ComparingInterestGroupScoresacrossTimeandChambers:AdjustedADAScoresfortheU.S.Congress
STOR
®
TimGroseclose;StevenD.Levitt;JamesM.Snyder,Jr.
TheAmericanPoliticalScienceReview,
Vol.93,No.1(Mar.,1999),33-50.
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AmericanPoliticalScienceReviewVol.93,No.1March1999
ComparingInterestGroupScoresacrossTimeandChambers:AdjustedADAScoresfortheU.S.Congress
TIMGROSECLOSE
StanfordUniversity
STEVEND.LEVITT
UniversityofChicago
andJAMESM.SNYDER,JR.
MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology
I
terestgroupra~ingsarewidelyusedinstudiesoflegislativeb~havior.Sincetheset?fvotesusedisnotconstantovertimeandacrosschambers,thescalesunderlymgthescorescanshiftandstretch.Weintroduceaneconometricmodelthatcorrectstheproblem.Specifically,wederiveanindex,muchlikeaninflationindexforconsumerprices,thatallowsonetomakeintertemporalandinterchambercomparisonsofinterestgroupratings.TheadjustedscoresfortheADAshowastrongliberaltrendintheaveragememberofCongressduring
1947-94,
followedbyaconservativereversal.AnonparametrictestusingADAandACUscoresdemonstratesthevalidityofadjustedscoresandtheinvalidityofnominalscoresforintertemporalandinterchambercomparisons.Usingtwostudies(Levitt
1996;
ShipanandLowry1997)weillustratethatthechoiceofadjustedversusnominalscoresmaygreatlyaffectsubstantiveconclusionsofresearchers.
W
ithoutquestion,the1974Houseelectionsthatbroughtaninfluxof"Watergatebabies"causedtheHousetobecomemoreliberal.Despitethis,however,boththemedianandmeanratingofHousemembersbytheconservativeinterestgroupAmericansforConstitutionalAction(ACA)
rose
between1974and1975(Groseclose1994).WhileanaivecomparisonofACAscoresfromthesetwoyearswouldsuggestthattheHousebecamemoreconserva-,tive,theperverseresultissurelydueinsteadtotheACAshiftingitsscales,nottoatruechangeinHousepreferences.Theexamplehighlightsafundamentaldifficultyfac-ingresearcherswhouseinterestgroupratingstomakeintertemporalorinterchambercomparisons.Becausethesetofvotesusedtoconstructtheratingsaredifferenteachyear,thescalesunderlyinginterestgroupratingsarelikelytoshiftandstretchacrosschambersandtime.'Evenworse,whenpreferencesinCongresschange,whetherduetomembershipturnoveroractualchangesinmembers'views,interestgroupsmayre-spondbychangingthescalestokeeptheaveragescore
TimGrosecloseisAssociateProfessorofPoliticalEconomy,Grad-uateSchoolofBusiness,StanfordUniversity,Stanford,CA94305.StevenD.LevittisAssociateProfessorofEconomics,UniversityofChicago,Chicago,IL60637.JamesM.SnyderisProfessorofPoliticalScienceandEconomics,MassachusettsInstituteofTech-nology,Cambridge,MA02139.WearegratefulforcommentsfromLarryBaum,AageClausen:JeffLewis,KeithPoole,threeanonymousreferees,andseminarparticipantsatColumbiaUniversity,DukeUniversity,EmoryUni-versity,theMassachusettsInstituteofTechnology,StanfordUniver-sity,UniversityofChicago,UniversityofColorado,andtheUniver-sityofMississippi.Also,wethankLarryAlbright,FredBlakeslee,LoriHausegger,JeffLewis,AdamMeirowitz,andJasonMycoffforexcellentresearchassistance.
1
Thenotionofshiftingorstretchingscalesisbestexplainedbyananalogytoathermometer.Supposethetubeofmercuryisfixed,butonecanrecalibratethenumberedmarksonthesideofthethermom-eter.
If,
say,allthemarks(andcorrespondingnumbers)aremoved
x
unitsabovetheoriginalmarks,wesaythatthescalehasshifted.
