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SpecPro Round 5 Digests

SpecPro Round 5 Digests

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Published by cmv mendoza
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Published by: cmv mendoza on Jan 02, 2012
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G.R. No. L-63345GUTIERREZ, JR; Jan 30, 1986
- Efren C. Moncupa, together with others, wasarrested on April 22, 1982, 10:50 P.M., at QuezonAvenue, QC. He was detained at MIG-15 CampBago Bantay. Next day, Apr 23, on the allegationthat he was a National Democratic Front (NDF)staff member, a Presidential Commitment Order(PCO) was issued against him and 8 otherpersons.- After two separate investigations, it wasascertained that Moncupa was not a member of any subversive organization. Both investigatorsrecommended the prosecution of Moncupa onlyfor illegal possession of firearms and illegalpossession of subversive documents under PD33.- Two separate informations were filed againstMoncupa, one for illegal possession of firearmsbefore CFI Rizal, and the other for violation of P.D.33 before the City Court of QC. Against the otheraccused, however, the cases filed were forviolation of P.D. 885 as amended.- Moncupa was excluded from the charge underthe Revised Anti-Subversion Law. During thependency of this petition, his arraignment andfurther proceedings have not been pursued. Ashis motions for bail were denied by the lowercourt, Moncupa filed this petition for habeascorpus.- Respondents, in their return of the writ, justifiedthe validity of Moncupa’s detention on the groundthat the privilege of the writ had been suspendedas to Moncupa.- However, on Aug 30, 1983, respondents filed amotion to dismiss stating that on May 11, 1983,Moncupa was temporarily released fromdetention on orders of the Minister of NationalDefense with the approval of the President, andthat “since the petitioner is free and no longerunder the custody of the respondents, thepetition… may be deemed moot and academic...”- It should be noted that attached to Moncupa'stemporary release are restrictions imposed onhim:1) His freedom of movement is curtailed by thecondition that Moncupa gets the approval of respondents for any travel outside Metro Manila.2) His liberty of abode is restricted because priorapproval of respondents is also required in casehe wants to change his place of residence.3) His freedom of speech is muffled by theprohibition that he should not "participate in anyinterview conducted by any local or foreign massmedia representatives nor give any press releaseor information that is inimical to the interest of national security."4) He is required to report regularly torespondents or their representatives.- Moncupa argues that although admittedly histemporary release is an improvement upon hisactual detention, the restrictions imposed by therespondents constitute an involuntary and illegalrestraint on his freedom, and his temporaryrelease "merely shifted the inquiry from thelegality of his actual detention to the legality of the conditions imposed by the respondents."
WON the petition has become moot andacademic in view of Moncupa's temporaryrelease.
A release that renders a petition for a writof habeas corpus moot and academic must beone which is free from involuntary restraints.Where a person continues to be unlawfully deniedone or more of his constitutional freedoms, wherethere is present a denial of due process, wherethe restraints are not merely involuntary butappear to be unnecessary, and where adeprivation of freedom originally valid has, in thelight of subsequent developments, becomearbitrary, the person concerned or those applyingin his behalf may still avail themselves of theprivilege of the writ.- Moncupa may have been released from hisdetention cell, but the restraints attached to histemporary release preclude freedom of action. The reservations of the military in the form of restrictions constitute restraints on his liberty,and limit his freedom of movement. It is notphysical restraint alone which is inquired into bythe writ of habeas corpus. The latitudinarianscope of the writ of habeas-corpus, as held in
Villavicencio v Lukban
, has, in law, remainedundiminished up to the present.-
Villavicencio v. Lukban:
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus isrestraint of liberty. The essential object andpurpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquireinto all manner of involuntary restraint asdistinguished from voluntary, and to relieve aperson therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Anyrestraint which will preclude freedom of action issufficient....-
Caunca v. Salazar 
: (case involving employmentagencies restricting freedom of movement of prospective employees/maids) …Freedom may belost due to external moral compulsion, to foundedor groundless fear, to erroneous belief in theexistence of the will. If the actual effect of suchpsychological spell is to place a person at themercy of another, the victim is entitled to theprotection of courts of justice as much as theindividual who is illegally deprived of liberty bydeprived or physical coercion.-
Toyoto, et al v. Hon. Fidel Ramos, et al.:
Ordinarily, a petition for habeas corpus becomesmoot and academic when the restraint on theliberty of the petitioners is lifted eithertemporarily or permanently…. The question to beresolved is whether the State can reserve thepower to re-arrest a person for an offense after acourt of competent jurisdiction has absolved himof the offense. An affirmative answer… (on theground that) the release… being merely'temporary', it follows that they can be re-arrested at anytime despite their acquittal… isrepugnant to the government of laws and not of men principle. Under this principle the moment aperson is acquitted on a criminal charge he canno longer be detained or re-arrested for the sameoffense.
