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Prior to adoption of the plan, the United States will initiate a process of binding
consultation with Japan and will propose that:
(insert plan)
During consultation, the U.S. will advocate the adoption of this proposal, but will allow
Japan to propose modifications and alternate solutions. The U.S. will adopt and
implement per the results of consultation. Funding and enforcement are provided. We
reserve the right to clarify.
The word resolved means ?to make a firm decision.? The counterplan allows for policy
changes to occur.
B. Net Benefits.
1. Prior, genuine consultation is critical to the alliance
Programmatically, making the alliance work is less a matter of bold new initiatives that of
achieving improved consultation between Tokyo and Washington on the whole panoply
of international issues that they face. The Armitage Report contains numerous specific
recommendations along these lines. For example, Washington must accept a greater
political role for Japan and understand that there is a difference between genuine
consultation and mere forewarning. At the same time, Tokyo should be reminded that
global and regional policy initiatives undertaken without prior consultation with
Washington ? such as AMF proposals in 1997, and the FTAs that it has launched
unilaterally in recent years ? are unlikely to succeed. The alternative to making the
alliance work would be for Japan to become an autonomous great power. Under current
circumstances, without significant regional organizations that mediate festering historical
animosities, this would run the risk of destabilizing Asia.!
Its huge costs, to Japan itself and to the United States as well as to regional and global
stability, add strongly to the case for making every effort to restore the Japan-United
States relationship ? including in the economic sphere ? in a modern and normal
direction.
Kurt M. Campbell is a senior vice president and director of the International Security
Program at CSIS,. THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Fall 2000, p. 25
For all the talk of the U.S.-Japan security alliance as the cornerstone of U.S. strategy in
the Asian and Pacific region, there has not been enough attention by senior U.S.
policymakers, commentators, and elites to understand its complexities or sustain its
importance. Indeed, except for a brief period of strategic reexamination in 1995 -- the so-
called Nye initiative that culminated in the 1996 Clinton-Hashimoto Security Declaration
-- the alliance has, for more than a decade, been managed by mid-level bureaucrats on
both sides of the Pacific. (I must admit here to being one of those mid-level officials,
having worked at the Pentagon between 1995 and 2000 on Asian security matters.)
CONSULTATION STRENGTHENS RELATIONS
Dennis C. Blair and John T. Hanley Jr. Admiral Dennis C. Blair has been the
commander-in-chief of the U.S. Pacific Command since 1998. Dr. John T. Hanley is his
primary strategic adviser in the Asia-Pacific region, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY,
Winter 2001, p. 7
The way ahead in Northeast Asia is to reinvigorate U.S. bilateral alliances with Japan and
South Korea by clarifying their broader strategic purpose and direction. A decade after
the end of the Cold War, U.S. exercises with Japanese self-defense forces need to move
beyond scenarios involving the invasion of Japan. They need to address more directly the
provisions of the defense guidelines and to develop skills to cooperate on the broader
security agenda as Japan accepts a greater role in regional security. U.S. forces in South
Korea and Japan do much more than deter North Korean aggression. They reassure
these countries of the continuing U.S. commitment to our mutual defense treaties. U.S.
forces forward-stationed in these countries anchor U.S. commitments to extended nuclear
deterrence. As reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait
progresses, U.S. forward-stationed forces in Japan and South Korea will remain an
essential part of a security !
equilibrium, removing incentives for major strategic realignments or the buildup of
independent military capabilities that would raise tensions and spark arms races in the
region. These forces will also remain the best positioned U.S. forces to work with armed
forces throughout the Asia-Pacific region on shared interests in security and peaceful
development. A concurrent step is to pursue what Stephen Bosworth, U.S. ambassador to
the Republic of Korea, refers to as "enriched bilateralism." Enriched bilateralism
principally involves greater consultation and policy coordination with the nations of the
region regarding the full range of U.S. policies that affect their security interests, going
beyond those that affect only bilateral arrangements. U.S. consultation with security
partners regarding third countries before setting policy and taking action is becoming
more important as security challenges become more regional and interdependent.
Kent Calder, is director of the Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies and
Reischauer Professor of East Asian Studies at the School for Advanced International
Studies, Johns Hopkins University, ORBIS, Autumn 2003, p. 65
Similarly, Prime Minister Koizumi, who is especially reliant on public opinion given
intra-party weakness within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, has also found dramatic
U.S.-style foreign policy initiatives attractive in sustaining the support he needs to remain
effective on public-policy issues more generally.
Masaharu Kohno, Visiting Fellow, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, IN
SEARCH OF PROACTIVE DIPLOMACY, Fall 1999,
http://www.brook.edu/fp/cnaps/papers/1999_kohno.htm
Furthermore, Japan is often criticized for "always following the United States." The fact
is that Japan, as an ally of the United States, shares fundamental values and ideas with the
United States, and as such, its foreign policy naturally moves in a direction similar to that
of the United States. The Japanese decision-making process has been described as an
accumulation of slow actions based on precedents. According to this view, due to general
restraint in its foreign policy decisions and other various considerations, Japan has
refrained from unnecessarily overturning precedents. This reflects a pattern of behavior
that exists throughout the Japanese bureaucracy, but is not necessarily unique to Japan.
