The Past and Present Society

Fortifications and the "Idea" of Force in Early English East India Company Relations with India Author(s): I. Bruce Watson Reviewed work(s): Source: Past & Present, No. 88 (Aug., 1980), pp. 70-87 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Past and Present Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/650554 . Accessed: 19/12/2011 05:16
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FORTIFICATIONS AND THE "IDEA" OF FORCE IN EARLY ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY RELATIONS WITH INDIA
I
DISAGREETHERE IS CONSIDERABLE IN ANGLO-INDIANHISTORIOGRAPHY

ment over the role of force and fortifications. In general, historians have decided that the use of force and the establishment of fortified settlements was essentially a defensive development. The myriad conflicting statements in the records of the East India Company lend themselves to this somewhat tentative conclusion. Even where forts were built and the English employedforce, such actions were largely in retaliation against attacks on English commerce and English settlements. There was thus no claim to sovereignty inherent in the situations.1 On the other hand, however, it may be argued that force was the logical outcome of such a relationship, because the basis of the relationship was mercantile in an age dominated by the preceptsof mercantilism.2 In a recent, and very sophisticated, analysis of the early AngloIndian relationship K. N. Chaudhuri argues that force was "an implicit part" of European trade with Asia.3The reason why this was so, he says, must have been "that profits from armed trading were higher than in the case of peaceful commerce".4This conclusion goes beyond the traditional framework, while still utilizing the traditional premisses for the use of force: conflicts between Europeans in Asia, the Portuguese crusade against Islam, European accounts of themselves as victims in their relationships with Asian rulers, the system of licences for indigenous shipping imposed by Europeans, and the failure of the ruling elites to comprehendthe nature of European aspirations in the east. Force, according to Chaudhuri, was profitable when the sale of protection became an economic transaction, when redistributiveenterprise could be enjoyed by the Europeans, when the possession of independent territorial bases yielded revenues through customs and taxes,
1 For example, K. M. Panikkar,Asia and WesternDominance, I498-I945 (London, I959), PP. 5 I, 73; J. H. Parry, Trade and Dominion: The European Oversea Empires in the Eighteenth Century (London, I97I), pp. 65, 7I, 335. 2 R. Mukherjee, The Rise and Fall of the East India Company: A Sociological
Appraisal (Berlin, I955), p. 7 .
3

K. N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia and the English East India ComI978), p. I II.

pany, I660-I760 (Cambridge, 4 Ibid., pp. 113-I4.

FORTIFICATIONS, FORCE AND ENGLISH TRADE IN INDIA

when commercial concessions could be gained from ruling elites, and when the system of maritimepasses was working well.5 Chaudhuri's argument is exciting, for it analyses the nature of the mercantile relationshipbetween the English and India far more deeply than previous accounts. This essay will accept the economic arguments propounded by Chaudhuri, and will suggest that while the development from factory to fort was an economic necessity for Englishmen in India, it was based upon the power of maritimetradersto enforce their demands at sea. Defence and offence are regardedas a symbiosiswhich revealed either pacific or offensive attitudes in responseto given or perceived threats, and/or situations where an advantage could be gained. Flexibility was the defining characteristic of the relationship, and this was developed by the "idea" and utility of force as it was understood by Englishmen in India between I608 and 1759. Although Englishmen in India evolved distinct attitudes towards the use of force, the establishment of fortified settlements was not an English innovation in Asia. First the Portuguese, and then the Dutch, had developed the idea of the fortified settlement defensible from the sea. While the Portuguese concentrated on levying tribute from the indigenous maritime trade of the Indian Ocean, the Dutch utilized their forts to establish control over the supply of fine spices in the south-east Asian archipelago. In both cases there was an obvious reliance on force in relationships with indigenous peoples, and in conflicts between the Europeans in the east.6 In India the strength of the land powers made necessary a far more cautious approach to the problems of security of settlements, and the expansionof a profitablecommerce. In the English case the debate about the utility of fortifications and force is confused by the conflicting views expressed at various times. Early in the seventeenth century Sir Thomas Roe considereddesiresto establish forts in India as delusions of a costly and ineffective nature.7 Roe was essentially opposed to fortifications because he was utterly convinced of the ability of English ships to control the maritime trade of the Mughal empire. As we shall see, however, while Roe was opposed to fortifications he was also a committed advocate of the use of force against anybody who checked English aspirations in India. The cost factor was important, and throughout the records we find examples of the company's demands for economies in its settlements.
s Ibid., ch. 6, "Politics of Trade". 6 M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian Trade andEuropean Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between I5oo and about 1630 (The Hague, 1962), chs. 6-7; C. R. Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire, I600-I800 (Harmondsworth, 1973), ch. 7; N. Steensgaard, Carracks, Caravans and Companies: The Structural Crisis in the EuropeanAsian Trade in the Early Seventeenth Century (Copenhagen, 1973); H. Furber, Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient, I600-I800 (Minneapolis, 1976), esp. pp. 3Io-I4; Chaudhuri, Trading Worldof Asia and the English East India Company, pp. I 09- I 5. 7 The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to India, I615-I9, ed. W. Foster, revised edn. (London, 1926), pp. 303-4, 373-4-

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"Profit, not grandeur,which is our end in trading", was one of the constant themes.8The point to rememberhere is that profit was the operative factor; grandeur was acceptable as long as it did not interfere with the accumulation of profits. The economies in the settlement at Bombay, insisted upon by the directors in the 167os, were not attractive to the resident English because they believed in the necessity for effective protection.9 The perceived threat was far more evident to resident Englishmen than it was to the directors in London. The exigencies of Bombay's situation, within the arena of Mughal conflicts with the Marathas, compelled the expansion of fortifications at the settlement - to such an extent that, by 1683, the directorscould object to fortifications in Bengal, in the belief that Bombay would act as the most effective check on Mughal depredationsagainst English settlements in
India. 10

