WILLIAM R.

McPIKE SBN 95869 Attorney At Law 36360 Peterson Road Auberry, CA 93602 (559) 841-3366 Attorney for Plaintiff

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF FRESNO

WILLIAM R. McPIKE, an individual, Plaintiff, vs. ) ) Case Number: ) ) ) PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT FOR:

) (1) DECLARATORY RELIEF/JUDGMENT ) (2) VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA ) CIVIL CODE 52.1(B), ET SEC. COUNTY OF FRESNO, A POLITICAL ) (3) WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF ) MANDAMUS/WRIT OF MANDATE CALIFORNIA, FRESNO COUNTY ) (4) PRELIMINARY AND PERMANENT BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, ) INJUNCTIONS (EXCLUDING SUSAN ANDERSON) ) (5) JUDGMENT TO VOID ORDINANCE AND DOES 1 - 100 ) T-086-364 OR PARTS THEREOF Defendants. ) (6) DAMAGES

PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT 1. I. INTRODUCTION The monetary damages sought by the plaintiff exceed the minimum

jurisdictional limits of the Superior Court. Venue is proper in Fresno because defendant, COUNTY OF FRESNO, (hereinafter referred to as Defendant) is a governmental entity, incorporated into existence by the State of California, and the Fresno County Board of Supervisors, are elected TRUSTEES, (hereinafter referred to as Trustees) i.e., delegates of the electorate of Fresno County, (excluding Susan Anderson) who passed the unconstitutional Ordinance, in excess of their delegated

powers, and in violation of the federal Controlled Substances Act [CSA], State laws, and in violation of Plaintiffs rights. Fresno County Board member Susan Anderson is not a party hereto. 2. Plaintiff WILLIAM R. McPIKE, is an adult individual, and was and now is at all

times herein mentioned, a qualified patient under Health and Safety Code 11362.5, and a lifetime resident of the County of Fresno 3. William R. McPike is recognized as a qualified patient by both the State of California and the Fresno County Department of Health. See as incorporated herein, Exhibit 1, which is a MMPA identification card. Said card is evidence that McPike is a qualified patient under both Health & Safety code sections 11362.5, and 11362.7 et seq. Plaintiff cultivates his own medicinal marijuana, and is desirous of becoming a member of a private (non-business) association of patients or a collective of similar patients. Plaintiff does not distribute his medical marijuana. 4. The acts complained of herein, deny McPike his vested rights, and access granted by the state electorate in 1996, by passing the Compassionate Use Act, codified at H&S 11362.5. In 1996, California voters concluded that marijuana does have medical use. The conflicting CSA has not reached this decision. 5. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant, Trustees, and DOES 1-100, and each and every one of them, are responsible in some manner for the occurrences herein alleged, and Plaintiff s injuries and damages, violations of constitutional rights, civil rights and other statutory rights, as herein alleged or proven; and are directly, proximately, and/or legally, caused by Defendant, Trustees, and Does 1100, by all of said acts and/or omissions. 6. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that all Defendants and DOES 1-100 are responsible for the acts alleged herein as the agents and employees of residents in Fresno County. All Defendants were, when doing the acts herein alleged, were purportedly acting within the scope of their office, authority, agency and employment, under color of law, in representative capacity on behalf of all residents of Fresno County and are therefore responsible for the acts complained of herein. 7. Trustee defendants acting separately and in unison for Defendant County of Fresno, and its residents, in individual and official capacities, approved ordinance T-86-364 on August 9, 2011, which took effect on September 8, 2011. Two urgency ordinances (10014 and 10-019) were repealed and negated by this ordinance. 8. Said ordinance purports to make it unlawful and declare a public nuisance (in the unincorporated part of the external boundaries of Fresno County) thepersonal and collective cultivation of marijuana for medical use, unless an onerous and expensive procedure is followed. Once the procedure is followed, and money paid to Defendant, the Ordinance purports to authorize (by Defendants issuance of a medical marijuana cultivators business license) the legal growing in a county Manufacturing zone. 9. All Defendants are prohibited by Federal CSA regulations, from creating and