JAPAN WILL SAY YES ? THEY ALWAYS DO
THE DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo) January 23, 2004, p. 4
Now, under Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's leadership, Japan is virtually an
unquestioning partner of the United States. Tokyo has shown full support for Washington
in the most controversial and divisive U.S. foreign policy initiative since the Vietnam
War: the military overthrow of the regime of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.
Koizumi has also signed on to U.S. President George W. Bush's hard-line approach
toward North Korea.
Japan will say yes ? especially when the U.S. consults them. Support for Iraq and the war
on terror prove strong motive not to deviate from the U.S.
Lincoln, Council on Foreign Relations, 2004
[Edward, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter, p.
http://www.twq.com/04winter/docs/04winter_lincoln.pdf]
On one hand, Koizumi?s boldness in supporting the United States in the face of
opposition to the war from some 70 percent of the Japanese public appears an exercise of
leadership. On the other hand, a closer examination suggests that Koizumi?s behavior
reflected a familiar pattern in Japanese foreign policy. The Japanese had three reasons to
support Bush, none of which had anything to do with fighting outrageous dictators or
bringing a better future to the Middle East. First, the Japanese government wanted to
avoid aggravating the U.S. government the way it had during the Gulf War through its
slow and grudging support. Second, the real strategic issue for the Japanese government
was North Korea, and it expected that support for the war against Iraq would translate
into influence with Washington on policy toward North Korea. Whether or not that
assumption was correct, it factored into Japanese thinking. Third, Iraq became the most
recent opportunity for conservatives in Japan!
to press to alter or reinterpret the constitution to permit dispatching soldiers abroad for
combat. Thus, in East Asia and on a broader global scale, the Japanese government has
continued to act very much as it has ever since the end of the U.S. occupation, as a
subordinate power tied to the United States. The U.S. gov- ernment consults the Japanese
government, but the reality remains that Japan does not have its own seat at the table of
international policymaking. Although Japan criticized the U.S. government and the IMF
during the Asian financial crisis, it has not acted on these sentiments to lead its neighbors
toward a more independent stance on either international finance or trade. Neither in the
Middle East nor in Afghanistan has the Japanese government moved to claim expertise in
nation or economy building. Instead, it has ridden the coattails of the U.S. government,
avoiding criticism and advancing the causes of domestic conservatives concerning the
use of military!
force unrelated to the Middle East.
Dennis C. Blair has been the commander-in-chief of the U.S. Pacific Command since
1998. Dr. John T. Hanley is his primary strategic adviser in the Asia-Pacific region,
WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter, 2001, p. 7
Japan wants to be consulted on PKOs ? without a permanent seat on the Council, they
feel left out
Toshiro Ozawa, Ambassador of Japan to the United Nations, 6-3-04
[To The Fifth Committee
Fifty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly
3 June 2004, http://www.infojapan.org/announce/speech/un2004/un0406.html]
Speaking of Japan, we must point out that the Government of Japan is not blessed with a
budgetary mechanism that can easily absorb a more than 60 percent increase of a major
budget item. We must also point out that there is criticism within Japan for providing
money to PKOs for the benefit of those parties who may or may not be willing to settle
their conflicts. This criticism is reinforced by the fact that Japan, not being a Permanent
Member of the Security Council,does not participate has often no say in the decisions of
the Security Council concerning the long term policies of individual PKOs, despite
Japan's obligation to shoulder about one fifth of the related costs. Needless to say, such
criticism arises out of Japan's strong commitment to peace on the one hand, and on the
other, the frustration regarding the obligations incurred from assessed contributions for
peacekeeping budgets. It would be intolerable for the Government of Japan to be left out
of discussions espec!
ially if those discussions are held without due consideration for facing "the moment of
truth" for cases where there is a perceived lack of will to pursue peace.
The most urgent task at the political level is to institutionalize prior consultation on
diverse aspects of the operation of the alliance. It is more logical for Japan to start by
establishing a system for stating its preference through prior consultation with the United
States. Then, and only then, Japan should prepare tools it will need when saying yes:
arrangements with the United States for supporting U.S. military operations to the
maximum extent possible within the Japanese Constitution, and their enabling legislation.
Overall, Japan and the United States are not likely to say no to each other often.
However, the two countries can reap great rewards from institutionalization of prior
consultation. First, if the United States shows that it solicits Japan?s view before military
operations in Asia, Japan?s neighbors would trust Japan more and expect more of it.
Japan will say yes ? Good faith consultation ensures that Japan supports the U.S.
Kazuya, Osaka University law professor, ?01
[Sakamoto, JAPAN QUARTERLY, April-June, ?Advancing the Japan-U.S. Alliance,? p.
