000 MODERN Rise of Arab Mathematics Al-Khwarizmi's "Algebra" Inca Quipu Rise of European Mathematics MATHEMATICS Sulbasutras Rise of Greek Mathematics Euclid's Elements Rise of Chinese Mathematics Chinese "9 Chapters" Rise of Mayan Mathematics Babylonian and Egyptian Mathematics "Chou Pei" - Earliest Chinese Text
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Jaina and Buddhist Period
Figure 4: Time lines: India and the rest of the world. Yuktibhasa implies, unlike any other Indian mathematical text known to me of that and earlier periods, the text contains a detailed exposition of the rationale (or proofs) usually in a verbal form, consisting of a mixture of technical terms and katapayadi notation, a renement of Aryabhatas alphabet-numeral system of notation. It is from this rationale that one puts together the derivation of the arctan series according to Kerala mathematicians. I will not consider the detailed derivation here. Instead, a few words about the approach. The approach involves what is known as the direct rectication of an arc of a circle, i.e., the summation of very small arc segments and reducing the resulting sum to an integral. From the Madhava-Gregory series, the Kerala School was able to derive the series for pi, known in mathematical literature as the Leibniz series. I would suggest that in all fairness, it should be renamed MadhavaLeibniz series. Before I leave this subject, let me say something more about the method of direct rectication that formed the basis of the Kerala approach to the derivation of a number of innite series. This may be of some interest to the mathematicians among you. This is a very interesting geometric technique different from the method of exhaustion used in the Arab and European mathematics. In the Kerala case we sub-divide an arc into unequal parts and while in the other (Arab and European) case there is a subdivision of the arc into equal parts. The different technique used in Kerala was not because the method of exhaustion was unknown to the Indians. Indeed, it is likely that Aryabhata used the method of exhaustion to arrive at his accurate estimate of the circumference for a given diameter. The exhaustion method was probably avoided because the calculation, involving working out the square roots of numbers at each stage of the calculation, was a tedious and a time-consuming task. What we have here
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1. PATIGANITA (ETYMOLOGY : "SAND-CALCULATION") (I) PARIKARMA : Number representation and the four fundamental operations of arithmetic (II) VYAVAHARA : (Arithmetic problems, including the "Rule of three") 2. KALASAVRNA : Advanced treatment of fractions 3. RAJJU : Plane geometry calculations as carried out by means of a rope 4. RASI : Mensuration of plane figures and solids 5. YAWAT-TAWAT : Study of that which is unknown or algebra 6. VARGA : Problems involving square and square-root 7. GHANA : Problems involving cube and cube-root 8. VARGA-VARGA : Problems involving higher powers and higher roots 9. VIKALPA : Permutations and combinations ()
Innite Series
Figure 5: Maths curriculum according to Sthnanga Sutra. may be an interesting foundational difference between what I would call the Indian approach and the Greek-Arab-European approach. In the Indian case, numbers were merely entities to be operated on, and the stress was on operations rather than the numbers themselves. As a result Indian mathematics steared clear of any philosophical difculties with incommensurability. For example, surds (karani) were accepted as proper numbers from the time of the Sulbasutras and rules for handling them were developed. In place of rational-irrational classication, a notion of exact-inexact numbers may have prevailed. What motivated the Kerala School to undertake the work that they did? The motivation may be found in a verse from Aryabhatiya which happens to be one of the most famous verses in Indian mathematics. It tells you how for a given diameter you calculate the circumference of that circle:
Add 4 to 100, multiply by 8, and add 62,000. The result is approximately (?) the circumference of a circle whose diameter is 20,000. (Aryabhatas Aryabhatiya (Verse 10))
Certain historians of mathematics (such as Kay and Morris Kline) have argued that the Indians were not aware of the fact that could never be exactly determined. I see this confusion arising in the minds of these historians because of the mistranslation of the word Asana as approximate or rough inaccurate value as in the quotation. The word is more subtle term than that. What it conveys is the notion of unattainability. Unattainable is something that one can never reach. Unless one understands this one can not understand the interest of the Kerala School in this quotation.
Joseph
NILAKANTHA (b. 1444) Aryabhatiyabhasya : "Commentary on Aryabhatiya" Tantrasamgraha : "A Digest of Science" JYE STHADEVA (Fl. 1550) Yuktibhasa : "An Exposition of Rationale" NARAYANA (fl. 1525)/SANKARA VARRIER (fl. 1550) Kriyakramakari : "Performance in Correct Order" PUTAMANA SOMAYAJI (c. 1660-1740) Karanapaddati : "Operational Methods" SANKARA VARMAN (1800 - 1838) Sadratnamala : "A Garland of Pearls"
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Figure 6: Major texts of the Kerala school. Let me illustrate this point with a long passage from Nilakanthas commentary, Aryabhatiyabhasya. It is worth reading carefully.
Why is only the approximate value (of circumference) given here? Let me explain. Because the real value cannot be obtained. If the diameter can be measured without a remainder, the circumference measured by the same unit (of measurement) will leave a remainder. Similarly, the unit which measures the circumference without a remainder will leave a remainder when used for measuring the diameter. Hence, the two measured by the same unit will never be without a remainder. Though we try very hard we can reduce the remainder to a small quantity but never achieve the state of remainderlessness. This is the problem. (Nilakanthas Aryabhatiyabhasya (1500 AD))
What it shows is that Nilakantha and others understood the irrational nature of . So the question is what did they do as a result? The following passage from Sankara and Narayanas Kriyakramakari suggests a strategy:.
Thus even by computing the results progressively, it is impossible theoretically to come to a nal value. So, one has to stop computation at that stage of accuracy that one wants and take the nal result arrived at by ignoring the previous results.
Indian mathematicians were not generally preoccupied with the philosophical implications of numbers as mathematical objects. Faced with irrationality, they tried to arrive at as accurate an estimate as possible. And this is what is being suggested in Kriyakramakari. However, in applying the innite series approach to estimate the circumference, the Kerala mathematicians came across a serious difculty. The problem is that the Madhava-Leibniz series converges very very slowly. For example, summing the rst 19 terms on the right hand side of: /4 = 1 1/3 + 1/5 . . . would give a highly inaccurate estimate of as 3.194.
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Madhava (ca. 1340 - 1425) Paramesvara (ca. 1380 - 1460) Damadara (b. 1410) Nilakantha (1444 - 1543) Chitrabhanu (1474 - 1550) Narayana (ca. 1525 - 1610) and Sankara Variyar (ca. 1500 - 1560) Damodara (b. 1410) Jyesthadeva (ca. 1500 - 1575) Pisharoti (ca. 1550 - 1621) Achuta
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Figure 7: Teacher-student lineage in the Kerala school. (The names underlined are generally recognised as the major gures of the Kerala School.) The problem was tackled in two directions: (a) rational approximations by applying corrections to partial sums of the series; and (b) obtaining more rapidly converging series by transforming the original series. There was considerable work in both directions as shown in detail in Yuktibhasa and Kriyakramakari. As an illustration of (a) from the Yuktibhasa, consider the incorporation of the following correction term to the Madhava-Leibniz series: Fc (n) = (n2 + 1)/(4n3 + 5n) where n is the number of terms on the right hand side. Applying this correction where n = 11 , the implicit estimate of is 3.1415926529 which is correct to 8 places. And this interest in increasing the accuracy of the estimate continued for a long time, so that as late as the nineteenth century the author of Sadratnamala estimated the circumference of a circle of diameter 10 18 as: 314, 159, 265, 358, 979, 324 correct to 17 places! What the work exhibits is a measure of understanding of the concept of convergence, of the notion of rapidity of convergence and an awareness that convergence can be speeded up by transformations. Similar work was found in modern mathematics only as late as the end of the 18th century. Incidentally, there was a whole range of other achievements of the Kerala School in mathematics and astronomy which I will not discuss here, except to mention that using very similar approaches they derived the Sine series, Cosine series and something that I think is of interest to mathematicians in general, the Taylor series. So the ubiquitous Taylor series was already known in India about two hundred and fty years before it entered modern mathematics. To understand the context in which the mathematics developed, there is a need to take a broad look at the social landscape of medieval Kerala society and seek answers to the following questions: What was the nature of the social structure of medieval Kerala? What was the pivotal role of the Kerala temple? Each of these questions could well provide enough subject matter for another essay. Let me very briey bring out a few points. When I initially started research on this subject, I thought I found a fairly plausible explanation for the genesis of mathematics and astronomy in this geographically remote part of India. In a way, why I found research in this area very interesting was because it upset a whole lot of preconceptions, including some of my earlier conjectures. How was scientc knowledge acquired and disseminated in medieval Kerala?
Joseph
METHOD OF DIRECT RECTIFICATION + Find the length of an arc by approximating it to + a straight line + Involves summation of very small arc segments and + reducing the resulting sum to an integral INTERESTING GEOMETRIC TECHNIQUE: The tangent is divided up into equal segments while at the same time forcing a sub-division of the arc into unequal parts + Contrast with "method of exhaustion" in European and + Arab mathematics where there was a sub-division of an arc into equal parts + Adoption of "infinite series" technique rather than the + "method of exhaustion" for implicitly calculating p was not through ignorance of the latter in Kerala
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A Foundational Difference In Approach INDIAN : Numbers are entities whose value depends on their efficacy in mathematical operations EUROPEAN (GREEK) : It was from measurability that countability and other operations stemmed
Figure 8: The approach. As I mentioned before, the members of the Kerala School were predominantly Nambuthri Brahmins with a few who came from sub-castes, such as the Variyars and the Pisharotis, traditionally associated with specic duties in the temple. Within a mainly two-tier caste system, consisting of Brahmins and Nairs, two institutions operated to strengthen and sustain the economic and social dominance of the Nambuthris to a degree not known elsewhere in India: the janmi system of land-holding and the Nambuthri control of vast tracts of land owned by temples. There were other factors that helped to strengthen the economic and social powers of the Nambuthris. The Nairs practised the marumakkattayam (matrilineal) system of descent without the formal institution of marriage. Sexual alliances between Nair women and Nambuthiri men were permitted, indeed sometimes encouraged, with children of such unions remaining the sole responsibility of their mothers family. At the same time, the Nambuthris operated a system of patrilineal descent (makkatayam), with a form of primogeniture that allowed only the eldest son to inherit land and property and to marry Nambuthri women. The eldest son was also required to provide for the material needs of his siblings consisting of younger brothers and unmarried sisters (of whom there were a number given the operation of the system). Madhava and all those who knew and followed him lived and worked in large compounds called illams in villages with predominantly Nambuthri settlements. Set well away from roads to prevent contact with others, often surrounded by a high wall, each illam had its own well for water, a tank for bathing and a number of outbuildings. Many of these illams belonged to households that owned large landed properties and were
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very afuent. With their estates farmed by workers or tenants from lower castes and often under the management of Nairs, the Nambuthris, and particularly the younger sons, enjoyed considerable leisure and were expected to pass their time in study and ritual observances. These illams provided a base for the education of the young in Sanskrit works, including mathematical and astronomical classics, notably the Aryabhatiya of Aryabhata (b. 476 AD) and its commentaries. Not only was traditional knowledge transmitted in these illams by rote, but they also provided a centre for research and scholarship. Sometimes, the scholars wrote commentaries on the classics and in those commentaries they appended their own discoveries as additions and supplements. The short distances between the illams, the role of the temple and political stability combined to provide for long and stable development, usually based on generations of teacherstudent relationships. A study of their interaction with certain temple personnel (especially, the ambalavasis such as Sankara Variyar and Achuta Pisharoti) may shed light both on how non-Brahmin Hindus were recruited into their circle as well the process by which a wider dissemination of the results of their work in mathematics and astronomy took place into the neigbouring areas, notably todays Tamilnadu. Now even a cursory examination of the social background of the members of the Kerala School would indicate that many were Nambuthri Brahmins. But Madhava was not one. He was an Empran Brahmin: a member of a group who were trying very hard to be identied as Nambuthris. Yet he was pursuing activities such as studying mathematics and astronomy which per se did not constitute high status activities. The most notable member after Madhava, Neelakanthan, belonged to the highest rank among the Nambuthris. He was a somayagi, one of the select sub-caste among the Nambuthris, who could carry out the soma sacrices. But there were also other members of the Kerala School who were not brahmins. There was, for instance, Sankara Variar, where the name Variar indicated that he belong to the Ambilavasis, a caste of temple servants. And similarly with Achuta Pischaroti. This would indicate that the Kerala School were an interesting group following an interest in mathematics and astronomy that did not have great social value or status, a group that to some extent cut across caste lines and a group who had considerable interactions with the temple personnel. Rajan Gurukkals study of the medieval history of Kerala and the importance of the temple culture is particularly illuminating. The temple may have fullled an important purpose: it served as an institution for acquiring and disseminating knowledge. lt was an inuential organisation since it combined religious power with secular power, being in many cases powerful landlords in their own right. The temple served as a medium through which the Nambuthris exerted their power and kept other groups in check. There are clearly parallels between the power of the Church in medieval Europe and that of the Temple in medieval Kerala. Another aspect, delving into the background of the members of the Kerala School, would indicate that a number of the Nambuthris may have been younger sons. This fact could lead to an interesting theory. As mentioned earlier, the Nambuthris followed a strict system of primogeniture, so that all landed property went to the eldest son. There was the additional twist. Only the eldest son could marry a Nambuthri woman.
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The younger sons never married but formed sexual partnerships with Nair women. So we had a situation of a number of Nambuthris freed of all economic and family responsibilities, a truly leisured class. From these facts it would be a simple matter to posit the following scenario. A group of younger sons, who had very little to do and coming from extremely welloff circumstances, especially since in the Kerala context then, the Nambuthris were also the biggest landlords exerting their control directly or through the temple, were able to live a life of leisure. They had no family responsibilities and their religious duties were conned to a few and not very demanding rituals. Some wrote erotic poetry and a many others whiled away their time in other pursuits. But there were a few who pursued their interest in astronomy and mathematics over a period of about three hundred years, sustained by the institution of guru-chela prevalent among the Nambuthris of that time. While this explanation is attractive, it would seem somewhat simplistic. First, it does not account the presence and the important inuence of nonNambuthris as members of the Kerala School. Second, this explanation ignores the symbiotic nature of the relationship between the traditional jyotish who came from the lowly Kaniyan caste and the Nambuthri jyotish. Third, the granthaveri (i.e., village records) of Kerala of this period is full of information about the metrical precision of a number of artisans and craftsmen (such as the carpenter, the trader, the builder and the architect). A number of them showed some awareness of the developments taking place in astronomy and mathematics during that period. The granthaverie and temple records remain a good but relatively untapped source of information about the calculating people of the period. Incidentally, a study of the social context of Kerala mathematics has an additional bonus. There is a deeply entrenched notion in standard histories of mathematics that all non-European mathematics is utilitarian. A number of Indian scholars have fallen into the same trap. They search for the motivation behind Kerala mathematics in astronomy, navigation and other practical pursuits. One should never ignore the practical motivation. After all many of the members of Kerala School were both mathematicians and astronomers. The texts of that period cover both subjects. However, a lot of the work on innite series do not have any direct applications to astronomy. So what led them on in their pursuit of knowledge? I have this vision, of a group of pure mathematicians sitting around in Kerala between the 14th and 16th centuries, like Hardy and Littlewood in Cambridge, indulging in their passion and probably boasting of the fact that the mathematics that they did was of no use to anyone! Some of them probably delighted in long and tedious calculations, such as the one reportedly undertaken by Madhava in calculating the Sine tables to 12 places of decimals! About a hundred years later the Arab mathematician, Jamshid al-Kashi, working in the Samarkand Observatory obtained an implicit estimate for , correct to 16 places of decimals, by circumscribing a circle by a polygon having 805306368 sides! There seemed also in this case to a veritable fascination with numbers and a boundless delight in calculation which was far removed from any utilitarian concern. The mathematics produced by the Kerala School was not trivial nor elementary in any sense. And this would bring into question another stereotype regarding Indian
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mathematics. Standard histories of mathematics would want us to believe that mathematics in India which was elementary and involved mainly arithemetic, virtually came to a stop with Bhaskara II in the 12th century. The existence and content of Kerala mathematics would question this interpretation. An important reason for taking a cross-cultural perspective in examining the development of a particular area in mathematics is that it provides a useful indication of differences in methods and motivations between different mathematical traditions. In Europe, the details of the circumstances and ideas leading to the discovery of the arctan series by Gregory and Leibniz are well-known. It was an important event because it was a precursor to calculus. In an attempt to discover an innite series representation of any given trigonometric function and the relationship between the function and its successive derivatives, Gregory stumbled on the arctan series. He took, in terms of modern notation, d = d(tan)/(1 + tan2 ), and carried out term by term integration to obtain his result. Leibnizs discovery arose from his application of fresh thinking to an old problem, namely quadrature or the process of determining a square that has an area equal to the area enclosed by a circle. In applying a transformation formula (similar to the present-day rule for integration by parts) to the quadrature of the circle, he discovered the series for arctan. It must be pointed out, however, that the ideas of calculus such as integration by parts, change of variables and higher derivatives were not completely understood then. They were often dressed up in geometric language with, for example, Leibniz talking about characteristic triangles and transmutation. The Chinese work is interesting for a different reason. Innite series, as a mathematical object, was introduced into China divorced from its European context, i.e., calculus. The introduction of European mathematics into China began in the closing decades of the sixteenth century, when the Chinese rst came in contact with the Jesuits. In their intention to spread their religion in China, the Jesuits arrived from Europe bringing with them both new technological gadgets as well as scientic theories which, though not updated with more recent discoveries in Europe, proved a sufcient novelty and attraction for the educated classes. In 1601, the Italian Jesuit, Matteo Ricci (1552-1601) began his translation of the rst six books of Euclids Elements into Chinese in 1607. Later, in the last few decades of the Ming dynasty, many astronomical books were translated into Chinese. But most of the scientic books translated were pre-Newtonian publications. In early Qing dynasty, after listening to a debate between a Jesuit astronomer, Adam Schall, and a Chinese astronomer, Yang Guangxian, the Kangxi Emperor, became interested in Western science. In answer to an invitation to send more mathematicians and astronomers, Louis XIV of France sent a group led by J. de Fontaney, the Kings mathematician, and asked them to make astronomical observations, study the ora and fauna, and learn the technical arts of China. In 1690, the French Jesuits began teaching mathematics to the Emperor and his courtiers. Pierre Jartoux, a French Jesuit, arrived in China in 1701 and taught at the court. He introduced three results new to Chinese mathematics: the power series for sine, versed sine and for which was derived from arcsine function. The last result was attributed to Newton. For none of these results did Jartoux provide a proof. The calculus needed was not known in China until the middle of the nineteenth century.
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Ming Antu (d. 1765) was an astronomer who worked with the Jesuits in cartography and later on reforming the astronomical system. At the time of his death, he was the director of the Imperial Board of Astronomy. In his book, Ge Yuan Mi Lu Jie Fa (Quick Methods of Trigonometry and for Determining the Precise Ratio of the Circle) contains the statement and proof of nine formulae, including the three formulae of Master Jartoux. It is possible that Ming Antu was introduced to the three formulae by Jartoux himself. His proofs are based on the generalisation of a method occurring both in Chinese and European tradition: the method of the division of the circle. In China, it is found in Liu Huis commentary on the premier text, Chiu Chang Suan Shu, from the beginning of the Christian Era. The idea of the method is to approximate the circle by inscribing polygons, the number of sides which is doubled at each step. This method was extended by using continued proportions (lu) as an algebraic language, so that it applies to the measurement of any arc. In 1720, Takebe Katahiro, a Japanese mathematician, expressed for the rst time the square of the length of the arc of the circle as an innite power series of the sagitta (or the cosine of the half angle). Both the Chinese and Japanese derivation were heavily based on their common mathematical tradition. I will end by some stray reections on certain intriguing connections between Kerala mathematics and some subsequent developments. An interesting question is why is it that Kerala school which came so close to the concept of the limit seem to shy away from it? If they could have incorporated the limit into their work, calculus would have been rst established in Kerala. We know that Bhaskara II had already resolved the idea of innitesimal in his astronomical work. The missing element, in my view, was the concept of limit. I would suggest that the answer may lie to some extent in the nature of Indian mathematics. To illustrate from a later period, consider the case of Master Ramachandra. In 1850, Yesudas Ramchandra wrote a book in which he tried to revive the spirit of algebra so as to resuscitate the native disposition of (the Indians) that had been eroded over the centuries. The book was republished nine years later in England as a result of the efforts of Augustus De Morgan, an English logician and mathematician. De Morgan pointed out in the preface, Ramchandras essential contribution was the application of the theory of equations as found in Bhaskara IIs Bijaganita to the solution of an elementary problem in calculusthe obtaining of the maxima and minima of a function . The function could be quadratic or of higher order. And he did this without the help of differential calculus making the theory of equations as the starting point. This attempt should be seen in the context of a widespread perception, even today, that may be traced back to Colebrookes book on Indian algebra, rst published in 1817. This perception is well summed up by his remark that the Indians had cultivated algebra much more, and with greater success than geometry; as is evident from the comparatively low state of knowledge in the one and the high pitch of attainments in the other. So that, according to De Morgan, one should see Ramchandras effort as bridging the discontinuity between an Indian mathematical tradition which was perceived as algebraically strong but geometrically weak and modern calculus with Bhaskaras theory of equations serving as the bridge. Ramchandra certainly subscribed
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to this view while De Morgan believed that the strength of the book lay in drawing upon the native resources and not on the imported science of his teachers. But neither Ramchandra nor De Morgan saw the book as being useful only to the Indians. Ramchandra wrote the book in the hope that his labours will be of some use to those mathematical students who are not advanced in their study of the differential calculus, and that the lovers of science, both in India and Europe, will give support to my undertaking (Preface to Indian edition, p. v). And De Morgan, whose interest in the pedagogy of mathematics teaching was well known, recommended that
selections from Ramchandras work might advantageously be introduced into elementary instruction in this country (England). The exercise in quadratic equation which it would afford, applied as it is to real problems, would advantageously supersede some of the conundrums which are manufactured under the name of problems producing equations. (Treatise, Preface to English Edition, p. xiv-xv)
Yet this brave attempt at building a pedagogic bridge between two mathematical traditions was a failure. The Treatise did not gain acceptance in any Indian school and while there is the intriguing suggestion by Mary Boole, the widow of the renowned algebraist, George Boole, that English students were being taught to solve problems in maxima and minima by other simple devices similar in essence to Ramchandras and probably superior in efciency, the interest petered out there as well. The book was reviewed poorly in India when it was rst published though it picked up well after De Morgans endorsementa characteristic common to many other Indian endeavours which gain in value only after Western endorsement. There is also another intriguing connection, which I will merely mention for you to ponder, and that is between Kerala mathematics and Ramanujan. Here the idea is that if one looks at some of the early works of Ramanujan (i.e., before he went to England), these are a few problems that involved the series which he published in an Indian mathematics journal. Some of these remind us of the Kerala work. This is just a conjecture but it is worth pursuing. Remember that Ramanujan came from the Iyengar Brahmin caste. The Iyengars are found right across what we would call Kerala (although it was not part of Kerala but of the Madras Presidency at that time) and Tamil Nadu. Ramanujans mother was, according to contemporary accounts, a wellknown local jyotish. She practised her arts not only in individual homes but in local temples as well. A jyotish is usually well versed in calculation techniques. So instead of treating Ramanujan as a freak, consider his background, including the possibility that he may have been doing ethnomathematics which combined his natural ability with what he learnt from the two English texts to form the basis of his remarkable work later. Now there are cases of Iyengars and Nambuthris particularly around the areas of northern Kerala, mixing together within the temple. The temple was, as I mentioned earlier, an important centre for dissemination of knowledge. We can extend our speculation further: Kerala mathematics travelling West. Two connections I want to bring to you. One connection is through the Arabs and their links with Kerala. Now, we know that the works of al-Haytham, the great Arab scientist, particularly on geometric series, were known in some of the Madrassas in Kerala. So, was it possible, that through the medium of the Arabs that some of the mathematics
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and astronomy of the Kerala School went west? But, more important connection was the possible role of the Jesuits. There is evidence that Matteo Ricci on his way to China spent some time in Cochin. In fact for a number of Jesuits who followed him, Cochin was a staging post on the way to the China. As I mentioned earlier, the Jesuits of that time were not merely priests but also scholars, very knowledgeable in science and mathematics. In fact, if one wanted to be trained as a mathematician in Italy at that time, we couldnt do better than go to a Jesuit school. A number of reports that the Jesuits sent from India and China to their headquarters in Rome contained appendices of a technical nature which were then passed on by Rome to those who understood them, including the notable Italian mathematicians of those days such as Cavalieri and Cardona and others. We require to follow this link closely, for at the moment there is only circumstantial evidence. It is gratifying that research in this area is starting. Finally, what about Kerala mathematics and China, any possible links? The more I look at the works of Ming Antu and his associates, the more I see some distinct resonance between their work and Kerala work. Again, the question is: Did some of the information go to China through the medium of Jesuits? An intriguing question! In conclusion, I would like to emphasize the need to rewrite the history of Indian mathematics as it is presented in many historical texts. The new history should reect some of the more recent work done by the Indian scholars, people such as Gupta, Shukla, Kuppana Sastri, Sarma, and Bag to mention a few. The excessive dependence on work done during the last century as sources of information should surely decrease. Otherwise, there is a danger of the same mistakes being repeated ad innitum. And of course, the medieval phase of Indian mathematics needs to be highlighted particularly since it was crucial to the development of modern mathematics. Victor Katzs book is one beacon of hope in that direction. References Edwards, C.: 1979, The Historical Development of the Calculus, Springer-Verlag, New York. Gurukkal, R.: 1992, The Kerala Temple and Early Medieval Agrarian System, Vallathol Vidyapeetham, Sukapuram. Hayashi, T. Kusuba, T. and Yano, M.: 1990, The Correction of the Madhava Series for the Circumference of a Circle, Centaurus 33, 149174. Jami, C.: 1988, Western Inuence and Chinese Tradition in an Eighteenth Century Chinese Mathematical Work, Historia Mathematica 15, 311331. Joseph, G.: 2000, The Crest of the Peacock: Non-European Roots of Mathematics, 2nd edn, Princeton University Press. Marar, K. and Rajagopal, C.: 1944, On the Hindu Quadrature of the Circle, Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 20, 6582.
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Rajagopal, C. and Rangachari, M.: 1986, On Medieval Keralese Mathematics, Archive for History of Exact Sciences 35, 9199. Rajagopal, C. and T.V.V., A.: 1951, On the Hindu Proof of Gregorys Series, Scripta Mathematica 17, 6574. Rajagopal, C. and Venkataraman, A.: 1949, The Sine and Cosine Power Series in Hindu Mathematics, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal 15, 113. R.V., T. and Aiyar, A. (eds): 1948, Yuktibhasa Part I, Mangalodayam Ltd., Trichur. Sarma, K.: 1991, A History of Kerala School of Hindu Astronomy, Vishveshavaranand Institute, Hoshiarpur. Sarma, K. and Hariharan, S.: 1991, Yuktibhasa of Jyesthadeva, Indian Journal of History of Science 26, 186207. Whish, C.: 1835, On the Hindu Quadrature and the Innite Series of the Proportion of the Circumference to the Diameter . . ., Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, Great Britain and Ireland 3(part III), 509523. Yan, L. and Shiran, D.: 1987, Chinese Mathematics: A Concise History, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
How should Euclidean Geometry be Taught?

C. K. Raju
Centre for Studies in Civilizations, New Delhi, India. Email: c k raju@hotmail.com
Introduction I grew up on the classical presentation of the Elements, as found in books like those by Todhunter. It had one or two confusing points, but the work as a whole had a certain persuasive charm and seductive beauty to it that still lingers with me. The fascinating drawings of Japanese temple geometry1 are, to my mind, the best example of something that today still evokes that sense of beauty. Some history is needed to understand how geometry has reached the present state of ugliness and confusion in the NCERT (National Centre for Education, Research and Training) texts (especially the text for Class 9), and what should be done to correct it. Tracing the history also helps to arrive at a clearer understanding of the Elements, needed for any corrective process. The Arabic-Islamic Tradition of Geometry First, Euclidean geometry is also a strong Arabic-Islamic tradition. There are at least three dozen known commentaries and translations of the Elements in Arabic, including those of al Kind, Thabit Ibn Qurra, al Farabi, al Haitham, Ibn Sna, and Nasiruddin at Tus. Unlike 19th century European historians, Arabs did not feel any need to hide the fact that they got their initial knowledge of geometry from others: the Haji Khalfa records2 that Caliph al-Mansur (754-775) sent a mission to the Byzantine emperor, from whom he obtained a copy of the Elements among other Greek books. Caliph al-Mamun (813-833) similarly obtained a copy of the Elements from Byzantium. According to the Fihrist, a late Arabic index of books, al Hajjaj translated it twice in a Haruni (for Harun ar-Rashid 786-809) and a later Mamuni version.
1 Japanese Temple Geometry Problems, San Gaku, Selected and translated by J. Fukugawa and D. Pedoe, Winnipeg, Canada, 1989. I am indeed grateful to Prof. E. C. G. Sudarshan for presenting me with a copy of this book. 2 T.L. Heath: 1956, The Thirteen Books of Euclids Elements, Dover Publications, New York, 1908, I, 75. It should be pointed out that Heath has a curiously ambivalent attitude: while he prominently quotes the Haji Khalfa at p. 75, to establish that Arabs had translated copies of the Elements, on p. 4 he asserts regarding the apparently circumstantial accounts of Euclid given by Arabian authors that the origin of their stories can be explained as the result of (1) the Arabian tendency to romance, and (2) . . . misunderstanding. He goes on to assert (p. 4) that these accounts were intended to gratify a desire which the Arabians always showed to connect famous Greeks in some way or the other with the East and cites (p. 4, note 6) the Haji Khalfa to conclude that The same predilection made the Arabs describe Pythagoras as a pupil of the wise Salomo, Hipparchus as an exponent of Chaldean philosophy or as the Chaldean, Archimedes as an Egyptian etc. In short, Heaths attitude is to accept as true, from Arabic sources, whatever suits him, and to reject everything else with some racist remarks.
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It is necessary here to point out that translation usually meant rewriting the book. This was particularly the case with the Elements, because the book apparently never was entirely as elementary as it rst seems. As recorded in the Fihrist, from the earliest times of Heron of Alexandria, all commentaries and translations of the Elements endeavoured to solve its difculties, and explain the obscurities in Euclid. 3 Not the least of these obscurities concerns the name Euclid. The Arabs spoke of Uclides, which they derived from Ucli, a key, and des, measure or particularly measure of earth (= geo-metry), so that Uclides meant key to geometry. Why was Uclides so important to Arabs? Why did so many key Arabic thinkers rewrite Uclides? Why was Uclides a standard part of the curriculum of later Islamic thinkers? The standard histories of geometry, being concerned almost exclusively with the West, do not ever seem to have bothered to raise this question. The importance of the question, in understanding the Elements, will become clear later on, when we answer it. Euclid the Geometer: A Name or a Person? While the Arabic-Islamic tradition of the Elements is quite clear, it is not so clear that there was any actual person called Euclid who wrote the Elements. The only Euclid known to classical Greek tradition was Euclid of Megara, a contemporary of Plato. When medieval Europe rst came to know about the Elements and Aristotle from the Arabs, Europeans thought that Uclides was a reference to Euclid of Megara. This baseless belief about this standard text was taught in Universities like Paris, Oxford, Cambridge for over ve centuries: the rst English translation of 1570, for instance, attributed the Elements to Euclid of Megara.4 The scholarship of the late nineteenth century has veered around to the view that it was impossible that Euclid of Megara could have been the author. The reasons for this shift need to be made quite explicit. If one discounts later Arab sources, as Heath does, our belief in the historicity of Euclid rests wholly and solely on a single remark attributed to Proclus. In this remark, Proclus is not particularly denite about Euclid, for his language admittedly shows that he is the rst to speak of Euclid, and is proceeding on speculative inferences about events some seven centuries before his time:
All those who have written histories [of geometry] bring to this point their account of the development of this science. Not long after these men [Hermotimus of Colophon and Philippus of Mende] came Euclid, who brought together the Elements, collecting many of Eudoxus theorems, perfecting many of Theaetetus, and also bringing to irrefragable demonstration the things which were only somewhat loosely proved by his predecessors. He must have been born in the time of the rst Ptolemy, for Archimedes [who comes after the rst Ptolemy] mentions the Elements; and further, they say that Ptolemy once asked him if there was in geometry any shorter way than that of the elements, and he answered that there was no royal road to geometry. He is then younger than the pupils of Plato but older than Eratosthenes and Archimedes; for the latter were contemporary with one another, as Eratosthenes somewhere says.5 21. 109. 5 Proclus: 1992, A Commentary on the First Book of Euclids Elements, (Tr) Glenn R. Morrow, Princeton
4 Heath, 3 Heath,
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If Proclus is right and Euclid was much younger than the pupils of Plato, then he could not possibly have been Euclid of Megara,a contemporary of Plato. If, however, Proclus is wrong about the date of Euclid, we could well conclude that he was also confused about the person, in this vague paragraph, so we would be left with no basis to believe in any person called Euclid. (The story about there being no royal road to geometry has been told also about Alexander and Menaechmus; the relation of political equality to the geometric equality in the Elements is considered later.) Prior to Proclus, this Euclid, if at all there was such a person, did not have the stature that he acquired in later times through the combined inuence of Islamic and Christian rational theology, and colonial history. No author prior to Proclus mentions Euclid, though there are references to other historians of geometry like Eudemus, Eudoxus, and Apollonius, a carpenter of Alexandria, who, according to Arab sources, is said to have written a book in 15 sections to make geometry accessible to all. Claudius Ptolemy, for example, does need to use geometry in the Almagest, e.g. the theorem of Menelaus, but he makes no mention of Euclid, even though the Great Library of Alexandria was still intact in Ptolemys time, and there is ample evidence that he not only consulted it but relied on it heavily for his astronomical observations. It is unconvincing to assert that Ptolemy had no need of the Elements since they were, in a sense, elementary. All known commentaries on the Elements, such as those of Heron, Porphyry, and Pappus, directly or indirectly mentioned in the Arabic literature, postdate Claudius Ptolemy who comes over two centuries after Cleopatra, the last of the Ptolemies who ruled Egypt. In his commentary on Ptolemy, Theon of Alexandria (c. 4th century CE), too, does not mention Euclid. In the same context, Theon, however, does refer to his book on the Elements:
that sectors in equal circles are to one another as the angles on which they stand has been proved by me in my edition of the Elements at the end of the sixth book.6
Proclus himself acknowledges, (in the beginning of the quotation) that he is the rst person to mention Euclid, stating that Euclid is NOT mentioned by earlier historians of geometry. So, is this quote from Proclus adequate to establish the historicity of Euclid or the antiquity of the Elements? Imagine for a minute that we are dealing with Arab tradition rather than Greek tradition, and apply to Greek tradition, the standards of critical historiography that Heath applies to Arabs. What would be the conclusion? If one is not a rank racist, the least one can do is to explore alternatives to the traditional belief in the historicity of Euclid and the antiquity of the Elements. Perhaps Proclus simply misjudged the antiquity of the Elements, like later Arabs misjudged the antiquity of Proclus works. It is also possible that Proclus attributes authorship to Euclid in the same way as later Arabic texts attributed various works, including the works of Proclus, to Aristotleafter all attributions were not so terribly important either to the Neoplatonists
University Press, 56. Heath p. 1, and footnotes 2 and 3. Heath omits the rst sentence. His footnote 2 asserts that the word o must mean ourished and not was born, on the grounds that otherwise part of Proclus argument [for the existence of Euclid] would lose its cogency. 6 Heath, 46; emphasis Heaths, de-emphasis mine.
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or to the Islamic rational theologians, as they were to later-day European historians of science, or as they are to current-day information capitalism, where ownership is decided on attribution. Arabic treatises customarily began by taking the name of Allah, and after that attributing everything to a famous early source. This custom can still be observed in relatively remote places like the Lakshadweep islands where it has survived. The custom of attributing everything to an early sourcethe earlier the betterwas a form of homage, and added authority to the text; it was not meant to be taken literally. Among Greeks, Pythagoreans followed this custom of attributing everything to Pythagoras, and the continuity of Pythagoreans with Neoplatonism is well known. Mathematics and Religion The most plausible alternative, however, is the following. Given the politics of the Roman empire in his timewith violent priest-led Roman-Christian mobs attacking Neoplatonists, murdering the most brilliant among them like Hypatia, and invoking state-support to smash or take over Neoplatonic places of worship,7 and burn down the Great Library of Alexandriait would have been quite natural for Proclus, or someone else between Claudius Ptolemy and Proclus, to have simply invented a Greek called Euclid to give an appropriate pedigree to their own teaching. In this context one should recognize that mathematics was then viewed not as a universal or secular science, but as a key aspect of the religious and political philosophy of Neoplatonism. The chief aim of Proclus prologue to the Elements is to bring out this dimension of mathematics which he felt was neglected by some of his contemporaries.
Pythagoreans recognized that everything we call learning is remembering, . . . although evidence of such learning can come from many areas, it is especially from mathematics that they come, as Plato also remarks. If you take a person to a diagram, he says [Phaedo 73b], then you can show most clearly that learning is recollection. That is why Socrates in the Meno uses this kind of argument. This part of the soul has its essence in mathematical ideas, and it has a prior knowledge of them . . ..8
The famous Socratic argument was as follows.