regulating conditions which facilitate said activity. In Pack, supra, it was decided that such ordinances are beyond the powers of any city or county, due to the fact that only the Federal government can regulate marijuana. Said ordinance and its goals are in direct conflict with the Federal CSA, and are void. State law is not in conflict with the CSA, as it merely decriminalizes possession and cultivation of marijuana for certain individuals in a medical class. (See Pack.) 10. Said ordinance interferes with California statutes H&S 11362.5 and 11362.7 et seq. It creates unreasonable barriers to McPikes access to medical marijuana. E.g., McPike resides about 50 miles away from any Manufacturing zone. He would have to submit and pay for a Sheriff background check, fill out disclosure forms admitting to certain cultivation activity which public records might be used against him. He would have to rent a building, hire security, buy cameras, be compelled to make reports to Defendant, be compelled to grant immunity to all Defendants; and give up rights and meet such other requirements which are set forth in said ordinance, which are all preempted by state law. It requires Plaintiff to become a business, removing his private activity into the business realm. Defendant is entitled to his privacy and his private activity without such outrageous disclosures and without such financial burdens. Plaintiff does not want to become or be treated as a business. 11. Said ordinance equally affects all such individuals in this medical class of State law, and directly violates equal protection, due process, privacy rights, is a contract of adhesion, and burdens access to state laws. When California voters decriminalized cultivation statewide for this class, the Defendants, each and every one, could not make this activity unlawful and declare it a nuisance in Fresno County. Defendants and each of them cannot opt out of state law. 12. Fresno County issues MMPA ID cards, evidencing those who shall not be arrested for personal cultivation. It could not opt out of this state law. On the other hand, all Defendants have declared the underlying activity unlawful and a public nuisance in county. This inconsistency, is ultra vires is in direct conflict with state goals and laws. FRESNO COUNTY ORDINANCE/REGULATION HISTORY 13. The public was not invited to any officially scheduled Planning Department meetings concerning this ordinance until after its enactment. Such after enactment meetings have been held with public input, and the Trustee Defendants agendized the public input results for a meeting on or around November 8, 2011, which is more than 90 days from passage of said ordinance. A facial challenge to said ordinance can only be made within 90 days of passage. (See Govt. Code 65009 (c)(1)(B).) This action is timely. No administrative procedures are allowed in said ordinance, only judicial relief is provided. (ORD. page 10, Judicial review pursuant to CCP 1094.5.) DECLARATORY RELIEF AND JUDGMENT 14. McPike alleges and incorporates allegations in all paragraphs above and below this cause of action and further alleges herein that he is directly effected by said Ordinance, in that if he fails to timely challenge it, he will be irreparably injured by its standing, results, and enforcement. All of the following are Plaintiffs contentions, whereas, all

Defendants, and each of them, dispute McPikes following allegations: (a) McPike claims that he has been banned from possession, use and cultivation, of his medicinal marijuana within the exterior boundaries of the unincorporated areas of Fresno County, due to the Ordinance and other activity of all Defendants, and each of them. (b) The only exception to the ban is the arbitrary facilitation of said activity according to onerous and unconstitutional terms of said Ordinance. All Defendants have effectively threatened McPike with sanctions should he not comply with said ordinance, and declare his personal activities with medical marijuana, illegal, unless he can comply with said ordinance and pay Defendant money. The Ordinance interferes with McPikes rights under the State constitution, and various statutes. Its facilitation of marijuana growing in Manufacturing zones only, with a 99 plant limit, violates Federal regulations, and state decriminalization. (See Pack and People v Kelly.) All Defendants have created local regulations inconsistent and beyond the powers mentioned at H&S 11362.83. (d) Contrary to the direction of the voters in this state, said ordinance at 6.60.010, declares the cultivation of marijuana for medicinal purposes unlawful and a public nuisance in Fresno County, unless a business license is issued to the individual patient, and other conditions are met. Defendants and each of them cannot make medical marijuana unlawful or a nuisance, in Fresno County. (e) Said provision(s) directly and irrationally interfere with McPikes personal individual rights as granted by the State voters and legislature. (1) Among interferences and obstructions intentionally created by all Defendants and each and every one of them, is the fact that said ordinance requires that McPike, (in order to exercise his state rights as an individual qualified patient) become a business. Also to operate under a business name. (See ORD. 6.60.080) (2) The ordinance admits that: H. The County has received Federal grants for the eradication of marijuana . . . The conflict and violation of McPikes Fifth Amendment rights becomes evident where the ordinance requires individual applications and privacy disclosures to the Fresno Sheriff (obtaining Federal grant money) and the County Treasurer, to merely cultivate marijuana for his medicinal purposes. The required information is so intrusive it raises a question about the possible violation of Federal laws. (See Pack, supra, (10/04/2011) [w]hether certain record-keeping requirements imposed by the ordinance violated collective members Fifth Amendment rights.) (3)The arbitrary procedures, of disclosure, record keeping, zoning, security guards, etc., cannot stand as a barrier to McPikes personal or collective cultivation which are conduct decriminalized by state law. [p]rivate collectives are immune from H&S 11362.768. (See Pack v Superior Court/Long Beach (10/4/2011) 2nd Appellate Dist., Div 3.) Every individual affected is required to give up such intrusive information (that could be used in Federal courts) to the Sheriff and Defendant to supposedly become legal to grow within County. This appears to be a fraud as no Defendants, and each of them,

