Appeal from CFI Ilocos Sur decision
Alejandria Feliciano – father is in Hawaii; entrusted to father’s friend, Estanislao Serrano who tookcare of her & raised her from 12 until she got married
June 21, 1948 – Alejandria & Melchor Solomon were married. Before the ceremony, Solomonexecuted alleged Deed of Donation w/c stated among others that he was donating all of hisexclusive properties to serve as capital for their conjugal life & for the maintenance & support of their offsprings. Their children will inherit such donation but in the absence of children, half of theproperties will go to his brothers/sisters/their heirs if he dies before his wife or if his wife diesbefore him, half will go to those who raised his wife.
March 2, 1949 – Alejandria died.
Few months after – Estanislao instituted action to enforce & implement terms of alleged donation.Being the one who raised Alejandria, he believed he had the right to half of Melchor’s property.
CFI: donation was not a donation
because it was not made in consideration of marriage & it was not made to one or both parties of the marriage
WON the donation made by Melchor can be considered as a donation
No alleged donation is null & void. CFI affirmed. Estanislao won’t get anything.
Whether you apply Art. 1327 of the old CC or Art. 126 of the new CC, the result would be thesame, donations
are only those bestowed (1)before the celebration of marriage, (2)inconsideration of the same & (3)upon one or both of the spouses. Melchor’s donation violated conditions2 & 3. It was not in consideration solely of the marriage, it had additional terms like the marriage hadto be childless and one of the spouses had to die before the other. Also, it was not in favor of Alejandria. Instead, it was in favor of her parents & those who raised her. Based on Manresa’scommentary, donations granted to persons other than the spouses even though founded on themarriage are excluded. It’s not a donation
(during their lifetime) either, because doneenever accepted it by same instrument of donation or in separate document as required by law. It’s nota donation
(upon death) either. It has to be governed by provisions on the dispositionexecution of wills to be appreciated as such. Besides, donor is still alive. It will only be operational uponhis death.
SOLIS v. BARROSO
53 Phil. 912
On June 1919, spouses Juan Lambino and Maxima Barroso made a donation propter nuptiasof certain lands in a private document in favor of their son Alejo and his soon-to-be-wife FortunataSolis, in consideration of their upcoming marriage. One condition of the donation is that in case oneof the donees dies, half of the lands thus donated would revert to the donors while the survivingdonee would retain the other half. On the same month, Alejo and Fortunata got married andimmediately thereafter the donors delivered the possession of the donated lands to them. A monthlater, Alejo died. In the same year, Juan also died. After Juan’s death, Maxima recoveredpossession of the donated lands. Surviving donee, Fortunata filed an action against Maxima(surviving donor) et al and demanded:(1)the execution of the proper deed of donation according to law,(2)transferring one-half of the donated property, and(3)to proceed to the partition of the donated property and its fruitsThe lower court granted the plaintiff’s prayer, basing its judgment on article 1279 of the Civil Code.It ordered the defendants to execute a deed of donation in favor of Fortunata, valid in form totransfer to her the legal title to the part of the donated lands assigned to her in the originaldonation.
WON one-half of the donated lands should properly be awarded to her.
No. CFI’s judgment reversed and defendants absolved from complaint.
Article 1279 used by lower court is not applicable to donation propter nuptias
Article 1279 provides that, should the law require the execution of an instrument or anyother special form in order to make the obligations of a contract effective, the contractingparties may compel each other to comply with such formality from the moment that consenthas been given, and the other requirements for the validity of the contract to exist.
In the case at bar, what is of concern is a donation propter nuptias. According to article1328, CC, donation propter nuptias are governed by the rules established in articles 618 to656 of the CC, on donations.
Art. 633 provides that for a donation of a real property to be valid, it must be made in apublic instrument.
Exception to the rule: onerous and remuneratory contracts, in so far as they do notexceed the value of the charge imposed, which are then governed by the rules on contracts(art. 622)
Because the donation propter nuptias by the spouses were made in a privateinstrument, it is not valid and does not confer any rights.