The soul, then, as being immortal, and having been born again many times and having seen all the things that exist, whether in this world or in the world below, has knowledge of them all; and it is no wonder that she should be able to call to remembrance all that she ever knew about virtue and about everything; for as all nature is akin, and the soul has all things, there is no difculty in her in eliciting or as men say learning out a single recollection all the rest, if a man is strenuous and does not faint; for all enquiry and all learning is but recollection.9
7 e.g. in 390 the temple of Seraphis and the adjacent library of Alexandria were burnt down by a violent Christian mob. The magnicent temple of Dea Caelestis at Carthage remained open until c. 400; but many laws were passed against pagan temples, and, in 401, the synod of Carthage twice asked the State to implement these laws. Eventually, in 407 the Catholics forcibly took possession of Dea Caelestis and Bishop Auerilus, Augustines lifelong friend, triumphantly planted his cathedra at the exact spot occupied by the statue of the pagan goddess. H. Jedin and J. Dolan (eds) History of the Church, Vol. II, The Imperial Church from Constantine to the Early Middle Ages, Tr. Anselm Biggs, Burns and Oates, London, 1980, p. 205. 8 Proclus, cited earlier, 45, p. 37. 9 Plato, Meno, 81-83.
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Socrates then gave a practical demonstration of this by questioning a slave boy and eliciting the right responses regarding geometry.) For Proclus, then, mathematics was not a secular activity, but the key means of propagating his fundamental religious beliefs. This is the concluding thought of part I of his prologue:
This, then, is what learning ( [mathesiz]) is, recollection of the eternal ideas in the soul; and this is why the study that especially brings us the recollection of these ideas is called the science concerned with learning ( [mathematike]). Its name thus makes clear what sort of function this science performs. It arouses our innate knowledge . . . takes away the forgetfulness and ignorance [of our former existence] that we have from birth, . . . lls everything with divine reason, moves our souls towards Nous, . . . and through the discovery of pure Nous leads us to the blessed life.10
These religious beliefs were earlier championed within the Christian church by Origen (also of Alexandria, and from the same school as Proclus). However, by Proclus time, these religious beliefs (doctrine of pre-existence, equity) were exactly what were being abusively opposed and cursed by the church and its key ideologues (Augustine, Jerome, subsequently Justinian). It is well known that fundamental aspects of presentday Christian religious dogma, such as resurrection (as opposed to pre-existence), eternal (as opposed to temporary) heaven and hell, doctrine of sin (as opposed to essential equity), etc., came about from the rejection of Origen and the acceptance of Augustine during this period, starting from Constantine and ending with Justinian. Therefore, Proclus, in writing on mathematics from the philosophical viewpoint, was right in the eye of a religious storm, at its dead centre in Alexandria, and exposed to great personal risk. Since Jerome had only just translated the Bible from Greek into Latin, and Greek was still held in high regard in the Roman empire, inventing the name Euclid, to give an early Greek legacy to his teachings would have been the most natural strategy for Proclus. If Euclid was indeed invented to escape from religious persecution, then it would, have been entirely in keeping with the character of the Egypto-Greek Mysteries, if the name Euclid had some mysterious signicance, as the Arabs thought. Proclus fears, incidentally, were quite genuine, for soon after him, the school at Alexandria was permanently shut down, at about the time that Justinian cursed Origen of Alexandria. Can Authorship be Attributed to a Single Individual? There is another way of looking at the question of authorship. It is clear that, from at least the time of Theon and Proclus, through the Arabic and European rationalists, right down to the time of Hilbert, Birkhoff, and the US School Mathematics Study Group, there has been a continuous attempt to remove the obscurities in the Elements, and to update it. To look for a unique author for the Elements is like trying to trace the origin of all the water in a mighty river back to its visually apparent source in a small pond: this transparently neglects the vast underground drainage system that contributes most of the water to the river on its way to the sea.
10 Proclus,
cited earlier, 47, p. 38.
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As for the apparent source itself, Europe got its knowledge of the Elements from the decaying Arab empire, the Arabs got their knowledge of the Elements from the decaying Roman empire, the Romans got their knowledge and culture from the decaying Greek empire, and the Greeks, as Herodotus records, got their knowledge of geometry from the Egyptians. As I have argued in detail, elsewhere,11 the typical pattern is that the direction in which information ows has been from the vanquished to the military victor, though this fact has often enraged the descendants of the military victors. There is ample evidence that 18th-20th century CE European historians of science reinvented history in a racist12 way to make it appear that this entire chain of information transmission had a unique beginning in Greece. These historians did not represent the Greek texts as merely one in a chain of translations and improvements into English, from Latin, from Arabic, from Greek, and from Egyptian texts, but represented the Greek text as the absolute beginning of this chainas the original creative fount of practically all human thought! Since the geographical origin of the Elements (and all its earliest commentaries) in Alexandria, in the African continent, could hardly be denied, the name Euclid, suggesting a Greek legacy, was critical to the process of appropriation via Hellenisation.13 Why was this appropriation rst attempted? Why were the Elements so important to the rational theologians of Christianity? This is a complex issue to which we will return when we address the importance of the Elements for Islamic rational theology. The Most Recent Clarication of Obscurities in the Elements Let us rst examine the most recent example of clarifying obscurities in the Elements. In recent times, a major step to modify the teaching of Euclidean geometry was taken in 1957 when the US School Mathematics Study Group issued its recommendations on the teaching of geometry.14 That recommendation, followed the studies into the foundations of geometry by Hilbert,15 Russell,16 and Birkhoff,17 etc. These authors addressed
11 C. K. Raju: (to appear), Interaction between India, China, and Central and West Asia in Mathematics and Astronomy, in A. Rahman (ed), PHISPC, New Delhi, 1999. 12 Martin Bernal: 1991, Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization, 1, The Fabrication of Ancient Greece 1785-1985, Vintage. The use of the term racist, as distinct from Spenglers term Eurocentric, refers also to the technology gap and the industrial revolution. See, M. Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology and Ideologies of Western Dominance, Oxford, New Delhi, 1990. While Bernal does not say much about the history of science per se (and neither do his detractors in the more recent debate in Isis), it is clear that the resurrection of Euclid, after the belated discovery that he could not have been Euclid of Megara, is very much in line with the belief in a nineteenth century pattern of fabricating a Greek origin for everything under the sun. A closer look at the material basis (palimpsets etc.) of the conclusions of classical scholars will make clear the enormous amount of tinted speculation that underlies this belief. 13 The Hellenisation itself proceeded by reference to the military conquests of Alexander and Julius Caesar, and the in-between period of Ptolemaic rule. Consequently the importance of these conquests got amplied out of all proportion to their global or even local signicance. 14 School Mathematics Study Group: Geometry: 1961, Yale University Press. 15 D. Hilbert: 1902, The Foundations of Geometry, Open Court, La Salle. 16 B. Russell: 1897, 1908, The Foundations of Geometry, London. 17 G. D. Birkhoff: 1932, A Set of Postulates for Plane Geometry (based on scale and protractor), Ann. Math., 33.
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a variety of obscurities in the Elements. The most obvious of these obscurities may be put into the following classes. 1. Unsound denitions: e.g., those of point, line, plane etc. 2. Missing denitions: but the corresponding notions are used: e.g. area. 3. Hidden assumptions: e.g. the correspondence of lines with real numbers. In addition to these, there are subtler problems, relative to the current formalistic notion of mathematics, such as 4. Axioms taken as self-evident truths (about empirical reality): this is also true of the constructions used in proofs. 5. Redundant assumptions: e.g. the parallel postulate becomes redundant if one admits reals and rigid motions, or the notion of distance. In judging these obscurities in the light of current formalistic mathematics, one must, of course, keep in mind that the present-day formalistic epistemology of mathematics (axiom-denition-theorem-proof) itself historically originated from the analysis and clarication of these obscurities in the Elements. Furthermore, one must also bear in mind that there is nothing universal or natural about the formalistic approach, and that it is steeped in a particular theological and cultural tradition.18 The Unreal and Meaningless as the Sole Concern of Mathematics The obscurities of type (1) are clear enough. One can dene something ostensively (e.g. one can dene the word dog by pointing to an instance of a dog) or one can dene it in other words. In the case of a geometric point, an ostensive denition seems somewhat unsuitable: Platonic philosophy requires that geometry should deal with idealisations that have no real existence. Hence one cannot point to a point. One can point to a dot on a piece of paper; but no real entity like a dot can ever correspond to the ideal notion of a geometric point which is required not to have any real existence. The alternative is a verbal denition. Consider the denition in the Elements: A point is that which has no part, or which has no magnitude. (The Heiberg version has only the rst part of this denition.) A person familiar with atoms and magnitudes may not question this denition: but it communicates nothing to anyone else. (Besides, is one talking of real atoms hereelementary particles of some sort? The particle which is closest to a point is the electron. But the electron cannot be a Euclidean point, for a circuit around a Euclidean point brings us back to where we started, whereas two circuits around the electron are needed to return to the starting point, because the electron has the paradoxical property of half-integral spin). Clearly, a verbal denition
18 C.K. Raju: 1999, Mathematics and Culture, in: Daya Krishna and K. Satchidananda Murty (eds) History, Time and Truth: Essays in Honour of D.P. Chattopadhyaya, Kalki Prakash, New Delhi, 179193. Reprinted in Philosophy of Mathematics Education, 11, (1999). Available at http://www.ex.ac.uk/ PErnest/pome/art18.htm
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of a non-real notion cannot avoid an innite regress, for at no point can it terminate in an ostensive denition. Thus, Platonic philosophy, by its insistence that the ideal should be non-empirical, eliminates both possibilities of an ostensive or a verbal denition, and the only option left is that of current formalistic mathematics, which regards the notions of point, line, etc., as meaningless, undened notions. In other words, the current way of removing the obscurities in the Elements is to adopt Russells denition of mathematics: Mathematics may be dened as a subject in which we never know what we are talking about . . .!19 Real Numbers and Euclidean Proportions Obscurities of type (2) are examined later. Obscurities of type (3) are manifest in the very rst proposition of the Elements. The rst proposition constructs an equilateral triangle on a given segment AB. This process involves drawing two circles, the rst with centre at A and radius AB, the second with centre at B and radius BA. One obscurity is that the two circles may fail to intersect, in the sense that the point of intersection need not mathematically exist. If points on the circles correspond to (pairs of) rational numbers, there may be gaps between them, such as the gaps between the numbers 1, 2, 3. Indeed one is led to expect such gaps since the Euclidean approach to proportions suggests a reluctance to use irrational numbers like 2. It was the attempt to clarify this obscurity in the rst proposition of the Elements that led Dedekind to the idea of the real line as something that could be cut without leaving any gaps. Needless to say, the real numbers, as conceptualized by Dedekind are something necessarily unreal, for there is no real process by which one can specify or fully name a real number such as . The SAS Theorem/Postulate The other obscurity in the proof of Proposition I. 1 is this: why is the radius measured out twice? Cant the rst measurement of AB be re-used for BA? This is related to the key obscurity concerning Proposition I. 4. This difculty must have been noticed by every schoolchild who did geometry using the older Theonine texts, like those of Todhunter, current in India up to the end of the 1960s. In the Heiberg version, Proposition 4 of the Elements states that:
If two triangles have the two sides equal to two sides respectively, and have the angles contained by the equal straight lines equal, they will also have the base equal to the base, the triangle will be equal to the triangle, and the remaining angles will be equal to the remaining angles respectively, namely those which the equal sides subtend.20
In brief: if two sides and the included angle of one triangle are equal to those of another triangle, then the two triangles are equal. We will refer to this as the SideAngle-Side proposition, or SAS for short.
19 The best that one can do is to interpret these meaningless notions using other meaningless notions like sets: e.g., a point is an element of a set, a line is a subset etc. 20 Heath, p. 247.
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The key obscurity is this. In the Elements the proof of this proposition involves superposition: it involves picking up one triangle, moving it through space, rotating it as necessary, and applying it to the other triangle. The later theorems on the equality of triangles (with the exception of I. 8) do not, however, use this procedure: they rely instead on SAS. There is no doubt at all that physical motion in space is implied, and there is a specic Common Notion or Axiom to enable this proof to go through. Common Notion 4 of the Heiberg version asserts Things which coincide with one another are equal to one another.21 For those accustomed to reinterpreting this in terms of congruence, it should be pointed out that this clearly applies to distinct geometrical objects that are brought into contact, and superposed, through motion. Likewise, Axiom 8 of the Theonine version asserts: Magnitudes which coincide with one another, that is, which ll the same space, are equal to one another. If this is not a tautology, it must refer to distinct objects which are made to coincide with each other, by moving them about. Physical Movement and Motion without Deformation The doubt that must have entered the mind of every schoolchild is the following. This method of picking and carrying greatly simplies the proofs of all other theorems and riders: if it can be used in one place, why cant it be systematically used in other places as well? My teacher had no satisfactory answer why it was all right to do this in one place, but wrong to do it elsewhere. He simply said it is better not to do it, but could not explain why. But one may attempt an answer as follows. Picking and carrying line-segments is a common enough thing: one must do this every time one ordinarily makes a measurement. But, by the late 19th century mathematicians were sceptical about the very possibility of making a measurement: moving an object might deform it. What sense did it make to say that a gure remained identical to itself as it was moved about in space? A shadow moving on uneven ground is continuously deformed; perhaps space itself is similarly uneven, so that any motion may involve deformation, and measurement may require more complicated notions like a metric tensor. The avoidance of picking and carrying in the proofs of the subsequent theorems was interpreted, by the 20th century, as an implicit expression of this doubt about the very possibility of measurement. It was argued against Helmholtz that measurement required (a) the notion of motion; furthermore this motion must be without deformation, so that it required (b) the notion of a rigid body, and neither of these was the proper concern of the geometer, who ought to be concerned only with motionless space. (The notion of rigid body depends on physical theory; e.g. the Newtonian notion of rigid body has no place in relativity theory, for a rigid body would allow signals to travel at innite speed.) Historically, this doubt about measurement was expressed as a doubt about (a) the role of motion in the foundations of mathematics, and (b) the possibility and meaning of motion without deformation. In favour of (a) the authority of Aristotle was invoked to argue that motion concerned astronomy, and that mathematics was in thought
21 Heath,
p. 224 et seq.
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separable from motion. The authority of Kant was implicitly invoked to argue that motion was not a priori, but involved the empirical, and hence could not be part of mathematics. All these worries are captured in Schopenhauers criticism of the Theonine Axiom 8 (corresponding to the Heiberg Common Notion 4) which supports SAS:
. . . coincidence is either mere tautology, or something entirely empirical, which belongs not to pure intuition, but to external sensuous experience. It presupposes in fact the mobility of gures; but that which is movable in space is matter and nothing else. Thus, this appeal to coincidence means leaving pure space, the sole element of geometry, in order to pass over to the material and empirical.22
In short, motion, with or without deformation, brought in empirical questions of physics, and Plato, Aristotle, and Kant, all concurred that mathematics ought not to be based on physics, but ought to be a priori, and that geometry ought to be concerned only with immovable space. The Synthetic and the Metric Axiom Sets The Hilbertian reading of the Elements, hence denies the possibility of measurement, so that the proof of Proposition 4 (SAS) fails. To preserve the structure of the Elements it is then necessary to assume Proposition 4 as a postulate (the SAS postulate) that cannot be proved from any more basic principles. This approach is called the synthetic approach.23 One way to describe this approach is by distinguishing synthetic instruments from those found in the common instrument box of school geometry. The synthetic instruments are the straight edge (unmarked ruler) and collapsible compass. The last term is De Morgans graphic description of the impossibility of measurement with the synthetic approach: distances cannot be reliably picked and carried because the synthetic compasses are loose and collapse as soon as they are lifted from the paper. (Collapsible compasses may well be an accurate description of the then-prevailing state of technology!) Hence, also the ruler is left unmarked. In this synthetic approach, the term equal used in the original Elements is changed to the term congruence: motion is replaced by a mapping, so that it is not necessary to transfer gures from one place to another, one only needs to shift ones attention from one gure to the other. The other way of clarifying the obscurity in the original Elements is to accept the possibility of measurement, and to accept that the proof of Proposition 4 (SAS) is valid. This is called the metric approach, and has been championed by Birkhoff. The main problem with a full metric approach is that it completely devalues the Elements. Even Proclus does not claim any originality for his Euclid; the value of the Elements derived from the nice arrangement of the theorems, so that the proof of any theorem used only the preceding theorems. With a full metric approach, even the arrangement of theorems in the Elements loses its signicance: it is quite possible to prove the Pythagorean Theorem (I. 47), by cutting, picking and carrying, without recourse to the preceding theorems.
1844, Die Welt als Wille, 2nd ed, 130, cited in Heath, p. 227. a detailed and easily accessible account, see E. Moise: 1963, Elementary Geometry from an Advanced Standpoint, Addison Wesley, Reading, Mass.; B.I. Publications, Bombay, 1966.
23 For 22 Schopenhauer:
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The synthetic and metric approaches being so different, the problem is to choose one of them. It is in deference to the synthetic formulation of the Elements, that the proposition 4 of the original Elements is now taught as the Side-Angle-Side (SAS) postulate. This permits one to continue teaching the Elements as a valid example of the deductive method of proof used in modern mathematics. This is unacceptable for several reasons. 1. A metric approach makes Euclidean geometry very simple: a straightforward metric approach could prove the Pythagorean Theorem (Proposition I.47) in one step, as in the YuktiBhasa proof.24 The synthetic approach was originally motivated by the desire to justify the apparently needless complexity of the proofs in the original Euclid. The justication was needed because of the importance attached to this text by Christian rational theology. The justication was sought by denying the possibility of picking and carrying segments without deformation; hence, also, the possibility of measurement was denied. Thus, the synthetic approach makes proofs more difcult, and is counter-intuitivefor it denies the everyday ability to pick and carry, and compare and measure. (The ultimate justication for denying the manifest ows from the Platonic-Kantian idea that mathematics is a priori, and so ought not to be contaminated by the empirical. The other way of looking at this idea is that it demands that mathematics ought not to correspond to anything real, and hence ought to remain perfectly meaningless.) 2. The synthetic interpretation of the Elements substitutes the key term equal in the original by the new term congruent. This key substitution clearly does not work beyond Proposition I. 34. Thus, Proposition I. 35 states that Parallelograms on the same base and in the same parallels are equal to one another. This proposition asserts the equality of areas that are quite clearly non-congruent (when not identical). It follows that one must either abandon all propositions after proposition I. 35 (including the Pythagorean Theorem I. 47), or else one must abandon the synthetic interpretation of the Elements. It does not help to try to dene a general area through triangulation, as Proclus contemporary, Aryabhata did25 since the notion of area is not dened anywhere in the Elements, and the usual formula for the area of a triangle is itself derived from I. 35. Some attempts have been made to supplement the synthetic approach by axiomatically dening area in a way analogous to the Lebesgue measure (overlooking the connection of the Lebesgue measure to the notion of distance). Area, however, is an intrinsically metric notion; indeed, it would be a rather silly enterprise to dene area without rst dening length.
24 K.V. Sarma (Ed and Tr.): (to be published), The GanitaYuktiBhasa of Jyeshtadeva. For a description of the proof, see , C.K. Raju, Mathematics and Culture, cited earlier. 25 Ganita 6-9. Aryabhatiya of Aryabhata (Eds and Trs) K. S. Shukla and K. V. Sarma, INSA, New Delhi, 1976, pp. 38-45.
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The schizophrenic method of denying metricity until proposition I. 35, and admitting it thereafter is only confusing to young minds. The whole project is born of the compulsions of theology and racist history.26 The Current Text We have substituted this with our own schizophrenic project. The schizophrenia derives from multiple inheritance. The formal structure of our educational system: schools, colleges, universities is patterned on the system prevalent in Europe, rather than the indigenous tradition of pathshala-s or Nalanda and Takshashila. The educational system in Europe was for several centuries quite explicitly oriented towards theological concerns. With the rise of industrial capitalism, in the last hundred years or so, there was a partial shift in the West towards more practical and utilitarian concerns. Euclidean geometry, for example, is no longer taught in British schools. Independent India accepted industrial capitalism, and the elite in this country still continue to regard education as a means of forging links to the metropolitan centre, so that even 50 years after independence most of the country remains illiterate, and education remains the preserve of the elite for one excuse (shortage of government funds) or another (need to commercialise). Education, furthermore, has been demoralised, and the theological concerns of the West have been substituted by elitist chauvinism. In line with the British legacy of bureaucracy, and the clerks dharma of evading responsibility, our school texts are produced in clerkdom (which still controls education), by a duly constituted committee. The committee has sought to balance the requirements of industrial capitalism (which needs the products of education), with those of chauvinistic history (which seeks to correct racist history without understanding tradition). These contradictory requirements are reected in the current NCERT text for Class 9.27 On the one hand, this is how the NCERT text justies the teaching of geometry For instance, those of you who will become engineers, technicians and scientists will not only nd all this information useful but will also realise that you cannot do without it. (Needless to say, there is no other concrete instance in the explanation which occupies one paragraph in this vein of redundancy improving communication!) But if practical usefulness were the sole justication for teaching geometry, then metric geometry ought to be taught. Engineers, technicians and scientists, all, have no use for geometry without measurement. (Not even relativists care much for spacetime geometry based on the connection rather than the metric.) On the other hand, a similar conclusion follows from the historical assertions with which the NCERT exposition of geometry begins [pp. 123-124].
The Baudhayana Sulbasutras . . . contains [sic] a clear statement of the so-called Pythagoras Bernal, Black Athena, cited earlier. Vaidya et al.: 1989, Mathematics: A Textbook for Secondary Schools, Class IX, NCERT, Ninth Reprint Edition (sic) 1998, 124.
27 A.M. 26 Martin
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The subtle way in which Western historians have exploited the notion of proof seems to have quite escaped the authors of the text. Western historians have readily conceded that Babylonians, Egyptians, Chinese, Indians all knew earlier that the Pythagorean theorem was true. They have maintained, however, that none of them had a proof, hence none of them knew why it was true: they knew of the theorem only as an empirical fact which they did not quite comprehend, much as an ass might know the theorem without comprehending it. Comprehension, therefore, still dawned with the Greeks. To refer to constructional methods as implicit proofs is to miss the central issue claried above: the motivation for synthetic geometry is that empirical knowledge is not only distinct from mathematics but that it cannot logically precede mathematics. Hence, if the second sentence in the above quote is true, then the very notion of mathematical proof would need to be changed to accept empirical inputs. Needless to say, the committee does not intend any such revolutionary challenge to mathematical authority which is entirely beyond its terms of reference! Therefore, on the third hand (surely committees have at least three hands!), the text lapses back into the synthetic geometry recommended by the US School Mathematics Study Group. Like a proper committee report, the resulting text has included a little something to suit every taste. So the text introduces the SAS postulate [p. 162] as the SAS (Side-Angle-Side) Congruence Axiom, where axiom is to be understood as follows [p. 125]: basic facts which are taken for granted (without proofs) are called axioms. Axioms are sometimes intuitively evident. That is, an axiom, like a fact, belongs to the domain of empirical and physical, rather than the intuitively a priori exactly the thing that was denied to motivate the SAS postulate and the notion of congruence in the rst place! One wonders why, unlike most other committee reports, this report was not left to gather dust! The natural casualty is the student who has to digest the whole thing, and so may be put off geometry for the rest of his life, especially if he is clear-headed. If congruence is explained through superposition (Heiberg Common Notion 4, or Theonine Axiom 8), as the text does (pp. 159-161), one has clearly a metric approach. Within a metric approach, it is trivial to prove the synthetic congruence results proved in the textin fact there is then no need for a SAS congruence axiom, one has a SAS theorem, the way it was proved in the original Elements. To now prove these results, in the manner of synthetic geometry, on the ground that one is teaching the axiomatic method, is to teach the axiomatic method as a completely mindless and elaborate ritual that one must complete on the strength of the state authority that NCERT enjoys. What children are being taught is not the sceptical attitude which underlies the need for a proof, but mindless obedience to rituals which cannot be justied. The hotchpotch geometry in the NCERT text for Class 9 is indigestible because it has mixed up the Elements by mixing up elements that ought not to be taken together like diazepam and alcoholunless the object is to induce a comatose state. To make the text digestible, one needs to sort out which geometry one wants to teach: metric, synthetic, or traditional. Even if one wants to teach all three they should be kept in
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separate compartments: it is NOT a good idea to make the synthetic notion of congruence more intuitive by dening it metrically as the NCERT text does! The authors need to appreciate the incompatibility of the metric and synthetic approaches, and the way these differ from the traditional approach, which incorporates an altogether different notion of mathematical proof.28 Traditional Geometry Distinguished from the Metric and the Synthetic Enough has been said above about the incompatibility of the metric and synthetic approaches; and I will briey recapitulate the way in which both these approaches differ from the traditional approach. First, the authoritative traditional literature is the sutra literature; the sutra style is well-known for its extreme brevitylike a telegraphic message, further distilled by digital compression. The sutra-s are not intended to serve primarily a pedagogical function, and they are not intended to be accessible to all. Consequently, they have no place for proofs. Texts dealing with rationale, on the other hand, being less authoritative, have not been translated. The key text on rationale, available in English translation,29 is the YuktiBhasa, which, as stated earlier, proves the Pythagorean theorem in one step, by drawing the gure on a palm leaf, cutting it, and rearranging the cut parts. An examination of rationale in traditional geometry shows the following. What distinguishes traditional geometry from both metric and synthetic geometry is the traditional notion of proof (pramana). Though there have been many debates in tradition on what constitutes pramana, the one ingredient that went unchallenged was the physically manifest (pratyaksa) as a means of proof. The traditional notion is not embarrassed by the empirical, and does not regard it as intrinsically inferior to metaphysics. Both the Baudhayana and the Katyayana sulbasutra-s begin by explaining the use of the rope for measuring areas. Aryabhata dened horizontal using a water level, and a perpendicular using a plumb line. The proofs in the YuktiBhasa clearly accept the physically manifest as a good argument. All this would horrify a modernday mathematician, who believes that mathematics is a priori, and certainly logically prior to the physically manifest. Asserting the sulbasutra tradition would clash with the entire tradition of education in medieval and renaissance Europe, which was geared to theological purposes, and hence reinforced the philosophy of the authorities like Plato, and later Kant which justied the deprecatory attitude towards the physical world. For Proclus, the key object of teaching mathematics was not its military or political utility, which he regarded as subsidiary, but its ability to make the student forget the practical concerns of everyday life and thereby discover his real self.
the soul has its essence in mathematical ideas, and it has a prior knowledge of them . . . and brings of them to light when it is set free of the hindrances that arise from sensation. For our sense-perceptions engage the mind with divisible things . . . and . . . every divisible thing is an
28 For the traditional notion of pramana in relation to mathematics, see C. K. Raju, Mathematics and Culture, cited earlier. 29 Another text dealing with rationale, the Karanapaddhati is now available in a Japanese translation, being retranslated into English.
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obstacle to our returning upon ourselves. . . .Consequently when we remove these hindrances . . . we become knowers in actuality . . ..30
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Rejecting this attitude is not a trivial matter for all of current-day mathematics depends upon the belief that mathematics is a priori and divorced from the empirical. Nevertheless, the fact is that the Nayyayika notion of proof proceeds from a realistic philosophical standpoint directly opposed to Platonic idealism. Classical Indian tradition saw no need to regard mathematics as something necessarily metaphysical, and consequently, there was no need for two separate procedures of validation: (1) a notion of mathematical proof, and (2) criteria (such as logical and empirical falsiability) to decide the validity of a physical theory. Therefore, though metric, traditional Indian geometry does not need to proceed from Birkhoffs axioms. Against this background, various other considerations are summarised in Table 1. The second key point about the notion of proof concerns inference (anumana), about which different schools of thought had mutually different ideas which differed also from the idea of logical deduction underlying the current metamathematical denition of a mathematical proof (which denes a proof as a sequence of statements each of which is either an axiom or is derived from some preceding axioms by the use of modus ponens or similar rules of reasoning). The Lokayata explicitly rejected inference, at least in the metaphysical domain (which includes modern mathematics), allowing its use only for practical purposes. The Buddhist and Jaina traditions pose an even more fundamental question: what should be the logic underlying proof? If one insists on regarding mathematics as metaphysical, as in the current formalistic approach, then what is the justication for the use of a 2-valued truth-functional logic underlying mathematical proof? Clearly, the formalistic approach cannot possibly answer this questionthereby showing that allegedly universal mathematical truths ultimately rest on a narrow base of authority, localised in the West. Despite the authority, the belief is purely a matter of cultural prejudice, for the seven-fold classication (saptabhanginaya) of the Jaina syadvada of Bhadrabahu cannot be accommodated within 2-valued logic, while the four-fold negation used by the Buddha, Nagarjuna, and Dinnaga cannot be accommodated within a truth-functional framework. The logic of the empirical world, by the way, may be similarly quasi truth-functional, for quantum mechanics permits Schr dingers cat31 to be simultaneously both alive and dead, without permitting any o arbitrary statement to be deduced from this contradiction. The objectives of education, and the philosophical substance of the Elements We now have before us, three distinct models of Euclidean geometry: synthetic, metric and traditional . Which model one ought to teach depends upon the objectives of education. The objectives of education in India prior to independence are well known, especially Macauleys objectives of creating a cheap clerical workforce to help rule the empire. In independent India, as things stand, educational objectives have largely been
cited earlier, 45. details of the relation of quasi truth-functional logic to von Neumanns postulates for quantum mechanics, see C.K. Raju: 1994, Time: Towards a Consistent Theory, Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht.
31 For 30 Proclus,
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Type of geometry I Metric (S, L, P, d, m) II Synthetic (S, L, P, B, ) Not mentioned Not mentioned Given (for segments) Given (for angles) Postulate
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III Euclidean Semi-idealized (not real, not ideal) Lenghts Only equality and inequality with right angles Not mentioned (only equality, presumed predened) Not mentioned (only equality, presumed predened) Theorem (differently proved) Not dened (only equality, presumed predened ) Geometric construction Complex assertions using inequality and integer addition. Not in Book 1 Not explicitly stated IV Traditional Real space Measured with a rope Measured physically (e.g., with a plumb line) Not mentioned (equality through pick and carry) Not mentioned (only measured equality) Similarity and rule of three (equality a special case) Explicitly dened through triangulation/rectangulation Floating point numbers Rule of 3
Fundamental setup Distance Measure of angles Congruence segments Congruence angles SAS for
d m
From d
for
From m
Theorem
Area
Additional denition needed Real Numbers Real numbers
Not dened (else length would be dened) Congruence classes Congruence classes + complex assertions (using betweenness, inequality, and integer addition) Unmarked straightedge and collapsible compasses
Addition Inequality Proportion
Instruments
Scale, protractor, and compass (geometry box)
Rope
Note: S = set of points, L = set of lines (subsets of points), P = set of planes (subsets of points), d = distance, m = measure of angles, B = Betweenness relation, = congrence for segments/angles.
Table 1: A comparison of metric, synthetic, Euclidean and traditional geometry.
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decided in clerkdom by appealing to precedents established in the West. So, before deciding what the objectives of education ought to be, it would help to answer the two questions that were postponed earlier. Why were the Elements so important to Islamic and to Christian rational theology? Why were they such a necessary part of the theological curriculum? (This is the sort of thing that modern-day mathematicians do not usually understand, since their education, geared to the needs of industrial capitalism, encourages a narrow view of the world, together with an unquestioning acceptance of the postulates and rules of inference laid down by mathematical authority.) Very briey, to understand this, one must situate Christian rational theology in the context of the two traditions which it inherited. The rst is that of Arabic-Islamic rational theology, which reached medieval Europe through Averroes and the debate that preceded him in Islam, and deeply inuenced the beginnings of Christian rational theology. For the Arab rationalists (Mutazilah and falasifa) Uclides was important as a demon stration of Neoplatonic principles, which they accepted as a key aspect of their theology, attributing it to Aristotle. The Arab rationalists aimed to deduce everything from the two key principles of equity and justice. The Elements provided a model of how even the physically manifest could be deduced, starting from the principle of equity. The notion of equality in the Elements has obvious political and philosophical overtones of equity, that are quite lost upon those now accustomed to thinking in terms of congruence: the absence of a royal road to geometry was an assertion about the political content of the Elements. Equity is contrary to Platonic ideas of the republic, and Proclus stated aim in writing his commentary on the Elements was to inform people about its deep philosophical contentthe doctrine of the oneness of humankind. Secondly, Christian rational theology also inherited the legacy of the early Roman church and its confrontation with Neoplatonism over the issue of equity. Though the very early church doctrines clearly favoured equity, and Origens theology is barely distinguishable from Neoplatonism, the state-church after Constantine, found this doctrine of equity a gross political inconvenience. We have already noted the churchs confrontation with Neoplatonism, ending with the closure of the Alexandrian school and when Origen was formally condemned by the Fifth Ecumenical Council.32 Impelled by these contradictory inheritances, Thomist philosophy rejected equity as irrelevant, and retained only the process of rational deduction. The philosophical importance of the Elements was now conned to the process of rational deduction which could be used to persuade the non-believer, since both Islamic rationalists and al Ghazal accepted that God was bound by Aristotelian logic. How should Geometry be Taught? Against this background, we can nally turn to the question raised in the title of this paper. Which geometry should be taught depends upon the objectives of education. In a democracy these objectives should be decided by consensus, or majority, or, at least,
32 or, which amounts to the same thing, thought to have been so condemned for 1400 years. (Hair splitting over the 5th Ecumenical council is irrelevant here.)
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informed public debate. In India, bad governance by the elite has made this impossible. We still follow a tightly hierarchical model: all knowledge is believed to reside at the top management layer, even though it may be manifestly scientically illiterate, or out of date! Committees are nominated only to make a pretence of oligarchy; but those of us with the slightest experience in committee formation know that the whole structure aims to reect the will at the very narrow top. This will is that the majority of people in the country should be kept illiterate (so that they do not constitute a threat) and that the cream of educated people should be exported to the West (since that nancially benets the elite from which this creamy layer comes). Under these circumstances, I cannot prescribe the objectives of education. But once these objectives are laid down, the following should help to arrive at an answer to the question raised in the title of this paper. 1. If the state policy is that education is justied by its linkages to industrial or information capitalism (it is needed by future engineers, technicians and scientists) it is not so clear that it is imperative to teach the classical method of proof. We must then consider what is increasingly likely to happen in the future: a computer simulation for which there is no numerical analysis, and no convergence proof. According to Hilberts ideas this would not count as mathematics. Nevertheless, such computer simulations may be increasingly used as the basis of everyday decisions: such as decisions about large nancial investments. Briey, if mathematics is to be justied by its utility, then one should be teaching practical mathematics rather than formal mathematics. In the case of geometry, this means that the synthetic approach should be rejected in favour of the metric approach, and that even with the metric approach, one could omit teaching proofs. It is true that this might compromise understanding; but if education is justied by its utility, one might as well explicitly accept that understanding is of lesser importance, for the time thus saved could be used to teach some more useful things. 2. If the objective of education is to establish linkages to tradition, this tradition cannot be arbitrarily selected. The Neoplatonic origin of the Elements seems to me undeniable. On the other hand, Neoplatonism links naturally to Indian tradition not only through Islam and the su-s, but also through direct contact, and strong conceptual similarities to Advaita Vedanta. The links were physical, with some 250 ships sailing annually to carry out a huge trade with the Roman empire. They were also philosophical: Augustine, born some 50 years after Porphyrys death, records that Porphyry (the very same student of Plotinus, who recorded the Enneads and commented on the Elements) searched for a universal way for the liberation of the soul in the mores and disciplina of the Indi.33 Therefore, it needs to be spelt out what state policy enables us to say that a certain sort of tradition at a certain point of time should be regarded as more valuable than another tradition at a different point of time. For example, should one reject the
33 John J. OMeara,: 1982, Indian Wisdom and Porphyrys Search for a Universal Way in: R. Baine Harris (ed), Neoplatonism and Indian Thought, Sri Satguru publications, Delhi, 6.
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237 Buddhist or Jaina tradition, both of which rejected as wrong many more ancient traditional things? Again, there is no reason why the medieval tradition in which clearly Uclides was part of the talm, of, say, Abul Fazl, should not be deemed to be as Indian a tradition as the sulbasutra-s. One cannot really say that the more ancient thing is necessarily a more authentic part of ones tradition, for one may quite recently have consciously rejected some ancient ideas like untouchability. Depending upon which tradition is ofcially approved as worth teaching, one could then decide whether to teach one or more of traditional geometry, or metric geometry (which trivialises the Elements), or synthetic geometry and the method of proof (after resolving the issue over the method of proof to be adopted in mathematics). There is also the following question. Though the geometry of the sulbasutra-s has been called ritual geometry because of the association of the sulbasutra-s with the construction of vedis and citis, the fact of the matter is that this geometry had purely practical signicance, and lacked the theological orientation of the Elements, from the time of Proclus. Practical signicance is something that changes from time to time; to teach traditional geometry, devoid of its practical concerns would be to do violence to the tradition by reducing practical considerations to ritualistic ones.
3. If the objective is to teach a certain method of inference, or a certain method of proof, it is not clear that Euclidean geometry is the best vehicle for it. One could take syllogistic examples from elsewhere. Conclusions 1. Our current school texts in geometry must be corrected to distinguish clearly between metric and synthetic geometry. 2. One must decide which geometry to teachmetric, synthetic, or traditionaland stick to teaching that geometry. It is NOT a good idea to motivate synthetic concepts like congruence by appealing to the intuitive physical idea of superposition which underlies metric notions. 3. If traditional geometry is also to be taught, the texts must further separate it from formal metric and synthetic geometry: it is NOT a good idea merely to claim priority, as the present text does, for traditional geometry is fundamentally different, since the traditional notion of proof differs fundamentally from the current metamathematical notion of proof. One should rst decide which method of proof one wants to teach, and then develop a mathematics based on that method of proof. 4. If the aim in teaching the Elements is to teach formal axiomatics, the authors of texts should distinguish between meaningless formal axioms and empirical facts. If this is too hard a thing for educators to do, then it is too hard for schoolchildren to understand, and formal axiomatics ought NOT to be taught to schoolchildren.
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5. The Elements have long been part of the theological curriculum because of their philosophical signicance, rst for Neoplatonists (to arouse recollection of ones true Self), then for Islamic rationalists (rational deduction from equity), and nally for Christian rationalists (rational deduction). Our objective in teaching the Elements must be formulated in awareness of this signicance, as also an awareness of Neoplatonic linkages to Indian traditions directly and via the su-s. 6. Our objectives must also recognize that no individual tradition can claim to be the unique Indian tradition either as regards the matter of proof (pramana), or as regards the tradition of geometry: the sulbasutra-s, the YuktiBhasa, and Uclides are all part of Indian tradition. Tradition should not be reduced to ritual by separating it from its original context of practical usefulness. 7. If we choose to teach geometry purely for its practical utility, then this practical usefulness needs to be clearly thought out in the context of future needs, to protect education from rapid obsolescence.
The Axiomatic Method: Its Origin and Purpose

S.D. Agashe
Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay, India. Email: eesdaia@ee.iitb.ac.in
Introduction This is an informal introduction to a formal paper that was published about 12 years ago and has been reprinted here. It is also a brief description of what Prof. Amitabha Gupta and myself have been trying to do in our elective courses, History and Philosophy of Science and Logic and Foundations of Mathematics at the Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay, over the last 25 years or so. After I encountered some problems in my understanding of physics and mathematics, I was led to a study of history and philosophy of science and mathematics. I was forced to do a critical examination of a lot of what I had learnt. As a student, of course, I was not expected to critically examine what I was being taught. This, unfortunately, may be true of students anywhere! In our courses, however, we made students critically examine what they were taught as science and mathematics, rather than dogmatize about scientic knowledge. I was then led to critically examine axiomatization. In such matters, we think it is best to go back to the Masters. So before reading Aristotle, Kant or Mill, I started reading Euclids Elements. I would urge you to have a rst-hand look at Euclids Elements before reading the paper. I have also appended the contents of Books I and II as given in Mueller, 1981. The starting point for an understanding of axiomatization, it seems to me, is Proposition 14 of Book II: to construct a square equal to a given rectilineal gure. Why bother to do this? What is square and rectilineal gure? What does equal mean? The way geometry was taught to me, equal meant equal in area. Had I been bold enough at that time, I would have asked my teacher: What do you mean by equal in area? What is area of a gure? Why should I accept the formula that the area of a rectangle is the product of its length and breadth? Further, what are length, breadth, and product? And most importantly, why should we do all this? Looking at Books I and II, starting with II. 14 in a backward direction, one can see perhaps an intuitive notion of equality of gures as coincidence, and a notion of inequality as a part-whole relationship. One can then see that a problem can arise here with some pairs of gures: neither they coincide nor does one of them t inside the other. One problem leads to another, one notion leads to another and we are also forced to make (or to grant) some assumptions. Having done this exercise, one sees in
This paper is reprinted from Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research, Volume VI, Number 3, May-August 1989, with permission from the author. The introductory section and the appendix are added in this version.
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it a vision of an axiomatic approach. Please try to go through this exercise yourself, and draw the gures. As with Geometry, so with Arithmetic, Algebra, Mechanics, Electricity and Magnetism, etc. Over the years, we have been spending a lot of time with the Masters! Euclidean Geometry and the Axiomatic Method Euclids Elements constitutes the earliest extant substantial presentation of a body of material in the axiomatico-deductive form.1 Through it the subject of geometry got permanently associated with axiomatico-deductive formulation which was then viewed as a method, so much so that the expression more geometrico (the geometric way) became synonymous with axiomatico-deductive formulation. Thus arose the general belief, especially in methodological quarters, that Euclids Elements and, in particular, Euclids geometry were merely instances of the application of a previously thought out/discovered/known method, and, thus, that the axiomatico-deductive method existed prior to the axiomatico-deductive formulation of geometry.2 Using Euclids Elements as my principal evidence,3 I want to suggest that the true state of affairs is the other way round. The axiomatico-deductive formulation of geometry emerged out of a successful attemptmost probably by some of Euclids predecessors to solve some geometrical problems. Once this was done, it was seen by these geometers and also, of course, by Euclid as an instrument of open-ended discovery. Only, then, could the germs of a method be seen in it.
1 Although the name Euclid is almost synonymous with the word geometry, it should be noted that Euclids Elements deals not only with geometry but also with (the natural) numbers, certain incommensurable geometrical magnitudes (and thus indirectly with a special class of irrational numbers), and a theory of general magnitudes. The Elements is divided into thirteen Books. Books I to IV, VI, and X to XIII deal with geometrical topics. Books VII to IX are concerned with natural numbers. Book Va very interesting one but, unfortunately, rather overlooked by physicists and philosophers of sciencecontains a theory of general magnitudes, which is in many respects similar to algebra and lays the foundation of a theory of measurement. Each Book contains a number of propositions, which are either assertions (or theorems, in modern terminology), or problems. The theorems (for example, in Book I, Proposition 5: In isosceles triangles the angles at the base are equal to one another, and, if the equal straight lines be produced further the angles under the base will be equal to one another) are followed by a demonstration of the correctness of the assertion (proof), ending in the proverbial Q.E.D. (in the Latin version). The problems (for example, in Book I, Proposition 1: On a given nite straight line to construct an equilateral triangle) are followed by a construction and a demonstration that the construction, indeed, solves the problem, ending with the less familiar Q.E.F.. Some Books (I to VII, X and XI) have some denitions stated at the beginning. Only Book I has some postulates and common notions following the denitions. (In todays terminology, these can be called specic axioms and general axioms respectively). 2 Although both Euclids name and the subject of geometry have become synonymous with the axiomatic method, unfortunately we do not nd any elaboration of this method which says something about the genesis, evolution or purpose of the method, either in Euclids Elements or in any extant work by his predecessors (such as Plato and Aristotle, among others). There is, for example, no preface to the Elements. Plato, of course, alludes frequently to the method of the geometers, and Aristotle has written in detail on the demonstrative sciences. 3 My main source is the second revised edition of The Thirteen Books of Euclids Elements (3 vols.) translated from the text of Heiberg with introduction and commentary by Sir Thomas L. Heath and published by Cambridge University Press in 1925. The book was reprinted by Dover Publications, Inc., in 1956. The contents of the Elements have been put together in the appendix in Ian Muellers Philosophy of Mathematics and Deductive Structure in Euclids Elements published by M.I.T. Press in 1981.
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My view of the genesis of the axiomatic method emboldens me to suggest further that in general a method, which is something consciously conceived, arises as the result of reection on an activity that is already being pursued intuitively. Again, once the method is consciously conceived, it can engender new activity being pursued consciously in accordance with the method, i.e. methodically. The Geometrical Problems and their Solutions If the axiomatic method arose as a result of reection on some geometrical activity being pursued intuitively, what could this activity have been? I suggest that this activity was initiated by a problem which, although it is not explicitly posed in the Elements, can be solved on the basis of another problem which is explicitly posed and solved in Book II, Proposition 14, of the Elements: To construct a square equal to a given rectilinear gure. This problem could well be called the problem of squaring a rectilineal gure by analogy with the name of a well-known problem of Greek geometry: squaring the circle. (Euclid was not able to solve this latter problem, and therefore, perhaps, does not mention it at all in the Elements). Let us note that Book II ends with Proposition 14; I might say that our teaching and learning of geometryand of the axiomatic method-ought to begin with this proposition which actually enunciates a problem. But why is this problem of squaring a rectilineal gure important? The comparison of two straight-line segments to nd out whether they are equally long or not, and, if not, to nd out which one of the two segments is shorter and which the longer is, practically speaking, a simple matter, if one is allowed to use a string or a rope.4 Euclid solved this problem theoretically, allowing himself the use only of a straight-edge (to draw a straight line joining two given points) and of a pair of compasses (to draw a circle with a given centre and a given segment, of which that centre is an extremity, as a radius of that circle, i.e. without using a pair of compasses as a pair of dividers). In fact, this is reected in his Postulates 1 and 3 of Book I. Euclids solution of this problem of the comparison of two straight-line segments is given as Proposition 3 of Book I: Given two unequal straight lines, to cut off from the greater a straight line equal to the less. The corresponding problem for plane rectilineal gures is far from easy, even practically speaking. We may, where possible, move one of the two given rectilineal gures and try to place it on the other to see whether the two t together perfectly, or whether one of them can be tted entirely within the other. (Common Notions 8 and 9 of Book I reect this approach. Common Notion 8: And things which coincide with one another are equal to one another. Common Notion 9: And the whole is greater than the part). But very often neither of these two things will happen, even if the gures
4 The comparison of two line segments to nd out which one is the longer and which the shorter is perhaps the earliest example of the idea of the comparison of two objects with respect to a given quality to detect which one of the two has more and which one less of the quality. I have argued in another paper presented at the workshop on The Genesis and Purpose of Quantication and Measurement that this idea of comparison with respect to a quality is more primitive than the precursor of the notion of quantity. The Greeks, and in particular Plato talked repeatedly of the notion of the more and the less, or the greater and the lesser
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have some denite and simple shape such as that of a rectangle. However, should both the gures be squares, superposition will always yield a solution; in fact, we need not even superpose the squares: we need only compare their sides. Note that this happy situation is based on the observation that any two right angles t, and this requirement is what perhaps led the geometers to dene a right angle the way Euclid does (Denition 10, Book I: When a straight line set up on a straight line makes the adjacent angles equal to one another, each of the equal angles is right), and led Euclid to put down his Postulate 4, Book I: And that all right angles are equal to one another. Another important observation would have to be made before one could proceed further with the problem. A given gure can be cut up or decomposed into parts and these parts put together differently to obtain a different-looking gure. (This can be easily seen by cutting up a square into two equal parts and putting these together to obtain a rectangle). Now, two such gures are not equal (in the sense of Common Notion 8), but there is something special about them, namely, that their corresponding parts are equal in the sense of congruence. At this point, the ancient geometers must have realized that no further progress on the problem of comparison of gures was possible unless one was willing to regard two gures, which were equal in parts, to be equal. This is, of course, a weakening or widening of the notion of equality of gures, and appears as Common Notion 2 in Book I: And if equals are added to equals the wholes are equals. (The original Greek wording of this Common Notion does not suggest the notion of addition in a numerical sense; rather, it suggests putting together prostethe). This broadening of the original notion of equality as congruence allows one literally to transform a given gure, i.e., change its form or shape, while retaining its size, i.e., while keeping the new gure equal to the original gure. The problem of comparison of two gures could now be reduced to the problem of transformation of one gure into another through the techniques of dividing and putting together. But the fact that squares can be compared with ease would have suggested the following alternative. Suppose, instead of trying to convert one of the given gures into the other, one tries to convert both the gures into squares; and, suppose, it turns out that the converted squares are equal. Could we, then, assert that the two original gures were equal? The astute Greek geometers saw that this was not justied unless the notion of equality was weakened further; thus, we have Common Notion 1 of Book I: Things equal to the same thing are also equal to one another.5
far, I have accounted for three of the ve Euclidean Postulates and four of the ve Euclidean Common Notions in Book I. (Mueller lists one more Postulate and four more Common Notions, but these are not regarded as genuinely Euclidean and so are enclosed within square brackets). This leaves only one more Common Notion (Common Notion 3): And if equals are subtracted from equals the remainders are equal and two more Postulates; Book I, Postulate 2 is: To produce a nite straight line continuously in a straight line and Book I, Postulate 5 is the so-called Parallel Postulate: If a straight line falling on two straight lines make the interior angles on the same side less than two right angles, the two straight lines, if produced indenitely, meet on that side on which are the angles less than the two right angles. Postulate 2 is obviously required in most constructions where a point is to be obtained by the intersection of two straight lines or of a straight line and a circle. As regards Postulate 5, Euclid postpones the use of this postulate as far as possible; it, is involved for the rst time in proving Proposition 29: A straight line falling on parallel straight lines makes the alternate angles equal to one another, the exterior angle equal to the interior and opposite angle, and the interior angles on the same side equal to two right angles. In fact, this Proposition could
5 Thus
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Having agreed to the broadening of the notion of equality (of gures) through the Common Notions 1 and 2, the problem of comparison of two gures is reduced to the problem of squaring of a gure. Naturally, Euclid takes up the simpler case of a rectilineal gure, and, thus, arrives at the statement of his basic problem in Books I and II, Proposition II. 14: To construct a square equal to a given rectilineal gure. How does Euclid solve the problem? Or, rather, how did Euclid, or some predecessor, arrive at the solution we nd given in the Elements? Certainly not by starting off with the denitions, postulates and common notions, and brilliantly deducing one theorem after another (there are forty-eight propositions in Book I and fourteen in Book II). The problem was solved by reducing it, in turn, to one or more problems. This approach to problem solving was discussed much later by Pappus under the name of the Method of Analysis and Synthesis, but we nd allusions to it already in Plato. The analysis part involves the formulation of auxiliary or subsidiary problems in what later appears as a back tracking when the solution is nally described in the synthesis part. Although a triangle would be the simplest rectilineal gure, for obvious reasons Euclid prefers to tackle the rectangle rst. So the problem of squaring a rectilineal gure is broken down into two sub-problems: (a) the problem of squaring a rectangle (this construction is given in II.14) and (b) the problem of rectangulating any rectilineal gure (this construction is given in I. 45). Euclid solves (a) essentially by transforming a rectangle into a gnomon (which is an L-shaped gure left when a smaller square is taken out of a bigger square; see shaded area in the gure). A gnomon is clearly a difference of two squares, and we thus have the new problem of constructing a square equal to the difference of two squares. This problem can be solved perhaps if we succeed in solving the problem of constructing a square equal to the sum of two squares; this is precisely what the famous Pythagorean proposition amounts to, and it is Proposition I. 47, the last but one proposition in Book I, the last (48th) proposition being the converse of the Pythagorean proposition. Of course, Pythagoras Theorem in the special case of the isosceles right-angled triangle was known to many civilizations before Euclid, and perhaps even before Figure 1: A gnomon. Pythagoras, and its truth could be visually ascertained. It must have been natural to conjecture that the theorem was true for any arbitrary right-angled triangle, but this already presupposes a broadened notion of equality of gures. Indeed, Euclid makes use of this broadened notion in his proof of Pythagoras Theorem by dividing the square on the hypotenuse into two
well have been taken as a postulate in place of Postulate 5. (The converse of this Proposition is contained in Propositions 27 and 28 which are proved without invoking Postulate 5, and this is incidentally the rst occasion for Euclid to talk about parallel lines). I have put the verb postpones in quotation marks, because, according to the view that I am putting forward here, this was not a deliberate postponement by Euclid on account of some inherent abhorrence of the parallel Postulate, as alleged by many critics, but rather it was the last step along one line of progress in Euclids backtracking journey from Book II, Proposition 14 to the Denitions, Postulates and Common Notions.
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rectangles and showing the equality of these rectangles with the squares on the corresponding sides. Now, getting convinced about the correctness of the Pythagorean construction for the sum of two squares required further backtracking and ultimately must have led to the inverted or backward construction of Book I, or something similar to it, perhaps by some predecessors of Euclid. This involves, in particular, getting convinced that the diagonal of a parallelogram splits it into two equal triangles, and that under certain conditions two triangles are equal. (Incidentally, Common Notion 3 is demanded or postulated in claiming that the gnomon is equal to an appropriate square.) In his solution of problem (b), i.e., converting a rectilineal gure into a rectangle (in fact, Euclid gives a stronger construction I. 45: to construct in a given rectilineal angle a parallelogram equal to a given rectilineal gure, and to effect that the construction I. 44: to a given straight line to apply, in a given rectilineal angle, a parallelogram equal to a given triangle), Euclid uses the obvious fact that a rectilineal gure can be easily decomposed into triangles, so that one is led next to the problem solved in I. 44. To summarize, I wish to suggest that investigations into the problem of comparison of two rectilineal gures led the Greeks before Euclid to the realization that some concessions had to be made with regard to the notion of equality, which led to the formulation and investigation of some subsidiary problems, leading nally to a number of postulates, common notions and denitions. Having done this, they then reversed the whole process of thinking, making it appear to posterity that, almost by a miracle, from the small acorns of a few innocent-looking denitions and postulates mighty oaks such as Pythagoras Theorem and II.14 could be grown. I have indicated this with reference to Books I and II, but the same could be said about the other geometrical books. It should be noted, however, that the other non-geometrical books of Euclids Elements, namely, those on natural numbers and general magnitudes do not invoke any postulates explicitly but are based only on denitions. So they could well have been the result of an application in the forward direction of the axiomatic method discovered by investigations in the reverse direction into some geometrical problems. Of course, geometers after Euclidand even Euclid himselfdid carry out further geometrical investigations in the forward direction, proving many interesting new theorems. Eventually, Lobachevskii, and Bolyai followed, non-Euclidean lines of exploration. This last step, after some initial resistance, later turned into reluctance, and a considerable delay of about fty years led to our modern conception of the axiomatic method as the method of mathematics, involving notions of denition, axiom and proof. The Purposes of the Axiomatic Method Having discussed the possible genesis of the axiomatic method in rather great detail, I would like to turn to the several purposes or uses, to which it has been put subsequently.
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As mentioned just above, the axiomatic method was put to use in mathematics no sooner than it was discovered, and thus it was recognized to be a powerful instrument of open-ended discovery or derivation. This had several consequences. Firstly, the process of derivation or deduction came under close scrutiny giving rise to the subject of logic, and I would venture the guess that Aristotles investigations into logic were stimulated more by mathematics, particularly geometry, than by rhetoric or sophistic discourse. Eventually, this led to the feeling that, logic was an engine of deduction which required only the turning of a handle to churn out new propositions from old. Now, deduction done by mathematiciansat least the human onesare not so mechanical as that, but it is possible to automate the process of deduction, and this is, indeed, what has been done recently by theorem-proving programs. The second, and rather unfortunate, consequence was that the postulates and common notions, with the exception of Euclids parallel postulate, were regarded as being true in some sense and so irreplaceable. Logic was then seen as an engine to derive new, less obvious truths from old, more obvious, self-evident truths. I doubt if the Greek geometers themselves regarded their postulates and common notions as selfevident or true. Three of the ve postulates are not about propositions, that is, about any state of affairs in this world or in some other world. Rather, they are assumptions about what can be done in an ideal world. Of the other two postulates, equality of all right angles could have had some empiricism about it, but was nally assumed in order for some constructions to work. Finally, the parallel postulate was necessitated by the somewhat empirical fact that parallel straight lines cut by a transversal produced equal angles, but this, too, was necessitated by the conception of a square, say, as having all angles equal and right (Denition 22). (Euclids I.46 shows how to construct a square: On a given straight line to describe a square). The common notions were all required in order to surmount the problem of equality and comparability of (rectilineal) gures. Of course, there was a happy side to the view that the postulates and common notions were self-evident. Thanks to the non-self-evident nature of the parallel postulate, it eventually emboldened geometers to abandon it, to replace it by something equally non-self-evident and then, working the engine of deduction, squeeze out some startling and almost false consequences. But this development, in its turn, had the effect that henceforth axioms (to use a single word for postulates and common notions) were deemed to be completely arbitrary and unprovable assertions, and, in an extreme view, even meaningless and having no relation with truth or reality whatsoever. This was accompanied by the view that denitions also were completely arbitrary, and one merely dened some terms (the dened terms) in terms of some other terms (the undened or undenable? terms). Now clearly, for Euclid, denitions were far from arbitrary, though he stretched himself too far, trying to dene almost every geometrical term. But it must be noted that nowhere did he or any of his predecessors, say that terms like part, breadthless length, extremity, etc., were undened in the modern mathematical sense of being devoid of any connotations. They were undenable in
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a relative sense; they were simply left undened in Euclids formulation. There was nothing either undened (meaningless) or undenable about them. However, towards the end of the nineteenth century there did arise a widespread view of mathematics that it consists of setting out some undened terms and some unproved propositions at the beginning; and then, after giving some denitions of dened terms as and when one fancies, of proving or deriving some other assertions on the basis of or from the unproved assertions using sheer logic or rules of inference. The American mathematician Benjamin Peirce said, Mathematics is the science which draws necessary conclusions; and Russell, 1901, confessed (with tongue-in-cheek humour): Thus mathematics may be dened as the subject in which we never know what we are talking about, nor whether what we are saying is true. (One realizes, of course, that mathematics is a creative or imaginative activity, and not a routine, mechanical activity, because necessary conclusions do not follow easily or automatically from the unproved assertions; rather, they have to be conjectured and then drawn out by hard work.) This open-ended view of the axiomatic method in mathematics leads one to believe that one is free to start with arbitrary undened terms and arbitrary unproved assertions, and then to make arbitrary denitions in order to draw the conclusions, too, somewhat arbitrarily, i.e., as and when they occur to the mathematician, so that the whole thing is a stupendous exercise in arbitrariness! Of course, Russell, 1919, himself realized that this was not so, for he said (about twenty years after his earlier quip):
Mathematics is a study which, when we start from its most familiar portions, may be pursued in either of two opposite directions. The more familiar direction is constructive, towards gradually increasing complexity: from integers to fractions, real numbers, complex numbers, from addition and multiplication to differentiation and integration, and on to higher mathematics. The other direction, which is less familiar, proceeds, by analysing, to greater and greater abstractness and logical simplicity; instead of asking what can be dened and deduced from what is assumed to begin with, we ask instead what more general ideas and principles can be found, in terms of which what was our starting-point can be dened or deduced. It is the fact of pursuing this opposite direction that characterises mathematical philosophy as opposed to ordinary mathematics. But it should be understood that the distinction is one, not in the subject matter, but in the state of mind of the investigator. . . . The distinction between mathematics and mathematical philosophy is one which depends upon the interest inspiring the research, and upon the stage which the research has reached; not upon the propositions with which the research is concerned.
I might add that many great mathematicians of the last hundred years or so have contributed a lot to mathematical philosophy in Russells sense, because they have contributed to the process of axiomatization of mathematics in the original Euclidean sense. Further, it must be added that usually one stipulates one or more of the following requirements for an arbitrary set of axioms, namely, that they must be consistent, independent, complete, categorical. The Cartesian Purpose The use to which Descartes sought to put the axiomatic method was the establishment of indubitable truths. A proposition about whose truth we are doubtful (such as I exist) is sought to be established on the basis of some intuitively clear or indubitable
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propositions (such as I think). Thus, the axiomatic method is an instrument for dispelling doubt and for creating certainty. Of course, the process of nding out whether a seemingly doubtful proposition can, indeed, be indubitably established is one of back-tracking, quite similar to the back-tracking in mathematics, where a conjectured theorem is sought to be proved. But the difference is that, in mathematics we do not bother about the truth of the axioms, whereas in the Cartesian approach the rst principles have to be indubitable and thus true. Organization of Knowledge Another use that has been found for the axiomatic method is that of organizing a body of knowledge or systematizing a discipline. Here, it is supposed that we already have a set of truths somehow obtained, but these truths are perhaps too many or seemingly unrelated to each other. We then try to create some system or order by trying to discover whether a small subset of them can serve as a set of axioms from which all the rest can be derived. One may, of course, question the utility of such an enterprise. The whole exercise of organization is to start with the knowledge base that is already there. This base would include terms whose meanings we already know and assertions whose truth we are already condent of. But, if this is so, why bother to dene the already known terms in terms of undened terms, and to derive the already trustworthy assertions in terms of some selected assertions? Perhaps one is trying to apply Ockhams razor here, i.e., one is trying to obtain simplicity. But simplicity in the form of a small number of axioms is won at the cost of complexity of derivations of the other truths from the axioms. Discovering Unknown Causes or Hypotheses In this application of the axiomatic method, one starts with a known body of truths with terms whose meanings are known. One then tries to discover a set of undened and unknown terms, a set of denitions of the known terms in terms of the undened and unknown terms; and, nally, a set of assertions whose truth is unknown in such a way that the known truths, when reformulated using the denitions in terms of the undened terms, can all be derived from the axioms. This is, of course, the game of (scientic) theory construction6 . What is the point of such a game? Well, after the axiomatization, using the axiomatic method in the forward direction as an instrument of discovery, one may stumble across new consequences of the axioms, which, when reformulated using the known terms, give us propositions whose truth can then be ascertained. Their truth is not guaranteed, because the axioms are not necessarily (known to be) true. But the task of ascertaining the truth of new propositions can produce new truths which, otherwise, we may not have bothered to look for. The axioms could be called causes, hypotheses or principles of the body of knowledge or the science that one is dealing with. Success in this approach at the initial stages depends upon the size of the body of knowledge one starts with; usually, it does not pay to be too
6 One
would immediately think of the Kinetic Theory of Gases as an example.
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ambitious, but one may gradually enlarge the body of knowledge and simultaneously modify the undened terms, denitions and axioms, that is, the theory. I may, nally add that perhaps one should not be too much preoccupied with truths. Taking the cue from the initial axiomatization of geometry, one should perhaps be equally concerned with problems, and should try to discover an axiomatization in the course of the attempt to nd acceptable solutions. Appendix The Contents of the Elements (from Ian Mueller: Philosophy of Mathematics and Deductive Structure in Euclids Elements, 1981). I give here in an English translation, which varies in many minor ways from Heaths, all of the rst principles and propositions of the Elements as they are given in the rst hand in the body of the manuscript P. . . . Material which is added for clarity is put in parentheses; material excluded by Heiberg is put in brackets. Denitions (Horoi) 1. A point is that which has no part (hou meros outhen). 2. A line is breadthless length. 3. The extremities (perata) of a line are points. 4. A straight line is one which lies evenly (ex isou) with the points on itself. 5. A surface is that which has length and breadth only. 6. The extremities of a surface are lines. 7. A plane surface is one which lies evenly with the straight lines on itself. 8. A plane angle is the inclination (klisis) to one another of two lines in a plane which meet one another and do not lie in a straight line. 9. And when the lines containing the aforesaid angle are straight, the angle is called rectilineal. 10. When a straight line set up on a straight line makes the adjacent (ephexes) angles equal to one another, each of the equal angles is right, and the straight line standing on the other is called a perpendicular to that on which it stands. 11. An obtuse angle is an angle greater than a right angle. 12. An acute angle is an angle less than a right angle. 13. A boundary (horos) is that which is an extremity (peras) of something. 14. A gure is that which is contained by some boundary or some boundaries.
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15. A circle is a plane gure contained by one line [which is called its circumference (periphereia)] such that all the straight lines falling upon it [upon the circumference of the circle] from one point of those lying inside the gure are equal to one another. 16. The point is called the center of the circle. 17. A diameter of the circle is any straight line drawn through the center and termi nated in both directions (ephhekatera ta mere) by the circumference of the circle, and such a straight line also bisects the circle. 18. A semicircle is the gure contained by the diameter and the circumference cut off by it. [A segment (tmema) of a circle is the gure, either greater or less than a semicircle, contained by a straight line and a circumference of a circle.] 19. Rectilineal gures are those which are contained by straight lines; trilateral by three, quadrilateral by four, and multilateral those contained by more than four straight lines. 20. Of trilateral gures, an equilateral traingle is that which has its three sides equal, an isosceles triangle that which has only two of its sides equal, a scalene traingle that which has its three sides unequal. 21. Further, of trilateral gures, a right-angled traingle is that which has a right angle, an obtuse-angled that which has an obtuse angle, an acute-angled that which has three acute angles. 22. Of quadrilateral gures, a square is that which is equilateral and right-angled, an oblong (heteromekes) that which is right-angled but not equilateral, a rhombus that which is equilateral but not right-angled, a rhomboid that which has its opposite sides and angles equal to one another but which is neither equilateral nor right-angled. 23. Parallel straight lines are those which, being in the same plane and being produced ad innitum in both directions, do not meet each other in either direction. Postulates (Aitemata) 1. Let it be postulated (aitestho) to draw a straight line from any (pas) point to any (pas) point, 2. and to produce a limited straight line in a straight line, 3. and to describe a circle with any center and distance, 4. and that all right angles are equal to one another,
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5. and that, if one straight line falling on two straight lines makes the interior angles in the same direction less than two right angles, the two straight lines, if produced ad innitum, meet one another in that direction in which the angles less than two right angles are, 6. and that two straight lines do not enclose a space. Common Notions (Koinai Ennoiai) 1. Things equal to the same thing are also equal to one another. 2. And if equals are added to equals the wholes are equal. 3. And if equals are subtracted from equals the remainders are equal. 4. And if equals are added to unequals the wholes are unequal. 5. And if equals are subtracted from unequals the remainders are unequal. 6. And doubles of the same thing are equal to one another. 7. And halves of the same thing are equal to one another. 8. And things which coincide with one another (ta epharmodzonta ep allela) are equal to one another. 9. And the whole is greater than the part. (Propositions) 1. On a given straight line to construct an equilateral triangle. 2. To place at (pros) a given point a straight line equal to a given straight line. 3. Given two unequal straight lines, to cut off from the greater a straight line equal to the less. 4. If two triangles have the two sides equal to two sides respectively and have the angle contained by the equal straight lines equal to the angle, they will also have the base equal to the base, the triangle will be equal to the remaining angles respectively, (namely) those which the equal sides subtend (hupoteinein) 5. The angles at the base of isosceles triangles are equal to one another, and if the equal straight lines are produced further the angles under the base will be equal to one another. 6. If two angles of a triangle are equal to one another, the sides which subtend the equal angles will also be equal to one another.
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7. On the same straight line there cannot be constructed (ou sustathesontai) two other straight lines equal to the same two straight lines (and) at (pros) a different point, in the same direction, (and) having the same extremities as the original straight lines. 8. If two triangles have the two sides equal to two sides respectively and also have the base equal to the base, they will also have the angle contained by the equal straight lines equal to the angle. 9. To bisect a given rectilineal angle. 10. To bisect a given limited straight line. 11. To draw a straight line at right anlges to a given straight line from a given point on it. 12. To draw a straight line perpendicular to a given innite straight line from a given point which is not on it. 13. When a straight line set up on a straight line makes angles, it will make either two right angles or angles equal to two right angles. 14. If relative to (pros) some straight line and a point on it, two straight lines not lying in the same direction make the adjacent angles equal to two right angles, the straight lines will be in a straight line with one another. 15. If two straight lines cut one another, they will make the vertical angles (hai kata koruphen goniai) equal to one another. 16. If one of the sides of any triangle is produced, the exterior angle is greater than each of the interior and opposite angles. 17. Two angles of any triangle taken in any way are less than two right angles. 18. The greater side of any triangle subtends the greater angle. 19. The greater angle of any triangle is subtended by the greater side. 20. Two sides of any triangle taken in any way are greater than the remaining side. 21. If two straight lines are constructed inside (and) on one of the sides of a triangle from its extremities, the constructed straight lines will be less than the remaining two sides of the triangle but will contain a greater angle. 22. To construct a triangle out of three straight lines which are equal to three given straight lines; thus it is necessary that two taken in any way be greater than the remaining one [because also the two sides of any triangle taken in any way are greater than the remaining side].
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23. To construct relative to a given straight line and a point on it a rectilineal angle equal to a given rectilineal angle. 24. If two triangles have the two sides equal to two sides respectively but the angle contained by the equal straight lines greater than the angle, they will also have the base greater than the base. 25. If two triangles have the two sides equal to two angles respectively, but have the base greater than the base, they will also have the angle contained by the two equal straight lines greater than the angle. 26. If two triangles have the two angles equal to two angles respectively and one side equal to one side, either the one adjoining (pros) the equal angles or the one subtending one of the equal angles, they will also have the remaining sides equal to the remaining sides respectively and the remaining angle to the remaining angle. 27. If a straight line falling on two straight lines makes the alternate (enallax) angles equal to one another, the straight lines will be parallel to one another. 28. If a straight line falling on two straight lines makes the exterior angle equal to the interior and opposite angle in the same direction or the interior angles in the same direction equal to two right angles, the straight lines will be parallel to one another. 29. The straight line falling on parallel straight lines makes the alternate angles equal to one another and the exterior angle equal to the opposite and interior angle and the interior angles in the same direction equal to two right angles. 30. Straight lines parallel to the same straight line are also parallel to another. 31. To draw a straight line parallel to a given straight line through a given point. 32. If one of the sides of any triangle is produced, the exterior angle is equal to the interior and opposite angle, and the three interior angles of the triangle are equal to two right anlges. 33. Straight lines joining equal and parallel straight lines in the same direction are themselves also equal and parallel. 34. The opposite sides and angles of parallelogrammic areas (parallelogramma choria) are equal to one another, and the diameter bisects them. 35. Parallelograms which are on the same base and in the same parallels are equal to one another. 36. Parallelograms which are on equal bases and in the same parallels are equal to one another.
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37. Triangles which are on the same base and in the same parallels are equal to one another. 38. Triangles which are on equal bases and in the same parallels are equal to one another. 39. Equal triangles which are on the same base and in the same direction are also in the same parallels. 40. Equal triangles which are on equal bases and in the same direction are also in the same parallels. 41. If a parallelogram has the same base as a triangle and is in the same parallels, the parallelogram is double of the triangle. 42. To construct in a given rectilineal angle a parallelogram equal to a given triangle. 43. The complements (parapleromata) of the parallelograms around the diameter of any parallelogram are equal. 44. To apply to (parabalein para) a given straight line in a given rectilineal angle a parallelogram equal to a given triangle. 45. To construct in a given rectilineal angle a parallelogram equal to a given rectilineal (gure or area). 46. To describe a square on (apa) a given straight line. 47. In right-angled triangles the squares on the side subtending the right angle is equal to the squares on the sides containing the right angle. 48. If the square on one of the sides of a triangle is equal to the squares on the remaining two sides of the triangle, the angle contained by the remaining two sides of the triangle is right.
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1. Any right-angled parallelogram is said to be contained by the straight lines containing the right angle. 2. Let any one of the parallelograms around the diameter of any parallelogrammic area (together) with the two complements be called a gnomon. (Propositions) 1. If there are two straight lines and one of them is cut into any number of segments, the rectangle (orthogonion) contained by the two straight lines is equal to the rectangles contained by the uncut straight line and each of the segments. 2. If a straight line is cut at random (hos etuchen), the rectangle contained by the whole and both of the segments is equal to the square on the whole. 3. If a straight line is cut at random, the rectangle contained by the whole and one of the segments is equal to the rectangle contained by the segments and the square on the aforesaid segment. 4. If a straight line is cut at random, the square on the whole is equal to the squares on the segments and twice the rectangle contained by the segments. 5. If a straight line is cut into equal and unequal segments, the rectangle contained by the unequal segments of the whole with the square on the segment between the sections is equal to the square on the half. 6. If a straight line is bisected and some straight line is added to it in a straight line, the rectangle contained by the whole with the added straight line and the added straight line is equal to the square on the straight line composed of the half and the added straight line. 7. If a straight line is cut at random, the two squares together that on the whole and that on one of the segments, are equal to twice and the rectangle contained by the whole and the said segment and the square on the remaining segment. 8. If a straight line is cut at random, four times the rectangle contained by the whole and one of the segments with the square on the remaining segment is equal to the square described on the whole and the aforesaid segment as on one straight line. 9. If a straight line is cut into equal and unequal segments, the squares on the unequal segments of the whole are double of the square on the half and the square on the segment between the sections. 10. If a straight line is bisected and some straight line is added to it in a straight line, the two squares together, that on the whole with the added straight line and that on the added straight line, are double of the square on the half and the square described on the straight line composed of the half and the added straight line as on one straight line.
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11. To cut a given straight line so that the rectangle contained by the whole and one of the segments is equal to the square on the remaining segment. 12. In an obtuse-angled triangles the square on the side subtending the obtuse angle is greater than the squares on the sides containing the obtuse angle by twice the rectangle contained by one of the sides around the obtuse angle, the one on which the perpendicular falls and the straight line cut off outside (the triangle) by the perpendicular towards (pros) the obtuse angle. 13. In acute-angled triangles the square on the side subtending the acute angle is less than the squares on the sides containing the acute angle by twice the rectangle contained by one of the sides containing the acute angle, the one of which the prependicular falls, and the straight line cut off inside by the perpendicular towards the acute angle. 14. To construct a square equal to a given rectilineal (gure or area). References Heath, T.L. (trans.): 1925, The Thirteen Books of Euclids Elements, 3 Vols., Cambridge University Press. Mueller, I.: 1981, Philosophy of Mathematics and Deductive Struture in Euclids Elements, M.I.T. Press. Russell, B. A. W.: 1901, Recent work on principles of mathematics, International Monthly, Vol. 4, pp. 83101. Reprinted as Mathematics and the Metaphysicians in Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays, London, Longmans Green, 1918. Issued as a paperback by Penguin Books Ltd. p. 75. Russell, B. A. W.: 1919, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, George Allen and Unwin Ltd. Reprinted by Simon and Schuster.
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Approaches to the Periodic Table

