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Georgia - Primary Ballot Challenge - Obama - Opposition to Motion to Dismiss - Welden

Georgia - Primary Ballot Challenge - Obama - Opposition to Motion to Dismiss - Welden

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Published by Jack Ryan

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Categories:Types, Research, Law
Published by: Jack Ryan on Dec 20, 2011
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial


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The Plaintiff, David Welde
n, respectfully submits this opposition to Defendant’s motion
to dismiss.
Statement of Facts
For the reasons set forth below, none of the facts asserted by the Defendant are relevant.The only fac
t relevant to this case is the fact that the Defendant’s father was not a U.S. citizen.
This fact has been repeatedly documented and stated by the party opponent, Defendant Obama.This fact is also
evidenced by Plaintiff’s exhibit 6, previously submitted with Plaintiff’s pre
order and apparently authenticated by Defendant’s citation to this exhibit in Defendant’s“Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute,” number 7.
Argument and Authority
The lengths to which the Defendant goes in order to avoid the one relevant fact is telling.The Defendant asks this Court to interpret Georgia election code in a way that leaves the code inconflict with itself, goes against the plain language of the law, leaves the law without meaning,and conflicts with common sense. He then cites freedom-to-associate precedent to support an
assertion that has never been supported by such precedent, and which would nullify electioncodes in several states. All of these arguments are futile attempts to distract from the undeniableconclusion: Barack Obama is not Constitutionally-qualified to hold the office of President of theUnited States.
Statutory Authority
Georgia Election Code states: “Every candidate for federal and state office…shall meetthe constitutional and statutory qualifications for holding the office being sought.” O.C.G.A.
§21-2-5(a).The Defendant claims
that this clear code doesn’t apply to Presidential
primaries, arguingthat such primaries are not elections.
Def.’s Mtn.
at 3. This argument is absurd. If the Stateof Georgia intended Presidential primaries to not be considered elections it would not codify theadministration of such primaries within
Title 21 of Georgia’s codes, entitled “Election Code.”
e Defendant’s argument is an attempt to claim that
an early part of Title 21 should beconstrued against its plain language in order to prevent that section from having an effect on alater section of Title 21. This argument requires an interpretation of law that leaves Title 21internally conflicting. The Defendant requests this Court to read §21-2-
5(a) to mean “Every
candidate for federal and state office shall meet the constitutional and statutory qualifications forholding the office being sought,
except candidates for President 
.” The code doesn’t make an
exception for Presidential candidates. The Georgia legislature certainly could have included such
an exception if they had intended such an exception. They didn’t include such an exception
because they
didn’t intend one.The Defendant’s argument also rests upon an assertion that §21
-2-5(a) addresses
“elections” and not “candidates.” However,
doesn’t contain the word “election.” It
does contain the word “candidate.” More specifically, it
applies to
candidate…” §21
-2-5(a)(emphasis added). Since the explicit prevails over the implicit, the
“Every candidate”
language in §21-2-5(a) negate
s the Defendant’s
argument that that section implicitly exempts aspecial category of candidates.For th
e Defendant’s argument to make sense the Presidential primary would need to be
administered without candidates. However, Georgia Election code specifically requires the
 political parties to “
submit to the Secretary of State a list of the names of the
of suchparty to appear on the presidential preference primary ballot.
§21-2-193(emphasis added). The
list of names submitted by the parties to the Secretary of State are “candidates,” in the
Presidential primary.
. §21-2-5(a) applies to
for federal office,
and requiresthem to be constitutionally qualified to hold such office.
. Therefore, §21-2-5(a) applies to thelist
of “candidates” submitted by political
parties under §21-2-193.
Unlike the Defendant’s argument,
s clear-meaning reading of Georgia Electionc
ode leaves the code in harmony. Under the Defendant’s interpretation the word “candidate”
would mean one thing in one section and would not mean the same thing in another section.According to the Defendant, in one section he is a candidate and in the other section he is not acandidate.
Contrary to the Defendant’s assertion, nothing in O.C.G.
A. §21-2-193 grants the Democratic
Party of Georgia the “sole discretion” to determine which candidates will appear on the
Democratic Presidential primary ballot. While the Party does have sole discretion to determinewhich candidates will appear on the list it submits to the Secretary of State, pursuant to §21-2-193
, the State of Georgia determines which candidates will appear on the ballot. The Defendant’s
assertion presumes to place the Democratic Party in the shoes of the State. This bold statementreflects an arrogance r
egarding the Party’s authority in the election process. The Party doesn’t pay for Georgia’s ballots, or administer its elections.
§21-2-193 grants the Party authority tochoose candidates for its list. Nothing more. What the State does with that list is up to the State.
The Defendant’s presumptuous view of the authority of the Party begins to explain his clearly
erroneous interpretation of Georgia code.

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