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IINAL 1LCnNICAL AkAISAL
of the L|ectora| rocess for res|dent and Leg|s|at|ve kepresentat|ves

NICAkAGUA 2011

I. IN1kCDUC1ICN

Worklng under a concepL of soverelgnLy and baslc rlghLs, Lhe Crupo Clvlco LLlca y 1ransparencla (L1) dld noL
requesL auLhorlzaLlon from Lhe Supreme LlecLoral Councll (CSL) and based lLs LlecLoral CbservaLlon work on
lLs 13 years of experlence observlng 32 elecLlons around Lhe world and 10 ln nlcaragua. 1he observaLlon
meLhodology used was LhaL of Appralslng Lhe lulflllmenL of Mlnlmum CuallLy SLandards, wlLh 18 lndlcaLors
ln Lhe 4 key areas of Lhe elecLoral process, lncludlng suffrage and balloL counLs. ln maklng Lhls llnal 8eporL
avallable Lo Lhe clLlzenry, L1 would llke Lo Lhank all secLors for Lhe supporL and solldarlLy recelved, and Lhe
more Lhan 78,000 nlcaraguans who conLrlbuLed Lo Lhe naLlonal CbservaLlon efforL under Lhe moLLo of ocb
Nlcotoqooo oo Obsetvet.

II. 8ACkGkCUND

AL 6:30pm on november 6, wlLh Lhe voLlng concluded and Lhe counLlng sLarLed, Lhe LLhlcs and 1ransparency
Clvlc Croup (L1) presenLed lLs rellmlnary 1echnlcal 8eporL, summarlzlng Lhe process as follows:

...1be lock of solotloos to tbe boslc ptellmlooty lssoes meoot qoloq loto electloos wltb moqlsttotes kept lo
tbelt posts by tbe excloslve Jeclsloo (wltb oo leqol bosls) of ooe of tbe pteslJeotlol cooJlJotes, tbe some ooe
wbo lotet, lo opeo vlolotloo of tbe coostltotloo, wos occepteJ os o cooJlJote by tbe c5 os tbe ftolt of o
ptoceJote by some 5opteme coott jostlces ooJ c5 moqlsttotes tbot took less tboo 72 boots ooJ vloloteJ
tbe most elemeotol coostltotloool Jocttloe, wblcb ls tbot tbe Moqoo cbotto moy ooly be tefotmeJ by tbe
Notloool Assembly. As o tesolt, o cooJlJocy exptessly ptoblblteJ by two coostltotloool locks wos petmltteJ
ooJ tbe cteJlblllty of tbe electotol ptocess wos Jeclslvely ooJetmloeJ.
poolly oeqotlve ooJ olso vety expllcotlve of tbe loss of poollty of tbe ptocess ooJ tbe opeo fovotltlsm of tbe
electotol ootbotltles towotJ tbe lteslJeot of tbe kepobllc ooJ llleqol pteslJeotlol cooJlJote wos tbot tbe
lottet, lo oJJltloo to qtootloq oo exteosloo of tbe lectotol Moqlsttotes fooctloos ootll fottbet ootlce, olso
ptotecteJ tbem ftom tbe most mlolmol octloos of tbe 5tote lostltotloos of coottol oftet sevetol yeots of
embezzlemeot of o tbltJ of tbe oooool c5 boJqet by tbls colleqlol boJy wos teveoleJ wltb omple ooJ cleot
Jocomeototloo, locloJloq foke lovolces ooJ mooey otJets, topes, vlJeos ooJ swoto Jeclototloos. 1bls
lmmoolty olso lmpeJeJ tbelt tepolteJ Jlsmlssol fot tbe electotol ftooJ commltteJ lo 2008. All tbls tesolteJ lo
oo electotol ptocess tbot teocbeJ tbls lectloo uoy wltb setloos flows ooJ ls oot cettlfloble.
wltb ooly tbe bollot cooot peoJloq ooJ cooslJetloq tbot tbe meosotloq of tbe loJlcotots teloteJ to tbe tbtee
otbet lssoes of oolvetsol opptolsol wltb tespect to electotol obsetvotloo ls olteoJy coocloslve, tbe tblcs ooJ
1toospoteocy clvlc Ctoop mokes pobllc lts opptolsol of tbe fltst 1J loJlcotots teloteJ to tbe lssoes of
pottlclpotloo, cleoo compolqos ooJ qootootees of sofftoqe. tblcs ooJ 1toospoteocy obsetves systemotlc
ooJ voloototy vlolotloo ooJ locompllooce by tbe Nlcotoqooo 5tote lo 11 of tbese 1J loJlcotots. 1be
locompllooce of tbese 11 lotetootloool mlolmoms oo tbe lssoes obllqes os to Jeclote tbot tbe cotteot
electotol ptocess ls oot folt, booest ot cteJlble. Oo tbe coottoty, lt pteseots loJlcotloos of ftooJ ooJ
loteotlooolly folls to comply wltb mlolmom tepolsltes of poollty, tesoltloq lo tbe loexlsteoce of mlolmom
qootootees teqotJloq tbe flJellty ooJ ttoospoteocy of tbe bollot cooots, wblcb lo tbe ctltetloo of tbls
otqoolzotloo become ootelloble.
We also sLaLed LhaL we would conLlnue observlng Lhe process. ln Lhls documenL Lo Lhe nlcaraguan clLlzenry,
we are submlLLlng Lhe flnal appralsal of Lhe 2011 elecLoral process, now lncludlng Lhe evaluaLlon of Lhe
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pendlng lndlcaLors (Lhose relaLed Lo Lhe balloL counL and challenges), as well as Lhe lncorporaLlon of newly
avallable elemenLs regardlng Lhe lndlcaLors already evaluaLed ln Lhe rellmlnary 1echnlcal 8eporL.