24]
The first need is for closer security consultation at several levels, in specific substantive
terms, rather than as a mere matter of form. Consultation is a basic prerequisite for
cooperation between sovereign states. True cooperation is impossible without
consultation. Given the conventional approach to cooperation by goods and people,?
however, it is doubtful whether hard-hitting consultations can be conducted with the two
sides saying ?yes? or ?no? clearly. The chances are that they will be tempted to follow
their old habits, with one side trying to act freely on its own initiative and the other
shirking its responsibilities and avoiding tough decisions. It is welcome that close
consultations are under way at the administrative and military levels on the daily
execution of the Security Treaty. Since the outcome of such consultations is not always
disclosed, however, the Japanese people continue to wonder whether Japan-U.S. security
cooperation is truly equal and rec!
iprocal. More important, they do not know how top-level government-to-government
consultations would be conducted in the event of a real crisis or whether such
consultations would successfully resolve the crisis.
Reciprocity ensures they say yes
Kazuya, Osaka University law professor, ?01
[Sakamoto, JAPAN QUARTERLY, April-June, ?Advancing the Japan-U.S. Alliance,? p.
19]
While there can be no doubt about the long-term importance of the Japan-U.S. Security
Treaty, it should be noted that it was concluded half a century ago and revised a decade
later, when Japan-U.S. relations were very different from what they are now. Therefore,
abiding by the rights and obligations stipulated in the treaty is no guarantee that the
Japan-U.S. alliance will remain strong in the 21st century. After all, the Security Treaty
is not mutual in the true sense of the word. As it stands, the treaty is unlikely to create a
satisfactory ?giver-and-take? relation ship between the two nations. To keep the alliance
strong the partners will have to make it truly reciprocal by picking up where the treaty
provisions leave off. To that end, security consultation should be conducted more
closely. One way to enhance reciprocity would be for Japan to be able to exercise, even
if in a limited way, the right to collective self-defense.
Japan is taking an active role in supporting the basic human needs of Cambodia
The Government of Japan, February 200 [?Japan?s Assistance Policy for Cambodia?,
http://www.kh.emb-japan.go.jp/cooperation/japfc.htm] The most important factor for
sustainable economic growth is the improvement of Basic Human Needs (BHN). The
improvement of BHN directly provides benefits to the lives of the poor, and is also
important as it provides a social safety net to deal with the social costs brought by
economic growth. Japan has provided assistance for BHN sectors such as education,
health and medical care, water and sanitation improvement, and other priority sectors for
cooperation. These sectors are very important from the viewpoint of humanitarian
concerns and poverty reduction, and the demand for assistance is still very high.
Moreover, it is anticipated that the number of the so-called socially vulnerable will
increase as Cambodia makes economic progress, and Japan will continue to positively
support the foundation of a social safety net for these people. I!
n the education sector, Japan will continue to provide assistance through grassroots grant
aid for the construction of schools, the absolute number of which is still greatly lacking,
and technical assistance for improving the quality of teachers' capacity and the
administrative capacities of the education authorities. Assistance will particularly focus
on improving science and mathematics education, subjects which are vital for economic
growth and achieving sustainability.
To keep the alliance strong, the partners will have to make it truly reciprocal by picking
up where the treaty provisions leave off. To that end, security consultations should be
conducted more closely.
TREATING JAPAN AS A ?JUNIOR PARTNER? RISKS A BACKLASH
Michael Ohanlon, Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings, JAPAN QUARTERLY,
October-December 1997, p. 21
Second, Japan?s apparent position as the ?junior partner? in the alliance is not entirely
healthy. In event of crisis or war, these factors could lead to an American backlash
against a ?freeloading? ally, or to a Japanese backlash against ?domineering? Americans.
Most Japanese felt that their vast monetary contribution was not appreciated by the
United States. For Japan one of the main lessons was that it should not allow itself to be
placed in a position where the not appreciated by the United States. For Japan one of the
main lessons was that it should not allow itself to be placed in a position where the
United States could drag it into a foreign policy adventure without adequate prior
consultation.
Enhance bilateral consultations. Differences will inevitably emerge between Japan and
the United States in their approaches to the region. The new administration should ensure
that effective consultation processes are in place that give Japan a voice in alliance policy
before decisions are actually made.
Genuine Consultation is Key to U.S. ? Japan Alliance
Genuine prior consultation is the only way to bolster and maintain the U.S. Japan alliance
Mochizuki, Brookings fellow, ?97
[Mike, ?Relations with the Great Powers,? BROOKINGS REVIEW,
http://www.brookingsinstitution.org/press/review/spring97/powers.htm
As the U.S.-Japan alliance becomes more reciprocal, the United States must genuinely
consult Japan, not merely inform it of decisions already made. Although the two
countries agreed to a prior consultations process when the 1960 bilateral security pact
was signed, this mechanism has never been used. Because support for U.S. military
operations beyond Japan would provoke such intense domestic controversy, Tokyo
appeared to prefer not to be consulted. The Japanese government has applied such strict
criteria for when Washington would have to consult with Tokyo that Washington has
never had to get Japan's formal permission to use bases in Japan for military operations in
Southeast Asia or the Middle East. The result has been, paradoxically, that pacifist Japan
has given the United States freer rein on the use of overseas bases than America's
European allies. Japan's abdication of its right to be consulted has fueled public distrust in
Japan about bilateral defense cooperation. A!
healthier alliance demands prior consultation. As Japan musters the courage and will to
say "yes" to collective defense and security missions, it should also gain the right to say
"no" when it disagrees with U.S. policy. The U.S.-Japan alliance would then evolve
toward something akin to America s strategic relationships with the major West European
allies.