Juggling the balance sheet, to keep the costs of the fortifications within limits acceptable to a company maintaining its presence in India by commercial profits, became increasingly difficult. The situation in India worsened as Aurangzeb pushed to the south in his attempts to crush the Marathas. The Dutch capture of Bantam in 1682 threw the English back into India, and caused them to consider retaliation against the Dutch in India and the archipelago. Bombay became the base for such operations, but plans had to be aborted when the Dutch connived with the Mughals at Surat to check English ambitions. The company's conflicts with English interlopers also exacerbated the problemsit was experiencingin the east. In England the company persuaded Charles II to revoke warrants granted to other English traders, and part of its argument was based on the costs incurredby the company in maintaining its Indian settlements.11 During the I68os it became evident to Sir Josiah Child that there was a need for a fort in every region in which the company had settled a trade.12 A series of pamphletscirculated in England arguing the necessity for forts in India. The writer representing the company in 168I estimated that it had expended more than 3oo,ooo on warehouses,
8

9 English Factories in India, I670-I684, ed. Fawcett, i, pp. i60 ff.; cf. Gyffard's objections, 23 Feb. 1675/6: factory records Bombay, I.O.R., G/3/7, pp. 23-5. 10The Diary of William Hedges ... during his Agency in Bengal, as well as on his Voyage out and Return Overland, I68I-I687, ed. H. Yule, 3 vols. (Hakluyt Soc., i st ser., lxxiv-lxxv, lxxviii, London, 1887-9), ii, pp. xxii-xxiii; cf. despatches to Bombay, 6 Jan., I I Apr., 27 Aug. I688: letter books, I.O.R., E/3/9I, pp. 498, 524, 548. 11Calendar of State Papers: Domestic, i Nov. 1673 to 28 Feb. I675, p. 29I. 12 S. A. Khan, The East India Trade in the Seventeenth Century in its Political and Economic Aspects (London, 1923), P. 20 I.

I936-5 5), iii, p. 237; see also The English Factories in India, 1618-1669, ed. W. Foster, 13 vols. (Oxford, I906-27), x, I665-I667, p. I09; cf. despatch to Bombay, 21 July I738: letter books, India Office Records (hereafter I.O.R.), E/3/I 07, p. 441.

The English Factories in India, 1670-1684, ed. C. Fawcett, 4 vols. (Oxford,

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garrisons, and negotiations with Indian rulers.13Another pamphlet of the same year put the annual expenditure on "forts, castles, soldiers and otherwise" at oo,0ooo.14In I686 the company went to war with the Mughals, with the intention of making the English "nation" as formidable as any of the other European powers in India, and this could not be accomplished without fortified bases which paid their own costs.15The following year the directors took to task their servants at Fort St. George, Madras, for being timorous and over-concernedwith their own safety.16The merchants had decided to become warriors. In 688 Child reiterated the company's belief in the necessity for fortified settlements by which English servants, shipping and estates could be secured, particularly in Bengal.17 He considered also that the jointstock company was the organization best able to absorb the costs of such an infrastructure.18 The merchants lost the war, learning that Mughal might - contrary to the impressiongiven by the temporarysuccess of the Marathas - was still very much in control of the empire. The expansionary euphoria, following the early successes against the local Indian governors in estuarine Bengal, was soon dissipated, forcing resident Englishmen back on to a defensive posture.19Although humbled, the English retained their belief in fortifications and shows of strength to conduct a profitable trade. Alliances with Indian rulers were regarded as too ephemeral to be effective.20By 1698 the company estimated expenditure on its infrastructureat approximatelya million pounds.21It is evident, therefore, that by the end of the seventeenth century the English had a committed view on the necessity for forts in their trade with India. They viewed these as primarily for defence, but had attempted to use them as bases from which to launch an offensive against the Mughal empire. It is also clear that the infrastructure as a whole had become a major part of the English investment in India. Fortified settlements, as with the Portuguese and the Dutch, had become the norm in English perceptions of the Anglo-Indian relationship.
13 Anon., A Treatise Wherein is Demonstrated that the East-India Trade is the Most National of All Foreign Trades (London, I68 ), p. 36. 14Anon., The East India Company'sAnswer (London, I68 ), p. 14. 15Despatch to Fort St. George, 26 Aug. 1685: letter books, I.O.R., E/3/9o, p. 500. 16 Despatch to Fort St. George, 28 Sept. 1687: letter books, I.O.R., E/3/9 I, p. 412. 17 Despatch to Bombay, I i Apr. I688: letter books, I.O.R., E/3/9I, p. 524. 18 Josiah Child, A Treatise Concerning the East India Trade (London, 168 ), p. 5; see also Josiah Child, A New Discourse of Trade (London, 1693), p. 8 I. 19Chaudhuri, Trading Worldof Asia and the English East India Company, p. I 17. 20 "Dr. Charles Davenant's Report to Sir William Trumball, Secretary of State, 7 Feb. 1695-96": Berkshire Record Office, Reading, Trumball Add. MS. 122, p. 7; cf. Charles Davenant, An Essay on the East-India Trade (London, 1696), pp. 50-I . 21Anon., The Case of the Governour and Company of Merchants of London Trading to the East Indies (London, 1698), p. 2.