If
onerecalibratesthemarkssothatthedistancebetweenthemincreases,thenwesaythescalehasstretched.
roughlyconstant.Asaconsequence,theshiftingandstretchingofscalesmayseriouslymaskchangesinpreferences.Thesameprinciplealsopresentsproblemsforinter-chambercomparisons.AsenatorandHousemembermayhaveidenticalpreferencesorideologies,butbe-causeaninterestgroupusesdifferentrollcallvotesinconstructingitsratingsforthetwochambers,thetwopoliticiansmayhavedifferentscores.Unfortunately,intertemporalandinterchambercomparisonsofgroupratingsarenecessaryinordertotestmanyofthepredictionsmadebyrecentmodelsinAmericanpolitics.SpatialmodelssuchasthoseofFerejohnandShipan(1990),GelyandSpiller(1990),KiewietandMcCubbins(1988),Krehbiel(1996),Segal(1997),andShepsleandWeingast(1987)makepredic-tionsthatdependontherelativepreferencesofHouseandSenatecommitteemedians,HouseandSenatefloormedians,andnonlegislativeactorssuchasthepresident,theSupremeCourt,oradministrativeagencyheads.Ataminimum,therefore,oneneedsacommonscaleonwhichbothHouseandSenatepref-erencesaremeasured.Also,inordertohaveasamplesizegreaterthanone,suchstudiesrequireseveralyearsofdataonacommonscaleaswell.Intertemporalcomparisonsarealsonecessarytotestvarioushypoth-esesabout"ideologicalshirking"(istherea"last-period"shirkingproblem,ordomembersshirkmoreinnonelectionyears?)andtodescribeandtesthypothe-sesabouthowtheideologicalcompositionofCongresshaschangedovertime.
In
thisarticleweintroduceaneconometricmodelthatcorrectsforshiftingandstretchingscalesofinter-estgroupscores.Specifically,wederiveanindex,muchlikeaninflationindexforconsumerorwholesaleprices,thatallowsonetoconvertthescoressothattheycanbeusedtomakeintertemporalandinterchambercomparisons.Next,todemonstratethevalueoftheconvertedscores,weprovidethreeempiricalapplica-tions.Themostimportantisademonstrationofhowaggregatecongressionalpreferencescompareover
33
AdjustedADAScoresfortheU.S.CongressMarch1999timeandacrosschambers.Todothis,weuseconvertedscoresoftheAmericansforDemocraticAction(ADA).Previousresearchershaveincorporatedanumberofpartialfixestotheproblemsofshiftingandstretchingscales.PooleandDaniels(1985),forexample,allowforshiftsinthescaleovertimebutdonotaccountfordifferencesinscalesacrosschambers,nordotheyallowforstretchingorshrinkingofthescalesovertime.Similarly,LottandBronars(1993)includeyear-fixedeffectsasindependentvariables,whichcorrectsforshiftingscalesbutnotforstretching.OurfindingsindicatethattheADAscalesexhibit'asubstantialamountofstretchingovertime,inadditiontosubstan-tialshifts.Also,inoneofourempiricalapplicationswefindthatadjustedADAscoressignificantlychangetheresults,evenwhenyear-fixedeffectsareincludedinthe
specifications.?
Athirdstrategyformitigatingtheprob-lemofshiftingscalesistofocusondifferencesinscoresacrossindividualsratherthanchangesinanindividu-al'sscoresovertime.Forexample,Grier(1991)as-sumesthateachmember'spreferencesarefixed,andhemeasuresamember'spreferenceastheaverageofhisorherADAscoresovermanyyears.Thus,changesinGrier'svariableofinterest-theaveragescoreoftheBankingCommittee-aredrivenlargelybymember-shipturnover,andthesechangesarelikelytodwarfthoseduetochangesintheADAscale.Similarly,Moe(1985)andSpillerandGely(1992)focusoncommitteechairs,whileWeingastandMoran(1983)concentrate-onsubcommitteemembership.Alargeproportionofthevariationinthesevariablesisalsoduetoturnover,soshiftingandstretchingscalesmaynotposetoolargeaproblem.Themostsystematicapproachtoachievingintertem-poralcomparabilityofrollcallvotingmeasuresisPooleandRosenthal's(1991)D-Nominatescores."WhilethesehavetheshortcomingthatHouseandSenatescoresarenotcomparable,inmanyotherrespectsthemotivationsunderlyingthedevelopmentofD-Nominateandtheconclusionsdrawnfromanal-ysisofD-Nominatescoresparallelthosepresentedinthisarticle(withafewimportantdifferencesdiscussedbelow).Presumably,therelativeattractivenessofadjustedinterestgroupratingsandD-Nominatescoreswillvarywiththeparticularresearchquestionathand,anissueweconsideratgreaterlengthinoneofourempiricalapplications.Oneadvantageofourmethodisthatitissimpletounderstandandeasytoimplement(itis.assimpleasconvertingtemperaturesfromCelsiustoFahrenheit).Amoreimportantadvantageisthatour
2
CoxandMcCubbins(1993)proposetheuseofordinalrankingsoflegislatorsratherthaninterestgroupscoresthemselves.Thisap-proachisnotveryhelpfulformakingintertemporalorinterchambercomparisons,however.Forinstance,considerthemedianoftheHousein1975versusthemedianin1995.Nomatterwhattheirideologicaldifferences,bothwouldreceiveapercentilerankiugof50.Also,sinceinanygivenyearthereisnooverlapinmembershipbetweentheHouseandSenate,theordinalrankingsmethodisextremelyineffectiveformakinginterchambercomparisons.