can locally facilitate any greater immunity than does State law. State law is hands off with decriminalization, whereas Ordinance is hands on with facilitation by local regulation, permits and allowance of certain activity. The Ordinance is more than a wink at Federal law. These local agencies receive Federal grant money for marijuana eradication and is evidence of a real and direct conflict in loyalties and purposes, when mandatory patient money is paid to County Defendant. Due to these circumstances alone, the Ordinance is facially and as-applied, unconstitutional. There can be no trust or validity in this scheme as it was designed for the sole purposes of all Defendants, not to enhance this Plaintiffs access and use. The State decriminalizes this activity. All Defendants and each of them declare the same activities unlawful, but provide an onerous, burdensome, way out of unlawfulness, including accepting money for the magic way out. (4) Obstacle Preemption - Onerous compliance requirements are best evidenced by the obvious financial burdens created by said ordinance. McPike as an individual qualified patient cannot afford to become a business to locate and rent a building in a M1-2-3 zone, hire security, buy cameras, etc., just to provide personal medicine. If he grows with his family members in a private collective, he is still not a business. Obstacle preemption arises when the challenged law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives . . . Fn. 31., We again note that the high costs of compliance with Citys ordinance may have the practical effect of allowing only large-scale dispensaries, rather than small collectives (See Pack.) (5) Comparing the Ordinance scheme to the legislatures voluntary MMPA ID card, no person could be compelled to obtain said state ID card. Said card is not required to receive and reach the benefits of Proposition 215. As stated in People v Mower, the possession and cultivation of marijuana for personal medical use is no different than the acquisition and possession of any prescription drug under a physicians prescription. It is no longer criminal. Defendants and each of them cannot make these activities unlawful in this county. H&S 11362.5 negates penalties and sanctions for the possession and cultivation of medicinal marijuana by a person in the class. Contrary to the voluntarily nature of a card, no person, even if issued a card by Defendant County, can cultivate medicine unless they comply with mandatory provisions of said Ordinance, and pay County money. This is not how government is supposed to represent their residents. (6) Defendant accepts money and processes applications and delivers ID cards under the MMPA ID card program. Defendant is mandated by state law to do this. Said ID card is instant verification that the individual is a qualified patient and shall not be subject to arrest (H&S 11362.71(e)) for possession and cultivation in reasonable amounts related to medical needs. (7) All Defendants by approving and enforcing said Ordinance (whatever their participation) and all of its oppressive conditions, and demanding money to make a declared illegal activity legal, purport to be complying with state medical marijuana laws. However, state statutes preempt said Ordinance. (8) Local jurisdictions may only adopt and enforce regulations which are