Rudolf Kraus
University of Toronto, Canada. Email: rkraus@chass.utoronto.ca
Despite its value to students of chemistry in predicting the structure of an elements electron orbitals, the periodic table was not developed on the basis of electronic structure. This is often overlooked by modern educators. A possible reason is that many modern science textbooks are written by scientists, who have spent a great deal of time and effort mastering their elds, but at the cost of historical training. Some sift though the history of their discipline for only those ideas that support currently accepted positions. Another common error shows all scientic research leading inevitably to our present position. Famous discoveries and famous scientists risk complete reinterpretation in accordance with modern theory. This is poor history, and it is at best erroneous. At its worst, it presents a distorted view of scientic thinking and scientic processes, and engenders a misplaced faith in the authority of science. I intend to show that a historical approach to the teaching of science benets students in several ways. By presenting chemical topics from a historical point of view, students develop an appreciation for the development of science, and learn to see theories as dynamic entities that change as new information is discovered. Historic experiments, in general, rely upon common materials and use techniques and instruments that can be easily duplicated. For example, Lavoisiers discovery of oxygen can be duplicated with nothing more complicated than a spirit lamp, a magnifying glass, and a supply of lead. As a case-study, I have examined high-school chemistry textbooks with regard to their presentation of the periodic table, including the CHEM Study program introduced in the United States in the 1960s and a current text, Merrills Chemistry, one of the current texts used by the Ontario Board of Education. These will be compared to Mendeleevs own approach in his Principles of Chemistry, the 1891 edition. The Chemical Education Material study, or CHEM Study, arose from a combination of changes within the eld of chemistry, and a general enthusiasm for curriculum reform in the United States. The National Science Foundation awarded monies to a group of university chemists who wished to reform secondary chemistry education. These professors brought together a number of high-school teachers and university chemists, and designed a new curriculum. As might be expected from such a group, which contained only one specialist in education out of hundreds of members, there was a strong inuence from professional science. The professional group introduced the periodic table after a discussion of atoms and bonding. The structure of the periodic table was then revealed as a reection of the nature of electronic orbitals, and the order in which they ll. Instead of a systematic description of the properties of elements, quantum mechanics was introduced. This focused on the structure of the atom, and the lling of electron orbitals. Then, the
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authors showed that elements with similar electron structures have similar properties. This kind of descriptive chemistry puts the cart before the horse, and was completely anachronistic. Historically, the similar properties of elements led chemists to believe that their electronic structures were similar. Logically, deductive reasoning built from facts to generalizations. The academics that wrote CHEM Study presented their material in the opposite order. Why might this have been the case? When considering their new curriculum, the CHEM Study, these authors did not assess what the average student needed to know (as an employee and as a citizen). Instead, they focused on the four percent of the class who were to become university students of chemistry, and decided what knowledge would be useful for them. As an example, here is a list of questions that were asked during the creation of the CHEM Study. The underlying message behind these questions was that knowledge of chemical processes is important, and CHEM Study only needed to adjust the proportions of the various sub-disciplines of chemistry in their curriculum to be successful. 1. Should atomic structure and the nature of chemical bonding be discussed early or late in the course? 2. Should the descriptive chemistry include a detailed discussion of some of the recently discovered exotic compounds, or should it adhere rather closely to the compounds that have relatively high stability under atmospheric conditions? 3. To what extent should algebra, as used in the gas laws and in equilibrium calculations, be included in the course? 4. To what extent should the gas laws themselves be treated, as contrasted with an approach based more directly on kinetic theory and molecular motions? 5. To what extent should the text be based on laboratory experimentation already performed by the student? 6. What is the most effective way of acquainting students with stoichiometry and getting them to the point where they can work with it readily? 7. How useful is the mole concept, and is it reasonable to dene the mole as a number rather than continue to give its historical denition? 8. To what extent should various interpretations of experimental observations be presented? For example, how many acid-base theories should be used in interpreting chemical reactions? 9. To what extent should the treatment of the elements attempt to cover the whole periodic table in contrast to concentrating on a few selected elements? 10. How much treatment of radioactivity should be included? 11. What level of vocabulary should be used as compared with vocabulary usually found in books at the high school level?
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12. How much emphasis should be placed on industrial practice and practical applications of chemistry?1 The need to teach atomic structure and chemical bonding was unquestioned despite the fact that many great chemists and important chemical industries had prospered without them. Instead, the CHEM Study questioned the extent of this need. This academic bent was responsible for the assertion of theoretical considerations like the atomic theory of structure, Avogadros hypothesis, and the kinetic molecular theory of gases within the rst three chapters in a cursory, authoritative manner. These theories were to be proved in later chapters of the text; unfortunately many of these so-called proofs relied on data that the student could not determine in the laboratory, and lacked the background to understand. The worst offender was chapter fourteen, entitled Why we believe in atoms, which cited the electrical nature of atoms, the determination of charge/mass ratios in CRT tubes, evidence from X-ray diffraction, and microwave and infrared spectroscopy as proof of the existence of atoms. Except for the rst, these experiments required equipment beyond the abilities and budget of an average high-school. Even if they had been available, they relied on a host of assumptions in optics, mechanics, the nature of light, and mathematics in order to produce meaningful data, and these assumptions contradicted the spirit of inquiry promoted in the introduction.2 Other evidence of academic motivation was seen in the vocabulary. Rather than use the full names of chemical compounds (sodium chloride), or the common substances that are equivalent (table salt), chemical abbreviations were used almost exclusively (NaCl). Quantitative results were also emphasized, as can be seen in this sample problem. Exercise 11-4 Suppose that 0.099 mole of solid NaOH is added to 0.100 litre of 1.00 M HCl. 1. How many more moles of HCl are present in solution than moles of NaOH? 2. From the excess number of moles and the volume, calculate the concentration of excess H+(aq) 3. Calculate the excess concentration of H+(aq) from the difference between the initial concentrations of HCl and NaOH.3 The middle chapters of the book, from thirteen to eighteen, all dealt with subjects that in my opinion are useless to the non-chemist. Practice in stoichiometry (measurement of quantities consumed and produced in reactions), proof of the existence of the atom, quantum mechanics, the nature of chemical bonding, electron orbital hybridization, and cis-trans isomerism were perhaps not chosen with the interest of
1 Merill, R.J., and Ridgway, D.W.: 1969, The CHEM Study Story, W.H. Freeman and company, San Francisco, p. 7. 2 CHEM Study: 1962, ChemistryAn Experimental Science, W.H. Freeman and company, San Francisco. 3 CHEM Study, Chemistry
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the public in mind. In addition to the difculty of applying these theories, the ideas of physicists Max Planck and Niels Bohr on the quantization of energy and structure of the atom were adopted uncritically, as was the electron exclusion principle of Wolfgang Pauli. Relatively simple practical applications of chemistry, such as developing lm or chemical batteries, were at best mentioned briey in the laboratory manual. Practical applications of chemistry are not only more concrete to the students, and thus more easily taught, but accurately reect the average students involvement with chemistry. CHEM Study did address this problem in chapters nineteen to twenty-three. There was a resurgence in the importance of laboratory work and descriptive chemistry. Students investigated properties of carbon chemistry, halogens, the third-row elements, alkaline earths, fourth and fth-row transition metals, and some sixth and seventhrow rare earths. Emphasis was placed on carbon rings in chapter nineteen, and the radioactive properties of the rare-earths in chapter twenty-three. The last two chapters, twenty four and twenty ve dealt with biochemistry, and the chemistry of the solar system, especially the chemical makeup of the third planet. Absent was a chapter on chemistry in the workplace, or chemistry in the environment.4 While this descriptive chemistry is well done, it comes late in the text, and attempts to survey most of modern practice at the time, instead of treating fewer topics in depth. While claiming to be a general course for all students, the CHEM Study course presupposed a good grounding in algebra, and routinely used graphs and charts to present data, as well as reporting quantities in terms of signicant gures with exponential notation. Additionally, the emphasis on uncertainty calculations introduced some statistics to the laboratory. The general student of chemistry must have been well-versed in mathematics to have succeeded in this course. All of these difculties were particularly ironic because the writers of CHEM Study promoted chemistry as an experimental science, or at least they claimed to. The full title of their book was ChemistryAn Experimental Science.5 Within it, they claimed that laboratory work was essential to understanding chemistry. This could be seen clearly in the units of CHEM Study concerned with descriptive chemistry. They were concerned with a systematic approach to the elements of the periodic table, studying and learning their properties. Unfortunately, they were less concerned with common chemicals familiar to students. This, coupled with their emphasis on vocabulary, resulted in a sharp distinction between the laboratory and the real world for many students. In addition to discrepancies in the content of CHEM Study, there were problems with method as well. The after the fact laboratory experiments, which were supposedly meant to conrm the theories expounded in the text, actually promoted a dogmatic kind of experimentation. The correct answers were already known to the students, and of course the students found a way to reach them. This kind of thinking is not at all similar to the processes of actual scientists, and can mistakenly teach the students that there is one right answer which they would obtain if they were skillful experimenters. Of course, this may be exactly what was meant by the writers of CHEM Study, but this
4 ibid 5 ibid.
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emphasizes the importance of scientists, not that of science. CHEM Study had lost sight of the history of its own discipline; everything that they taught reected modern academic chemistry. This was a level of abstraction that students neither wanted, nor needed. Even the biographies of famous scientists included within the chapters reected modern practice; many of the featured chemists were practicing at the time of the study, and some were on the committee that produced the textbook. Also implied is that there is no diversity of cultures, races or genders among chemists. The students found this class difcult, and of limited value. Many of the concepts taught in this course will never have application outside a chemistry laboratory. Despite its claims at universality, CHEM Study seemed only an attempt to bring high-school chemistry up to-date, reecting both contemporary progress in the eld, and the expectations of undergraduate chemistry programs. A second example of modern secondary chemistry comes from the Ontario Ministry of Education. A close examination of one of their approved textbooks for secondary chemistry, Chemistry, by Merrill, shows us a different approach.6 The Merrill book has a better grasp of the history of science, and is careful in avoiding the school of Great Man History. Mendeleev is presented in context as the best of several systematizers of chemistry, whose periodic table was more complete than the efforts of Doberiner and Newlands, and whose chemical periods were more developed than earlier ideas of triads or octaves. This kind of history gives the student a better grasp of the nature of science, and shows that scientic theories are selected on the basis of utility, not on the basis of truth. The Merrill writers discuss atomic structure in chapter four, and after covering electron clouds and probability, move to the periodic table. According to them, the periodic table is constructed in the following manner. Use the arrow diagram on page 128 to determine the order of lling the sublevels. Each s sublevel can contain two electrons . . . 7 Clearly, they have reinterpreted Mendeleevs efforts in terms of modern electron orbital theory. Only four chapters later do the authors discuss periodic trends, following this overview with a look at some typical elements. This look is mostly supercial, with most of the classroom time devoted to the text and the demonstrations of the teacher. Laboratory practice is limited to a cookbook style similar to that of CHEM Study. For most of the laboratory questions, the correct answers are given in the teachers manual, which undoubtedly creates the impression that there is one right answer to get. This approach also assumes that the observations of the students is unrelated to their conceptual systems. To their credit, the Merrill writers have signicantly reduced the amount of mathematics in their course, relative to CHEM Study. Students no longer need to be mathematicians in order to be chemists. While Merrills Chemistry has lesser theoretical approach than CHEM Study, it still presents the periodic table ahead of the empirical evidence on which it was based. If science is empirical and imaginative, then why not let the students nd this evidence
6 Merill: 1995, Chemistry, Glencoe/McGraw-Hill, New York. This text is approved for the grade 13 OAC program, which is a course for advanced students who have already had two years of general secondary science. 7 ibid., p. 141.
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for themselves? Filling an unjustied framework with data contradicts this empirical approach. Additionally, valence electrons, or any other kind of electrons, were unknown to Mendeleev. His belief that indivisible atoms precluded any such ideas. So how exactly did Mendeleev come upon the idea of the periodic table? The answer to this question is of educational as well as historical value because it is unlikely the student has understanding of the electronic conguration of atoms. Other means should be used to convince the student of the structure and utility of the periodic table. Dmitri Mendeleevs own chemistry textbook, Principles of Chemistry, the rst to ever present the periodic table as part of the curriculum, discusses different factors that led to the periodic table. Electronic orbitals did not make the list. Thompsons discovery of the electron was not foreseen by Mendeleev, who would have denied the possible existence of sub-atomic particles. The factors that Mendeleev did cite for studying the elements in a systematic way included isomorphism, (by which he means the analogy of crystalline forms and analogous compounds), relations of volumes of these analogous compounds, composition of their saline compounds, oxides and hydrides, crystalline structures, and their atomic weights. All of these properties can be investigated in the laboratory, and Mendeleevs own students did so. Unlike the Ontario program and CHEM Study, Mendeleev did not have a separate laboratory book, or lists of experiments for students to try. Instead, all of his assertions could be demonstrated for, or performed by, the students. It was assumed throughout the body of the work that the students would be conrming everything by experiment. In the second appendix to his book, Mendeleev stated:
Under the all-penetrating control of experiment, a new theory, even if crude, is quickly strengthened, provided it be founded on a sufcient basis; the asperities are removed, it is amended by degrees, and soon loses the phantom light of a shadowy form or of one founded on mere prejudice; it is able to lead to logical conclusions, and to submit to experimental proof. Willingly or not, in science we all must submit not to what seems to us attractive from one point of view or another, but to what represents an agreement between theory and experiment; in other words, to demonstrated generalization and the approved experiment.8
Role of experiment was not meant to be a demonstration of theory; it was a determination of theory. The importance of students gathering experimental data was clear from the organization of Mendeleevs text. The periodic law was rst fully explained in the beginning of the second volume. All of the rst volume was concerned with descriptive chemistry, and we can safely assume that Mendeleev proceeded according to the organization that he created for his textbook. Daltons law of multiple proportions was veried through numerous tests, and when it had been conrmed, the students used it to investigate the oxide types of various elements. The arrangement of the elements with respect to increasing atomic weight, oxide and hydride type, were the main supporting evidence for the structure of the table. Mendeleev himself was careful to support the Law of Periodicity with several tests that the students (or other chemists) could easily repeat.
8 Dmitri Mendeleev: 1891, Principles of Chemisty, trans. George Kamensky. Longmans, Green, and Co., London, Vol. 2, p. 435.
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So, unlike the creators of CHEM Study, Mendeleev had a deep interest in the experimental verication of scientic theory. He included a short paper in his textbook on the application of one of Newtons queries to the eld of Chemistry. Clearly, nothing could be admitted as fact until it was supported by evidence. The evidence for his periodic law was carefully and thoroughly presented with this idea in mind, making it both good science and good pedagogy. His careful examination of crystalline structure is a good example of Mendeleevs commitment to experimental support. He reported that the angles of the prisms of aragonite, strontianite, and witherite all belong to the rhombic system, and have the following angles:9 CaCO3 SrCO3 BaCO3 116 10 117 19 118 30
Likewise, the crystalline forms of calc spar, magneseite, and calamine belong to the rhombohedral system, with the following angles: CaCO3 M gCO3 ZnCO3 105 08 107 10 107 40
As a result of this similarity, Mendeleev deduces that Zinc is more similar to Magnesium than Zinc is to Calcium. Other relations are gathered from the crystallization of certain salts with water, and noting the amount of water of hydration. Since ferrous sulfate can hydrate itself with seven molecules of water, we will immerse it in copper sulfate to determine the hydration state of copper. Because the copper deposits in the same form as the iron, both iron and copper must be analogs, both forming salts with seven molecules of water. This idea is generalized to compounds of the form RX, where X is a univalent element, and R is an element combined with it. Observing that only eight types of compounds are observed in nature; RX, RX2 , . . . RX8 , Mendeleev deduces that there must be only eight groups of elements. To determine the group that an element belong to, its compounds with univalent hydrogen and bivalent oxygen are examined. Mendeleevs approach to classication was largely empirical, and still ts well into a modern laboratory setting. Students can be given a variety of common elements to test for density, melting point, and crystal structure. For corroboration, oxides can be prepared, and relative proportions can be determined. Once a sufcient number of samples have been analyzed by the students, they should be in a position to group them
9 Ibid.,
v. 2, p. 2.
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in classes. After some discussion, the students can be given the data for other elements which are not practical to measure in the lab, and assemble their own periodic table. Once this has been completed, students will be able to appreciate periodic trends, and see relations between neighboring elements. This provides a much better basis for understanding electron orbitals and atomic structure than abstract mathematics does. This also reects the pedagogical arguments of Derek Hodson.10 He argues that science teaching is much more teacher-directed in practice than the curriculum would have us believe. In order to compensate for this, and return to the stated goals of the curriculum, we should encourage teachers to learn something about the philosophy of science, and create new curriculum to reect that philosophy. This includes portraying science as having a range and variety of methods which are applied when they are useful, not in terms of an all-encompassing scientic method. The variety of collaborating evidence which Mendeleev brings to support his Periodic Law is an example of this range and variety. Mendeleevs experimental approach is also supported by child psychologist Jean Piaget, whose work describes stages of learning.11 Many students need examples from which to generalize abstract rules. By conducting experiments without knowledge of the correct results, these students will think for themselves. This will make further generalization and abstraction easier. Mendeleevs inclusion of subjects like astronomy, biology, geology, and meteorology allowed for better interrelations between sciences. This in turn, benets the students who are already familiar with these topics. The Principles also incorporated chemical problems relevant to the economic development of Russia. This kind of practical application provides even more concrete examples to students, and educates future citizens about their country. A lesson in the authority of science is the nal benet available with an approach inspired by the Principles. Students will likely have condence in their collective efforts, and even more in Mendeleevs published results. Introducing an unknown element, such as Argon, should cause quite a difculty for the students. A noble gas will be unreactive to their tests, and will not have a clear place in the table that they have constructed. They will have to revise their table in order to include the noble gases before these tensions are resolved. This can show the students that no theory is perfect, and that the utility of a theory is not a measure of its validity. While I have not examined this issue directly, the ideas of classication and taxonomy are not unique to Mendeleev. Other nineteenth century chemists were trying to organize the list of elements into a structure.12 Taxonomy was an important part of botany and zoology at the time, and can be considered an entire style of thinking, because it was such a prevalent concern in the nineteenth century.13 The connections
Hodson, Towards a More Philosophically-Oriented Science Curriculum, Science Education, v. 72. J.: 1970, Psychology and Epistemology, The Viking Press, New York, pp. 63-88. 12 The discovery of radioactivity would make this a much more difcult enterprise. For this reason, the window in which a classication system was possible was limited. See Bensaude-Vincents Mendeleevs periodic system of chemical elements, British Journal for the History of Science, v. 19, pp. 3-17. 13 For more information on styles of thinking, see Hacking, Style of Scientic Thinking or Reasoning: A New Analytic Tool for Historians and Philosophers of the Sciences, ed. by Kostas Gavroglu, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, 1994, pp. 31-48.
11 Piaget, 10 Derek
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between societys concerns with classication and Mendeleevs own thinking are left to the sociologist of science, but I am sure that this inuence exists, and did inuence Mendeleev in some way. An approach to chemistry that is closer to Mendeleevs is long overdue. Instead of conducting experiments in which the goal is already known, the instructor should allow the students to investigate chemical properties with less guidance than customary. As laboratory tests proceed, students will see the relations between elements. At this point, they are ready to appreciate Mendeleevs work, and not before. This approach will challenge students to think for themselves, investigate unknown quantities, in short, to practice the empirical method that is often advocated and seldom achieved. Not only does this approach emphasize Mendeleevs chemical ideas, but it uses the exact educational approach that he advocated. While famed as a chemist, Mendeleev is also important as an instructor. He understood the need to support theories with experiments, and advanced no theories to his students which he could not rst prove. Modern students would also benet from this method of teaching. In addition to the gain in chemical knowledge, a conceptual understanding of the periodic table aids students in appreciating the difculties of research, allows them to combine laboratory results with experimental theory, and demonstrates the strengths and weaknesses of scientic authority.
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Alternative Frameworks in Electricity and Conceptual Change

A.B.Saxena
Regional Institute of Education, Ajmer, India.
Introduction
During the last couple of decades large number of studies have been conducted to explore the nature of alternative frameworks (Driver and Easley 1978). These studies have been conducted in different areas of physics such as force, motion, acceleration, heat, light and electricity. (For a review of such studies, see for example, Driver et. al. 1985, Novak 1987 Osborne and Freyberg 1985, Watts and Gilbert 1983). In view of prevailing misconceptions in different areas, attempts have been made for conceptual change (e.g. Eylon and Linn 1988: Saxena 1992, 1994, Smith et al. 1993, Shipstone 1988 Thorley and Woods 1997). Some models have also been proposed for this purpose (e.g. Clement 1987, Driver and Oldham 1986, Gilbert and Watts 1983, Hashweh 1986, Smith et al. 1993) and the necessary conditions for conceptual change has been discussed (Posner et al. 1982). In this article, we shall conne ourselves to conceptions and alternative frameworks related to current and its ow through resistors in a simple circuit. In the section that follows, a review of students concept of current, and related difculties shall be presented. It is followed by discussion on the stability of these concepts and conditions that are responsible for it. The effect of classroom instructions and its little impact on the students previous ideas is signicant in this respect. Several strategies based on models for conceptual change have been used to achieve it. These are discussed in the next section. Finally the implications of research ndings particularly in terms of curriculum construction and teacher education are discussed. 2 The Electric Current and Related Alternative Frameworks Many studies have been conducted to map the students conception of (direct) current in simple circuits at various levels of education, for example at primary level (Summers, Kruger and Mant 1998), at secondary level (Saxena 1994, Shipstone 1984, 1988), and at undergraduate level (McDermott and Shaffer 1992, Saxena 1990, 1996, Shipstone 1984). Cross-cultural studies have also been conducted (e.g. ASPEN 1991) to compare their nature across the globe. For example, at the lowest level, in some studies students have been, found to predict lighting of the bulb with the help of one wire (Osborne 1981). As far as current is concerned Shipstone (1984) observed four models of current. These are: Model I: This is known as clashing current model. In this model current leaves both the electrodes and is consumed as it passes through the various circuit elements such as resistors bulbs etc.
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Model II: Contrary to clashing current model, in this model, current is assumed to ow in one direction only. The current gets weakened as it passes through various circuit elements. The element that is farthest from the anode receives the least current. Model III: This model assumes that the current is shared between various components in the circuit. The components having equal resistance get equal current. In this model also, current is not conserved. Model IV: This is the scientic model of current. It differs from Model II in the sense that constant current ows in a series circuit and it does not get consumed. Apart from these models, in some cases students use a model of current which does not t into any of these models. For example, in some cases the use of constant current owing out of the source has been reported (Cohen, Eylon and Ganniel 1982, McDermott and Shaffer 1992). In this model, magnitude of current in the circuit does not depend upon the circuit elements. Use of constant current model has been reported in other studies as well (Saxena 1994). Another model known sequence model (Shipstone 1984) has also been reported in the literature (e.g. Saxena, 1994). In this model the current is affected down the stream only. It could be explained using (gure 1). In this approach constant current is assumed to ow out of the source of current, say, cell. If the + V resistor r2 is varied, its effect is only on the current passing through the resistor r2 and not on current passing through the resistor r1 . r2 r1 Non-conservation of current in a series circuit i.e. different amount of current passing through Figure 1: A resistor. resistors r1 and r2 is also obtained using erroneous use of Ohms law (Saxena, 1992). In this the current passing through individual resistor is calculated as, current through resistor r1 = V /r1 ; current through resistor r2 = V /r2 . Obviously, the current is not conserved. Nonconservation of current is also reected when students are asked to predict which bulb would glow (gure 2), when bulb B2 is fused. Many students opine that bulb B1 would glow and B3 would not (Saxena 1994, 1998). This kind of model of current is also observed + when children attempt to light the bulb with one wire only (McDermott and Shaffer 1992, Shipstone 1998). The concept of resistors connected in series and parallel is introduced at secondary level (BalasubB2 B3 B1 ramanian et. al. 1985). However, even at undergraduate level, some students fail to recognise the Figure 2: A bulb. type of connection (McDermott and Shaffer 1991, Saxena 1992). They tend to categorise the connection according to geometrical shape in the diagram rather than the actual connections. They are also not able to predict the effect of connecting another resistor in parallel, on the current and total effective resistance in the circuit. McDermott and Shaffer (1991) provide in detail the difculties faced by students
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while explaining the behaviour of electric current in a simple circuit. These are related to concept of current, potential difference, resistance and qualitative reasoning of behaviour of electric current. Many students fail to recognize that a circuit diagram represents only electric elements and connections and not actual physical or spatial relationship of various elements. This poses considerable difculty when students were required to make connections according to a given circuit diagram. Students while studying the transition from electrostatics to electrokinetics historically and among students, Benseghir and Closset (1996) compared their thought processes. They found that scientists use the electrostatics in early efforts to conceptualise the concept of current. Similarly, part of the students reasoning in electrokinetics comes from conceptual basis which includes a more or less intuitive knowledge of electrostatics. 3 Stability and Origin of Alternative Frameworks The simple evidence of stability of alternative frameworks comes from the fact that they persist despite formal education in school and college over a number of years. Some of the studies cited earlier were conducted on undergraduate students (McDermott and Shaffer 1991, Saxena 1992, 1996) and sixth-form college (Shipstone 1984). In another study conducted on undergraduate students (Saxena 1998) for a period of three years, students concept of current was evaluated annually using a questionnaire. The results of the study indicated that the students exhibited many misconceptions throughout the course of study. In many students alternative frameworks persisted despite teaching for three years. These students had physics as one of the major subject of study. In this context Aron (1995) states:
The pre- and mis-conceptions found to be widely prevalent among students in introductory physics courses extend to students in upper division courses, to secondary school teachers, to graduate students, and even to some university faculty members, the proportion of individuals exhibiting such difculties decreases signicantly but does not drop to zero discontinuously beyond introductory level.
Another study, conducted on students enrolled for electrical engineering programme showed that spontaneous conceptions survive formal training and they had difculty in applying Ohms law. This predicament which persists after ve semesters of formal education in electronics, is apparently rooted in inadequate conception of voltage and current (Metioui et. al. 1996). Further, it is found that lack of coherent links between electrostatics and circuits in typical electricity instruction is responsbile for the high degree of difculty of that subject. Moreover, theorectical view also accounts for differences in success of students learning in the context of a standard high school physics course (Gutwill et. al. 1996). Many reasons have been given that could be responsible for the origin and persistence of the alternative frameworks. Eylon and Linn (1998) argue that uniformity of intuititve conception developed suggests that there must be well dened mechanism behind the origin of alternative frameworks. However, there is no agreement on the mechanism itself. It is suggested that the kinaesthetic or sense experiences make their effect on the human beings much before they are able to formalise them. The common
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misconception that it requires a force for a body to move with constant velocity comes in this category of alternative frameworks. Another source of origin of alternative framework is ascribed to metaphorical use of language in everyday life. Much electric current is consumed when electric heater is used falls in this category. Solomon (1983) is of the view that exposure to non-scientic explanation through mass-media and other means could be one source of generation of alternative frameworks. The inability of the learners to distinguish between scientic world of the laboratory and the classroom and the life world of outside environment, and to switch over from one world to another is the reason of many learners problems (Solomon 1983). Mohapatra and Bhattacharya (1989) have suggested that induced incorrect generalisation during teaching and outside could possibly be operating to generate alternative frameworks. Further, Mohapatra (1991) has suggested that the episodic conceptualisation could also be the source of some alternative conceptions. Saxena (1994) has suggested linguistic interference and world association of possible mechanisms responsible for the development of alternative frameworks. With their continual use over time for explanation of events and observations, these frameworks become readily available at subconcious level and are integrated with procedural knowledge. Hashweh (1986) points out that procedural knowledge is difcult to change. Further, it could be due to linguistic interference as is observed in persistence of sentence structure in the speakers native language to construct sentence in a new language. Another explanation is cited in the form of Einstelling effect in which a previous conception is strongly tied to certain features of the problem or situation through previous experience. The situation is similar to stimulus-response conditioning in behaviourism. 4 Attempting Conceptual Change As long as the existing conception continues to help understand some of the observations it does not get changed. Unless specic conditions are not created that question the validity of existing conception, the conceptual change does not take place. So long as the existing conception continues to serve, though in limited domain, it is retained. Posner, Strike, Hewson and Gertzog (1982) suggest four necessary conditions for conceptual change. These are: 1. Dissatisfaction with existing conception: Conceptual change occurs only when one feels that minor change will not work. Dissatisfaction with the existing conception is necessary for conceptual change. 2. The new conception should be intelligible: It is necessary for the learner to understand the new conception minimally. He should be able to represent it and see how the experience can be structured on its basis. 3. The new conception must appear plausible initially: At the outset, the new conception must appear to be able to solve problems and help understand situations, that cannot be dealt with the existing conception. It should also appear consistent with coneptions already accepted by the learner.
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4. The new conception should be fruitful to the learner: Apart from the properties of being intelligible and plausible, the new conception should help achieve something of value to the learner. It should have potential to explain new areas of experiences, observations and domain. For these reasons, exposure to a new idea through structured curriculum using guided experiment for a short period may not be successful to make conceptual change in many students. Such a situation was observed in an attempt to make conceptual change (Saxena, 1992) wherein it was observed that, in one third of cases students failed to solve similar problems. This could be due to variety of reasons. The time for experimentation was nearly two hours. Students worked in small groups rather than independently. Perhaps, working for a longer period individually and having more learning experiences would have given better results. One possible strategy to achieve conceptual change could be to make use of demonstrations during teaching. However, all demostrations may not be meaningful to the learner. Roth et. al. (1997) analysed in detail the characteristics of demonstrations that help learning. On the basis of results obtained, it is suggested that in all activities including conducting experiment, discussion about design of the experiment, explaining the observations, representing the observations and their analysis are considered as social practices in which students participate. The effective demonstration activity should (Roth et. al. 1997): engage students in talking about and representing phenomena; engage students in discussion about scientic inquiry and construction of variables such as to produce a consistent theoretical framework and construction of variables that allow them to keep account of systems despite change; engage students in discusion about the mutually constituitive function of language game and phenomenon, situated language, and knowledge which assist in the seperation of signal from noise; have students generate evidence and theory, set up a forum in which these are hammered out, and decide on future evidence to be needed and constructed. Another strategy for conceptual change has been to use examples and analogies (Brown 1992, Clement 1987). To identify anchoring examples separate diagnostic test is used. Conceptual change is obtained with the help of Socratic dialogue, bridging analogies and anchoring examples. To be successful the examples must be understandable and believable to the students, the analogy must be clear to the students. Otherwise, the analogy must be claried by the teacher in order to be explicit. Finally qualitative visualisable models may be developed to give mechanistic explanation of the phenomena. Unless students are able to see in the same way as the teacher they fail to evoke the desired phenonomena. To explain, the role of battery in a circuit with a bulb, Shipstone (1985) suggested the analogy of boiler and radiator. Similarly, the role of emf source is compared with water pump which can cause water to move from
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conflict 2

