eK. WHY I SUPPORT BOLSHEVISM By RENE MARCHAND 9a. net. B.S.P.WHY I SUPPORT BOLSHEVISM By RENE MARCHAND Correspondent of "Le Figaro and ‘*Le Petit Parisien” Translated from the French by EDEN and CEDAR PAUL Lane, Strand, W.C, 2TABLE OF CONTENTS. Chapter I. The March Revolution and the Cadets - 3 Chapter II. Kerenskiand Korniloff - = =. 7 Chapter III. November Days in Petrograd- - = 14 Chapter IV. Moscow in Mid-Winter - - - - 19 Chapter V. First Proposals for Allied Intervention - 24 Chapter VI. My Views during the Summer of 1918 - 29 Chapter VII. The Gradual Change in my Opinions - 35 Chapter VIII. The First Results of Intervention - 40 Chapter IX. Allied Intrigues in Russia - =. 44 Chapter X. Constructive Work of the Soviet Government Chapter XI, Europe and the Peace Conference - — - Chapter XII, The Bolshevik Solution is the only Solution 60 THE LnpaRy THE UNIVERSITY TEX WHY I SUPPORT BOLSHEVISM. THE MARCH REVOLUTION AND THE CADETS, When the Russian Revolution of Mar in Petrograd on sick leave. ‘My last visit to the front, in conjunction with all the obser- ms L made and all the impressions I received during tho closing months of 1916, had left no doubt whatever in my mind ial power was in a slate of extreme Alter the assassination of Stolypin in 1911, the hority of the government declined slowly but surely. ‘Sub- sequently to the outbreak of the war, that authority rapidly ‘appeared owing to the anazchical importance of a bureau- ‘acy equally lacking in the simple honesty and in the energy nd efficiency indispensable in the circumstances, Nevertheless, I must) adm:t that the revolution took me rely by surprise. Thinking of nothing but the war, wholly eoceupied in considering the best measures for securing a ‘ximum tension in the Allied forees arrayed against Germany, knowing that Germany was still powerful, I had been too ly to mistake my wishes for realities. Since 1 would not upon the internal situation of Russia except irom the tlook of the war, I had ended by persuading myself that what, I desired would come to pass, and that the structure of the Russian state would be able, somehow or other, to hold together long as was necessary, that is to say, until the victory of ihe Allies. ae 810210 broke out, T4 For the very reason that the edifice was so extrem fragile, 1 felt assured that any attempt to overthrow it out of the question ; or, at any rate, I considered that such ‘attempt would involve terrible risks, and that France li ‘absolutely nothing to gain from anything of the Kind. ‘Some of the ambassadors from the Allied powers fayou ideas of “renovating” the government ; some, even, went jar as to hope for a “change” of monarch. But for my for the reasons above outlined, I was strongly and op opposed. The policy 1 favoured was one which would do evel thing possible to promote the consolidation of the forces of existing government. Naturally, therefore, when the revolution broke out, first feelings were those of stupefaction and utter prostratiom ‘Not for a moment did I share the satisfaction displayed the time in Russian bourgeois circles and shared by most of members of the Allied diplomatic corps. ‘But upon one point I was perfectly clear. An end had e to Russia's participation in the war. Resistance upon eastern front had ceased once for all, and a not unlikely r of this would be the triumph of German imperialism. In case, for France, already so sorely tried, there must now ens! jhe need for an enormous additional output of effort Frenchman could contemplate this without dismay. 1 realised the truth instinctively. From the very fi however, it was equally apparent to M, Paleologue, Fi ambassador in Petrograd. So great was his perspicactt neeurate his judgment, that he could not share the chimer hopes of his colleagues, hopes extremely dangerous to Pr He looked upon his mission in Russia as practically at an Jfrom the outset, members of the Russian bourgeoisie and of the Allied diplomatisis made the serious mistake of shut to the revolution. Perhaps, however, It woulk to say that they could only see the revol sses chosen by themselves, and could the lines which thelr ey more correc rough Linted gla foresee revolutionary developments along were prepared to lay down, In other words, they anticipated nothing more than terial reconstruction,” nothing more than “a change of mona ‘At the most they expected a new regime which would be m only tn yoint of form and could not possibly Involve fundamentat lterstions.” Adapting temuetves:betwist night and’ toriiag this change which they considered purely formal, they pre} ea fo resume thelr crainary labours after a few hours Inlerruption They failed to see, and subsequently they refused to ‘Bee, thine the incidents’ whlch were not simply.