It is imperative to nurture popular support in the United States and Japan to sustain
current cooperation and to open the door to new bilateral endeavors. There should be no
surprises in diplomatic cooperation. Japan often has promoted ideas, such as the Asian
Monetary Fund, without coordinating with Washington. The United States too often has
brought Japan belatedly into its own diplomacy. Both countries suffer when
policymaking-by-afterthought characterizes our relationship. It is past time for the United
States to drop the image of Japanese cooperation in foreign policy as checkbook
diplomacy. Japan must recognize that international leadership involves risk-taking
beyond its traditional donor's role. U.S. policy must consider Japan's goals, even as it
strives to ensure that our agenda is well understood and actively supported by Tokyo.
Consulting Japan on East Asian regional issues is critical to the durability of relations
Curtis, Columbia political science professor, 2000
[Gerald, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS, p. 37]
The U.S.-Japan alliance has proved enormously valuable to both countries. There are no
compelling reasons for the United States to want to change it fundamentally. While thee
is more vigorous debate in Japan today than at any time since the early 1950s about what
course its foreign and defense policies should take in the future, there is a broad
consensus among both its leadership elite and the public that alliance with the United
States should be maintained as the centerpiece of its foreign policy. The challenge to
U.S. leaders is not to devise policies or employ an antagonistic rhetoric that suggests that
the United States is less committed to sustaining this relationship than is in fact the case.
American national interests will best be served by continuity rather than radical change in
U.S.-Japan relations. A close and positive relationship with Japan is of critical
importance in dealing with a host of regional and global issues. But given the changed
economic and !
political context of U.S.-Japan relations, sustaining and strengthening this relationship
will require innovative thinking and leadership by the president and the senior members
of the administration. More has to be done to involve people with expertise about Japan
when making important dec
isions with respect to East Asia. Greater attention needs to be paid to engaging top
Japanese policymakers in consultations about regional issues. The United States needs to
think strategically about East Asia and place Japan at the center of that strategic thinking.
Even a cursory examination of the alternatives should make clear why investing in a
stable and positive relationship with Russia is in the national interest. We must not take
Russia's pragmatism and ability to act in its self-interest for granted. We need to look no
further than the record of Russia adrift throughout the 1990s for proof. Russia may have
achieved a substantial degree of stability since the nadir of 1998 when its currency
collapsed and its leadership became mired in a succession of crises and corruption
scandals. However, this achievement and Russia's constructive stance in the international
arena should not be considered irreversible. Russia's ability to act in its self-interest will
not always translate into compliance with U.S. interests. But dealing with a responsible
and coherent leadership presiding over a stable and secure Russia is preferable to coping
with an erratic Russia. In the short and medium term, U.S. efforts to combat proliferation
and terror!
ism would face much tougher odds without Russian cooperation. Despite Russia's
diminished stature in the international arena, its cooperative approach to U.S.-Russian
relations since September 11 has had a positive, soothing impact on trans-Atlantic
relations, making it possible for the United States in turn to focus its diplomatic and
political energies where they have been needed most. The record of the 1990s offers an
important lesson: a weak Russia is in the interest of no one. The ability of Russia to put
its own house in order--from securing its nuclear weapons to pumping oil and gas to
global markets--is an important element of U.S. national and international security. The
danger to U.S. interests is not from a potential challenger to President Putin, who might
shy away from a good personal relationship with his American counterpart, but from
Russia failing to consolidate its political and economic accomplishments of the last few
years. In the long run, U.S. interests!
would be well served by a cooperative relationship with Russia, as envisioned by
President Bush. Russia is by no measure likely to regain its global superpower status.
However, as a regional power, it could be a useful collaborator with the United States--
from helping to balance China to supplying energy to key markets to exercising restraint
in critical areas of conventional and WMD proliferation. Thus, shaping positive and
collaborative long-term Russian attitudes is an important U.S. objective.
Straits Times, 2000 [June, 25, No one gains in war over Taiwan]
Close cooperation between Japan and the US can thwart emerging global threats
Hwang, writer for the Backgrounder, April 26th 2004
[Balbina Y., ?A New Security Agenda for the U.S. Japan Alliance?
http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bg1749.cfm, downloaded on
7/14/04]
The U.S.-Japan alliance was created in the aftermath of World War II and became the
anchor for building stability and prosperity in Northeast Asia during the Cold War. The
current security environment, however, is dramatically different. Some Cold War threats
such as North Korea persist, while new threats from non-state actors, including terrorists,
have emerged. Continued close cooperation between the United States and Japan could
prove critical to defeating these threats.