III. LkLCU1IVL SUMMAk

Pavlng falled 17 of 18 measurable lndlcaLors and each of Lhe 4 areas sub[ecL Lo Lechnlcal evaluaLlon ln an
elecLoral process, we conflrm our prellmlnary appralsal LhaL Lhls elecLoral process ln 2011 was nelLher falr
nor honesL. 1he publlshed resulLs do noL merlL credlblllLy glven Lhe serlous, sysLemaLlc and lnLenLlonal
lrregularlLles durlng Lhelr emlsslon and balloL counLs and even less ln llghL of Lhe lrregularlLles of Lhe earller
sLages, ln whlch aL leasL 6 of Lhe elecLoraLe
1
was rendered unable Lo parLlclpaLe or lmpeded from
parLlclpaLlng by Lhe LlecLoral apparaLus durlng Lhe voLer reglsLraLlon phase, wlLh severe a pollLlcal blas.
8ased on Lhe above, Lhls organlzaLlon cannoL cerLlfy Lhe elecLlon resulLs, and esLabllshes LhaL Lhe problems
lmpedlng Lhls cerLlflcaLlon are Lo no exLenL accldenLal buL are Lhe frulL of Lhe CSL's pollLlcal vollLlon Lo
generaLe a process wlLhouL mlnlmum guaranLees or equanlmlLy, Lo Lhls end recurrlng Lo sysLemaLlc
vlolaLlons of Lhe naLlonal leglslaLlon and of 17 of Lhe 18 mlnlmum requlremenLs on elecLoral lssues.

AddlLlonally, LhroughouL Lhe elecLoral process, L&1 lssued four analysls reporLs and posed Lhe exlsLence of a
Modus Cperandl (MC) by Lhe CSL slnce 2008 Lo faclllLaLe fraud of Lhe people's wlll. Slnce May, wlLh Lhe
greaLesL sclenLlflc rlgor, lL presenLed Lo Lhe publlc lLs hypoLhesls abouL how fraud was belng conducLed ln
nlcaragua, noLlng Lhe evenLs and sLages, Lhe voLe 8ecelvlng !unLas (!8vs) aL speclal rlsk, and Lhe forecasLed
corollary. All was fulfllled wlLh enormous exacLlLude.

1he CSL sysLemaLlcally gave Lhe governlng parLy conLrol of Lhe Munlclpal and ueparLmenLal LlecLoral
Counclls (CLus and CLMs) and Lhe !8vs, almosL LoLally ellmlnaLlng any role for Lhe opposlLlon, lL even wenL
Lo Lhe exLreme of noL publlshlng Lhe names or parLy represenLaLlon of Lhose maklng up Lhe Lhree-member
!8vs. 100 of Lhe resulLs are noL audlLable because Lhey were noL publlshed !8v by !8v and Lhe opposlLlon
parLles were prevenLed from monlLorlng aL leasL 30 of Lhe !8vs. ln Lhose same !8vs Lhe lSLn obLalned up
Lo 30 more voLes Lhan lL dld ln places where aL leasL Lhe balloL counL for naLlonal Assembly
represenLaLlves was duly monlLored. lL ls also reveallng LhaL, for Lhe flrsL Llme ln Lhe pasL 30 years ln over
200 elecLlons ln a presldenLlallsL elecLoral reglme anywhere ln Lhe world, Lhere are more voLes for leglslaLors
LhaL for Lhe resldenL. ln Lhe presenL case, and based on Lhe offlclal resulLs, L&1 conslders LhaL boLh evenLs
hlghllghL slgnlflcanL alLeraLlons of Lhe sums ln favor of Lhe lSLn by aL leasL 130,000 voLes (8 Lo 12 leglslaLlve
seaLs), whlch represenL Lhe mlnlmum of seaLs fraudulenLly asslgned ln Lhe presenL condlLlons of Lhe
elecLoral sysLem's opaclLy and dysfuncLlon.

