SPECIFICATION SEEKING
000
more media rather than options that correspond to moredesirable final outcomes. For example, in a study reportedin Hsee, Yu, et al. (2003), participants were given a choicebetween a short proofreading task that would award 60points and a longer proofreading task that would award 100points and were told that 60 points would entitle them to aserving of vanilla ice cream and 100 points would entitlethem to an equally large serving of pistachio ice cream.Most participants opted for the longer task. But when askedlater which flavor they would enjoy more, most favored thevanilla ice cream. Medium maximization can be consideredas a special case of specification maximization. Likeaspeci-fication, a medium has no intrinsic value. Decision makersought to ignore media if they know which option corre-sponds to what final outcome and know which outcome theywill enjoy more. Likewise, buyers ought to ignore specifi-cations if they can experience the underlying attributes andknow which option carries more consumption utility. Butin reality such normatively superfluous numbers have a pro-found influence on decision makers.Another line of research that has inspired thepresentwork is on money illusion—a tendency to base judgment on thenominal value of money rather than on its real purchasingpower (Fehr and Tyran 2001; Raghubir and Srivastava2002;Shafir, Diamond, and Tversky 1997; Wertenbroch, Soman,and Chattopadhyay 2007). For example, travelers rely onthe nominal value of a foreign currency relative to theirhome currency to make purchasing decisions, even thoughthey are aware of the exchange rate between the foreigncurrency and their home currency. This, as well as otherresearch (e.g., Chinander and Schweitzer 2003; Silvera, Jo-sephs, and Giesler 2001), suggests that people pursue spe-cious proxies. Our research extends the prior research bypositing that consumers pursue specious specifications evenwhen fundamental experiences are available.To summarize, ourpropositionhereisthatconsumersseek quantitative specifications even in situations in which theydo not know how to use these numbers yet they can directlyexperience the relevant products. This proposition leads toour first general hypothesis:
H1:
Specifications can change consumer choice evenif experiences are available and specificationsprovide little or no additional predictive infor-mation.Formally, let
s
A
and
s
B
denote the specifications of twoproducts (A and B) on a given attribute, for example, thespecified screen resolutions of two MP4 players. Let
e
A
and
e
B
denote the corresponding direct experiences, for example,the experienced screen sharpness of the two MP4 players. Letdenote the likelihood that thebuyer willpurchaseproduct
P
1
A B
A instead of B. The likelihood can be modeled roughly as
s e
A A
P
p
w
+ (1
w
) ,
(1)
1
A B
s e
B B
where
w
, the weight of specifications, is greater than zero.We adopt a ratio form because people largely evaluate theadvantage of one option over another in relative terms (e.g.,Hsee, Yu, et al. 2003; Shafir, Osherson, and Smith 1993).In the equation we assume greater
s
’s and
e
’s are better.The equation should be reversed in cases in which smaller
s
’s and
e
’s are better, for example, with the noise of an airconditioner.Normatively, if buyers have full access to
e
’s, and
s
’soffer no additional predictive information, they should ig-nore the
s
’s and base their decisions on the
e
’s. That is,
w
should be zero. Contrary to the normative perspective, whatour first general hypothesis (hypothesis 1) posits is that evenin these situations buyers base their purchase decisions on
s
’s or on some combination of
e
’s and
s
’s. In other words,
w
is not zero.It is important to note that if were equal to ,
s
/
s e
/
e
A B A B
then would be the same regardless of whether buyers
P
1
A B
base their decisions on or on , that is, regardless
s
/
s e
/
e
A B A B
of what
w
is. In reality, however, and often differ,
s
/
s e
/
e
A B A B
and, therefore, the resulting will also differ depending
P
1
A B
on whether buyers rely on or on . For example,
s
/
s e
/
e
A B A B
suppose that a jade shopper who is fond of green jade en-counters two pieces of jade. By just looking at the jewelry,one piece looks only slightly greener than the other. But bysome greenness index (a type of specification) ascribed bythe jade producer, the greener piece has a much higher indexnumber. According to our model, the jade shopper is morelikely to buy the greener jade if she attends to the indexthan if she ignores it.The above general hypothesis yields two concrete andtestable subhypotheses (corollaries). The first concerns thepresence or absence of specifications and can be easily in-ferred from our model (eq. 1):
H1a:
Holding the underlying attributes constant, thepresence or absence of specificationscanchangeconsumer preference. Specifically, when facedwithtwooptions,AandB,where isgreater
s
/
s
A B
(smaller) than , people will be more (less)
e
/
e
A B
likely to choose A over B if the
s
’s are pre-sented than if they are not.The second subhypothesis concerns how the specifica-tions are described. The same attributes may be describedin different ways, yielding different ratios. For ex-
s
/
s
A B
ample, the size of a circle can be specified either by its areaor by its diameter. Because area is a function of diametersquared, the ratio of a large circle over a small circle, whenexpressed in area versus in diameter, would be different. Acircle with a diameter of 4 centimeters is the same as onewith an area of 12.56 square centimeters; a circle with adiameter of 2 centimeters is the same as one with an areaof 3.14 square centimeters. In terms of areas, the ratio of the large circle over the small one is 4; in terms ofdiameters,it is only 2.Normatively, describing the same attributes differentlyshould not affect consumer preference. A rose will smell assweet, regardless of what it is called. However, according
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