Petition granted. The conditionsattached to the temporary release of Moncupaare declared null and void. The temporary releaseis declared absolute.
24 SCRA 663 (1968)Habeas Corpus as remedy in cases of violation of the right against self-incrimination.
Roger Chavez, Actor Ricardo Sumilang, Edgardo“Ging” Pascual, Pedro Rebullo, Luis “Baby” Asistioand Lorenzo Meneses and three John Does wereaccused of car napping a Thunderbird car form Johnson Lee.
 The prosecution failed to prove conspiracy andacquitted all of the accused except for RogerChavez. He was found guilty of qualified theft. Hisguilt was proven basing heavily on his testimonywhen he was called as witness in the proceedingsin the trial court by the prosecution on the firstday of trial for which he stated that he will nottestify. The Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal andthe related MR.Chavez now comes to the Supreme Court allegingthat he was forced to testify against himself.
Whether or not the remedy of the writ habeascorpus is available.
 Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that clearly Chavezprotested against being asked to be presented aswitness. The Court also ruled that there was nowaiver of his right against self-incrimination.On the issue of the propriety of the writ the Courtstated:“The course which the petitioner takes is correct.Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It istraditionally considered as an exceptional remedyto release a person whose liberty is illegallyrestrained such as when the accused'sconstitutional rights are discarded. Such defectresults in the absence or loss of jurisdiction andtherefore invalidates the trial and the consequentconviction of the accused whose fundamentalright is violated. The void judgment of convictionmay be challenged by collateral attack, whichprecisely is the function of habeas corpus. Thewrit may issues even if another remedy which isless effective may be availed of by the defendant. Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appealbefore the Court of Appeals does not preclude arecourse to the writ. The writ may be grantedupon a judgment already final.”Roger Chavez is ordered released.
37 SCRA 420 (1971) The SC ruled that the 5 petitioners who continuedto languish in jail could avail of habeas corpus toquestion the legality of their continued detentionpursuant to the ruling in People v. Hernandez.
1. Petitioner Mario Gumabon, afterpleading guilty, was sentenced to suffer
reclusion perpetua
for the complex crime of rebellion withmultiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping.Petitioners Gaudencio Agapito, Paterno Palmaresand Epifanio Padua, likewise pleaded guilty to thecomplex crime of rebellion with multiple murderand other offenses, and were similarly made tosuffer the same penalty in decisions rendered. The last petitioner, Blas Bagolbagol, stood trialalso for the complex crime of rebellion withmultiple murder and other offenses and penalizedwith
reclusion perpetua
. Each of them has servedmore than 13 years.2. The other accused, however, appealed theirconviction, resulting in a new ruling in People v.Hernandez to the effect that there can be nocomplex crime of rebellion with homicide, rape,etc., for these common crimes are absorbed byrebellion. As a result, while those who appealedwere now free, those who did not remained in jail.3. Petitioners now premise their stand on thedenial of equal protection if their plea would notbe granted. They also invoke the codal provisionthat judicial decisions shall form part of the legalsystem of the Philippines, necessarily resulting inthe conclusion that the Hernandez decision oncepromulgated calls for a retroactive effect underthe explicit mandate of the Revised Penal CodeArt. 22 as to penal laws having such charactereven if at the time of their application a finalsentence has been rendered and the convict isserving the same.
s the writ of habeas corpus available under thecircumstances?