Conception C1
explains
Conception C2
s lain exp
t lic nf co 1
ins pla ex
Domain R1
Domain R2
Domain R3
Figure 3: A model for conceptual change based on Hashweh (1986). Conict 1 and 2 are to be resolved for conceptual change. a place of lower gravitational potential to a place of higher potential (Halliday and Resnick 1987). At primary level Summers et. al. (1998) use bicycle chain analogy for current. However, the use of analogies is not without suspicion. Duit (1991) warns that the use of analogy create some diculties for the learner because many scientic phenomena can be explained using abstract concepts and sophisticated mathematical techniques. Treagust, Harrison and Venville (1996) are not sure about the nature of change obtained as a result of using an analogy because it is not conclusive whether the analogy contributed to conceptual change or whether the analogy merely provided students with a means to express themselves with the language which was otherwise unavailable to them. The instructional material provided to the students in support of the activities conducted in the class plays an important role in making conceptual change. Smith, Blakeslee and Anderson (1993) concluded that it requires the support of appropriately designed instructional materials in order to use conceptual change strategies successfully. Moreover, the conceptual change approach should probably be thought of as a coherent approach to teaching rather than as a collection of individually useful strategies. 4.1 The Process of Conceptual Change: Several models for conceptual change have been suggested. The process of conceptual change could be divided into four subprocesses (Hashweh 1986): 1. discarding of old conception, 2. acceptance of the new conception for consideration as an alternative, 3. conict between the existing conception and the new conception, and 4. acceptance of the new conception and its availability for future use. Diagramaticatly it could be represented as shown in gure 3. It shows that the previous concept C1 is able to explain the observation in a limited domain R1. Exposure to domain R2 generates conict (1) as the existing concept C1 is not able to explain the
Saxena
View P
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View P
Time (Instruction)
View S3
View S1
View S2 (View Equality)
View S3
View S2
View S1 (View Hierarchy)
Figure 4: Two routes for conceptual change (Thornton 1995). observations in this domain. It is assumed that conict (1) is resovled by adopting concept C2 which better explains in domain R2. However adopting conception C2 does not resolve conict (1). Moreover, another conict (2) occurs between conception C1 and C2. Both types of conicts are to be removed for successful conceptual change. Thornton (1995) suggests two possible routes of conceptual change: View equality and View hierarchy. These are shown in gure 4. View equality shows equality among three possible conceptions and, therefore, one could go from any of these views to the desired view P . In view hierarchy, the three views S1, S2 and S3 are hierarchical in the sense that someone holding the view S1 has to move through S2 and S3 inorder to reach view P . Hence, he is less likely to reach to view P than those holding the view S2 or S3. Sometimes combination of view equality and view hierachy could also occur. Driver and Oldham (1986) has suggested ve stage teaching model to obtain conceptual change. The stages in this model are: orientation, elicitation of ideas, restructuring of ideas, application of ideas and review. Restructuring of ideas is the most crucial stage which includes clarication and exchange of ideas, exposure to conicting situations, construction of new ideas and their evaluation. 5 Implications Teacher education is an important component to improve efcacy of teaching. There are two important components that are to be paid attention to: (i) teaching strategy and (ii) teachers attitude towards science (physics). The rst part includes development of teachers awareness towards students ideas about electricity, their conception of current, potential difference etc., and procedural knowledge to employ Ohms law etc. Further, it would encompass strategies that could be adopted to remove alternative frameworks. Finally it includes the approaches that could be used in introducing the scientic concepts related to electricity. Aron (1990) points out that two approaches could be adopted to introduce electricity. One approach rst introduces the concept of charge and arrives at the concept of current at the later stage. The other approach rst
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introduces the concept of current and the concept of charge is brought in later. Either of the two approaches could be adopted without encountering any difculty. Further, it implies that while planning and transacting the curriculum, the teacher identies the common alternative frameworks among the students, related to the topic; develops a list of activities that help to remove the identied alternative frameworks; and tests the efcacy of his/her approach. This needs to be investigated and explored in the context of various topics. It is not necessary that the same approach is adopted while teaching various topics. A technique such as the drawing of concept maps requires its use over long duration before its gains could be readily obtained. This is because students need practice before they obtain mastery in drawing of concept maps. Moreover one could also reasearch on various modes of using concept maps during teaching. The second component of teacher education is concerned with teachers attitude. Some suggestions are given below: Science to be described as social activity rather than individualistic. The role of cooperative work and social interaction to be given due importance. Science is not to be taken as a value free pursuit, rather it be discussed in the social, moral and ethical context. Science to be considered as the result of creative, sometimes restructuring endeavour, rather than linear and accumulative. Extreme inductivism, free observations and experimentation are to be discouraged. The role of hypothesis making and construction of coherent body of knowledge is to be encouraged. Finally, more and more research evidence is being obtained that shows students competence is heterogeneous, not unitary. It depends upon interaction between individual and the context. Therefore, one single task would not do justice with the evaluation of students competence because it hides the heterogeneity of performance (McGinn and Roth 1988). 6 Conclusion Electricity was taken in this paper as one example to illustrate the problems and approaches related to teaching of physics. It shows that the classical approach of teaching adopting transmission model is to be replaced by variety of strategies that treat the learner as active agent, having his/her own ideas. Sensitivity of the teacher in this regard can take him a long way to make the learning more meaningful.
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Arons, A. B.: 1990, A Guide to Introductory Physics Teaching, John Wiley & Sons, New York. Arons, A. B.: 1995, Generalizations to be drawn from results of research on teaching and learning, in B. C. Tarsitani and M. Vicentini (eds), Thinking Physics for Teaching, Plenum Press, New York, pp. 18. ASPEN: 1991, (asian Physics Education Network), ASPEN- APTEA Workshop II on Research for Students Conceptual Structures and Changes in Learning Physics . ASPEN University of Philippines, Manila. Benseghir, A. and Closset, J.-L.: 1996, The electrostatic electrokinetic transition: Historical and educational difculties, International Journal of Science Education 18(2), 179191. Brown, D.: 1992, Using Examples and Analogies to Remediate Misconceptions in Physics, Factors Inuencing Conceptual Change, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 29(1), 1734. Clement, J.: 1987, Overcoming Students Misconceptions in Physics: The Role of Anchoring Intuition and Analogical Validity, in J. Novak (ed.), Proceedings of Second International Seminar: Misconceptions and Educational Strategies in Science and Mathematics, Vol. III, Cornell University, Ithaca, pp. 8496. Driver, R. and Easley, J.: 1978, Pupils Paradigms - A Review of Literature Related to Concept Development in Adolescent Science Students, Studies in Science Education 5, 6184. Driver, R. et al.: 1985, Childrens Ideas in Science, Open University Press, Philadelphia. Driver, R. and Oldham, V.: 1986, A Constructivist Approach to Curiculum Development in Science, Studies in Science Education 13, 105122. Duit, R.: 1991, On the Role of Analogies and Metaphors in Learning Science, Science Education 75, 649672. Eylon, Bet-sheva and Linn, M.C.: 1988, Learning and Instruction: An Examination of Four Research Perspectives in Science Education, Review of Educational Research 58(3), 251301. Gilbert, J. and Watts, D.: 1983, Concepts, Misconceptions and Alternative Conceptions: Changing Perspectives in Science Education, Studies in Science Education 10, 61 98. Gutwill, Joshna, et al.: 1996, Seeking the Causal Connection in Electricity: Shifting Among Mechanistic Perspectives, International Journal of Science Education 18(2), 143162.
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Halliday, D. and Resnick, R.: 1987, Physics, Part II, Wiley Eastern, New Delhi. Reprinted p. 789. Hashweh, Z.: 1986, Toward an Explanation of Conceptual Change, European Journal of Science Education 8(3), 229249. McDermott, L. and Shaffer, P.: 1991, Research as Guide for Curriculum Development: An Example from Introductory Electricity. Part I Investigation of Student Understanding, American Journal of Physics 60(11), 9941003. McGinn, Michelle, K. and Roth, W.: 1998, Assessing Students Understanding About Levers: Better Test Instruments are Not Enough, International Journal of Science Education 20(7), 813832. Metioni, A. et al.: 1996, The Persistence of Students Unfounded Beliefs About Case of Electrical Circuits; the Case of Ohms Law, International Journal of Science Education 18(2), 193212. Mohapatra, J.: 1991, The Interaction of Cultural Rituals and the Concepts of Science in Student Learning: A Case Study of Solar Ecplipse, International Journal of Science Education 13(4), 431437. Mohapatra, J. and Bhattcharya, S.: 1989, Pupils, Teachers Induced Incorrect Generalisation and the Concept of Force, International Journal of Science Education 41(4), 429436. Novak, J. (ed.): 1987, Proceedings of Second International Seminar Misconceptions and Educational Strategies in Science and Mathematics, Vol. III, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y. Osborne, R.: 1981, Childrens Ideas About Electric Current, New Zealand Science Teacher 29(12), 9. Osborne, R. and Freyberg, P.: 1985, Learning in Science: The Implications of Childrens Science, Heinemann, Auckland. Posner, G.J. Strike, K.A. Hewson, P.W. and Gertzog, W.A.: 1982, Accommodation of a Scientic Conception: Toward a Theory of Conceptual Change, Science Education 68, 211227. Roth, Wolff-Michael et al.: 1997, Why do Students Fail to Learn from Demonstrations? A Social Practice Perspective on Learning in Physics, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 34(5), 509533. Saxena, A.B.: 1990, A Study of Students Misconceptions About Electricity, School Science XXVII(2), 815. Saxena, A.B.: 1992, An Attempt to Remove Misconceptions Related to Electricity, International Journal of Science Education 14(2), 157162.
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Saxena, A.B.: 1994, Alternative Frameworks and Addressing Conceptual Change, Regional College of Education, Bhopal. Saxena, A.B.: 1996, An Analysis of the Students Concept of Current, Bulletin IAPT 13(5), 140143. Saxena, A.B.: 2000, The Development of Concepts Related to Electricity Among College Students - A Longitudinal Study, School Science XXXVIII(1), 2032. Shipstone, D.: 1984, A Study of Childrens Understanding of Electricity, in Simple DC Circuits, European Journal of Science Education 6(2), 185198. Shipstone, D.: 1985, Electricity and Simple Circuit, in R. Driver, E. Guesen and A. Tiberghien (ed.), Childrens Ideas in Science, Open University Press, Philadelphia, pp. 3351. Shipstone, D.: 1988, Pupils Understanding of Simple Electrical Circuits, Physics Education 23(2), 9296. Smith, E.L. Blakeslee, Theron, D. and Anderson, C.W.: 1993, Teaching Strategies Associated with Conceptual Change Learning in Science, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 30(2), 111126. Solomon, J.: 1983, Learning About Energy: How Pupils Think in Two Domains?, European Journal of Science Education 5(1), 4959. Summers, M. Kruger, C. and Mant, J.: 1998, Teaching Electricity Effectively in the Primary School: A Case Study, International Journal of Science Education 20(2), 153172. Thorley, N. R. and Woods, K.: 1997, Case Studies of Students Learning as Action Research on Conceptual Change Teaching, International Journal of Science Teaching 19(2), 22945. Thornton, R.: 1995, Conceptual Dynamics: Changing Students Views of Force and Motion, in B. Tarsitani and M. Vicentini (eds), Thinking Physics for Teaching, Plenum Press, New York, pp. 157183. Treagust, D.F. Harrison, A.G. and Vanville, G.J.: 1996, Using an Analogical Teaching Approach to Engender Conceptual Change, International Journal of Science Education 18(2), 213229. Watts, D. and Gilberts, J.: 1983, Enigmas in School Science: Students Conceptions for Scientically Associated Words, Research in Science and Technology Education 1(2), 16171.
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Common Mans Science and Its Role in Making General Science Education Meaningful
Rakesh Popli
Birla Institute of Technology, Ranchi, India.
Introduction
It is no exaggeration that general science education in India has been a disaster. Our experience in villages of South Bihar1 and the city of Ranchi shows that science education in primary, middle and high schools is not fullling its stated objectives2 in any measure. It is neither enabling students to understand science concepts, principles and theories nor to use the process of science in daily-life situations in solving problems, making decisions and extending ones own understanding. As far as inculcation of a scientic outlook is concerned, the picture is even bleaker. Instead, science is a burden on poor students who have to remember all the tongue-twisting keywords, concepts, principles, derivations, explanations, etc. Other workers in various parts of India have come across similar experiences. This phenomenon is not conned to village children or rst-generation learners. Even urban children attending well-endowed schools often nd science awesome and burdensome. Many of these students may be able to score good marks in examinations by dumping a lot of unconnected information into their short-term memories, but it is neither intellectually enlightening nor practically useful. For almost two decades, science education has been made compulsory for all students in India upto class X. While the basic idea of enlightening all with the light of science is unexceptionable, in practice the only thing it has given to a vast majority of students is a formidable stumbling block on the path to matriculation. In the area of science popularization too, efforts by prominent scientic organizations have hardly stirred the general public. All this brings into sharp focus the question whether the meaning and content of science for common people (and common children) has to be the same as for professors Newton and Maxwell and their modern successors. There is, therefore, need to review the scheme of science education as a part of general education. This necessarily involves a reconsideration of the nature of science itself-in particular, a consideration of how science interfaces with the day-to-day lives of all people and how they can interact with and benet from it.
1 Rakesh Popli: 1987, Popularization of Science Among Tribal Youth, Report of project supported by DST, Govt. of India, Vikas Bharati Bishunpur. A part of this report deals with the interaction of high school students with science curricula and concludes that these curricula are hopeless. See also, Rakesh Popli: unpublished 1992, An Evaluation of Science and Mathematics Prociency Levels of Rural School Students in Ranchi District. This Report encompasses a survey of Class IV and Class VIII students of about 25 schools each. The results are almost uniformly dismal, regardless of the quality of management of the schools. 2 National Council of Educational Research and Training: 1986, Science Education for the First Ten Years of Schooling.
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In this paper we review some aspects of the nature of science and point out why it is found so difcult and alien by general public and students. We then propose the concept of Common Mans Science (CMS) which can help make general science education lively and meaningful. CMS is a community- and context-specic assortment of items from the totality of science. It is related directly to natural phenomena in the lives of all people of a community. CMS is seen to be derived from two sources: (a) empirical facts, generalizations and observations accumulated over generations, and (b) relevant parts of conventional sciences dealing with subjects of interest to all people at appropriate phenomenological levels. The nature of CMS is examined in some detail and it is distinguished from traditional and folk sciences. Possible objections based on notions of oneness of science and pre-scientic knowledge-systems are dealt with. In the next part, a concrete but illustrative outline of the proposed curricula of CMS at the primary (Class I-V) and secondary (Class VI-X) levels of school education is given which would be conducive to the best intellectual appreciation of science as well as practical benet of all students in India. The role of CMS in senior secondary and higher education and science popularization among communities at large is briey discussed. 2 2.1 Science in relation to the common man The Nature of Science
The formulation of a scheme of science education as a part of general education requires a consideration of the nature of science to some extent and of the purpose(s) of science education in the overall scheme of general education. Therefore, we shall rst look into some aspects of the nature of science before dening Common Mans Science. The term science used in this paper refers to the body of scientic knowledge of natural phenomena, i.e. it does not cover social phenomena. In the history of mankind, observation of natural phenomena, search for generalizations and inter-relations, and utilization of such knowledge for practical benet, has been an important aspect of life. Some of these generalizations are rather limited in scope; others have wide ranges of applicability. Some are directly and readily veriable; others have been discovered and validated over many generations, for example, that progeny born of marriages between close blood-relatives are more prone to some diseases than other people. What is conventionally called science is a narrower scheme whose scope is extremely wide in principle. It aims particularly at making vast generalizations and bringing all phenomena within the ambit of a few laws. This includes not only phenomena of day-to-day life but also those very far removed from ambient conditions. It covers man-made phenomena, and even those that have never taken place. Similarly, the objects of scientic investigations are not only those readily accessible to the general public but all conceivable objects. Thus, for example, Newtonian mechanics is equally applicable to the motions of a motorcar, a ball thrown up at any angle, a bird ying in the sky, and the Moon.
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The general principles and theories of science can embrace such a vast array of objects and phenomena only at a certain cost: these deal more with increasingly abstract concepts and operations than with actual objects and phenomena of daily life. For example, Newtonian mechanics deals with point-objects (particles), forces, momenta, etc., which are all considerably abstract. Quantum mechanics, which covers even wider ground, involves much more abstract entities like wave-functions. In Biology, classication of forms of life becomes an exercise in abstraction if it is to cover all forms, not only those of direct interest to a given community at a given time. The difculty of students and common people in interacting with science is to be viewed in this light. Conventional science has been sub-divided into disciplines and sub-disciplines, of which Physics, Chemistry and Biology are usually taught in general education. It is interesting to note that these sciences differ from one another not only in content and terminology but also in methods employed. For example, in Atmospheric Science and Cosmology, hardly any experiment can be done. Biology does not follow the hypotheticodeductive method followed in much of Physics. It may also be noted that there is no unique basis for the division of science into branches: it is quite dependent on need. An important aspect of scienceimportant from the point of view of general education is phenomenology. It may be noted that a given body of phenomena may be understood and discussed at various levels of abstraction or, we may say, various levels of phenomenology. At the lowest level is that description which may be obtained by a direct and simple observation with the bare senses. Above that, successively higher levels of phenomenology and phenomenological theory can be conceived of. For example, the rising and setting of the sun, the moon and the stars may be observed directly. The monthly or annual variations in their timings may be tabulated systematically. The same may be done with the phases of the moon. All these phenomena (plus eclipses) are readily explained by a geocentric phenomenological theory in which the sun, the moon and the stars revolve around the earth with various periods. The heliocentric (suncentred) theory represents a higher level of phenomenology which explains even more phenomena like the planetary motions and the stellar aberration. Still higher levels of phenomenology can encompass terrestrial motions too, albeit in a more abstract and mathematical way. It would be nave and short-sighted to claim that one particular level of phenomenology (say, heliocentric) was the truth or science and another level (say, geocentric) was a false notion or not science. 2.2 Common Mans Science By the term common man we do not mean a particular class of people, but refer to the common denominator of lives of all people in a community. Thus, even a scientist is a common man when not working as a specialist. Common Mans Science (CMS) is that part of science which is relevant to life and problems of the common man. Just as science curricula can have different contents and levels of treatment for various purposes, say science for physicians or science for painters, CMS is to be considered as that part of the totality of science which is (i) of use to the common man, and (ii) accessible to him, i.e. the level of phenomenology is such that the common man may understand and work with it. The science of food, water, human body, motions
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of objects including vehicles, housing, weather, life of common plants and animals, celestial objects and calendars, various consumer goods, etc. such are the topics which make up the subject matter of CMS. But subject headings alone do not make CMS. In order to distinguish CMS from the science of the above subjects taught conventionally in schools, three important points may be noted. First, CMS treats these subjects at an appropriate level of phenomenology. As we have already discussed, taking up any aspect of nature at the level of general principles or theories or high levels of abstraction means going far away from the actual phenomena of concern to the common man. For example, in discussing food, a chemist may be interested in different chemical constituents of food items and their various reactions in the human body mediated by various enzymes. The common man is not interested in details of these reactions. He is interested in the various practical characteristics of whole food items, e.g. their digestibility, their mutual complementarity or incompatibility, the energy and other benets given by each, etc. He is interested broadly in the general process of digestion and particularly in how this process is helped or hindered by various spices, the state of the body and the state of the mind. He is also interested in correlations like that of eating carrots with prevention and cure of night-blindness. Second, CMS does include the understanding of nature acquired by communities over the ages, e.g. compatibility of specic spices with particular foods. Whether such understanding is considered a part of science or pre-scientic is a matter of denition. Either way, it can hardly be denied that much of this understanding of nature and knowledge of its phenomena is useful and readily accessible to the common man. Parts of it have been subjected to scientic investigation and validated, e.g. breast-feeding being the best for babies and useful for mothers. Other parts may be at various stages of investigation; yet others may not have been investigated yet. Certain pieces of such traditional understanding have been further generalized by scientic researches and made more abstract, without affecting the validity of the earlier understanding in its limited domain. The geocentric understanding of the commonly observed motions of celestial bodies is an example. Such understanding is a part of CMS unless proved wrong by systematic investigation. Third, the practice of CMS is integrated and practical rather than disciplinary. The emphasis is on dealing with common phenomena of life in more and more systematic, analytical and creative ways, not on delving into one particular narrow aspect of a phenomenon to the exclusion of all others. Organization of the subject matter of CMS will, therefore, be done largely in terms of departments of life, not in terms of conventional scientic disciplines. Of course, this is not to rule out the inclusion of topics, theories and principles of conventional disciplines needed for a practical understanding of life phenomena. 2.3 Some Clarications Let us point out that CMS is to be distinguished from traditional sciences and folk sciences. It is, of course, true that CMS bears a close relationship with these, is community-specic in content and emphasizes continuity with earlier knowledge. How-
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ever, the term traditional sciences usually refers to closed systems belonging to past ages, whereas CMS is very much contemporary and open. Also, CMS is not bound by any theoretical basis these sciences may have in ancient philosophies but utilizes their phenomenology. Thus, for example, empirical facts of Ayurveda like properties of various plant-products, in terms of their effects on the human body, are useful parts of CMS, but not necessarily the underlying notions like the ve elements (mahabhutas). The overlap of CMS with folk sciences is obvious, but the former does not share the superstitions and witch-craft which go with the latter. Besides, CMS freely draws from the modern sciences where appropriate and useful. For example, knowledge about and correct use of a modern drug like paracetamol can be a part of CMS. Results of the latest investigations into sleep can be a part of CMS. Also, CMS seeks to utilize elements of the method of science (e.g. experiment) within the common mans environment. It may also be noted here that CMS is not just a collection of facts. It can enable one to understand nature, to make simple calculations where the parameters are quantiable, to experiment, to discover and to invent. Some popularizers of science refuse, in the name of oneness or unity of science, to recognize the distinct identity of CMS.3 One must ask what meaning they attach to unity. If they simply mean that science encompasses all cognitively meaningful statements about nature and its phenomena, then surely this unity does not preclude partitioning of the one science into various sciences for purposes of convenience. Nor can it prevent the common man from parameterising a given situation differently from the conventional scientist. If unity means reducibility of all objects of nature to elementary particles and all phenomena to a few fundamental laws, this reducibility can be admitted, if at all, in principle only. Even when such reducibility is fully realized in highly abstract terms, phenomenology will retain its importance in practice. After all, dont biologists treat life in terms of cells and even whole organisms, and not necessarily in terms of atoms of which these are made? Similarly, the common man can understand nature at a level of phenomenology suited to his purposes. Another objection may be raised by those who consider science to have a beginning (a few centuries ago) and do not recognize the existence of any science outside the particular system that was born then. They may object to the inclusion of any other system like folk sciences into CMS. We would like to point out that whatever point of time may be considered as the beginning of science, it must be admitted that some knowledge and understanding of nature existed among various communities prior to that. Not only that, a method of exploring nature existed. That understanding and that method may be useful to the common man even today, depending upon circumstances. A substantial part of folk knowledge may not have been scientically validated yet, but where a certain item has been strongly believed over many generations, and has not been scientically invalidated, it makes sense to consider it provisionally a part of science. In conclusion, we may say that such knowledge may either be considered a
3 For example, Prof. B.M. Udgaonkar declared emphatically at the Fourth Peoples Science Congress held at Mumbai in 1990 that, science being one, there could be no such thing as Peoples Science, and the adjective Peoples qualied only the word Movement in Peoples Science Movement. He thereby implied that there was no need to re-orient science education to make it relevant to the common public.
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part of science or, if it is considered pre-scientic, it should be integrated into science education. It would be irrational to let this philosophical issue stand in the way of the common man beneting from past experience. 3 3.1 CMS curricula in general education The General Scheme
Before going into the curricula, it is pertinent to consider briey the purpose of the science part of general education. The main purpose, in our view, is (a) to develop a scientic outlook and scientic appreciation of nature among all citizens, (b) to enable them to solve their own day-to-day problems in a scientic manner, and (c) to be generally aware of the emerging science and technology scenario, whether benecial or detrimental, and to be able to make personal and social decisions where necessary. It may be noted here that a learning of the general principles and theories well known to scientists, key concepts of physicists, etc. is not necessarily needed to accomplish (a), (b) or (c). And certainly it is not sufcient. Therefore, we do not agree with decision-makers who insist on making the learning of key concepts, principles and theories a major objective of general science education; this objective should apply only to specialized education in conventional sciences. Instead, the above purposes can be eminently served by making CMS an integral part of general education at all stages. We have seen in the last section that phenomenology relating to any topic (e.g. food) can be obtained at many different levels. It follows that CMS relating to any topic of interest to the common man can be treated at many different levels of sophistication. Hence, it is possible to design CMS courses from the lowest to the highest stages of education. In particular, the science part of primary and secondary education should be completely re-organized along the lines of CMS. This will mean allowing all children to observe, understand and manipulate nature at a level of phenomenology naturally suited to them and will ensure full scope for a owering of their scientic creativity. In secondary classes, attention may be focussed on phenomenology of practical subjects like health, environment, mensuration and technology. Some rudiments of physical, chemical and biological sciences, e.g., velocity, acceleration due to gravity, atoms and molecules, micro-organisms, etc., will be needed in CMS, but in a phenomenological way. Hypothetico-deductive systems like Newtonian mechanics and conventional electrostatics, which can neither be directly veried by simple experiments, nor are of practical use to the common man, may be left out. At the senior secondary and tertiary levels, a separate stream may specialize in conventional sciences as at present, but it would be desirable to continue CMS at a suitably higher level for all students. It is suggested that CMS be taught at these levels in two ways: (a) as general science which will enable all people to solve their own problems related to health, environment, etc., and to understand community, national and international issues, e.g., big dams and missile proliferation, besides familiarizing them with the latest developments, e.g., laser-based communication systems, and (b) as professional CMS courses which would prepare science teachers, science popularizers
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and researchers tackling community-level science-related problems. In recent years, some eminent scientists have called for school and college students devoting their attention to certain problems at the phenomenological level, e.g., surveying the ora and fauna in every corner of the country. In our view, such an activity would t CMS curricula in a natural way. We now spell out detailed outlines for CMS curricula at the primary and secondary stages of education. This exercise is only illustrative and is intended to give concrete shape to the concept of general science education indicated above. No attempt has been made here to prepare class-wise syllabi, nor to chalk out in detail the breadth and depth at which the given topics are to be treated, partly because such details are location- and community-specic. Such syllabi can be prepared, once the idea is accepted in principle. It may be noted that the CMS curricula outlined below are meant for all students. It is not our contention that some students should learn CMS and some others should learn conventional sciences. 3.2 CMS curricula for the primary level (Age 6-11, Class I-V)
At the primary level, apart from the general considerations relating to CMS, we must keep in mind the age-related needs of children. The general science curricula at this stage should consist mostly of (a) inculcation of healthy habits, and (b) development of elementary scientic skills of observation, experimentation, reasoning, classication and manipulation. Observation starts in the earliest classes and slowly progresses to involve other skills. Illustrative lists of topics are given below. Inculcation of healthy habits : This is not something to cram but to do regularly. Some discussion may be necessary. Maintaining personal cleanlinesswashing the face and eyes, cleaning the teeth, taking bath, wearing clean clothes, combing the hair, washing the hands with soap and water after defecation and before meals. Keeping surroundings clean; disposing of garbage properly. Eating, sleeping and waking at the proper times. Playing. Eating healthy foods and avoiding unhealthy ones (even if attractively packed and aggressively advertised). Caution against junk foods and drinks.
Eating in the proper way: eating enough but not too much, washing up and settling down (possibly with a small prayer) before eating, proper chewing, washing up afterwards, etc. Not suppressing bodily urges as for urination, defecation, sneezing, etc. Not handling electricity (A.C.), moving machines or medicines. Keeping the correct posture, keeping eyes at sufcient distance from book, notebook or TV.
Development of scientic skills : This development takes place informally and in an elementary way. For example, experiments for younger children (upto age 8)
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Common Mans Science are merely activities and demonstrations. In later classes, children start controlling particular parameters consciously. In any case, there is more of doing and observing than of describing in scientic terms. Here is an illustrative list of items. (i) Observing the environment keenly and carefully, e.g., Trees, bushes, herbs, creepers in the environment; parts of a plant; animals, birds and insects; their various organs; leaves of various trees (observing and copying the shapes);
clothes and their materials, relation with season;
common machines/accessories and their functions, means of transport; common cereals, pulses, vegetables, fruits, edible leaves and their respective plants; rising and setting of the sun, phases of the moon; recognizing a few stars, planets and constellations; clouds.
water bodies/water supply: where water comes from;
demands of the body (hunger, thirst, activity, rest and waste expulsion);
parts of the human body (those which can be seen and felt);
(ii) Manipulation and experimentation, e.g., making designs and toys with paper, plant parts and waste materials; making various objects and geometrical shapes with clay;
use of simple tools, e.g. spade, screw-driver;
planting and growing useful plants; observing growth;
experimenting with air, water, sunlight and shadows, magnet, lenses, mirrors, electric cells and lamp, etc.;
experimenting with sense-perception, e.g., binocular vision, visual illusions, directionality of hearing. (iii) Reasoning and classication, e.g., classication of things into living and non-living; animals and plants; animals, birds and insects; domestic and wild, etc.; classication of water bodies into stagnant and owing; understanding the reasons behind rules of hygiene; classication of foods according to solid/liquid state and according to taste;
classication of vehicles driven by muscle-power and by various fuels and electricity; hence various forms of energy.
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cause and effect (related to fuel and motion, fall and injury, etc.).
oxygen, carbon dioxide, nitrogen (related to air and plant and animal life);
It may be noticed that many of the topics given in the above list are common with the existing curricula. However, the emphasis in the CMS scheme proposed here is different. For example, in classifying objects into living and non-living, our emphasis is not on memorization of the points of contrast but on observation, preferably carried out during outings into a rich environment, e.g. forest or garden, and on identifying classes of objects, their behaviours and sequences of events. There should be no hurry to jump to pre-determined conclusions or to dip into abstract analyses. Demonstrations of various spectacular behaviours of air, water, etc. should be aimed at arousing childrens curiosity rather than at proving some principles. There is no room for formal denitions of work, energy, etc. and their relations with force at this stage. It is abstract and useless. Nor are details of internal anatomy and physiology included in the CMS curricula. 3.3 Curricula for the Secondary Level (Age 11-15, Class VI-X) The CMS curricula at the beginning of the secondary stage have a signicant overlap with those at the late primary stage in terms of topics but there is a difference in the level of treatment. Thus, while general observation is to be continued, the emphasis is to shift gradually to a systematic study of phenomena. Observation is not the sole source of information at this stage; knowledge is provided from textbooks too, but it is still related to daily life for the most part. The CMS curricula at this stage consist of matters of direct concern to the common man, viz. (a) health, (b) environment, (c) mensuration and analytical aspects, and (d) agricultural or industrial technology. In middle classes (VI-VIII) these subjects may be treated mostly in terms of traditional parameters. However, as further details are taken up, it will become necessary to bring in technical terms. Elements of physical and biological sciences will, therefore, have to be taught, though in a phenomenological way. 3.3.1 Health Science In CMS, health science begins with understanding the importance of health and relating it to parameters under the direct control of the common man, e.g. food, sleep, work,
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exercise, cleanliness, state of mind, etc. Children need not be burdened with unnecessary details of human anatomy and physiology or of cell structure or of pathological tests. They should be made familiar with the phenomenology of health and disease, and enabled to take elementary care of their health themselves. It should also be noticed that, in health education under CMS, the inner observation of the state of the body also plays an important role. For example, the natural rhythms of the body are to be observed in this way. This inner observation, though alien to conventional sciences, is an elementary skill for the common child. Given below is an illustrative list of topics. Holistic denition and supreme importance of health. Pillars of health: balanced food and water, fresh air, balanced activity and rest, right expulsion of wastes, right state of mind, cleanliness, being free from addictions, vaccination. Symptoms of health: appetite for good food, thirst, deep sleep, proper expulsion of wastes, cheerful mind, desire for right activity and right relationships with others. Physical and mental hygiene. Human body and its systems (broad idea). Natural rhythms and balance of the body. Natural capacity of the body to correct internal imbalances and deal with external invasions (injuries, infections, etc.) Signals and warnings given by the body and their signicance, e.g. heaviness of the stomach means a meal or snack should be skipped. Various possible causes of headache, fever, etc. Preventing diseases by heeding warnings and taking timely corrective measures. Disease: breakdown of the rst line of defence. Exercises, play-activity, yoga and their importance. How to eat. Balanced food in terms of cereals, pulses, vegetables, etc. Constituents of foodstuffs: proteins, energy-giving matters, vitamins and minerals. Implications for diet. Processed, rened and preserved foods: need to avoid highly rened foods and those containing added chemicals, junk foods and drinks. Effects of different foodstuffs and spices on our bodies.
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Broad idea of the process of digestion of food: various stages, time taken, involvement of various chemicals (names of individual enzymes not necessary) and the brain. Importance of drinking water; how to keep water clean. Importance of adequate and deep sleep. The sleep cycle. How to sleep. Managing constipation and diarrhea. Self-examination of the stool. Care of the eyes, ears, teeth, hair and skin. For girls: menstrual cycle, its signicance and related hygiene. Common diseases, their causes, prevention and home remedies. First aid; care of the sick, the young and the old. Measuring body temperature and pulse rate: normal values. Science and technology: helping and hindering mans health. Different systems of medicine and the systems to be preferred in various conditions. Selecting and reporting to a doctor. Pathological tests. Story of eradication of smallpox; attempts at eradicating/controlling malaria and polio. 3.3.2 Environmental Science
At the secondary stage, a broad awareness of the abiotic and biotic factors of the environment and their relationship with the common mans life is necessary. This naturally brings in some chemistry and biology. It is recommended that the treatment of environment in terms of technical parameters be taken up only after class VII or VIII. An illustrative list of topics is given below. Five basic constituents of non-living nature: air, water, soil, sunlight, and space. Their importance for all life, their pollution and protection. Air: importance, constituents, role of green plants in purication, pollution by vehicles, industrial wastes, etc. Water: importance, sources and cycle, pollution, purication and conservation, drainage and soak-pit. Water-management. Soil: formation, various types, pollution, erosion and protection. Suns radiation: its energy being stored in plants and ultimately providing food to every living being and most energy sources. Various colours and photon energies.
290 Space: pollution due to crowding, noise and radiation.
Common Mans Science
Forest: importance, how to reap resources, conservation and planting. Foodstuffs: how to recognize pure/fresh/ripe/juicy fruits and vegetables. Common adulterants and surface contaminants. Need to wash fruits, vegetables. Clothing: various natural and articial bres; relation with season, health and convenience. Housing: materials and designs; elementary map- making. Earthquakes, cyclones, oods and droughts. Their causes. Various kinds of energy and sources, renewable and non-renewable. Need for conservation. Tapping Suns energy. Biosphere: variety of ora and fauna; friends and foes of man. Caution against snakes, scorpions, ies, mosquitoes, etc. Micro-organisms: friends and foes. Sterilization. Simple experiments with air, water, soil, sun-light, plants and photo-synthesis. Exploratory and constructive projects as per local conditions. (Examples: exploration of tunnels and living places of rats, colonies of ants, etc.; making soak-pits, tree-planting, preventing soil erosion.) Natural resources: need for conservation. Mans survival needs versus secondary ones. Sanitation: importance and practical arrangements. 3.3.3 Mensuration and Analytical Sciences The mensuration part of the proposed curricula will be found to have a considerable overlap with conventional curricula. In the CMS scheme, however, the interface with the common mans life is to be kept up. For example, in weights and measures, the local units must also be taught and related to the standard units. Secondly, there is to be a lot of emphasis on doing (making measurements, estimating by feeling and then verifying by actual measurement). The essential elements of the Gregorian, the Vikrami and other locally prevalent calendars must form a part of studies. Their dependence on the motions of celestial objects (as seen from the earth) should be explained and these matters demystied. Watching of the night-sky and identifying its salient features should be an important part of education at this stage. This should set the stage for critically examining many superstitions and beliefs prevalent in the society. A discussion of elementary Chemistry, Physics and Biology is inescapable in contemporary CMS. However, the criteria of accessibility to and usefulness for the common
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man must be kept in mind. Thus, for example, there is no need of going over the entire periodic table; mention of 20-30 elements should be enough. An illustrative list of topics is given below. Units of length, mass (weight), time, area and volume: quasi-quantitative, local as well as standard. Practice of making correct measurement. Rough-and-ready assessment. Idea of extremely small objects (upto nuclei) and very large ones (galaxies). The suns revolution as seen from the earth. The solar (Gregorian and Saka) calendars. The phases of the moon. The moons revolution around the earth. The lunar Hijri and the luni-solar Vikrami calendars. The shape and rotation of the earth. Day and night. The seasons. Solar and lunar eclipses: description and explanation. Rahu and Ketu. Watching an eclipse safely. Sky-watching: recognizing the planets, some prominent stars and constellations. The nature of stars, planets and comets. Pressure: atmospheric and hydrostatic. Mixtures, compounds and elements. Chemical reactions. Organic and inorganic compounds. Common examples from environment and human physiology. Metals and non-metals. Conductors, insulators and semi-conductors. Horizontal motions of objects. Speed and velocity. Friction: sliding and rolling. Acceleration. Vertical motion and acceleration due to gravity. Motion of projectiles. Periodic motion. Sound: wave-motion. Loudness and pitch. Decibel. Echo and reverberation. Heat, heat transfer and relation with temperature. Thermal expansion and conductivity. Elements of electricity. Charge and current. Attraction and repulsion between charges and between currents. The electric circuit. A.C. and D.C. voltages. Ohms Law. Power and its calculation. Attraction and repulsion between magnetic poles. Electro-magnets. Behaviours of mirrors and lenses (broad idea).
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The atomic nature of matter. Atoms and molecules. Parts of the atom: the electron, the nucleus. Protons and neutrons. X-rays and other radioactive radiations. Their effects on body tissues and genes. Units of energy and power: Joule, calorie, Watt. Examples in mechanical, thermal, electric areas. Caloric values of a few common foodstuffs and fuels. Cell: smallest living part of the body. Different kinds. Elements of genetics: how information about characteristics is written into each cell and how these are transferred to offspring. Genes and DNA (elementary ideas). Things which can be quantied and those which cannot (at present). Prevalent superstitions and their analyses. Reasons behind social customs. 3.3.4 Technology: Agricultural and Industrial Under CMS, technology too is to be discussed at a phenomenological level. Thus, computer chips as well as fertilizers can be discussed fruitfully without necessarily going into details of electronics and chemical reactions. Here is an illustrative list of topics. (i) Agriculture: Various crops and respective requirements of conditions (soil type, water, sunlight, etc.). Crop rotation. Seeds: indigenous, exotic and hybrid. Different requirements and yields. Manures and composting; role of legumes in enriching the soil. Fertilizers: different kinds and compositions. How to prepare solutions. When and how to administer. Management of pests and diseases. Use of neem and other domestic means. Pesticides, their correct use and hazards. Indigenous and foreign species of cattle and birds. Special requirements of foreign breeds. Biogas: concept, construction of plant, use. Solar cooker, improved chulha, improved implements. (ii) Industrial Technology: Use of simple hand-tools. Study of a bicycle. Simple repairs.
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Household use of electricity and precautions. Power levels of various implements. How electricity is generated and distributed (simple ideas). Common domestic equipment (electric and non-electric), their parts and functions, e.g. pressure cooker, kerosene stove, radio, TV, computer, etc. Maintenance and simple repair. Rened and processed foodstuffs: added chemicals including synthetic colours and avours. Unhealthy nature of all these, particularly ice creams, bottled drinks, etc. Soaps and detergents: their proper use and possible effects on skin. Caution. Reading the list of ingredients and other information on a label. Computer: concept, language and uses. 3.4 Science Popularization If school science education needs a CMS orientation, science popularization needs it even more. The subject matter of science popularization efforts is broadly along the lines indicated under 3.2 and 3.3 above. Among educated communities, the terminology of conventional science, e.g. proteins, X-rays, atmospheric pressure, etc. may be freely used whereas, for the uneducated communities, the traditional parameters may be used for the most part and new ones introduced slowly. A word must be put in here about science popularization among housewives in particular. Contrary to any impression that the phrase Common Mans Science might give about CMS being male-oriented, the fact is that it concerns housewives more than any other class of people. Indeed, it would not be too much of an exaggeration to say that CMS essentially comprises the experience and wisdom of generations of housewives, systematized and enhanced by modern scientic discoveries. Vigourous programmes of CMS education should be launched for housewives living under various conditions, e.g., rural, urban, etc. There should be emphasis on understanding and defending the vital resources of the common man, having condence in the indigenous culture on the basis of scientic understanding, attacking problems in a systematic way, and investigating matters which appear mysterious (e.g. ghosts). Above all, innovation must be looked for, recognized and nurtured. Village and district level organizations (science centres) should be started on a massive scale and entrusted with these responsibilities. Such centres must be manned by CMS personnel including housewives rather than by conventional scientists.
294 4 Conclusions
Common Mans Science
With education and research in conventional sciences getting more and more limited to exotic phenomena, abstract theories, general principles and industrial processes far away from the ambient conditions, scientic enlightenment of the common man and solution of his ordinary problems is being neglected. In particular, general science education is losing its direction and purpose. In the foregoing, we have pointed out the doubly disastrous effect of the present science curricula at the school level: the students are needlessly burdened with formalism which most of them cannot learn and cannot use, while they do not get the opportunity to learn practical skills and attitudes that they could well learn and use. We have reviewed some aspects of the nature of science and formulated the concept of common mans science, which readily makes an interface with the day-to-day lives of all citizens and can play a crucial role in making general science education meaningful and purposeful. Common mans science is that part of science which is at once useful for and accessible to everybody in a community. CMS draws upon both traditional understanding and modern science at a suitable level of phenomenology. We have shown above how CMS is a distinct part of science, and how it relates to traditional and folk sciences as well as conventional sciences. We have pointed out that in as much as the purpose of general education is not to make one an expert in any one discipline but to enable one to solve the problems of life, and to have an intelligent appreciation of all that happens around one, the science part of general education has to mean CMS. We, therefore, advocate CMS as an integral part of general education at all stages. At the primary school level, what is desirable is inculcation of healthy habits and development of scientic skills of keen observation, experimentation, classication, reasoning and manipulation with the hands and simple tools. At the secondary stage (Class VI to X), some topics of particular interest to the common man can be taken up for detailed and systematic study. These topics are (a) health, (b) environment, (c) mensuration and analytical aspects, and (d) agricultural or industrial technology. From Class VII onwards, elements of Chemistry, Physics and Biology, which are essential for an understanding of all the above subjects, can be introduced explicitly under part (c). All the above topics are to be taken up at an appropriate phenomenological level so as to be directly accessible to and useful for the common man. The more abstract concepts, general principles and theories (particularly the hypothetico-deductive systems like Newtonian Mechanics) are to be left out of general education curricula, being of interest to specialists alone. It has been further suggested that CMS be made an essential subject at the senior secondary and higher stages of education too, enabling students to relate science to matters of interest to the community, the country and the world at large. Besides, professional CMS courses should be offered for would-be school teachers, science popularizers and researchers. The re-orientation of general science curricula along the lines of CMS should be seen in the overall context of injecting sense into the otherwise mad, mad world of education. The widely publicized slogansof making education child-friendly, reducing the weight
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of the school-bag (which, according to the Yash Pal Committee, consists not so much of reducing the amount of learning required as of making it learnable), and reversing the increasingly anti-nature and anti-people trend in educationwill remain empty slogans without curricular changes along the lines indicated in this paper. Such changes in the education system are bound to have an enormous impact on future generations. Children, liberated from the tyranny of senseless cramming and given an opportunity to learn science in a natural and useful way, will be able to learn more thoroughly and creatively. They will be able to raise questions about prevalent customs and ways and, indeed, about the world of science and technology itself. Not only will all students understand the nature around them better, but also those who go on to specialize in sciences will make better and more creative scientists, having had a thorough familiarity with phenomenology. Even those terminating their studies at the matriculation level will be able to follow science and technology developments through various media throughout their lives. Further, children of educationally backward sections of the society will be able to compete on a more even ground, the natural phenomenology being their home territory. We have actually seen both in tribal high schools and in primary-level non-formal education centres that children take to CMS as naturally as sh to water. This seems to be the only logical way of bringing about social justice in educationa way which is advantageous to all and disabling to none. It may be mentioned that even in so-called developed countries like U.S.A., there is widespread concern about students not imbibing the concepts and principles of science. They plan to pump even greater amounts of resources than before to make their population scientically literate.4 The situation in countries like India is different. We do not have the same priorities as U.S.A. Every citizen here does not have to learn the principles of science just because these are a part of the human heritage. Nor do we have to struggle against the dogmas of medieval Europe. On the other hand, we have a wealth of traditional wisdom that can be integrated with modern science. Also, we have urgent problems of hunger, disease, superstition, stagnation in production, and general ignorance. India can show the world how to utilize general education in solving these problems, without giving up on advancement in conventional sciences, by adopting the above approach. Acknowledgement Helpful discussions with Professor Dharmendra Kumar are gratefully acknowledged.
4 American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS): 1989, Science for All Americans (Project 2061), AAAS.
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Common Mans Science
Attitude Towards Science: An Analysis.