I. SUMMAk CI 1nL 1LCnNICAL ANALSIS CI MINIMUM kLUISI1LS

Areas of LvaluaLlon:

l. unlvL8SAL A81lClA1lCn (3 lndlcaLors)
ll. CLLAn CAMAlCnS (6 lndlcaLors)
lll. Sull8ACL Wl1P CuA8An1LLS (4 lndlcaLors)
lv. 18AnSA8Ln1 CCun1S - 8LSLC1 lC8 1PL CuLA8 WlLL (3 lndlcaLors)

CA1LGCk 1: UNIVLkSAL Ak1ICIA1ICN

INDICA1CkS 1C 8L LVALUA1LD:

1
198,073 citizens, based on projections of the 2005 National Population Census.
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1. rocesslng of lu/voLer card ln llne wlLh Lhe requlslLes esLabllshed by law and wlLhouL
pollLlcal dlscrlmlnaLlon.
2. reparaLlon and lssulng of lu/voLer card or subsLlLuLe documenL ln reasonable Llme, when Lhe
clLlzen has reglsLraLlon problems.
3. lalLhful and deflnlLlve publlcaLlon of Lhe elecLoral rolls ln whlch all reglsLered voLers are lncluded
and are locaLed aL Lhe !8v [voLlng Lable] correspondlng Lo Lhelr domlclle.

LVALUA1ICN

1. We have denounced Lhe funcLlonlng of a para-sLaLe governlng parLy sLrucLure ln all of Lhe counLry's
munlclpallLles whlch ls ln charge of processlng Lhe voLlng documenLs wlLhouL Lhe auLhorlLles havlng
observable conLrols over abuses such as reglsLerlng forelgners and mlnors, of whlch numerous cases are
known, ln vlolaLlon of varlous arLlcles of Lhe LlecLoral Law (arLlcles 173 Lo 173, for example). 1he cases LoLal
198,073 accordlng Lo Lhe 2003 opulaLlon Census versus Lhe deflnlLlve 2011 LlecLoral 8ole. ln addlLlon, an
esLlmaLed 100,000 publlc employees and oLher lndlvlduals close Lo Lhe governlng parLy also preferenLlally
recelved, as Lhe CSL lLself declared, a second voLlng documenL, and ln 80 of Lhe cases Lhe prevlous
documenL was noL recovered from Lhese lndlvlduals.

2. All of Lhe offlclal sLrucLures for lssulng voLlng documenLs remalned closed unLll up Lo Lhree monLhs before
Lhe elecLlons and Lhelr poor funcLlonlng slnce Lhen lncludes documenLed complalnLs of noL recelvlng
paperwork, noL lssulng voLlng documenLs and oLher forms of denylng Lhe voLe Lo an esLlmaLed mlnlmum of
198,073 lndlvlduals
2
. lL ls lmposslble Lo cerLlfy Lhe CSL's alleged lssuance of approxlmaLely 300,000 oLher
voLlng documenLs.

3. 1he LlecLoral 8oll was noL audlLed and Lhere are no rellable conLrols over Lhlrd-parLy use of Lhe voLlng
documenL and rlghL Lo voLe of Lhe approxlmaLely 30 of Lhe roll conslsLlng of clLlzens who are llvlng abroad
or deceased. 1he 8oll verlflcaLlon process became an exerclse by Lhe elecLoral auLhorlLy Lo lnLenslfy
governlng parLy conLrol over Lhe clLlzenry ln general and over Lhe admlnlsLraLlve sLrucLure of Lhe elecLlons.
ln LhaL process, Lhe CSL lnflaLed Lhe verlflcaLlon parLlclpaLlon, whlch was under 13 of Lhe roll, declarlng a
60 parLlclpaLlon (of course, provldlng no supporLlng documenLaLlon whaLever ln a process ln whlch
monlLorlng was denled). Clven Lhe background of fraud ln Lhe counLlng of 40 munlclpallLles ln Lhe 2008
elecLlons by Lhe same maglsLraLes, we conslder LhaL maklng evldenL Lhe maglsLraLes' blas and governlng
parLy preference and absurdly lnflaLlng Lhe daLa consLlLuLed an lnsLlLuLlonal efforL Lo fosLer absLenLlon
among Lhe opposlLlon secLors.