 Yes.RATIO:1. The write of habeas corpus is the writ of liberty, "the most important human rightsprovision" in the fundamental law, and one of theprincipal safeguards to personal liberty. In
Villavicencio v. Lukban
, the remedy challengedthe validity of the order of the then respondentMayor of Manila who, for the best of reasons butwithout legal justification, ordered thetransportation of more than 150 inmates of houses of ill-repute to Davao. In the opinion of  Justice Malcolm: The essential object and purposeof the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into allmanner of involuntary restraint as distinguishedfrom voluntary, and to relieve a person therefromif such restraint is illegal. ANY restraint which willpreclude freedom of action is SUFFICIENT.2. Range of inquiry in a habeas corpusproceeding: No writ if person is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court ormagistrate.3. Once a deprivation of a constitutional right isshown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction andhabeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assailthe legality of the detention.4. Petitioners precisely assert a deprivation of aconstitutional right, namely, the denial of equalprotection. In the case at bar, the petitionerswere convicted for the very same rebellion forwhich Hernandez, Geronimo, and others wereconvicted. Contrary to the mandate of equalprotection, people similarly situated were notsimilarly dealt with. What is required under thisrequired constitutional guarantee is the uniformoperation of legal norms so that all persons undersimilar circumstances would be accorded thesame treatment both in the privileges conferredand the liabilities imposed.5. The continued incarceration after the twelve-year period when such is the maximum length of imprisonment in accordance with our controllingdoctrine, when others similarly convicted havebeen freed, is fraught with implications at warwith equal protection. Teehankee, concurring and dissenting: The rule of prospective and non-retroactiveoperation of judicial doctrines, and its corollaryrule of the law of the case, have no applicationhere. Here, the whole question turns simply onthe nature of the crime of rebellion as defined insection 134 of the Revised Penal Code and themaximum penalty imposable therefor undersection 135 of the same Code. The case at barpresents a clear case of an excess in penaltyimposed beyond twelve years of 
 prision mayor 
which has become illegal by virtue of this Court'ssettled doctrine that the crime of rebellion cannotbe complexed with other common crimes. On this
ground, a crime that the law at the time of theirconviction as well as now punishes only with
 prision mayor 
which they have more than fullyserved, would be to deny them theirconstitutional rights of due process and equalprotection of the law. 
September 23, 1994; KAPUNAN, J.
- Respondent Lt. Col. Marcelino Malajacan wasarrested in connection with the December 1989coup attempt.- He was brought to the ISG Detention Center inFort Bonifacio, Makati where he was detained fornine months without charges.- A charge sheet was filed against privaterespondent by the office of the Judge AdvocateGeneral alleging violations of the 67th, 94th and97th Articles of War for Mutiny, Murder andConduct Unbecoming an Officer and aGentleman, respectively.- A petition for habeas corpus was filed by theprivate respondent with the Court of Appeals onMarch 7, 1991 which was, however, dismissed bythe said court's Fourth Division on the groundthat pre-trial investigation for the charges againstthe respondent was already ongoing before a Pre- Trial and Investigative (PTI) Panel of the JudgeAdvocate General's Office (JAGO).- Three months after these charges were filed,the Pre-Trial Investigative Panel came out with aResolution finding no evidence of directparticipation by the private respondent in theDecember 1989 coup.- Said panel nonetheless recommended thatrespondent be charged with violation of Article136 of the Revised Penal Code (Conspiracy andProposal to Commit Rebellion or Insurrection) andthe 96th Article of War in relation to the 94thArticle of War.- Consequently, all existing charges againstrespondent were dismissed and a new charge forviolation of Article of War No. 96 for ConductUnbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman forhaving allegedly been involved in a series of conferences with other military officers for thepurpose of overthrowing the government,carrying with it the penalty of dismissal fromservice was filed with the General Court Martial(GCM) No. 8.