W a s h i n g t oD .,C .

2 0 5 0 5 n

29 November 20Il

Mr. Erik Larson

Reference: EOM-2012-00364 Dear Mr. Larson: an Your facsimile of 4 November2011 requested ExecutiveOrder 13526mandatory declassification review of the following: l. CIA intelligencereport "FacilitatingDisaster:An Overview of 11 September Finance."812212002. 2. Cl{intelligence report re: 9lll plot. 61112003. 12002. 11 . 3 . CIA intelligencereport re: 91 12001 817 4. CIA intelligencereport re: 9I 11 120019I | 6 12002. . 5. 12 classifiedCIA intelligencereportsprovidedto the Joint Inquiry Staff. suppliedto the Joint Inquiry.812012002. 6. Index of CIA documents 7. Documentsrelating to the CIA report "The Plot and the Plotters" and CIA DCI Request#5. All documentsdated responsive Commission's to documents 2002-2003.UU2002. re: 8. CIA documents Hambali (Documenttype: Intelligencereports). 9. IntelligenceTelegram(Documenttype). 185 pages.NARA retrieval # 3 4 10 0 0 1 3 0 3 71 8 0 10. IntelligenceTelegram(Documenttype). 12 pages.NARA retrieval # 34r 0001400395 11. IntelligenceTelegram(Documenttype). 167 pages. NARA retrieval # 3 4 r 0 0 0 1 50 0 4 3 2 12. IntelligenceReport (Documenttype). 150 pages.NARA retrieval # 34r 0002000584 13.Memo of intelligencere: hijackers. With regard to Item I of your request,we are currently processinga request for the samerecord from anotherrequester. Once our researchand review of that requestis completed, will forward to you the sameClA-originatedrecord,if released.We have a we substantialbacklog, which we are working diligently to reduce,so we are unable to estimate of when we will completeour review. However,we will notify you once the processing the original requestis complete.

With regard to Item 6 of your request,our records indicate you submitted an earlier requestfor records on this samesubject under the Freedom of Information Act (Reference is was and NumberF-2011-00625) a response providedon 17 May 2011. Enclosed a copy of our response. ooThe Plot and the Plotters," With regard to the first portion of Item 7, the CIA report, we located a recent review of the documentwhere we had determinedthat it could be in released sanitizedform. We areproviding you a copy of this currentreview on the basis of Section3.5(d) of ExecutiveOrder 13526. With regardto Items 2, 3, 4, 5, the secondportion of Item 7, andltems 8, 9, 10, I 1, with Section3.5(a)(1)of ExecutiveOrder 13526,a mandatory 12, and 13, in accordance declassificationreview must describethe document or material containing the information with sufficient specificity to enablethe agencyto locate it with a reasonableamount of effort. Since your requestdescribesrecordsmaintainedby the National Archives and Records Administration, it does not sufficiently describeany requesteddocumentsthat the CIA could of locateto enablethe processing this request. Therefore,we must declineto processthese items of your request. Sincerely,

SusanViscuso Coordinator Information and Privacy

Enclosures

Agency Intelligence Central

,ffi

D.C.20505 Washinston,

17 Mav 20lI Mr. Erik Larson 967 Millwood Lane GreatFalls, V A22066 Reference:F-20 I I-00625 Dear Mr. Larson: This is a final response your 12 January2011 Freedomof Information Act to (FOIA) requestfor copiesof any and all records CIA created in responseto, or as a result of, the document (or records) requestsof the CongressionalJoint your Intelligence Committee Inquiry into the 9lll attacks (JICI). We processed requestin accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. $ 552, as amended, and the CIA includeda searchfor Information Act, 50 U.S.C. $ 431, as amended.Our processing recordsas described our 18 February20ll acceptance in letter existing through the date of that letter. We completeda thoroughsearchfor recordsresponsive your requestand to is locatedmaterialwhich we determined currently and properly classifiedand must be deniedin its entirety on the basisof FOIA exemptions(bXl) and (bX3). Exemption (bX3) pertainsto information exemptfrom disclosure statute. The relevantstatuteis by AgencyAct of L949,50U.S.C.$ 403, as amended, e.g.,Section the CentralIntelligence informationpertainingto the requirement 6, which exemptsfrom the disclosure functions,including thoserelatedto the protectionof intelligencesources organization, and numbersof personnel employedby the and methods,names,official titles, salaries, Agency. An explanationof exemptionsis enclosed.As the CIA Information and Privacy for Coordinator,I am the CIA official responsible this determination.You have the right Release Panel,in my care,within 45 days from the to appealthis response the Agency to date of this letter. Pleaseinclude the basisof your appeal. Sincerely,

