Liberating “Palestine”

by Philip Rizk

A young Palestinian fisherman, Mohammed Ayyash, and Sheikh Kifah, a man highly

esteemed in his community- a mediator of conflicts- first met in the Friday fish market

near the makeshift port of Gaza City in March of 2007. The atmosphere had been

tense as the two opposing political factions Fateh and Hamas had been in conflict

challenging each other’s authority to govern a small strip of land that since 1948 was

labeled the “Gaza Strip.”1 Sheikh Kifah had been wandering among the various stalls

of the market when fighting broke out and the two men- Mohammed daily sold his

catch in the market- found themselves fleeing in the same direction. They took cover

in a small alley, hiding behind the shell of an old bullet hole riddled home, as sounds

of gunfire filled the air, the two men had exchanged some words. They met again

three and a half months later when the young fisherman sought out the sheikh in

Zuwaida, a village bordering Mohammed’s hometown Deer Al-Balach.

Sheikh Kifah: Ahlan wa sahlan Mohammed, please come in.

[The two men proceed by inquiring about the wellbeing of each other’s families- since

their last encounter heavy internal fighting in Gaza had lead to Hamas’ complete

control of the Gaza Strip and the exile of most Fateh leadership. Mohammed then

takes the lead in the conversation.]

Mohammed: Sheikh Kifah I should have listened to you when we first met… between

you and me I am starting to have my doubts if Hamas is really the answer in Gaza.

1
Labeling, whether categorizing and demonizing of the other or the shaping of boundaries and maps is
a form of governance and a method of domination.

1
Sheikh Kifah: These days are difficult for us all…

[Mohammed Ayyash, his eyes weary from hard work and his heart heavy because

although still in his 20s Mohammed- like most youths in Gaza- is already mature

beyond his age, a condition credited to the effects of Israeli occupation on Gaza. He

glances over at the old man across from him and shakes his head gently.]

Mohammed: I have always wanted the world to recognize us as a country like every

other, with a legitimate governing body… I am now starting to doubt that this is

possible under Hamas’ rule.

Sheikh Kifah: You sound like a different man than when I met you some months ago.

Mohammed: Let me tell you what I have been thinking lately… my father told me that

in the 50s and 60s when Egypt ruled us things were different. He says that when he

was young he used to walk from here to Arish and back, he would bike to Yaffa to sell

fish to the Jews… and not that long ago even I used to take my boat out further than

the eye can see from the coast to catch the best fish, today, no, its not that way. My

father says while the Egyptians were still rulers in Gaza- its true nothing was perfect,

there were so many restrictions- he was free to work, free to be and able to feed his

family. Today, I can barely make it from day to day. Back then we Palestinians did

not have our own state but at least the Egyptian governor that ruled us provided

general security,2 imagine what it would be like under a Palestinian ruler, yes, one

2
Mohammed has faith in a Hobbesian social contract whereby he will give up rights and gain the
hoped for security. Such a condition is more hopeful than all the internal conflict he has witnessed in
his lifetime. The longing of many Gazan youth both Hamas and Fateh members to live in “the West,”
points to a certain faith in the functionability of what is perceived as “model” societies. This vision is

2
that had the authority to rule this place, with defined borders, a functioning

government and a respected court system… a state!... with a police force and an

army, ministries and government institutions under his control.3 But as long as Israel

is controlling us from the outside and not giving us our freedom to rule ourselves, life

will continue like this… its unbearable.4

Sheikh Kifah: Mohammed, let me tell you, the dawla, the state is a created entity, we

cannot place all our hope in a creation of humankind. As a people we have never

been so divided as we are today. Some people are speaking of a collapse, but is this

not merely the collapse of this “idea,” the imagination of our colonizers that is

collapsing here?5

Mohammed [barely listening]: Under Abu Ammar we had hope, the world spoke to us

now they are shunning us, what do we have left?

