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East Bengal "He who understands himself and understands his enemy will prevail in one hundred battles. Sun Tzu Introduction 1. War is changing. Warfare and its means always changes. That is why, all

armies of the world are continuously training to adapt with these fast changing natures of warfare. Like other armies, we must do the same or fall behind and lose. Side by side, the technology is also developing and new inventions of science are directly influencing the changing natures of warfare. A good economy, indigenous resources and advanced technologies are all prerequisites to modernise an army. However, a modern army is not a must to win wars but a trained army is. A trained army always follow, learn and analyse the changes in the nature of warfare to capitalise on its strong points and exploit enemy weak spots. Therefore, it is essential to track the changes in the natures of warfare, analyse and understand the framework of the generations of warfare to evaluate both ourselves and our enemies. 2. Bangladesh must maintain an army to protect territorial integrity and

national sovereignty though our economic constrains restrict us having a sophisticated and large army. Bangladesh Armys standard of training is equal to any modern armies of the world but we lack in equipment and weapon. Formulating and implementing a suitable defence plan for Bangladesh is a nightmare of any military strategists. The legacy of serious mistakes by British 1 RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED during formation of India and Pakistan basing on only religious faiths forsaking the defence consideration is still borne by Bangladesh. Having a strong regional superpower in all sides, Bangladesh thus faces a serious predicament. With developing economy and poor resource base, many adverse factors on the security of small states are common in our country. 3. However, we must ensure our security with resources available. Hence,

we need to defend our motherland and strike a balance between the demand and resources. The situation may seem bleak but we have many advantages, too. With a vast homogenous population, we have a reasonably strong professional military force. Integration of these two vital components can overcome many odds and achieve wonders. Our Liberation War is a glaring example in this context. Once motivated and properly trained Bengali soldiers can be as courageous as any other martial race. This was manifested in 1965 Indo-Pak war and our glorious war of liberation 1971. Not many countries in the world have earned a new flag through armed struggle. Moreover, history possesses examples of superpower being routed by combined might of military and people. 4. Military doctrine is the fundamental principle by which military forces guide

their actions to attain the objective. The Operations of War, Volume 1 (GSTP 0032) came into being to provide Bangladesh Armys own war fighting doctrine and formalised the modified ideas to give it a functional shape to warfare. In this publication, it projects a whole new horizon of tactical ideas of blending Conventional Warfare (CW) with the Unconventional Warfare (UCW) as its

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RESTRICTED major concept.1 The Army has made this new adoption with a view to bringing a qualitative change in our military philosophy. The modifications are made for the adjustment of our psyche towards purely functional attitude2 which certainly shows the institutional will to continue to change for the better. Therefore, understanding four generations of warfare will facilitate our thinking process, help us to analyse and logically justifying the requirement of adopting a doctrine mentioned above. 5. War is an extension of politics where military is one of the tools to achieve

strategic goal. There are two ways to dominate the war, either by denying or by punishing the threats capability. Denial of enemys design of warfare demands superiority in forces strength, technology and even a strong economy. To punish the enemy by using various types of options may be offensive, airland battle, armoured heavy thrusts that can be afforded by superior forces only. Being a weaker state, Bangladeshs options for war are limited to defensive and infantry intensive only. Bangladesh Army being reasonably equipped, over the years, gained enough strength to blunt any enemy initial offensive. To strengthen this achievement further, the thought process of the invader has to be disrupted by attrition from all direction with all means. We lack in geographical depth to fight a pure conventional war for a long time. CW simultaneously with UCW at operational and tactical levels, from the very beginning throughout its length and breadth, will help in compensating for adversary's numerical superiority and own

Major General Iqbal Karim Bhuian, psc, the Chief of General Staff , Bangladesh Army, The Iqbal, Loc Cit.

Foreword of GSTP 0032, April 2006, p ix.