Susan Viscuso Information and Privacy Coordinator Enclosure

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I

1l Sepuember:
The Plot and the Plotters lUl

Scope Note lUl

plot of Our knowledge the I I September is still inoeasingandevolving-this paper Informalionin this paper all doesnot represent we will everknow abouttheattacks. is currentthroughMay 2003.1 I of are in thisassessment drawntiom analysis a varietyof sources
have included all information we deemed credible but

frequently weretbrced some thejudgments of

provided a great deal of information on the as details on hoW the plot came together and who was involved. The information ithin the United Statesis from the FBI, INS, of on theactivities the

andtheFAA

attacks the and leadingto the l I September f'ocuses theevents on This publication identified the 2001,we have SinceI I September participants theattacks. in actual who is the subject ZacaiasMoussaoui, who carriedout theattacks. l9 individuals
of a US criminal investigation-and others who may have been involved, have not beenincludedin this publicatiorl I

of of Because thelengthandcomplexity Middle Noteon our useof names: versions the nameof the t9 hijackers Of we names, tendto useabbreviated Eastern in are The this throughout asscssment. fuller andformallycorreclnames captured with Arabic for B. in dau sheets appendix It is common individuals theindividual fatherand between to names havetbur or motepansto their nameto distinguish (U) constructs. with similarmultiple-name sonor brothers Individualsand placespicturedon the front cover: 'AttJi Hani LeJt side, photo:Phonsof hii,ackers HaniurantlMajid firs1
(a,k.u. Majitl Muqil)l I

al-Aeizal'Umari. Hiiacker'Abd photo: second Left sitle,

Lcft side, thlrd photct: Hiiackers fron United Airlines fight 175. Left side, ftiurth phottt: Hiiacker Ahnnd al'Haz4ctwlggattrrlmt ed in a testimonial video.

Left side,ftfth ph^to: Hiiacker'pikn Ziad Jaffa 'Abdal-Azizul-unuri as photo: Phototrl'hijackersMulwtnmadAtlaancl Left sirle,si-rtfi
they pussthrcugh the Portland Intemational (Maine

Center'sOfnc" otf...orist by paperwas prepared the DCI Counterterrorist This research Commentsandqueriesaiewelcomeandmaybedirected.
I

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c0541,6,912
I

Gontents

Soope Note (Ul

of The 1 1 SeotemberPlot: The Evolution the ActackstUl

Appendixes
A. B. C. D. Divense Hijackers: Pachs co The 11 September (U) Profiles Hijeokers' Timelines tUl AtLacks(U) on Other Publications bhe 1 1 September

c054L6912

c05416912

2OOl Plot: The 11 Septamber The Evolutlonof the Attacks tUl

Key Findings

tul

2001 evolvedover a period on The plot to altackthe United States I I September of severalyears, and its roots go back evenfunher to tlre bombing of the World anackshas revealed of TradeCenterin 1993.An invgstigation the I I September Khalid ShaykhMuhammad,is not only the uncle that one of its chief planners, of of RarnziYousef-the mastermind the I 993 plot-btrt also providedfunds,

in of to training, othersupport theconspirators thebombing 1993' and

UsamaBin Ladin's approvalin The ideafor ih, attacksreportedlyreceived beganto selectthe young men who would t998, after wtrich al-Qa'ida leaders carry them out. . Threeof the four pilots-Muhammad Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, andZiad Jarrah-were apparentlyrecruited for the plot from Germany,where they had cometo study from Egypt, theUnited Arab Emirates(UAE), and Lebanon.A their efforts. in network of alQa'ida associates Hamburgsupported . TWoof the hijacken-Nawaf al-Hazmiand Khalid al-Mihdhar-had been activein al-Qa'ida circlessincethe mid-1990s,had fought with otherjihadists in threecountries,and anived in the United Stateswell beforeany of the other fligbt training hijackers.Khalid left the country after they briefly attempted servingas 2000.Nawaf remainedin the United SCates in the United Statesin plot. in second commandfor the . The fourth pilot-Hani Hanjur-and the remaininghijackers,with the They largely were Saudis. exceptionof UAE,citizen Fayiz Banihammad, religiouscamps, appear havebeenradicalizedby contacls8t universities, to and in and mosques theJ4teJ99O,s were probablybroughtinto the plot in the laner half of 2000.1 | The plot waslaunchedin eamestin late 1999,when the threeHamburg-based their and al-Hazmiand al-Mihdharcoordinated pilots traveledto Afghanistan, travelto Malaysiaafter which thcy enteredthe United States'The Hamburg pilots cameto the United Statesin late May and June2000,spendingthe rest of the year in flight training in Florida.Hanjur enteredthe United Statesin late 2000 and pairedup with al-Hazmi in Arizona to continuethe flight training he had intermittentlypursuedin the United Statessince 1996.The supporting an enteringthe United Statesin late April 2001.