“ taking place,’ bu mes iorslpsite Ueclenince of i eieantclaasGncan ame something vary different trom the “rosonstruction of the esbinet? Te (Wilolt (hey ‘has louksd: forward. yulh NensiestGi oor ae months. They would not understand that they were listening to the first ery of revolt u:tered by an entire people, a peo} ie x Serene an initial expression of will, its refusal to go Statesmen, journalists, diplomatists, the public at large, all like wers| thei ylotine of an-elmost incredible. inusiony hee seid rion (40 ou ariamimuely/(: Undestia teicance ae ines composed of the sles of the tourgens inter Kula. thor delet. wont Hensiorand march fom vitor Erni elonat, Hillasult ive) Gado eel ag aoet es ag ‘uglted ae fovotini minister, hastead 0) réemuma 1(tE6 oem sol tia ausunes) Ore, dumsiug fcluious up Oeoktantias meee thagetteity (anette to bay) belveatarmes an aul aciemtale rogram of Russian imperialism, the program of bourgeols Fiibe gihaslag tts gover uped alvuavlecray.| Hey ont een cna fluid ta undersGcad’ We reniltiod’ of tue a(tiation aye Ieee Ee Sel ledvanly cis uayoat Having ved tm Rusola for several yeara before the outros CE ee pea ina Gaetivaty as suey joinon ataleeee thee Waceri adi orig) Whit. 1 had meek jeumoat “19 aad rig Me nual oli the cakes ert ieThcpent aa cea el Gobel Litre or tua scronationh Substantially the Cadet Party had been a party of professors, ee ttne vee! did hou trig inout ints eeatue Sih oe te a sedan by) narra corovataa wide avy lic erliy eee had continually aimed at governmental power, and had nearly: Habiavedisgwer) Jt ted remained, however, in opyceltion 9 att ta/an opposition it had oppceed, in the wors! sense of western6 parliamentarism, every action of the government, every action good or bad. It had helped to secure the downfall of compara- _ tively honest and capable ministers, helped to bring about their replacement by comparatively dishonest and incapable ministers. To one man, however, they had given unhesitating support, to Sazonoff, minister for foreign affairs, urging upon him all the ‘while and compelling him to adopt a policy of “national honour” and “firmness.” Sazonoff was a man of gentle disposition, ex- tremely religious, and essentially pacific. Had it not been for the support of the “liberal opposition,” there can be little doubt that Sazonoff would have recoiled trom the consequences of such a policy. Finally, although some of the Cadets sincerely admired France and French culture, the party as a whole had never been Francophil, The mentality of the Cadets is substantially Teutonic, In this respect they resemble their Finnish friends Svinhufvud & Co, the nature of whose “Francophilism” and hhumanitarianism” has of late been sufficiently exposed. During the war, the Cadets had been forced by circumstances to avow an admiration, an almost exclusive admiration, for the British monarehy, for parlamentarism, for all the constitutional tradi- tions of Great Britain. In this admiration, which was at times deliberately overstressed, I have been able to detect an associ- ‘ated antipathy, nay a positive contempt, for France. The Cadets seemed to display a complete and deliberate lack of under- standing of all that France has done in the war; they seemed to manifest gross injustice towards the French army, and there: Fore towards the French people. 1 do not propose, here, to mention any names. But I have teen intimately associated with Russian life, and have had plenty of opportunities for hearing some really remarkable critic: isms of the French, Not a few of these criticisms were as reasonable as the outburst of indignation from Rodzianko, president of the Duma, when he said: “What are you doing on your front? Whilst others are fighting for all they are worth, the best you can do is to recapture a-yard or so of ground in the sugar refinery at Souchez. Tt was natural, therefore, that in so serious a crisis the assumption of power by the Cadet Party did not inspire me with confidence. ds 1 was convinced that the Cadeis would prove unable to break away from the narrow restrictions imposed by the political combinations of the Duma. It was in this atmosphere of political intrigue that the party had come into existence. It was in the same atmosphere that the imperial goverment had, so to speak, perished slowly by starvation, On the other hand, I was certain that the masses of the people were so deeply: stirred that the Cadets, who could do nothing more than change the figureheads and the outwards forms of administration, would find it impossible to resuscitate the old imperial government, Such, briefly sketched was my state of mind, when circum. stances brought me into contact with a man whose outstanding intelligence and generous heart were to exercise at that juneture decisive influence upon my whole outlook. I refer to Albert homas who now visited Russia on a special mission. Albert Thomas is a man full of enthusiasm. He has a genuine love for the Russian people—a rare quality in the official representatives of the Allies. His honest ‘admiration for the Russian revolution and for the soviet system, opened for me new horizons, Under his influence, my faith in the destinies of Russia was speedily restored, CHAPTER II. KERENSKI AND KORNILOFF. Prior to this date T had lived, intellectually at least, If not materially, in an environment containing nothing but decomposed elements or elements in process of decomposition, But now, after the revolution, I was suddenly brought