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SpecPro Round 6 Digests

SpecPro Round 6 Digests

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51 Phil 507STREET; 1928
- Hacienda Rosario was owned by EscolasticoSinco, who was married to Saturnina Lopez. Theyhad 3 children, Sergio, Maria Paz, and Coloma.Coloma had 3 children of her own, Vicente, Pilar,and Desemparados. Coloma’s children are theplaintiffs in this case.- When Escolastico died, his estate was indebtedfor P14k. In order to pay for this, Saturnina andtheir children leased the hacienda for 7 years toLonga & his sister-in-law (Longa). The leaseagreement was such that the lessees wouldassume the indebtedness and the rentals wouldbe applied to the payment of the estate’s debts. The lease was extended for 2 years.- Coloma predeceased Saturnina. When Saturninadied, she left a will acknowledging theencumbrance of the hacienda. Sergio and MariaPaz tried to question the right of Coloma’schildren (plaintiffs) to inherit, but the oppositionwas abandoned (kasi medyo obvious diba).- After Saturnina’s death, Sergio was hard-pressed for money to sustain his huge family, sohe offered to sell his 1/3 undivided share in thehacienda to Longa. Longa wanted to buy thewhole property because he was trying to borrowmoney from the Tabacalera Company to pay thepurchase price of the hacienda and the companywasn’t secure in having a 1/3 undivided share assecurity for the loan. Maria Paz got on board. They sold their undivided shares to Longa. Sowhat was left to sell was the share of Coloma’schildren, who at that time were all minors underthe guardianship of Emilio Tevez, which couldn’tbe sold without court approval.- Before the approval of the court to sell, uncleand auntie executed a document, guaranteeingto Longa that (1) they will not take back their 2/3,regardless of the decision of the court; and (2)they will not oppose the sale of the children’sshare, once approved by the court.- The court approved the sale. And so thechildren’s share was sold to Longa. The childrenbrought a case, questioning the regularity of thesale of their property.
WON the sale of the property of the minors wasattended with fraud (of Longa).
NO.- In passing upon controversies of this characterexperience teaches the danger of acceptinglightly charges of fraud made many years afterthe transaction in question was accomplished,when death may have sealed the lips of theprincipal actors and changes effected by timemay have given a totally different color to thecause of controversy. In the case before us theguardian, Emilio Tevez, is dead. The same is trueof Trinidad Diago, mother of the defendantAgueda Longa; while Agapito Longa is now livingin Spain. It will be borne in mind also that, in sofar as oral proof is concerned, the charge of fraudrests principally of the testimony of a singlewitness who, if fraud was committed, was aparticipant therein and who naturally would nowbe anxious so far as practicable, to put the blameon others. In this connection it is well to bear inmind the following impressive language of Mr. Justice Story:xxx But length of time necessarily obscures allhuman evidence; and as it thus removes from theparties all the immediate means to verify thenature of the original transactions, it operates byway of presumption, in favor of innocence, andagainst imputation of fraud. It would beunreasonable, after a great length of time, torequire exact proof of all the minutecircumstances of any transaction, or to expect asatisfactory explanation of every difficulty, real orapparent, with which it may be incumbered. Themost that can fairly be expected, in such cases, if the parties are living, from the frailty of memory,and human infirmity, is that the material factscan be given with certainty to a common intent;and, if the parties are dead, and the cases rest inconfidence, and in parol agreements the mostthat we can hope is to arrive at probableconjectures, and to substitute generalpresumptions of law, for exact knowledge. Fraud,or breach of trust, ought not lightly to be imputedto the living; for, the legal presumption is theother way; and as to the dead, who are not hereto answer for themselves, it would be the heightof injustice and cruelty, to disturb their ashes,and violate the sanctity of the grave, unless theevidence of fraud be clear, beyond a reasonabledoubt. (Prevost
. Gratz, 6 Wheat. [U. S.], 481,498.)- The attorneys for the appellees criticize theorder of the court of November 16, 1910,authorizing the sale of the share of the minors inthe
as irregular and beyond the jurisdiction of the court. We are unable to concurin this view. The petition presented by theguardian stated a case, we think, for a sale of aportion of the guardianship estate forreinvestment, as contemplated in section 569 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the petition it wasclearly set forth that the income of the children'sproperty was insufficient property to maintainand educate them and that it was for their benefitthat their share should be sold. It was also thereinstated that the property was encumbered.Admitting that these statements of the petitionwere untrue the jurisdiction of the court toauthorize the sale was not thereby affected,because the jurisdiction of the court rests on theaverments of the petition and not upon the truthof those averments. The suggestion that theorder was irregular and beyond the jurisdiction of the court because publication was not made overthe whole period required by law losses its forcein view of the fact that the next of kin of theminors are stated in the order to have personallyappeared in court.* The court here said that the minors here werereally in a dangerous position since no oneintervened in the sale who was really looking outfor the minors’ interests. Uncle and Auntie wereprotecting theirs. Even the guardian was after thecash that would be realized from the sale to applyto his own uses, instead of reinvesting it.Especially considering that the minors were not indire need of the proceeds as was reflected in thepetition for the authorization to sell. They hadsufficient properties aside from the 1/3 share inthe hacienda to support them (as evidenced bythe fact that they got by without even using theproceeds kasi nga kinuha ni Tevez). Tsk tsk tsk.