c05416912

'il
plottersmademistakes ran into a numberof and Atthoughthe I t Septernber ofseveralfactors' because theywcre ableto cany out thehifackings obstaclcs. . Shrcwd selection oper:ctlves' of With the exception al-Hazmiand of were'tlean" andhadno thc al-Mihdhar. mcn sentinto the UniledStates of The four pilots alsohad the advantage years the troubleentering country. familiar with banking' counries wheretheybecame in of experience Westem and communication, travelpracfices' . Relellvely sofeopcrating cnvlronment.The planners the of enoughwith their assessment cvidentlyfelt comfortable I l..september attacks rnobile,anddiverse-that theycouldleavecrucial of tlS society---open, opcratives placefor morethana yearwithout fearof discovery' in . Flexlblllty and mlsslonfocus.Conspiratorg eitherfailedto qualify as who new assumed rclesin thc plot, while other pilots or to enterthe UnitedSlates operativelwerefoundto fulfill their original mles' . Well-coochedand coordincteil financial opentions. Thc financial that facilitated the I t ScptcmberoPerSllelgfleaed al-Qa'ida's transactions in long experience movlng funds unobtrusivel{_____l sincefall 2001, and security consciousness rcgulations ln spiteof increased plot, giventhe certainaspeosof the I I September alQa'ida could still duplicate financialtransactions. individuals, diffculty of idcntifyingsuspicious extreme as as in or communications a countryandeconomy largeanddiverse the United for insidethe UnitedStates to unnoticed States. hrjackers'ability operatc The al-Qa'idaleaders may evenhaveconvinced rnorethana yeorin somecases cveniJran in to that usingope.ratives cany out futureattacks the UnitedSt?tes, vigilancc,is a risk well worth taking,l of atmosphae heighrcned I

c05416972

Contents The Evolutionof the Attacks tUl

(U) KeyFindings Attacks [U) of Oevdopment the 11 September FlooEs EarlyConcepcual

The Plot TakesShape

of Executioners the Plot tul

Two al-Oa'idaVeEenans The HambungNetwork

ol-Ga'ida \bung SaudisGravitateToward of Exploitation AfghanCemps PatEerns Leadto Afghanisuan Tnavel Planning Meebings Crucial fon Preparations the Mission(U) New PassoortsCovefTracks Arrivein the UnitedScates First Groupof Saudis PilotTraining The Plot GathersStea Anrivss Fourth PiloE
Pilots TnavelAbnoad

SecondWeveAnrives "Plain View" Hidingin Final (Ul Keysto Suooess

Shrewd Selection of OPeratives RelativelySafe Operating Environment

15
15 15

and Flexibiliuy MissionFocus Financa and Well-Coached Coordinabed and AnalyticEffontstUl Collection GonEinuing

c05415972

The 11 September 2OOl Plot: The Evolution of the Attacks tUl

Oevclopmang of the 11 Septemher. Artacks fUl

Early Gonceptull Roots The I I September wasa sophisticated thai armck plot wasprobably the planning in slsges morerhan for two year$ caried out by a groupof l9 committed The Plot Tales Shape and individuals well asanexrensive as networkof largely As Bin Ladin's determination strike to America ar unwittingsupporteE facilitatoq$. ard homeincreased | 998.the ideas in . In an interviewtbr al-Jaeirah relcvision airedon 8 Septb'mber 2002,high-ranking al-Qa'ida member Kholid ShaykhMuhammad(KSM) saidthatrhe wereplanned attacks duringa three-year pcriod;a studyof possibl rargets began tle same at limc al-Qa'ida prepared theUS.Ernbassy for bombing operalion 1998 in inAfrica.l I Webelieve a common tJrat thread runsbetween the 6rstattack theWorldTrade on Cenrer February in

. ThatAugust, Ladinissued declaration war Bin a of against UnitedStates, tbe callingon his supporteru to begina guenillacampaign wouldqtyg_U!_ that forces ofrhe Saudi out Arabian peninsuhl I

Bin Ladinthatsrnallaircraftpacked with explosives target WorldTrade the Bin Cenrcr. Ladinreporredly suggested usingevenlarger planes, saying"why usc anaxeif you canusea bulldozer?" . In an interview al-Jazirah for television, KSM saidthathe hadcomeup with theproposal a that "manyrdom operation" the in

I I September operation. KSM, ah uncleof Ramzi Yousef, who masterminded 1993bornbing the plor against WorldTradeCenter, the providcd financial andlogisticsupport the 1993operation. for . Following | 993auack. the and Yousef KSM plored in | 995to blowup I 2 US planes flyingEast Asian routes-for whichKSM wasindicted 1996-and in to fly a plancinto CIA hcadquartcrs, Philippine authorities uncovered plot, andYousef later the was arrested Pakistan, KSM escaned.l in but I KSM wasnot rheonly al-Qa'ida figureto consider destroying commcrpial aircraftin themid-t90s. In 1996, Usama Din Ladin'ssecond command, in Muharnmad'Atlf (a.k.a. Abu Hafs),drewup a studyon thefeasibilityof hijacking planes US and destroyinS themin flight, possibly influenced by Yousef's KSM's unrcalized and plans.

look at potential targets. originallisr reponedly The included thirty rargesl,bural-Qa'ida's leadership andrnilitarycommitrce nurruwed downthelist,

claimed al-Oa'ida that theideafor fearrharit could

out of conlrol."