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RESTRICTED inadequate geographical depth. Hence, the idea of blending conventional and unconventional warfare merits a serious consideration. 6. The popular concept of switching over to UCW after fighting and

exhausting the conventional forces (CF) is no longer valid as, a regular army is a crucial component of state sovereignty and legitimate authority. 3 This denotes that UCW is not to be regarded as an aftermath of the CW rather should be waged simultaneously as an adjunct to the CW. Therefore, the blending of CW with the UCW will commence from the very beginning of the breakout of hostilities. Though the conduct will be concurrent yet one of the components would dominate in a particular time or phase. The UCW will act in a major role only when the CW can not be continued further. Logically, Bangladesh Armys present doctrine: To blend the CW with the UCW from the very beginning of the breakout of the hostilities, is a necessity for a weaker nation like us. 7. Blending CW with the UCW is not a new idea; it is termed as the

Compound Warfare by the USA and also sometimes mentioned as Irregular Warfare. All terms: Asymmetric Warfare, Irregular Warfare and Compound Warfare are products of the Fourth Generations Warfare (4GW). In this paper, the generations of warfare will be discussed to evaluate the changes of warfare. In order to examine the warfare, the various generations of warfare will be presented first. A brief description of the evolution process will also be discussed. Following the discussions, the paper will examine the relation of UCW with the
3

Military force is recognized as one element of sovereignty and national power. Other elements of sovereignty include the ability to tax, print money, legislate laws, etc; elements of national power include economic, diplomatic, and informational power - The Rapier or The Club: The Relationship Between Attrition and Maneuver Warfare, by Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey A. Springman, United States Army, USAWC Strategy Research Project.

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RESTRICTED generations of warfare. A conclusion will be drawn basing on the study as to where exactly it fits into the theorem of the generations of warfare. Aim 8. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the generations of warfare by

distinguishing the concept of blending CW with the UCW with a view to examining the extent to which it fits into the theorem. The Generations of Warfare 9. The First Generation Warfare (1GW). 1GW was fought with line and

column tactics roughly from 1648 to 1860. It lasted until the time of the American Civil War. Today its importance for us is that the First Generation battlefield was usually a battlefield of order. Most of the things that distinguish "military" from "civilian, i.e. uniforms, saluting, careful gradations or ranks were products of the First Generation and were intended to reinforce the culture of order. 4 10. The Second Generation Warfare (2GW). 2GW was developed by the

French Army during and after World War I. 2GW is also called firepower and attrition warfare. The characteristics included centrally controlled indirect artillery fire, carefully synchronized with infantry, armoured and aviation, to destroy the enemy by killing his soldiers and blowing up his equipment. The French summarized 2GW with the phrase, The artillery conquers, the infantry occupies.5

4 5

4GW, FMFM1-A (US Army Field Manual), Draft 3 (revised), 10 Jun 2005, p 35. FMFM1-A, Loc Cit.

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RESTRICTED 11. The Third Generation Warfare (3GW). 3GW also called manoeuvre

warfare, was developed by the German Army during World War I and formalized in World War II. 3GW dealt with the disorderly battlefield not by trying to impose order on it but by adapting to disorder and taking advantage of it. 3GW relied less on firepower than on speed and tempo. The tactics was to get into the enemy's rear and collapse him from the rear, instead of "close with and destroy." The approach was bypass and collapse. It sought to present the enemy with unexpected and dangerous situations faster than he could cope with them, pulling him apart mentally as well as physically. The broad differences amongst these three generations of warfare are compiled in a table at Annex A.6 12. 4GW.The term 4GW came into use among military strategists and

planners in the late 1980s as a way to characterize the dynamics and future direction of warfare. The 4GW has evolved in ways that take advantage of the political, social, economic, and technical changes since World War II. It makes use of the advantages of those changes offered to an unconventional enemy.7 4GW are characterized by a blurring of the lines between war and politics, soldier and civilian, peace and conflict, battlefield and safe zone. Fourth Generation forces will be mostly irregular light infantry. Few Fourth Generation actors can afford anything else and Unconventional Forces UCF (irregulars) enjoy some important advantages over CF. UCF are difficult to target, especially with air power and artillery. They can avoid stronger but more heavily equipped opponents by using concealment and dispersal (often within the civil population).
Ibid, p 36. Thomas X. Hammes, Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation, Strategic Forum, No. 214, January 2005, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, p 2.
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RESTRICTED They can fight an endless war of raids and ambushes. Because irregulars operate within the population and are usually drawn from it, they can solicit and enjoy popular support. In the next diagram, it shows that the moral dimension is emphasized maximum in 4GW.8

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10

8 Attrition 6 Manouvre Moral 4

0 1GW 2GW 3GW 4GW

The Moral Dimension in Four Generations of Warfare

The Evolution of the 4GW

13.