7 SCRA 894PAREDES; April 30, 1963APPLE
-This is an application for the registration of aresidential land, with a house, containing an area
of 465 square meters, situated in Iriga,Camarines Sur, by Jose Margate, who claims tohave purchased the property from Julia Rabacalfor P4,000.00.-Rabacal and her minor children opposed theapplication, on the ground that the property wasunder guardianship proceedings when sold; thatthe
sale was not authorized by the court 
;that the purchase price of P4,000.00 was not fullypaid, as there was a remaining balance of P500.00 and that the market price of the lot andhouse was P10,000.00.-After due hearing, the registration courtconfirmed the title of the applicant, and orderedthat the same be registered in the name of Margate-Oppositors appealed to the Court of Appealswhich certified the case to SC stating that theissues involved are purely legal in character.
**(facts as found by trial court)
-the parcel of land and house, was owned by Dr. Julio Berina, who died on October 15, 1945,survived by his widow, Julia Rabacal, and hisminor children, the oppositors herein.-Rabacal was appointed guardian of her minorchildren and letters of guardianship was issued inher favor. She filed a petition alleging that it wasnecessary to sell parcel 4 of the inventory, inorder to defray the expenses in the prosecutionof Civil Case No. 919 and for the support andeducation of the wards. This petition wasapproved by the court, authorizing the guardianto sell the residential lot and its improvements.-Rabacal offered to sell to Margate the residentiallot in question, for P5,000.00. After negotiations,the parties agreed on the selling price of P4,000.00. After the agreement, Rabacal begangetting money from Margate, such that whenRabacal secured the authority to sell from thecourt, she had already obtained from Margate thesum of P500.00, and after having secured theorder of authority to sell, Rabacal showed toMargate a copy of the order. On May 27, 1948, adeed of sale was executed by Julia Rabacal,acknowledged before a Notary Public, selling theland in question to Margate for P4,000.00, onwhich date Margate paid the balance of P3,500.00 to Rabacal.-
Notwithstanding the fact that Rabacal had sold parcel 4 of the inventory, and executed a deed of sale on May 27, 1948, Rabacal, inthe guardianship proceedings, asserted that despite her efforts, she was unable tofind a buyer for said parcel of land, leadingthe court to cancel the granted authority tosell 
WON the sale of the land to Margate was valid
 Yes.-Appellants argue that the deed of sale executedby Rabacal had no binding effect because theauthority to sell was cancelled and the sale wasnot approved by the guardianship Court.-the cancellation of the authority to sell did not,and could not, affect, the rights of the buyer,because at the time that the order cancelling theauthority to sell was entered, the guardian, JuliaRabacal, had already acted in accordance withauthority, and sold the land to Jose F. Margate.-The authority of the Court had already beenexhausted, after it was fulfilled by the guardian,and there was nothing to cancel.-Moreover, the cancellation of the order to sellwas entered by the Court due to the deception of the guardian. If the court had been informed of the sale, the court would certainly not haverevoked the authority.-Moreover, the revocation was entered withoutnotice to the purchaser Jose F. Margate-With respect to the lack of approval of the saleby the court, the law merely requires that theguardian should be authorized, and that theauthority to sell did not impose the condition thatthe deed of sale executed by the guardian shouldbe approved by the Court. The approval of thesale by the court, under the facts andcircumstances obtaining in this case, would thenbe merely pro-forma, since the appellants werenot able to show any reason why theguardianship would have refused to approve thesale which was already a fait accompli and withinthe authority given by said court.-Being the petitioners-vendors, appellants cannotvalidly attack the proceedings had in the sale, oncertain formal technicalities, considering the factthat they were the very persons who requested,obliged and prayed the court in the guardianshipproceedings to approve the said sale, and thatthey had derived the utmost advantage andbenefit out of the proceeds thereof.