Sheikh Kifah: Like your father, I too witnessed those times under Egyptian rule, I was

still young when the British were here and from my father I heard about the time of

the Ottomans. From my great-grandfather I know of a time even before that. Then

often the result of media portrayal of “other” societies. Akhil Gupta describes citizens imagining the
state through newspapers; in this case Mohammed is very likely to imagine his own non-existent
government according to the presentation of others on international TV (1995). It is this vision- even in
a “lawless” place like Gaza- that is the “familiar” (Foucault quoted in Gregory 2006).
3
Such desires for legitimacy, for recognition, for reaching a global standard/ model of governance is
portrayed by Robert Vitalis in America’s Kingdom, in king Abdallah’s desire for a railroad- a
component of a British imagining of society- despite its unjustified need in Saudi Arabia (2006).
4
Mohammed will not have his imaginary salvation shattered so quickly. Realizing the fragmentation
caused by vying political factions, he is so attached to the vision of a state that will unite what lies in
disarray. What if that longing will only be a mask of the reality he now lives? Philip Abrams says,
“The state is the unified symbol of an actual disunity” (1988: 79). Pierre Bourdieu describes
Mohammed’s condition as “doxic submission,” the imagined “state” has inscribed itself on his body in
such a way that he cannot think beyond it (1998: 38). Lastly, it is the familiar- that Foucault speaks of-
which Mohammed is not willing to give up for it is an internal logic that is too dear to the Palestinian
narrative of liberation (see Gregory).
5
Ottoman/ British/ Israeli imagining is collapsing: “it is specifically what remains of the colonial state
in African that is collapsing” (Mamdani, 2001: 652).

3
there were no thoughts of a state, there was no government Mohammed, elected or

imposed. Tribes were lead by elders and tribe sheikhs like myself mediated disputes

and conflicts within the clan and with neighboring clans.6 My role I have inherited

from many generations of conflict mediators. All this was disrupted by the integration

of our villages into the Ottoman Empire.7 They sought to enforce their ideas of

governance on us and at times there was much resistance both inadvertent and

violent. After the fall of the empire during the British mandate nationalism was

birthed here. But Mohammed, nationalism- as much as you have been inspired by it-

is also a foreign adaptation.8 It gave Abu Ammar and his fighters the opportunity to

capture the imagination of our people while suddenly becoming state actors and

politicians.9 Mohammed, they tore us further away from our roots than even the

Ottomans, British and Israelis had. Although especially Abu Ammar kept intact laws

and customs we had used for years, in this process our laws were re-shaped; for the

first time an outsider changed our laws and traditions.10 The state you so long for

Mohammed is not an absolute entity. We have already seen the limitations of this

thing called state. What did all of the PA’s ministries bring us, what about the police

force and the various security apparatuses? These bureaucratic entities, with all their

corruption and their divisive nature is only the beginning of what we are awaiting if

we achieve this state you speak of.

6
In line with outside imaginings governance shifted from a lineage to take on a shape of hierarchy.
Bayart speaks of the erosion of society for the establishment of the state (1999: 39).
7
Ottoman lawmakers considered shar’ia disorganized (“obscure”) and sought “order” (“known”)
elsewhere (Messick, 1996: 55). The question that arises is whose obscure/ unfamiliar was replaced for
whose known/ familiar.
8
“The idea of the nation requires people to forget part of their past” (Ernst Renan cited in Anderson
2003).
9
The movement between state-actor and resistance fighter is often a slight one (Das, 2007: 219).
10
David Scott and Talal Asad speak of the re-shaping of the modern, rather than it being destroyed.
Although Yasir Arafat was a Palestinian, he altered “customary” law as an act of statecraft thereby
doing violence its very nature.

4
Mohammed: Sheikh Kifah, I want a state, I long for that day that I can claim to be the

citizen of this state, to be treated as a respected person because I am a Palestinian. I

want a football team to cheer on, an army to fight with rather than being called a

terrorist.11

The conversation went on for some time before Mohammed departed from the

sheikh’s simple home. While walking away the fisherman was reminded of the words

they had first exchanged during those days of severe inter-fighting…

Mohammed: If only we had a true Islamic state, then all this would go away…

Sheikh Kifah: What makes you say that?