Daya Pant
NCERT, New Delhi, India.
Introduction
Importance of bringing about improvement in the outcomes of learning of science can be gauged from the time devoted to the teaching of science at school stage, right from the junior school as environmental science through middle and secondary stage to senior secondary school. Although, all the learners will not be studying science at a later stage but as effective citizens they need to possess the skills and competencies for understanding and use of science and technology in their daily life. It is useful for making personal and public decisions on various issues, such as, polluting industries and its locations, testing of drugs, use of banned drugs, and governmental decisions regarding projects having a bearing on our environment (Miller, 1996). Understanding of science means understanding the nature of science which involves developing not only the appropriate skills and competencies but also the relevant attitudes and values (Lederman, 1992) which are conducive to the learning of science in ways commensurate with the socio-cultural mileu (Roth and Roychaudhry, 1994). However, research relating to bringing about improvement in the learning outcomes of the science students has not changed the situation much (Linn, 1992). Science instruction mostly, involves reading out textbooks to students (Holiday, 1984). In a country like India where curriculum varies from state to state, and other facilities, like laboratories etc. which promote learning by doing are lacking, the textbooks assume a central place in the teaching-learning of science and they almost dictate the curriculum followed by the teachers and students (Gottfried and Kyle, 1992; Chiappetta et al., 1993). The text books not only provide instructional strategies to teach certain facts but there is a hidden curriculum that is woven into these facts and their presentation (Richardson, 1985; Watt, 1993; Kumar, 1989). This hidden curriculum inuences the values and attitudes students develop towards science and its use. It is not only the content of science text, but the exercises, diagrams and the activities in the text also have importance for their potential inuence on the understanding of science (Holliday and Whittacker, 1978; Holliday, 1981). The messages that are contained in them regarding nature of science, its methodology, and the attitudes and values reected in them inuence their relevance in daily life (Jegede and Okebukola, 1991). Therefore, the content along with these other aspects of the textbooks such as, questions, gures, tables, diagrams, activities etc. may be analysed so as to assess how do they present the nature of science, its methodology and social dimension.
298 2 Present study
Attitude Towards Science
This study analysed the content, including questions, gures, tables, diagrams etc., of the secondary school science textbooks published by NCERT (National Council of Educational Research and Training). The analysis was carried out to ascertain if the books adequately present an account of the nature of science, its methods and processes, its linkages with society, and its use in daily life. 3 Procedure The procedure involved using the criteria developed by science educationists (Chiappetta et al., 1987, 1993) partially modied (see Appendix A) to suit the specic objectives of the present study and the results are set out in tables 2 to 11. Interrater reliabiliability between the two raters was 90%. Apart from the analysis using the criteria identied to assess the nature of science and its representation, the book was also reviewed with reference to the psychological view point of the learners and the criteria employed for analysis of the textual material, generally, in respect of organization, presentation and lay out. The results are discussed along with the overall organization of the textbook with respect to the perspective the textbook presents to the reader on the nature and philosophy of science. 4 Result and discussion The analysis revealed that the four themes characterizing the nature of science, including its methodology, thinking skills, and social linkages were not represented in a balance manner in the IX and X class science text books. The themes and subthemes used in the analysis are given in the Appendix A. Total items analysed 106 I II 74 III 10 IV 3 Total items of agreement 9 Percentage agreement 96
Table-1: Table showing the agreement between two raters on the four themes of nature of science. These trends are also apparent in the analysis of the text books published in India (Kapalli, 1998) and abroad (Chiappatta, et al., 1993) and they have important implications for the learning of science. Details are presented below: 4.1 Analysis of IX class text book In this book the representation of the four themes was not quite proportionate as can be seen from the table 2. (Figures in parenthesis inside all the tables indicate percentages rounded off to nearest whole number.) Theme I: Basic Knowledge of Science had fty percent share followed by the theme II, Investigative Nature of Science. The theme III, Processes of Science and the theme
Pant Themes underlying nature of Science Unit analysed I II III IV Paragraphs 153 91 28 46 (48%) (29%) (9%) (15%) Questions 102 171 4 12 (35%) (60%) (1%) (4%) Figures 120 17 9 10 (77%) (11%) (6%) (6%) Tables 17 2 (89%) (11%) Highlights 12 6 5 4 (44%) (22%) (19%) (15%) Total 404 287 46 72 (50%) (36%) (6%) (9%) Total 318 289 156 19 27 809
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Table-2: The proportion of the four themes underlying the nature of science in IX class textbook of NCERT. IV Interaction of Science, Technology and Society, each getting less than ten percent share of the total units analysed. The contribution of the paragraphs to the theme III and IV is not quiet as unbalanced, as questions and gures. The theme III should have been better represented through the intext questions, as good questions should be aimed at encouragement of thinking and application among students. (Shepardson and Pizzini, 1991). The highlighted text infact, is relatively the most balanced component as far as the presentation of different aspects of nature of science is concerned. The text has all the ingredients of the material which if presented in the right proportion could make it a better book. The sub theme categories introduced for the present analysis were found represented in the text, although their proportion was not balanced (tables 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, and 11). The nature of science as the knowledge of science was presented most frequently as facts, principals and models as can be seen from table 3. There is a need to portray it more as a product of joint efforts of scientists over a period of time and also portrayal of the continuing efforts to improve upon them. Even presentation of the hypothesis, resulting from the existing knowledge or the new hypothesis which need to be worked upon in areas of ongoing activity were not present in the text. The linkages of the present material with the information already known/taught to them or material asking them to recall information was almost absent. The nature of science as an investigative endeavour has been well represented in this book, claiming one third of the total units as can be seen from table 4. Although, all the aspects of investigative method are present, there is a concentration of the material which requires them to make a calculation or requires them to reason out an answer as compared to the material which requires them to learn with the help of a graph or engages them in a thought experiment or activity. A new category was added to this theme of the nature of science which involved highlighting
300 Subthemes within theme-I Unit analysed a b c Paragraphs 143 7 3 94 5 2 Questions 3 99 (3%) (97%) Figures 118 2 (98%) (2%) Tables 17 Highlights 12 Total 293 9 102 (73%) (2%) (25%)
Attitude Towards Science d Total 153 102 120 17 12 404
Table-3: The proportion of the subthemes within the theme I, Knowledge of Science in IX class textbook of NCERT. the lack of experience or bias in the students mind resulting in faulty reasoning or different outcome of the experiment. Paragraphs and questions were presented in a balanced manner presenting the different aspects of investigative nature of science. But gures and tables did not present such balanced view of nature of science as investigative. Tables especially could be an effective way of presenting the inuence of bias and lack of experience, on the outcomes of experiments and reasoning of students. Apart from these lacunae, other aspects of investigative nature of science were adequately highlighted in the text. Science as a thinking process was not represented so well in this book as can be seen from table 5. Only six percent of the total units analysed depicted this theme, as a result there was no material whatsoever available on empirical nature of science and objectivity of science; within whatever limited material was presented in this theme, there was concentration on How a scientist experimented? and inductive and deductive reasoning in science. It is signicant to note that there were only four questions which highlighted this theme. Since, questions can focus the attention of the learners on the thinking processes of science, therefore it is of utmost importance that there be enough questions which highlight this theme. Tables could also have been used to depict at least two important aspects of science as a thinking process historical development of an idea and the way culture inuences scientic thinking. Highlighted box items in the text could be the model to introduce more of the units on thinking processes of science. One subtheme introduced for this analysis regarding the role of culture on the scientic thinking was found represented in the highlighted text. However, more subject matter needs to be introduced to take care of the use of assumptions in scientic thinking which is a very important aspect of the processes of science and was not found in the text. Use of assumptions could be very easily introduced through not only paragraphs but questions which make the learners think at different outcomes with different assumptions. Even the highlighted text could have
Pant Unit analysed Paragraphs Questions Figures Tables Highlights Total Subthemes within theme-II a b c d 25 2 26 11 (27%) (2%) (29%) (12%) 2 10 86 66 (1%) (6%) (50%) (38%) 6 1 1 (35%) (6%) (6%) 2 2 1 (33%) (17%) 35 13 113 80 (12%) (5%) (39%) (28%) e 27 (30%) 7 (4%) 9 (53%) 3 (50%) 46 (16%) Total 91 171 17 2 6 287
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Table-4: Proportion of the subthemes within the theme-II Investigative Nature of Science in IX class Textbook of NCERT. been useful to put across this sub theme by quoting incidences where the assumptions of scientist created difculty in arriving at solutions. The linkages between science, technology and society was represented by 9 percent of the total units analysed. However, almost about half of the subject matter representing this theme presented the usefulness of science and technology for society as can be seen from table 6. One third of the total units were found devoted to the discussion of social issues. Negative effects of science were not represented in the text book at all. A new category introduced under this theme, limitations of science was found represented through few units. The other aspects of interaction between science, technology and society such as acceptance of divergent ideas across authority, groups, individuals, and careers in science were not found discussed in the text. Paragraphs represented only three aspects of interaction between science and society, usefulness, and limitations of science for society, and social issues, while questions, gures and highlighted text represented only two aspects, usefulness of science, and social issues. Tables completely omitted presentation of this theme. Figures and questions could have very efciently communicated the interaction of science and technology with society especially negative effects of, and careers in science. Tables showing the increase in number of industries in catchment area and resulting pollution level of the rivers, gures depicting how industrial waste causes the water to get polluted, ozone layer thinning down, green house effect etc. could be the phenomenon which need to be highlighted in the text in a simplied manner. Besides, the utensils which have possible health hazards due to aluminium coating etc. are the instances of limitations of science and technology which ought to be communicated. The selection of the particular information which communicates limitations of science or its negative effect could be the subject decided by the writer keeping in view the developmental level and previous knowledge of the learners.
302 Unit analysed Paragraphs Questions Figures Tables Highlights Total a 9 (32%) 5 (56%) 1 (20%) 15
Attitude Towards Science Subthemes within theme-III b c d e f g 4 9 3 2 (14%) (32%) (11%) (7%) 1 1 (25%) (25%) 1 1 (11%) (11%) 1 2 (20%) (40%) 6 10 4 5 h 1 (4%) 2 50% 2 (22%) 5 i 1 (20%) 1 Total 28 4 9 5 46
Table-5: Proportion of the subthemes within the theme-III, Thinking Processes in IX class textbook of NCERT. 4.2 Analysis of Xth Class Text book Analysis of this book revealed that the nature of science is presented in a lop sided manner just as in the IX class science text book as can be seen from table 7. However, the relative proportion of the themes in this book was slightly different. Science as knowledge and facts was represented by about half of the units analysed (47 percent) as can be seen from table 8. In comparison with the paragraphs and the highlighted text, questions, gures and tables presented knowledge of science in greater proportion; within this theme all the different sub themes were found represented. However, there was concentration of facts, concepts and theories, as well as recall of information in the content. Investigative nature of science was presented by 11 percent of the units analysed as can be seen from table 9. Maximum contribution to this theme was made by questions, highlighted text and gures, although overall representation of this theme was poor. There was concentration of the reasoning aspect contributed by questions. The gures included more instances of the subtheme which involved students in answering questions using material such as, maps, tables etc. The paragraphs contributing to this aspects of nature of science were very few but each one of the subtheme was covered through them even though there was one paragraph of each kind. Except the new category added for the analysis in the scheme which intended to look for material dealing with bringing out of the students own bias and lack of experience inuencing their reasoning, was not found represented by any unit of analysis. Tables did not contribute to this theme, although use of tables could have been made to ask learners to make a calculation, and reason out answer etc. with the help of data which learners have to use to answer questions, or examine to detect trends or make a critical assessment based on observations presented. Highlighted text contributed, primarily, through a few units to the thought experiment or the thought activity. Overall there is poor representation of this theme in the text book.
Pant Unit analysed Paragraphs Questions Figures Tables Highlights Total Subthemes within theme-I a b c d 28 5 13 (61%) (11%) (28%) 6 6 (50%) (50%) 9 1 (90%) (10%) 2 2 (50%) (50%) 45 5 22 (63%) (7%) (31%) e f g Total 46 12 10 4 72
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Table-6: Proportion of the Subthemes within the theme-IV, Interaction of Science, Technology and Society in X class textbook of NCERT. The nature of science as thinking process was very poorly represented in X class text as can be seen from table 10. Only six percent of the total units analysed represented this theme. Except for the highlighted box items, all other units which presented this theme were very few in number. Infact gures, questions and tables were, one each, presenting this theme. The paragraphs presenting this theme of nature of science constituted ten percent of total paragraphs, while highlighted text contributed maximally to this theme. Almost thirty percent of these units presented science as thinking process inspite of the fact that there were few instances of each sub theme such as how scientists experiment, how ideas develop over time, empiricity and objectivity of science, and the use of assumptions. However, within this theme almost all sub themes were found represented, except those relating to the discussion of evidence and proof. More use of tables could have been and questions could have been made apart from more paragraphs to highlight this theme. Tabular material could highlight this theme effectively, for instance, listing out the changes in the scientic research and concommitent changes in the society and policy or sharp changes in science at different epochs will highlight the inuence of culture on the scientic thinking. Tabulating data supporting one hypothesis and refuting the other and elaborating on the contextual facts causing variations could be tabulated along side highlighting the discussions relating to evidence and proof. Questions and gures could also highlight the thinking processes of science. Questions which promote thinking among students could be framed instead of those which make students recall information provided in the text. For instance the text discusses the natural resources and question is framed, Can you name one technology that uses these resources? instead a question could be framed, Can you think of ways in which the depletion of natural resources through technology could be restricted? or Write how the technology which facilitates mankind can become counter productive?, or Which characteristics of the birds are suitable for their survival? Figures which
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Attitude Towards Science Themes underlying nature of science Unit analysed I II III IV Paragraphs 109 10 28 156 (37%) (3%) (9%) (50%) Questions 128 55 1 30 (61%) (26%) (0.47%) (13%) Figures 56 7 1 18 (76%) (8%) (1%) (15%) Tables 24 1 11 (67%) (3%) (31%) Highlights 9 3 10 10 (31%) (9%) (31%) (28%) Total 316 75 41 235 (47%) (11%) (6%) (36%) Total 303 214 82 36 32 667
Table-7: The proportion of the four themes underlying the nature of science in X class textbook of NCERT. present evidence leading to different conclusions could be presented and students may be asked to critically examine these as proof of different hypotheses. The paragraphs presented all the sub-themes except two, namely, discussion of evidence and proof, and inuence of culture on scientic thinking. Both these aspects of scientic thinking need to be emphasized through paragrapahs, tables, gures and questions. Interaction of science and technology with society was presented fairly adequately claiming one third of the total units analysed as can be seen from table 11. However, the various aspects of this interaction were not represented in a balanced manner. Usefulness of science and technology was presented by 40% units, and social issues by 48%, but negative effects of science and technology and limitations were presented through 6 and 4% units respectively. Acceptance of divergent views across individuals, authority levels and cultures was presented by two paragraphs but caraer in science and technology were not presented at all. This absence of any mention of careers in science and technology has a repercussion for the image of scientists. Knowing that science is studied not only for becoming a scientist but also for pursuing a career. Over all inspite of adequate number of units, this theme presented the interaction of science with society in terms of its usefulness and social issues. But the other important aspects like negative effects of science, its limitations, the careers in science and technology and existence of divergence and its acceptance across authority levels, individuals and groups was not presented adequately. Overall organization of the book: The two books were also reviewed from the point of view of: 1. the presentation of the content and its implications for inculcation of the appropriate attitudes and values towards science,
Pant Subthemes within theme I Unit analysed a b c Paragraphs 103 4 2 (95%) (4%) (2%) Questions 9 119 (7%) (93%) Figures 51 5 (91%) (9%) Tables 11 2 1 (79%) (14%) (7%) Highlights 9 (100%) Total 183 11 122 (58%) (4%) (38%) Total 109 128 56 14 9 9 316
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Table-8: The proportion of the sub themes within the theme-I, Knowledge of Science in X class textbook of NCERT. 2. the layout of the books in terms of gures, tables, and other features and 3. the students reactions to the overall organization of the book. Presentation of the Content: The organization of the content of the textbook inuences the levels of comprehension (Vidal-Abraca and Sanzose, 1998). The comprehension of the text in turn will have inuence on the inculcation of appropriate attitudes and values towards science and its relevance in life. Shallow comprehension will not result in application of the knowledge to real life situations. On the other hand deep levels of comprehension are likely to result in understanding the relevance of the knowledge in real life and, hence the positive attitudes towards it. The science curriculum framework sets apart the middle level science competencies from secondary level science competencies. Therefore, the two books could have been presented as a continuity with IX class textbook carrying a brief mention of the expected competencies, attitudes and values related to science, supposedly developed among the students at middle stage; and those that are to be developed at the secondary stage. Such an explicit statement of the objectives to be attained and competencies to be developed at different stages, termed linking of the textual content, enhances the comprehension of the text (Vidal-Abraca and Sansoss, IWB). Besides linking the textual contents to the readers previous knowledge, the text could also make a direct reference to the diferent aspects of the nature of science, such as, it should essentially project science as not only the product but also as a process of enquiry (Kapalli, 1998). However, the reference to the nature of science may be made using the vocabulary and language suitable to the developmental level of the IX and V class students. The general planning of the book, and its contents may be guided by the perspective explicitly stated in the rst section. The logical linking up of the different chapters to the perspective and their sequencing results in coherence of the ideas presented in the
306 Unit analysed Paragraphs Questions Figures Tables Highlights Total Subthemes within theme-II a b c d 2 1 2 1 (20%) (10%) (20%) (10%) 7 48 (13%) (87%) 6 1 (86%) (14%) 1 (33%) 9 1 10 49 (12%) (1%) (13%) (65%)
Attitude Towards Science e 4 (40%) 2 (67%) 6 (8%) Total 10 55 7 3 75
Table-9: Proportion of the sub themes within the theme-II, Investigative nature of science in X class textbook of NCERT. text (Vidal Abarca and San Joze, 1998). It would also help facilitate teachers task by increasing comprehension of the students as it draws atttention to those aspects of the text, which need to be highlighted while teaching and also while framing questions, to adequately communicate the nature of science and its processes. Not only in the beginning of the book but each chapter also needs to be put into focus. The chapters or a few chapters together should carry a introductory block which provides the connection between previous chapters and the forthcoming ones. Although in the present book each chapter does begin with an introductory paragraph but it does not cover comprehensively the expanse of the information in the chapter, thereby leaving it to the reader to sort out their own agenda in terms of the highlights and issues. In a science text book, this gap may make the readers focus on the issues and content quite irrelevant to nature of science and miss the objectives of learning of science widely not by a small margin, as the readers tend to assimilate new information in the already conceived cognitive structures. In the case of learning of science the previously conceived ideas may be quite irrelevant and divorced from the reality, prompted sometimes by fantasies or folklore. Layout of the book: A review of the layout of the books revealed that they are very dull and unattractive. The gures and tables are set out in very small print, sometimes the gures are presented without any caption. When the gures appear without caption its potential value for the students comprehension is much less, than a gure independently appearing. As the gures make more visual impact on the students and stay in their memory, they have to be presented complete with explanation and labelling. Movement wherever necessary and possible should be depicted to communicate conceptual understanding of the process, for instance in electric motor or the dynamo the direction of movement of current or the magnetic coil etc. The gures which are very small do not invite the attention of the reader, especially the students at this stage. The gures are not appropriately drawn. Where there is a need for real gures line drawings were shown and where line drawing would have
Pant Unit analysed Paragraphs Questions Figures Tables Highlights Total a 2 (7%) 1 1 3 (30%) 7 b 4 (14%) 2 (20%) 6 Subthemes within theme-III c d e f 3 3 11 1 (11%) (11%) (39%) (4%) 1 4 3 1 (10%) 12 1 g h 4 (14%)
307 i Total 28 1 1 1 10 41
2 (20%) 2
2 (20%) 6
Table-10: Proportion of the sub themes within the theme-III, Thinking Processes in X class textbook of NCERT. served the purpose real gure, a bad one was shown. The transfer of the learning to real life situation is hindered when the gures are not appropriately drawn or drawn without the natural perspective. It becomes extremely difcult to identify them in real life, for instance the gure of a moss or a touch-me-not plant when seen drawn out of proportion, not knowing its real life dimensions, will hinder the recognition of the plant in its real habitat. Sometimes the gures/gadgets are oversimplied and shown diagrammatically which comes in the way of comprehension of the real life gadgets and gures. The specic comments and instances which could be improved are given below: IX class Text book: The gures in the chapters 1, 2 and 3 are very large whereas in chapters 6, 7, 8 and 10, the gures are small. In chapter 14, on electricity, the gures illustrating various kinds of electric circuits, connections, voltmeter and resistances in series etc., are all hypothetical. In order to identify and set up an electric circuit in real life the real life ammeter would have served the purpose better. It has been seen that transfer of learning to handle these objects in real life is poor among students because they do not comprehend the circuit from the incomplete diagramatic representation. In chapter 16 even the gures of birds are drawings and not photographs. Based on these gures the identication of plants and animals in real life situations becomes extremely difcult. Even if the dimensional characteristics are given, the identication is still quite difcult in real life situations. Only when these living creatures are shown in appropriate real life perspective, their identication becomes easier. X Class Text book: In the X class science textbook the gures (see Appendix B) are often presented without the labelling of different parts (gures 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 3.4, 12.6). The gure 1.2 and 1.3 illustrate the working of combustion engines but in the absence of labelled parts in the gure, the interest and comprehension remains much below the desired level. Figure 2.4 shows distillation of petrol, the gure is entitled distillation tower but it looks like a cylinder. A real photograph of the tower along with the diagrams would communicate the process better. Figures 7.2 (c) on water contamination looks like a puzzle as to how the water is being contaminated. Other features: Glosarry of terms, concepts and explanations would have made a difference by introducing certain specic references to the words, terms and concepts
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that deal with the nature of science and these could be included in the glossary. Unit analysed Paragraphs Questions Figures Tables Highlights Total Subthemes within theme-IV a b c d 63 6 9 76 (40%) (4%) (6%) (48%) 9 1 2 18 (30%) (3%) (6%) (60%) 11 7 (61%) (39%) 8 3 (86%) (14%) 5 5 (50%) (50%) 96 7 11 109 (43%) (6%) (5%) (46%) e 2 (1%) 2 (1%) f Total 156 30 18 11 10 225
Table-11: Proportion of the sub themes within the theme IV, Interaction of Science, Technology and Society in X class textbook of NCERT. Students reactions to the organization of the book: There were 20 students whose reactions were recorded. These twenty students were drawn from all sorts of schools. There were 10 from public schools, 20 from government schools, and 10 from central schools. There were fewer students from public schools because public schools rarely prescribe textbooks of NCERT. They all were asked the same question: How are your science books? Out of the total, twenty reported that the books were dull and boring while others said they were o.k. These twenty reporting that the books were dull and boring were asked an additional question: What about other books? In response to this, there were twelve who said the same thing about the other books also, rest felt that the other text books were alright. In order to assess the understanding of the tables and graphs another question was asked: What do you understand by this graph or gure? In case student did not volunteer much information, supplementary questions were asked. The supplementary questions were: What do you understand by this table?, or Why this graph is drawn?, or What can be found out from this table or graph? The students responses revealed that they did not understand graphs or tables or the purpose they served. 5 Conclusion Overall, in the IX class textbook there is a heavy focus on the knowledge aspect and investigative aspect of the nature of science. In the former category more material could be on history of science. In the latter category there was emphasis on deductions and reasoning out an answer and even content relating to answering a question using material was present. However, there was no content devoted to inclusion of
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investigative methods relating to the use of charts, tables, graphs or involving them in experimentation or helping them become more aware of the personal biases that enter into investigative processes. There is low concentration of material portraying, science as thinking process and, the linkages of science with society. In the former category more content could be added. However, the material needs more emphasis on empirical nature of science and quantitative assessment as well as the use of assumptions in thinking needs to be emphasied thereby strengthening the need for learning the methods of science relating to qualitative assessment, and also the values relating to the rationality and openness to evidence. In the latter category whatever little content was present, protrayed the usefulness of science for society and negative effects of science and technology, the emphasis on careers, limitations of science and the portrayal of the democratic traditions, as against the dogmatic and authoritarian, was absent. Thus in the X class textbook the content was dominated by two themes underlying the Nature of Science, Basic Knowledge of Science and Interaction of Science with Society. The two other aspects of Nature of Science relating to Investigative method and Thinking processing had very little presence, the latter having weightages almost half of the former. Thus, the book lacks the emphasis on methods and processes of science. The knowledge aspect presented science as facts and also as the history of development of science. Interaction between science and society presented the usefulness of science issues but the negative aspects of science and its limitations were represented by negligible content while careers and the values of science that call for openness and antidogmatism and authoritarianism were not mentioned at all. Out of the few units that referred to the investigative nature of science most were aimed at calculation aspect only. Similarly, the units that represented different processes of science and related values were hardly one or two of each kind. Thus while IX class textbook is tilted more in favour of presenting science as Basic Knowledge and Investigative endeavor, X class books presents it as Basic Knowledge and Social Interaction. Both the books lack emphasis on processes of science which are responsible for inculcating the thinking skills and valuing process. Even the presentation of science as social affair, its negative effects, and limitations of science aught to be emphasied more so as that learners do not develop unjustiable single minded euphoria about omnipotency of science for all problems and ills of society. Apart fram the content, the organization of the book needs to be more focussed and contextualised with reference to the science related previous learning skills, competencies of the learners, and the objectives to be attained by present text content. Not only overall content, each chapter has to be put in perspective dovetailing each gure, graph, questions, tables etc. The vocabularly has to be brought to the level of the reader. Textbooks, thus improved are likely to result in capturing the interest of the students and, balanced development of science related comptencies in them. 6 Appendix A Categories for analysing science textbooks:
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The categories and subcategories (Chiappetta et. al, 1991a) have been described and examples provided to enable comprehension of the rules of categorisation. Read the categories carefully, before attempting to analyse the units in text. 1. Science as a body of knowledge: Science is characterised as a body of information about various natural phenomena. Scientic knowledge has been arrived at by the application of methods of science. Knowledge in science includes facts, concepts and principles which are supported by evidence and are largely replicable. The type of text included under this category is one from which the student receives information. Textbook material in this category: (a) Presents facts, concepts, laws and principles. i. Facts: Can be observed or demonstrated by accurate observaion. For example, humans have a vertebral column. ii. Concepts: As facts accumulate, they begin to show certain relationships. This pattern is referred to as a concept. For example, all animals possessing a vertebral column belong to a group called vertebrates. iii. Law: A statement of a relation or sequence of phenomena invariable under the same conditions. For example, Boyles law. iv. Principle: Constituent of a substance giving distinctive quality or effect. For example organic solvents dissolve organic compounds. (b) Presents hypotheses, theories and models. Hypotheses and theories are scientic speculations regarding relationships between facts. i. Hypotheses: Invented to explain a set of facts, a speculation that remains untested. For example, a hypothesis proposed by Sutton that genes are present in a linear fashion on a chromosome. ii. Theory: An invention by scientists which has empirical support and ts known facts. It is arrived at inductively to explain a set of facts. A hypothesis for which evidence is present, becomes a theory. For example, Darwins theory of organic evolution. iii. Model: This is arrived at deductively from observations. The DNA model proposed by Watson and Crick was based on X-ray crystallographic patterns. For example, the model of the solar system based on observations and calculating distances. (c) Asks students to recall information or knowledge which has been provided previously in the textbook. 2. Science as a way of investigation: This category includes; those parts of the text which stimulate thinking and doing by asking the student to nd out. This category involves the student in the processes of science such as observing, measuring, classifying, inferring, recording data, making calculations, experimenting. Paper and pencil, and hands-on activities are included. Textbook material in this category:
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311 (a) Requires the student to answer a question through the use of materials. For example, x a rubber band at one end and hold the other end with your nger. Now pluck the rubber band and listen to the sound produced. Hear the sound produced as the rubber band is stretched. Does the sound change as you change the length of the band? (b) Requires the student to answer a question or learn by the use of tables, charts, i1lustrations and sources of information other than the textbook. For example, look at the two gures. The bow in the X gure has potential energy. It can exert force on the arrow and make it move. (c) Requires the student to make a calculation. For example, a bus travels 200 mts in 40 seconds. In 1 second it will travel- metres. (d) Requires the student to reason out an answer. For example, Would sea water have a lower or higher boiling point than distilled water? (e) Engages the student in a thought experiment or activity. For example, ants are attracted to certain food items more than others. Devise an experiment to nd out what types of food attract ants. (f) Presents the material and incidence which bring out how the students own bias and lack of experience inuence his observation. For example error in reading the level of mercury and level of water could be due to inexperience.
3. Science as a way of thinking: This category would include the text material where the student is told how the scientic enterprise operates. It includes the scientic methods and problem solving. This category is different from Catetory 2 in that the student does not have to answer questions. Instead the student is told about how science in general or a scientist in particular discovered, invented ideas, or experimented. Textbooks material in this category; (a) Describe how a scientist experimented. For example, Edward Jenner observed that milkmaids showed very few incidents of small pox. He hypothesised that they develop immunity because they came into contact with cow pox. He experimented by taking serum from cows suffering from cow pox and infecting healthy people. He observed that the inoculated people did not succumb to small pox. He deduced that there is something in the serum of cows that prevents small pox. (b) Shows historical development of an idea. For example, in 1776, Alessandro Volta discovered that when two strips of different metals are dipped in an acid solution, an electric current begins to ow through the wire connecting the two strips. This simple source of current or a cell is called a Voltaic cell. The principle discovered by Volta was used to construct another cell with an improved design by J.F. Daniel in 1836. This gave steadier current but was cumbersome since liquid electrolytes were used. This disadvantage was overcome by the invention by Lechlanche of the drycell in 1866.
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Attitude Towards Science (c) Emphasises the empirical nature of science. For example, the ionisation of air produced by X-ray discharges electried bodies. The rate of discharge depended on the intensity of an X-ray beam. As a result, careful quantitative measurements of the properties and effects of X-rays could be made. (d) Illustrates the use of assumptions. For example, to assume how molecules can rearrange and change, we assume they must be built of smaller fragments called atoms. With this assumption, we can again explain diferences between two molecules because they contain different atoms. (e) Demonstrates how science proceeds by inductive and deductive reasoning. For example, In Mendels experiments with pea plants, it was noticed repeatedly that when a pure tall plant was crossed with a pure dwarf plant, the progeny was all tall. Subsequent experiments with pairs of this progeny produced tall and dwarf plants with a 3:1 ratio. The results led him to think that tallness was dominant over dwarfness. (f) Shows cause and effect relationship. For example, Take an ice cube on a plate and leave it on the table. After a while you notice that the ice has melted to form water. Ths warm temperature of the room caused the ice to become water. (g) Shows evidence and proof. For example, Hypothesis: Number of chromosomes generally remains constant from cell division to division, thus each successive generation would have twice the number of chromosomes their parents had. However it is found that successive generations of the same species have identical number of chromosomes. Thus the hypothesis is incorrect. (h) Presents the scientic method or problem solving steps. For example, a scientist rst gathers information to identify the probability. He then collects more information through observations, measurements, etc. He thinks over the observations and possibilities. He tests each possibility by experiments or repeated observations to collect data. He then calculates, compares and draws conclusions. (i) Presents material which brings out the inuence of culture on scientic thinking. For example, not looking at the eclipsed sun or moon or offering prayer during eclipse and holding in esteem plants.
4. Interactions of science, technology and society: Check this category if the intent of the text is to illustrate the effect or impact of science on society. This aspect of scientic literacy describes how science and technology helps or hinders mankind. It involves social issues and careers. Nevertheless, in the presentation of this kind of material the student receives knowledge and does not have to nd out. Text in this category: (a) Describe the usefulness of science and technology. For example, we have learnt to extract energy from animal wastes such as cowdung or plant wastes
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313 like sugarcane bagasse. One successful method is to ferment animal wastes in closed vessels and produce a gas called biogas. The waste from the biogas plant can be used as manure in elds and plantations. (b) Discusses the limitations of science and technology for society. When the text presents material relating to the areas where science and technology has not been able to solve problems due to the unresolved issues or new innovations are required to help resolve issues, e.g. Polymer substances whin make up garbage, their disposal is a severe problem and this puts a limitation on the use of this technology. (c) Describes the negative effects of science and technology. For e.g. sometimes science is used in harmful ways. Once people learnt that certain substances explode easily, they made bullets, bombs and crackers. These were devised for our safety and security. Some people misused bullets to kill wild animals and people. (d) Discuss societal issues related to science and technology, e.g. Some people feel that rain forests should be cut down. They argue that the cleared areas can be used for farming, which is necessary to feed the growing population. Other people believe rain forests should not be cut down. They point out that good yields from crops are possible only for a few years. That is because the tropical sun and large amounts of rain that these areas receive soon destroy the soil by moving water. The good soil is carried away by erosion. Thus the land becomes useless for farming. (e) Brings out the acceptance of divergent ideas across individuals, and authority levels or groups when the text reports material which makes explicit the instances whom the thinking of a particular individual or cultural group or person of rather lower authority level was acceptad by others for examination or use, such as, use of technology developed in one part of the world being used by others or a junior scientists paper or innovation being recognized by senior irrespective of his experience or level of authority. (f) Information about careers in science and technology. e.g. To prepare for a mechanical enginering career, you should opt for subjects like mathematics, physics and chemistry in high school.
314 7 Appendix B
Fig. 1.2
Fig. 1.3
Fig. 3.4
Fig. 1.4
Fig. 7.2 (c)
Figure 1:
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Fig. 2.4
Fig. 12.6
References AAAS: 1989, Project 2061: Science for All American, Author, Washington, DC. Anderson, T.H. Beck, D. and West, C.: 1994, A Text Analysis of Two Pre Secondary Science Activities, Journal of Curriculum Studies 26(2), 163186. APEID: 1991, Values and Ethics, and the Science and Technology Curriculum, Principal Regional Ofce for Asia and Pacic, Thailand. Chiappetta, E.L. Sethna, G. and Fillman, D.: 1987, Curriculum Balance in Science Textbooks, The Texas Science Teacher 16(2), 912. Chiappetta, E.L. Sethna, G. and Fillman, D.: 1991, Procedures for Conducting Context Analysis of Science Text Books, Department of Curriculum and Instruction, Houston, Texas. Chiappetta, E.L. Sethna, G. and Fillman, D.: 1993, Life Science Textbooks and Scientic Literacy, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 30(7), 787797. Dreyfus, A.: 1992, Content Analysis of School Textbooks: The Case of a Technologyoriented Curriculum, International Journal of Science Education 14(1), 312. Driver, R. Leach, J. Miller, R. and Scott, P.: 1996, Young Peoples Images of Science, Open University Press, Philadelphia. Etin, J.: 1990, Review of Research in Secondary Reading in Nigeria (1951-1958), Journal of Reading 34(2), 8491. Exline, J.: 1984, National Survey: Science Textbook Adoption Process, The Science Teacher 51(1), 9293.
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Fillman, D.: 1989, Biology Textbook Coverage of Selected Aspects of Scientic Literacy with Implications for Student Interest, and Recall, of Text Information. Unpublished dissertation. University of Houston. Gallagher, J.: 1991, Perspective and Practicing Teachers Knowledge and Beliefs about the Philosophy of Science, Science Education 75(1), 121134. Garcia, T.: 1985, An Analysis of Earth Science Textbooks for Presentation of Aspects of Scientic Literacy. Unpublished dissertation. Universtiy of Houston. Gottfried, S. and Kyle, W.: 1992, Textbooks Use and the Biology Education Desired State, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 29(1), 3549. Harms, N. and Yoga, R.: 1981, What Research Says to the Science Teacher?, Vol. 3, National Science Teachers Association, Washington, DC. Hazen, R. and Trel, J.: 1991, Science Matter, Doubleday, New York. Hempal, C.: 1966, Philosophy of Natural Science, Prenlice Hall, New Jersy. Hickman, F.: 1980, Preface. In Biological Science, An Inquiry Into Life, Teacher Edition, BSCS, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, USA, pp. IX-X. Holliday, W.: 1981, Selective Attentional Effects of Text Book Study Questions on Student Learning in Science, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 18, 283 289. Holliday, W.G. Whittaker, H. and Loose, K.: 1978, Differential Effects of Science Study Questions. Paper presented at the National Association for Research in Science Teaching, Toronto. Hurd, P.: 1960, Biological Education in American Secondary Schools, 1890-1960, AIBS, Washington, DC. Jeqede, J. and Okebukola, P.: 1991, The Effect of Instruction on Socio-cultured Beliefs Hindering the Learning of Science, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 28, 275285. Kapalli, S.: 1998, Representations of Science: A Criteque of Science Education, Perspections in Education, 14(3), 147153. King, B.: 1991, Beginning Teachers Knowledge of Attitude Towards History and Philosophy of Science, Science Education 75(1), 135141. Kumar, K.: 1989, The Social Character of Learning, Sage Publication, New Delhi. Lederman, N.: 1992, Students and Teachers Conceptions of the Nature of Science: A Review of Research, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 29(4), 331359.
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Lekin and Wellington, J.: 1994, Who Will Teach the Nature of Science Teachers Views of Science and their Implications for Science Education, International Journal of Science Education 16(2), 175190. Linn, M.: 1992, Science Education Reform: Building on the Research Base, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 29(8), 821840. Miller, P.: 1996, Towards a Science Curriculum for Public Understanding, School Science Review 77(280), 17. OConnor, E.: 1993, Management Education for the Future: Learning to Think Curriculum, (14), 6267. Pizzini, E.L. Shepardson, D.P. and Abell, S.K.: 1991, The Inquiry Level of Junior High Activities: Implications to Science Teaching, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 28, 111121. Ramanathan, S. and Siddiqui, N.: 1994, Representation of Science in Upper Primary Science Textbooks: An Assessment, Indian Educational Review 29(1&2), 112. Richardson, R.: 1985, The Hidden Messages at School Books, Journal of Moral Education 15(1), 2642. Roth, W. and Roychaudhry, A.: 1994, Physics Students Epistemologies and Views about Knowing and Learning, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 31(1), 5 30. Rutherford, F. and Ahlgren, A.: 1989, Science For All Americans, Oxford University Press, New York. Science A Textbook for Class X: 1989, National Council of Educational Research and Training, New Delhi, India. Shepardson, D. and Pizzini, E.: 1991, Questioning Levels of Junior High School Science Textbooks and their Implications for Learning Textual Information, Journal of Research in Science Education 75(6), 673682. Tamir, P.: 1972, Understanding the Process of Science by Students Exposed to Different Science Curricula in Israel, Journal of Research in Science Teaching 9(3), 239245. Watt, S.: 1993, Science in the National Curriculum Developing an Anti-racist and Multicultural Perspective, in A. Fyfe and P. Figueroa (eds), Education for Cultural Diversity - The Challenge for a New Era. Westbury, I.: 1985, Textbooks an Overview, in I. Hussen and T. Postlethwaite (eds), The International Encyclopedia of Education Research and Studies, Vol. 9, pp. 5233 5234.
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Science Textbooks in TamilEncounter of Modern Science with Traditional Knowledge Forms.

T.V. Venkateswaran
Centre for Development of Imaging Technology, Thiruvananathapuram, India. Email: tvven@sancharnet.in
Introduction
Modern Educational systems instituted in India during the colonial period usually evokes two responses among the scholars. One treats the educational edice as a valuable legacy, left by former rulers, albeit, unwittingly. The others, consider it as diametrically oppositeas yet another instance of the metropolitan powers deliberate attempt to keep down the hapless colonies for their exclusive benet. With the prex modern to the word education, the rst response focuses on the social mobility that colonial education provided to hitherto suppressed and depressed classes of people.1 The spread of ideas like democracy, scientic rationality, rationality and nationalism is traced as a worthy benefaction, with the colonial educational system regarded as having ushered in modernization.2 On the other hand, the alternative focuses on how education was a mask of conquest3 a sort of tool to obtain the consent of the oppressed; and how it colonized the minds. Gauri Viswanathan argues that the introduction of literary studies in place of religion by the British operated a veiled mechanism of social control to keep the Indian society governable without the excessive use of violence. Scholarship thus is intertwined in inescapable dualism, with weak explanatory potential. The rst response would be unable to explain how a well-articulated Macaulayan colonial educational project could turn out to be a patronizing agent of change, ultimately leading to the demise of colonialism itself. On the other hand if modern education was only a mask and a colonizing mind project, how could it generate a class of people who vociferously opposed colonialism? Both these dualist responses treat the recipient society as passive and fail to consider the possibility of natives actively engaging with the colonial project and re-appropriating elements in the colonial educational system. The way out is possibly to seek a solution in the mode of transmission and exchange
1 See Hardgrave, Robert: 1969, Nadars of Tamilnad, University of California Press, Los Angeles, for the impact of education on caste structure. Specically, the book takes the case study of how Nadars, a backward community, acquired wealth and education and moved upwards in the caste hierarchy. 2 Ghosh, Suresh Chandra: 1995, The History of education in Modern India, Orient Longman, is a representative of this view. 3 See Vishwanathan, Gauri: Masks of ConquestLiterary Study and British Rule in India, Columbia University Press, New York. She argues that the introduction of literary studies in place of religion by the British operated a veiled mechanism of social control to keep the Indian society governable without the excessive use of violence.
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of knowledge between the metropolitan and colonial cultures. Extending the point made by the sociology of science, this paper seeks to examine the native attempt to divest western science of its European cultural codes and to assimilate modern science into the native cultural cosmos. As Aparna Basu points out: education was a central concern in the nationalist quest for self-identication for it was in education that the cultural agenda of colonialism had been most succinctly expressed,4 and thus an investigation into the content and character of textbooks on science during the nineteenth century would be rewarding. In the cultural ecology of colonialism, European missions, emergence of scientic naturalism and social changes ushered in at the turn of the century, this paper attempts to document the toils of native intellectuals in skillfully balancing the traditional and modern. Textbooks being one of the main conduits for the spread of modern scientic knowledge, this paper specically underscores the native effort in neutralizing5 and domesticating6 the publication and dissemination of science textbooks during the nineteenth century by Tamil intellectuals (vernacular literati). 7 2 Educational Policies and its Impact During the nineteenth century there were mainly two types of educational systems in Tamil Nadu: a.) an educational rooted in indigenous practices called Payal schools and b.) Modern schools established by European missionaries and East India Company. As every other society, Indian society too had its own traditional system of schools for training the young and transmitting knowledge from generation to generation. There were indigenous village schools,8 called Payal or patasalasin various parts of Tamil Nadu to impart basic literacy, numeracy and to train children in various useful arts. Dharam Pal claims that there was a Macaulayan programme of erasure of village schoolsakin to that of de-industrialization. De-education under the colonial British Raj may be argued; however, it remains that the education provided in these indigenous schools were discriminatory, and was disproportionately in favour of the upper caste. During 1835, while the Brahmin population constituted only one twentieth of that in the Madras Province, out of every ve students in patasalas, one was from the
4 Basu, Aparna: 1998, National Education in Bengal 1905-1912, in Sabyasachi Bhattacharya (Ed), The Contested Terrain, Orient Longman, New Delhi, 54-67. 5 Raina, Dhruv & Irfan Habib: 1996, The Moral Legitimization of, Modern Science: Bhadralog reections on theories of evolution, Social Studies of Science, 26, 9-42. 6 Raina Dhruv: 1997, The Young P C Ray and the Inauguration of the Social History of Science in India, Science Technology & Society, 2, 1, 1-39. 7 I am aware of the fact that this expression of intellectuals smacks of elitism. The emergence of modern (English) educated strata has diversely been characterized as middle class, elite and so on. I am following K N Panickar, who, applying the Gramscian notion, uses intellectuals to characterize this strate. Autodidact, as conceptualized by the Dhruv Raina and Irfan S Habib is more appropriate, nevertheless as we are not focusing on specic individuals but wish to underscore a social class, we use the term Tamil intellectuals. I am also aware that these Tamil intellectuals were not a homogenous group but were internally differentiated. However, the contradictions within the Tamil intellectuals were more pronounced consequent to the cultural politics since 1920s. 8 Pal, Dharam: 1983, The Beautiful Tree, Biblia Impex Pvt Ltd, New Delhi: A uncritical exalted documentation of the indigenous schools surviving from earlier period to that of early Raj.
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Brahmin community. Also, the education offered to various castes was not uniform; it was skewed to t to the students caste-designated role. Thus a Brahmin could learn astronomy, logic, arithmetic and law, but a trader would be provided with education in bazaar mathematics and so on. Higher education obviously was restricted to Brahmins and a few other upper caste sections. It goes without saying that female education was dismal and the education of Sudhra caste almost absent. Radhakrishnan remarks that
the nature of indigenous instruction from the perspective of its stages and methods, character and quality and prevalence and characteristics of domestic instruction showed its imperfection and inadequacies. But viewed . . . from the perspective of Pre-British Indian Society, what we perceive as its limitation was perhaps only some of the manifestations of an educational system which was designed and developed to reproduce the society in all its discriminating dimension. 9
It is well documented that the Payal schools used classics and texts composed in cadjan leaves, on the other hand, syllabus, schedule and prescribed textbooks were absent. While the payal schools were discriminatory, in general the modern schools established by the missionaries during the nineteenth century admitted students from all classes of people. As Keay notes, the payal schools were not replaced or erased but were gradually incorporated into the mainstream modern school system.10 In fact, in South India, such types of Payal schools did not completely fade away, but were progressively brought under the control of the State. To start with, it was the missionaries who instituted modern educational institutions in Tamil province. Portuguese established a Tamil school as early as in 1567 and eight students began their course in language at Punnakayal, a coastal town in southern Tamil Nadu.11 There is a reference to school master (by implication to school) in an East India Company record of Fort St George dated 1678.12 However, it is not known whether the school serviced only the whites or was open to the natives too. Nonetheless, such efforts were far and few, and with the absence of printing presses, hardly any textbooks were published. The age-old practice of committing to memory, and the use of Cadjan leaves, were resorted too. By the late eighteenth century, the Society for Promotion of Christian Knowledge and the Danish Missions instituted schools and Rev Schwartz established a number of schools at Tanjore, Ramnad and Sivaganga. Essentially the efforts were on the part of various European missions who in addition to evangelical work also took upon provision of school education.13 Evangelical belief in the transformation of human
9 Radhakrishnan, P.: 1986, Caste Discrimination in indigenous Indian education I: Nature and extent of education in early, 19th century British India, Working paper No. 63, Madras Institute of Development Studies, Madras. 10 Keay F. E.: 1989, Ancient Indian Education; An inquiry into its origin, development and ideas, Oxford University Press, London. 11 Jayaseela, Stephen: 1998, Portuguese in Tamil Coast: Historical Explorations in Commerce and Culture 1507-1749, Navajothi, Pondicherry. 12 Gover, Charles: 1982, Report on the Results of Educational Census of Madras 1871, Government Press, Madras, 45. 13 See for details, Satthianandan, S.: 1894, History of education in the Madras Presidency, Christian Literature Society, Madras.
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character through education and the conviction that conversion to Christianity required some amount of learning, promoted the cause of modern education in India. 14 Lalitha Jayaraman notes that15 in the period prior to 1833, the missionaries mainly concentrated on establishing elementary school teaching through the medium of modern Indian languages . . . While the East India Company as such was not keen on the spread of education among its colonial subjects,16 during the 1820s, Sir Thomas Munro, Governor of Madras Presidency, took interest in the spread of education to the masses. Munro commissioned district ofcials to gather information regarding the spread, reach, content and structure of education then prevailing in various districts of Madras Presidency. Reecting on the dismal state of affairs in education, he favoured the spread of education in the Presidency at the Companys expenses. He promoted the establishment of one school for Hindus and one for Muslims in each major town and at least one school in each Talook (Tehsil). By 1830 there were 70 Talook schools and by 1835 it was only 81 all over the Madras Presidency, implying that the establishment of modern school were essentially enclavist. While the provincial schools were conducted in the medium of English and the Zilla through both English and Vernacular, the Talook schools were essentially vernacular schools. The policy of promoting education in the vernaculars received a set-back with the irtation of the British with the ltration theory of education, cogently advocated by Macaulay in his famous 1835 minutes. Concurring with Maculay, Lord Bentinck ordered that His Lordship in council is of the opinion that the great object of the British Government ought to be the promotion of European literature and science among the natives of India and that all the funds appropriated for the purpose of education would be best employed in English education alone.17 The Macaulayan minutes assiduously advocated English education in addition to class education, and thus there was a fundamental change in the colonial educational policy. It argued:18
to place within the reach of higher class of natives the highest instruction in the English languages and in European literature and science so as not only to improve the intellectual and moral condition of the people, but also to train a body of natives qualied by their habits and acquirements to take a large share and occupy higher situations in the civil administration of the country.
The ltration theory argued that it is better to provide quality English education to a small class of native people, who would be brown in colour but white in habits
Tejaswini: 1992, Siting Translation, Orient Longman, New Delhi. Jayaraman: 1986, History of Education in the Madras Presidency 1800-1857, MPhil Thesis, Madras University (unpublished), 62. 16 In the charter act of 1813, a provision was incorporated that made lawful but not obligatory on the part of the East India Company to set aside funds for the revival and improvement of literature and encouragement of the learned natives of India and for the promotion of knowledge of the sciences among the inhabitants of the British territories in India. See Sharp, C.H.(Ed): 1920, Selections form the Educational Records 17811839; Part I Calcutta, 22. But the efforts were taken earnestly only after a decade, in 1823. 17 Resolution of the 7th March 1835 in Sharp, C. H.(Ed): 1920, Selections form the Educational Records 1781-1839; Part I, Calcutta. 18 Cited in Satthianandan, S.: 1894 History of Education in the Madras Presidency, Christian Literature Society, Madras.
15 Lalitha, 14 Niranjana,
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and mentality. Thus the earlier policy of the East India Company to support oriental educationeducation in Sanskrit, traditional knowledge and vernacular literature were reversed. The new Macaulayan policy had indeed denitely impeded the spread of vernacular education in British Indian territories; nevertheless, in Madras Presidency it was not completely arrested.19 Missionaries were also very active in Madras Presidency in providing elementary education; furthermore most of the missionary elementary schools were consistently vernacular in the medium of instruction. However, the unrealistic policy of exclusive English education did not last long, and the Governor General Lord Auckland in his minutes of 1839 departed from the stringent policy of Bentinck and noted that spread of mass education through English is not a feasible one. Further he also pointed out that the vernacular education may be economical, than through English, which require the employment of an English master on a salary at least two or three times as high as would be adequate for a native master who had received an English education and at the same time perfectly conversant in his own tongue.20 Further the minute desired that the leading facts and principles of our literature and science be transferred by translation into vernacular tongues21 and argued the justness and importance of the advice of the Honorable Court that such a series of class books should be prepared under one general scheme of control and superintendence. In conclusion the Government of India in its order22 stated that class book consisting of selections from English work, or, of compilation drawn up and adapted for native pupils should be prepared at the charge of education funds of all the presidency. A system consonant with Lord Aucklands prescription was soon drawn-up by the Madras Government and a scheme for bestowing annual prizes to vernacular compositions with the object of procuring expositions of standard English works of the character 23 was practiced. The Educational Despatch of Sir Charles Wood in 1854, described as the Magna Carta of Indian Education suggested a major deviation from the ltration theory of education and advocated the spread of mass education at an elementary level. Though this despatch also endorsed the desirability of English education at secondary and higher levels of education, it accepted the use of vernacular at primary levels. The despatch recommended to24
recur to the past scheme of education viz., the classical language of the East as the media for imparting European knowledge. This object of extending European knowledge must be Suresh Chandra: 1995, The History of Education in Modern India, Orient Longman, New Delhi. H. Sharp (Ed), Selections form the Educational Records 1781-1839; Part I Calcutta, 1920, (p. 162). 21 ibid, 156-157. 22 Minute of the Governor General in Council, dated 21st Nov, 1839 in Sharp, C.H.(Ed): 1920, Selections form the Educational Records 1781-1839; Part I, Calcutta, 147-170. 23 In 1841, Robertsons History of America was translated into Tamil and was given the annual price. The textbook was latter prescribed a text book in the Madras University. 24 Educational Despatch 1854 (No. 49 Dated 19th July 1854) (Popularly referred to as Woods Despatch) 1854, (copy appended in the Arubthnot, J.(Ed), Selections from the Records of the Madras Government No. II, Papers relating to Public Instructions, comprising of the proceedings of the Madras Department of Public Instructions, Fort St George Press, Madras, 1855).
20 C. 19 Ghosh,
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effected by means of the English language in the higher branches of institutions and by means of vernacular language of India to the great mass of people.
and furthermore, that25