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II Fortificationsfor defence were understandablein commercial terms during the mercantilist era, especially where English commerce in India was seen to be struggling in an often hostile environment. This is undeniable, and as such constitutes the bases of the argument about defensive fortifications. But to be able to defend a position it is necessary to have enough strength to gain a position worth defending. On the one hand is the perceivedthreat, and on the other is the capability to act upon that perception. From the early years of the relationship with India, Englishmen had a very clear idea of their ability to react to the perceivedthreat. The essence of this ability was maritimepower. English East Indian shipping of the early seventeenth century was designed not only to carry commodities, but also to perform two other important functions, both of which were made necessary by the dangers of long-distance overseas trade. They were armed for defence and were highly manoeuvrable.They had to be, because of the presence of corsairs and pirates operating out of the Mediterranean, along the African coasts, and in the Indian Ocean. Heavily armed vessels could, when the need arose, be used to fight the Portuguese and the Dutch. They could also impressAsian potentates.22As self-contained,flexible, armed transportation for exotic commodities, they could become tactical weapons for offence. Sir Thomas Roe believed whole-heartedlyin the utility of English maritimeforce, using it, or the threat of it, to contain the excesses of Sultan Khurram at Surat.23Sir Henry Middleton had already proved the value of privateering among Mughal shipping between Surat and the Red Sea in I612,24 and Roe was demonstrating how such activities could be used as the basis for effective diplomacy. The critical element in maritime force was its flexibility, for Roe was already convinced of its effectiveness. He informed the directors: "At sea you may take and leave; your designs are not published".25 WheneverMughal officers interferedwith English trade from Surat, Roe instructedthe factors at the port that Englishmen would still trade into the Red Sea revenging themselves on Mughal shipping.26The
22For a succinct account, see R. Davis, English Merchant Shipping and AngloDutch Rivalry in the Seventeenth Century (London, 1975), esp. pp. 7-17; see also V. Barbour, "Dutch and English Merchant Shipping in the Seventeenth Century", in E. M. Carus-Wilson (ed.), Essays in Economic History, 3 vols. (London, 195462), i, pp. 227-53. 23 Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to India, ed. Foster, pp. 207, 213, 386, 402-3; cf. Letters Received by the East India Companyfrom its Servants in the East, I602-I617, ed. F. C. Danvers and W. Foster, 6 vols. (London, 1896-1902), iv, pp. 302-3; cf. English Factories in India, 1618-1669, ed. Foster, i, 1618-162I, pp. 237-8, 273. 24 The Voyage of Thomas Best to the East Indies, 1612-14, ed. W. Foster (Hakluyt Soc., 2nd ser., lxxv, London, 1934), p. 230; cf. the views of the factors at Surat, 25 Jan. 1613, in Letters Received by the East India Companyfrom its Servants in the East, ed. Danvers and Foster, i, pp. 234-5. 25 Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to India, ed. Foster, p. 304. 26 Ibid.,p. 422.

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strength of this belief in the effectiveness of "gunboat diplomacy" was also evident in English demands for trade concessions at Mocha in I6 8.27Like Thomas Best before him, Roe considered his trade agreement with Khurramto be based on the exercise, not merely the threat, of English maritimeforce.28And while the use of maritime force had to be tempered with caution, particularly if there were large English investments at stake in the various factories,29the idea of maritime force as a last resort was a constant theme in Anglo-Indianrelations.30 A second characteristic, central to English attempts to establish what A. P. Thornton has so succinctly described as an "image of dominance",31was the belief in fear as the key to the Anglo-Indian relationship. Sir Thomas Roe understood that peaceful coexistence, giving due respect to individual sovereignties, was impossible. There was, therefore, an absolute necessity for the relationshipto be based on fear. Since the English were themselves apprehensive in India they attempted to redress the balance by making Indian rulers fear them. "So that only for a little fear we were entertained; but for our trade or anything we bring, not at all respected".32Roe knew, "as well as the heart that trembled", that fear preserved the English presence at Surat.33In fact, "Anything that would stir these people to know us and fear us will work better effects than all the fair ways of the world".34 For as long as he remained in India Roe emphasized the need for the English to establish and maintain a presence based on fear," and his advice to other Englishmen resident in the east reflected this conviction.36
27 Edward Heynes, "The Voyage of the Anne Royall from Surat to Moha in the Red Sea, for Setling an English Trade in those Ports, I618", in Samuel Purchas (ed.), Hakluytus posthumus: or, Purchas His Pilgrimes, Contayning a History of the World in Sea Voyages and Lande Travells by Englishmen and Others, 4 vols. (London, 625, S.T.C. 20509), repr. in 20 vols. (Hakluyt Soc., extra ser., Glasgow, 1905-7), iv, p. 554. 28 Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to India, ed. Foster, p. 48 I. 29 Chaudhuri, Trading Worldof Asia and the English East India Company, p. 25. 30 H. D. Love, Vestiges of OldMadras, 1640-1800, 4 vols. (London, 9I 3),i, p. I99; see also Niccolao Manucci, Storia do Mogor: or, Mogul India, 1653-I708, ed. W. Irvine, 4 vols. (London Text ser., London, I 907-8), repr. 4 vols. (Calcutta, 1965), iii, p. 371; see also Ashin Das Gupta, "The Crisis at Surat, 1730-32", Bengal Past and Present, lxxxvi (I967); see also Chaudhuri, Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company, p. I 9. 31 A. P. Thornton, Doctrines of Imperialism (New York, 965), p. 2. 32 Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to India, ed. Foster, p. 162. 33 Ibid., p. 359. 34Ibid., p. 387; see also pp. 304, 384. 35 Sir Thomas Roe to Sir Thomas Smythe, I6 Feb. "Fear only keeps us I617/I8, in", in ibid., p. 466. 36 Sir Thomas Roe to Capt. Martin Pring, 14 Feb. 1617/I 8, "Nature is easier to deal with when it is a little afraid", in ibid., p. 461; "Until we show ourselves a little rough and busy, they will not be sensible", in ibid., p. 462; Roe to the factors at Bantam, "Nothing but fear keeps a Moor in awe; use him kindly and he will abuse you, but deal with him in smooth words and nipping deeds and he will respect and reverence you", in ibid., p. 461 note i.