into contact with its living sourees: Studying close at hand the counclls of workers’, soldiers’, and peasants’ deputies, and making the ac. duaintanee for the frst time of the Socialist parties, 1 had @ renewed and extremely defiaite perception of the energy of Russia. ‘The forees which now Deeamo apparent to me aitfered doubtless, fem those with which I had previously been famuilian.8 ut I was not slow to understand that these new forces were much deeper, much more real, springing as they did directly from the people, and making themselves visible to me unfalsified by statistics, unmodified by diplomatists. Within a brief space of time, completely forgetting, in contact with this new energy, jy first impressions, I succeeded in persuading myself, being still concerned above all with the question of the war, that the Russian people would re-enter the struggle, and would pursue jt with far greater vigour than had been displayed by the old regime. I believed, in a word, that this revolutionary force was going to be a force for waging an imperialist war ! ‘At this juncture T was quite unable to detect the preposterous contradiction involved In such an association of ideas. 1 was increasingly attracted by the manifestations of the folk-spirit, which, as I perceived day by day more clearly, was the driving foree behind everything that was going on. Yet at the same time, fascinated by the oratory of such men as Keren- ski and Tseretelli, T attached no importance whatever’ to Bol- shevist propaganda, which was now being vigorously rushed. Viad I recalled my first impressions, my belief that the revolation was a revolt of she Russian people against the war, I might have been saved from a serious mistake. In July the sailors from Kronstadt attempted an insurrection in Petrograd; “Pravda” was cerrying on a vigorous campaign, in connection with which Lenin’s figure was already assuming prominence ; there now occurred the disastrous failure at Tarnopol, and the whole Russian front was disintegrating, Through an almost incredible short-sightedness, I looked upon all these occurrences as matters of secondary importance, and I believed them to be due to the machinations of “German agents.” I was sure that the police and the secret service would have to take action, but I did not think ‘that these happenings had any political stgni- fleance ! By this time the Russian bourgeoisie was becoming disen- chanted with the revolution, which had ceased to be their own revolution, Most of the members of the Allied diplomatic corps were in touching agreement with the Russian bourgeoisie. In all these circles, thoughts were now current that it would be necessary to establish a military dictatorship, open or masked. Such people began to look to the generals for help. Now came a press campaign on behalf of a “more energetic” government, Among the names suggested for the premiership we find that of Admiral Kolchak, This trend was especially noticeable at the British embassy, for there, after the first mo- ment of surprise, the diplomatists had revived the formula which had been made ready for use in case a revolution should occur in Russia, ‘The British view was that the revolution must on no account exceed the limits of a change of ministry, a change that would put the Cadet Party in power. Since there now seemed to be good reasons for fearing that this party would not be strong enough to seize the reins of power, only one method suggested itself for placing the Cadets in control, ‘The only possibie expedient was a military dictator. ship. In this connection, an indelible impression has been left on my mind by the sittings of the Moscow Assembly, convened by Kerenski in August, 1917, Kerenski believed that the Assembly would firmly re-establish the authority of the Provisional Govern- ment until the meeting o! the Constituent Assembly. The sittings took place in the auditorium of the Great Theatre. T was present in the box reserved for the diplomatic corps, and I shall never forget the poignant moment when the appear ance at the rostrum of General Korniloff, then commander-in- chief, was greeted by a thunderous ovation from one section of the assembly. Tt was impossible to misinterpret the significance of this manifestation. ‘Those who took part in it comprised almost exacily half of the assembly. On the other hand, all the dele~ gates {rom the soldiers and sailors remained seated, and were onspicuously silent. Hardly had I realised this when the nglish general who was officially representing the British ‘embassy, exclaimed : “He is dictator !” ‘The words were uttered in a triumphant tone, which, in view of the atmosphere of the meeting, sounded positively defiant, Their recklessness and levity produced a painful Im- pression in my mind. Directly afterwards, a Rumanian officer underlined them, as it were, by saying coldly and cuttingly + ‘These soldiers ought to be shot, these fellows who do not rise out of respect for their general.” He spoke as if “these soldiers” ere present as soldiers, instead of being delegates from the* i0 army soviets. He spoke as if “ thelr general” was