Mohammed: The world has conspired against us, we voted for a party to represent us

and the world is backing them to remain in power. With my own eyes I saw Fateh men

armed with new American weapons stirring up trouble- they kidnapped and tortured

11
Rajan speaks of the state’s act of “naming” as serving the institutional image of the state (2003).
Foucault puts it this way speaking of the individual criminal which in this case can be applied to a
collective criminal entity: “It is the criminal, in fact, that is needed by the pres and public opinion. It is
he who will be hated, against whom all the passion will be directed, and for whom the penalty and
oblivion will be demanded” (1994: 342). This analysis can be applied to the criminalization of the state
in Israel’s process of demonizing Fateh (until Oslo) and then Hamas. Very critically, Jonathan Hill
argues that in the “failed state” literature such a “condition” is considered an internal/ domestic
problem by identifying such a “failed state” with a sick body that needs curing. Such analysis
furthermore points to the benevolent restorative stance of the “international community;” the entire
process is a red herring distracting from the systemic role of external players in bringing about internal
fragmentation (2005: 149). Mamdani points out that “political communities are defined… not by a
common past but by a resolve to forge a common future” (2001: 661). This resolve for a common
future is exactly what is obstructed by ongoing internal strife. Israel’s role in the formation of a militant
Hamas as alternative to the more active and influential Fateh in the 80s is well documented (see Khaled
Hroub 2002; Milton-Edwards 1992). The role of the USA, Egypt and Jordan in Fateh’s backing in
opposition to Hamas in 2007 is less well recorded. Rajan addresses the episode of “scandal”/ the
abnormal referring to the intention of keeping the attention off the day to day hostilities thus distracting
the role of the state- in this case the occupier, Israel- of perpetuating the occurrence of civil war
(Gramsci in Rajan 2003: 232 n. 33).

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one of my neighbors for no reason- while other Fateh members fired qassams into

Israel, not for the sake of resistance but because they knew it would undermine

Hamas’ rule here in the eyes of the world.12 They know that if Hamas is in power

conditions will improve, but these corrupt kuffar won’t let go of the power they are

hoarding. Hamas is the answer, Allah will look with pleasure upon us now that we

have elected a party that is made up of men that worship him, who are humble in their

ways and most importantly who are not corrupt… if only these godless tyrants would

hand over authority that we rightfully gained in the elections.

Mohammed recalled that Sheikh Kifah had answered him carefully, speaking

indirectly in such a way that only now, after all what had occurred in Gaza had past,

started to make some sense to Mohammed. The old man had spoken of the chasm

between Hamas’ vision for an Islamic state and previous forms of rule in Palestine.

The sheikh had explained that Hamas’ vision had little in common with the traditional

form of ijtiyah of shar’ia.13 In the case of Hamas, its envisioning of an Islamic state is

a harsh break from its tradition of jurisprudence rooted in the teachings of the

Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.14 The sheikh had also spoken of an economic

dimension. The British had had a yearning, he had explained, for control over

12
Veena Das provides the example of implicitly of police in riots in order to dissect the “state” as made
up of institutions and individuals with good and bad intentions, feelings and individual logic etc. The
various “security apparatuses” that appeared under Fateh’s rule speak to a matter of Nomenklatur in
which the PA’s “pseudo-state” (see Hill 2005:140 for a critique) is able to legitimize violence which in
fact often acts as a criminal entity. Bayart et al. refer to the “shadow structures of power” (1999: 23).
13
In the Calligraphic State, Brinkley Messick maps out in great detail Yemeni society’s transition from
rule inspired by ijtihad within the Islamic tradition of rule based on shari’a to post-revolutionary
constitutional Yemen (1996: 71ff.). Messick cites Jaques Derrida’s concept of logocentrism in his
analysis of Yemeni society, whereby the value of spoken word is upheld while underscoring the
potential for the written word to simplify and falsify the intention of the author (25). Yemeni rulers first
under Ottoman rule and then under Nasserite influence after the 1962 revolution began envisioning
society according to the imaginings of its rulers or those it aspired to emulate (Chatterjee, 1994: 84).
14
Hamas shows its desire to “subsume Palestinian nationalism within one or another form of Islamic
identity,” (Khalidi, 1998: 148-9). This in contrast with the teachings of Sayyed Qutb: “Those who
claim that jihad intends to defend muslim territory, overlook the programme of Islam and consider it
less important than (watan) territory” (ma’lim fil tariq: 84, cited in Nuesse 1998).