CCNCLUSICN: We esLlmaLe LhaL a mlnlmum of 198,073 clLlzens of voLlng age were denled Lhe rlghL Lo
clLlzenshlp and Lo Lhe voLe ln Lhese elecLlons, ln Lhe ma[orlLy of cases for reasons of Lhelr presumed
opposlLlon afflllaLlon. lL ls lmposslble Lo quanLlfy elLher Lhe dlssuaslve effecLs of Lhe CSL's blased acLlons on
voLlng or Lhe eroslon of conLrols on double voLlng, buL boLh lrregularlLles consLlLuLe very grave vlolaLlons.
8ased on the above, we cons|der that the e|ectora| process does not fu|f||| m|n|mum un|versa| requ|s|tes
and guarantees w|th respect to C|v|c art|c|pat|on.

CA1LCC8? 2: CLLAn CAMAlCnS.

INDICA1CkS 1C 8L LVALUA1LD:

1. Candldacles ln sLrlcL accordance wlLh Lhe ConsLlLuLlon and Lhe Law.
2. LlecLoral auLhorlLy acLlng capably and lmparLlally.
3. LlecLoral campalgns and perlods free of vlolence.

2
Source: 2005 Population Census and 2011 definitive electoral rolls.
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4. non-use of sLaLe goods for parLy proselyLlzlng.
3. Access Lo Lhe medla by all parLles.
6. 8aslc Lransparency ln campalgn fundlng.

LVALUA1ICN

1. 1he mosL elemenLal consLlLuLlonal prlnclple, recognlzed aL Lhe world level, LhaL Lhe Magna CharLa may
only be abrogaLed by a very speclal leglslaLlve procedure, was Lransgressed: Lhrough a 72-hour weekend
maneuver, some Supreme CourL [usLlces and Supreme LlecLoral Councll maglsLraLes meL behlnd Lhe back of
oLhers and lnvalldaLed Lhe double lock lmpedlng Lhe candldacy of Lhe currenL resldenL. LaLer, Lhe CSL
ellmlnaLed candldaLes of one Alllance afLer Lhe Llme esLabllshed and noL based on recognlzed grounds, Lhen
boLh lnsLlLuLlons LhreaLened LhaL Lhe candldaLes Lhe people chose from LhaL Alllance could be removed due
Lo an alleged exLemporaneous lnLernal dlspuLe by one of Lhe Alllance members.

2. WlLh lLs managemenL of Lhe process exLended by Lhe declslon of one of Lhe presldenLlal candldaLes, Lhe
CSL lefL no doubL aL any Llme as Lo lLs favorlLlsm Loward LhaL candldaLe and Lhe governlng parLy, permlLLlng
hls reglsLraLlon as a candldaLe ln vlolaLlon of Lhe ConsLlLuLlon, ellmlnaLlng and LhreaLenlng candldacles of
oLher alllances and Lurnlng conLrol of Lhe admlnlsLraLlve and [urlsdlcLlonal auLhorlLles over Lo Lhe governlng
parLy, among oLher quesLlonable acLlons deLecLed by Lhls mlsslon. AL Llmes Lhese acLlons reached
unprecedenLed levels, such as when Lhe CSL lefL abuse of sLaLe goods ouL of Lhe LlecLoral LLhlcs manual (an
lssue LhaL arLlcle 173 of Lhe LlecLoral Law lLself punlshes wlLh Lwo years ln [all) or acLlvely and ln dlverse
ways lmpeded Lhe accredlLaLlon and funcLlonlng of parLy monlLors. Also noLable ls Lhe express vlolaLlon of
Lhe law wlLh respecL Lo elecLoral observaLlon, whlch was reduced Lo accompanlmenL" and denled Lo
naLlonals noL loyal Lo Lhe governlng parLy.