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Despite the appearance of a generally pacific approach to Indian commerce during the years which followed, the English belief in fear as crucial in the relationship was never far away. John Fryer thought that the English on the west coast of India were too complacent, permitting too many abuses on the part of the Indians around them. He did not have a particularly high regard for merchants of any complexion, but wasted no opportunity to exhort his countrymen to instil a sense of "awe" in the Indians around them.37The problems being experienced by English merchants at this time were compounded by the conflict between the Mughals and the Marathas. In this environment the notion of fear again became prominent. The directors instructed their servants at Bombay to maintain a relationship with the Mughals based on "fear of us, which is the surer and much stronger passion than love".38 The nexus between maritime force and an "image of dominance" based on fear was expressedmost explicitly by Governor Boone at Bombay in 17 8. His statement to the directors, "if no naval force no trade, if no fear no friendship",39was not, as Chaudhuri believes, merely rhetorical.40It was a reiteration of an idea familiar to Englishmen in India at the time. Not only was there a long history to the belief in fear as an essential condition in Anglo-Indianrelations, in 1718 there was still a future for it. Robert Clive saw Siraj-ud-daulah not only as a nawab bearing a "deep resentment against the English" but, even more significantly, as a nawab whose "compliances" arose "solely from fear".41Mir Jafar was regarded in the same light by the council at Fort William. "We have reason to believe that nothing but his fear of the English ... induced him to comply with our petition" for the saltpetre monopoly in Bengal.42The select committee at Fort William went even further, when it generalized about the AngloIndian relationship. Every day's "experience convinces us that Mussulmen will remain firm to the engagements no longer than while they are actuated by principles of fear".43 Belief in their own maritime supremacy, and the necessity of maintaining a relationship within which Indians feared them, encouraged the English to employ force against Indian governments. The use of force was not consistent, nor even inevitable in any given circumstance. The English showed great flexibility of response, reacting to
37 John Fryer, A New Account of East India and Persia, Being Nine Years' Travel, 1672-i681, ed. W. Crooke, 3 vols. (London, 1909- 5), ii, p. I 5. 38 Despatch to Bombay, 27 Aug. 688: letter books, I.O.R., E/3/9 I, p. 548. 39Charles Boone to company, 20 Dec. 1718: abstracts of letters from Bombay, I.O.R., E/4/449, p. 322; see also p. 320. 40Chaudhuri, Trading Worldof Asia and the English East India Company, p. I13. 41Clive to company, 6 Aug. I757, in Fort William-India House Correspondence and Other Contemporary Papers Relating Thereto, I748-800o, 2I vols. (Delhi, I949-59), ii, ed. H. N. Sinha, p. 236. 42 Fort William to company, 31 Dec. 1758, in ibid., p. 339. 43 Select committee to company, 31 Dec. I758, in ibid., p. 392.

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each situation as it came about. It is also true that force can be regarded rather as a "strategic deterrent" than a "tactical weapon" in Anglo-Indian relations,44but only if we disregardthe two notions discussed so far. Before we analyse the various issues at the level of ideas it may be instructive to examine English attitudes to force as an offensive weapon in the periodbefore Plassey. As we have already seen, Sir Thomas Roe was an ambassadorwho believed that effective diplomacy was based on adequate force being available to maintain peace. He assuredthe directorsthat Indians were "best treated with the sword in one hand".45As a loyal and forthright Englishman he informed his king that English force would teach the Indians a necessary lesson: "Your Majesty is lord of all the seas and can compel that by your power, which you have sought with courtesy".46 Not all the sabre-rattling was directed at the Indian rulers, and

where it was, it was confined to responses to direct impositions on the English presence. English force was most in evidence against the Portuguese, in the Indian Ocean and the Middle East. By proving themselves superior to the Portuguese at sea, the English gained a better relationship with the Indian governors at Surat. English ships acted as privateers among Portuguese shipping in the sea lanes of the northwest, and they undertook convoy duties with Indian merchant shipping. The combined Persian and English attack on the Portuguese fortress at Ormuz in I622 enhanced the standing of the English in India as well as in Persia. Conflict between Portuguese and English effectively ended in 1635 with the Goa Accord,concluded between the Portuguese viceroy at Goa and the English at Surat.47In the south-east, along the Coromandel coast, the English settled at Madras in 1639, where they quickly established Fort St. George as a haven within the internecine conflicts of the Carnatic. By the 166os conditions for trade in India and Persia were deteriorating. Agreementswith Persian rulers regardingcustoms concessions at Gombroon - the reward for the assistance given in the attack on Ormuz - were becoming increasingly difficult to maintain. At Surat there was a series of difficulties with the local governors, while in the Bay of Bengal various petty governors were making demands that the English found offensive. As a result the council at Surat advised the directors to suspend all relations with local governors for the time
44Chaudhuri, Trading Worldof Asia and the English East India Company, esp. pp.
I 17, I26.
46 Ibid., p. 465. Roe had already had occasion to remind Zulfikar Khan, governor of Surat, "I come hither not to beg, nor do nor suffer injury. I serve a king that is able to revenge whatsoever is dared to be done against his servants": ibid., p. 54. 47 For a general survey of English activities at this time, see I. Bruce Watson, "The Establishment of English Commerce in North-Western India in the Early Seventeenth Century", Indian Econ. and Social Hist. Rev., xiii (1976), pp. 375-9 I.

45 Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to India, ed. Foster, p. 457.

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being, and to stop all traffic at sea. The necessary pre-conditions for such action were a safe place for Englishmen in India and adequate force. In the council's view it was time "to remedy these ills by commanding us to use force".48The directors, however, could not come to any decision which might risk the company's trade. The resident Englishmen continued to press their masters for a decision. In March I668 the company assumed control of the government of Bombay, whereupon the council at Surat again suggested the use of force against the Persian and Indian governors. They concluded with the familiar idea: "it is better in trade to be feared than beloved, if fair means will not prevail".49 Such problems continued to irritate the English in India, particularly after the Portuguese began attempting to divert trade in Persia from Gombroon to Kung. The directors still refused to commit themselves to a direct order, despite the advice from India.50 Gerald Aungier, with his customary moderation, continued to advocate the appearance rather than the reality of preparing for war.51However, 1676 turned out to be an exceptionally trying year, forcing Aungier to alter his stance and join the more "hawkish" of his colleagues. While still insisting on prudence, he advised the directors: "in violent distempers, violent cures are only successful... the times now require you to manage your general commerce with your sword in hand".52 Bombay suggested that the factors at Surat should act with the sword in one hand and an olive branch in the other.53The directorswere still not convinced by the advice they were receiving from India, contenting themselves with the standard instruction for prudence, whenever the issues were not clearly on the side of the company's profit.54The company's servants in India were not impressedby such statements.55But it was not until Sir Josiah Child and the faction supporting the forward policy became dominant in the court of directors that the official emphasis changed. At the same time the company shifted its base for
48 Surat to company, 16 Feb. 1660, in English Factories in India, I618-I669, ed. Foster, x, i665-i660, pp. 300-I. 49 Surat to company, 2 Nov. 1668, in ibid., xiii, 1668-1669, p. 32. 50 Despatch to Surat, 5 Mar. 1675: letter books, I.O.R., E/3/88, p. I70; see also Selections from the Letters, Despatches and Other State Papers Preserved in the Bombay Secretariat, ed. G. W. Forrest, 2 vols. (Bombay, 1887), i, p. 15. 51 Gerald Aungier to company, 17 Jan. 1675/6: original correspondence, no. 4163, I.O.R., E/3/36, pp. I2-I8 (of letter). 52Gerald Aungier to company, 22 Jan. 1676/7: original correspondence, no. 4258, I.O.R., E/3/37, p. 8; see also p. 37 (of letter); cf. Fawcett's view of this letter, in English Factories in India, 1670-i684, ed. Fawcett, i, p. 353. 53 Bombay to Surat, 27 June 1677, in Selections from the Letters, Despatches and Other State Papers Preserved in the Bombay Secretariat, ed. Forrest, i, p. I32. 54Despatch to Surat, 5 Mar. 1677: letter books, I.O.R., E/3/88, p. 542. 55George Boucher's report to Thomas Rolt, "President of India & ca.", received by the company, 6 July 1679: original correspondence, no. 4564, I.O.R., E/3/39, p. I (of letter).

