Mars Veloso 1C, 2006-2007
Persons Digests v1.0
Page No. 3
Joaquin v. Navarro
May 29, 1953 (257 Phil. 93), Tuason, J.
Three proceedings instituted in CFIManila were heard jointly and weregiven a single decision. This wasappealed to the CA, whose decisionmodified the former. A subsequentappeal to the SC ensued.
Feb. 6, 1946 – While the battle for theliberation of Manila was raging, thespouses of JN, Sr. and AJ (mother of petitioner), together with their threedaughters P, C, and N, and their son JN, Jr. and the latter’s wife, AC, soughtrefuge in the ground floor of thebuilding known as the German Club, atthe corner of San Marcelino and SanLuis Streets of the city. Building waspacked with refugees, shells wereexploding around, the Club was set onfire, and the Japanese were shootingthose who tried to escape. Threedaughters were shot and died. JN, Sr.and son decided to abandon thepremises to seek safer haven. AJremained. Upon attempting to escape, JN, Jr. was shot and died. Minutes later,the Club, already on fire, collapsed. JN,Sr. and daughter-in-law died threedays later. Friend and former neighborFL who escaped with JN, Sr. from thebuilding, survived to narrate the story. The RTC claims that the mother,natural child of petitioner Joaquin,survived the son; the son dying firstbefore the mother. CA claimed thereverse. If the son died first, petitionerwould reap the benefits of succession.If the mother died first, the respondentAntonio, son of JN, Jr. by his firstmarriage, would inherit.Decision was reviewed by the SC.
(1) WON the discussion of section 69(ii) of Rule 123 of the Rules of Courthaving repealed Art. 43 of the CC ornot is relevant to the case at bar.No. Neither of the two provisions isapplicable. Both provisions, as theirlanguage implies, are intended as asubstitute for facts, and so are not tobe available when there are facts.
(2) WON the mother died before theson or vice versa.No. The son died first. The facts areadequate to solve the problem of survivorship without the need forstatutory presumptions. Thepresumption that AJ, the mother, diedfirst is based purely on surmises,speculations, or conjectures withoutany sure foundation in the evidence. The opposite theory is deduced fromestablished facts which, weighed withcommon experience, engender theinference as a very strong probability.
Carrillo v. Jaojoco & Jaojoco
March 24, 1925 (956 Phil. 46), Avancena, J.
Miguela Carrillo, as sister of deceasedAdriana Carrillo and currentadministratrix of the latter’s estate,brought action to the CFI Cavite for theannulment of the document of becauseher sister was declared mentallyincapacitated nine days after thetransaction. The defendants were
Rule 123, section 69 (ii) of the Revised Rules of Court reads: “When two persons perish in thesame calamity, such as wreck, battle, orconflagration, and it is not (1) shown who diedfirst, and there are no (2) particularcircumstances from which it can be inferred, thesurvivorship is presumed from the probabilitiesresulting from the strength and age of the sexesaccording to the following rules…Article 43 of the CC is of the following tenor:“Whenever a doubt arises as to which was thefirst to die of the two or more persons who wouldinherit one from the other, the person whoalleges the prior death of either must prove theallegation; in the absence of proof thepresumption shall be that they died at the sametime, and no transmission of rights from one tothe other shall take place.”