- Additionally, the Judge Advocate General'sOffice endorsed the filing of charges for violationof Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code to theQuezon City Prosecutor's Office. The CityProsecutor eventually came out with a resolutiondismissing the charges.- Upon private respondent's arraignment (andbefore entering his plea) in General Court MartialNo. 8 for violation of the 96th Article of War,private respondent entered a special motion todismiss the case on grounds of prescription underAW 38. The private respondent contended thatthe offense was supposed to have beencommitted between August to November, 1989,more than two years before his arraignment onApril 22, 1992.- Favorably resolving the motion to dismiss forbeing "substantial . . . meritorious and legallytenable," the General Court Martial dropped thelast remaining charge against private respondent.- The Assistant Trial Judge Advocate submitted areport to the Chief of Staff quoting the Resolutionof GCM No. 8 for "info/notation".- Respondent filed a second petition for habeascorpus before the Court of Appeals where heassailed his continued detention at the ISGDetention Center in spite of the dismissal of allcharges against him. He contended that hiscontinued confinement under the circumstancesamounted to an "illegal restraint of liberty"correctable only by the court's "issuance of thehigh prerogative writ of habeas corpus."- The 12th Division of the Court of Appealsordered petitioners Lt. General Lisandro Abadia,Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of thePhilippines and Maj. General Arturo Enrile,Commanding General of the Philippine Army "(t)oproduce the person of Lt. Col. Marcelino Q.Malajacan" and to show lawful cause for thelatter's continued detention.- 12th Division of CA promulgated the questioneddecision issuing a writ of habeas corpus andcommanding herein petitioners to release theprivate respondent.- Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari
WON the Resolution of the 12th Division of CAcontravenes a previous decision by a co-equalbody, the Special 4th Division of the Court of Appeals which dismissed respondent's petition forhabeas corpus.
- NO. The factual circumstances surroundingboth decisions are different.- First, at the time of the first petition, the privaterespondent was being held in the detentioncenter for eleven months without charges beingfiled against him. The pre-trial investigative panelhad not yet been constituted. Because of hisconfinement without charges, a petition for theissuance of the writ of habeas corpus was filed inhis behalf on the basis of respondent's avermentthat his arrest and continued detention withoutcharges violated his constitutional rights.- The Fourth Division found adequate supportupholding military jurisdiction over the case of the private respondent under the Articles of War.It also noted that the case against the privaterespondent was ongoing and that it would bedifficult to order respondent's release on a writ of habeas corpus without giving military authoritiesreasonable time within which to investigate andtry the case. The Court nonetheless urged theChief of Staff to act on the petitioner's case "withall deliberate speed, consistent with hisconstitutional right to a speedy disposition of hiscase."- Second, by the time the subsequent petition forhabeas corpus was before the court's TwelfthDivision (herein respondent court), the JAGO'sPre-trial Investigative Panel had dismissed allcases against the petitioner and endorsed thefiling of charges (under Article 136 of the RevisedPenal Code) with the Quezon City Prosecutor'sOffice. The latter subsequently dismissed thecase.- Moreover at the time the Twelfth Divisionrendered its assailed decision, respondent wasalready languishing in a military detention centerfor three years, half of those spent in the limbobetween the GCM's decision dismissing the casesfiled against him and the uncertainty of when themilitary appellate process would finally comearound in either exonerating him or overturningthe GCM's findings. This in spite of the fact thateven during the first petition before the FourthDivision, the court had already urged speedydisposition of the case.- Finally, in dismissing the cases against theprivate respondent, the General Court Martial hadmade a determination that the charges againstrespondent had prescribed under Article 38 of theArticles of War. Conformably with this conclusionand with this Court's ruling in Domingo vs

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