present as their commander, and not as the man whom one half of the assembly was at that very moment acclaiming as tho uneom- promising antagonist of these same soldiers. ‘There was no delay about the counter-demonstration. Kerenski rang his bell, and Tose to ask for silence that Korniloff might speak. At the same time he put Komiloff in his place by speaking of the general as “the first soldier in the service of the government.” Kerenski was received with an ovation no less striking. In- cluded with Kerenski as objects of this demonstration were the officers risen from the ranks, ‘Thus the delegates of the soldiers, sailors, and workers, who were frantic in their acclamations, contrasted thelr own officers and the Premier with the “generals —blind “political instruments” and not the real leaders of the armies, For the first time I had before me the alarming spectacle of a Russia divided into two hostile camps, a Russia in which a sanguinary struggle seemed imminent, a struggle likely to be advantageous to German imperialism, or the first time 1 in- stinetively understood, or rather, instinctively felt, that the (al breach of the peace, the declaration of war, had come from the side of the bourgeoisie. It had come from that bourgecisie which had hitherto done nothing but display its impotence ; from that bourgeoisie which had obstinately persisted in a com- bat sterile and disestrous for the country. I perceived, too, :hat the official military representatives of the Allies were delighted at the rupt My emotions were understood and shared by Gabriel Ber: trand, French consul-general in Moscow. He was a new comer in Russta, but from the first day of his arrival his heart opened towards this youthful people whose entrance into political life was characterised by a trustful and frank spontaneity, He sympathised with their deeply felt aspirations, for he was a man of extraordinary disinterestedness ; a man’ remote from the intrigues and diplomatic prejudices of an age with which Young Russia has nothing in common. I do not hesitate to say that the premature death of Gabriel Bertrand was an irreparable loss Had he been able to remain at his post, the unfortunate events Which were to’ ensue during 1918 would have either been lto- gether prevented, or would have been remedied before it was Boy too late. ‘Thinking matters over today, I am absolutely con- vineed of this truth, ‘The few and brief hours which I spent in Bertrand’s company between the sittings of the Moscow Assembly will remain for ever impressed upon my memory. With what splendid French clarity of mind, with what sterling loyalty, did he envisage the situation, Giving his whole mind lo the successful conduct of the war, heartbroken at the misfortunes of France, longing for the over- throw of German imperialism, he was all the more ready to love the Russian people, He understood and justly appreciated the privations of the Russians, the great sacrifices they had made, their heroic efforts on the eastern front and also side by side with us in the western field. At the same time he understood and loved the pacific temperament of the Russians, their instine- live love of their neighbour, in a word their “Tolstoyanism,” He understood and admired all that the professional diplo- matists, persons whose ony interest in Russia was their interest in a country capable of putting into the field (to quote M. Declassé’s phrase) “so many millions of bayonets,” were accus- tomed to stigmatise as “poltroonery,” “supineness,” and “lack ot character.” I can still hear Gabriel Bertrand saying : “ We can hope tor nothing further from these manufacturers who have been making millions ever since 1914. ‘They are interested only in profits. They are men who, in pursuit of personal gain will not hesitate to plunge their unhappy country into the miseries of civil war. I have already seen enough of them to take their measure. It is to the people that we must turn for aid, to these new democratic elements that have but now risen to the surface. These are our friends ; these are our predestined allies. With their help alone can we hope to hold the eastern front and to repel the German invasion of Russia.” After the “candidate for the dictatorship” had made his dramatic appearance, the assembly lost: interest for the diplo- matic corps, and the box was henceforward practically empty. Gabriel Bertrand, however, continued to attend the sittings, and“ Breat was his delight when a yote was passed authorising the Provisional Government, without waiting for the Constituent Assembly, to establish the new Russian regime upon a republicani | 1 i 12 basis. Ostensibly this decision effected a reconciliation between the two halves of the Moscow Assembly. It exorcised, such was my confident belief at the time, the ghastly spectre of eivil war. Nevertheless, the diplomatisis did not accept defeat. They continued to be guided by “trustworthy information” which reached them “from all quarters.” They continued to believe that the coup prematurely attempted at Moscow was merely postponed. A decisive change would, they thought, take