The Psyche. One of the America's greatest military theorist, Air Force

Colonel John Boyd, said, When I was a young officer, I was taught that if you have air superiority, land superiority and sea superiority, you win. Well, in Vietnam we had air superiority, land superiority and sea superiority, but we lost.
William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightengale (USA), Captain John F. Schmitt (USMC), Colonel Joseph W. Sutton (USA), and Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson (USMCR), The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation, by Originally published in the Marine Corps Gazette, October 1989.pp22-26.
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RESTRICTED So I realized there is something more to it.9 If war was lone matter of might in terms of power consisting of advanced weapon system and technology then all wars would have been won by mighty nations only. However, the history says otherwise. Mighty nations also loose to weaker states. The weaker nations always are in search of that something more as mentioned by Colonel John Boyd. 14. 4GW is a Necessity for Weaker Nations. The prime objective of the fourth-

generation practitioner is to create political paralysis in target nation.10 4GW is the only kind the United States has ever lostand not just once, but three times. All major failed US uses of force since 1945in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia have been against materially weaker enemies.11 This form of warfare also defeated the French in Vietnam and Algeria and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. It continues to bleed Russia in Chechnya and the United States in Iraq, Afghanistan and other areas where it is engaged in the war. 12 To complicate matters, 4GW will incorporate elements of 1GW, 2GW and 3GW. a. Why Blending Conventional and UCF (Irregular)? (1) A nation that does not possess a large population or

industrial base will not, as a rule, possess durable forces even if it is a modern nation. It will be forced to rely either on the industrial capacity of other nations or will not have the manpower required to maintain durable forces competitive with the major powers. Such a
9

FMFM1-A, Loc Cit. G.I. Wilson, John P. Sullivan, and Hal Kempfer,Military.Com, September 8, 2003. Jeffrey Record, Why the Strong Lose, Parameters, winter 2005-2006.

10 11

12

Thomas X. Hammes, Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation, Strategic Forum, January 2005.

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RESTRICTED nation would probably lose a CW of attrition against a major power because of a lack of depth. In compound warfare,13 one of the antagonists maintains both a CF (regular force) and an UCF (irregular force). Countries like Bangladesh that do not possess a modern industrial base can not sustain forces during a war of attrition unless they can be guaranteed a steady stream of replacement equipment14. Our best opportunities will be to win a decisive battle or revert to attrition through UCW (irregular warfare). (2) The basic vulnerabilities of our country originate from the

lack of depth and the concept of blending CW with UCW intends to increase it by fighting with UCF from the beginning. That is, when CF will start fighting the battle in and around the international boundary, an UCF would operate along the rear of the invading force. Numerous and the non-linear actions by the UCF will overwhelm the Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence (C3I) of the invaders. This simultaneity of operations is termed as blending. b. Blending Conventional and UCF (Irregular) for a Protracted War.

Indirect defence via UCW (irregular warfare) is in most cases the only sensible strategy for the weaker side, because a direct defence is an
13

Dr. Thomas Huber, an instructor at the Combat Studies Institute, U. S. Army, Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Fort Leavenworth, raised the idea of compound warfare during the Evolution of Military Thought course, at CGSC in 1996/1997. The term refers to using both conventional and irregular forces in unison to gain victory.
14

Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey A. Springman, The Rapier or the Club: The Relationship between Attrition and Maneuver Warfare, Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, 15 March 2006.

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RESTRICTED invitation to swift defeat. The principal elements of UCW are protraction (prolonged warfare), attrition, and camouflage. The required protraction and attrition are dictated by the conventional enemys military superiority and sustainability. Because the weaker side has no hope of quick and decisive victory, it employs time( prolonged warfare) and the steady infliction of casualties (attrition) and other war costs to subvert the enemys political will to continue fighting. Protraction also requires willingness to trade space and resources for time, because attempted territorial defence plays to the conventional enemys superiority in firepower. Camouflage or the capacity to dissolve into the local population and terrain (natural and man-made), shields UCF from the potentially catastrophic consequences of the enemys firepower superiority and compels the enemy to inflict politically self-defeating collateral damage (killing unarmed people) on the civilian population.15

The liberation war of Bangladesh is a classic example where second, third and fourth generations played an effective role to end the war by only nine months. The superior strength of commitment thus compensated for military inferiority. The allied forces (both Freedom Fighters and Indian Forces) eroded the Pakistanis political will to continue the war and won despite having the opposing military force largely intact.

UCW: An Idea and Innovation of the 4GW

15

Jeffrey. Loc cit.