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action in the north-west to Bombay. From here the company decided to pursue its offensive against the Mughals.56 The use of force had still to be balanced against its cost. Nevertheless there had been a conscious decision to employ force wherever other remedies were proving too costly. In Bengal the efficacy of the idea of force had taken some time to become accepted by the company. In I684 William Hedges believed that unless the company openly quarrelled with the nawab's government the English trade would never prosper. Here again there was no consensus, but the popular belief was that "no good was to be done with these people without compulsion".57 Two years later the merchants had drawn the sword in an effort to make the Mughals "as sensible of our power, as we have of our truth and justice".58From 1687 onwards the official guide for action became "the old proverb, suaviter in modo, fortiter in re".59In Bengal, when the need for the English to make peace with the Mughals became apparent, Charnock and Ellis suggested it be accomplished "with sword in hand".60 The delusion, under which Englishmen thought they could employ outright force against the Mughal empire, was soon dispelled. Nevertheless they continued to cherish a belief in their ability to overawe the local Indian governors, and maintained their commitment to fortified settlements. They were allowed to remain in India and were granted a settlement in Bengal, which they promptly began to fortify. Along the Coromandel coast similar attitudes were dominant among Englishmen, who viewed Indian affairs from the comparative safety of Fort St. George. Even old Niccolao Manucci, with his fifty years of experience in Indian courts, considered himself safe at Madras. He went even further when he asserted his belief in the ability of Europeans to overcome many times their number of Indian forces.61 His view was the familiar one: "employing force against them brings of forceful temperament, was not one to tolerate injury from Indian governors, especially if he considered that he was in a position to "bang" them.63His advice to his employers in 170I was to use force in the Persian Gulf and at Surat to overcome such difficulties.64
Entry for 7 Nov. 1684, in Diary of WilliamHedges, ed. Yule, i, pp. 164-5. Secret committee to Bengal, 14 Jan. 686, in ibid., ii, pp. li-liii. 59"Courteous in manner, firm in deed": despatch to Fort St. George, 6 June 1687: letter books, I.O.R., E/3/9I, p. 310. 60 Letter to Sir Josiah Child and council, Io July 687, in Diary of WilliamHedges, ed. Yule, ii, p. lxiv; see also p. cxxix. 61 Manucci, Storia do Mogor, ii, p. 4 I4. 62 Ibid., iv, p. 58. 63Thomas Pitt to his son, Robert Pitt, in Canton, July 1701: Brit. Lib., Add. MS. 22843, fo. 49a. 64 Pitt to company, 27 Oct. 170 I: Brit. Lib., Add. MS. 22844, fos. 5 -51 a.
57

them to reason though it be against their will".62 Thomas Pitt, a man

56 Despatch to Surat, 23 Mar. 1686/7: letter books, I.O.R., E/3/9 I, p. 274.

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The following year the factors in Bengal suggested that a united company would have more capacity to force trade in the province.65 When Bengal's subahdar, Azim-ush-shan, demanded money from the English to raise troops, the latter wrote to their agent at Patna telling him that if the company's settlement was disturbed, they would take "satisfaction at Hugli, or anywhere" they found it convenient so to do.66An obvious willingness to use force was communicatedto Indians whenever the occasion arose, and was believed by most Englishmen to be the best way to treat with Indians.67 However, force was not to be used without discretion. It was only to be employed when peaceful negotiations had failed.68 Negotiations were conducted on the basis of a known enthusiasm for resort to force, and this inevitably contributedto the tensions within the relationships. Maintaining a balance between the costs of such operations and the need to show strength, in order to keep the demands of Indian governors to a minimum, was the essence of the relationship between the company, its servants, and the Indian ruling elites.69 It was far simpler to overawe the petty governors than it was to act against the nawabs and subahdars. At the same time the possible implications of acting against local governments had to be weighed against the benefits of such actions, and possible reactions from more powerful rulers. The decisions were not taken lightly and appearto have been discussed rationally by the resident English officials.70 Throughout the first half of the eighteenth century, resident Englishmen exercised force as a curb on the excesses of Indian governors. The old notion of the silver salve being part of the relationship with Indian governments, along with that of fear and force, was abandoned in favour of the latter. Company servants saw little need to purchase peace, even from the Mughals at Surat. But what worked so effectively against petty local governors was still an unknown quantity against the might of the Mughal empire.71During the eighteenth century this hesitancy was
65 Bengal to company, 24 Dec., 6 Jan. I702/3: original correspondence, no. 8097, I.O.R., E/3/65, paras. 27, 29 (of letter). 66 Consultation at Fort William, 3 June 1707, in Early Annals of the English in Bengal, Being the Bengal Public Consultations for the First Half of the Eighteenth Century, ed. C. R. Wilson, 2 vols. (London, 1895-1900), i, p. 282; see also p. 178. 67 Despatch to Bengal, 4 Feb. 1709, in Old Fort William in Bengal: A Selection of Official Documents Dealing with its History, ed. C. R. Wilson, 2 vols. (London, 1906), i, p. 76; Edward Harrison to company, I3 Oct. I71I: abstracts of letters from the Coast and Bay, I.O.R., E/4/, p. 305. 68 Despatch to Bengal, I2 Jan. 1714/I 5: letter books, I.O.R., E/3/98, pp. 468-9. 69 Fort William to company, 3 Dec. 7I 5. The resident Englishmen were pleased that their masters approved of their using force when necessary; they also promised that they would not be the aggressors, but would ensure the "Moors know they will not submit tamely": abstracts of letters from the Coast and Bay, I.O.R., E/4/2, p. 30. 70 Fort St. George to company, 3, 7 Jan. 17 6/I 7: abstracts of letters from the Coast and Bay, I.O.R., E/4/2, p. 93. 71Despatch to Bombay, 25 Mar. 1724: letter books, I.O.R., E/3/Io2, p. 254.