3. Cur rellmlnary 1echnlcal 8eporL publlshed Lhe nlghL of Lhe elecLlons sLaLed: ln general Lerms and
conslderlng Lhe sad reglonal sLandards, where even deaLhs are common durlng elecLlons, Lhe nlcaraguan
case compares favorably so far. 1he absence of aggresslons agalnsL [ournallsLs sLands ouL." Clven Lhe
execuLlon of aL leasL four people by Lhe ollce, CSL offlclals and pollLlcal parLy personallLles Lhe nlghL
followlng Lhe elecLlons as a resulL of Lhe lrregular elecLoral process, plus 18 oLher cases of vlolence relaLed
Lo Lhe elecLlons (lncludlng Lhe burnlng of 30 !8vs) polnLed ouL by recognlzed human rlghLs organlzaLlons,
Lhls appralsal has ceased belng poslLlve.

4. lL ls dlfflculL Lo flnd a slngle publlc offlce or school anywhere ln Lhe counLry LhaL ls free of Lhe
governmenL's proselyLlzlng messages or lLs parLy flags. 1he LransporLlng and presence ln proselyLlzlng
acLlvlLles of unlformed youLhs of hlgh school age and even younger durlng class hours ls openly promoLed
and execuLed, wlLh abundanL lndlcaLlons LhaL Lhls ls accompanled by beLLer grades and oLher paymenLs Lo
Lhe parLlclpanLs. varlous publlc spaces, such as Lrafflc clrcles, have permanenLly lnsLalled pro-governmenL
propaganda and personnel, wlLhouL slmllar opporLunlLles for Lhe oLher parLles. SLaLe vehlcles and offlces
are openly ln charge of loglsLlcs for Lhe proselyLlzlng acLlvlLles, lncludlng open proselyLlsm ln rescue and
emergency work LhaL occurred durlng Lhe campalgn. 1he llsL of vlolaLlons and lrregularlLles ls long because
of Lhe sysLemaLlc arLy-SLaLe confuslon Lhe governmenL promoLes Lo Lhe deLrlmenL of conLrols and llmlLs
appllcable Lo boLh.

3. ln general, Lhere was a plural medla specLrum open Lo freedom of expresslon. 8uL Lhere was LoLal
lncompllance wlLh arLlcle 90 of Lhe LlecLoral Law, whlch esLabllshes opposlLlon parLy access Lo 30 mlnuLes a
day on Lhe sLaLe Lelevlslon channels and radlo sLaLlons.

6. 1he enormous dlfference ln campalgn spendlng esLlmaLed by Lhls observer group, ln whlch Lhe governlng
parLy spenL 13 Llmes more Lhan all lLs compeLlLors comblned ln all acLlvlLles relaLed Lo Lhe elecLoral
campalgn, ls noL lndependenL of Lhe problem of SLaLe-parLy confuslon, ln LhaL a prlvaLe buslness of mlxed
caplLal malnly from Lhe SLaLe of venezuela ls ln charge of paylng publlc employees and caplLallzlng sLaLe
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programs Lhrough Lhe governlng parLy Lo Lhe Lune of uS$300 mllllon annually ln acLlons noL
monlLored by any naLlonal lnsLlLuLlon. lL ls evldenL LhaL parL of Lhls money ls belng used Lo supporL Lhe
governlng parLy's elecLoral campalgn. ArLlcle 103 of Lhe nlcaraguan LlecLoral Law prohlblLs donaLlons Lo
pollLlcal parLles by sLaLe or mlxed (naLlonal or forelgn) buslnesses. 8uL no auLhorlLy seems Lo have reallzed
Lhls ls happenlng.

CCNCLUSICN: 3 of 6 lndlcaLors and Lhe correspondlng mlnlmum requlslLes have been openly vlolaLed or noL
complled wlLh. 1he cllmaLe of freedom of expresslon was reasonable, desplLe Lhe menLloned vlolaLlons of
Lhe LlecLoral Law. 1he lssue of vlolence, orlglnally approved, decayed as a frulL of Lhe four execuLlons
perpeLraLed by elecLoral auLhorlLles, acLlvlsLs and pollce offlcers under Lhe lnfluence of Lhe lrregular process.
Cn Lhe lssues of respecL for Lhe legallLy of candldaLes, lmparLlallLy of auLhorlLles, abuse of sLaLe goods and
Lransparency ln campalgn fundlng, Lhe lncompllance of 3 mlnlmum requlslLes by Lhe nlcaraguan SLaLe and
lLs elecLoral auLhorlLles ls evldenL. 8ased on the above, we cons|der that the L|ectora| rocess does not
fu|f||| the requ|s|tes and m|n|mum un|versa| guarantees for C|ean L|ectora| Campa|gns.