place: in the near future. ' My own mistake was that I could think of nothing ‘Thus preoccupied, I forgot the Soviets, and consequently overlooked the movement towards Bolshevism which was going,on in these organisations. All my thoughts and all my hopes turned to the leader of the Provisional Govern. ment, He alone, in my opinion, would henceforward be able to counteract dictatorial ambitions. He alone would be able to preserve Russia from civil war, to save her from terrible sufferings, and to prevent a military cgllapse whieh would leave: her at the mercy of German imperialism. Tt. was in this state of mind, in an atmosphere of unremitting anxiety, that I passed the weeks which preceded the fall of Kerenski. Now ensued the Korniloff affair and the loss of Riga. As Ludovie Naudeau has shown in one of the most impressi of his writings, published a: in “L’Ententi a French journal then being issued in Petrograd, the loss of Riga was due rather to intrigue and treachery on the part of ‘the staif than to the alleged “shameful disloyalty” of the common soldiers. I regard it as my duty to reaffirm here that meny seetions Of the troops in Riga, and notably the Letts who were In the sequel to be among the first to go over to the Bolsheviks, fought with courage wortiy of the highest praise, Next came the Fore-parliament. The Provisional Govern- ment, realising that its authority was becoming more and more unstable, summoned this body after the Moscow Assembly had concluded its labours. It was to sit until the convocation of “he Constituent Assembly. > No disinterested observer could have failed to recognise: that the Provisional Government was in its death throes. Meni festly this regime was incompetent to carry on affairs until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. It was plain that she THE LIBRARY THE UNIVE whole course of events was leading up to a Bolshevist coup @état, But for my part, deceived by my hopes, and longing for their realisation, I was still able to persuade myself that Kerenski’s power was solidly based. I was not unaware of the danger; I saw the imminent risk of militarist attempts at dictatorship, which could not fail to involve the country in the most disastrous adventures. But I utterly failed to discern the trend towards Bolshevism, whose origin and growth I had almost entirely overlooked. In my innocence I considered Bolshevism a purely artificial produet, brought into being, or at any rate supported, and continually helped forward, by German propa: ganda. As the future was to convince me, this was @ Drepos. terous delusion, utterly without foundation. Besides, my associates at this epoch were united in looking’ upon Bolshevism as of no account. They failed to understand that the Bolsheviks were beginning to secure widespread support from the masses, owing {o the fact that their program promised to fulfil the most poignantly felt amongst popular aspirations. ‘Above all, the Bolsheviks took a definite line and promised’ Vigorous action to secure peace and to settle the land questic ‘As an instance of our short-sightedness, I may recall that Georges Weill, the evening before he left Petrograd only a few hours before the coup d'état, said to me with the utmost confi dence : “Never mind the Bolsheviks, they'll never do anythin have just been among chem. 1 had an opportunity of studying} ‘Trotski at Smolny, while 1 was talking about Alsace-Lorraine} to the soviet. One has but to look at these fellows to feel| certain that they've nothing in them, and that they'll ney venture to make a move.” Moreover, on the eve of the cout délat, ‘Tereshehenko, one of the ministers, declared that the Government was quite free from anxiety, that it had unmaske ‘and paralysed the entire plot, and that it held all the thre in its hands, ‘The authorities, he said, would not be tak unawares as they had been in Jul Whilst we, completely hoodwinked, were thus marching towards the November revolution, the members of the diplo- matic corps, more and more immersed in schemes for a militai Gictatorship, continued to associate only with Russians of the right wing, continued to confine their studies to the movement heading for reaction, From such Sovietist Socialists at Tsere. RANDANi 14 telli, they had passed first of all to the Socialists of the right wing, and had subsequently moved on from these to a new com- Dination termed “Radical Socialist,” of which Savinkoff repre- sented the Socialis: left. “Soviets mean chaos." What’s needed is a strong man. —“We have made a mistake in our easy-going attitude toward: this revolution, which shows itself more and more hostile to us. —“What we must do now is to break with the policy of Albert ‘Thomas, and to give unstinted support to’ our own friends.’