. . . we must emphatically declare that the education which we desire to see extended in India is that which has for its object the diffusion of the improved arts, science, philosophy and literature of Europe, in-short of European knowledge.
With the acceptance of the major recommendations of the dispatch, a Directorate of Public Instruction (DPI) was instituted in each province to control and inspect over the whole educational system.26 The despatch also advocated a system of grant-in-aid to various agencies for the spread of education among the natives of India.27 Thus many a payal schools as well as elementary schools established by the missionaries could receive support from the state in the form of grant-in-aid. This resulted, progressively, in brining much of the elementary educational institutions in the Madras Presidency under the supervision of the state. Schools under direct Government management Under Government inspection Missionary Schools recieving Grant-in-aid Total No. of Schools 73 112 303 488 No. of Scholars 2148 4020 8973 15141
Source: Report of the Director of Public Instruction for the year 1856-57
Table 1: Vernacular Schools in the Madras Presidency during 1856-57 The grant-in-aid system not only triggered the spread of the mass education, but also ensured spread in terms of the caste groups who received modern education. Thus, by 1872-73, the general average male literacy rate in the Madras Presidency was 5% and in Madras district it was 18%. In the Presidency, Hindus had a literacy rate of 4.8%, Muslims 4.9%, Native Christians 7.4%, European and East Indians 63.3%, Jains 12.9% and others 18.4%.28 One of the signicant consequences of modern education was thatat least a few from the oppressed classes could receive education as much as the Brahmins or caste Hindus. As the missionaries were arguing that education could better ones social standing, those caste sections in the lower hierarchy could lay claim for social mobility.
(p. 2). 34-41. 27 See Manickam, S.: 1988, Grant in aid and Christian mission in Madras, in Studies in Missionary History, Christian Literature Society, Madras, 82. 28 Data compiled from The Report of the Administration of the Madras Presidency, 1872-73, Part II, Madras, 1873, 37.
26 ibid 25 ibid,
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Till about 1870, all schools other than under direct government management had autonomy to choose the text book and also prepare their own scheme of studies. However, with the introduction of government exams, adoption of inspection, schools receiving grant in aid, inclusive of many a missionary schools, had to recourse to use of text books approved by the government. The Textbook Review Committee in its report also directed each province to set-up a text book committee to approve suitable textbooks for use in school receiving government aid. In practice, in many a case it meant that, it was only the textbooks produced by the government or prescribed by it were used. The Education Code of 1881, while reducing the grants to the high schools and colleges, increased the grants to the primary schools. The Hunter commission of 1882 also recommended the spread of elementary education and stated that29
while every branch of education can surely claim the fostering care of the state, it is desirable in the present circumstance of the country to declare the elementary education of the masses, its provision, extension and improvement to be that part of the educational system to which the strenuous effort of the state should now be directed in a still larger measure than heretofore.
The Hunter commission also favoured progressive retraction of the Government from the educational sector. It suggested a mode of grant-in-aid scheme to agencies and also recommended vesting elementary schools with Municipal and Local boards. By 1922, in Madras Presidency, merely 4% of the students were attending the government schools. The result was an expansion of elementary schools under private management. Previously, though class books were prepared and published, the accent given were for promotion of sound vernacular literature and most of such publications were used as supplementary texts to instruction in the school. Meanwhile, Hunter commission advocated that only books approved and prescribed by the government be used in the schools receiving state aid. This resulted in production of books with specic character and style of textbooks, even on topics such as sciences. The net result of these policy changes was relatively widespread primary education among the vernacular literati, mostly in vernacular medium, predominantly under private management with modest autonomy in choice over textbooks. 3 Science for NativesEarly Nineteenth Century It was the missionaries who took lead in propagating modern science in India. Even the efforts by the colonial government in early period in the Madras Presidency were essentially a missionary affair, with most of the compliers and authors of textbooks being European missionaries. Though the proclaimed aim of the public instruction was improved European literature and sciences, even during 1850s while, mathematics and geography were introduced into the scheme of studies, natural sciences (natural philosophy & natural history) were, mostly, absent from the scheme of studies for vernacular schools. In Talook schools, which were essentially vernacular schools, the natural science was not a separate subject of study, nonetheless, book titled Joyces Dialogue on Sciences was a prescribed text for Tamil prose for 3rd and 4th classes. This book was a Tamil
29 Report
of the Indian Education Commission 1882, Calcutta, 1883, 586.
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translation of a English elementary work on physical sciences prepared by the Calcutta School Book Society and published in Tamil and Telugu by the Madras School Book Society around 1827. Halls Outline of Astronomy, Ed by Rev T.S. Pratt, was a prescribed text for Tamil prose for 5th class. Later, a book titled Brief and familiar sketch of Europe published by the Madras School Book Society was also used as a text for Tamil prose. This book though, essentially on the history of Europe, information on inventions, institutions and natural phenomena of Europe, thus providing additional information on certain aspects of natural sciences. Woods dispatch advocated provision of education in natural science and though the subject did not nd a place in the revised scheme of studies, it was suggested that the pupils should be made to write from dictation, striking passages of history or important facts of Natural Philosophy or Natural History being selection for that object, so that their very copy book may be made to serve the purpose of common place books. Moreover, lessons on natural science and inventions were included in the vernacular language readers. Thus we nd the following in the Tamil readers published by the Director of Public Instructions in the Madras Presidency: In the rst reader, while there were no substantial chapters on science, natural philosophic topics such as soul, heaven and hell were included. But, the second book of lessons in reading, contained elementary lessons on physiology, natural history, and astronomy. Lessons on head, eye, nose and ear were part of physiology and animals such as cow, crow, ass sheep, cat and so on where on natural history and seasons, and natural phenomena such as ice, ice skating etc formed part of natural philosophy while lessons on stars, moon and sun were taught as part of the astronomy. In the third book of lessons in reading, natural history included lessons on minerals, vegetables and animals kingdoms. A chapter on creation attempted to provide basics of natural philosophy, chapters on natural phenomena such as atmosphere, dew, rain, lightning and thunder. The minerals such as gold, silver, lead and tin, iron, copper and brass were part of mineralogy. Lessons on vegetables included coconut, palmyra, cotton, grains, coffee, tea, tobacco and areca. Swan, cock, hen, reptiles, bat etc. were on animal kingdom. Lessons on astronomy provided basics on the sun, moon and the stars and few astronomical events such as eclipse. The Brief sketch of Europe, though was primarily intended to teach history of Europe was also a prose reader and it contents included manner, customs, institutions, events, objects and scenery. Nonetheless, the natural phenomena observed in Europe are described in terms of Natural History. Rev Percival, a missionary and a professor of vernacular literature at the Presidency College, prepared these series of Tamil readers, assisted by natives. While the series were pruned of every Christian element, allusion to European outlook remained. Thus, for example, chapter on creation was retained and the tone and tenor of the works were natural philosophic in perspective. Even the titles of books published before the 1870s provides evidence that the publications by the missionaries on scientic subjects were in the paradigm of natural philosophy. In the catalogue compiled by John Murdoch the following are classied
Venkateswaran under Natural Science:30 1. On General Knowledge, Rev C Rhenius.
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2. Tattuvanul Surukkam, [On astronomy, natural history in the form of question and answer], anonymous, however a publication by missionaries. 3. On the Sub-division of Knowledge, Published by the Madras School Book Society Depot, a translation of Dr. Ballantynes work. 4. Siruvar Kalvi Thunai, [Catechism of general knowledge], anonymous. 5. Thattuva Sastram, (Natural Philosophy), Rev E Sargent. 6. Catechism of Natural Philosophy, Rev E Sargent. 7. Joyces Scientic Dialogue, Madras School Book Society. 8. Lectures on Natural Philosophy, anonymous. 9. Oriental Astronomer, Rev HR Hoisington, [a complete system of Hindu Astronomy]. 10. Halls Outline of Astronomy, Ed by Rev TS Pratt. 11. Astronomy, Christian Vernacular Education Society. 12. Wild Animals, anonymous. 13. Domestic Animals, anonymous. 14. A Reader on Natural History, published by the Madras Government. 15. Anatomy, Physiology and Hygiene, Dr Green. 16. Atma Vasa Vivaranam, [The house I live ina popular account of the human body]. 17. Chingalpat Civil Dispensary, anonymous (Government publication). 18. Health and How to Preserve It?, Dr Lowe. 19. Midwifery Adapted to India, Dr Green. 20. Bazaar Medicines, Dr Waring. 21. Asuva Sastram, [on horse], anonymous. 22. Maddu Vakadam, anonymous.
30 Murdoch, John: 1865, Classied Catalogue of Tamil Printed Books with Introductory Notices, (republished by the Tamil Development and Research Council).
328 23. Gun Powder Manufacture, anonymous. 24. Indigo Cultivation, anonymous.
(Note: the rst 14 publications are on natural sciences and the rest on medicine, technology etc.,) In addition to the above, four books on mathematics and 35 books on traditional medicine were also noticed in the said catalogue of Tamil printed works. While the Government schools and most of the other private schools not under the missionary management essentially used the government textbooks, the missionaries prepared their own textbooks and readers. In 1854, South Indian Christian Textbook Society was formed to prepare textbooks with Christian elements. Latter in 1858 this society was merged with the Madras Branch of the Christian Vernacular Education Society (CVES). Many of the vernacular books issued by this society were chiey for the purpose of school education. The book Thattuva Sastram (Natural Philosophy) by Rev E Sargent,31 a missionary, appears to have been popular, as reprints of this book appeared as late as 1898. The book was written drawing upon heavily from the works of Dr Arnott. The book Thathuva Sasthram, rstly describes the32 atomic concept, physical forces of nature (attraction, repulsion and inertia), mechanics, explanations of natural phenomena, hydrostatics, pneumatics, hydraulics, acoustics, heat or caloric, light or optics, electricity (galvanism), magnetism (electric telegraphy), weightless matter and so on. In the introduction the author, Rev Sergent, asserts that unlike humans, inferior animals have no natural capacity to learn. The nature here implies the inclination of God. However humans have innate capacity to learn from their parents and gather knowledge through life experience and by exerting oneself.33 The author states:
During earlier days, prior to the proper pursuit of Natural Philosophy, deception was galore. People were misled and deceived by blending astronomy with astrology, chemistry with alchemy. When various principles of natural philosophy became known in (the western) countries, superstition was eradicated.34
Natural philosophy was dened by the author as knowledge that describes properties of matter in the universe, laws of motion of the bodies and how the knowledge is practically useful to man.35 The book also approvingly cites Francis Bacon, and goes on to illustrate the contributions of Galileo, Boyle, Newton, Franklin, Herschel, Laplace, and Davy. The author, to illustrate the magnicence of the creation by the True God advances the argument of prime mover. While some of the indian tradition also held the view of God as the designer, christianity the way explained by the missionaries attempted to show that the rst cause was True God and the motion in the universe is the grand effect and that the modern science provides ample evidence to this. the author
E Sargent: 1874, Thathuva Sasthram, Church Mission Press, Palayamcotta, (in Tamil). 16-17. 33 ibid, 1. 34 ibid, 3. 35 ibid, 6.
32 ibid, 31 Rev
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reasons that the study of natural philosophy is not only for material progress but also for spiritual progressone who acutely studies natural philosophy will realize the greatness, intellect and kindness of the creator (God).36 Rev Fish Green, an American missionary who established a medical mission at Jaffna in the early nineteenth century observes that omen, black-magic and such nonexistent sasthras had their sway over people unchecked and they caused havoc. We publish this book with the desire and intent to establish, Chemistry, the technique of classifying elemental matter instead of Rasayana, Astronomy instead of Jothista (astrology), True knowledge instead of false education, and eradicate superstition in individuals as well as in society.37 He refuses to even consider Rasayana as an equivalent and admissible term in Tamil for chemistry instead coins a new word Chemistham.38 The Bhoomi Sasthram, by Rev Rhenius, considered to be the rst science publication in Tamil, states to enlighten (native) Tamil as its object of publication.39 The condescending tone is hard to miss. The missionaries saw the task of teaching natural philosophy as a way to civilize the natives. The missionary Murdoch was blunt but forthright, when he wrote to his family at distant Glasgow, You ask about the telescope that you sent me. It answers the purpose tolerably. I may mention that it had considerable effect on the minds of youth in causing him to disbelieve Buddhism, as it showed the mountains of the moon and the satellites of Jupiter. This may, perhaps, surprise you. I have however only room to mention that the religion of the people is quite opposed to European geography and astronomy, and, consequently, if the latter are true, the former is false.40 It can be evidently seen that, in the Tamil publications of the missionaries, the natural philosophy was so construed as to challenge the traditional knowledge of the natives or to elucidate the alleged corroboration of the newly revealed religion and the gospel by the truths of natural philosophy. Missionary Tamil publications on science during the early nineteenth century highlighted the superstitions of the natives purported to wean away the heathen brethren from the path of ignorance and to lead them to the true knowledge. At the same time it was also an effort to establish a connection made by reason, between Christian truths and empirical knowledge.41 K N Panickar notes:42
Incorporation of colonial cultural elements was marked in the textbooks in the Indian languages produced by the government, Christian missionaries, voluntary organizations and private individuals. These books both through diction and content guided the impressionable 11. F.: 1875, Chemistham, Nagercoil London Mission Press, Jaffna; in the preface to his book Chemistham. 38 In the periodical Udyatharagai, Vol. I, Issue 1, the equivalent term for chemistry is left blank by Fish Green. He articulates this view explicitly in his work Chemistham. 39 Fr Rhenius: 1832, Bhoomi Sasthram, Church Mission Press, Chennai. 40 Letter of 8th June 1847, reproduced in Henry Morris, The life of John Murdoch, Christian Literature Society, Madras, 1906, 20. 41 Studdert-Kennedy, Gerald: 1998, Providence & Raj; Imperial mission and missionary imperialism, Sage, New Delhi, 64. 42 Panickar, K. N.: 1995, Culture, Ideology, Hegemony, Thulika, New Delhi, 129.
37 Green, 36 ibid,
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minds of young children to a cultural universe alien to their life experience. . . . This was not always achieved through a dismissal or denigration of indigenous culture, but by locating the cultural ideals in the achievements of western society.
The dissemination of modern science by the missionaries had a close relationship with their spiritual mission of spreading the word of Gospel and was closely linked to the mundane colonial project of civilizing the natives. John Murdoch remarks that . . . the aims of education are (1) to promote the temporal well-being of the people of India (2) to elevate them intellectually (3) to raise their moral character.43 Treating literature, philosophy and science as aspects of the one morally informed source of authentic knowledge44 was a strategy of missionaries to ground morality and social behavior in an analytical appreciation of institution, obligation and law.45 Tejaswini Niranjana observes that missionaries . . . functioned as colonial agents in the formation of practice of subjectication, not only in their role of priests and teachers, but also in the capacity of linguists, grammarians and translators.46 Furthermore she argues that the discourse on education, theology, historiography and literature by the missionaries was by setting up a series of opposition between tradition and modern, developed and underdeveloped, and this discourse informed the ideological structure of the hegemonic apparatus of colonial rule. The colonial project is candidly unveiled in the report submitted by the DPI in 1868. The report, while attempting to explain the not-so-impressive record in production and dissemination of literature in the vernacular, notes that the substitution of new literary books for those now possessed by the Hindus which have their roots in the past history of the people, could only be effected very slowly47 which clearly indicates the cherished hope that the European knowledge and western culture will replace the indigenous. As the consequence of these colonial cultural intrusion, more strongly felt during the latter half of the nineteenth century, natives organized cultural defences by creating alternative cultural practices or by revitalizing the traditional institutions. The intellectual leaders were enchanted by modern science, especially its promise for material progress.48 Thus, in their endeavor to decolonize the educational system the natives never failed to negotiate a space for the reception of science and technology from the west.49 At the same time, native intellectuals were also disenchanted with modern science, especially natural philosophy, as this knowledge form not only had its origin in the west, but was being used as a resource to deprecate native society. Eventually, as Sabyasachai observes that . . . however critical, the reception [of modern science] was,
43 Murdoch, John: 1881, Education in India: A Letter to Rippon, Christian Knowledge Society Press, Madras, 42. 44 Studdert-Kennedy, Gerald: 1998, Providence & Raj; Imperial mission and missionary imperialism, Sage, New Delhi, 64-65. 45 ibid, 64. 46 Niranjana, Tejaswini: 1992, Sitting Translation, Orient Longman, 34. 47 Report of the Director of Public Instruction, July, 1868-69, Madras 1869, 59-60. 48 Raina, Dhruv & Habib, Irfan: 1996, The Moral Legitimization of Modern Science: Bhadralog reections on theories of evolution, Social Studies of Science, 26, 9-42. 49 Bhattacharya, Sabyasachi (Ed): 1998, The Contested Terrain, Orient Longman, New Delhi, 4.
Venkateswaran inevitably on the agenda of the intellectual class.50 4 Science by Natives During Late Nineteenth Century
331
Thought the (in)famous Maculays minutes, Woods dispatch and numerous other governmental reports advocated instruction in European literature and sciences, the instruction in natural sciences in vernacular schools were slow to materialize. Lack of standard textbooks, incapacity to teach science in other than English medium, lack of trained teacher with adequate knowledge in science while at the same time ease with vernacular languages were presented from time to time as hurdles for instruction of science in the vernacular schools. By 1870s there was a renewed craving for introduction of science in vernacular school education. Native associations such as British Indian Association, missionaryeducationist such as Murdoch as well as ofcial government reports favoured introduction of instruction in science at vernacular schools. The British Indian Association in its memorial to the Governer General lamented that at present an acquaintance with the higher branches of knowledge can be obtained only by a study of the English language, and it is this which presents the greatest obstacles to the general and rapid prorogation of useful knowledge in the country and pleaded for education in vernacular languages and also instruction in modern science.51 Murdoch in his Letter to Lord Ripon, Viceroy remarked that instruction in natural science is a vexed question.52 Director of Public Instruction in Madras Presidency, Powell concurred that it is unquestionable that everywhere, the old curriculum of studies will have to make room for some new subjects calculated to give a wider and a clearer view of nature and her laws, and to draw forth the powers of observation implanted in man, but hitherto left undeveloped in most countries, and especially in India . . .53 and that ordinary education will have to embrace such subjects as a general knowledge of mans frame and constitution, the elements of physics.54 But he cautioned hasty introduction of such subjects of study in the lower schools and argued that observational and experimental science should not just be an optional paper but a compulsory one in the university examinations like FA and BA. Slowly, but inevitably, instruction in natural science was introduced and gaining ground in the scheme of studies prescribed for vernacular schools. In no less measure efforts in promotion of science education as a part of general public instruction was impelled by educational developments back home. The Royal Commission on Scientic Instruction favoured that instruction in the elements of natural science can be, and eventually ought to be, made an essential part of course of
51 Memorial from the British Indian Association to the Victory and Governor General of India in Council, Naik JP, Selections from Educational Records, Vol II, Development of University Education (1860-87), National Archives of India, New Delhi, 1963, 6-28. 52 John, Murdoch: 1881, Education in India: A letter to his excellency the most Honble The Marquies of Ripon, Viceroy and Governor General on India, CKS press, Vepery, Madras, 42. 53 Cited in Satthianandan, S.: 1894, History of Education in the Madras Presidency, Christian Literature Society, Madras, 93-94. 54 ibid 50 ibid
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instruction in every elementary school.55 The committee on revision of textbook in its report recommended encouragement of the study of Sanskrit and physical sciences. 56 The Secretary to the Government of Madras Presidency conceded to the recommendation and requisitioned the Director of Public Instruction to submit his proposal for introducing elementary textbooks on the subject into the ordinary school course. 57 Educational Code of 1881 as well as Hunter commission of 1882 echoed similar views and elementary science education was incorporated into the school curriculum. These culminated in a new code for grant-in-aid, that required the lower primary class have two optional subjects and upper primary school four optional subjects among such subjects of instruction like object lessons, sanitation, agriculture and few other scientic discipline. To meet the new educational demand, text books in these areas were produced from 1880s. The marginalization of missionaries from the vernacular textbook publication was further accentuated by certain developments in the metropolis. With the ascendancy of scientic naturalism in England during the 1850s, the cultural competence of the clergy to comment upon scientic discipline was called into question and clergy were being relegated to the domain of the spiritual. Scientic disciplines such as magnetism, galvanism (Electricity), geology and thermodynamics constructed in Europe were fast displacing the traditional disciplinary boundaries such as natural history and natural philosophy. In the new dispensation the scientic authorities were not Butler or Paley but Huxley and Spencer.58 Huxleys series of science primers formed the basis for preparation of textbooks in the vernacular in the Madras Presidency.59 Meanwhile, the paradigm of natural sciences were also undergoing sea change. Scientic naturalism was replacing natural philosophy as the paradigm and subsequently, the object of the science education itself got changed. Though the Huxleys report still used the language of mental and moral improvement, as the object of scientic instruction, in deference to the then prevailing Victorian attitudes in England, goals such as, economical prosperity and social improvement were also gaining accentuation.60 With the rapidly changing social order under colonialism, new professions were open for the modern educated natives and they constituted and articulated themselves as the new middle class. Having received education in English language and culture, they commanded a new authority in the colonial political society these educated nain John, Murdoch: 1881, Education in India: A letter to his excellency the most Honble The Marquise of Ripon, Viceroy and Governor General of India, CKS press, Vepery, Madras, 46. 56 Report of the Committee for the revision of English, Telugu and Tamil School Books in the Madras Presidency, Government Gazette Press, Madras, 1874, 72. 57 GO (Edl) Government of Madras, 338, No. 5-9, 3rd Oct 1874. 58 Paley William: 1802, Natural Theology: Or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity, Collected from the Appearance of Nature, the Woods Despatch of 1854 suggested it as a textbook. Furthermore Huxley is cited with acceptance in the educational reports emanating during 1880s, especially for the preparation of syllabus for science. 59 Committee of Madras School Book and Vernacular Literature Society invited person to prepare edited translation of primers edited by Huxley. Report on the public Instruction in the Madras Presidency 1873-74, Government Press, 1874, 94. 60 For contemporary reponse to Huxleys report and its implication for Indian Education see, John, Murdoch: 1881, Education in India: A Letter to Lord Ripon, CKS Press, Madras.
55 Cited
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tives self styled as the new middle class, sought made claims to the privileges and a share of governance under the British political tradition. This emerging vernacular literati, quite independently of their class and caste origins, were politically aware and active as theorists, strategists, organizers and spokespersons on behalf of the emerging autonomous social group of incipient national bourgeois. The Tamil Brahmin, traditional custodian of knowledge, seamlessly took advantage of modern education and the acquired benets accruing out of it. Being the traditional lawgiver, he could exercise his pre-existing hegemony in the civil society through his caste status while his modern education gave him a new found authority in the colonial political society.61 As Aparna Basu notes, along with the Bengali Bhadralok and the Chitapavan of Maharastra, it was the Tamil Brahmin who assumed political hegemony in the respective provinces.62 While the Tamil Brahmin retained his devotion to Sanskrit, on the other hand he was also a promoter of Tamil so as to hegemonize other vernacular languages of the Madras province. Hence, among the vernacular languages of the Madras province, Tamil was the forerunner. In addition another social group that forged a self identity of Saiva Vellalars (which included caste groups such as Vellalars, Mudaliars and Chettiyars) were also acquiring new status and power within the colonial set-up.63 As Sabyasachi Bhattacharya notes contest between nationalism in education with the colonial state (was) inseparably intertwined historically with the contest for hegemony within the colonial society and during the late nineteenth century most of the educated vernacular literati organized themselves into various local socio-political organizations associated with educational service.64 The emergent forums were usually styled as scientic and literary societies. Reading rooms, societies for debates and organizations championing for educational advancement as well as social reform were instituted in many provincial towns. As a representative of these movements, the Villupuram Literary Society in 1882 and the Villupuram Educational Society in 1885 were initiated with the objective to discuss literature and science subjects and for educational and social reform.65 At the turn of the century there were more than 100 such societies and reading rooms in various provincial towns of the Madras Presidency. In these societies irrespective of their religious persuasion, Indian intellectuals found in science a neutral pursuit that was to become a common meeting ground and serve as a means of articulating counter colonial political stance,66 and as K.N. Panickar observes being conduits for the dissemination
Pandian: 1996, Towards National Popular, ntoes on self-respecters Tamil, Economic and Political Weekly, Dec 21, 3323-3329. See also Arooran, K Nambi: 1980, Tamil Renaissance and the Dravidian nationalism 1905-1940, Kudal Publishers, Madurai. 62 Basu, Aparna: 1974, The growth of education and political development in India 1898-1920, Oxford University Press, 232. 63 See Irschik, Eugene F.: 1969, Politics and Social Conict in South Indiathe Non-Brahman movement and Tamil Separatism 1916-1929, University of California Press; also Washbrook, D. A.: 1976, The Emergence of Provincial PolityThe Madras Presidency 1870-1920, Cambridge University Press 64 Bhattacharya, Sabyasachi: 1998, The Contested Terrain, Orient Longman, New Delhi, 6. 65 Tirumizi, S.A.I.: 1989, Scientic Associations in British India, NISTADS, New Delhi. 66 Habib, Irfan & Raina, Dhruv: 1989, Introduction of Scientic Rationality into India, a Study of Master Ramachandra-Urdu Journalist, Mathematician and Educationist, Annals of Science, 46, 597-610.
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of colonial ideology, these institutions provided a useful platform for intellectual exchange.67 Even as early as 1850s, educated literati of the Madras Presidency formed their own society for the production and publication of vernacular textbooks. Madras Upayukta Granda Karna Sabha (society for production of useful books) was established in 1847, by the former native students of the Madras University, for the specic purpose of production of vernacular textbooks. This society was active for few years, and many of their textbooks were also used by the government and government aided schools. Following the implementation of the new scheme of studies, that made compulsory for all schools receiving grant-in-aid from the government, to use only government approved textbooks, even many a vernacular missionary school resorted to use of government textbooks, rather than those published by the CVES.68 Meanwhile, in 1870s the Madras School Book Society found in 1820 was refurbished as Madras School Book and Vernacular Literature Society and was activated for the production of textbooks and vernacular literature. This society, though received the patronage of the government, had its own management committee, in which over a period of time natives came to dominate.69 Having got the institutional space and the required cultural competency through higher education, natives could by late nineteenth century lay claim to be acceptable professional expert to dispense and purvey scientic knowledge.70 The educated native expert could now legitimately unseat the missionary expert in production of textbooks in vernacular for school education. With the persistent demands made by natives as well as missionaries, though with diverse purposes, by the1880s, science was introduced into the elementary education as a subject of study. This necessitated textbooks in Tamil. Initially, textbooks, were more a handbooks for teachers in elementary schools than textbooks for direct use by the students. The textbooks were styled as nature readers consisting of object lessons, and were in the paradigm of Scientic Naturalism. Drawing upon the ideas of Huxley and Tyndall, these works eschew anthropomorphism, anthropocentrism, and teleological views of nature. These books emphasized empiricism and scientic rationality. The following are representative titles published71 at the turn of the century that exemplify
K.N.:1995, Culture, Ideology, Hegemony, Thulika, New Delhi, 88-89. laments that the sale of CVES books have fallen off considerably and investigating the reason for it, it was found that in schools receiving grant-in-aid, teachers prefer to use the government textbooks, and this trend was noticed even in the boarding schools of the missionaries. John, Murdoch: 1982, Education as a Missionary agency in IndiaA letter to the Church Missionary Society, Caleb Foster, Vepery, Madras. 69 The members of the managing committee of the society in 1895 were: Mr Abdur Razak Sahib, Mr Bilderbeek, Mrs Brander, Mr Krishnamachariyar, Mr Bangyya Chettiyar, Revt Sell, Mr Seshagiri Sastriyar, Mr Staart, Mr Tamotharam Pillai, Mr Velupillai, Mr P Vijayaranga Mudaliyar. 70 Note that most of the native authors were college professors, school headmasters, educational ofcials or other professionals. 71 See the following catalogues for a full list of textbooks produced and used during the late nineteenth century: Madras State Bibliography of books 1867-1900 Tamil Development and Research Council, Volumes published in 1961, 62, 63 and 64; Madras State Bibliography of books for the years 1911-15 and 1916-20 published respectively in the years 1974/77, and 1978; Classied catalogue of the Public Reference Library 1867-89, 1890-1900, 1901-10, 1911-15, 1916-20, 1921-25 published respectively in the years 1894, 1961, 1964, 1965, 1971.
68 Murdoch 67 Panickar,
Venkateswaran the process of replacement of natural philosophy by scientic naturalism. A. Periyanayagam, Bhouthiga Pustagam, 1903. Diwan Bahadur Krishnamachariyar, Nature reader, 1904.
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V. Koli Pillai, Elementary Pada RathinangalPrakurithi, Mulathava Rasayana Sasthrangal 1910. V.K. Narayanasamy Iyer, Iyarkai Porutpadam, Vol I and Vol II, 1910for elementary school teachers. A. Sivaprakasa Iyer, Tavara Sastra Vina Vidai, 1910. B. Narayanasami Iyer, Practical lessons in science and geography [Vol I & II] 1914/15. J. Viswanathiya, Tavara Nur Churukam for kindergarten and primary classes 1912. The Nature Readers72 by V Krishnamachariar, an active member of the SPCA (Societies for Prevention of Cruality to Animals), and also once the secretary of MSB & VLS, had the following lessons related to natural sciences: Morning light, the moon and stars, sunshine and shadows, homely talk about animals and deeds of kindness [our cow, the sheep, the stag, the horse and so on . . .], air around us, plants and owers, frog and duck, debate between the wind and the sun, seaside scenery, coconut tree, cart and cycle, the Palmyra tree, the Banyan tree, a sparrows nest and birds house. Samuel V Koil Pillai in preface to his book titled Civics, Nature Study and Elementary Science states that nature studyi.e., physics and chemistryshould be thought in such a way so as to use drawings and easily available equipment to demonstrate and by encouraging analytical approach by observation . . .73 The rst part of the book was on Civics. The second part was on Nature study and elementary science. The second part had the following chapters: Botany [consisting of 14 lessons] Zoology [Consisting of 24 lessons] Geology, Meteorology and Minerals [consisting of 34 lessons] the third part of the book was devoted to health and temperance. In his book titled Nature Study, V.K. Narayanasami Aiyar observes this subject has been only recently introduced into the curriculum of studies . . . and it is not likely that most elementary school teachers will be able at present to deal with the subject effectively and intelligently . . . It is mainly with a view to give a sort of guide to the elementary school teachers [that this book is published]74 This book supplies materials for giving a course of lessons on (1) plants and animal life (2) the surface of the earth (3) the simplest physical and chemical phenomena . . . for giving them an
72 Krishnamachariar, 73 Pillai,
v-vi. 74 Aiyar V. K. Narayanasami: 1910, Nature Study, I and II, Ananda Steam Press, Preface i-viii and 1-5.
V.: 1905, Nature Readers, Madras, Preface iii-v. Samuel V Koil: 1912, Civics, nature study and elementary science, Kalaratnakaram press, Madras,
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idea of climate, products etc., of their places and for enabling them to understand the important rule of health and sanitation. Subsequently, by 1920s the textbooks were cast in the modern disciplinary framework of Natural sciences, and are so arranged to contain sections on physics, chemistry and biology. A representative list of textbooks of this genre is: K. Dooraisamy Iyengar, Iyarkai Sasthram, 1920. This book contained lessons on physics, astronomy geology and so on. B. Narayanasamy Aiyer, Practical textbook for science and geography. This book has eight sections with 44 lessons. The sections are: Earth, Wind, Atmosphere, Sky, health and sanitation and so on. V. Krishnamachariyar, Iyarkai Porut Padam, 1920. R.C. Kasthuri Rangaiyar, Iyarkai Arputhangal, 1911.
Discipline specic textbooks, such as on botany [for illustration see R. Gopala Iyers Jeeva-Vargam]75 and on zoology commence to appear by 1920s. Also from the preface and other notes in these text books one can gather that these books were no longer guides and aids for teachers but were proper school textbooks (in the modern sense) to be used by students for self study and instruction. A detailed examination of the science textbooks in the nineteenth century divulges certain trends. Modern science, as the colonial government and the missionaries introduced it, located the achievements of sciences in European cultural ideals. In the colonial and missionary literature science was frequently and habitually referred to as European science or European knowledge.76 The natives too used the same idiom,77 but from the late nineteenth century subtle chances could be noticed, and more often, science was prexed with (naveenam) modern rather than European.78 These and other cultural codes inscribed in the modern science transmitted from the metropolis had to be removed or at least blunted. To receive modern science into his cosmos, the Tamil intellectual had to rst universalize science.79 It is with this intent that Sivachidampara Iyer argued:80
R. Gopala: 1924, Jeeva-Vargam, Part I, Mc Millan & Co., Madras. needs only to just glance to the education reports-often the reference is to European science or knowledge. See the writings of Murdoch for the illustration of missionaryio usage. 77 See for example the mast of the periodical Arivu Vilakam published since 1901, that the magazine will publish articles on Indian Philosophy, English (Western) philosophy, English natural sciences, religious truths . . . 78 As Panickar notes there was no articulated debate on the suitability of the use of the expression Western science, however one can hardly fail to notice the use of neutral expressions such as Natural science or modern (naveena) science in the popular Tamil publications from about the 1900s. 79 Universality of science was taken for granted by the Indian intellecutals. They did not face the question whether science was western or new as in the case of China. About 1640 there was a discussion in Peking as to whether the new science were primarily or primarily new. The Chinese objected to the word western used by the Jesuits in the titles of the scientic books which they wrote and translated. They insisted that it should be dropped in favour of new. Panickar, K. N.: 1995, Culture, Ideology, Hegemony, Thulika, New Delhi, 10,ff. 80 Iyer, Sivachidambara: 1906-07, Arivu [Knowledge], Sentamil, 5,, 330.
76 One 75 Iyer,
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Few psychologists maintain that every one is not endowed with rational capacity and that the rational capacity of a person depends upon his race. While this claim cannot be totally rejected the assertion can not be accepted. telegraphy, steam engines and such other wonder mechanisms evident the intellect of the inventor and not manifest their race or social status.
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Another intellectual, Ramaiyar81 argued that the discoveries are validated not by looking at the race or colour of the discoverer but by proof (presented by him) and further asserted that the [usage of] expressions such as Eastern science and Western science are to be rejected.82 Tamilar Nesan, a monthly science magazine launched by native intellectuals, argued, knowledge about means of earning a living may vary among people and depend upon their profession. All the rest of knowledge is common heritage of allfrom sweeper to a lord; [this knowledge] is essential for every one; and by striving every one can acquire this knowledge.83 Similar sentiments to universalize and legitimize modern science can be noticed in the writings of natives. Sashtra Vichitram or Wonders of Science was a popular book by M. Natesan.84 As the titleVichitramindicates, modern science is visualized as strange and queer sasthram (science). A glance at the various articles in the Vidhya Varthamani, a Tamil periodical devoted to education published since 1897 reveals the allusion to wonder, strangeness and oddity of the modern science. The allusion to the strangeness and oddity of modern science during this period is palpably obvious from the title of the Tamil periodical Vinodha Vichitra Patrikai, published since the 1900s to popularize science. Thus it can be argued that the natives reasoned the notion of modern as novelty something new. Naveenam, the expression used in Tamil to denote modern also implies that which is novel, new. The telegraph, steam engines and such other modern artifacts, and the emerging knowledge about Nature such as electricity, magnetism, and so on, fascinated the imagination of the natives as being novel and new.85 In the writings of the natives during the late nineteenth century, one can hardly fail to notice the use of words such as Vinodham and Vichitram (wonder, strange, queer, oddity) while referring to modern science. Through the metaphor of novelty the alien knowledge was legitimized in the native cosmos. That which belongs to the present is also suggested at by the expression naveenam. The usage such as Naveena Ulagu (Modern world) implies an understanding of here and now. This case is well illustrated by the writings of Ms M. Lakshmiyammal, a regular columnist in Tamilar Nesan. While translating the article The future of Economic and Scientic Thought a speech by Prof. Soddy, the article in Tamil was titled as Eni Pzhaikum Vazhi (The way to prevail henceforth)that is, the modern science
82 ibid 81 Ramaiyar:
1923-24, Civilization and Progress, Tamilar Nesan, VIII, 250-60.
1917-18, Namadhu Sangam, Tamilar Nesan (in Tamil), I, 1-9. M.: 1888, Sastra Vichitram or wonders of Science, VN Jubilee Press. The book contains science activities and simple elementary scientic principles, which were published as a serial in the periodical, Viveka Chinthamani. The book was reprinted in 1902 and again in 1913. The popularity of this book could be gauged from this. 85 Fascinated by the novel devices being invented, Vaidyanatha Iyer composed books on Submarine (2nd Ed 1914, 3rd Ed 1915), Airship, Airplane (1915), Telegraphy and so on.
84 Natesan,
83 Editorial:
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is construed and presented as knowledge required for the present age. In this article she argues (in addition to stating the views of Prof. Soddy) that material progress and moral progress are not necessarily antithetical. Recourse to modern knowledge is thus justied by the logic that modern science is the knowledge of today and hence one cannot ee from it. This temporal logicthat the modern ensue after the ancient is also effectively used to legitimize modern science without always necessarily needing to be contrite about traditional knowledge forms. For now the natives could argue that the past is superseded, besides the present is different from the past and hence each can have its own rational; but only that these rationales are different. The rhetoric of temporal logic also assisted the natives to overcome the colonial rhetorical demarcation between tradition and modern. The traditional knowledge can thus be safely located in the pastas ancient science, and the modern could be legitimately assimilated into the native cosmos. In this discursive strategy, the idea of progress and evolution came in handy for the native intellectuals to insulate traditional knowledge forms as well as legitimately assimilate modern science. Knowledge was now seen as an ever growing, evolving entity. Tamilar Nesan averred that knowledge is not unchanging . . . but evolves . . . and further it contended that . . . if we do not revitalize our traditional knowledge and at the same time assimilate modern knowledge, which at present is lacking among us, we would not be able to progress . . .86 V.K. Narayanaswamy Iyer elucidated that (our) ancestors held ve elements [Pancha Bhoothams]Prithvi (Earth), Appu (Water) Theyu (Fire) Vaayu (Air), Agasam (Sky) to be the basic elements and that all the created materials are composed of various combinations of these ve basic elements. However, chemists maintain that re and sky have no mass (weight) and also that re is an energy dependent on matter. Therefore we shall look at the chemistry of the other three Pancha BhoothamsAir, Water and Earth.87 This work is a typical exemplar of the genre that placed and presented the modern science in the frame work of the traditional categories. The chapters of this textbooks are classied as Air, Water, Earth, Fire (heat) and sky (about natural phenomena, weather and so on). Ekambaranathaiyar, in his article on poisonous snakes makes a remark on the traditional treatise Chitraduram, before embarking to detail the modern antidotes and remedies for snakebites. He adduces the Chitraduram as an ancient adage. Lakshmiyammal in the article on bacteriology renders the word (concept) immunity as Vaishnava Shakthi in Tamil. In his work Bhoogola Vasaga Pusthagam88 (Geography reader), S.K. Divasigamani, observed that knowledge comes by open-eyes and working hand and that . . . in the lessons on the sun, the moon and the stars, the facts are so explained as to enable the children to understand something of Hindu Panchangam, thus to bring them in close relation to the life they have to lead . . .. The textbook Vaana Sashtram (astronomy)89 by
87 Narayanaswamy 86 Nesan,
Tamilar: 1917-18, Namathu Sangam, I, 1-9. Iyer, V.K.: General Elementary Science (in Tamil), 4th ed., 157. 88 Divasigamani, S.K.: 1925, Bhoogola Vasaga Pusthagam, Macmillan & Co., Madras. 89 Iyer, Balakrishna: 1913, Vaana Sasthram, Hindu Educational Trading & Co., Kumbakonam. Note the
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Balakrishna Iyer elucidates the rational behind the Panchangam besides providing an introduction to modern astronomy. These are in striking contrast to the representation of the tradition in the hands of the colonialist, who paints it habitually as superstitious or at the least superuous beliefs indicative of the mental and moral depravation and decadence of the indigenous culture. In contrast, in the narratives of the natives, traditional knowledge form is neither deprecated nor eulogized, but is presented as knowledge of the past. The repertoire of colonial binaries,90 tradition/modernity; civilization/barbarism, is thus subdued by the natives in the narratives contained in the textbooks authored by them. The translation theory anticipates cultural refraction in the act of translation, and the way certain concepts of Duncans geography primer were re-rendered into Tamil is illuminating. While George Duncan in his original English version states that
Hindus hold the water of the Ganges sacred from Gangothri (Ganga Avatari) . . . however, particular portions (are) held more sacred than the rest, to which pilgrims resort from all parts of India to perform their oblations and to carry of the water to be used in future ceremonies . . .
However, J.M. Velupillai a native intellectual translating the same book into Tamil for use in the schools states that91
the following six rivers dry up in summer, nevertheless, (rivers) originating in Himalayas much ow will be there during the summer than in the other three seasons . . . among this there is no other river as useful as Ganges . . . (Ganges) ows through thickly populated regions . . . May be it is due to the immense benet accruing to the people, that Hindus hold (Ganges) as sacred water.
Thus it can be clearly seen that even translation was not just mechanically rendering what is in the source language into the target language, but an act of re-rendering, and a kind of cultural translation. The process of drift, invention, mediation, and at times even fabrication of links that did not exist before, form some of the repertoire of narratives adopted by the natives to render modern science as legitimate within the cultural cosmos. 5 Summary
Shapin92 suggests that diffusion of scientic knowledge across boundariesbetween countries, between town and country, between social classesshould be seen as political and a logistical problem. Transmission of knowledge between the colonial metropolis and the colonized province, especially in the context of colonialism in the nineteenth century Tamil Nadu provides an interesting location for study. If the instruction in modern science through vernaculars was not shown same enthusiasm as that of spread of European literature by the colonialists, the prevailing
name of the publishers. 90 Sing, Jyotsna: 1996, Colonial Narratives; Discoveries of India in the Languages of Colonialism, Routledge, 8. 91 Velupillai, J.M.: 1813, Bala Bhotha Boogola Sasthram, (Original by Duncan), CKS press, Madras, 10. 92 Shapin, Steven: 1982, Nibbling at the teats of Science; Edinburgh and the diffusion of science in the 1830s, in Ian Inkstar and Jack Morrell (Ed.), Metropolis and Province, science and British culture 17801850, Hutchinson, 151-178.
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Victorian ideology may have had a role, but the view that modern science is difcult to convey through the vernaculars was entrenched among the colonialist and the educated elite that even while addressing a memorial to the Viceroy for instruction on modern science through the medium of vernaculars, the British Indian association admitted that instruction of higher standard is not feasible in vernacular. Thus, during the rst half of the nineteenth century even while the instruction in European literature and science was proclaimed time and again instruction in science was scanty, that the Madras Mail, a daily English news paper lamented that: A man may become a Master of Arts in Madras, without knowing why apple falls to the ground, where rain comes from, what is the meaning of a burning stick, why he has to breath constantly, or what sun means by occasionally disappearing at inconvenient times.93 Nonetheless the topics on natural philosophy and natural history that was found in the textbooks were embodied with natural theology. Before the 1880s most of the titles of science textbooks published were in the idiom of Natural Philosophy and were primarily about basic principles of natural philosophy, astronomy, natural history and geography/geology and further as noted earlier, authored mostly by missionaries. The books on astronomy were contrasted with astrology and invariably contained arguments about the popular belief about the eclipses.94 The books on geology/geography argued the alleged evidences of the Christian Truths and were aficted with the Paleys Evidences.95 In the paradigm of natural philosophy during the early nineteenth century, the ideology of Europe as the ideal was being promoted, while traditional knowledge forms were being threatened and marginalised. As Julian Martin96 notes natural philosophy was never a socially disengaged, purely intellectual activity and natural philosophical pronouncements were believed to entail assertions about the political order. The colonial educational programme was seeking to hegemonise and dominate in cultural terms, the native society. The Macaulayan ourish of Indian in blood but European in taste was not an accidental slip, but the general urge. Thus the colonial subject was the ideal of education. The native intellectuals were not passive to these colonial maneuvers, but were actively engaged with the modern science being introduced into colonial Tamil society as part of the colonial subjectication, during the nineteenth century. There were a host of historical factors that contributed to the natives acquiring determining role as purveyors of knowledge in the Tamil society even under colonialism. In this process of reproduction of knowledge the native intellectuals were also producing knowledge forms suited to their cultural and political requireplea for physical sciences in our school and universities, Madras Mail, 4th March, 1874. Vernacular Education Society, Graganangal Yerpadum Kararnangal, 1880; challenges the traditional Hindu popular mythological belief on Rahu and Kethu being the cause of Eclipse and provides scientic explanation to the eclipse. Christian Vernacular Education Society, Pagola Sasthramum Jothista Sasthramum, 1891 aims to show belief in Jothista Sasthram leads to calamity. 95 Christian Vernacular Education Society, Yerimalaigalum Bhoomi Atherchiyum Sristipin Athisiyangalum, 1894; clearly alludes to the biblical creation and justication of Genesis based upon theory of geology as understood at that period. 96 Martin, Julian: 1991, Natural Philosophy and its public concerns, in Stephen Pumfrey etal., (Ed), in Science, Culture and Popular belief in Renaissance Europe, Manchester University Press, 116.
94 Christian 93 A
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ments. Due to the policy changes prompted by the Woods Despatch and the recommendations of the Hunter Commission, elementary education was spread in its reach in the Madras Presidency and was progressively placed under private management. While the native intellectuals were not able to completely recast the colonial policies in the education sector, they could exercise a signicant inuence. With native intellectuals acquiring education in English and modern science, the monopoly of missionaries in printing and publication was disputed. By occupying a preeminent position in the Madras School Book and Vernacular Literature Society, the natives sought an institutional base for challenging the missionary monopoly of production of vernacular textbooks. When textbook publication was liberalized (but with government retaining its power to scrutinize and approve), the natives published textbooks from their native printing houses as well. Thus, by the turn of the century, the native intellectuals almost displaced the missionaries from the textbook production scene. Gradually the native intellectuals entered into publication and printing. Native intellectuals, besides being educated in modern science were also the traditional elite of the society, and had to come to terms with the modern knowledge; but the modern knowledge was being transmitted by the colonial system with western cultural codes. Having got a determining role in the production of textbooks, the native intellectuals, through the process of translation and composition of vernacular textbooks, divested modern science of its western cultural meaning. In the process, modern science was not only neutralized but also domesticatedthat is, native intellectuals redeemed whatever was salvageable from the traditional knowledge systems. Eventually the natives endeavored rendering modern science into the vernacular languages and, in the process, recongured and domesticated modern science. The dislodging of the European missionaries was further hastened by the shift in knowledge form taking place in Europe. Scientic naturalism was fast replacing natural philosophy, and clergy were being restricted to ecclesiastical domains and their competency in scientic domain being questioned. At the turn of the century, the native intellectuals who had by then acquired the right professional higher education could claim to be more competent to compose science textbooks, rather than the missionaries or colonial ofcials. Through the process of translation, by establishing a series of transit points, the native intellectual was attempting a trans-cultural conceptual bridge building. The rhetorical repertoire of naveenam as novelty, here-and-now, of-the-present was deployed to mollify the colonial binary of the traditional and modern. In the age of nationalism when science came to be the measure of progress achieved by the nation, by conjuring up a civilization and by salvaging parts of the past, the native intellectuals waged a symbolic war. This study also conrms the conception put forth by Dhruv Raina that the role of the history of science, in purveying of science, was one of essentially lamenting the loss of golden past and a battle-cry for a resurgent India. 97
97 Raina, Dhruv: 2000, Lamenting the Past, Anticipating the future: A chronology of popular science writing in India (1850-1914), in Narender K Shegal etal., (Ed), Uncharted TerrainEssays on Science Popularisation in Pre-independence India, Vigyan Prasar, New Delhi.
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Thus, through the process of science textbooks, the native Tamil intellectuals were inventing a space for articulating a counter colonial perspective during the nineteenth century. The reception of the modern science by the natives was not passive and once they obtained space for inscribing their ideology in the textbook, they utilized the opportunity. However, this study clearly shows that the reaction of the native to reject modern science as unsuited to our culture or take a revivalist position were rare during the nineteenth century. In conclusion, following, Roger Cooter and Stephen Pumfery scientists, science communicators and audiences dene their relationship to something called science and . . . that (the) relationship is embedded in the particularities of their different culture and ideologies,98 it is contented that, as textbooks have a crucial role in shaping the dogmas of the period, aside from seeing the efforts of the native intellectuals as reproduction of modern science, it should also be viewed as production of ideology. 99
98 Cooter, Roger & Pumfrey, Stephen: 1994, Separate spheres and public places; reections on the History of science popularization and science in popular culture, History of Science, XXXII, 237-67. 99 Ideology in the sense of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence.
Index
a priori, 118 A.F. Chalmers, 58 A.J. Ayer, 76 A.K. Biswas, 40 A.P. Shukla, 41, 42 A. France, 48 A. J. Harrison, 204 AAAS, 112, 317 abiotic, 311 abstract concepts, 316 concepts and operations, 303 cosmological picture, 178 concepts, 294 theories, 316 abstraction, 283 Abul Fazl, 259 academic chemist, 204 academic historians, 199 acceleration, 289 acid-base theories, 280 acidic, 198 acidic principle, 198 Adam Schall, 236 Adas, 54 Advaita Vedanta, 258 African-American Baseline Essays, 53 Afrocentrism, 116 ahistorically, 198 AI, 98 al Farabi, 241 al Ghazal, 257 al Haitham, 241 al Hajjaj, 241 al Kind, 241 al-Hayatham, 238 Ala Samarapungavan, 167 Alan Sokal, 85, 116 Alessandro Volta, 333 Alexander, 243 Alexandrian school, 180 Algebra, 262 algebra, 280 alkaline earths, 282 Almagest, 243 alphabet-numeral system of notation, 229 Alternative frameworks in electricity, 289 alternative conceptions, 292
frameworks, 289, 291, 296 alternative framework origin, 292 American Indian Science and Engineering Society, 53 American Universities, 39 Amitabh Ghosh, 40 Analytical Sciences, 312 analytical arguments, 207 Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, 42 anatomy, 309 ancient philosophies, 305 Anderson, 4 Andrew Ross, 116 antagonism, 115 antagonists, 199 Antanio Favaro, 175 anthropology, 167 anti-Aristotelian way, 178 anti-dogmatism, 331 anti-evolutionism, 115 anti-foundationalist, 104 anti-intellectualism, 21, 86 anti-racist, 211 anti-racist mathematics, 211 anti-realism, 71 anti-realist, 58 anti-reductionism, 62 anti-science, 21, 116 antiscientic views, 5 Antoine Lavoisier, 198 Apastamba, 225 Apollonius, 214, 243 Arab and European mathematics, 229 Arab mathematics, 214 Archimedes, 175, 179, 214, 242 areas of physics, 204 Aristotelian, 163, 181 causality, 48 conceptual scheme, 175 dynamics, 29 logic, 257 Scholasticism, 46 view, 175 world-view, 176, 177 Aristotelian science, 185 Aristotelianism, 46
Aristotle, 175, 178, 192, 242, 243, 249, 250, 257, 261, 267 thesis, 183 Arithmetic, 262 arithmetic, 209 Arnauld, 76 Aron, 291, 295 Arthur Kornberg, 113 articial intelligence, 98 Aryabhata, 221, 226, 251 Aryabhatiya, 221, 226, 230 Aryabhatiyabhasya, 231 Ashmore, 106 Asian and Afro-Carribbean origins, 211 ASPEN 1991, 289 astrology, 105 Astronomical, 47 Astronomy, 46 astronomy, 46, 169, 228, 286 Atmospheric Science, 303 atomic nature of matter, 314 structure, 280 theory of structure, 281 atomic physics, 43 atomic structure, 281 Atomism, 46 Atomists, 179 atoms, 199, 206, 279, 284, 334 Augustine, 245, 258 Augustus De Morgan, 237 authoritarian, 135, 331 authoritarianism, 331 autonomy view, 97 Avogadros hypothesis, 281 axiom, 255, 266 axiomatic approach, 262 method, 253, 262, 263, 266, 268, 269 axiomatico-deductive, 262 axiomatization, 261, 268 Axioms, 253 axioms, 255, 259 Ayurveda, 305 BAAS, 209 Babylonians, 253 Bacon, 48 Baconian empiricism, 47 Baghdad, 213 balance of forces, 103 Barber, 54 Barnes, 77, 95 Basalla, 54 Baudhayana Sulbasutras, 252
Baudhyana, 225 Baudrillard, 104 Beardsley, 4 beginning of science, 305 behaviour atoms, 202 ions, 202 molecules, 202 Behaviourism, 97 behaviourism, 97, 98 psychology, 97 behaviourists, 97 Behrens, 54 beliefs, 312 Benjamin Peirce, 268 Benoit Mendelbrot, 126 Benseghir and Closset, 291 Berkeley, 71, 76 Berkeleyan idealism, 72 Berlin, 54 museum, 216 Bernal, 246 Bertrand Russell, 5, 23 Bhaskara-I, 221, 226 Bijaganita, 222 biochemistry, 282 Biogas, 314 biological condition, 202 science, 309 Biology, 303, 312 biology, 204, 286, 311 Biosphere, 312 biotic factors, 311 Birkhoff, 245, 250 Birkhoff s axioms, 255 Bishop, 112, 115 Bishop Auerilus, 244 Black-Body radiation, 31 Blacks in Science: Ancient and Modern, 53 Bloor, 77, 89, 91, 9498, 103 Bloor & Barnes, 55 Bolyai, 266 bonding, 279 Boorse, 95 Boster & Johnson, 54 botany, 286 Bown, 4 Boyle, 206 Boyles law, 135, 332 breast-feeding, 304 Brethren of sincerity, 48 Brown, 293 Browne, 116 Bruno Latour, 116
Bucky ball, 208 Bucky balls, 196 Buddhist, 259 and Jaina traditions, 255 Burtt, 61, 119 Byzantium, 241 C.P. Snows, 196 Cairo, 213 calculus, 225 algorithms, 225 differential,, 238 calendars, 312, 313 Caliph al-Mamun, 241 Caliph al-Mansur, 241 caloric thermodynamics, 29 carbon chemistry, 282 rings, 282 Cardinal Bellarmine, 94 Cardona, 239 careers science, 323 science and technology, 326 Carr, 42 Cartesian, 76 purpose, 268 approach, 269 dualism, 72 epistemology, 72 model, 72 split, 47 Case Study, 163 categorical thinking, 184 view, 178 cattle and birds, 314 causal view, 96 causality, 61, 96 Aristotelian, 48 order, 61 causation, 61 Cavalieri, 239 celebration of science, 111, 117 celestial bodies, 304 cell structure, 310 central science, 204 centrality of science, 125 change, 165 characteristics, 304 charge/mass ratios, 281 Charles Darwin, 54 Charles Eliot Norton, 41 Charles Whish, 226
CHEM Study, 280285 study, 203 Study program, 279 Study Story, 281 CHEM Study, 279, 281, 282 Chemical Education, 200 synthesis, 207, 208 chemical analysis, 209 bonding, 280, 281 composites, 206 compounds, 281 concept, 205, 207 constituent, 198 contexts, 201 curriculum, 209 education, 196, 200, 201, 203, 205, 207 element, 206 elements, 206 equilibrium, 206 facts, 204 industry, 202 knowledge, 202, 287 phenomena, 205 philosophers, 206 philosophy, 206 processes, 280 reactions, 280 species, 205 substance, 198 synthesis, 208 chemical education aim, 200 Chemical Education Material study, 279 chemical knowledge applications, 202 Chemistry, 285, 303, 312 chemistry, 44, 46, 200, 202204, 206, 207, 279, 280, 282, 287, 311, 335 aims, 204 citizens, 201 courses, 203, 205 educators, 201 environment, 282 instruction, 203 laboratory, 283 learners, 203 physics, 206 solar system, 282 textbook, 284 chemists, 201, 203, 206, 207 chemists and scholars, 204 Chiappetta, 332
Chiappetta et al., 319 child psychologist, 286 childrens theories, 167 China, 213 Chinese, 253 Chinese encyclopaedia, 42 Chinese science, 61 Chiu Chang Suan Shu, 237 Chomsky, 97, 104, 106 Chou Pei, 218 Christian rationalists, 260 Christian science, 62 circuit diagram, 291 cis-trans isomerism, 281 citizen, 209 clashing current model, 289, 290 classical approach of teaching, 296 classical Greek, 214 classical Greek mathematics, 214 classical Greek tradition, 242 classical view of realism, 117 classication, 308, 316 classication and manipulation, 307 classication and taxonomy, 286 classication of forms of life, 303 classication system, 286 classroom teaching, 211 Claudius Ptolemy, 243, 244 Clement, 289, 293 Cleopatra, 243 clinical interview, 167 Clothing, 312 CMS, 302307, 309, 312, 314317 curricula, 306 education, 315 CMS curricula, 307, 309 Cobern, 60, 61 Cobern & Aikenhead, 118 Cobern, Gibson & Underwood, 124 Cognitive Science, 133, 163 science, 137, 165 cognitive conicts, 175 developmental research, 165 entity, 159 psychologists, 178 revolution, 98 science, 98 structures, 76, 328 turn, 154 Cognitive-historical, 164 cognitive-historical, 137 cognitively, 57
Cohen, Eylon and Ganniel, 290 Colebrooke, 237 Collingwood, 61 Collins, 21, 86, 98, 99 colloquial positivism, 117 colonial science, 209 common laboratory procedures, 202 common domestic equipment, 315 Common Mans Science, 302, 303, 315, 316 common notions, 264 community of science, 62 community- and context-specic, 302 community-level, 307 compound, 198, 206, 208 compound nature, 198 compound nature of water, 198 compounds, 204, 206 comprehension, 327 computer science, 41 concept of resistors, 290 charge, 295 common mans science, 316 convergence, 232 current, 291, 296 formation, 309 fundamental, 206 limit, 237 map, 125 proof, 220 conception of constructivism, 72 conception of current, 295 conceptions alternative, 292 conceptions of knowledge, 72 concepts, 198, 201, 206, 207, 301, 317, 324, 332 abstract, 316 and principles of science, 317 chemistry, 195 science, 165, 196 conceptual learning, 208 structures, 166 Conceptual change, 166 conceptual change, 165167, 173, 175, 289, 293 295 approach, 165 conditions for, 292 conceptual development, 173 conceptual scheme Aristotelian, 175 modern, 175 conceptual space, 159
conceptual systems, 283 conceptual understanding of the periodic table, 287 conceptualizations of science, 126 conceptually networked, 204 condence and skill, 202 conformation, 205 congruence, 259 Congruence Axiom, 253 conjectures and refutations, 24 connectionist model, 159 conservation of energy, 122 constant current, 290 Constituents of foodstuffs, 310 constraints, 172 construction hypotheses, 202 constructive empiricism, 71, 94 constructivism, 71, 77, 80 Kantian,, 72 social, 21, 8587, 91, 94, 95, 9799, 106, 117 varieties, 71 constructivist, 21, 85, 104106 programme, 96 teaching methods, 13 constructivists, 100 content of science text, 319 context discovery, 193 contextualised, 331 contextualist, 104 continuum hypothesis, 91 conventional curricula, 312 Conventional science, 303 conventional sciences, 302, 306, 310, 316, 317 conventionally, 302 convergence proof, 258 convergent thinking, 24 Coomaraswamy, 42 Copernican Revolution, 47 Copernican revolution, 140 Copernicus, 100 copper, 192 Cordoba, 213 corporeal nature of the media, 185 Corsiglia & Snively, 56 Cosmology, 303 Costa, 113 counter-inductive, 176 counter-intuitive, 176, 196, 251 course chemistry, 201, 203 courses chemistry for citizens, 204 cramming, 317
Crease, 112 creation science, 52 creative imagination, 202 critical assessment, 324 pedagogy, 116 unbiased observation, 201 critical-logical-analytical thinking, 10 crops, 314 cross-cultural research, 167 studies, 289 CRT tubes, 281 crtical thingking skills, 13 crystallization, 285 cultural capital, 114 chauvinism, 63 enterprise, 196 hegemony science, 63 imperialism, 52 culture expansionist, 54 curricula, 302, 309 CMS, 306 reforms, 203 science, technology and society, 13 science-technology-society, 123 curriculum, 40, 242, 280, 286 construction, 289 educational implications, 106 hidden, 319 Czeslaw Milosz, 41 D.C. Phillips, 86 D. Mazlish, 48 Dark Ages, 212 Darwin, 47, 60 theory of organic evolution, 332 theory, 98 theory of evolution, 138 David Hume, 28, 219 David W. Ridgway, 281 day and night cycle, 167 day/night cycle, 167, 171 De Caelo, 185 De Motu, 175, 176 De Revolutionibus, 71 Dea Caelestis, 244 deconstruction science, 121 deconstructionist, 103 affectation, 103 Dedekind, 248
deduction, 267 reasoning, 330 deductive method of proof, 251 reasoning, 176, 322, 334 denition, 266 science, 62 DeLoria, 53 demonstrations, 293 denser media, 192 Densmore, 21 Derek Hodson, 286 derivation, 267 derivations, 301 Derrida, 102 Derridadaism, 103 Descartes, 48 Descartes, 72 descriptive chemistry, 280, 282 design of experiments, 202 Desmond & Moore, 60 development European thought, 48 mathematics, 213 science, 61, 279, 331 science concepts, 165 scientic skills, 307 developmental level, 323, 327 dialectic, 138 differential calculus, 238 Diophantus, 214 disc earth, 168 discourse science, 63 discovery, 175, 176 electron, 284 epistemic, 176 Greek learning, 213 Disease, 310 disease, 317 disequilibrium, 179 diSessa, 165 divergent thinking, 24 Dmitri Mendeleev, 284 DNA, 114 extraction, 114 model, 332 synthesis enzyme, 113 Doberiner, 283 dogma, 48 dogmas, 317 dogmatic, 331 domain, 58 empirical, 253
physical, 253 thought, 62 domains knowledge, 63 domains of knowledge, 117 dominant discourse of science, 63 Drabkin, 175 Driver, 5860, 289 Driver and Easley, 165, 289 Driver and Oldham, 289, 295 Drori, 115 Drosophila, 113 drugs, 204 drycell, 333 dual earth, 168 dualism Cartesian,, 72 Duit, 294 Durant, 112 Durkheim, 88, 89 Durkheimian view, 96 Duschl, 59, 118 dynamics, 180 Aristotelian, 29 Dyson, 112 E.H. Carr, 195 eclipse, 313 eclipses, 313 ecological systems, 122 Edgar Jenkins, 111 Edinburgh Strong Programme, 87 education, 165, 255, 260 and research, 316 CMS, 315 health, 310 higher stages, 316 liberal, 10 technical, 10 educational implications for the curriculum, 106 educationally backward, 317 Edward Jenner, 333 Egyptians, 253 Einstein, 176 Einstelling effect, 292 Eleaticiam, 46 electric current, 289, 291 electrical engineering programme, 291 nature of atoms, 281 electricity, 262, 289, 295, 296, 308 alternative frameworks, 289 electrokinetics, 291 electromagnetic theory, 44
electron exclusion principle, 282 orbital hybridization, 281 orbitals, 279, 286 structures, 280 electronic conguration, 284 orbitals, 284 structure, 279 structures, 280 electrostatics, 291, 306 circuits, 291 element, 204, 206 and a compound, 206 element, mixture and compound, 206 elementary particles, 305 Elements, 241244, 257262 Arabic-Islamic tradition, 242 elements, 280 empirical consistency, 59 explanation, 96 facts, 259 inputs, 193 issue, 195 knowledge, 253 naturalistic science, 93 nature of science, 322, 331, 334 observations, 193, 207 question, 200 tests, 201 empirical-experimental inquiry, 122 empiricism, 72 empiricist, 28 framework, 165, 170 views, 25 empiricity, 325 energy, 308, 312 energy and power, 314 enlightening, 301 Enneads, 258 environment, 306, 308, 309, 311, 316 laboratory, 208 environmental science, 13, 311 episodic conceptualisation, 292 epistemic nature, 176 discovery, 176 epistemic strength discovery, 176 epistemological, 43, 52, 65 egalitarianism, 106 hegemony, 52 perspectives, 55 pinnacle, 63
pluralism, 65, 66 position, 117 presuppositions, 170 pyramid, 64, 118, 122 reconstruction, 175 relativists, 51 epistemology, 11, 55, 75, 77, 111, 118, 156 Cartesian, 72 naturalization, 156 science, 156 Eratosthenes, 242 Eric Hoffer, 118 Ernst von Glasersfeld, 71 Escherichia coli, 113 essentialism, 178 estimating, 312 ethical, 41 ethnic minority populations, 211 ethnomathematics, 218, 238 ethnomethodology of science, 100 ethnoscience, 54, 106 Euclid, 175, 214, 242246, 261, 262, 265 historicity, 243 the geometer, 242 Euclidean geometry, 222, 241, 246, 251, 252, 255, 259, 262 Eudemus, 243 Eudoxus, 242, 243 Eurocentric trajectory, 213 Eurocentrism, 214 European chemical philosophers, 206 mathematics, 212 Evolution theory of, 53 evolution, 118 East and West Arab numerals, 214 number system, 214 evolutionary biologists, 118 examples and analogies, 293 exclusion by denition, 214 exclusivity of science, 62 existence of atom, 281 experimental science, 282 experimentalist, 147 experimentation, 307, 308, 316, 331 experiments, 312 explanations of the seasons, 167 of the weather, 167 extracted DNA, 113 extremist social constructivism, 117 Eylon and Linn, 289, 291 face numerals, 216, 217
facts, 324, 332 factual, 167 factual question, 167 falasifa, 257 fallibilism, 77 fallibility of science, 14 falsiability Popperian,, 72 Falsicationism, 46 Faraday, 126 Farrington, 24 feminist science, 13 fetal tissue research, 126 gure of 8 knots, 216 Fihrist, 241, 242 Finneran, 117 First Nations science, 62 ve elements, 305 attened sphere, 168 folk knowledge, 305 science, 302, 304, 316 food items, 304 Foodstuffs, 312 force, 181, 289, 303 balance, 103 formal axiomatics, 259 denitions, 309 logic, 154 mathematics, 258 metric geometry, 259 synthetic geometry, 259 formalism, 316 formalistic approach, 255 foundations geometry, 246 mathematics, 261 modern thought, 104 four elements, 177 Four Western Imperatives, 118 fourth and fth-row transition metals, 282 fractal geometry, 126 framework theory, 166, 170 Francis Crick, 119 Frederick Grinnell, 58 Fredric Jameson, 116 Freeman Dyson, 116 Freud, 47 Freyberg, 289 Fuller, 52 function maxima, 237 minima, 237 fundamental
concepts in chemistry, 206 principles, 202 G.E.R. Lloyd, 221 Galilean Platonism, 47 world-view, 177 Galileo, 48, 175, 199 experiments with pendulum, 199 Gardner, 98 Gargi, 217 Garrard & Wegierski, 118 Garrard and Wegierski, 64 gas laws, 280 gases, 198 Gaskell, 111 Gauss, 43 Ge Yuan Mi Lu Jie Fa, 237 gedanken, 185 Geertz, 61 general education, 301, 306, 316, 317 principles, 306, 316 principles of science, 303 public, 301 science, 306 science curricula, 316 science education, 200, 301, 306, 307, 316 theories of science, 303 general aim of chemistry, 200 general education, 200 generalization, 302 generalization and abstraction, 286 generative justication, 164 generative question, 167 genetic arrangements and chromosomal structures, 113 geocentric, 173, 303, 304 geocentric phenomenological theory, 303 geography, 122, 209 geology, 286 geometric equality, 243 Geometry, 262 geometry, 207, 241, 243, 250, 257259, 267 foundations, 246 teach, 260 traditional, 254, 259 geometry of the sulbasutra-s, 259 Georg Cantor, 91 George Bernard Shaw, 39 George Boole, 238 George Wald, 43 Gernet, 61 Gibson, 51 Gieryn, 58