CA1LCC8? 3: Sull8ACL Wl1P CuA8An1LLS

INDICA1CkS 1C 8L LVALUA1LD:

1. 1he make-up of Lhe ueparLmenLal and Munlclpal LlecLoral Counclls (CLu and CLM) and voLe
8ecepLlon !unLas, or voLlng Lables (!8vs) ln accordance wlLh Lhe law and wlLhouL manlpulaLlons.
2. resence of parLy monlLors from all pollLlcal parLles ln all of Lhe elecLoral sysLem's key acLlvlLles,
especlally Lhe balloL counLs and challenges.
3. 1he appllcaLlon of quallLy lndellble lnk Lo all voLers and Lhe use of oLher locks Lo lmpede double
voLlng.
4. 1he condlLlons Lo exerclse a secreL voLe.

LVALUA1ICN:

1. 1he law regardlng Lhe proper seLLlng up of Lhe CSL's key admlnlsLraLlve and [urlsdlcLlonal auLhorlLles,
known as ueparLmenLal and Munlclpal LlecLoral Counclls (CLus and CLMs), was vlolaLed ln LhaL Lhe
governlng parLy Alllance was granLed an lllegal second membershlp ln Lhose 3-person bodles ln over 33 of
Lhe cases. lurLhermore, Lwo parLles were denled Lhelr respecLlve quoLa. ln Lhe case of Lhe Ll, lLs quoLa ln
Lhe CLus was 0 lnsLead of 33. 1he mosL flagranL vlolaLlon occurred aL Lhe level of Lhe !8vs, whose
composlLlon was noL even publlshed.

2. lrom Lhe ouLseL, Lwo parLles were arblLrarlly denled accredlLaLlon of Lhelr naLlonal monlLors, wlLh Lhe
CSL granLlng lLself an lnexlsLenL veLo rlghL. 1he CSL also held up accredlLaLlon and resLrlcLed access by Lhe
remalnlng monlLors from varlous enLlLles Lo numerous processes, Lhe mosL serlous one belng Lhe
verlflcaLlon process ln !uly, ln whlch monlLorlng was LoLally and absoluLely blocked. lnsLead of lssulng Lhe
parLy !8v monlLors Lhelr credenLlals 10 days before Lhe voLe, as esLabllshed ln arLlcle 28 of Lhe law, Lhe
remalnlng 30 of Lhe nearly 13,000 credenLlals Lo work ln Lhe !8vs correspondlng Lo each of Lwo opposlLlon
parLles were dellvered Lo Lhem less Lhan 24 hours before Lhe elecLlons, and wlLh numerous errors, Lhus
maklng lL lmposslble Lo monlLor over 20 of Lhe !8vs aL a naLlonal level. Comblned wlLh oLher measures
such as expulslon [of monlLors] and Lhe lack of leglble coples of Lhe balloL counL Lally sheeLs, Lhls hlgh
percenLage can only grow. (lor more lnformaLlon, see lndlcaLor 1 of Lhe nexL secLlon.)

3. AlLhough Lhe lnk was of good quallLy, Lhe CSL regulaLed a llghL appllcaLlon (only Lhe flnger Llp), conLrary
Lo all prevlous elecLlons LhaL ensured appllcaLlon Lo Lhe vlslble slde of Lhe flnger and cuLlcle, maklng lL
dlfflculL Lo remove. Members of almosL 70 of Lhe !8vs refused Lhe monlLors access unLll afLer Lhe !8v was
seL up, so Lhey were unable Lo guaranLee LhaL Lhe balloL box was empLy aL Lhe sLarL of voLlng. SecurlLy
requlslLes and locks (slgnaLures and codes on Lhe reverse slde of Lhe balloLs) were ellmlnaLed and Lhe CSL
GRUPO CVICO ETICA Y TRANSPARENCIA
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also pre-generaLed Lhe securlLy code, prevlously esLabllshed ln each !8v by lLs own members.
1hls opened Lhe posslblllLy of balloL subsLlLuLlon. no explanaLlons were glven for Lhese dangerous changes.