But opinions can change, can't they? Such must be the rationale for questioning Japan's
nonnuclear policy. Japan's democratic system will keep in check any nuclear militarism -
for now. But Japan's security environment is changing, and so is Japanese military policy.
Nuclear weapons are still taboo, though the constraints are political rather than
constitutional or technical. In March 1959, then prime minister Nobusuke Kishi told
parliament that while Japan had no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons, "speaking in
terms of legal interpretation of the constitution, there is nothing to prevent the
maintaining of the minimum amount of nuclear weapons for self-defence". Nor is there a
technical obstacle. One nuclear expert recently told the AFR Japan had 70 tonnes of
plutonium in storage. North Korea is considered to be a nuclear power because
authorities cannot account for between 6 and 8 kilograms of plutonium. The same expert
said that, if the political environment changed, Japan could produce a crude nuclear
weapon in three or four days.
Turn ? China wants a strong alliance ? it?s the best check on Japan
Johnson, Harvard government professor, ?03
[Alastair Iain, International Security, Spring, Lexis]
As for the U.S.-Japan alliance, Chinese attitudes are exceedingly complex. Since the
announcement of guidelines for revising the U.S.-Japan security treaty in 1996 to specify
more clearly the Japanese role in support of U.S. military operations in the region,
Chinese leaders have been increasingly worried about the possibility that this alliance
could become a tool for defending a permanently separated or even a formally
independent Taiwan. 9 Many Chinese analysts believe, however, that a Japan within a
bilateral alliance with the United States is still better than a Japan outside of such
constraints as long as this alliance is not used to provide military cover for an
independent Taiwan.
More evidence?
Cossa, Pacific Forum president, ?97
[Frank, U.S.-JAPAN BILATERAL DYNAMICS,
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books%20-
%201997/Strength%20Through%20Cooperation%201997/stcch10.html]
The U.S.-Japan alliance plays another crucial role in Korean security today and after
reunification by providing Korea with a certain (although varying) degree of confidence
that Japan will not become the future threat. Anti-Japanese sentiments are already
proving to be a unifying force in Sino-ROK relations and could have significant
ramifications on the postreunification security framework for Northeast Asia. The de
facto three-way relationship among the United States, Japan, and the ROK has, as one of
its few unifying factors, the common bond provided by the long-standing alliances
between the United States and each of the two former bitter rivals. ROK-Japan
cooperation is important to long-term stability in Asia and, more immediately, appears
crucial to the success of the U.S.-initiated Agreed Framework and the Korean Peninsula
Economic Development Organization (KEDO) efforts to denuclearize North Korea.
The most important of these factors is that both the Japanese and Chinese governments
are domestically focused on the economic development of their countries. They believe
that economic development requires a prolonged, peaceful, and cooperative relationship
with their Asian neighbors, notably one another. China depends heavily on Japan for
economic assistance, for technology and investment, and as a market for Chinese goods.
Japan is increasingly dependent on China as a market, a source of imports, and an
offshore manufacturing base.
Fortunately, China's and Japan's recent policy and behavior in Asia show little sign of
becoming seriously divisive for the foreseeable future. Neither Beijing nor Tokyo appears
to give primary attention to offsetting the influence of the other in seeking their
respective regional goals; they are focused on more general priorities and concerns.
Although Sino-Japanese differences may flare from time to time over issues grounded in
the two countries' changing power and influence in Asian and world affairs, the
differences are bounded within confines that help to avoid serious disruption and to
preserve regional stability and prosperity.
China-Japan DA Answers
Realistically, the probability is low that a Sino-Japanese entente may emerge that would
seriously complicate the existing U.S. security architecture in Asia or possibly challenge
the leading U.S. economic role in the region
Sino-U.S. DA Answers
CHINA DOES NOT SUPPORT A BREAK-DOWN IN U.S.-JAPANESE RELATIONS
Robert Manning, Senior Fellow at the Progressive Policy Institute, THE WASHINGTON
QUARTERLY, Winter 1994, p. 45
The PRC has no desire to see a breakdown in the U.S.-Japan security relationship that
would result in a withdrawal of U.S. forward-deployed forces and its nuclear umbrella, a
fully independent Japan, and probable risk for China-Japan economic cooperation. This
sequence of events would almost certainly produce a new arms race, one compounded by
the North Korean nuclear threat, which at the G-7 summit of July 1993 led Tokyo to
publicly not rule out the unthinkable: becoming a nuclear power. This was not a new
Japanese position. Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi in 1957 had previously stated,
"Depending on future developments in nuclear weaponry I do not think that the
Constitution bans nuclear weapons if they are of a defensive character." This view was
reaffirmed in Japan's 1970 White Paper on Defense.