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not so much the result of memories of the failure of the late I68os; rather was it uncertainty about the extent to which the "intestine broils" in India had weakened the central polity. Nevertheless by the middle of the century it was becoming clear that force could be employed effectively against the regional governors at Surat and in Bengal.72The various connections that existed between resident Englishmen and Indian mercantile groups reflected a certain community of interest, and provided a viable basis for wholesale attacks against Indian governments. Merchants and disaffected members of the old elites combined with the English to overthrow the governments at Surat and in Bengal. At Surat the mercantile connection was clearly the principalfactor in the assumptionof control by the English in I759,73 and the role played by disaffected factions within the nawab's court in Bengal was yet more apparent.74The ability of the English to employ force effectively against the ruling elites was an attraction both for the mercantile groups and for disaffected members of the old elites. At Surat, in Bengal, and at Masulipatam, the English assumed control of government, under nominal figure-heads, and thus became a revenue-raising territorial power in India.75 It was not so much the revenue itself that was the critical issue here; more important than this was the delegation of authority given under the rights to revenue. While revenue was obviously good for the company, in that it helped defray some of the costs of the infrastructure, as far as general trade was concerned it was the control now given to Englishmen which provided the basis for the vast expansion of English activities in the country trade. III Establishing and developing fortified settlements, utilizing maritime power, emphasizing the idea of fear, and the overt exercise of force, were all components in the evolution of an expansionary ideology among the English in India. They also believed in the "sanctity" of the English flag and in their own sovereignty within India. Sovereignty can be seen in the expressionof extra-territorialityclaimed by Englishmen, in their demands to live within their settlements according to their own laws and religion. Their claims to property rights had to be established in the early firmans, and against the rival claims of Mughal
72 Despatch to Fort William, 17 June 1748: letter books, I.O.R., E/3/I I0, p. I26. 73 Surat to Bombay, read in consultation at Bombay, 6 Feb. I759, in Selections from the Letters, Despatches and Other State Papers Preserved in the Bombay Secretariat, ed. Forrest, ii, pp. 95-6; Bombay to company, 27 Mar. I759: abstracts of letters from Bombay, I.O.R., E/4/45 I, pp. 295-6, 305; see also Bombay to company, 7 May 1759: ibid., p. 314. 74B. K. Gupta, Sirajuddaullah and the East India Company, I756-I757: Background to the Foundation of British Power in India (Leiden, 1962), p. 88, and passim. 75 See the statements of revenues from these three areas, 1758-63: Brit. Lib., Add. MS. 12564, fos. 29a, 31, 33-4.

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76 Despatch to Bombay, I I Sept. 1689: letter books, I.O.R., E/3/92, pp. 63-4. 77 Despatch to Fort St. George, 6 June 1687: letter books, I.O.R., E/3/9 I, p. 31 o. 78 Report of H.M. attorney, solicitor and advocate general, 24 Dec. I 757: Chatham Papers, Public Record Office, London, 30/8/99, pt. 2, fo. 237. 79 English Factories in India, 1618-1669, ed. Foster, xiii, I668-1669, p. 254. 80 Surat to Fort St. George, 16 Feb. I663/4, in Selections from the Letters, Despatches and Other State Papers Preserved in the Bombay Secretariat, ed. Forrest, i, p. 34; see also W. Foster, "Sivaji's Raid upon Surat in 1664", Indian Antiquary, 1(192 I), p. 318. 81 See the notice in Diary of William Hedges, ed. Yule, ii, p. ccxxix; see also Selections from the Letters, Despatches and Other State Papers Preserved in the Bombay
82 Surat consultations, 20 Feb. I 702/3, in Selections from the Letters, Despatches and Other State Papers Preserved in the Bombay Secretariat, ed. Forrest, i, p. 253. 83 Fryer, New Account of East India and Persia, ii, p. 6; see also The Travels of the Abbe Carre in India and the Near East, 1672 to 1674, ed. Sir C. Fawcett, 3 vols. (Hakluyt Soc., 2nd ser., xcv-xcvii, London, 1947-8), iii, pp. 712-13.

rulers. Sovereignty as such became an issue during the conflicts with the Mughals between 1686 and 689. It was present in the company's insistence on a form of "imperium"over all Englishmen in the east, as well as in the need to emulate the Dutch.76It was also interpretedas a claim to sovereignty over the "small territory belonging to Madras", which the English would "maintain and defend against all persons, and govern by [their] own laws without any appeal to any prince or potentate whatsoever, except [their] sovereign lord the king".77 By 1757 developments within the Anglo-Indianrelationship had reached the stage where the company's entitlement to booty from India was being contested by parliament itself. The ensuing debate was couched in terms of sovereignty over which crown and parliament had the higher claim.78 In still other ways did the English exercise sovereignty within their settlements. By offering a sanctuary for Indians the fortified settlements became of crucial importance in altering the traditional relations between Indians during a period of deterioratingorder. Aungier's arguments in I670, in favour of fortifications at Bombay to attract Indian settlers,79was itself a reflection of the success enjoyed at Madras. The attacks by the Marathas on Surat in the 66os clearly demonstrated how Indian merchants came to see the English settlements as havens for themselves and their property. While many of the merchants suffered losses when the local Mughal governors failed to repulse the Marathas, those merchantswho had sought sanctuary within the English factory saved their property.80And when Sivaji launched his second attack on the port, the son of one of the richest merchants in Surat applied to the English for permissionto migrate to Bombay.81It became common for Indian merchants at Surat to use the English factory as a place of safety whenever the port was threatened.82A similar development occurred at Karwar during conflicts between the local governor and the king of Bijapur, and also when Sivaji plundered the area in 675.83

Secretariat, ed. Forrest, i, pp. I I 1-12,

129-30.