4. 1he poslLlonlng of Lhe secreL voLlng booLhs ln Lhe !8vs was sysLemaLlcally changed wlLh respecL Lo
prevlous years. We found ln Lhe observaLlon of our sclenLlflc sample LhaL 33 of Lhe !8vs dld noL provlde
condlLlons for exerclslng a secreL voLe, prlnclpally due Lo Lhe poslLlonlng of Lhe booLhs.

CCNCLUSICN: 1here were grave and sysLemaLlc vlolaLlons relaLed Lo Lhe four lndlcaLors of mlnlmum
requlslLes relaLed Lo suffrage wlLh guaranLees. 8ased on that, we cons|der that the L|ectora| rocess d|d
not comp|y w|th the m|n|mum un|versa| requ|s|tes w|th respect to Suffrage Guarantees.

CA1LCC8? 4: 18AnSA8Ln1 8ALLC1 CCun1S - 8LSLC1 lC8 1PL LCLL'S WlLL

INDICA1CkS 1C 8L LVALUA1LD:

1. 1he counLlng of voLes ln Lhe presence of parLy monlLors, wlLh each parLy lssued a falLhful copy of
Lhe counL Lally sheeL.
2. no voLes or !8vs are ellmlnaLed based on parLy preference.
3. lmmedlaLe publlcaLlon of Lhe resulLs on Lhe ouLslde wall of Lhe voLlng cenLer and access Lo Lhe
populaLlon Lo see Lhem.
4. 1he CSL's publlcaLlon of 100 of Lhe voLlng resulLs, !8v by !8v, wlLhln a mlnlmum reasonable
Llme.
3. Appeals are handled wlLh due process and Lransparency.

LVALUA1ICN:

1. ln aL leasL 20 of Lhe !8vs, Lhe CSL, uslng varlous maneuvers, dld noL accredlL monlLors of aL leasL
Lhree parLles. AL leasL Lwo of Lhem had shown Lhe naLlonal Cbservers Lhelr compleLe llsL on Llme
and ln Lhe proper form from 20 days prlor Lo Lhe elecLlons. ln an addlLlonal 13 of Lhe !8vs some
opposlLlon parLy monlLor was expelled before Lhe balloL counL. ln Lhe case of Lhe Ll, lL was noL
glven a leglble copy of Lhe Lally ln aL leasL 33 of Lhe !8vs ln whlch lL succeeded ln havlng a
presence. More Lhan 70 of Lhe !8vs were seL up or opened ahead of Llme, closlng Lhe balloL
boxes wlLhouL glvlng Lhe monlLors a chance Lo verlfy wheLher or noL Lhey were empLy before Lhe
voLlng commenced. 1hese facLs colnclde wlLh clLlzen observaLlons and denunclaLlons, 49 of
whlch noLe Lhe enLry of Lable members and Lhe lSLn monlLor prlor Lo Lhe offlclal creaLlon of Lhe
!8v, whlle Lhe monlLors for Lhe oLher pollLlcal alllances or organlzaLlons were denled enLry.
Moreover, we found LhaL ln 73 of Lhe !8vs audlLed
3
, more voLes were recorded for leglslaLlve
candldaLes (boLh naLlonal and deparLmenLal candldaLes, buL especlally Lhe laLLer) Lhan for
resldenL), whlch ls aLyplcal ln nlcaragua's elecLoral hlsLory
4
. 1hls percenLage lncreased Lo 86
3

for Lhe !8vs aL rlsk. 36 of Lhe audlLed Lallles do noL provlde lnformaLlon abouL valld voLes and
39 have no lnformaLlon abouL annulled voLes, agaln an aLyplcal slLuaLlon ln Lhls elecLoral process.

2. Clven Lhe monlLorlng problems and oLher problems noLed, lL ls lmposslble Lo cerLlfy Lhe fulflllmenL
of Lhls requlslLe, parLlcularly glven Lhe sysLemaLlc ellmlnaLlon of opposlLlon monlLors and of
conLrols such as Lhe securlLy code on Lhe balloLs (now declded ahead of Llme by Lhe CSL and noL on

3
60% of the tallies were audited by E&T (7,784 of 12,960 JRVs)
4
Source: CSE. The votes for President exceeded those for the legislative body by 7,874 in the 2001 general elections and
by 14,082, in the 2006 general elections. This year, for the first time, the votes in the legislative election exceeded those in
the presidential election, and by 118,305.
3
As a result of the Tally Audit, actions were detected that were directed particularly to the JRVs at Risk with respect to more
votes for legislators than for President, and the absence of totals for valid votes and for annulled votes.
GRUPO CVICO ETICA Y TRANSPARENCIA
7

elecLlon mornlng by Lhe !8v). noneLheless, Lhe sample Laken reveals lmporLanL flndlngs.
ln 18 of Lhe !8vs no voLe scruLlny was done, we flnd LhaL ln Lhe !8vs aL rlsk approxlmaLely 71,300
clLlzens were unable Lo voLe. lurLhermore, aL leasL 98 documenLed cases are known ln Lhe !8vs of
more voLes Lhan voLers and of a hlgh degree of sysLemaLlc fllllng of Lhe balloL boxes Lhrough Lhe
double and Lrlple voLe ln !8vs lacklng Lhe proper monlLorlng.