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RESTRICTED 15. The Concept of UCW. a. UCW is a general expression which designates all those resistance

activities conducted within the enemy's sphere of influence primarily utilizing indigenous personnel and resources of military, political, or economic objectives. The major components are guerrilla warfare and psychological warfare as it pertains to all phases of UCW. These resistance activities may be completely overt, completely covert, or something in between these two extremes, depending upon the effectiveness of the enemy's countermeasures.16 b. UCW forces are to be integrated with the conventional effort to be

effective. The CF will deploy in their area of responsibility as per the operational plan. As the battle develops, CF should be able to identify the main effort of the enemy and concentrate forces accordingly with strong mobile reserve. Different layers of defence to be prepared prior to initial engagement. While the UCF gradually cause attrition to enemy war potentials, the CF will engage the enemys major elements at the decisive time and place. d. Coordination is necessary between conventional and UCF in

aspects like: intelligence, security, guidance and augmentation of strength. This will facilitate to have synergistic effort and achieving a cumulative outcome on to enemy. The chain of command has to be clear an easily understood to avoid any duplication of actions.

Frank A. Gleason, Jr, Unconventional Forces - The Commander's Untapped Resources, Military Review, October 1959, p 25-31.
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RESTRICTED e. UCF need to decrease dependence on centralized logistics. In

Fourth Generation war, most engagements (light infantry combat) will occur at the company level or below. To achieve sufficient dispersion and to be able to react swiftly, the forces will require a high degree of ability to live off the land and the enemy. The dispersion of the battlefield "will require even the lowest level to operate flexibly on the basis of the commander's intent." 17 f. Mission oriented Command and Control, i.e. Auftragstaktik (Mission

Tactics) has to be adopted to be most effective. As enemy advances through friendly (own) territory, the engagement areas grow in size and at some stage he will find himself incapable of tackling his rear and front simultaneously. He will then have to give up his fight along the conventional front in favour of securing his rear. 16. The Objectives of UCW. a. To act as a force multiplier by operating with the CF (regular armed

forces) in major and minor actions. CW and UCW are to be regarded as single unified combined warfare for the attainment of same overall objective. b. To harass and weaken enemy vulnerabilities i.e. to engage and hit

the enemy from all the sides to confuse, bleed, attrite and slow down the enemy to gradually hit his centre of gravity. All efforts to be made to upset enemy time plan.

17

FMFM1-A, Opcit, p35.

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RESTRICTED c. To instigate a national action to regain the liberty of a country

threatened by the enemy. d. To defend the country as a last resort when the CF (regular armed

forces) have been depleted. e. The Areas to Put Emphasis to be Effective. (1) The maximum emphasis should be put to survive enemys

initial air strafing and then negate enemys air power. (2) The full use of urban and built-up area warfare (Fighting in

Build Up Area- FIBUA) must be done. Advanced military powers are still challenged by the problems of FIBUA. (3) Junior leaders are to be trained to carry out Mission Type

Orders. Maximum Initiative by the junior leaders is to be allowed and encouraged as long as they remain with in the broad diagram of commanders intent. The cumulative effects of innumerable small tactical initiatives can become a major factor in changing the overall military posture of enemy. (4) For the weaker state, using the UCF will produce the same

effect of manoeuvre. Therefore, the UCF should be light infantry and be able to operate independently. (5) The logistics are to be decentralised. Simultaneous

application of both conventional and unconventional method of warfare requires related logistic support system capable of meeting the demand of fluid battle condition. According to Lind and his co-

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RESTRICTED authors, a prominent aspect of 4GW is the: "decreasing dependence on centralized logistics. As the battlefield disperses and the organizational links are loosened, 4GW operatives will be increasingly responsible for procuring their own logistical

requirements.18 (6) The conventional logistic support system relies on better-

established line of communications and a set pattern of logistic train. Hence, the major drawback of conventional logistic support system is its inflexible nature and reliance on the central base for replenishment. Such a set pattern of logistic support system will be unable to provide necessary support to UCF. (7) Inflict maximum and continuous casualty on to enemy by

targeting the morale of the enemy forces and ultimately target the popular support of the enemy nation. Large-scale casualties will provoke his (enemy) population against the government. People will question government for the justification of sacrifice. For example, Indian Peacekeeping Force was forced to withdraw from Sri Lanka because of large-scale casualty. (8) Blending CW with UCW requires active support of the media

and an active psychological warfare should be launched side by

18

William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightengale (USA), Captain John F. Schmitt (USMC), Colonel Joseph W. Sutton (USA),and Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson (USMCR), The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation, p 24.