consistent with state law, as passed by the Legislature. See H&S 11362.83. State law came in two (2) parts: 1. H&S 11362.5 the Initiative which is not subject to amendment; and, 2. H&S 11362.7 et seq. Neither part can regulate medicinal marijuana, as both parts merely decriminalized the activities each covered. Thus, any facilitation, such as the Fresno Ordinance offers on one hand when it is paid money, and the ban on all state decriminalized cultivation and other conduct, which is decriminalized at the state level are in direct conflict. Demanding and accepting money for facilitation is undoubtedly illegal under the Federal CSA. It is as if the Defendants have schemed up a bribe solicitation or extortion with said Ordinance. McPikes state activities are locally declared unlawful, but when he pays Defendant money he can become legal locally. The ordinance is beyond the power of all Defendants and each of them to enact, and/or enforce. It is inconsistent with State laws and Federal laws. (9) Another blow to the ordinance is the fact that the voters decriminalized medical marijuana possession and cultivation for the class of individual in which McPike is a member. Defendant is delivering state ID cards pursuant to state law, which ID is evidence that the person seized of said card is a qualified patient. Said card is evidence of the States granted immunity for possessing and cultivating marijuana for medical purposes. However, all Defendants declare, legislate, and purportedly enforce the Ordinance which proclaims all medical marijuana cultivation is illegal in County. The only allowance or permission is when one complies with the onerous provisions set forth in the ordinance. (10) Trustee defendants are not only preempted by state law, they are preempted by Federal law. Pack already decided that no city/county ordinance can permit or authorize that which is exclusively regulated under the Federal Controlled Substances Act. In violation of said Act, all Defendants claim to be able to set forth conditions to regulate permit and facilitate such activity, in said ordinance, and to declare unlawful and yet authorize the cultivation of medicinal marijuana within said County. This goal or purpose to issue permits to be legal in County is beyond all local powers, and has been declared the possible violation of aiding and abetting the criminal violation and/or facilitation of the Federal Controlled Substances Act. (11) Therefore, McPike alleges that all Defendants, by Trustee defendants enactment of Ordinance may be in violation of the CSA. They may decriminalize under rights reserved to the states, (Pack 10th Amendment, see also Bond v US (6/16/2011) USSC 9-0) however, they/it cannot authorize and accept money for activity which violates the CSA. If such political-regulatory activity is not enjoined, said Trustees may be subject to prosecution by the United States government. In other words, all Defendants cannot regulate and permit by Ordinance, that which is prohibited under the exclusive control and regulation of the national government. The ordinance is in direct conflict with these laws. Nor can the Defendants, each and every one, refuse to follow California law which decriminalizes the possession and cultivation of marijuana, by declaring such activity illegal in Fresno County. All Defendants are preempted by the State voters and Legislature.

(12) Requiring the Sheriff and the County Treasurer to accept money in exchange for approving persons to engage in this conduct, may invoke the [i]ssue of whether the ordinance requires certain [county] officials to violate federal law by aiding and abetting (or facilitating 21 USC 843(b)) a violation of federal CSA. (See Pack fn. 27, infra.) McPike does not want the Sheriff or any County officials or employees getting in trouble for enforcing and facilitating said Ordinance. (13) Based on the foregoing, the severable ordinance cannot be salvaged, due to its 5th Amendment privacy disclosures, record keeping, business requirements, onerous financial and other conditions, entire conflict preemption and authorization of activity for money, which interferes with state and federal laws. (14) People v Kelly decided the issue of whether or not any numerical amount of marijuana plants or quantity in possession could be legislated. The Legislature could not create any such numerical quantities, which amended and violated the Initiative. Numerical numbers or limits do not exist as to plants and possession, as they are declared unconstitutional. Therefore, Defendants and each of them cannot declare any limit of 99 plants in said ordinance. Limits depend on the medical use and need of each individual in the protected class. (15) The Ordinance is null and void as if never enacted. (16) Plaintiff resides in the County of FRESNO, in the State of California, and seeks to enjoin all Defendants from enforcing said Ordinance or any part therein, and from expending any taxpayer funds or taxpayer-financed resources to enforce or facilitate the Ordinance, No. T-086-364, and seeks a refund of funds expended to enforce said ordinance, and a judgment that Ordinance is void. (17) Private collectives are immune from H&S 11362.768. See Pack v Superior Court (10/4/2011) 2nd Appellate Dist. Div. 3, B228781 pg. 10, In other words, private collectives are immune from this requirement. In TRAUDT v City of Dana Point (9/30/2011) Court of Appeals 4th Dist., Div. 3, No. G044130, the court declared vested individual rights, and collective rights to ensure access to medicinal marijuana. However no one individual (without derived authority or other authority to act for the group) may assert an ordinance violation for the collectives rights. Page 3 of 7: [t]he Legislature has vested certain rights to control the lawful access . . . The group and individual have vested rights, to grow their medicinal marijuana. Other issues are equal protection, due process, conflict and obstruction to enjoyment of state laws, and facial and as-applied discrimination and preemption. There is a huge distinction between a private person/collective, and a business one. (18) There is a statute of limitations of 90 days to facially challenge any

