DRAFT VERSION DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION
3
greater
recognition
of historical injustices, including e.g. local accumulations of pollutinginfrastructure that stigmatize particular places and communities (Walker 2009). To beeffective in serving these three purposes, participation should ideally be early, whenalternatives are still open; be inclusive and feature two-way communication; allow access tokey information; offer genuine opportunities to influence or even veto decisions; take intoaccount the diverse values of participants; and be transparent (Bond et al. 2004). However,participation may be effective in another sense by allowing public reflection on substantiveissues
–
including what kind of society participants wish to inhabit, questions of “nationalinterest”, and other matters
. In this way, participation around planning concerns at local andregional scales can provide an arena for focused reflection on the assumed purposes of national strategies (Cowell and Owens 2006, 2011).Consequently, participation can embody reflexivity in an expanded sense, even if it takes
place “downstream” of strategic decisions
. If a piece of infrastructure is a kind of solution toa problem, then participatory governance may, by including more perspectives, enable theproblem itself to be examined, along with the ways in which it has been framed
as
a problem.In this way, whether participation is effective or not depends on how far it enacts second-order reflexivity towards both means and presupposed ends. Substantively effectiveparticipation may be imagined as creating a feedback loop (Rough 2011), which begins withan examination of localised impacts, benefits and risks associated with a given proposal.Widening participation in examining these illuminates, in turn, considerations which maylead to a critique and re-framing of the policy problem to which the planning proposalappears as a viable solution. In this way, local planning conflicts can lead to modifications in
assumed definitions of the “national interest”
, even if they do not end in consensus (Owens2004).
Risk thinking, power and energy infrastructure planning under neoliberalism
We now turn to the second of the aforementioned tendencies, i.e. the internalisation of risk thinking within governance as a legitimatory discourse, and how this shapes the distributionof power in planning. The relationship between this tendency and the evolution of
participation as a form of “second
-
order reflexivity” is often conflictual. The tension here
derives from the opposed logics of power which characterise the two tendencies. Whereeffective participation demands dispersed power (Ward 2001), embodied in institutionalizedprocesses that drive critical scrutiny of policy problems as well as solutions, neo-liberalenrolment of private companies and other governance actors
de
centralises whilesimultaneously
re
centralising
. The creation of new “centres of calculation” (e.g. privatised
energy utilities, industry regulators) is accompanied by the need to render the field in whichthey operate legible to government, both in the present and with a view to its projectedfutures
–
requirements in which risk thinking plays a significant role. In the next section, wewill explore the internalisation of risk thinking within
the UK‟s planning regime
in relation toenergy privatisation, and how risk knowledge and power are linked.As noted at the beginning of the previous section, the neo-liberal state can be viewed asevolving, in some respects, out of the high-modernist state. The high-modernist state evolveda set of tools for transforming an uncertain future into a meaningful parameter of planning,
one that could be both “told” and “tamed”
(Adam and Groves 2007). State bureaucraciesdeveloped quantitative criteria for measuring the success or failure of policies, depoliticizingdecision making in the process and recreating the domain of politics in a way amenable tobureaucratic management (Rose 1999, pp. 198-199). Representing the future in terms of risk,