— Such were the formulas voiced from day to day in diplomatic circles. ed with Maklakoff’s axiom “The true ideas of the revolution will triumph through the instrumentality of other men and under anoth : This axiom speedily gained popularily in the embassies, where it was unanimously interpreted as implying a complete and final rupture with Socialism. CHAPTER IL. NOVEMBER DAYS IN PETROGRAD. Such was the state of affairs when the Novemb took me by surprise. ‘The phy Just as in the previous or had ignored the ey course of development. This time, however, I found it difficult to see the true light. ‘This November revolution was no lent Ik genuine uprising of the Russian masses, Under the proletariat and of the International they were making the first decisive attack upon the old world, hitherto immune, Bind to the significance of the movement, entirely swayed by my own inward impressions, I could seo but two things : Being absolutely certain that revolu:ion fe is nol exaggerated, for now, 1 of the events (a) The question of the war. 15 the Bolsheviks, meaning fo: me at that date Lenin, Trotski, and their intimates, were the paid agents of the Germans, I never doubted for a moment that the November coup d'état was a German coup. It had been engineered, I believed, with the aim of securing the final destruction of the eastern front ; with the aim of breaking once for all the fighting strength of the Russian army. In other words, I believed that the November days were not a revolution but a plot, though a more important one than earlier plots had been, more important than the July rising and the disaster of Tarnopol. (b) The question of the revolution. become dear to me ; the energy, the vitality, of Russia seemed inseparably associated with the revolution. But now the revolu- tion appeared to me to be in danger. I had been alarmed by the widely expressed sympathy for military dictatorship, and T considered that such a dictatorship would be a catastrophe. In my view, the November affair would strengthen the hands of the diplomatic faction which favoured a militarist dictatorship. I ought to have seen that the Soviets had not been weakened by the recent turn of events; I ought to have seen that the Soviets had assumed power under their own flag, the flag of Bolshevism. But instead of understanding that the Soviets were the fulerum, the centre of gravity of the revolution, I imagined that the fulerum, the centre of gravity, were to be found in Kerenski and the Constitueat Assembly For these reasons 1 was utterly deceived, and for these reasons my anxieiy was intense, Nevertheless, during the opening days, and even during the opening weeks, I firmly convineed that the November revolution (whieh I con- linued to regard as “the November riot”) was a passing affair, J continued to believe that Kerenski would return to power. If only his restoration to power did not come too late! It was ‘ential Id take place before the ermans could derive important military advantages from the ituation. It was equally essential that Kerenski should succeed In defeating the anti-patriolic ambitions of the generals upon whose aid he would have to depend. Such were the thoughts with which my mind was wholly occupied amid the innumerable and fantastic rumours current at that date in Petrograd. ‘The revolution had16 ‘As for Bolshevism, 1 must repeat that for me it practically nonexistent. I completely misunderstood its t character. Not for a moment could I take a serious view of the first decrees with which the government of the “People Commissaries” beplastered the walls of Petrograd, Furthermore, the general aspect of events, and what I maj call the physiognomy of the capital, were strange and elus ‘The Bolsheviks had overthrown the Provisional Government with extraordinary ease, There had been no effective resistance ‘Most of the soldiers in the garrison had been “neutral,” that is to say, indifferent. ‘The Provisional Government had vanishet lke a wraith, leaving not a trace behind. ‘on the other hand, it did not appear as if those who hs gained so easy and so complete a victory had any real backin In the streets there was open talk of the approach ol government troops. ‘They had been rallied by Kerenski. ‘The; ywould soon suppress the handful of “rioters,” of “fanatt who were in possession of the Smolny Institute. ‘The embassies had “absolutely trustworthy that the Bolsheviks could not possibly retain pow than eight or ten days. Finally, all the employees in the public services were strike. ‘This sabotage would suffice, should the worst come the worst, to overthrow the Bolsheviks within two or weeks at the outside. ‘Day followed day, however, and the reports concerning approach of governmental forces, instead of becoming mor definite, grew increasingly vague. Sabotage in the pablic sery vices continued, with results extremely inconvenient to the publie, but it did not seem to be proving fatal to those whi had seized power. At any rate its effects were less rapid tha had been hoped. Thus the date fixed for the fall of Bolshevisi had to be repeatedly postponed. At length, without admittiny that the new regime would endure and would thus falsity predictions, the embassies found it convenient to open “busin relations” with Smolny. It was really uncomfortable to hai to wait so long without petrol for motors, without visas passports, without means of getting about. Yet, as far as the formalities of politics and diplomat formation 1? . were