does contain the word “candidate.” More specifically, it
-2-5(a)(emphasis added). Since the explicit prevails over the implicit, the
language in §21-2-5(a) negate
s the Defendant’s
argument that that section implicitly exempts aspecial category of candidates.For th
e Defendant’s argument to make sense the Presidential primary would need to be
administered without candidates. However, Georgia Election code specifically requires the
political parties to “
submit to the Secretary of State a list of the names of the
of suchparty to appear on the presidential preference primary ballot.
§21-2-193(emphasis added). The
list of names submitted by the parties to the Secretary of State are “candidates,” in the
. §21-2-5(a) applies to
for federal office,
and requiresthem to be constitutionally qualified to hold such office.
. Therefore, §21-2-5(a) applies to thelist
of “candidates” submitted by political
parties under §21-2-193.
Unlike the Defendant’s argument,
s clear-meaning reading of Georgia Electionc
ode leaves the code in harmony. Under the Defendant’s interpretation the word “candidate”
would mean one thing in one section and would not mean the same thing in another section.According to the Defendant, in one section he is a candidate and in the other section he is not acandidate.
Contrary to the Defendant’s assertion, nothing in O.C.G.
A. §21-2-193 grants the Democratic
Party of Georgia the “sole discretion” to determine which candidates will appear on the
Democratic Presidential primary ballot. While the Party does have sole discretion to determinewhich candidates will appear on the list it submits to the Secretary of State, pursuant to §21-2-193
, the State of Georgia determines which candidates will appear on the ballot. The Defendant’s
assertion presumes to place the Democratic Party in the shoes of the State. This bold statementreflects an arrogance r
egarding the Party’s authority in the election process. The Party doesn’t pay for Georgia’s ballots, or administer its elections.
§21-2-193 grants the Party authority tochoose candidates for its list. Nothing more. What the State does with that list is up to the State.
The Defendant’s presumptuous view of the authority of the Party begins to explain his clearly
erroneous interpretation of Georgia code.