P 211638Z DEC 06 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8642 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 004654 SUBJECT: THE SECURITY SITUATION

IN ANBAR: A YEAREND REVIEW Classified By: ANBAR PRT LEADER JIM SORIANO. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 1. (U) This is a PRT Anbar reporting cable.

2. (S) Summary. The security situation in Anbar is typically described as "deteriorating," and there is little doubt that the enemy is deeply rooted here and ruthlessly pursues its goals. However, AQI is on the defensive. The organization may have been able to intimidate Anbari civilians with relative ease at the beginning of 2006, but finds that task more difficult as the year closes. Several key indicators are pointed in the right direction. Two such developments include the emergence last September of a group of Ramadi-based sheikhs who are battling AQI, as well as a tribalbased police recruitment drive. Neither factor was on the scene as recently as four months ago; nor did they arise merely because of the initiative of local leaders. They happened because of ongoing Coalition and Iraqi security operations in Ramadi, which are enabling local citizens to regain control

of their city. The anti-insurgent tribal movement in Ramadi is making a bid to spread its influence to other cities. Police recruitment is up, compared to the slow in-take earlier in the year. The two Iraqi army divisions in the province have been bloodied in battle and are showing increasing confidence. On the down side, they are 5,000 soldiers below full complement and are hampered by inadequate logistics. Two further elements are needed in our engagement with Anbar: encouraging constructive governmental relations between Baghdad and Ramadi, a necessary condition for post-war reconstruction and national reconciliation; and the need for local elections. End Summary. ------------The Situation ------------3. (SBU) The recently published Iraq Study Group Report contains only four references to Anbar Province, one of which stated: "In Anbar, the violence is attributable to the Sunni insurgency and to Al-Qaeda (AQI), and the situation is deteriorating." Keying on that sentence, a web search on "Anbar" and "deteriorating" returns 95,000 hits, suggesting that the press shares the view that the province is slipping into the hands of the insurgents. But far from slipping away, the security situation in Anbar presents several opportunities that could reduce insurgent attacks to a level that would allow the return to normal economic and political life.

4. (S) AQI is on the defensive. Coalition Forces (CF) and Iraqi security forces (ISF) are taking the battle to the enemy and much of the rise in weekly attacks (see below) reflects AQI defensive action. AQI never had widespread public support in Anbar and signs point to growing public opposition to the insurgency. At the beginning of 2006, AQI was able to intimidate Anbari civilians with relative ease; it finds that task more difficult as the year closes. --------The Enemy --------5. (S) AQI is the dominant insurgent group on the scene today. It has eliminated or co-opted competition from Baathist insurgents, who are no longer a significant factor. Ansar Al-Sunna is also active, but accounts for a small percentage of attacks on CF and the ISF. AQI aims to debilitate the Iraqi police (IP), keep pressure on the CF, and intimidate the local population. 6. (S) AQI's murder and intimidation campaign targets the police, local government officials, contractors working on Coalition or GOI projects, and prominent citizens. Anbar's Provincial Council fled to the relative safety of Baghdad last April amid continuing insurgent threats. Council members say that security conditions in Ramadi are still too volatile to contemplate the Council's early return to the province. The Council is effectively in exile.

7. (S) AQI is deeply involved in economic crime and has disrupted the normal patterns of commercial and social life in the province. It is involved in hijacking, highway extortion, black marketing, and control of gasoline stations, and is largely selffinanced by these activities. Moreover, Anbari youths -- even pre-teens -- are commonly detained in security sweeps. AQI has increasingly resorted to the use of children as auxiliaries, look outs, and even as attackers. 8. (S) There are few foreign fighters, estimated at 300 to 500, in the province. Foreign fighters, using valid or forged travel documents, typically enter from Syria through the Walid border crossing, or in the vicinity of the Al-Qaim crossing, which opened in mid-December. Few foreign fighters enter through Jordan. Some assume AQI leadership positions; others travel to points east to conduct anti-Shia operations. 9. (S) Recidivism is a continuing problem that tends to replenish insurgent ranks. Security detainees are typically not prosecuted because Anbar does not have a criminal justice system. Some detainees are transferred to Baghdad for arraignment, but many are released without criminal prosecution after serving the statutory detention period. The photos of many at-large insurgents show them wearing the orange prison jumpsuit of a previous detention. Recidivism makes local citizens less willing to cooperate with CF and the ISF because they perceive that detained insurgents