Bilateral relations between Japan and the United States promise to remain critical for
both countries in the foreseeable future. On economic issues, however, the bilateral
approach inescapably will continue to generate interactions of a destructive kind. What
may prevent such developments from turning into more active hostility is that neither
country can inflict great harm upon the other without imposing great costs upon itself in
the process. Likewise, there are few bilateral issues that do not intimately affect third
countries as well. As a result, most of the disputes that arise between Japan and the
United States involve issues in which third countries have a legitimate interest,
suggesting the desirability of shifting to multilateral settings wherever the choice exists.
In the case of Japan and the United States, however, the reasons for avoiding bilateral
efforts to resolve large problems or disputes are strengthened greatly by the basic
incompatibilities in th!
e decision-making processes of the two governments. As a result, when the United States
and Japan engage in two-way conversations, it appears that they cannot hear each other.
Inadequate as existing multilateral institutions may be for the development of policy and
the settlement of disputes, therefore, they are measurably superior to the bilateral
channels of Japanese-U.S. relations. Japan already shows small signs of recognizing this
critical point, and it is time for the United States to recognize it, as well.
TURN: CHINA
Considering other external forces, no government with an interest in Asian affairs would
benefit from greater Sino-Japanese friction, including the United States. The Bush
administration has been careful to balance its strong pro-Japan slant by reaffirming its
continued interest in closer, mutually beneficial relations with China, designed in part to
sustain regional peace and stability.
On the other side, long-standing Chinese concerns about Japan's impressive military
capabilities have increased since 1996 as a result of U.S.-Japanese agreements
broadening Japan's strategic role in Asia to include recent Japanese naval deployments in
the Indian Ocean. Recent plans for a Japanese-U.S.-Australian strategic dialogue have
elicited repeated expressions of concern from China.
Little appears to be on the horizon that will substantially change the recent balance
between friction and cooperation in Sino-Japanese relations in a way that would pose
serious challenges for U.S. leadership in Asia or U.S. interest in regional stability and
development. The shock of the September 11 attacks on the United States along with the
U.S.-led war in Afghanistan had the effect of somewhat reducing China's relative
influence in Asia while providing Japan an opportunity to expand its role in South and
Central Asia. Policy changes after the presidential elections in South Korea late this year
could upset the delicate equilibrium on the peninsula, though few see viable alternatives
to some continued South Korean engagement with the North. The Chinese leadership
transition in 2002 -- 2003 is not expected to result in significant changes in policy toward
Asia, as Beijing strives to maintain a calm external environment and focuses.
Kent Calder, is director of the Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies and
Reischauer Professor of East Asian Studies at the School for Advanced International
Studies, Johns Hopkins University, ORBIS, Autumn 2003, p. 65
Clearly there are powerful winds, both foreign and domestic, blowing in the direction of a
more assertive, nationalistic Japanese foreign policy, particularly within Asia. Japan has
financial resources that many Asians, especially in infrastructure-poor Northeast Asia, see
as critical to their own long-term development, while many younger Japanese chafe at
established patterns of diplomatic deference toward the United States.
We are still at a preliminary stage in our discussions, but we have reviewed our overall
strategic interests and reconfirmed that we share a broad range of common values and
shared interests. The Japanese have indicated they will take these discussions into
account as their own defense plans are updated. For our part, we have apprised our
Japanese counterparts of our ongoing review of future force structure and assured Japan
that we would be consulting with them closely before we reach any final conclusions.
We are working to enhance our alliances and friendships in East Asia by ensuring that our
linchpin ally, Japan, continues to play a leading role in both regional and global affairs,
based on our common interests, common values, and close defense and diplomatic
cooperation. We reaffirmed those common values and interests with Japan in the meeting
of the Security Consultative Committee -- commonly referred to as the "2+2" ? in
December 2002. The "2+2" Joint Statement is testimony to our shared views on threats of
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, Iraq, North Korea,
regional security issues, China's role in regional stability and prosperity, missile defense
and defense planning. I note that the level of Japan's participation in Operation Enduring
Freedom has been unprecedented and, for Japan, path-breaking.
Yet again Japan's solution was to acknowledge its weaknesses and work desperately to
regain a position of greater importance in international society. This time the strategy
worked brilliantly. Japanese governments from the occupation years on have rarely
budged from professing to work closely with the United States. President George Bush
has reason indeed to claim that the United States has "no closer ally" ? at least historically
and in this particular region.
Given the Chinese focus on dealing with the more important concern posed by the United
States, one result that works against Sino-Japanese rivalry is that Chinese officials have at
times sought to avoid disputes with Japan. In fact, they have tried to woo Japan away
from close alignment with the United States and toward positions more favorable to
China.
* Securing China's foreign policy environment at a time when the PRC regime is focused
on sustaining economic development and political stability.
* Promoting economic exchange that assists China's internal economic development.
* Reassuring Asian neighbors through increased contact about how China will use its
rising power and influence.
* Boosting China's regional and international power and influence and helping to secure a
multipolar world order -- Chinese leaders seem more confident of China's power and
influence but they also remain wary of U.S.-led or other regional efforts to work against
China.
In addition to advances in relations with Southeast Asia and Korea, China's relations with
other powers around its periphery, with the possible exception of Japan, have improved.