ordinance. (See Sonoma County v Superior Court /Marvin Gardens, 190 CA 4th 1312, citing Government Code 65009, (1)(B). This timely action is within 90 days of passage of Ordinance T-086-364 on 8/9/2011. Said Ordinance is attached hereto as EXHIBIT 2, and is incorporated herein as if set forth in full. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 15. Jurisdiction in this case is found under California Code of Civil Procedure 526(a), which provides as follows: An action to obtain a judgment, restraining and preventing any illegal expenditure of, waste of, or injury to, the estate, funds, or other property of a county, town, city or city and county of the state, may be maintained against any officer thereof, or any agent, or other person, acting in its behalf, either by a citizen resident therein, or by a corporation, who is assessed for and is liable to pay, or, within one year before the commencement of the action, has paid, a tax therein. 16. In Blair v. Pitchess (1971) 5 Cal.3d 258, the Supreme Court of California stated that [t]he primary purpose of this statute [Section 526a], originally enacted in 1909, is to enable a large body of the citizenry to challenge governmental action which would otherwise go unchallenged in the courts because of the standing requirement [citations omitted]. 17. In Blair, 5 Cal.3d at 268, the Supreme Court of California also declared that the mere expending [of] the time of the paid [local] police officersin performing illegal and unauthorized acts constitute[s] an unlawful use of funds which could be enjoined under section 526a The Court also declared that it is immaterial that the amount of illegal expenditures is small or that the illegal procedures actually permit a saving of tax funds Id. 18. Plaintiff contends and alleges that all Defendants, each and every one, cannot opt outof the state decriminalization of marijuana for medical purposes, and its exceptions as the voters and Legislature have granted. Fresno cannot be a dry county making medicinal marijuana illegal locally, and within the external boundaries of the State of California. 19. The claims alleged herein arose in the County of Fresno, in the State of

California. Therefore, venue is proper in the Superior Court of the State of California, in the County of Fresno.

NOTICE TO GOVERNMENT
20. Plaintiff spoke to all the Defendants requesting that it immediately terminate

proceedings on said Ordinance. However, at this public meeting on August 9, 2011, all Defendants ignored Plaintiffs concerns and enacted said Ordinance. As a result of the failure and refusal of the Defendant to take appropriate action this taxpayer and individuals rights lawsuit is the only viable means to stop the continued actual and threatened illegal violation of State laws, and the unlawful expenditure and waste of tax dollars (see Cal. Const., Articles I 1 and 26,II 1, and II 3.5c). 21. There is no adequate remedy at law that will protect the publics resources from being expended in violation of the medical marijuana policy of the State of California. It is impossible to put a price on the liberty of the people of California to follow their doctors advice and possess, manufacture, and/or distribute medical marijuana. Likewise, it is impossible to put a price on the sovereign authority of the People of California to control their local government, law enforcement officers and prevent them from using public resources and as Trustees, their individual and collective powers to subject qualified persons to sanctions or prosecutions for using, possessing and cultivating medical marijuana in a manner consistent with California law. There is no nexus between the state right to cultivate medical marijuana individually and/or collectively, and the demand by all Defendants to pay money and comply with the Ordinance to facilitate that which is decriminalized and a vested state right. Therefore, injunctive and declaratory relief is just and proper.

STATEMENT OF FACTS 22. On November 4, 1996, the California electorate approved Proposition 215,

which is codified as the Compassionate Use Act at California Health & Safety Code 11362.5, to ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes (See Cal. Health & Safety Code 11362.5(b)(1)). 23. Seven years later, on September 10, 2003, the California Legislature enacted Senate Bill 420, Stats. 2003 c. 875 (hereinafter SB 420), to provide that [q]ualified patients, persons with valid identification cards, and the designated primary caregivers of qualified patients and persons with valid identification cards, who associate within the State of California in order to collectively or cooperatively cultivate marijuana for medical purposes, shall not solely on the basis of that fact be subject to state criminal sanctions under Section 11357,11358,11359,11360, 11366, 11366.5, or 11570 (Cal. Health & Safety Code 11362.775). Under these laws, qualified medical marijuana patients and/or caregivers have a right to associate with each other to furnish themselves the medicine they need. (See People v. Urziceanu (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 747). 24. On June 9, 2005, the Attorney General of California issued a bulletin to all