3
Seealso,PooleandRosenthal(1985a,1985b,1997).D-NominatestandsforDynamicNOMINALThree-stepEstimationprocess.
34
methodcanbeappliedto
any
interestgroup'sratings.Thisallowsresearcherstoanalyzeparticularissues,suchaslabor,civilrights,ortheenvironment,ratherthansimplyagenericliberal-conservativedimension.Asanexampleofwhythesecondadvantageisimportant,considerthestudiesmentionedabovebyGrier(1991),Moe(1985),SpillerandGely(1992),andWeingastandMoran(1983).Eachstudyfocusesonaparticularpolicyarea-FederalTradeCommissionde-cisionsinWeingastandMoran,monetarypolicyinGrier,laborpolicyinMoeandSpillerandGely.Furthermore,asnotedabove,theempiricalspecifica-tionsinthesestudiesaredesignedtoreducetheproblemsassociatedwithchanginginterestgroupscales;yet,thesespecificationsalsopreventthere-searchersfromexaminingmanyhypothesestheysurelywouldliketotest.Forexample,itisnaturaltotesthypothesesabouttherelativepowerofchamberfloorsversuschambercommittees,orabouttherelativepoweroftheHouseversustheSenate.DoestheHousemedianmattermorethanthecommitteemedianorcommitteechair?Docommitteesmattermorethansubcommittees?Hasthebalanceofpowerchangedsincethereformsofthe1970s?Domajoritypartymembershavemoreinfluencethanminoritymembers?Existingstudiesdonotaddressthesequestionsbecausetheycannot.Theproblemofshiftingscalesmeansthatthemedianoraveragescoresoflargesubsetsofrepresentatives(suchaswholechambers,politicalpar-ties,andmanycommittees)areincomparableovertimeandacross.chambers.Whatthestudiesneedaretherollcallscoresofrelativelynarrowinterestgroups(laborunions,banks,environmentalgroups,smallbusi-nessassociations)andamethodsuchasoursthatallowsthegroup'sscorestobecomparedovertimeandacrosschambers.Asweshow,theuseofadjustedADAscoresratherthanrawscoresnotonlysubstantivelyaffectstheconclusionsofsomeinfluentialandexcellentresearchbutalso,ingeneral,leadstomorepreciseestimatesandlesssensitivityoftheresultstotheparticularchoiceofmodelspecification.OneofthemaineffectsoftheshiftsandstretchesintheADAscalesistoaddconsiderablemeasurementerrortothescores.
In
fact,weestimatethatthiserroraccountsforapproximatelyone-fourththetotalvarianceinthescoresofatypicalmember.Thistendstobiascoefficientstowardzerowhenthescoresareusedasregressorstopredictotherphenomena.Therefore,theuseofadjustedratherthanrawscoreswilloftenstrengthenresearchers'findingsbasedonrawscores,asitdoesinoneoftheempiricalapplicationsweexamine.
AMODELOFPREFERENCESANDINTERESTGROUPSCORES
LikeconvertingtemperaturefromCelsiustoFahren-heit,weassumethataninterestgroup'sscores(here-after,ADAscoresforbrevity)canbeconvertedfromoneyeartoanotheroronechambertoanotherbyalineartransformationwithtwoparameters:ashiftandstretchfactor.Forinstance,toconvertatemperature
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