ROMUALDEZ; November 21, 1923ATHE
Appeal from the judgments of the CFI of Manila
- Galo Lichauco, Geronimo Jose as guardian of thespendthrift Zacarias Lichauco, and Amparo N. Jose as guardian of the minors Luis and JulitaLichauco entered into a contract of lease of landwith Tan Pho in his capacity “as general atorney-in-fact of Tan-U, widow of the late Chua Piengco,and administrator of all of the property of thelatter’s heirs.” The contract of lease provided forthe erection of a building of strong materials forthe period of twenty years, from the date of theexecution of the contract, for the price or rent of P1,560 monthly. Upon the termination of theperiod of the lease, all the improvements orbuildings constructed on the leased land shallbecome the property of the owners of the land,without the lessee being entitled to payment orcompensation of any kind, either by reason of said building or by the improvements on the land.- At the time the contract of case was executed,the owners of this and were: Galo Lichauco, of one-third
pro indiviso
; Zacarias Lichauco, at thattime incapacitated, of another one-third
; and Luis Lichauco then a minor and JulitaLichauco also at that time and still a minorcoowners of the remaining one-third part
.- Faustino Lichauco, the new guardian
ad litem
both of the minors Luis and Julita Lichauco, and of the incapacitated Zacarias Lichauco, filed a caseagainst the lessee Tan Pho, his principal Tan U(
Tan O), the children of the latter andagainst Galo Lichauco one of the lessors. In saidcase, the Court of First Instance of Manilarendered judgment finding, among other things,that said contract of lease is valid. From this judgment plaintiff appealed. Faustino assailed thecontract as void raising the following issues:
1. WON the contract of lease is valida. WON the guardians of the incapacitatedperson and of the minors could not execute itb. WON the contract was not, and could nothave been authorized by the court;
c. WON Tan Pho had no power to enter intoit.2. WON the registration of the said lease in theregistry is final and conclusive.
1. NO. That the contract of lease is void asregards the plaintiffs, and the effects of thisdeclaration of partial nullity retroacts toSeptember 17, 1920, the date on which thecomplaint for nullity was presented.a. YES. Article 1548 of the Civil Code providesthat “No lease for a term of more than six yearsshall be made by the husband with respectto the property of his wife, by the father withrespect to that of his children, by the guardianwith respect to that of his ward, or by a managerin default of special power with respect to theproperty entrusted to him for management.”
- The lease was for a period greater than sixyears and the respective guardians of theincapacitated Zacarias Lichauco and the minorsLuis and Julita Lichauco lacked the special powerrequired by this legal provision.b. Although the lease in question could beapproved by the court, nevertheless, suchapproval was neither obtained in due time, norsubsequently.