Thus, article 1279 is not applicable because (1) it refers to contracts; (2) the donation inquestion requires the execution of an instrument in the form required to make it
,whereas article 1279 refers to the execution of an instrument that is in the form required tomake the obligation in the contract
.The lower court’s judgment that the present donation is onerous and pursuant to article 622 mustbe governed by the rules on contracts is not well-founded.
Donations for valuable consideration (onerous donations), as may be inferred fromarticle 619, are such as compensate services (1) which constitute debts which are recoverablefrom the donor, or (2) which impose a charge equal to the amount of the donation upon thedonee
Neither applies to the present donation, which was made only in consideration of marriageThe lower court’s assertion that, by the fact that this is a donation propter nuptias, it is based uponthe marriage as a consideration, and must be considered onerous is also not well-founded.
In donations propter nuptias, the marriage is really a consideration, but not in the senseof being necessary to give birth to the obligation. The marriage in a donation propter nuptias israther a resolutory condition which, as such, presupposes the existence of the obligation whichmay be resolved or revoked, and it is not a condition necessary for the birth of the obligation.***sana ma-gets nyo..sobrang hirap ako maintindihan siya coz it presupposes that I understand whatonerous donations are. Just as reference, onerous means having legal obligations that outweigh theadvantages. Sorry talaga..it’s all I could come up with..
Mateo vs. Lagua [October 30, 1969]Petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals
Cipriano Lagua was the original order of 3 lots (998, 6541, 5106). In 1917 he donated lot998 and 6541 to Alejandro Lagua in consideration of the marriage of his son. The Certificateof Titles remained in the donor’s name.
1923 Alejandro Lagua died and his wife and infant daughter stayed with Cipriano. Ciprianoundertook the farming of the donated lots and initially he was giving the to Bonifacia (wife of Alejandro) the owner’s share of the harvest of the land. However in 1926 Cipriano refusedto deliver the share of Bonifacio and as such Bonifacio resorted to the Court wherein sheobtained a judgement award to her possession of the two lots plus damages.
July 31, 1941 – Cipriano executed a deed of sale of the two parcels of land in favour of hisother son, Gervasio. Even with the sale Bonifacia continued to receive her owner’s share of the harvest until 1956. Bonifacia discovered the sale only in 1956 when the remittance of her share has stopped. She also discovered that in September 22, 1955 TCT Nos. 19152and 19153 of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan were issued to Gervasio. She went tocourt to seek for the annulment of the deed of sale in favour of Gervasio and for recovery of the possession of the properties. The court ruled in her favour.
August 18, 1957 – Gervasio and his wife filed an action against Bonifacia for reimbursementof the improvements allegedly made by them in lots 998 and 6541 plus damages. This casewas dismissed but Gervasio appealed the decision. At about the same time Cipriano andGervasio filed for the annulment of the donation of the two lots insofar as one-half portionthereof was concerned. They were claiming that in donating the two lots, which allegedlywere all that plaintiff Cipriano owned, said plaintiff not only neglected leaving something forhis own support but also prejudices the legitime of his forced heir, Gervasio. On November22, 1958 Cipriano died. (the cases were still pending in court)
Lower Court dismissed both cases.
CA affirmed the decision of the lower court with regards to the damages claim but withrespect to the annulment case it ruled that the donation to Alejangro of the 2 lots with thecombined area of 11,888 square meters exceeded by 494.75 square meters his legitime andthe disposable portion that Cipriano could have freely given by will and as a result itprejudiced Gervasio. The Defendants were ordered to reconvey to Plaintiff Gervasio a portioof 494.75 square meters to be taken from any convenient part of the lots.
Bonifacia appealed the decision raising the following errors:
Validity of the donation propter nuptias have been determined in a previous case
Action to annul the donation has already prescribed since the case was filed 41years after the donation
Donation propter nuptias is revocable only for any grounds enumerated in Art.132 of the new civil code