Welcome to Scribd, the world's digital library. Read, publish, and share books and documents. See more
Download
Standard view
Full view
of .
Look up keyword
Like this
2Activity
0 of .
Results for:
No results containing your search query
P. 1
Achieving System Safety by Resilience Engineering IET_System_Safety_Hollnagel

Achieving System Safety by Resilience Engineering IET_System_Safety_Hollnagel

Ratings: (0)|Views: 114|Likes:
Published by stanchell

More info:

Published by: stanchell on Jan 02, 2012
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial

Availability:

Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.
download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
See more
See less

11/16/2012

pdf

text

original

 
1
©Erik Hollnagel 2006
Achieving System Safety byResilience Engineering
Erik HollnagelIndustrial Safety Chair, Écoledes Mines de Paris, FranceE-mail: erik.hollnagel@cindy.ensmp.fr
Professor, University of Linköping, SwedenE-mail: eriho@ida.liu.se
©Erik Hollnagel 2006
Accidents, incidents
Safety as a non-event
Dailyoperation(Status quo)Unwanted outcomenexpected eventPrevention ofunwanted eventsProtection againstunwanted outcomesSAFE SYSTEM = NOTHING UNWANTED HAPPENSReducelikelihood.Reduceconsequences.Safety management must prevent/protect against both KNOWN and UNKNOWN risks.Safety management requires THINKING about how accidents can HAPPEN
 
2
©Erik Hollnagel 2006
Looking into the futureooking at the past
What has happened? What may happen?
Accident modelSimple linearComplex linearNon-linear*
* outcomes are not proportional toinputs, and cannot be derived froma simple combination of inputs
Risk modelComponent failuresCombination of failuresand degraded defencesPerformance variabilitycoincidences
©Erik Hollnagel 2006
Simple, linear cause-effect model
Assumption: Accidents are the (natural) culmination of aseries of eventsor circumstances, which occur in a specific and recognisable order.Consequence:Accidents are prevented by finding andeliminatingpossible causes.Safety is ensured by improving the organisation’s ability torespond.
Domino model (Heinrich, 1930)
Hazards-risks:Due tocomponentfailures(technical, human, organisational), hence looking forfailure probabilities (event tree, PRA/HRA).

You're Reading a Free Preview

Download
scribd
/*********** DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! ************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code)//-->