California law enforcement agencies that concluded in pertinent part: California law enforcement agencies should not [because of Federal law] change their current practices for the non-arrest and non-prosecution of individuals who are within the legal scope of Californias Compassionate Use Act (italics added). 25. On June 22, 2005, the Attorney General issued a supplement to the June 9, 2005 bulletin (hereinafter Attorney Generals Memorandum) that concluded: California state and local peace officers may not refuse to abide by the provisions of Californias Compassionate Use Act on the basis that this Act conflicts with federal law (italics added). The Attorney General also opined, In our view, this express policy of [medical marijuana] decriminalization must necessarily govern the exercise of discretionary arrest powers by California peace officers and counsels against effecting arrests and seizures under federal law when the use, possession, or cultivation of the marijuana appears legal within the meaning of Californias Compassionate Use Act (see Attorney Generals Memorandum). 26. Federalism means that while Federal officials may be able to currently criminalize the third-party distribution and manufacture of medical marijuana (see Gonzales v. Raich (2005) 352 F.3d 1222), the Constitution of California, Article III, 3.5c, mandates that California officials, like Trustees, County law enforcement personnel, abide by Californias medical marijuana laws unless or until an appellate court rules Californias medical marijuana laws unconstitutional. To date, no appellate level or higher court has struck down such laws. 27. By mandating that County law enforcement personnel not enforce federal drug laws against legitimate medical marijuana patients and/or caregivers and that County law enforcement personnel conduct medical marijuana investigation and enforcement actions independently of federal authorities, the rights of qualified medical marijuana patients and caregivers are protected, and therefore, tax dollars subject to the jurisdiction and control of the Constitution of California are not to be spent criminalizing conduct that the State of California does not consider to be criminal. It is not permissible for County law enforcement personnel to use local resources to knowingly participate in federal-led medical marijuana raids resulting actual or threatened criminal sanction or prosecution and/or loss of privacy for legitimate medical marijuana patients and/or caregivers, because privacy, including medical privacy, is protected by the Constitution of California (see Article I, 1) and qualified patients and/or caregivers are permitted to possess, cultivate, and/or distribute medical marijuana in certain circumstances (see Health & Safety Code 11362.5 and SB 420). 28. The State of California (see Cal. Const., Article II, 1) has decriminalized the medical use and cultivation of marijuana in certain circumstances via the Compassionate Use Act of 1996 (Health & Safety Code 11362.5). A unanimous California Supreme Court upheld this act as a wholly California issue (see People v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457). The Constitution of California, Article III, 3.5c, requires California officials, like County, its Trustees and law enforcement personnel, to abide by the Compassionate Use Act, even if federal law does not recognize this act, unless or until an appellate court strikes it down. Therefore, County law enforcement personnel are

required to protect the right of qualified people to enjoy safe access to medical marijuana. Resources of the County, its Trustees cannot be spent denying conduct that the State of California considers legal. 29. Plaintiff is informed and believes that all Defendants, and each of them, as representatives of a subdivision of the State of California have a duty to respect, uphold, and enforce California state law. California Constitution. Art. III, 3.5. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION (Cal.Civ.Code 52.1(b) et seq.) 30. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation

contained in all previous paragraphs set forth herein, and alleges as this Cause of Action for Damages as follows. 31. The Defendants and each of them, foregoing alleged conduct constitutes a violation of the California Civil Rights Act, prohibited by California Civil Code 52.1(b) et seq. Said conduct and Ordinance threatens interference with Plaintiffs enjoyment of Constitutional rights to assemble/associate, privacy, to become a witness against himself, and denies the enjoyment of state law. It is harassment and discriminates against aprotected class of person of which Plaintiff is a member. All Defendants, and each of their herein alleged violations were made under color of law. 32. Plaintiff was forced to bring this action challenging said Ordinance, not only to protect himself and his rights, but as is explained herein, to correct and protect all Defendants and each of them, and County employees from violating his rights, violating State laws, and also to prevent them from facilitating a breach of Federal laws. 33. Plaintiff is entitled to damages, (attorney fees under this statute if an attorney is hired) his costs and other relief according to proof. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION (WRIT RELIEF) 34. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation

contained in all previous paragraphs set forth herein, and alleges as follows. 35. Ordinance, by its terms, allows no administrative appeals or reviews and sets forth only judicial review. Such review if it existed, does not stay the 90 day statute of limitations (Govt. Code 65009) to any facial challenge in court. Such a local appeal or review would be futile do to the illegalities, and violations facially seen in Ordinance. 36. As Ordinance suggests this is a CCP 1094.5 (and/or 1085) request for writ relief. This writ is requested to inquire into the validity of said ordinance. The propriety of the public proceeding is not questioned. 1194.5 (b), the inquiry in

such a case shall extend to the questions whether the respondent has proceeded without or in excess of jurisdiction; . . . and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is established if the respondent has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, . . . 37. 1094.5 (f) The court shall enter judgment either commanding respondent to set aside the order of decision, or denying the writ. (g) the court may stay the operation of the administrative order or decision pending the judgment . . . 38, CCP 1985, a writ of mandate may be issued by any court to any inferior tribunal corporation, board, or person to compel the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins . . . or to compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right . . . 1986, The writ must be issued in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy . . . 39. The allegations and the Ordinance document show that a writ should issue. The Court is requested to take judicial notice of the Ordinance, its terms, the law, and make a decision to issue a proper writ. PRELIMINARY AND PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS 44. Plaintiff realleges by incorporation herein, all prior allegations in all the preceding paragraphs. 45. Plaintiff is informed and believes that all Defendants and each of them, acted under the color of the law when they enacted said Ordinance, and its facilitating provisions, declaring the cultivation in Fresno County unlawful, and demanding certain conditions and disclosures be met, and money paid to be legal in County. 46. All Defendants acted in excess of powers and jurisdiction, and contrary to both state and Federal laws. They created unreasonable burdens on Plaintiffs rights under state laws. A law which is invalid is no law at all. The Ordinance is nothing and cannot regulate or facilitate Plaintiffs personal activities. Plaintiffs private activities are at odds with Ordinance, and the Ordinance is void, and should be declared null and void by this Honorable Court. JUDGMENT DECLARING ORDINANCE VOID 46. Plaintiff realleges by incorporation herein, all prior allegations in all proceeding paragraphs. 47. Plaintiff alleges that the Ordinance in its entirely as it applies to him as an individual qualified patient or a member of a (non-business) private collective has no legal or regulatory effect and that it is null and void for all the reasons stated herein. 48. Plaintiff has been and will be damaged according to proof by the actions of all Defendants and each of them, in the past, present, and future. Defendant was forced to take legal action to assert his rights, and to correct the wrong created by the Ordinance. Plaintiff also seeks to see all Defendants and each of them to come into compliance with state and Federal laws. Defendants should not require our Sheriff and County Treasurer to participate and facilitate this scheme created by the Ordinance.

DAMAGES AND RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for the following relief: 1. For monetary relief and/or special damages, in an amount according to proof; 2. For general compensatory damages in an amount according to proof; For reasonable attorneys' fees; Restitution according to proof; 3. An injunction issue against all Defendants preventing the Ordinance from taking effect, and refunding all tax money expended on said Ordinance. 4. For costs of suit incurred herein; and for such other and further relief as the Court deems proper and just under all the circumstances. 5. For an order requiring all Defendants and each of them to show cause, if any exist, why he should not be enjoined as set forth in this complaint during this action; 6. For a preliminary injunction, and a permanent injunction, enjoining all Defendants and its agent, servants, and employees, and all persons acting under, in concert with, or for Defendant to enforce said Ordinance and its goals. 7. For an order providing declaratory relief and judgment, that states that Ordinance is Null and void, and for all other declarations requested in said Cause of Action.
DATED: OCTOBER 21, 2011 Respectfully Submitted, ____________________________ WILLIAM R. McPIKE, Plaintiff PROOF OF SERVICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF FRESNO I am employed in the County of FRESNO, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the action within action. My address is , California 93602. On ____, I served the foregoing document(s):
BY MAIL:

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As follows: I am readily familiar with the firms practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at ________, CA in to ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.

BY FACSIMILE:

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The within document was served on the interested party(s) in said action via facsimile.

BY PERSONAL SERVICE: [] The within document was served on the interested party(s) in said action via personal service.

Executed on:

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