- There was an allegation that Amparo Nableverbally requested the presiding Judge Crossfieldto execute said lease. Judge Crossfield alsoexecuted an affidavit stating that he approved of the lease, in the presence and with the completeapproval of all the parties interested and heordered that clerk to prepare orders for entry inthe record. However, F. Canillas, the deputy clerkdenied that Crossfield ordered him to prepareorders for entry in the record nor did the judgegive him any orders or instructions with referenceto the approval of the lease. Thus, the allegedapproval signed by Judge Crossfield was notattached to the court records of the case, nor didever form part thereof. Consequently, theapprobatory
nunc pro tunc
order impliedly
 The office of a judgment
nunc pro tunc
is to recordsome act of the court done at a former time which wasnot then carried into the record, and the power of acourt to make such entries is restricted to placing upon
entered in the judgment appealed from, is invalidon account of having been entered without asufficient legal basis therefor.c. NO. If Tan Pho was the administrator of theestate of Chua Piengco, then he had the power tomanage to manage the property of said estate. The employment of funds of the latter for theconstruction of a building on leased land, for thepurpose of obtaining rents from such building isan investment of capital which may beconsidered as included in the powers of anadministrator of a decedent's estate. We cannotforce ourselves to believe that, in view of thefacts of the case, Tan Pho took part in this leaseas direct attorney-in-fact of the heirs of thedeceased Chua Piengco. If at the time, the estatehad not been partitioned, as it appears in thecase, such heirs had as yet no hereditaryproperty to dispose of, nor to answer for theiracts, seeing that the estate was legally in thehands of the administrator.2. NO.
the record evidence of judicial action which has beenactually taken. It may be used to make the record speakthe truth, but not to make it speak what it did not speakbut ought to have spoken. If the court has not rendereda judgment that it might or should have rendered, or if ithas rendered an imperfect or improper judgment, it hasno power to remedy these errors or omissions byordering the entry
nunc pro tunc
of a proper judgment.Hence a court in entering a judgment nunc tunc has nopower to construe what the judgment means, but only toenter of record such judgment as had been formerlyrendered, but which had not been entered of record asrendered. In all cases the exercise of the power to enter judgments
nunc pro tunc
presupposes the actualrendition of a judgment, and a mere right to a judgmentwill not furnish the basis for such an entry. (15 R. C. L.,pp. 622-623.) The phrase
nunc pro tunc
signifies "now for then,"or that a thing is done now that shall have the samelegal force and effect as if one at the time it ought tohave been done. A court may order an act done
nunc pro tunc
when it, or some one of its immediateministerial officers, has done some act which for somereason has not been entered of record or otherwisenoted at the time the order or judgment was made orshould have been made to appear on the papers orproceedings by the ministerial officer. (Secou
Leroux,1 N. M., 383, 389.)
the judgment appealed from isreversed and it is hereby declared and ordered:1. That the contract of lease here in questionexecuted by Galo Lichauco and the respectiveguardians of Zacarias Lichauco and the minorsLuis and Julita Lichauco on the one side, and by Tan Pho on the other, is void as regards theplaintiffs, and the effects of this declaration of partial nullity retroacts to September 17, 1920,the date on which the complaint for nullity waspresented.2. Without prejudice to any contract or contractswhich the interested parties herein may desire toexecute in accordance with the law and inharmony with this opinion, the plaintiffs, from thetime Tan Pho is notified of this decision, shall beentitled to appropriate two-thirds part
of the buildings and improvementsconstructed by the party represented by said TanPho on the property in question, upon payment of the proper indemnity, according to the provisionsof articles 361, 453, and 454 of the Civil Code inforce or said plaintiffs shall have the right tocompel the party represented by the defendant Tan Pho to pay to the plaintiffs the value of two-thirds
pro indiviso
of the land.3. The plaintiffs shall be entitled to demand andto receive from the party represented by thedefendant Tan Pho a rental for the occupation of two-thirds part
pro indiviso
of the land, fromSeptember 17, 1920, until said two-thirds part
 pro indiviso
of the buildings and improvementsconstructed by said Tan Pho becomes theproperty of the plaintiffs, as aforesaid, or until thetwo-thirds part
pro indiviso
of the land belongingto the plaintiffs becomes the property of theparty represented by said Tan Pho in the mannerspecified in the preceding paragraph. The amountof this rental mentioned in this paragraph shall befixed by the interested parties, reserving themthe right to resort to the courts for itsdetermination, in case they cannot reach anagreement; provide that the rents, which byvirtue of the lease in question the plaintiffs mayhave received or may receive from Tan Pho fromSeptember 17, 1920, shall be applied upon saidrent to be agreed upon by the interested partiesor judicially fixed.4. The registrar of deeds of Manila is herebyordered to amend the certificate of title to theland in question issued under decree No. 17729in registration proceeding No. 9667, as also thecorresponding books of registry, as well as the

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