One must consider other factors as well, however, for this development.
China and Japan are balanced on a razor's edge between closer cooperation and
dangerous rivalry. In September 2002, the two countries celebrated the thirtieth
anniversary of the sudden normalization of their bilateral relations. Normalization was
the first pillar, followed by the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978, as friendship
became the mantra of leaders on both sides. If current trends continue, peace is likely to
hold, but friendship may no longer be tenable.
The Japanese delegation is in Washington for consultations on the U-S - Japan defense
alliance. The group is meeting with officials at the State Department and Defense
Department as well as Asia defense specialists to review the status of the security
alliance in light of new threats posed by international terrorism and countries like North
Korea that have weapons of mass destruction. (Signed)
The United States and Australia plan to expand their alliance consultations to include
Japan and South Korea, but Australian officials sought Tuesday to reassure Beijing that
the move was not directed against China.
Southeast Asian peacekeeping is key to check China threat ? Japan will say no because its
vital to their national security
Self, Stimson Center associate, ?03
[Benjamin, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Winter,
http://www.twq.com/03winter/docs/03winter_self.pdf]
JDA officials tend to see the rivalry with China in broader geographic terms as well.
Japan?s effort to engage in peacekeeping operations in Southeast Asia?especially its
current operation in East Timor?is part of a plan to fill the strategic vacuum in the region
and prevent China from exercising increased influence.
Japan will say no ? they oppose increased funding for peace keeping
Toshiro Ozawa, Ambassador of Japan to the United Nations, 2004
[4 May, http://www.infojapan.org/announce/speech/un2004/un0405.html]
Ironically, however, the continuing creation and deployment of peacekeeping operations
on an unprecedented scale is beginning to cast a grim shadow over this revival. In his
press conference on 2 April, the President of the Security Council said that there is a
possibility that the total budget for peacekeeping operations this year could rise to 4.5
billion dollars, an amount unprecedented in history. Under such circumstances, Japan
would be expected to shoulder approximately 900 million dollars of this burden. This is
an enormous figure, surpassing Japan's current annual bilateral Official Development
Assistance (ODA) to the African countries. It may be true that there is no price-tag on
peace, but it is also true that Member States' resources are not unlimited. Should not
Member States face up to the fact that increased budgets for peacekeeping do consume
resources that might otherwise flow into such areas as development and poverty
alleviation? Should not Member States as!
k whether it makes sense for peacekeeping operations to carry out such tasks as
development and human rights, tasks which other international organizations are better
equipped to undertake? Japan is of the view that we Member States must give more
serious thoughts on whether continuation of current practices is truly beneficial for the
international community as a whole.
Japan will say no ? they oppose anything that increases peacekeeping costs
Inter Press Service, 6 ? 24 - 04
A key issue of concern to Japan is the rapid rise in the U.N. budget for peacekeeping
operations. Japan already contributes about 20 percent of those costs, far more than any
country. Last month, U.N. officials announced that next year's budget will rise to 4.6
billion dollars, a 60 percent increase from the year before. That has alarmed the Japanese
government, which says it will be forced to cut its offshore development aid to meet the
increased peacekeeping operations costs. Japan's U.N. ambassador, Toshiro Ozawa,
outlined those concerned in a Jun. 3 speech to the General Assembly. ''We must point out
that the Government of Japan is not blessed with a budgetary mechanism that can easily
absorb a more than 60 percent increase of a major budget item,'' he said. Ozawa added
that Japanese criticism of the U.N. peacekeeping budgets ''is reinforced by the fact that
Japan, not being a Permanent Member of the Security Council, has often no say in the
decisions of the Security !
Council concerning the long-term policies of individual PKOs (peacekeeping operations),
despite Japan's obligation to shoulder about one fifth of the related costs.''
Japan will say no ? the oppose open ended PKOs ? there has to be a clear exit strategy
before they?ll support it
TOSHIRO OZAWA
AMBASSADOR OF JAPAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS, 2004
[29 March, http://www.infojapan.org/announce/speech/un2004/un0403-8.html]
A large-scale PKO was set up in Liberia last year. This year, another major PKO is being
initiated in Cote d'Ivoire, and in the horizon, new missions are expected in Burundi, Haiti
and Sudan. Having reiterated the importance of the PKOs and the Japanese government's
position to cooperate with these PKOs, we have to be insistent on some points in order to
be accountable to the Japanese taxpayers who bear about 20% of the total PKO budget;
when creating a new mission, full account of the necessity of the mission, the
appropriateness of the plans and the exit strategy for each case must be put forward. And,
after the missions are established, periodic reviews must be made in order to ensure that
the activities of each mission are implemented both effectively and efficiently including
through further cost reductions by enhancing synergy of the regional missions. We also
wish to point out that the size of a mission must be reduced step-by-step in line with the
gradual fulfillment!
of its mandate.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, famous geostrategist, former diplomat, John?s Hopkins & CSIS,
THE CHOICE: GLOBAL DOMINATION OR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, 2004, p. 115-6
Zbigniew Brzezinski, famous geostrategist, former diplomat, John?s Hopkins & CSIS,
THE CHOICE: GLOBAL DOMINATION OR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, 2004, p. 115-6
The Japanese themselves show considerable sensitivity to Chinese concerns and are
likely to maintain a low profile even while steadily enhancing their military capabilities.