will soon be on the street again. --------------------------------------Security Incidents: Long-term up trend --------------------------------------10. (S) Insurgent attacks have increased steadily throughout 2006, rising to about 430 incidents recorded weekly by mid-December from 230 weekly incidents a year ago. Two-thirds of the attacks take place in Ramadi. 11. (S) The year-long rise in attacks is due to several factors, including the effectiveness of AQI,s murder and intimidation campaign, as well as the increased presence of CF and ISF in the field. There are more Iraqi police, army, and CF than a year ago, presenting AQI with more targets. Another factor is AQI's improved its command and control. The killing last June of AQI chief Abu Musab AlZarqawi was followed by an increase in attacks on CF, suggesting that the organization will not be neutralized merely by the elimination of its leadership. ----------------Tribal Engagement ----------------12. (S) Perhaps the most significant development on the battlefield this year was the emergence of a group of anti-insurgent tribal leaders in the

Ramadi area, led by Sheikh Sattar Abu Risha. The group was formed in mid-September and is variously referred to in the press as the "Awakening Council of Anbar" (Sahawa Al-Anbar, SAA) or the "Salvation Council." 13. (S) SAA is a backlash phenomenon, a tribal reaction to AQI excesses. Sheikh Sattar himself has lost his father and a brother to AQI assassins in the past two years. SAA fighters have taken control of several neighborhoods of east Ramadi. The movement comprises some 25 tribes and is making a bid to spread its influence east and west from Ramadi through the Euphrates Valley. The SAA reportedly has killed 70-80 insurgents since September, while sustaining 35 "martyrs" in its own ranks. 14. (U) Sattar and his group publicly denounce the notion of "honorable resistance," which is the moral double-standard in currency among some Sunni clerics which prohibits an Iraqi from taking the life of another Iraqi, but is silent on the taking of a life of a CF soldier. Sattar has publicly described the Coalition Forces as "friendly forces," openly cooperates with them, and calls on other tribal leaders to do the same. 15. (U) Today the SAA is actively recruiting area youth to serve in the police force, striving, with apparent success, to raise 4,000 policemen. Police recruitment in the Ramadi area has surged in recent months. By contrast, few applicants answered the recruitment drives last summer when AQI had greater

influence in Ramadi. ----------------The Al-Qaim Model ----------------16. (S) MNF-West commanders continue to engage tribal leaders like Sattar, using them as a sort of "force multiplier" in the fight against AQI. The anti-insurgent phenomenon now evident in Ramadi was previewed 16 months ago in the Syrian border town of Al-Qaim, when the local Abu Mahal tribe decided to align itself with MNF-West forces to eliminate AQI. The result of that cooperation was a success: today Al-Qaim has thriving markets, full schools, a functioning city government, and even real estate development. A key element in the formula was the recruitment of Abu Mahal youth into the local police force, which helps the tribe keep a close eye on jihadist activity. Today the tribal sheikhs of Ramadi are trying to imitate that experience. ----------------Battle for Ramadi ----------------17. (S) Using Al-Qaim as a model, MNF-West forces launched major operations in Ramadi in June. They are still underway. The plan calls for establishing a series of inter-locking combat outposts (COPs), forward positions set up in urban areas to deny space to the insurgents. The COPs are set up sequentially, a new one going up as MNF-

