1/9/12 12:30 AMStirner and Foucault: Toward a Post-Kantian FreedomPage 3 of 22file:///Users/libermay/Downloads/Moshe-Elhanati-Thinking-Anarchism%202/007d-Stirner_and_Foucault_Toward_a_Post-Kantian_Freedom.htm
the maxims of the choice are comprehended in the samevolition as a universal law" (59). It would appear that thereis a central paradox in this idea of freedom--
you are freeto choose as long as you make the right choice, as long as you choose universal moral maxims.
However, for Kantthere is no contradiction here because, although adherenceto moral laws is a duty and an absolute imperative, it isstill a duty that is freely chosen by the individual. Morallaws are rationally established, and because freedom canonly be exercised by rational individuals, they willnecessarily, yet freely, choose to obey these moral laws. Inother words, an action is free only insofar as it conforms tomoral and rational imperatives--otherwise it ispathological and therefore "unfree." In this way, freedomand the categorical imperative are not antagonistic but,rather, mutually dependent concepts. Individual autonomy,for Kant, is the very basis of moral laws.
But that the principle of autonomy[...] is the sole principle of moralscan be readily shown by mere analysisof concepts of morality; for by thisanalysis we find that its principle must be a categorical imperative, andthat [the imperative] commands neither more nor less than this very autonomy.(59)
The Authoritarian Obverse
4. Nevertheless, it would seem that there is a hiddenauthoritarianism in Kant's formulation of freedom. Whilethe individual is free to act in accordance with the dictatesof his own reason, he must nevertheless obey universalmoral maxims. Kant's moral philosophy is a philosophy of the law. That is why Jacques Lacan was able to diagnose ahidden
--or enjoyment in excess of the law--thatattached itself to Kant's categorical imperative. Accordingto Lacan, Sade is the necessary counterpart to Kant--theperverse pleasure that attaches itself to the law becomes,in the Sadeian universe, the law of pleasure.
The thingthat binds Kantian freedom to the law is its attachment toan absolute rationality. It is precisely because freedommust be exercised rationally that the individual finds himor herself dutifully obeying rationally founded universalmoral laws.5. However, both Foucault and Stirner have called intoquestion such universal rational and moral categories,which are central to Enlightenment thought. They contendthat absolute categories of morality and rationalitysanction various forms of domination and exclusion and