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RESTRICTED side. In reality, psychological warfare is part of the military operation and synchronized with all actions. The media must project the outcry of the civil population of the enemy state questioning the timacy of the aggression launched. It must also capitalize violations made by the enemy state disrespecting Laws of Armed Conflict.

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RESTRICTED
GOVERNMENT OF THE ENEMY NATION

Compel To Pull Out Force

Inflict Maximum Causality

Deprive enemy of the popular support

ATTACK MORALE DIMENSION ALWAYS

PEOPLE

MILITARY

OWNOWN ACTIONS ACTIONS AGAINST ENEMY

A Possible End State of 4GW: Through Blending CW with UCW

Conclusion

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RESTRICTED 17. The first generation of modern war was dominated by massed manpower

and culminated in the Napoleonic Wars. The second generation, which was quickly adopted by the worlds major powers, was dominated by firepower and ended in World War I. In relatively short order, during World War II the Germans introduced 3GW characterized by manoeuvre. This type of combat is still largely the focus of advanced forces.19 18. In broad terms, 4GW seems likely to be widely dispersed and largely

undefined where the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between "civilian" and "military" may disappear. 4GW is a form of warfare that uses all available networkspolitical, economic, social, and militaryto compel the enemys war planners to believe that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for them. The blending of CW with the UCW falls in the domain of 4GW. This concept believes that relative military power is hardly a reliable predictor of war outcomes.20 19. The 4GW introduced terms like: asymmetric warfare, compound warfare,

irregular warfare and blending CW with UCW and all these are a necessity for weaker nations. Blending CW with UCW is an innovation of 4GW that requires a concerted effort of all sections of society to evolve a plan and a devoted nation to prepare and execute those with commitment and determination. For both the

19

Thomas X. Hammes, 4th-generation Warfare: Our Enemies Play to Their Strengths, Armed

Forces Journal, November 2004, pp. 40-44.

20

Jeffrey, Loc Cit.

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RESTRICTED stronger and the weaker sides, the CW targets the enemys armed forces or capacity to fight, whereas the UCW seek to destroy the enemys will to fight.21 20. Bangladesh is a weak nation like the Vietnam had been against the USA

hence we are to find out that something more which compels the strong nations to lose despite having land, air and naval superiority. We have already started looking for it by adopting a modified war fighting doctrine that will compensate our quantitative inferiority, also negate enemy technological superiority by the qualitative approach of our army. Lessons Drawn and Recommendations 21. A weaker nation like us is likely to fight against a neighbour who is an

advanced and strong enemy, the aim must be to make the war costlier for the aggressor that they have calculated and planned for. The enemy will be brought to a culmination point and will be forced to abandon the invasion. This psyche should be absolutely made clear to all of our junior leaders so that they can take necessary initiative at their level to achieve the same goal. 22. Correct identification of enemy strategic centers of gravity will be highly

important. The main effort should be aimed at collapsing the enemy internally rather than physically destroying him. Through constant harassment and by inflicting casualty, the situation should be made as such that the aggressor looses his own population's support for the war. In all cases the "moral"

21

Ibid, P19.

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RESTRICTED dimension of war should be attacked to outweigh the numerical and technological superiority of the enemy.

MOHAMMAD ALAM TAREQUE Sept 2007 BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. 2. 3. The Operations of War, Volume 1 ,GSTP 0032, April 2006. 4GW, FMFM1-A, Draft 3 (revised), 10 Jun 2005. The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation, Marine Corps

Gazette, October 1989, William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightengale (USA), Captain John F. Schmitt (USMC), Colonel Joseph W. Sutton (USA), and Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson (USMCR), 4. 5. Why the Strong Lose, Parameter, Winter, 2005-2006, Jeffrey Record. Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation, Strategic

Forum, No. 214, January 2005, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, http://www.ndu.edu/inss, Thomas X. Hammes. 6. 7. 8. 9. Military.Com, 8 September 2003.G.I. Wilson, John P.Sullivan and Hal Unconventional Forces - The Commander's Untapped Resources, Military 4th-generation Warfare: Our Enemies Play to Their Strengths, Armed How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, International Kempfer. Review, October 1959, Frank A. Gleason, Jr. Forces Journal, November 2004,Thomas X. Hammes. Security, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001), 2001 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Ivan Arregun, Toft, , 19 RESTRICTED