3. 31 of Lhe !8vs dld noL dlsplay Lhe show card of resulLs and ln 77 of Lhe sample observed, access
Lo Lhe voLlng cenLer was denled Lo clLlzens durlng and afLer Lhe scruLlny.

4. ln Lhe face of unrellable counLs, Lhe CSL dld noL publlsh Lhe resulLs !8v by !8v, Lo hlde Lhe
lrregularlLles.

3. 1o Lry Lo lmpede Lhe proper documenLaLlon of appeals by Lhe parLles, Lhe CSL, ln addlLlon Lo noL
publlshlng Lhe daLa by !8v and denylng leglble coples of Lhe Lally ln 33 of Lhe !8vs Lo aL leasL one
of Lhem, lllegally cuL a week off Lhe perlod avallable Lo Lhe parLles Lo presenL Lhelr challenges.

CCNCLUSICN: 1he 3 lndlcaLors of mlnlmum requlslLes relaLed Lo LransparenL balloL counLs and respecL for
Lhe people's wlll presenL serlous, lnLenLlonal and sysLemaLlc vlolaLlons by Lhe nlcaraguan elecLoral auLhorlLy.
8ased on the above, we cons|der that the L|ectora| rocess does not meet the m|n|mum un|versa|
requ|s|tes w|th respect to transparency |n the ba||ot count and respect for the peop|e's w|||.

IV. kLCCMMLNDA1ICNS

1. 1he publlc splrlL and peaceful and democraLlc naLure of Lhe nlcaraguan people musL be
caLegorlcally applauded and sLrengLhened, esLabllshlng Lhe lnsLlLuLlonal, clvlc and peaceful paLh as
Lhe only way Lo solve Lhls crlsls of leglLlmacy.

2. Clven Lhe damaged leglLlmacy of Lhose elecLed ln such a corrupL process, Lhe exlsLlng leglslaLlon
and elecLoral sysLem musL be replaced Lhrough a LransparenL and parLlclpaLory process, aLLenLlve
Lo evaluaLlons of weaknesses ln boLh Lhe LexL and appllcaLlon of Lhe LlecLoral Law, assessed over
Lhe course of 10 years by varlous LlecLoral CbservaLlon lnsLlLuLlons and wlLh conLrlbuLlons by
dlverse secLors of naLlonal llfe. ALLenLlon musL be pald Lo Lhe conLenLs of Lhe elecLoral reform Lo
avold cosmeLlc changes or even a worsenlng of Lhe leglslaLlon, as occurred durlng Lhe prevlous
reform (2000).

3. Clven Lhe nearness of Lhe nexL Munlclpal LlecLoral process (less Lhan a year away), Lhe lmmedlaLe
and urgenL replacemenL of all elecLoral auLhorlLles musL begln, as well as Lhe proper lnvesLlgaLlon
and Lrlal of CSL offlclals for Lhe commlsslon of elecLoral crlmes and express vlolaLlons of boLh Lhe
LlecLoral Law and Lhelr speclflc mandaLe.

4. We appeal Lo Lhe lnLernaLlonal sLakeholders noL Lo fall lnLo frusLraLlon when seelng Lhe democraLlc
backpedallng of our counLry. Measures LhaL affecL Lhe precarlous naLlonal economy and Lhe
opporLunlLles and lncome of nlcaraguans musL be caLegorlcally dlscarded as responses Lo Lhe
lrregular elecLoral process. 1he permanenL shame of Lhose responslble and Lhe moral sancLlons
accompanled by a serlous summons Lo Lhe CovernmenL of Lhe 8epubllc Lo acLlvely and prompLly
Lake Lhe necessary correcLlve measures are, moreover, requlslLes for Lhe urgenL fundamenLal
change requlred by nlcaragua's LlecLoral SysLem and uemocracy.