concerned, Bolshevism was non-existent. ‘here was @ lemporary interregnum in Russia. ‘The allied diplomats held that the only way in which this “government” could be got id of was by the sword of a general. Perhaps by Alexeieff, Korniloff, or Kaledin, seconded by Rodzianko, Miliukoff, or kof? ‘0 these wiseacres the whole problem was one of personages, ‘The matter was extremely simple. “Discipline and order” must be re-established throughout the country, for Kerenski had been unable to maintain them to the degree “indispensable to every state worthy of the name. ‘There was not the slightest allusion to Bolshevism. There was no understanding of the tremendous proletarian revolution which had just taken place. Russia had been convulsed by one of the most gigantic crises known to history, and yet the diplomatists could think only of “discipline and order.” M, Noulens’ words still ring in my ears. From the windows of the embassy, pointing to the French Quay, he showed me” st destroyers of the red fleet steaming up the Neva, what happens,” he said, “when those who are respon- sible for the work of government are unable to make their authority respected. Yet [ warned Tereshchenko again and again. In parliament, and throughout my political career, I have never ceased to draw my colleagues’ attention to the dangers of demagogy. See what this unhappy country has to suffer through haying lost the sense of disciplin ‘Towards the end of December I left Petrograd for Moscow and the south. I was to interview Kaledin, upon whom great hopes were now centred in diplomatic circles. As yet the only contact I had had with the Bolsheviks had been during a visit to Smolny to obtain the necessary passport, I went to Smolny with a from the French ambassador, a recommendation “to the civil and military authorities of Russia.” eadquarters there was considerable discussion case, I was first asked to give a clear explana- tion of the formula employed. I was told that it ought to be plainly indicated in one way or another that the document I had received from the French embassy was really addressed 819 to thé military revolutionary committee of the Petrograd Soviet. In the second place I was asked for guarantees of my good faith towards the workers’ and peasants’ government of Russia. Being aware that M. Noulens would refuse to accept either of the proposed alterations, I stuck to my guns, and in the end the matter was’ referred to Trotzki, who promptly made a mar- ginal note on my letter to the effect that I was to be furnished with all necessary documents. It was on the occasion of this visit that I made the acquaintance of Volodarski, one of the best known among the younger Bolshevik leaders. Ire long he was destined to receive the important position of Commissary for Propaganda. He _ held this office until the day of his assassination, and displayed the utmost energy in the performance of his duties. CHAPTER IV. MOSCOW IN MID WINTER, hing Moscow I went to see Solz, one of the regular ributors to the Moscow "Social Democrat.” In that journal had published @ series of fierce attacks upon the “eounter- activities” of the French military mission in ussia, at the same time voicing his indignation against the 's in Franee, I regarded is. I would not give it yoked upon it as a signal proof agents was working through mded an explanation, hoping to iny of those whom I then regarded as conselenee- protested vigorously, and asserted that French people. Not for a moment, he ad the fierce attacks in the “Social Democrat” been -cted against the French people. However unjust the attitude French government towards the workers’ and peasants’ veinment of Russia, the Russian proletariat neither could r would forget that the French workers had on several ‘sions been the first to raise the red flag of world revolution, er would the Russians forget that their French brothers braved all dangers on belialf of the sacred cause of the essed. assing to the question of peace negotiations with Germany, look an even Stronger line than Volodarski. ‘The revolution- ‘oletariat of Russia desired peace, but did not seek peace y spirit of weakness. Tie ‘Russian workers were fully e of their own sirengih, and they would never sell the Wslan people to the “bandits of German imperialism He added: “Even from your own imperialist outlook, you sally that by our example, by rontier, and by the whole range done much 16 enfeeble the military In conversation with him I questioned him again and again upon the matter 1 had most at heart, the relations between the Bolsheviks and the Germans. In the most precise terms, and quite unhesitatingly, Volo- darski vigorously expounded the thesis of the international proletarian revolution as a counterblast to international im- perialism. He gave a consistent refutation of the accusations of Germanophilism that had been levelled against the Bolsheviks, declaring that nothing would ever induce them to sign an uncon- ditional peace, that in no circumstances would they deliver over the Russian people bound hand and foot to the tender mercies of Germen imperialism. Turning to home