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This development was not a rapid one, nor was it inevitable. Most merchants clearly decided to stay where they were and simply put up with the problems. Traditional acceptance of such difficulties and social constraints, as well as the fear of possible retaliation against relatives and property, all combined to restrict their mobility. Nevertheless by 753 it was evident that the flow of population into Bombay was a consequence of its attraction as a sanctuary in time of social disorder.84Madras, of course, had already set the example in attracting Indian populations into English settlements. Indeed Manucci saw the success of Madras as being largely due to the safety and freedom which it afforded to "merchantsof all nations".85His opinion was supported by Alexander Hamilton,86and verifiedwhat the directors had believed in I687.87 In both of the settlements the populations paid levies, dues and customs to the English. Because Calcutta was established so much later than either Madras or Bombay, and thus benefited from their record of experience, its success in attracting an Indian population was extremely rapid.88The constant state of near-anarchy in the province during the eighteenth century also tested the quality of the protection offered by the English at Fort William. Indians were given protection against the demands of the nawabs, largely on the grounds that compliance with such demands would establish precedents which could be used against English property.89Just as at Surat in the late I66os and 1670 local authority was recognized by some Indians to have been less effective than the strength of English defences. Fateh Chand Jagat Seth, the "banker of the world", sent his family and fortune to Calcutta for safe keeping when the Marathas were plundering Orissa in
I742.90

Protection and sanctuary imply the existence of effective force with

84 The directors were aware of the potential. See their specific instructions, despatch to Bombay, 15 Mar. 1748: letter books, I.O.R., E/3/ Io, pp. 289-90; see also the migration to Bombay of merchant bankers from Aurangabad and Poona, in Bombay to company, I Dec. 1753: abstracts of letters from Bombay, I.O.R., E/4/45 I, p. 92. 85 Manucci, Storia do Mogor, ii, p. 278; see also iii, pp. 92, 37I. 86 Alexander Hamilton, A New Account of the East Indies, ed. W. Foster, 2 vols. (London, 1930), i, p. 199. 87 Despatch to Fort St. George, 22 Mar. I686/7: letter books, I.O.R., E/3/9I, p. 279. 88 Early Annals of the English in Bengal, ed. Wilson, i, p. 193; P. J. Marshall, East Indian Fortunes: The British in Bengal in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1976), p. 24; G. Blyn, "Revenue Administration of Calcutta in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century", Indian Econ. and Social Hist. Rev., i no. 4 (1964), pp. 128-9. 89Bengal public consultations, 17 Apr. 1733, cited in S. Bhattacharya, The East India Company and the Economy of Bengal, 1704 to 1740 (London, 1954), pp. 63, 65; see also Bengal to company, 23 Feb. I756, in Fort William-IndiaHouse Correspondence and Other Contemporary Papers Relating Thereto, 1748-1800, i, ed. K. K. Datta, p. 989, and also pp. 935-6, 964, 990; see also J. Z. Holwell to company, 30 Nov. 1756, in ibid., pp. 1057-8; see also the directors' approval of such resistance, 25 Mar. 1757, in ibid., ii, ed. Sinha, p. 5. 90 J. H. Little, "The House of Jagat Seth", Bengal Past and Present, xii (1921 ), p. 3.

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which to provide and maintain them. These notions intensified in the course of time and were themselves sustained by English attitudes towards raising revenues in their settlements. Originally seen simply as one -way to save on the costs of maintaining the infrastructure of the company, revenues from this source became of central importance to the way in which the English regarded their presence in India. Although the sums were small compared with the returns to the English following the campaigns in Tanjore, Bengal, the northern Circars and Surat, by the mid-eighteenth century they nevertheless comprised a great number of taxes, duties, levies and cesses, which affected almost every aspect of life within the settlements. There were fixed revenues: ground-rents, quitrents, and a number of tax-farms; and there were the variable revenues from sea and land customs, mint duties, licence and pass money, consulage, and a host of minor duties on conveyancing, and contractual transactions. The figures for revenue are scattered throughout the company's records, and appear to have been only irregularly collated by company servants during the period. Nevertheless it is possible to discern an upward trend in the amount of revenue collected, which is wholly consistent with the assumption that, once instituted, revenues and their increase become of prime concern to those responsiblefor their collection. This was all the more crucial since the expenses of English settlements were generally in excess of revenues for most of the period in question, and most particularly at times of crisis. At Fort St. George by I679 some 2,903 was entered as revenue, while 5,209 was recordedas expenditure;of the latter figure, 2,8 I 8 representedthe costs of the garrison at the fort.91Eighteen years later, Fort St. David, Cuddalore. By 1714 the amount collected at Fort St. George had risen to 36,324, but declined by 1727 to 25,600. Of this latter figure, I 2,800 came from sea customs. Ten years later the sum of 25,777 was collected, while expenses were recordedas 5,86 , of which 6,850 was spent on the garrison. Over the next decade revenues tended to remain at about the same level. but expenditure increased sharply, as the hinterland was subjected to incursions by the Marathas, and as Anglo-French relations deteriorated into open conflict. In 1743 expenses amounted to 20,875. After the return of Madras to the English it took a while before revenues could be restored to their former level, and in 750 only I 2,800 could be raised within the settlement. This had increasedto I 8,880 by the following year, while
46,315 was collected in 1754. In 1753 the company had managed to 91 The figures illustrating revenues in English settlements presented here have been gleaned from a great many sources. I have rounded the crude figures to the nearest pagoda, xeraphin or rupee, and then converted them to sterling. Conversion rates are 8s. to the pagoda, is. 8d. to the xeraphin, and 2s. 6d. to the rupee. I do not consider these figures as completely accurate, but I do believe they can be used to show trends.

in I697, the company collected 16,285

at Madras, and I I,996 at

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gain from its campaign in Tanjore some 80,000, which it hoped would continue as an annual revenue.92 Bombay underwent a similar experience during this period. In 1667 revenues of some 6,490 were raised, while expenses were I 1,498. Two years later Aungier remitted customs at Bombay for five years, in order to promote trade at the settlement. Consequently the revenue in
1672 amounted to only 3,333, ment was raising