Gilbert and Watts, 289 Gillespie, 203, 204 Gillispie, 204 Gilmer, 117 Giroux & McLaren, 116 gnomon, 265 goals of courses in chemistry, 203 gold, 192 good pedagogy, 285 good science, 199, 285 Goodstein, 115 Gottfried and Kyle, 319 Grant, Sleeter, & Anderson, 116 gravity concept, 168 Greek atomists, 177 thought, 46 Greeks, 253 Gregorian, 312 Gregorian and Saka, 313 Gregory, 225 Gregory series, 228 Gross, 116, 119 Gross & Levitt, 5, 112 Gross and Levitt, 99 Grove, 5 growth science, 200, 201 growth of science, 201 Guba & Lincoln, 59 Gunther Stent, 113 Guthrie, 24 Gutwill, 291 Gwalior system representing numbers, 214 Haji Khalfa records, 241 Haldane, 126 Halliday and Resnick, 294 halogens, 282 Hamlet, 42 Hans Jonas, 39 Harding, 118 Hardison, 122 Harun ar-Rashid, 241 Haruni, 241 Hashweh, 289, 292, 294 Hawking & Penrose, 61, 117 health, 306, 309, 316 education, 310 science, 309 healthy foods, 307 habits, 307, 316 heat, 289
Heath, 243 Hegel, 88, 98 hegemony, 51, 118 Heidegger, 64, 104, 106, 118 Heilbron, 4 Heisenberg, 42, 43 heliocentric, 173, 303 theory, 42, 303 hellenistic astronomy, 48 Persian traditions, 214 science, 46 traditions, 214 world, 213 Helm, Hugh and Novak, 165 Helmholtz, 249 Hendrick Hart, 119 Henry, 77 Henry Giroux, 116 hermeneutic circle, 121 interpretation, 119 hermeneutical problem, 29 hermeneutics, 120 Hermotimus, 242 Heron, 242, 243 Hertz, 39 Hesse, 58 hidden curriculum, 319 higher mathematics, 268 stages, 316 Hijri, 313 Hilbert, 245, 246, 258 Hindu science, 106 society, 42 historian, 85 geometry, 243 mathematics, 213 science, 41, 200 historical, 41, 43, 58 evolution of institutions of science, 47 aspects of science, 41 continuity, 201 development of an idea, 333 episodes, 197 relativism, 99 historicity Euclid, 243 histories geometry, 242 mathematics, 217 historiography, 53, 58
history, 42, 44, 122, 195, 211, 241 and epistemology of science, 13 and philosophy of mathematics, 261 and philosophy of science, 4, 6, 15, 21, 32, 40, 43, 44, 72, 176, 195, 197, 199, 200, 261 of chemical education, 205 of chemical synthesis, 209 of chemistry, 200, 204207 of development of science, 331 of Indian mathematics, 239 of mankind, 302 of science, 9, 23, 3941, 43, 46, 96, 175, 195, 199, 200, 204, 207, 246, 283, 330 of science in India, 40 of scientic ideas, 40, 41, 46, 47 of synthesis of chemical compounds, 208 what, 42, 195 Hodson, 55 Holiday, 319 Holliday, 319 Holliday and Whittacker, 319 hollow sphere, 168 Holton, 5, 112, 115, 117 homeostasis, 122 Horton, 61 Horwood, 60 hotchpotch geometry, 253 Housing, 312 HPS, 21 and science education, 6, 11 in teacher education, 15 human anatomy, 310 genome project, 126 humanistic issues, 135 studies, 135 Humes racist views, 219 hunger, 317 Hunter Havelin Adams, 53 hydrostatics, 193 Hypatia, 217, 244 hypotheses, 332 construction, 202 hypothesis, 209 hypothetico-deductive method, 117, 303 mode of reasoning, 209 systems, 306, 316 Ian Hacking, 207 Ibid, 192 Ibn Sna, 241 ideal chemical experiment, 199
idealism, 77, 93 and relativism, 92 Berkeleyan,, 72 Idealists, 61 Idealists view, 61 idealize, 199 idealized systems, 193 ideas of chemical synthesis, 208 ideology for science education, 201 ignorant of history, 42 IIT Kanpur, 3941 IIT, Bombay, 261 imagination, 176 Immanuel Kant, 28 imperative economic, 118 naturalism, 118 scientistic, 118 technocratic, 118 Imperial Board of Astronomy, 237 implications curriculum, 106 for science education, 85 of research ndings, 289 of social constructivism, 103 Inarticulate Science, 111 Inca Quipu, 216 incommensurability, 72 Kuhnian, 72 Incompleteness theorem, 90 incorporeal, 183 India, 213 history of science, 40 industrial and social progress, 39 Indian astronomy, 228 Brahmi system, 214 geometry, 255 mathematics, 220222, 226, 228, 230, 239 numerals, 214 science, 47, 55 indigenous culture, 315 knowledge, 63 individual phenomena, 202 individualistic, 296 Indo-American programme, 39 Indo-Arab numerals, 214 induction, 176 inductive generalizations, 178 method, 25 reasoning, 176, 322, 334 inductively, 176 inductivism, 46, 296
inductivist, 28, 178 industrial, 314 and social progress in India, 39 chemist, 204 inertia, 134, 181 innite cardinal numbers, 91 innite series, 225, 231 inner observation, 310 innocent of philosophy, 42 innovation, 315 inquiry learning, 13 inscriptionalist, 104 instruction, 165, 170 instructional strategies, 319 instrumental causation, 61 knowledge, 61 instrumentalism, 71, 72, 94 interaction of science with society, 331 interaction of science, technology and society, 321, 325, 330 interdisciplinary nature of chemistry, 203 science curricula, 123 interest science, 122, 123, 202 science and chemistry, 203 interest in chemistry, 202 International History, Philosophy and Science Teaching Group, 6 introduction zero, 214 intuitive framework theory, 168 knowledge of electrostatics, 291 notion of equality, 261 physical idea, 259 physics, 166 scientic views, 168 theories, 170 investigative nature of science, 320, 322324, 328, 331 processes, 331 Ionian Nature-philosophy, 46 irrational numbers, 248 theories, 95 irrationality, 96, 115 Ishale at-Kindi, 48 Ishango bone, 215 Islamic rationalists, 257, 260 science, 46, 62, 106 thinkers, 242
isomorphism, 284 issue of synthesis, 204 Issues in Science and Technology, 116 Ivan Sertima, 116 Ivan Van Sertima, 53 J.B. Cohen, 41 J.D. Novak, 165 J.F. Daniel, 333 J. de Fontaney, 236 Jacob Bronowski, 22 Jaina, 259 James Conant, 9 James Gregory, 228 James Rutherford, 9 Jamshid al-Kashi, 235 Japanese temple geometry, 241 Jean Piaget, 286 Jegede and Okebukola, 319 Jenkins, 112 Jerome, 245 John Cairns, 113 John Fauvel, 219 John McDowell, 77 John Polkinghorne, 127 Johnson, 59 Jon D. Miller, 5 Joseph Novak, 13 Joseph Priestley, 198 Judson, 114 Jund-i-Shapur, 213 Justinian, 245 Jyesthadeva, 226228 K.S. Gandhi, 41 K.V. Sarma, 228 K. Tobin, 78 Kant, 41, 71, 250, 254, 261 Kantian, 93 Kantian constructivism, 72 Kapalli, 327 Karanapaddati, 226 Karl Mannheim, 89 Karl Marx, 219 Karl Popper, 113 katapayadi, 229 Katyayana, 225 Kawagley, 52, 53, 55, 56, 60, 63 Kay, 230 Keplers Harmony of the World, 126 Kerala mathematics, 226, 228, 235, 238 school, 225, 228, 230 Kevin Finneran, 116 Kevles, 115
key concepts, 306 khichdi geometry, 253 kinematics, 164, 180 kinetic molecular theory of gases, 281 kinetic theory, 204, 280 knots, 216 knowledge construction, 60 indigenous, 5153 instrumental, 61 nature, 89 procedural, 292 representation, 159 science, 171, 320322, 327, 331 scientic, 154 social interaction, 331 society, 89 validity, 106 Kosambi, 42 Kosslyn, 97 Kriyakramakari, 226, 231 Kronberg Castle, 42 Kuhn, 24, 41 Kuhnian incommensurability, 72 laboratory, 207 common procedures, 202 experimentation, 280 Ladri` re, 54 e Lakatos, 96 Lake Edward, 215 language, 166 Laplacian certainty, 117 Larry Laudan, 86 lateral thinking, 24 Latour, 99102 Latour and Woolgar, 99, 102104 Laudan, 21, 58, 96 Laudan and Stove, 99 Lavoisier, 198, 199, 279 Lavoisiers four experiments, 198 law free fall, 175 inertia, 176 nature, 208 periodicity, 284 Layton, 112, 115 Leach, 58 lead, 192 learning chemistry, 205 science, 165, 166, 171, 320, 328 skills, 331 teaching chemistry, 203 through science, 203
Lebesgue measure, 251 Lechlanche, 333 Lederman, 319 Lehman, 103 Leibnitzian Mathesis Universalis, 47 Leibniz, 225 levels abstraction, 303 phenomenology, 303 Levitt, 116, 119 Lewenstein, 111 Library Alexandria, 243 Library of Alexandria, 244 light, 289 particle/wave, 53 liking for science, 201 limitations of science, 203 limited, 302 Linden, 55 linguistic interference, 292 turn, 154 linking of the textual content, 327 links with physics and biology, 204 Linn, 319 Linus Pauling, 113 Liu Hui, 237 Lobachevskii, 266 local units, 312 Locke, 76, 77 logic, 99, 267 and reason, 48 and science education, 10 Aristotelian, 257 formal, 154 mathematics, 261 logical deduction, 255 inconsistency, 173 modality, 193 positivistic, 154 logical positivism, 117 lunar, 313 calendar, 215 luni-solar, 313 Lynda Birke, 115 Lynn White, 115 Lyotard, 55 M.D. Srinivas, 222 M.I.T., 39 M. Chastrette and C. N. R. Rao, 203 M. J. Frazer, 200 Macauley, 255
Macquare, 206 Madhava, 226, 227 Madhava-Gregory series, 228 Madhava-Leibniz, 231 Madhava-Leibniz series, 229 Madras Literary Society, 226 magic square, 218 Magnetism, 262 mahabhutas, 305 Malebranche, 76, 77 Mamuni, 241 manipulation, 308, 316 Mannheim, 95 Maori science, 62 map the students conception, 289 Marshak, 215 Martin Eger, 112 Martin Heidegger, 117 Martin Kline, 200 Marx, 47, 88 Marxist, 42 Mary Boole, 238 materialism, 135 mathematical artefact, 215 knowledge, 212 philosophy, 268 proof, 253, 255 reasoning, 193 mathematics, 46, 212, 245, 247, 253, 255, 258, 261, 266268, 281, 283, 335 Africa, 212, 213, 215 Arab, 214 curriculum, 223 development, 213 devlopment, 47 education, 71 European and Arab, 229 higher, 268 Indian, 222, 226, 239 Kerala, 226, 228, 235, 238 logic, 261 modern, 251 pedagogy, 238 teachers, 211 mathemtics Arab, 214 Matteo Ricci, 236, 239 matter atomic nature, 314 Matthews, 52, 60 Mauss, 89 Max Delbr ck, 113 o Max Planck, 31, 282 Maxwell, 301
Mayan civilisation, 216 Mayer, 3 Mazlish, 43 McDermott and Shaffer, 289291 McKinley, 55 measurements, 312 mechanical composites, 206 particles, 206 philosophy, 206 Mechanics, 46 mechanics, 169, 262, 281 mechanistic world picture, 135 media, 192 medicine, 46 medium quicksilver, 192 zero density, 192 Mendel, 334 Mendeleev, 283287 chemical ideas, 287 experimental approach, 286 mensuration, 306, 309, 312, 316 mental models, 166, 168, 171 models of the earth, 168 prodigies, 219 representation, 168 training, 209 Mercator, 225 Merton, 95, 105 Mertonian norms, 105 social attributes, 205 meta-scientic, 21 metaconceptual awareness, 167 metamathematical denition, 255 metamathematical notion of proof, 259 metaphysical, 61, 82, 93, 134, 255 domain, 255 realism, 75, 92 metaphysicians, 177 metaphysics, 11, 32, 64, 72, 75, 111, 117, 118, 127, 254 meteorology, 286 method chemical analysis, 209 proof, 259 science, 197, 203, 305 methodological, 43 methodology and epistemology of science, 9 Metioui, 291 metric, 255 metric and synthetic approaches, 254 metric and synthetic geometry, 254
metric approach, 258 metric geometry, 259 metric, synthetic, or traditional, 259 Michael Matthews, 199, 200 Michael Ruse, 118 Michel Foucault, 42 Michelson-Morley experiment, 42 Micro-organisms, 312 microwave and infrared spectroscopy, 281 Middle Ages, 46 Mill, 261 Millar, 58 Miller, 319 Ming Antu, 237 Ministry of Education, 40 misconceptions, 165, 166, 171, 289, 291 about science, 133 mixture, 206 mixture and a compound, 206 mixtures, 206 model Cognitive Science, 137 statics, 180 models, 332 current, 289 modern academic chemistry, 283 conceptual scheme, 175 electron orbital theory, 283 mathematics, 214, 225, 232, 251 science, 48, 316, 317 scientic discoveries, 315 secondary chemistry, 283 western science, 63 modern view, 175 Mohapatra, 292 Mohapatra and Bhattacharya, 292 Mohini Mullick, 40 mole concept, 280 molecular motions, 280 molecules, 334 Mole Asante, 116 momenta, 303 moral issues, 209 Morris Kline, 220, 230 MORST, 4 motion, 289 motions of celestial objects, 312 Mueller, 261, 264 Mullick, 41 multicultural, 52, 53 communities, 51 literature on science, 62 materials, 53 mathematics, 211
perspective, 56 perspectives, 51, 58 science, 53, 56 science education, 13 multiculturalism, 55 mathematics, 214 multiculturalists, 62, 63 multisciences, 56 Mutazilah, 257 mysterious, 315 N.R. Hanson, 43 nave inductivism, 198 Nadeau & Desautels, 118 Nalanda, 252 Nanda, 106 Narayana, 226, 231 NAS, 112 Nasiruddin, 241 Native American views, 57 natives, 209 natural kinds, 160 motion, 180 phenomena, 59, 120 philosopher, 120 philosophy, 53, 120, 195 resources, 202, 312 sciences, 118, 195 naturalism Quinean, 75 naturalist, 58, 93 naturalistic, 59, 93 conceptual system, 121 observation, 52 observation and insight, 63 nature, 122 and method of science, 201 and philosophy of science, 320 and science, 48 of chemical bonding, 281 of electronic orbitals, 279 of Indian mathematics, 237 of knowledge, 89 of light, 281 of objectivity in science, 116 of science, 15, 22, 27, 58, 85, 99, 283, 301, 302, 316, 319322, 324328, 330, 331 of scientic activity, 43 of scientic knowledge, 117, 154 of scientic mode, 46 of synthesis, 208 Nayyayika notion of proof, 255 NCERT, 241, 252254, 320, 323330 NCERT text, 253
Needham, 61 Neils Bohr, 42 Nelkin, 52 Neoplatonic, 258 Neoplatonic linkages, 260 Neoplatonic principles, 257 Neoplatonism, 244, 257, 258 Neoplatonists, 244, 260 Neugebauer, 213 Neuhaus, 112 Neurath, 94 New Apollonians, 135 new Dionysians, 135 Newlands, 283 Newton, 47, 98, 225, 301 inverse cube law, 95 notebooks, 101 Newtonian mechanics, 302, 303, 306, 316 notion, 249 synthesis, 47, 48 Niels Bohr, 282 night-sky, 312 Nilakantha, 226, 227, 231 nitric oxide, 198 non-Euclidean, 266 geometry, 211 non-European mathematical traditions, 220 mathematics, 235 non-living nature, 311 non-science, 58, 195 non-stoichiometry, 205 Normal Dahl, 39 Norman Levitt, 85 Norris, 104, 106 Norris-Tull & Norris-Tull, 52 Norris-Tull, & Norris-Tull, 53 notion inequality, 261 rapidity of convergence, 232 space and time, 176 Novak, 165, 289 NSTA, 112 number system, 214 O.B. Hardison, 114 Oakely, 39 objective education, 258 knowledge, 75 objectivism, 59 objectivity, 325 and precision, 202 of science, 322
observation, 309, 316 observational astronomy, 167 astronomy research project, 167 observing, 308 of Research Programmes, 46 of science, 286 Ogawa, 56 Ohms law, 291, 295 omissions and appropriation, 214 omnipotency of science, 331 On Floating Bodies, 180 one right answer, 282 oneness, 305 Ontario Board of Education, 279 Ontario program, 284 ontological, 43 presuppositions, 170 realism, 117 ontology, 76 optics, 281 order and causality, 61 organic or inorganic, 207 organization, 320 origin alternative framework, 292 origin of science, 24 origins of modern science, 30 Orwell, 104 Osborne, 289 outcomes of learning of science, 319 Overton, 52 Owens, 54 oxygen, 198 and hydrogen, 198, 199 discovery, 279 oxygene, 198 P.R.K. Rao, 41 Pappus, 243, 265 paracetamol, 305 paradigm, 100, 199 paradigmatic shifts, 46 parallel postulate, 267 parameters, 309 parapsychology, 105 partitioning, 305 Passmore, 5 pathological tests, 310 pathshala-s, 252 Paul Gross, 85 Paul Saltman, 113 Paulus Gerdes, 219 pedagogical, 53 pedagogoy
critical, 116 pedagogy, 77 good, 285 mathematics, 238 Peoples science, 305 Peoples science movements, 47 periodic law, 284, 286 periodic table, 279, 280, 282284, 313 personal cleanliness, 307 perspective on science, 55 Perspectives Multicultural, 51 Peru, 216 pessimistic historical meta-induction, 22 phenomenological, 302, 314 theory, 303 phenomenology, 303306, 316, 317 health, 310 practical subjects, 306 Philippus, 242 philosopher, 85, 118 philosopher of science, 22 philosophical, 41, 58 analysis, 206 arguments, 197 aspects of science, 41 materialism, 117 views, 58 views about science, 204 philosophies, 202 philosophy, 3, 42, 46, 54, 58, 76, 117, 195 of logical positivism, 117 of Neoplatonism, 244 of science, 911, 14, 23, 28, 40, 46, 71, 75, 176, 196, 203, 205 science, 58 phlogistic chemistry, 29 phrenology, 90 physical analogies, 181 condition, 202 particles, 206 science, 309 systems, 193 physics, 41, 185, 204, 206, 250, 261, 289, 303, 312, 335 physiology, 309, 310 Piaget, 71 Pickering, 104 Pierre Jartoux, 236 Pierre Macquare, 206 Pillars of health, 310 Pinch, 21, 86, 99, 106 Pinch and Collins, 105 planetary motions, 303
Plato, 242, 243, 250, 254, 265 Platonic idealism, 255 Platonic philosophy, 247 Platonic-Kantian, 251 Platonic-Pythagorean Tradition, 149 Platonism, 46 Plotinus, 258 political philosophy, 14 science, 219 Polymer substances, 335 polymerase enzyme, 113 Popper, 22, 98, 106 Popperian falsiability, 72 porphyry, 192, 243, 258 positional number system, 216 system, 214 positivism, 117 Posner, 289 post colonialism, 55 post modernism, 55 post-epistemological, 76 post-modernist, 71 postmodernist philosophy, 14 postulates, 265 potential difference, 291, 295 practical applications of chemistry, 282 mathematics, 258 skills, 316 pragmatic conception of science education, 21 view, 58 pragmatism, 200 pragmatist, 104 pre-scientic, 304 knowledge-systems, 302 presocratics, 24 primary education, 307 ontological reduction, 3941, 43, 44 school level, 316 prime numbers, 215 Principe, 27 Principia, 21, 98 principle, 202, 286, 301, 317, 332 and theories, 306 chemical elementarity, 199 chemical simplicity, 199 chemistry, 203, 279, 284 conservation of mass, 199 equilibrium, 179 fundamental, 202
mechanics, 39 unifying, 202 problem solving, 333, 334 procedural knowledge, 292, 295 process of enquiry, 327 processes of science, 320, 332 Proclus, 242245, 251, 254, 257, 259 professional CMS courses, 306, 316 Prociency Levels of Rural School, 301 Project 2000+, 111 proof, 253, 266 deductive, 251 properties of elements, 280 protagonists, 199 pseudo-science, 58, 106 pseudo-scientic, 26 pseudoscience, 58 Pseudoscientic and irrational world views, 5 psychological form of constructivism, 71 psychologism, 97 psychologistic, 91 psychologists, 165 psychology, 98 Ptolemy, 242, 243 public scientic literacy, 115 square, 112, 117 understanding of science, 111, 127 pure elements, 199 pure hydrogen and pure oxygen, 199 pure results, 199 Putumana Somayajin, 226, 227 Pythagoras, 48, 214, 244, 265 theorem, 253 Pythagorean theorem, 250, 251, 254 viewpoint, 125 Pythagoreanism, 46 Pythagoreans, 244 qualitative test, 209 visualisable models, 293 quantication and measurement, 263 quantitative formulation of problems, 202 quantum mechanics, 31, 204, 279, 281, 303 theory, 31, 53 questions, 322 Quine, 94 Quine-Duhem, 94 Quinean naturalism, 75 underdetermination, 72 R. J. Gillespie, 203
racist history, 252 radical constructivism, 71, 72 relativism, 119 skepticism, 106 social constructivist, 119 social constructivists, 116, 117, 119 sociologist of scientic knowledge, 121 radioactive properties, 282 radioactivity, 280 Ramanujan, 238 rampant relativism, 86 rare-earths, 282 rarer media, 192 rational, 56 reconstruction, 96 reconstruction of beliefs, 96 theology, 243, 251, 257 rationalism, 72 rationalist, 58, 91, 94, 97, 98 philosophers, 91, 96 philosophy of science, 92 theories, 92 view, 91 rationality, 96, 99, 116 African, 116 and critical thinking, 24 Rayleigh-Jeans, 31 reaction mechanism, 205 reaction rates, 207 real world experiments, 176 realism, 22 realism/instrumentalism, 28 realist, 58, 61 reason, 176 reasoned thought, 96 reasoning, 207, 307, 308, 316 mathematical, 193 skills, 13 students, 322 rediscovery of Greek thought, 46 reducibility, 305 reductionistic thinking, 125 relative density, 177 relativism, 66, 72, 93 relativist, 21 relativistic, 178 Relativistic Analysis, 178 Relativistic dethronement, 47 relativity, 193 theory, 249 representations of numbers and space, 215 requirements, 314 research chemists in USA, 201
cognitive developmental, 165 scientists, 204 resistance, 291 resistances, 192 Richard Dawkins, 51, 119 Richard J. Merill, 281 ritual geometry, 259 Robert Boyle, 206 Robertta Barba, 53 Roger Penrose, 61 role of chemistry, 205 history of chemistry, 200 history of science, 200 Roth, 293 Royal Asiatic Society, 226 rules of categorisation, 332 Ruse, 112, 118 Russell, 248, 268 Sadratnamala, 227, 232 Sagan, 60 Salviati, 175 Samarapungavan, Vosniadou, & Brewer, 167 Samarkand Observatory, 235 Sample examination paper, 47 Sandra Harding, 116 Sanitation, 312 Sankara, 231 Sankara Variyar, 226 Sankara Varman, 227 SAS postulate, 253 Saxena, 289293 school Alexandrian, 180 chemistry textbooks, 279 children, 211 education, 197, 302 high, 301 Kerala, 225, 228, 230 middle, 301 primary, 301 science, 51, 52 science curriculum, 52 science education, 315 science textbook, 320 Schopenhauer, 250 Schr dingers cat, 255 o science, 46, 51, 100, 195, 200, 209, 286, 301306, 316, 322, 323, 331, 334 popularization among housewives, 315 wars, 21 alternative, 47 and philosophy, 14 and society, 331
and technology, 39, 306, 311, 317, 323, 326, 331, 334, 335 and technology for society, 323 and technology with society, 326 anti, 115 antithetical, 117 basic knowledge, 331 burden, 301 celebration, 111 central, 204 centrality, 125 centres, 315 cognitive enterprise, 39 community, 62 competencies, 327 computer, 41 concept, 301, 317 curricula, 55, 136, 165, 301, 303, 316 curriculum, 327 curriculum frameworks, 112 deconstruction, 121 denition of, 51, 52 dehumanises, 135 development, 61, 279, 331 discourse, 63 educationists, 320 educators, 24 empirical, 93 empirical nature, 322, 331, 334 epistemology, 156 ethnomethodology of, 100 exclusivity, 62 for all, 111, 114 for common people, 301 for painters, 303 for physicians, 303 good, 199, 285 growth, 200, 201 historical activity, 42 historical aspects, 41 history of, 199 human activity, 201 in daily-life situations, 301 instruction, 200, 209 interest, 122, 202 Islamic, 62 learning, 165, 166, 171, 200, 320, 328 learning of, 165 liking, 201 literacy crisis, 3 methodological dimension, 11 nature, 331 of pendulum motion, 7 or scientic investigation, 196 pedagogy, 164
philosophical aspects, 41 philosophical dimension, 11 popularization, 301, 302, 315 principles, 301, 317 purpose, 306 society, 331 Standard Account of, 53 standard account of, 66 teachers, 3 teaching, 32 technology, and society, 196, 203 theory, 301 thinking process, 331 traditional, 302, 304, 305 universal, 51, 52 universality of, 51 uses and abuses, 201 utilitarian view, 21 wars, 52, 71, 85 wars in India, 106 western, 51, 53, 63 with society, 331 science and technology use, 319 science classrooms, 197 science curricula interdisciplinary, 123 science education, 5, 6, 8, 9, 24, 43, 51, 52, 56, 71, 78, 86, 100, 112, 123, 135, 171, 195 197, 199, 200, 205, 209, 226, 301, 306 and logic, 10 curriculum, 196 general education, 302 multicultural, 13 programme, 164 purpose, 302 research, 165, 173 science, technology and society, 40, 323, 334 curricula, 13, 123 science-technology-society, 14 scientic, 209, 306 enlightenment, 316 and epistemological relativism, 65 and technological needs, 39 antirealism, 32 appreciation of nature, 306 belief, 89, 98 community, 40, 62, 111, 112, 117, 205 concept, 5, 114, 168, 200, 295 creativity, 306 criteria, 202 development and conceptual change, 13 disciplines, 41 enterprise, 333 experiments, 135
ideas, 59, 111, 166, 196 illiteracy, 101 imagination, 175 inquiry, 103, 293 investigation, 304 investigations, 113 knowledge, 810, 14, 55, 62, 86, 89, 92, 104, 116, 118, 121, 124, 125, 133, 135, 136, 209, 213, 261, 332 literacy, 115, 334 method, 39, 46, 197, 333, 334 methods of investigation, 202 model of current, 290 organizations, 301 outlook, 301, 306 pipeline, 122 positivism, 111, 117, 119, 121 positivists, 120 progress, 63, 114 rationality, 106 realism, 32 research, 325 revolution, 30, 46, 97 skills, 316 skills of observation, 307 text, 121 themes and concepts, 125 theory, 23, 60, 93, 94, 96, 102, 154, 167, 283, 285 thinking, 125, 322, 325, 326, 334 truths, 44 understanding, 315 view of the earth, 168 ways of thinking, 112 world, 292 description, 51 investigation, 302 knowledge, 66, 154 method, 286 theory, 93 theory construction, 269 theory prole, 58 scientically educated men and women, 126 scientically literate, 317 scienticity of science, 101 scientism, 63, 64, 136 scientist, 42, 200, 201, 207, 303, 306, 315, 323, 326, 333 Scott, 58 second law of thermodynamics, 196 secondary, 306, 309, 316 school science textbooks, 320 education, 307 semiconductors, 204 senior secondary, 306, 316
sequence model, 290 Settle, 118 Shakespeare, 42 shape of the earth, 167, 173 Shepardson and Pizzini, 321 Shipstone, 289291, 293 Side-Angle-Side, 248, 251 Signals, 310 Silver Chloride, 203 Simplicio, 175, 192 sixth and seventh-row rare earths, 282 Sjberg, 111 Skinner, 97 Skinnerian, 97, 98 Sky-watching, 313 Slezak, 97, 98 slowness of motion, 183 Smith, 289 Smith, Blakeslee and Anderson, 294 Smith, Siegel & McInerney, 5 Smolicz & Nunan, 118 Snively & Corsiglia, 56, 59, 63, 65 Snivley & Corsiglia, 53 social, 41 constructivist view, 116 activity, 296 application, 205 constructivism, 21, 8587, 9195, 9799, 106, 117 constructivist doctrines, 87, 91, 104, 106 constructivist ideas, 104 constructivist programme, 97 constructivist writings, 104 constructivists, 94, 104 justice, 317 nature of chemical discovery, 205 social sciences, 195 socio-cultural mileu, 319 sociogical constructivist, 77 sociological, 58 form of constructivism, 71, 86 programme, 91 relativism, 95 relativist views, 21 sociologies of science, 14 sociologist, 85, 94, 95 of science, 117, 287 sociology, 95 sociology of knowledge, 88, 89, 96, 97 sociology of science, 99 sociology of scientic knowledge, 87, 90, 91, 98, 104 Socratic dialogue, 293 sodium atom, 209 sodium chloride, 281
sodium metal, 209 Sokal, 119 Sokal Hoax, 85 solar, 313 Solomon, 292 solving problems of physics, 184 Sophism, 46 sources, 302 South America, 216 South Bihar, 301 Spain, 213 specic empirical statements, 178 specic-theories, 170 speed, 192 spherical shape of the earth, 171 spiritual phenomena, 59 spiritualism, 115 Srinivas Ramanujan, 221 stages of learning, 286 stagnation, 317 standard account, 5153, 55, 56, 58, 6164 standard units, 312 Stanley & Brickhouse, 55, 59 Stanley Fish, 116 Stanley Miller, 113 state of equilibrium, 179 statics, 180, 193 stellar aberration, 303 Stephen Hawking, 61 stereochemistry, 207 Steve Fuller, 116 Steven Brush, 200 Sthananga Sutra, 226 stoichiometry, 205, 280, 281 stories of scientic success, 114 strategy achieve conceptual change, 293 conceptual change, 293 strict objectivity, 117 Strike, Hewson and Gertzog, 292 strong cultural aspect, 209 strong programme, 88, 89, 91, 9698 structure, 205 atom, 279 periodic table, 279 structured curriculum, 293 STS, 201 education, 14 students motivation and social maturity, 202 understanding of science, 202 understanding of technology, 202 students concept of current, 289 own bias, 324
reasoning in electrokinetics, 291 study of chemistry, 205 of science and epistemology, 91 sub-atomic particles, 284 sub-divided into disciplines, 303 subject matter of CMS, 304 sulbasutra, 259 sulbasutra-s, 259, 260 sulbasutras, 225, 230, 253 Summers, 294 Summers, Kruger and Mant, 289 super conductors, 208 superstition, 305, 312, 314, 317 Sutton, 332 swiftness of motion, 183 syllabi, 307 symbolic models, 159 Symptoms of health, 310 synthesis, 207, 208 synthetic, 255 approach, 258 aspect of chemistry, 204 geometry, 253, 259 models, 167, 168, 170 T.L. Heath, 180 Tus, 241 Takebe Katahiro, 237 Takshashila, 252 Tantrasamgraha, 226 Tasmania, 215 taxonomically ordered, 42 Taxonomy, 286 Taylor series, 232 teacher education, 289, 295 teaching and history, 39 history and philosophy of science, 39 classroom, 211 geometry, 252 physics, 296 science, 165, 279, 319 technical parameters, 311 terms, 309 technology, 306, 309 and scientic positivism, 118 agricultural, 316 industrial, 316 teleological, 91, 97, 98 teleological model, 96 teleological view, 96 tempels, 54 terminology, 315
tertiary, 306 textbook, 284 Thabit Ibn Qurra, 241 Thales, 214 Theaetetus, 242 theistic traditions, 120 Theocharis & Psimopoulos, 112 theological curriculum, 260 theology, 48, 58, 252, 257 Theon, 243, 245 Theonine, 248250 theorem of Menelaus, 243 theoretical basis, 305 consistency, 59 construction, 176 constructions, 193 framework, 165, 166 imagination, 176, 178 model, 193 analysis, 206 theories, 202, 324, 332 scientic, 93 theory, 165 knowledge, 104 electromagnetic, 44 knowledge, 22 theory of evolution, 4 thermodynamic, 207 thermodynamics, 204 caloric, 29 second law, 196 think logically, 202 thinking processes, 324, 329 processes of science, 322, 325 convergent, 24 divergent, 24 lateral, 24 third planet, 282 third world womens science, 106 Thomas Fuller, 218, 219 Thomas Kuhn, 199 Thomist philosophy, 257 Thompson, 284 Thorley and Woods, 289 Thorndikes Law of Effect, 98 Thornton, 295 thought activity, 324 experiment, 176, 185, 321, 324, 333 experiment, 31 tidal action, 52 TIMSS, 111 Tobias, 126
Tobin & Tippins, 78 Todhunter, 241, 248 Toldeo, 213 total vacuum, 192 totalitarian, 99 totality of science, 303 tradition of geometry, 260 traditional, 255, 316 ecological knowledge, 56 geometry, 254, 259 notion of proof, 254 parameter, 309, 315 representationalist theories, 76 science, 302, 304, 305 understanding, 316 wisdom, 317 traditions Buddhist and Jaina, 255 transcendental idealism, 73 philosophy, 74 transfer of the learning, 329 Treagust, Harrison and Venville, 294 treatment of data, 202 triads or octaves, 283 Truesdell, 41 truth-functional logic, 255 Uclides, 242, 257, 259, 260 ultra-violet catastrophe, 31 unacceptable biasedness, 201 unbiased observation, 201 underdetermination Quinean,, 72 understand the phenomena in chemistry, 204 understanding, 304 nature, 305 chemistry, 203 nature and knowledge, 304 the universe, 202 understanding science concept, 165 UNESCO, 111 uniformity, 122 unifying principles, 202 unilinear trajectory, 212, 213 unity of science, 305 universal concept of science, 62 science, 62 universalist, 52 perspective, 52 perspective on science, 51 universality, 51, 62
science, 62 concept of, 52 science, 51, 62 university science textbooks, 112 Upapatti, 222 use of science and technology, 319 uses and abuses of science, 201 utilitarian, 86 view of science, 21 V.K. Jairath, 41 vacuum, 186 valence electrons, 284 validity of knowledge, 106 van Fraassen, 71 varieties of constructivism, 71, 86 vast generalizations, 302 verbal behaviour, 97 Victor Katz, 239 Vidal Abarca and San Joze, 328 Vidal-Abraca and Sanzose, 327 view equality, 295 hierarchy, 295 of nature, 47 vigesimal, 216 Vikrami, 312, 313 Vine DeLoria, 53 visual impact, 328 vital resources of the common man, 315 vocabularly, 331 void, 176, 192 voltage and current, 291 von Glasersfeld, 77 Vosniadou, 167 Vosniadou & Brewer, 167, 168 W.H. Freeman, 281 Wallis, 225 Walsh, 117 warnings given by the body, 310 water as a compound, 199 Watson and Crick, 332 Watts and Gilbert, 289 Western science, 63 western science, 63 William Brewer, 167 witch-craft, 305 Wittgenstein, 97 Wolfgang Pauli, 282 woman mathematician, 217 Woolgar, 99101 working knowledge, 202 world view, 111, 177, 178, 196, 201 Galilean, 177
Aristotelian, 176, 177 Galilean, 178 X-ray crystallographic patterns, 332 X-ray diffraction, 281 Yager, 115 Yang Guangxian, 236 Yash Pal Committee, 317 Yesudas Ramchandra, 237 Yoruba method of multiplication, 220 YuktiBhasa, 254, 260 Yuktibhasa, 226, 227 Zaire, 215 Zambia, 215 zero, 216 introduction, 214 Zij al-Arjabhar, 226 Ziman, 112 zoology, 286
Index
a priori, 118 A.F. Chalmers, 58 A.J. Ayer, 76 A.K. Biswas, 40 A.P. Shukla, 41, 42 A. France, 48 A. J. Harrison, 204 AAAS, 112, 317 abiotic, 311 abstract concepts, 316 concepts and operations, 303 cosmological picture, 178 concepts, 294 theories, 316 abstraction, 283 Abul Fazl, 259 academic chemist, 204 academic historians, 199 acceleration, 289 acid-base theories, 280 acidic, 198 acidic principle, 198 Adam Schall, 236 Adas, 54 Advaita Vedanta, 258 African-American Baseline Essays, 53 Afrocentrism, 116 ahistorically, 198 AI, 98 al Farabi, 241 al Ghazal, 257 al Haitham, 241 al Hajjaj, 241 al Kind, 241 al-Hayatham, 238 Ala Samarapungavan, 167 Alan Sokal, 85, 116 Alessandro Volta, 333 Alexander, 243 Alexandrian school, 180 Algebra, 262 algebra, 280 alkaline earths, 282 Almagest, 243 alphabet-numeral system of notation, 229 Alternative frameworks in electricity, 289 alternative conceptions, 292
frameworks, 289, 291, 296 alternative framework origin, 292 American Indian Science and Engineering Society, 53 American Universities, 39 Amitabh Ghosh, 40 Analytical Sciences, 312 analytical arguments, 207 Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, 42 anatomy, 309 ancient philosophies, 305 Anderson, 4 Andrew Ross, 116 antagonism, 115 antagonists, 199 Antanio Favaro, 175 anthropology, 167 anti-Aristotelian way, 178 anti-dogmatism, 331 anti-evolutionism, 115 anti-foundationalist, 104 anti-intellectualism, 21, 86 anti-racist, 211 anti-racist mathematics, 211 anti-realism, 71 anti-realist, 58 anti-reductionism, 62 anti-science, 21, 116 antiscientic views, 5 Antoine Lavoisier, 198 Apastamba, 225 Apollonius, 214, 243 Arab and European mathematics, 229 Arab mathematics, 214 Archimedes, 175, 179, 214, 242 areas of physics, 204 Aristotelian, 163, 181 causality, 48 conceptual scheme, 175 dynamics, 29 logic, 257 Scholasticism, 46 view, 175 world-view, 176, 177 Aristotelian science, 185 Aristotelianism, 46
Aristotle, 175, 178, 192, 242, 243, 249, 250, 257, 261, 267 thesis, 183 Arithmetic, 262 arithmetic, 209 Arnauld, 76 Aron, 291, 295 Arthur Kornberg, 113 articial intelligence, 98 Aryabhata, 221, 226, 251 Aryabhatiya, 221, 226, 230 Aryabhatiyabhasya, 231 Ashmore, 106 Asian and Afro-Carribbean origins, 211 ASPEN 1991, 289 astrology, 105 Astronomical, 47 Astronomy, 46 astronomy, 46, 169, 228, 286 Atmospheric Science, 303 atomic nature of matter, 314 structure, 280 theory of structure, 281 atomic physics, 43 atomic structure, 281 Atomism, 46 Atomists, 179 atoms, 199, 206, 279, 284, 334 Augustine, 245, 258 Augustus De Morgan, 237 authoritarian, 135, 331 authoritarianism, 331 autonomy view, 97 Avogadros hypothesis, 281 axiom, 255, 266 axiomatic approach, 262 method, 253, 262, 263, 266, 268, 269 axiomatico-deductive, 262 axiomatization, 261, 268 Axioms, 253 axioms, 255, 259 Ayurveda, 305 BAAS, 209 Babylonians, 253 Bacon, 48 Baconian empiricism, 47 Baghdad, 213 balance of forces, 103 Barber, 54 Barnes, 77, 95 Basalla, 54 Baudhayana Sulbasutras, 252
Baudhyana, 225 Baudrillard, 104 Beardsley, 4 beginning of science, 305 behaviour atoms, 202 ions, 202 molecules, 202 Behaviourism, 97 behaviourism, 97, 98 psychology, 97 behaviourists, 97 Behrens, 54 beliefs, 312 Benjamin Peirce, 268 Benoit Mendelbrot, 126 Benseghir and Closset, 291 Berkeley, 71, 76 Berkeleyan idealism, 72 Berlin, 54 museum, 216 Bernal, 246 Bertrand Russell, 5, 23 Bhaskara-I, 221, 226 Bijaganita, 222 biochemistry, 282 Biogas, 314 biological condition, 202 science, 309 Biology, 303, 312 biology, 204, 286, 311 Biosphere, 312 biotic factors, 311 Birkhoff, 245, 250 Birkhoff s axioms, 255 Bishop, 112, 115 Bishop Auerilus, 244 Black-Body radiation, 31 Blacks in Science: Ancient and Modern, 53 Bloor, 77, 89, 91, 9498, 103 Bloor & Barnes, 55 Bolyai, 266 bonding, 279 Boorse, 95 Boster & Johnson, 54 botany, 286 Bown, 4 Boyle, 206 Boyles law, 135, 332 breast-feeding, 304 Brethren of sincerity, 48 Brown, 293 Browne, 116 Bruno Latour, 116
Bucky ball, 208 Bucky balls, 196 Buddhist, 259 and Jaina traditions, 255 Burtt, 61, 119 Byzantium, 241 C.P. Snows, 196 Cairo, 213 calculus, 225 algorithms, 225 differential,, 238 calendars, 312, 313 Caliph al-Mamun, 241 Caliph al-Mansur, 241 caloric thermodynamics, 29 carbon chemistry, 282 rings, 282 Cardinal Bellarmine, 94 Cardona, 239 careers science, 323 science and technology, 326 Carr, 42 Cartesian, 76 purpose, 268 approach, 269 dualism, 72 epistemology, 72 model, 72 split, 47 Case Study, 163 categorical thinking, 184 view, 178 cattle and birds, 314 causal view, 96 causality, 61, 96 Aristotelian, 48 order, 61 causation, 61 Cavalieri, 239 celebration of science, 111, 117 celestial bodies, 304 cell structure, 310 central science, 204 centrality of science, 125 change, 165 characteristics, 304 charge/mass ratios, 281 Charles Darwin, 54 Charles Eliot Norton, 41 Charles Whish, 226
CHEM Study, 280285 study, 203 Study program, 279 Study Story, 281 CHEM Study, 279, 281, 282 Chemical Education, 200 synthesis, 207, 208 chemical analysis, 209 bonding, 280, 281 composites, 206 compounds, 281 concept, 205, 207 constituent, 198 contexts, 201 curriculum, 209 education, 196, 200, 201, 203, 205, 207 element, 206 elements, 206 equilibrium, 206 facts, 204 industry, 202 knowledge, 202, 287 phenomena, 205 philosophers, 206 philosophy, 206 processes, 280 reactions, 280 species, 205 substance, 198 synthesis, 208 chemical education aim, 200 Chemical Education Material study, 279 chemical knowledge applications, 202 Chemistry, 285, 303, 312 chemistry, 44, 46, 200, 202204, 206, 207, 279, 280, 282, 287, 311, 335 aims, 204 citizens, 201 courses, 203, 205 educators, 201 environment, 282 instruction, 203 laboratory, 283 learners, 203 physics, 206 solar system, 282 textbook, 284 chemists, 201, 203, 206, 207 chemists and scholars, 204 Chiappetta, 332
Chiappetta et al., 319 child psychologist, 286 childrens theories, 167 China, 213 Chinese, 253 Chinese encyclopaedia, 42 Chinese science, 61 Chiu Chang Suan Shu, 237 Chomsky, 97, 104, 106 Chou Pei, 218 Christian rationalists, 260 Christian science, 62 circuit diagram, 291 cis-trans isomerism, 281 citizen, 209 clashing current model, 289, 290 classical approach of teaching, 296 classical Greek, 214 classical Greek mathematics, 214 classical Greek tradition, 242 classical view of realism, 117 classication, 308, 316 classication and manipulation, 307 classication and taxonomy, 286 classication of forms of life, 303 classication system, 286 classroom teaching, 211 Claudius Ptolemy, 243, 244 Clement, 289, 293 Cleopatra, 243 clinical interview, 167 Clothing, 312 CMS, 302307, 309, 312, 314317 curricula, 306 education, 315 CMS curricula, 307, 309 Cobern, 60, 61 Cobern & Aikenhead, 118 Cobern, Gibson & Underwood, 124 Cognitive Science, 133, 163 science, 137, 165 cognitive conicts, 175 developmental research, 165 entity, 159 psychologists, 178 revolution, 98 science, 98 structures, 76, 328 turn, 154 Cognitive-historical, 164 cognitive-historical, 137 cognitively, 57
Cohen, Eylon and Ganniel, 290 Colebrooke, 237 Collingwood, 61 Collins, 21, 86, 98, 99 colloquial positivism, 117 colonial science, 209 common laboratory procedures, 202 common domestic equipment, 315 Common Mans Science, 302, 303, 315, 316 common notions, 264 community of science, 62 community- and context-specic, 302 community-level, 307 compound, 198, 206, 208 compound nature, 198 compound nature of water, 198 compounds, 204, 206 comprehension, 327 computer science, 41 concept of resistors, 290 charge, 295 common mans science, 316 convergence, 232 current, 291, 296 formation, 309 fundamental, 206 limit, 237 map, 125 proof, 220 conception of constructivism, 72 conception of current, 295 conceptions alternative, 292 conceptions of knowledge, 72 concepts, 198, 201, 206, 207, 301, 317, 324, 332 abstract, 316 and principles of science, 317 chemistry, 195 science, 165, 196 conceptual learning, 208 structures, 166 Conceptual change, 166 conceptual change, 165167, 173, 175, 289, 293 295 approach, 165 conditions for, 292 conceptual development, 173 conceptual scheme Aristotelian, 175 modern, 175 conceptual space, 159
conceptual systems, 283 conceptual understanding of the periodic table, 287 conceptualizations of science, 126 conceptually networked, 204 condence and skill, 202 conformation, 205 congruence, 259 Congruence Axiom, 253 conjectures and refutations, 24 connectionist model, 159 conservation of energy, 122 constant current, 290 Constituents of foodstuffs, 310 constraints, 172 construction hypotheses, 202 constructive empiricism, 71, 94 constructivism, 71, 77, 80 Kantian,, 72 social, 21, 8587, 91, 94, 95, 9799, 106, 117 varieties, 71 constructivist, 21, 85, 104106 programme, 96 teaching methods, 13 constructivists, 100 content of science text, 319 context discovery, 193 contextualised, 331 contextualist, 104 continuum hypothesis, 91 conventional curricula, 312 Conventional science, 303 conventional sciences, 302, 306, 310, 316, 317 conventionally, 302 convergence proof, 258 convergent thinking, 24 Coomaraswamy, 42 Copernican Revolution, 47 Copernican revolution, 140 Copernicus, 100 copper, 192 Cordoba, 213 corporeal nature of the media, 185 Corsiglia & Snively, 56 Cosmology, 303 Costa, 113 counter-inductive, 176 counter-intuitive, 176, 196, 251 course chemistry, 201, 203 courses chemistry for citizens, 204 cramming, 317
Crease, 112 creation science, 52 creative imagination, 202 critical assessment, 324 pedagogy, 116 unbiased observation, 201 critical-logical-analytical thinking, 10 crops, 314 cross-cultural research, 167 studies, 289 CRT tubes, 281 crtical thingking skills, 13 crystallization, 285 cultural capital, 114 chauvinism, 63 enterprise, 196 hegemony science, 63 imperialism, 52 culture expansionist, 54 curricula, 302, 309 CMS, 306 reforms, 203 science, technology and society, 13 science-technology-society, 123 curriculum, 40, 242, 280, 286 construction, 289 educational implications, 106 hidden, 319 Czeslaw Milosz, 41 D.C. Phillips, 86 D. Mazlish, 48 Dark Ages, 212 Darwin, 47, 60 theory of organic evolution, 332 theory, 98 theory of evolution, 138 David Hume, 28, 219 David W. Ridgway, 281 day and night cycle, 167 day/night cycle, 167, 171 De Caelo, 185 De Motu, 175, 176 De Revolutionibus, 71 Dea Caelestis, 244 deconstruction science, 121 deconstructionist, 103 affectation, 103 Dedekind, 248
deduction, 267 reasoning, 330 deductive method of proof, 251 reasoning, 176, 322, 334 denition, 266 science, 62 DeLoria, 53 demonstrations, 293 denser media, 192 Densmore, 21 Derek Hodson, 286 derivation, 267 derivations, 301 Derrida, 102 Derridadaism, 103 Descartes, 48 Descartes, 72 descriptive chemistry, 280, 282 design of experiments, 202 Desmond & Moore, 60 development European thought, 48 mathematics, 213 science, 61, 279, 331 science concepts, 165 scientic skills, 307 developmental level, 323, 327 dialectic, 138 differential calculus, 238 Diophantus, 214 disc earth, 168 discourse science, 63 discovery, 175, 176 electron, 284 epistemic, 176 Greek learning, 213 Disease, 310 disease, 317 disequilibrium, 179 diSessa, 165 divergent thinking, 24 Dmitri Mendeleev, 284 DNA, 114 extraction, 114 model, 332 synthesis enzyme, 113 Doberiner, 283 dogma, 48 dogmas, 317 dogmatic, 331 domain, 58 empirical, 253
physical, 253 thought, 62 domains knowledge, 63 domains of knowledge, 117 dominant discourse of science, 63 Drabkin, 175 Driver, 5860, 289 Driver and Easley, 165, 289 Driver and Oldham, 289, 295 Drori, 115 Drosophila, 113 drugs, 204 drycell, 333 dual earth, 168 dualism Cartesian,, 72 Duit, 294 Durant, 112 Durkheim, 88, 89 Durkheimian view, 96 Duschl, 59, 118 dynamics, 180 Aristotelian, 29 Dyson, 112 E.H. Carr, 195 eclipse, 313 eclipses, 313 ecological systems, 122 Edgar Jenkins, 111 Edinburgh Strong Programme, 87 education, 165, 255, 260 and research, 316 CMS, 315 health, 310 higher stages, 316 liberal, 10 technical, 10 educational implications for the curriculum, 106 educationally backward, 317 Edward Jenner, 333 Egyptians, 253 Einstein, 176 Einstelling effect, 292 Eleaticiam, 46 electric current, 289, 291 electrical engineering programme, 291 nature of atoms, 281 electricity, 262, 289, 295, 296, 308 alternative frameworks, 289 electrokinetics, 291 electromagnetic theory, 44
electron exclusion principle, 282 orbital hybridization, 281 orbitals, 279, 286 structures, 280 electronic conguration, 284 orbitals, 284 structure, 279 structures, 280 electrostatics, 291, 306 circuits, 291 element, 204, 206 and a compound, 206 element, mixture and compound, 206 elementary particles, 305 Elements, 241244, 257262 Arabic-Islamic tradition, 242 elements, 280 empirical consistency, 59 explanation, 96 facts, 259 inputs, 193 issue, 195 knowledge, 253 naturalistic science, 93 nature of science, 322, 331, 334 observations, 193, 207 question, 200 tests, 201 empirical-experimental inquiry, 122 empiricism, 72 empiricist, 28 framework, 165, 170 views, 25 empiricity, 325 energy, 308, 312 energy and power, 314 enlightening, 301 Enneads, 258 environment, 306, 308, 309, 311, 316 laboratory, 208 environmental science, 13, 311 episodic conceptualisation, 292 epistemic nature, 176 discovery, 176 epistemic strength discovery, 176 epistemological, 43, 52, 65 egalitarianism, 106 hegemony, 52 perspectives, 55 pinnacle, 63
pluralism, 65, 66 position, 117 presuppositions, 170 pyramid, 64, 118, 122 reconstruction, 175 relativists, 51 epistemology, 11, 55, 75, 77, 111, 118, 156 Cartesian, 72 naturalization, 156 science, 156 Eratosthenes, 242 Eric Hoffer, 118 Ernst von Glasersfeld, 71 Escherichia coli, 113 essentialism, 178 estimating, 312 ethical, 41 ethnic minority populations, 211 ethnomathematics, 218, 238 ethnomethodology of science, 100 ethnoscience, 54, 106 Euclid, 175, 214, 242246, 261, 262, 265 historicity, 243 the geometer, 242 Euclidean geometry, 222, 241, 246, 251, 252, 255, 259, 262 Eudemus, 243 Eudoxus, 242, 243 Eurocentric trajectory, 213 Eurocentrism, 214 European chemical philosophers, 206 mathematics, 212 Evolution theory of, 53 evolution, 118 East and West Arab numerals, 214 number system, 214 evolutionary biologists, 118 examples and analogies, 293 exclusion by denition, 214 exclusivity of science, 62 existence of atom, 281 experimental science, 282 experimentalist, 147 experimentation, 307, 308, 316, 331 experiments, 312 explanations of the seasons, 167 of the weather, 167 extracted DNA, 113 extremist social constructivism, 117 Eylon and Linn, 289, 291 face numerals, 216, 217
facts, 324, 332 factual, 167 factual question, 167 falasifa, 257 fallibilism, 77 fallibility of science, 14 falsiability Popperian,, 72 Falsicationism, 46 Faraday, 126 Farrington, 24 feminist science, 13 fetal tissue research, 126 gure of 8 knots, 216 Fihrist, 241, 242 Finneran, 117 First Nations science, 62 ve elements, 305 attened sphere, 168 folk knowledge, 305 science, 302, 304, 316 food items, 304 Foodstuffs, 312 force, 181, 289, 303 balance, 103 formal axiomatics, 259 denitions, 309 logic, 154 mathematics, 258 metric geometry, 259 synthetic geometry, 259 formalism, 316 formalistic approach, 255 foundations geometry, 246 mathematics, 261 modern thought, 104 four elements, 177 Four Western Imperatives, 118 fourth and fth-row transition metals, 282 fractal geometry, 126 framework theory, 166, 170 Francis Crick, 119 Frederick Grinnell, 58 Fredric Jameson, 116 Freeman Dyson, 116 Freud, 47 Freyberg, 289 Fuller, 52 function maxima, 237 minima, 237 fundamental
concepts in chemistry, 206 principles, 202 G.E.R. Lloyd, 221 Galilean Platonism, 47 world-view, 177 Galileo, 48, 175, 199 experiments with pendulum, 199 Gardner, 98 Gargi, 217 Garrard & Wegierski, 118 Garrard and Wegierski, 64 gas laws, 280 gases, 198 Gaskell, 111 Gauss, 43 Ge Yuan Mi Lu Jie Fa, 237 gedanken, 185 Geertz, 61 general education, 301, 306, 316, 317 principles, 306, 316 principles of science, 303 public, 301 science, 306 science curricula, 316 science education, 200, 301, 306, 307, 316 theories of science, 303 general aim of chemistry, 200 general education, 200 generalization, 302 generalization and abstraction, 286 generative justication, 164 generative question, 167 genetic arrangements and chromosomal structures, 113 geocentric, 173, 303, 304 geocentric phenomenological theory, 303 geography, 122, 209 geology, 286 geometric equality, 243 Geometry, 262 geometry, 207, 241, 243, 250, 257259, 267 foundations, 246 teach, 260 traditional, 254, 259 geometry of the sulbasutra-s, 259 Georg Cantor, 91 George Bernard Shaw, 39 George Boole, 238 George Wald, 43 Gernet, 61 Gibson, 51 Gieryn, 58
Gilbert and Watts, 289 Gillespie, 203, 204 Gillispie, 204 Gilmer, 117 Giroux & McLaren, 116 gnomon, 265 goals of courses in chemistry, 203 gold, 192 good pedagogy, 285 good science, 199, 285 Goodstein, 115 Gottfried and Kyle, 319 Grant, Sleeter, & Anderson, 116 gravity concept, 168 Greek atomists, 177 thought, 46 Greeks, 253 Gregorian, 312 Gregorian and Saka, 313 Gregory, 225 Gregory series, 228 Gross, 116, 119 Gross & Levitt, 5, 112 Gross and Levitt, 99 Grove, 5 growth science, 200, 201 growth of science, 201 Guba & Lincoln, 59 Gunther Stent, 113 Guthrie, 24 Gutwill, 291 Gwalior system representing numbers, 214 Haji Khalfa records, 241 Haldane, 126 Halliday and Resnick, 294 halogens, 282 Hamlet, 42 Hans Jonas, 39 Harding, 118 Hardison, 122 Harun ar-Rashid, 241 Haruni, 241 Hashweh, 289, 292, 294 Hawking & Penrose, 61, 117 health, 306, 309, 316 education, 310 science, 309 healthy foods, 307 habits, 307, 316 heat, 289
Heath, 243 Hegel, 88, 98 hegemony, 51, 118 Heidegger, 64, 104, 106, 118 Heilbron, 4 Heisenberg, 42, 43 heliocentric, 173, 303 theory, 42, 303 hellenistic astronomy, 48 Persian traditions, 214 science, 46 traditions, 214 world, 213 Helm, Hugh and Novak, 165 Helmholtz, 249 Hendrick Hart, 119 Henry, 77 Henry Giroux, 116 hermeneutic circle, 121 interpretation, 119 hermeneutical problem, 29 hermeneutics, 120 Hermotimus, 242 Heron, 242, 243 Hertz, 39 Hesse, 58 hidden curriculum, 319 higher mathematics, 268 stages, 316 Hijri, 313 Hilbert, 245, 246, 258 Hindu science, 106 society, 42 historian, 85 geometry, 243 mathematics, 213 science, 41, 200 historical, 41, 43, 58 evolution of institutions of science, 47 aspects of science, 41 continuity, 201 development of an idea, 333 episodes, 197 relativism, 99 historicity Euclid, 243 histories geometry, 242 mathematics, 217 historiography, 53, 58
history, 42, 44, 122, 195, 211, 241 and epistemology of science, 13 and philosophy of mathematics, 261 and philosophy of science, 4, 6, 15, 21, 32, 40, 43, 44, 72, 176, 195, 197, 199, 200, 261 of chemical education, 205 of chemical synthesis, 209 of chemistry, 200, 204207 of development of science, 331 of Indian mathematics, 239 of mankind, 302 of science, 9, 23, 3941, 43, 46, 96, 175, 195, 199, 200, 204, 207, 246, 283, 330 of science in India, 40 of scientic ideas, 40, 41, 46, 47 of synthesis of chemical compounds, 208 what, 42, 195 Hodson, 55 Holiday, 319 Holliday, 319 Holliday and Whittacker, 319 hollow sphere, 168 Holton, 5, 112, 115, 117 homeostasis, 122 Horton, 61 Horwood, 60 hotchpotch geometry, 253 Housing, 312 HPS, 21 and science education, 6, 11 in teacher education, 15 human anatomy, 310 genome project, 126 humanistic issues, 135 studies, 135 Humes racist views, 219 hunger, 317 Hunter Havelin Adams, 53 hydrostatics, 193 Hypatia, 217, 244 hypotheses, 332 construction, 202 hypothesis, 209 hypothetico-deductive method, 117, 303 mode of reasoning, 209 systems, 306, 316 Ian Hacking, 207 Ibid, 192 Ibn Sna, 241 ideal chemical experiment, 199
idealism, 77, 93 and relativism, 92 Berkeleyan,, 72 Idealists, 61 Idealists view, 61 idealize, 199 idealized systems, 193 ideas of chemical synthesis, 208 ideology for science education, 201 ignorant of history, 42 IIT Kanpur, 3941 IIT, Bombay, 261 imagination, 176 Immanuel Kant, 28 imperative economic, 118 naturalism, 118 scientistic, 118 technocratic, 118 Imperial Board of Astronomy, 237 implications curriculum, 106 for science education, 85 of research ndings, 289 of social constructivism, 103 Inarticulate Science, 111 Inca Quipu, 216 incommensurability, 72 Kuhnian, 72 Incompleteness theorem, 90 incorporeal, 183 India, 213 history of science, 40 industrial and social progress, 39 Indian astronomy, 228 Brahmi system, 214 geometry, 255 mathematics, 220222, 226, 228, 230, 239 numerals, 214 science, 47, 55 indigenous culture, 315 knowledge, 63 individual phenomena, 202 individualistic, 296 Indo-American programme, 39 Indo-Arab numerals, 214 induction, 176 inductive generalizations, 178 method, 25 reasoning, 176, 322, 334 inductively, 176 inductivism, 46, 296
inductivist, 28, 178 industrial, 314 and social progress in India, 39 chemist, 204 inertia, 134, 181 innite cardinal numbers, 91 innite series, 225, 231 inner observation, 310 innocent of philosophy, 42 innovation, 315 inquiry learning, 13 inscriptionalist, 104 instruction, 165, 170 instructional strategies, 319 instrumental causation, 61 knowledge, 61 instrumentalism, 71, 72, 94 interaction of science with society, 331 interaction of science, technology and society, 321, 325, 330 interdisciplinary nature of chemistry, 203 science curricula, 123 interest science, 122, 123, 202 science and chemistry, 203 interest in chemistry, 202 International History, Philosophy and Science Teaching Group, 6 introduction zero, 214 intuitive framework theory, 168 knowledge of electrostatics, 291 notion of equality, 261 physical idea, 259 physics, 166 scientic views, 168 theories, 170 investigative nature of science, 320, 322324, 328, 331 processes, 331 Ionian Nature-philosophy, 46 irrational numbers, 248 theories, 95 irrationality, 96, 115 Ishale at-Kindi, 48 Ishango bone, 215 Islamic rationalists, 257, 260 science, 46, 62, 106 thinkers, 242
isomorphism, 284 issue of synthesis, 204 Issues in Science and Technology, 116 Ivan Sertima, 116 Ivan Van Sertima, 53 J.B. Cohen, 41 J.D. Novak, 165 J.F. Daniel, 333 J. de Fontaney, 236 Jacob Bronowski, 22 Jaina, 259 James Conant, 9 James Gregory, 228 James Rutherford, 9 Jamshid al-Kashi, 235 Japanese temple geometry, 241 Jean Piaget, 286 Jegede and Okebukola, 319 Jenkins, 112 Jerome, 245 John Cairns, 113 John Fauvel, 219 John McDowell, 77 John Polkinghorne, 127 Johnson, 59 Jon D. Miller, 5 Joseph Novak, 13 Joseph Priestley, 198 Judson, 114 Jund-i-Shapur, 213 Justinian, 245 Jyesthadeva, 226228 K.S. Gandhi, 41 K.V. Sarma, 228 K. Tobin, 78 Kant, 41, 71, 250, 254, 261 Kantian, 93 Kantian constructivism, 72 Kapalli, 327 Karanapaddati, 226 Karl Mannheim, 89 Karl Marx, 219 Karl Popper, 113 katapayadi, 229 Katyayana, 225 Kawagley, 52, 53, 55, 56, 60, 63 Kay, 230 Keplers Harmony of the World, 126 Kerala mathematics, 226, 228, 235, 238 school, 225, 228, 230 Kevin Finneran, 116 Kevles, 115
key concepts, 306 khichdi geometry, 253 kinematics, 164, 180 kinetic molecular theory of gases, 281 kinetic theory, 204, 280 knots, 216 knowledge construction, 60 indigenous, 5153 instrumental, 61 nature, 89 procedural, 292 representation, 159 science, 171, 320322, 327, 331 scientic, 154 social interaction, 331 society, 89 validity, 106 Kosambi, 42 Kosslyn, 97 Kriyakramakari, 226, 231 Kronberg Castle, 42 Kuhn, 24, 41 Kuhnian incommensurability, 72 laboratory, 207 common procedures, 202 experimentation, 280 Ladri` re, 54 e Lakatos, 96 Lake Edward, 215 language, 166 Laplacian certainty, 117 Larry Laudan, 86 lateral thinking, 24 Latour, 99102 Latour and Woolgar, 99, 102104 Laudan, 21, 58, 96 Laudan and Stove, 99 Lavoisier, 198, 199, 279 Lavoisiers four experiments, 198 law free fall, 175 inertia, 176 nature, 208 periodicity, 284 Layton, 112, 115 Leach, 58 lead, 192 learning chemistry, 205 science, 165, 166, 171, 320, 328 skills, 331 teaching chemistry, 203 through science, 203
Lebesgue measure, 251 Lechlanche, 333 Lederman, 319 Lehman, 103 Leibnitzian Mathesis Universalis, 47 Leibniz, 225 levels abstraction, 303 phenomenology, 303 Levitt, 116, 119 Lewenstein, 111 Library Alexandria, 243 Library of Alexandria, 244 light, 289 particle/wave, 53 liking for science, 201 limitations of science, 203 limited, 302 Linden, 55 linguistic interference, 292 turn, 154 linking of the textual content, 327 links with physics and biology, 204 Linn, 319 Linus Pauling, 113 Liu Hui, 237 Lobachevskii, 266 local units, 312 Locke, 76, 77 logic, 99, 267 and reason, 48 and science education, 10 Aristotelian, 257 formal, 154 mathematics, 261 logical deduction, 255 inconsistency, 173 modality, 193 positivistic, 154 logical positivism, 117 lunar, 313 calendar, 215 luni-solar, 313 Lynda Birke, 115 Lynn White, 115 Lyotard, 55 M.D. Srinivas, 222 M.I.T., 39 M. Chastrette and C. N. R. Rao, 203 M. J. Frazer, 200 Macauley, 255
Macquare, 206 Madhava, 226, 227 Madhava-Gregory series, 228 Madhava-Leibniz, 231 Madhava-Leibniz series, 229 Madras Literary Society, 226 magic square, 218 Magnetism, 262 mahabhutas, 305 Malebranche, 76, 77 Mamuni, 241 manipulation, 308, 316 Mannheim, 95 Maori science, 62 map the students conception, 289 Marshak, 215 Martin Eger, 112 Martin Heidegger, 117 Martin Kline, 200 Marx, 47, 88 Marxist, 42 Mary Boole, 238 materialism, 135 mathematical artefact, 215 knowledge, 212 philosophy, 268 proof, 253, 255 reasoning, 193 mathematics, 46, 212, 245, 247, 253, 255, 258, 261, 266268, 281, 283, 335 Africa, 212, 213, 215 Arab, 214 curriculum, 223 development, 213 devlopment, 47 education, 71 European and Arab, 229 higher, 268 Indian, 222, 226, 239 Kerala, 226, 228, 235, 238 logic, 261 modern, 251 pedagogy, 238 teachers, 211 mathemtics Arab, 214 Matteo Ricci, 236, 239 matter atomic nature, 314 Matthews, 52, 60 Mauss, 89 Max Delbr ck, 113 o Max Planck, 31, 282 Maxwell, 301
Mayan civilisation, 216 Mayer, 3 Mazlish, 43 McDermott and Shaffer, 289291 McKinley, 55 measurements, 312 mechanical composites, 206 particles, 206 philosophy, 206 Mechanics, 46 mechanics, 169, 262, 281 mechanistic world picture, 135 media, 192 medicine, 46 medium quicksilver, 192 zero density, 192 Mendel, 334 Mendeleev, 283287 chemical ideas, 287 experimental approach, 286 mensuration, 306, 309, 312, 316 mental models, 166, 168, 171 models of the earth, 168 prodigies, 219 representation, 168 training, 209 Mercator, 225 Merton, 95, 105 Mertonian norms, 105 social attributes, 205 meta-scientic, 21 metaconceptual awareness, 167 metamathematical denition, 255 metamathematical notion of proof, 259 metaphysical, 61, 82, 93, 134, 255 domain, 255 realism, 75, 92 metaphysicians, 177 metaphysics, 11, 32, 64, 72, 75, 111, 117, 118, 127, 254 meteorology, 286 method chemical analysis, 209 proof, 259 science, 197, 203, 305 methodological, 43 methodology and epistemology of science, 9 Metioui, 291 metric, 255 metric and synthetic approaches, 254 metric and synthetic geometry, 254
metric approach, 258 metric geometry, 259 metric, synthetic, or traditional, 259 Michael Matthews, 199, 200 Michael Ruse, 118 Michel Foucault, 42 Michelson-Morley experiment, 42 Micro-organisms, 312 microwave and infrared spectroscopy, 281 Middle Ages, 46 Mill, 261 Millar, 58 Miller, 319 Ming Antu, 237 Ministry of Education, 40 misconceptions, 165, 166, 171, 289, 291 about science, 133 mixture, 206 mixture and a compound, 206 mixtures, 206 model Cognitive Science, 137 statics, 180 models, 332 current, 289 modern academic chemistry, 283 conceptual scheme, 175 electron orbital theory, 283 mathematics, 214, 225, 232, 251 science, 48, 316, 317 scientic discoveries, 315 secondary chemistry, 283 western science, 63 modern view, 175 Mohapatra, 292 Mohapatra and Bhattacharya, 292 Mohini Mullick, 40 mole concept, 280 molecular motions, 280 molecules, 334 Mole Asante, 116 momenta, 303 moral issues, 209 Morris Kline, 220, 230 MORST, 4 motion, 289 motions of celestial objects, 312 Mueller, 261, 264 Mullick, 41 multicultural, 52, 53 communities, 51 literature on science, 62 materials, 53 mathematics, 211
perspective, 56 perspectives, 51, 58 science, 53, 56 science education, 13 multiculturalism, 55 mathematics, 214 multiculturalists, 62, 63 multisciences, 56 Mutazilah, 257 mysterious, 315 N.R. Hanson, 43 nave inductivism, 198 Nadeau & Desautels, 118 Nalanda, 252 Nanda, 106 Narayana, 226, 231 NAS, 112 Nasiruddin, 241 Native American views, 57 natives, 209 natural kinds, 160 motion, 180 phenomena, 59, 120 philosopher, 120 philosophy, 53, 120, 195 resources, 202, 312 sciences, 118, 195 naturalism Quinean, 75 naturalist, 58, 93 naturalistic, 59, 93 conceptual system, 121 observation, 52 observation and insight, 63 nature, 122 and method of science, 201 and philosophy of science, 320 and science, 48 of chemical bonding, 281 of electronic orbitals, 279 of Indian mathematics, 237 of knowledge, 89 of light, 281 of objectivity in science, 116 of science, 15, 22, 27, 58, 85, 99, 283, 301, 302, 316, 319322, 324328, 330, 331 of scientic activity, 43 of scientic knowledge, 117, 154 of scientic mode, 46 of synthesis, 208 Nayyayika notion of proof, 255 NCERT, 241, 252254, 320, 323330 NCERT text, 253
Needham, 61 Neils Bohr, 42 Nelkin, 52 Neoplatonic, 258 Neoplatonic linkages, 260 Neoplatonic principles, 257 Neoplatonism, 244, 257, 258 Neoplatonists, 244, 260 Neugebauer, 213 Neuhaus, 112 Neurath, 94 New Apollonians, 135 new Dionysians, 135 Newlands, 283 Newton, 47, 98, 225, 301 inverse cube law, 95 notebooks, 101 Newtonian mechanics, 302, 303, 306, 316 notion, 249 synthesis, 47, 48 Niels Bohr, 282 night-sky, 312 Nilakantha, 226, 227, 231 nitric oxide, 198 non-Euclidean, 266 geometry, 211 non-European mathematical traditions, 220 mathematics, 235 non-living nature, 311 non-science, 58, 195 non-stoichiometry, 205 Normal Dahl, 39 Norman Levitt, 85 Norris, 104, 106 Norris-Tull & Norris-Tull, 52 Norris-Tull, & Norris-Tull, 53 notion inequality, 261 rapidity of convergence, 232 space and time, 176 Novak, 165, 289 NSTA, 112 number system, 214 O.B. Hardison, 114 Oakely, 39 objective education, 258 knowledge, 75 objectivism, 59 objectivity, 325 and precision, 202 of science, 322
observation, 309, 316 observational astronomy, 167 astronomy research project, 167 observing, 308 of Research Programmes, 46 of science, 286 Ogawa, 56 Ohms law, 291, 295 omissions and appropriation, 214 omnipotency of science, 331 On Floating Bodies, 180 one right answer, 282 oneness, 305 Ontario Board of Education, 279 Ontario program, 284 ontological, 43 presuppositions, 170 realism, 117 ontology, 76 optics, 281 order and causality, 61 organic or inorganic, 207 organization, 320 origin alternative framework, 292 origin of science, 24 origins of modern science, 30 Orwell, 104 Osborne, 289 outcomes of learning of science, 319 Overton, 52 Owens, 54 oxygen, 198 and hydrogen, 198, 199 discovery, 279 oxygene, 198 P.R.K. Rao, 41 Pappus, 243, 265 paracetamol, 305 paradigm, 100, 199 paradigmatic shifts, 46 parallel postulate, 267 parameters, 309 parapsychology, 105 partitioning, 305 Passmore, 5 pathological tests, 310 pathshala-s, 252 Paul Gross, 85 Paul Saltman, 113 Paulus Gerdes, 219 pedagogical, 53 pedagogoy
critical, 116 pedagogy, 77 good, 285 mathematics, 238 Peoples science, 305 Peoples science movements, 47 periodic law, 284, 286 periodic table, 279, 280, 282284, 313 personal cleanliness, 307 perspective on science, 55 Perspectives Multicultural, 51 Peru, 216 pessimistic historical meta-induction, 22 phenomenological, 302, 314 theory, 303 phenomenology, 303306, 316, 317 health, 310 practical subjects, 306 Philippus, 242 philosopher, 85, 118 philosopher of science, 22 philosophical, 41, 58 analysis, 206 arguments, 197 aspects of science, 41 materialism, 117 views, 58 views about science, 204 philosophies, 202 philosophy, 3, 42, 46, 54, 58, 76, 117, 195 of logical positivism, 117 of Neoplatonism, 244 of science, 911, 14, 23, 28, 40, 46, 71, 75, 176, 196, 203, 205 science, 58 phlogistic chemistry, 29 phrenology, 90 physical analogies, 181 condition, 202 particles, 206 science, 309 systems, 193 physics, 41, 185, 204, 206, 250, 261, 289, 303, 312, 335 physiology, 309, 310 Piaget, 71 Pickering, 104 Pierre Jartoux, 236 Pierre Macquare, 206 Pillars of health, 310 Pinch, 21, 86, 99, 106 Pinch and Collins, 105 planetary motions, 303
Plato, 242, 243, 250, 254, 265 Platonic idealism, 255 Platonic philosophy, 247 Platonic-Kantian, 251 Platonic-Pythagorean Tradition, 149 Platonism, 46 Plotinus, 258 political philosophy, 14 science, 219 Polymer substances, 335 polymerase enzyme, 113 Popper, 22, 98, 106 Popperian falsiability, 72 porphyry, 192, 243, 258 positional number system, 216 system, 214 positivism, 117 Posner, 289 post colonialism, 55 post modernism, 55 post-epistemological, 76 post-modernist, 71 postmodernist philosophy, 14 postulates, 265 potential difference, 291, 295 practical applications of chemistry, 282 mathematics, 258 skills, 316 pragmatic conception of science education, 21 view, 58 pragmatism, 200 pragmatist, 104 pre-scientic, 304 knowledge-systems, 302 presocratics, 24 primary education, 307 ontological reduction, 3941, 43, 44 school level, 316 prime numbers, 215 Principe, 27 Principia, 21, 98 principle, 202, 286, 301, 317, 332 and theories, 306 chemical elementarity, 199 chemical simplicity, 199 chemistry, 203, 279, 284 conservation of mass, 199 equilibrium, 179 fundamental, 202
mechanics, 39 unifying, 202 problem solving, 333, 334 procedural knowledge, 292, 295 process of enquiry, 327 processes of science, 320, 332 Proclus, 242245, 251, 254, 257, 259 professional CMS courses, 306, 316 Prociency Levels of Rural School, 301 Project 2000+, 111 proof, 253, 266 deductive, 251 properties of elements, 280 protagonists, 199 pseudo-science, 58, 106 pseudo-scientic, 26 pseudoscience, 58 Pseudoscientic and irrational world views, 5 psychological form of constructivism, 71 psychologism, 97 psychologistic, 91 psychologists, 165 psychology, 98 Ptolemy, 242, 243 public scientic literacy, 115 square, 112, 117 understanding of science, 111, 127 pure elements, 199 pure hydrogen and pure oxygen, 199 pure results, 199 Putumana Somayajin, 226, 227 Pythagoras, 48, 214, 244, 265 theorem, 253 Pythagorean theorem, 250, 251, 254 viewpoint, 125 Pythagoreanism, 46 Pythagoreans, 244 qualitative test, 209 visualisable models, 293 quantication and measurement, 263 quantitative formulation of problems, 202 quantum mechanics, 31, 204, 279, 281, 303 theory, 31, 53 questions, 322 Quine, 94 Quine-Duhem, 94 Quinean naturalism, 75 underdetermination, 72 R. J. Gillespie, 203
racist history, 252 radical constructivism, 71, 72 relativism, 119 skepticism, 106 social constructivist, 119 social constructivists, 116, 117, 119 sociologist of scientic knowledge, 121 radioactive properties, 282 radioactivity, 280 Ramanujan, 238 rampant relativism, 86 rare-earths, 282 rarer media, 192 rational, 56 reconstruction, 96 reconstruction of beliefs, 96 theology, 243, 251, 257 rationalism, 72 rationalist, 58, 91, 94, 97, 98 philosophers, 91, 96 philosophy of science, 92 theories, 92 view, 91 rationality, 96, 99, 116 African, 116 and critical thinking, 24 Rayleigh-Jeans, 31 reaction mechanism, 205 reaction rates, 207 real world experiments, 176 realism, 22 realism/instrumentalism, 28 realist, 58, 61 reason, 176 reasoned thought, 96 reasoning, 207, 307, 308, 316 mathematical, 193 skills, 13 students, 322 rediscovery of Greek thought, 46 reducibility, 305 reductionistic thinking, 125 relative density, 177 relativism, 66, 72, 93 relativist, 21 relativistic, 178 Relativistic Analysis, 178 Relativistic dethronement, 47 relativity, 193 theory, 249 representations of numbers and space, 215 requirements, 314 research chemists in USA, 201
cognitive developmental, 165 scientists, 204 resistance, 291 resistances, 192 Richard Dawkins, 51, 119 Richard J. Merill, 281 ritual geometry, 259 Robert Boyle, 206 Robertta Barba, 53 Roger Penrose, 61 role of chemistry, 205 history of chemistry, 200 history of science, 200 Roth, 293 Royal Asiatic Society, 226 rules of categorisation, 332 Ruse, 112, 118 Russell, 248, 268 Sadratnamala, 227, 232 Sagan, 60 Salviati, 175 Samarapungavan, Vosniadou, & Brewer, 167 Samarkand Observatory, 235 Sample examination paper, 47 Sandra Harding, 116 Sanitation, 312 Sankara, 231 Sankara Variyar, 226 Sankara Varman, 227 SAS postulate, 253 Saxena, 289293 school Alexandrian, 180 chemistry textbooks, 279 children, 211 education, 197, 302 high, 301 Kerala, 225, 228, 230 middle, 301 primary, 301 science, 51, 52 science curriculum, 52 science education, 315 science textbook, 320 Schopenhauer, 250 Schr dingers cat, 255 o science, 46, 51, 100, 195, 200, 209, 286, 301306, 316, 322, 323, 331, 334 popularization among housewives, 315 wars, 21 alternative, 47 and philosophy, 14 and society, 331
and technology, 39, 306, 311, 317, 323, 326, 331, 334, 335 and technology for society, 323 and technology with society, 326 anti, 115 antithetical, 117 basic knowledge, 331 burden, 301 celebration, 111 central, 204 centrality, 125 centres, 315 cognitive enterprise, 39 community, 62 competencies, 327 computer, 41 concept, 301, 317 curricula, 55, 136, 165, 301, 303, 316 curriculum, 327 curriculum frameworks, 112 deconstruction, 121 denition of, 51, 52 dehumanises, 135 development, 61, 279, 331 discourse, 63 educationists, 320 educators, 24 empirical, 93 empirical nature, 322, 331, 334 epistemology, 156 ethnomethodology of, 100 exclusivity, 62 for all, 111, 114 for common people, 301 for painters, 303 for physicians, 303 good, 199, 285 growth, 200, 201 historical activity, 42 historical aspects, 41 history of, 199 human activity, 201 in daily-life situations, 301 instruction, 200, 209 interest, 122, 202 Islamic, 62 learning, 165, 166, 171, 200, 320, 328 learning of, 165 liking, 201 literacy crisis, 3 methodological dimension, 11 nature, 331 of pendulum motion, 7 or scientic investigation, 196 pedagogy, 164
philosophical aspects, 41 philosophical dimension, 11 popularization, 301, 302, 315 principles, 301, 317 purpose, 306 society, 331 Standard Account of, 53 standard account of, 66 teachers, 3 teaching, 32 technology, and society, 196, 203 theory, 301 thinking process, 331 traditional, 302, 304, 305 universal, 51, 52 universality of, 51 uses and abuses, 201 utilitarian view, 21 wars, 52, 71, 85 wars in India, 106 western, 51, 53, 63 with society, 331 science and technology use, 319 science classrooms, 197 science curricula interdisciplinary, 123 science education, 5, 6, 8, 9, 24, 43, 51, 52, 56, 71, 78, 86, 100, 112, 123, 135, 171, 195 197, 199, 200, 205, 209, 226, 301, 306 and logic, 10 curriculum, 196 general education, 302 multicultural, 13 programme, 164 purpose, 302 research, 165, 173 science, technology and society, 40, 323, 334 curricula, 13, 123 science-technology-society, 14 scientic, 209, 306 enlightenment, 316 and epistemological relativism, 65 and technological needs, 39 antirealism, 32 appreciation of nature, 306 belief, 89, 98 community, 40, 62, 111, 112, 117, 205 concept, 5, 114, 168, 200, 295 creativity, 306 criteria, 202 development and conceptual change, 13 disciplines, 41 enterprise, 333 experiments, 135
ideas, 59, 111, 166, 196 illiteracy, 101 imagination, 175 inquiry, 103, 293 investigation, 304 investigations, 113 knowledge, 810, 14, 55, 62, 86, 89, 92, 104, 116, 118, 121, 124, 125, 133, 135, 136, 209, 213, 261, 332 literacy, 115, 334 method, 39, 46, 197, 333, 334 methods of investigation, 202 model of current, 290 organizations, 301 outlook, 301, 306 pipeline, 122 positivism, 111, 117, 119, 121 positivists, 120 progress, 63, 114 rationality, 106 realism, 32 research, 325 revolution, 30, 46, 97 skills, 316 skills of observation, 307 text, 121 themes and concepts, 125 theory, 23, 60, 93, 94, 96, 102, 154, 167, 283, 285 thinking, 125, 322, 325, 326, 334 truths, 44 understanding, 315 view of the earth, 168 ways of thinking, 112 world, 292 description, 51 investigation, 302 knowledge, 66, 154 method, 286 theory, 93 theory construction, 269 theory prole, 58 scientically educated men and women, 126 scientically literate, 317 scienticity of science, 101 scientism, 63, 64, 136 scientist, 42, 200, 201, 207, 303, 306, 315, 323, 326, 333 Scott, 58 second law of thermodynamics, 196 secondary, 306, 309, 316 school science textbooks, 320 education, 307 semiconductors, 204 senior secondary, 306, 316
sequence model, 290 Settle, 118 Shakespeare, 42 shape of the earth, 167, 173 Shepardson and Pizzini, 321 Shipstone, 289291, 293 Side-Angle-Side, 248, 251 Signals, 310 Silver Chloride, 203 Simplicio, 175, 192 sixth and seventh-row rare earths, 282 Sjberg, 111 Skinner, 97 Skinnerian, 97, 98 Sky-watching, 313 Slezak, 97, 98 slowness of motion, 183 Smith, 289 Smith, Blakeslee and Anderson, 294 Smith, Siegel & McInerney, 5 Smolicz & Nunan, 118 Snively & Corsiglia, 56, 59, 63, 65 Snivley & Corsiglia, 53 social, 41 constructivist view, 116 activity, 296 application, 205 constructivism, 21, 8587, 9195, 9799, 106, 117 constructivist doctrines, 87, 91, 104, 106 constructivist ideas, 104 constructivist programme, 97 constructivist writings, 104 constructivists, 94, 104 justice, 317 nature of chemical discovery, 205 social sciences, 195 socio-cultural mileu, 319 sociogical constructivist, 77 sociological, 58 form of constructivism, 71, 86 programme, 91 relativism, 95 relativist views, 21 sociologies of science, 14 sociologist, 85, 94, 95 of science, 117, 287 sociology, 95 sociology of knowledge, 88, 89, 96, 97 sociology of science, 99 sociology of scientic knowledge, 87, 90, 91, 98, 104 Socratic dialogue, 293 sodium atom, 209 sodium chloride, 281
sodium metal, 209 Sokal, 119 Sokal Hoax, 85 solar, 313 Solomon, 292 solving problems of physics, 184 Sophism, 46 sources, 302 South America, 216 South Bihar, 301 Spain, 213 specic empirical statements, 178 specic-theories, 170 speed, 192 spherical shape of the earth, 171 spiritual phenomena, 59 spiritualism, 115 Srinivas Ramanujan, 221 stages of learning, 286 stagnation, 317 standard account, 5153, 55, 56, 58, 6164 standard units, 312 Stanley & Brickhouse, 55, 59 Stanley Fish, 116 Stanley Miller, 113 state of equilibrium, 179 statics, 180, 193 stellar aberration, 303 Stephen Hawking, 61 stereochemistry, 207 Steve Fuller, 116 Steven Brush, 200 Sthananga Sutra, 226 stoichiometry, 205, 280, 281 stories of scientic success, 114 strategy achieve conceptual change, 293 conceptual change, 293 strict objectivity, 117 Strike, Hewson and Gertzog, 292 strong cultural aspect, 209 strong programme, 88, 89, 91, 9698 structure, 205 atom, 279 periodic table, 279 structured curriculum, 293 STS, 201 education, 14 students motivation and social maturity, 202 understanding of science, 202 understanding of technology, 202 students concept of current, 289 own bias, 324
reasoning in electrokinetics, 291 study of chemistry, 205 of science and epistemology, 91 sub-atomic particles, 284 sub-divided into disciplines, 303 subject matter of CMS, 304 sulbasutra, 259 sulbasutra-s, 259, 260 sulbasutras, 225, 230, 253 Summers, 294 Summers, Kruger and Mant, 289 super conductors, 208 superstition, 305, 312, 314, 317 Sutton, 332 swiftness of motion, 183 syllabi, 307 symbolic models, 159 Symptoms of health, 310 synthesis, 207, 208 synthetic, 255 approach, 258 aspect of chemistry, 204 geometry, 253, 259 models, 167, 168, 170 T.L. Heath, 180 Tus, 241 Takebe Katahiro, 237 Takshashila, 252 Tantrasamgraha, 226 Tasmania, 215 taxonomically ordered, 42 Taxonomy, 286 Taylor series, 232 teacher education, 289, 295 teaching and history, 39 history and philosophy of science, 39 classroom, 211 geometry, 252 physics, 296 science, 165, 279, 319 technical parameters, 311 terms, 309 technology, 306, 309 and scientic positivism, 118 agricultural, 316 industrial, 316 teleological, 91, 97, 98 teleological model, 96 teleological view, 96 tempels, 54 terminology, 315
tertiary, 306 textbook, 284 Thabit Ibn Qurra, 241 Thales, 214 Theaetetus, 242 theistic traditions, 120 Theocharis & Psimopoulos, 112 theological curriculum, 260 theology, 48, 58, 252, 257 Theon, 243, 245 Theonine, 248250 theorem of Menelaus, 243 theoretical basis, 305 consistency, 59 construction, 176 constructions, 193 framework, 165, 166 imagination, 176, 178 model, 193 analysis, 206 theories, 202, 324, 332 scientic, 93 theory, 165 knowledge, 104 electromagnetic, 44 knowledge, 22 theory of evolution, 4 thermodynamic, 207 thermodynamics, 204 caloric, 29 second law, 196 think logically, 202 thinking processes, 324, 329 processes of science, 322, 325 convergent, 24 divergent, 24 lateral, 24 third planet, 282 third world womens science, 106 Thomas Fuller, 218, 219 Thomas Kuhn, 199 Thomist philosophy, 257 Thompson, 284 Thorley and Woods, 289 Thorndikes Law of Effect, 98 Thornton, 295 thought activity, 324 experiment, 176, 185, 321, 324, 333 experiment, 31 tidal action, 52 TIMSS, 111 Tobias, 126
Tobin & Tippins, 78 Todhunter, 241, 248 Toldeo, 213 total vacuum, 192 totalitarian, 99 totality of science, 303 tradition of geometry, 260 traditional, 255, 316 ecological knowledge, 56 geometry, 254, 259 notion of proof, 254 parameter, 309, 315 representationalist theories, 76 science, 302, 304, 305 understanding, 316 wisdom, 317 traditions Buddhist and Jaina, 255 transcendental idealism, 73 philosophy, 74 transfer of the learning, 329 Treagust, Harrison and Venville, 294 treatment of data, 202 triads or octaves, 283 Truesdell, 41 truth-functional logic, 255 Uclides, 242, 257, 259, 260 ultra-violet catastrophe, 31 unacceptable biasedness, 201 unbiased observation, 201 underdetermination Quinean,, 72 understand the phenomena in chemistry, 204 understanding, 304 nature, 305 chemistry, 203 nature and knowledge, 304 the universe, 202 understanding science concept, 165 UNESCO, 111 uniformity, 122 unifying principles, 202 unilinear trajectory, 212, 213 unity of science, 305 universal concept of science, 62 science, 62 universalist, 52 perspective, 52 perspective on science, 51 universality, 51, 62
science, 62 concept of, 52 science, 51, 62 university science textbooks, 112 Upapatti, 222 use of science and technology, 319 uses and abuses of science, 201 utilitarian, 86 view of science, 21 V.K. Jairath, 41 vacuum, 186 valence electrons, 284 validity of knowledge, 106 van Fraassen, 71 varieties of constructivism, 71, 86 vast generalizations, 302 verbal behaviour, 97 Victor Katz, 239 Vidal Abarca and San Joze, 328 Vidal-Abraca and Sanzose, 327 view equality, 295 hierarchy, 295 of nature, 47 vigesimal, 216 Vikrami, 312, 313 Vine DeLoria, 53 visual impact, 328 vital resources of the common man, 315 vocabularly, 331 void, 176, 192 voltage and current, 291 von Glasersfeld, 77 Vosniadou, 167 Vosniadou & Brewer, 167, 168 W.H. Freeman, 281 Wallis, 225 Walsh, 117 warnings given by the body, 310 water as a compound, 199 Watson and Crick, 332 Watts and Gilbert, 289 Western science, 63 western science, 63 William Brewer, 167 witch-craft, 305 Wittgenstein, 97 Wolfgang Pauli, 282 woman mathematician, 217 Woolgar, 99101 working knowledge, 202 world view, 111, 177, 178, 196, 201 Galilean, 177
Aristotelian, 176, 177 Galilean, 178 X-ray crystallographic patterns, 332 X-ray diffraction, 281 Yager, 115 Yang Guangxian, 236 Yash Pal Committee, 317 Yesudas Ramchandra, 237 Yoruba method of multiplication, 220 YuktiBhasa, 254, 260 Yuktibhasa, 226, 227 Zaire, 215 Zambia, 215 zero, 216 introduction, 214 Zij al-Arjabhar, 226 Ziman, 112 zoology, 286
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Philosphy of Science