affairs, he displayed an optimism which at that time I regarded as an unscrupulous bluff. He was certain, he said, that the Bolsheviks would be able to deal with the sabotage practised by the civil Servants, and would bring the strike to a speedy end. Within a brief period the government would gain effective control of the whole machinery of state. These assertions were as clear- cut as possible, and unquestionably expressed Volodarski's honest conviction. At the time, however, I treated them as mere news items, and they made no real impression on my mind, 20 power of Germany, and have therefore done much to prom the triumph of your armies. In fact, although we have worked directiy to further your military successes, we have don far more towards that end than all the Ruskis, Brusiloffs, an other distinguished butchers whose services the French pres loves to acclaim. You complain that Germany has been enable to concentrate all her forces for the attaek upon the westei front, But you forget that the armies recently transferre ivom the easiern front to the western have been strongly i fluenced by our propaganda. You forget that their morale bh been thorougily undermined during the last two or three month: You forget that these armies no longer penetrable barrier Y T looked upon this assertion as empty declamation. remember that Charles Dumas, to whom I repeated the su Stance of my conversation with Solz, exclaimed: “The m: musi be as mad as a hatter ! At that time I went no further in my study of the Bolshe outlook, for I was firmly convinced that the Bolsheviks wer German agents. A few of the most prominent among the leaders, “fanatics” or “‘illuminates,” might be animated bj honest conviction, but in the mass they were what the Frend nexspapers continued to term them. ‘They were “traitors ey Were "instrumental in bringing about the Russian desertio in the face of the enemy.” Throw plenty of mud; some of i is sure to stick. Obsessed with the idea, increasingly influenced by the per petual suggestions conveyed through the conversations to which I listened, through the articles I read, through the study o documents which were either wholly spurious or had been skil fully falsified, I continued to pass my days in Moscow down and during the negotiations of BrestLitovsk. “All this time was dreading the death blow which the Germans seemed Ikel to deal Russia, and was nevertheless exasperated by the paean of joy with which the members of the Ttussian bourgeoisi almost unanimously greeted the tidings of every fresh Germas advance towards Petrograd or Moscow. While the Ru: negoilaiors were at BrestLitovsk, I had the additional distres of learning, greatly to my surprise, that the French embass had been withdrawn from Russia to Finland. Now more tha 21 ever, when the situation was so threatening, I considered that we ought to extend to the unfortunate Russian people the moral support, if no more, of our presence. Now more than ever, in y opinion, it was our duty to make an effective protest against \@ monstrous greed that was being so shamelessly revealed the German imperialists. Sad beyond expression, profoundly disappointed, 1 was more an indignant; I was filled with unspeakable disgust with my surroundings. While I continued to look for the “reawakening the revolution,” to hope fo: the return to power of some such government as Kerenski’s had been, my hopes had hitherto been ustrated. The downfall of the Constituent Assembly, upon ich Thad built such high expectations; the tame surrender the populace, the futile submission of persons from whont I had hoped better things; the docility, the apparent resigmation, with which the revolutionary elements in Ruséia accepted the “brief respite” furnished by the peace of Brest-Litovsk—such were the combined causes of my disillusionment. Involuntarily I recatled words uttered by M. Diamandy, Rumanian minister, who had declared : “The verdict of history will be that this revolution was an unparalleled act of treachery; hat it was the abdication of an entire people which, through craven fear, deliberately embraced a policy of treason to its allies and of unconditional surrender to its enemies.” I began” to ask myself ‘whether this interpretation was not being con- rmed by events. And yet, I reflected, was anything of the kind wossible ? Could a sane man believe that a “group of German agents" would be able to stifle, once and for all, Russia and the Russian nation ? For my part, I found it impossible to accept this theory, I suffered deeply, but T suffered in silence. ‘The sareastic and contemptuous utterances of my associates cut me to the soul ‘They spoke after the manner of those who in the seventeenth century would have been termed “honest men”; regardless of Gistinctions of class or social conditions, they overwhelmed everything that was Russian in a universal condemnation, If only I had then been able to sce the truth, to understand the real nature of Bolshevism, to accept in all sincerity the assertions of such men as Volodarski and Solz! If only I had been able to free my mind from the over-riding influence of