8,983, of which 2,587 came from sea customs. By i686 the settleing the conflicts with the Mughals, the Sidis and the Marathas. It took some time for Bombay to recover its position in the maritime trade of the north-west, and expenses continued to remain a problem both for the settlement and for the directors in London.93In 1736 the revenues had risen to 26,338, increasing substantially to 37,500 during the next eight years, with a further rise to about 42,000 in 1759. Revenue collection at Fort William shows a similar trend. From the but perceptibleincrease continued to 1721, when 4,638 was collected at the settlement. From this time onwards the increase was more rapid, with I4,256 recorded as the nett revenue in 1754. As with the other English enclaves in India, expenses were still a major consideration, but these were recouped after Plassey, when the twenty-fourparganas greatly increased the amount of revenue collected by the English in Bengal. From 58,000 in 1758 revenues from the parganas rose to 83,010 in 1760. This sum was supplemented by Mir Jafar's concessions, totalling 650,000 in the same year. Discounting this last concession, it is clear that from a total revenue of 44,333 collected in the Indian and Persian settlements in I697,94 the returns to the company from the ceded lands alone had risen by 1760 to 228,949.95 At the same time the expenses forced on the company during the various conflicts between 1753 and I760 were substantial. These costs went far beyond the exigencies of the Anglo-Indian settlements and adversely affected the company's trade and shipping. Having, by its own accounting, lost 2.5 million in these seven years, it is little wonder the company engaged in activities which incurred the wrath of Adam Smith, Edmund Burke and parliament. IV The important consideration about revenues and their imposition is not that they were levied from English nationals, but that they were
92 Calendar of the Madras Despatches, I744-I755, ed. H. H. Dodwell (Madras, I920), p. 2 I1. 93 In I715 revenues stood at 7,858, expenses at 29,698: factory records miscellaneous, I.O.R., G/40/7, p. 14. 94 Brit. Lib., Add. MS. 22 85, fo. 58. 95 Brit. Lib., Add. MS. 12564, fos. 29a, 3I, 33-4.

but by 1675 had increased again to

12,7 17, but this fell to a mere ,416 by I694 dur-

trifling sum of I 65 in I694 revenues rose to 1,940 in 1703. A slow

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also levied from, and paid by, other nationals. This was a shift in authority, whether concededor taken, and constituted a developmentof the infrastructure necessary for "imperialism". Revenue-collecting contains the capacity for an infringement of sovereignty because of a structural necessity to expand the revenues once the mechanism of collection is instituted. This was perfectly clear to the directors in I694, when they informed the council at Fort St. George: "It is undoubtedly our interest to make our garrisonedports in India marts for nations, which will in a few years aggrandise our revenue, and with that our strength".96As the necessity for "garrisonedports" became the dominant ideology among the company's directors, so the costs of implementing the policy mounted. As the infrastructure expanded, so there was greater pressure on the inhabitants to pay for it. This demand could only be justifiedby the quality and effectiveness of the protection offered, and this in turn necessitated a better and more expensive infrastructure. The directors were in no doubt about this connection, "protection being the true foundation on which all pretences for raising customs subsidies and other taxes are originally built".97What was also clear to the directors was the need for tenable positions, "secure against any attempts of the Moors". Moreover the establishment of Fort William had to be undertaken as clandestinely as possible, with every effort to "colour over" the company's real intentions.98Not only were the fortifications themselves to be kept as secret as possible; so also were the revenues raised within the English settlements in Bengal. The directors instructed their servants to conceal the true value of the revenues in case the subahdar demanded a proportional payment.99In obtaining and expanding its concessions in Bengal the company followed its own redistributive aspirations, and undermined the sovereignty of the provincial and local governorsin the process. Throughout the period under review the English in India understood clearly that many of their actions infringed official agreements with Indian governments.The clarity of the notions expressedsuggests an ideology, and one which became self-sustaining in its attitude towards Indian rulers during the period. This paper has presented a number of themes which contributed to the development of this ideology, which had become dominant by the middle of the eighteenth century. From the outset there was the idea of English strength based on maritime power, and from this basic premissthere followed the idea of fear as the key to the Anglo-Indian relationship. The need to estab96 Despatch to Fort St. George, 3 Jan. 1693/4: letter books, I.O.R., E/3/92, p. 306. 97Despatch to Sir Charles Eyre, 20 Dec. 1699, in Old Fort William in Bengal, ed. Wilson, i, p. 47. 98 Despatch to Fort William, 4 Feb. 1709, in ibid., p. 75; see also p. 6I. 99 Despatch to Fort William, 26 Feb. 1703, in ibid., p. 53.

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lish defensible positions to protect English trade has therefore to be seen as both defensive and offensive in nature. It was defensive in its response to the perceived threat from internecine warfare on the subcontinent, and from extortion by individual Indian governors. The quality of the defence then allowed an offensive characteristic to develop, not only in the obvious sense of using the bases as points from which to attack Indian polity to redress perceived injuries, but also in less tangible ways. By providing sanctuary for Indians the fortified settlements were instrumental in attacking Indian perceptionsof traditional authority. By becoming relatively inviolable, English settlements representeda challenge to Indian authority around them. The notion of sanctuary also sustained the English belief in their extra-territoriality,and in their "right" to govern their settlements as they saw fit. Whether Indian governors regarded sovereignty in quite the same clear-cut manner is arguable, but it was also immaterial. As far as the English were concerned their sovereignty was precious to them, and they did whatever they could during the period to sustain this belief. And while force had the capacity to become an economic transaction, the idea of force and its material expression by Englishmen was a central characteristicin early Anglo-Indianrelations.
Australian National University I. Bruce Watson

ANNUAL CONFERENCE 198I on

THE ENGLISH RISING OF I38I

The 198 I Annual Conference of the Past and Present Society will be held on Wednesday, I July I981 in the rooms of the Geological Society, Burlington House, Piccadilly, London
WiV oJU.

Anyone interested in receiving further information or in participating in the Conference is invited to write to:
The Editor, Past and Present,

Corpus Christi College, Oxford OX I 4JF.

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The ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING OF THE PAST AND PRESENT SOCIETY will be held on the occasion of the Annual Conference.