That enhancement defenseless in the event of some unexpected U.S. disengagement, and
not by a national passion for independent military power. On balance, the Japanese goal
is more to have a fail-safe option than to plot a sudden breakout. It is, in fact, to the great
credit of the Japanese people and its political elite that democratic values and a strong
anti-militarist ethic have become deeply engrained in their outlook. The ongoing debates
in Japan regarding the scale and geostrategic scope of the country's military programs,
and the continued public support for strict constitutional limits on Japanese military
engagement abroad, all reflect a rational and responsible view of Japan's international
role. In brief, the Japan of today-a genuine constitutional democracy-is a good global
citizen."
Zbigniew Brzezinski, famous geostrategist, former diplomat, John?s Hopkins & CSIS,
THE CHOICE: GLOBAL DOMINATION OR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, 2004, p. 117)
To be sure, voices have been raised in Japan in favor of a more assertive international
posture, especially in the wake of 9/11. But aside from a strident minority without much
popular support, the mainstream case for a more active Japanese posture tends to
emphasize Japan's obligation as the world's number two economic power to shoulder its
commensurate share of responsibility for global security. By and large, this posture does
not involve calls for an altogether independent military status that would de-link Japan
from the United States. There may be a growing inclination to reject internationalist
pacifism, but that does not signify a desire to embrace nationalist militarism. The views
expressed after 9/11 by the chairman of the Japanese Upper House Standing Committee
on Foreign Affairs and Defense are typical. He noted that "a simple pacifist concept that
military power is evil has existed in postwar Japan as a result of the nations tragic
experiences in World War II. T!
his idea became exaggerated and developed into the so-called one-country pacifism, and
we must do some soul-searching about that." He then went on to argue that "Japan should
become capable of serving a role in responding to new threats in the post-Cold War era as
a responsible member of the international community. Next, we must establish a system
to protect our lives, property, and land from traditional threats (such as armed attacks by
other countries... .Finally, we must make adjustments to legal frameworks for smooth
functioning of the Japan-US alliance, which is indispensable to maintaining the overall
military balance in East Asia."
Given those attitudinal changes, one might expect that Japan's political-military
"normalization" would have proceeded apace. In fact, however, this process has been
gradual, hesitant, and contested. Pacifism, although on the defensive, is far from a spent
force. Japanese pacifists, moreover, can count on foreign (particularly Chinese and
Korean) support for their dubious contention that moves toward assuming greater
international military responsibilities feed, and are fed by, the revival of militarism and
ultranationalism. Other influential groups with different foreign policy agendas also
oppose movement toward defense normality and closer strategic cooperation with the
United States. "Mercantilists" fret over the possible impairment of Japan's access to vital
overseas markets and sources of raw materials; "multilateralists" prefer a focus on the
United Nations and regional multilateral initiatives; "Asianists" are worried about the
impact of defense normalization on Japa!
n's efforts to forge cooperative relations with China and the rest of Asia. And "Gaullists,"
although by no means averse to a larger and more active Japanese military role, criticize
any move that smacks of subordination to the United States. (2) Perhaps the most
fundamental obstacle to change other than the continuing appeal of pacifism, however, is
the complacency of the Japanese people as reflected in their attachment to a relatively
comfortable status quo and their reluctance to assume the burdens of engagement in
international power politics.
JAPAN DOESN?T HAVE THE ECONOMIC RESOURCES NEEDED FOR FULL RE-
MILITARIZATION
The reorientation of Japan's national security priorities has been complicated by its
prolonged economic slump and soaring government debt, which have limited defense
spending and focused attention inward on domestic reform. By the same token, however,
those developments have also generated pressure to cut Official Development
Assistance--a mainstay of "comprehensive security"--which many critics see as
increasingly unreliable in maintaining the goodwill of key countries such as China. The
declining efficacy of Japan's economics-first approach to national security has arguably
boosted the appeal of political-military normalization. Contrary to earlier expectations,
moreover, the breakdown of the Cold War-era hegemony of the Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP) and of the left-right axis of Japanese party politics has not given rise to bolder and
more effective political leadership. Indeed, the exigencies of building and maintaining
coalition governments have, if anything, reinforc!
ed pressures for compromise and consensus.
NO CHANGE IN JAPAN?S CONSTITUTION FOR 5-10 YEARS
Some are deterred by the risk of stirring up a divisive national debate. Others fear adverse
Chinese and Korean reactions. Still others are sincerely committed to pacifist ideals or
see those ideals as adding a moral dimension to the pursuit of economic objectives.
Perhaps most important, few regard constitutional change as an urgent national priority,
as is reflected in the leisurely pace of the Diet's consideration of constitutional revision--it
is expected to take five to ten years.