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Contents

Science Teaching: The Role of History and Philosophy of Science

Science Teaching: The Role of HPS

Michael Matthews Science and Cultural Health

Science Teaching: The Role of HPS

Science Teaching: The Role of HPS

4. Romantic Reaction 5. Idealisation and Theory Testing 6. Industrial Revolution

Science Teaching: The Role of HPS

Science Teaching: The Role of HPS

Michael Matthews Contributions of HPS to Science Education

Science Teaching: The Role of HPS

Michael Matthews Conclusion

Science Teaching: The Role of HPS

Science Teaching: The Role of HPS

Science Teaching: The Role of HPS

Does Science Teaching Need History and Philosophy of Science?

Does Science Teaching Need History and Philosophy of Science?

As if responding directly to Collins and Pinch, Einstein adds:

Does Science Teaching Need History and Philosophy of Science?

Contrary to a naive empiricist views, Newtons approach is characterised by Densmore:

Does Science Teaching Need History and Philosophy of Science?

Does Science Teaching Need History and Philosophy of Science?

Does Science Teaching Need History and Philosophy of Science?

Does Science Teaching Need History and Philosophy of Science?

Does Science Teaching Need History and Philosophy of Science?

Does Science Teaching Need History and Philosophy of Science?

Does Science Teaching Need History and Philosophy of Science?

Teaching History and Philosophy of Science: Experience at IIT Kanpur

Maximum length of answer for each question: 300 words

Multiculturalism in Science Education and the Question of Universalism

Texas A&M University. Email: cloving@tamu.edu

Multiculturalism in Science Education

Cobern & Loving

Multiculturalism in Science Education

Cobern & Loving

Multiculturalism in Science Education

Cobern & Loving

56 The Universality of Science

Multiculturalism in Science Education

Cobern & Loving

Multiculturalism in Science Education

Cobern & Loving

Multiculturalism in Science Education

Cobern & Loving

Multiculturalism in Science Education

Other Knowledge Domains

Cobern & Loving Epistemological Pluralism

Multiculturalism in Science Education

Cobern & Loving

Multiculturalism in Science Education

Cobern & Loving

Multiculturalism in Science Education

Varieties of Constructivism and their (Ir-)Relevance to Science Education

Constructivism and Science Education

Piaget himself explains clearly:

Constructivism and Science Education

Constructivism and Science Education

Constructivism and Science Education

Translation: Students sometimes learn new things.

Constructivism and Science Education

kids in school dont do the same thing as scientists

paying attention not paying attention the real world

Constructivism and Science Education