ing to the radio, on a work break, “on the go,” together withalcohol,inthecompanyofothers,whilehavingcoffee,andatwork. This study is consistent with expectations that socialsettingsinwhichalcoholispresentaremoreassociatedwithsmoking than restaurants where smokers apparently aremorecontenttosmokeuponleavingthepremisesthandur-ing meals. Moreover, studies also suggest that alcohol con-sumption influences both the magnitude and the emotion-al valence of cigarette cravings, thus again forging theconnection between alcohol establishments and smoking.
SOME MATTER MORE THAN OTHERS?
Ban proponents who cite “community effects” analyses arenot arguing that the bans are Pareto-optimal, as that wouldrequireeithernoharmtoanybarorrestaurantownerorade-quatecompensationtothosewhoareinjuredbytheban.They probablymeanthatharmtoindividualownersarematched,orsmallerthan,gainstootherowners.However,thisdistinctionis usually never discussed. Community effects studies do notdisaggregate to the level of individual owners, thus making itunclearwhogainsorlosesandwhethercharacteristicsofgain-ers and losers differinanysignificantmanner. A recent exception is a 2009 study by Hans Melbert andKarlLundofNorway’sban,inwhichaggregaterevenuegainsof restaurants were found to outweigh aggregate losses forbars.Theauthorsconclude,“Somesmallersub-sectorsmightexperience a decline, but the hospitality industry on thewholewillnotexperienceastatisticallysignificantdeclineinrevenue.”Apparently,theauthorsusedasocialwelfarefunc-tioninwhichallbarsandrestaurantsaretreatedequallyandthat, as long as the overall sum of revenues did not decline,the net economic damage is either zero or nonexistent. Of course,thisalsoignoresgainsorlossesimposedonworkers,customers, nonsmokers, and smokers.Thisdiscussionraisesquestionsofwhetherapolicythatcre-ates winners and losers is ethical — certainly an issue thatdeserves clarification when advocating bans on the groundsthat somehow the overall community is either unaffected orgainsfrombans.If,forexample,mostwinnersarerestaurantsandmostlosersarebars,doesthisfactmatter?Doesitmatterif most bars that lose are small, local “mom and pop” estab-lishmentsthatservelittleornofood,ratherthanlargecorpo-ratechainsthatofferfull-servicebarsalongwithlarge-scalefoodoperations?Unfortunately,the“communityeffects”method-ologydoesnotallowinspectionofwhoactuallygainsorloses.
NONCOMPLIANCE AS AN INDICATOR OF HARM
A few compliance studies exist based on independent obser- vationsofsmallsubsetsofaffectedbusinesses.A2003studyby M.D.Weberetal.examining650Californiaestablishmentsperyearforfiveyearsfoundcomplianceratesrosefrom46percentto 76 percent for bars and from 92 percent to 99 percent forbars/restaurants over 1998–2002. A 2009 study by RolandMooreetal.of121stand-alonebarsinSanFranciscofounda 30 percent noncompliance rate during 2002–2003. A 2008study by Douglas Eadie et al. of Scotland’s ban found that,despitegovernmentclaimsof98percentcompliance,compli-anceratesfromasampleofeightbarsvariedsubstantially,withthe lowest levels observed in bars located in lower-incomeneighborhoods. These studies never entertain the hypothesisthat noncomplianceindicates bans harmsome businesses. An advantage of examining compliance data is that com-monly used measures of revenue or tax receipts may notalwaysreflectharm.Dataonprofitsatthelevelofindividualfirms have never been examined either, though such data would provide better measurement of harm than revenues.Moreover, bans affect owners, employees, and customers inwaysthatinvolverevenues,prices,services,hoursofoperation,wages, hours worked, menu items, and other factors.Measuring harm by any subset of these factors is clearly notpossible since research has shown that bans exert differenteffects on these many factors across different businesses. Arecentexamplemakesclearthatbanspushownerstore-arrangetheirbusinessattributes.NickHogan,aformerpublandlord, became the first person to be jailed in connectionwiththeUKsmokingbanafterrefusingtopayafineandcostsofroughly$11,000.Hoganargued:“Ninetypercentofpeoplewho come into my pub want to smoke. Even the nonsmok-ers think there should be a choice. These laws are ridicu-lous.” In contrast, Deborah Arnott, chief executive of theanti-smoking group
, insisted it was a myth that thesmokingbansinanywaydamagedpubs.Arnottstated:“Many pubs have shifted their focus to serving food, so they havechangedtheirnature.”Butheranalysisisflawed;shiftingaway fromalcoholandtowardfoodreflectsharmreductionefforts,and likely would have been implemented prior to the ban if they were truly profit-enhancing. A focus on revenues or taxreceipts is unlikely to measure true levels of harm.Ownerswhodonotfinditprofitabletocomplywithabanwillpredictablybethosewiththemosttolosefromfullercom-pliance and, other than those who close their businesses, arethosemostdamagedbyaban.Fullercompliancecouldbepro-motedthroughhigherfines,morefrequentinspections,andpos-sible confiscation of liquor licenses or forced closures of busi-nesses. Continued noncompliance would thus appear to be a useful indicator of harm from bans and does not force us tochoose any one attribute — such as revenues or tax receipts —tomeasureharm.
OHIO’S SMOKING BAN
Ohio voters approved the state’s indoor smoking ban inNovemberof2006.TheOhioDepartmentofHealthestimatesthat280,000publicplacesandplacesofemploymentarecov-ered by the ban, which excludes only private residences, fami-ly-owned businesses with no non-family employees, certainareasofnursinghomes,outdoorpatios,andsomeretailtobac-costores.Businessownershavethreeresponsibilities:prohib-itsmokinginanypublicplaceorplaceofemployment,removeashtrays,andpostclearlylegibleno-smokingsignswiththetoll-free enforcement numberinconspicuousplaces.The law allows for both businesses and individuals to befined for violations, though recent court actions have calledintoquestionthelegalityoffiningownersforsmokingbycus-tomers.Businessesreceivewarninglettersforfirstviolations,
P R O P E R T Y