West pushes into a new neighborhood, -- and as soon as ISF are ready to follow up. From these positions, MNF-West keeps "overwatch" and patrols actively. Depending on conditions, security duties are transitioned first to the Iraqi Army (IA) and then to the local police. In some instances, the IA co-locates with CF on the same COP, or they set up their own outposts nearby. 18. (S) The operation proceeds in stages: isolate the area of interest; clear; retain; and transition to ISF. The process as a whole is visible to the local population, a sign that the Coalition and ISF are there to stay and are determined to eliminate the insurgents. Residents who had earlier fled the area begin to return. 19. (S) Such operations in Ramadi have had tangible results. The mobilization of Ramadi tribal sheikhs to fight AQI and the increase in local applicants for the police force did not happen merely because local leaders took the initiative. They happened as a result of CF and ISF security operations. The CF and the ISF shaped the security environment to allow local citizens to regain control of their lives. Looked at another way, the tribes of Ramadi would not be standing up to AQI and the city,s youth would not be applying for police jobs if they doubted the CF,s staying power. ----------------------Anbar's police and army -----------------------

20. (S) Compared to other provinces, Anbar has much catching up to do on police recruitment, but momentum is evident in recent months. Some 8,400 policemen are now on the province's rolls, compared to 1,000 policemen twelve months ago, and virtually none twenty-four months ago. The police are deployed in every Anbari city and town, with the exception of the desert oasis of Rutbah. The province aims at maxing out its full complement of 11,300 police officers by spring 2007. 21. (S) Meanwhile, Anbar's two IA divisions, the First and the Seventh Iraqi Army Divisions, continue to expand their operations. Both units have been bloodied in battle, are demonstrating confidence, and are eager to engage the enemy. Fifteen of the divisions' battalions now control independent battle spaces. On the downside, however, the two divisions are about 5,000 troops below full complement. The lack of manning and logistical support hampers IA operations in the province. 22. (S) Another drawback is that the police force is largely Sunni, as recruits are enlisted locally. The two IA divisions, however, are recruited nationally, and consequently their ranks are filled with Shia Muslims. There appears to be little desire by Anbari youth to join the army, which they perceive as a basically a Shia organization. Although many Shia army recruits in Anbar show loyalty to cleric Moqtada Al-Sadr, to date they have not displayed any sectarian antagonism on the battlefield.

-------------The Road Ahead -------------23. (S) No one has any illusions as to the difficulties ahead in the Battle for Anbar. The enemy is deeply rooted, adaptable, and ruthless. But Anbar's situation is far from "deteriorating." Key indicators are pointed in the right direction. One challenge that is ever-present is getting GOIAnbar governmental relations right. A combination of GOI neglect, administrative snafu, and Anbar's estrangement from the national political process has long hindered the flow of financing and other support from Baghdad to the province. The country's Sunni-Shia divide introduces an element of mutual suspicion in the relations between the Center and Ramadi. Consequently, the absence of GOI fiscal and policy support for the province has been a contributing factor for the insurgency. Building constructive Center-provincial ties is essential for turning the battle in our favor, as well as for post-war reconstruction and for national reconciliation. MNF-West and the PRT have roles to play in this regard. 24. (S) One element missing in our counterinsurgency strategy is provincial and municipal elections. Anbar's Provincial Council was elected in the January 2005 poll. Anbaris boycotted; only 3,700 votes were cast province-wide in a population of 1.2 million residents. Today the Council's claim to legitimacy rests on the shaky foundation

of a scant voter turn-out in a boycotted poll. Elsewhere in the province, some municipal councils have dispersed because of insurgent pressure. Those that continue to meet are the legacies of the CPA days. Both the provincial and municipal councils are today self-perpetuating: they fill vacancies without the expression of a public ballot. 25. (S) Anbaris recognize that they made a mistake boycotting the January 2005 poll. Electoral refreshment is needed. Holding local elections has tactical advantages in a counterinsurgency strategy. Evidence suggests that contested areas with functioning local governments tend to be more stable than those without them (AlQaim v. Ramadi, e.g.). But ultimately, such elections would allow the Anbaris themselves to search for their own political accommodations and have a voice in the future course of their province. KHALILZAD (Edited and reading.) reformatted by Andres for ease of