6
regional trade routes of the Mediterranean much like the Ottomans before them. For

sheikh Kifah it was clear, the inability of the shar’ia process to guarantee economic

free reign likewise lead to its marginalization under Hamas’ rule.15

In that moment of political tension- as well as aspiration- Mohammed had not wanted

to take the time to think these thoughts, they were too foreign and interfered too

succinctly with the image presented him by the mosque preachers and the Hamas

leadership in his neighborhood. Now his world had been punctured.

***

Shortly after the “Hamas Takeover” of June 2007 the “Gaza Strip” was deemed a

“terrorist entity” by the then internationally recognized new representative PA

cabinet based in Ramallah in the West Bank. In short, under Hamas’ rule the strip of

land was “criminalized,” not by the occupier –this was already the norm- but by an

opposing Palestinian faction applying the imaginings of its colonizers. Finally in a

position of “legitimized” authority, Hamas in turn sought to apply its stamp, its

model of rule in Gaza. The Hamas government replaced Fateh teachers with young

Hamas graduates who would apply more Islamic standards of conduct in schools.16

The Islamic political party furthermore replaced all Fateh-dominated public

institution administrations with Hamas members.17 Any Fateh protests, parades or

15
See Messick (1996: 58).
16
This process was not unlike Yemeni society being re-modeled after British conceptions down to the
smallest detail of the form of classroom, collective or individual blackboards or school curriculum.
These new formulations entailed a new but old form of hegemony over the very structure of society
(Messick, 1996).
17
Bourdieu speaks of a “field of power” in which capital and education are competed over. Hamas
introduced new forms of taxes while taking control of the expanding tunnel economy. Under this new
economic stratification businessmen with strong connections to the new authority thrived.

7
riots were silenced and often brutally crushed.18 Yet, these transitions did not occur

without opposition, suspected conspirators of an attack against Hamas were

summarily arrested, often tortured, often sentenced under Hamas’ newly instituted

judicial system- after sending home all judges active under Fateh’s rule.19

Weeks after Hamas came to power Sheikh Kifah was picked up by the “executive

security force,” newly legitimized in Gaza due to Hamas’ seizure of power. He was

deemed a traitor for publicly criticizing Hamas’ political actions and regarded as

“unorthodox” for his views on Islam. After being shot in both knees and found

unconscious on a main street connecting Gaza City with a nearby town his relatives

took him to a hospital in Gaza City. There he was rejected entry and consequentially

taken to a Fateh doctor who was treating patients in his living room. Sheikh Kifah

was ordered to end all involvement in conflict mediation in his community with the

threat of further punishment. Despite looming punishment, the sheikh continued his

work in his community in secrecy within the private confines of his home.20

Mohammed Ayyash yearned ever more for the ability to carry out his occupation of

fishing without restrictions, without the threat of being shot by Israeli gun ships.

Despite his conversations with Sheikh Kifah he wondered if this would ever be made

possible without the authority of his own state, his own government to determine the

boundaries of his movement and uniting the people of Gaza so as to provide the

protection he so longed for.

18
Rajan describes the colonial origins of the term “riot” to other the occurrence of protest against
legitimized state actions (2003).
19
Charles Taylor speaking of the division over “perspectives of legitimacy” in instances of “post-
revolution. Taylor goes on, “what made these... divisions so deadly was the absence of any agreed-
upon understanding of the institutional meaning of the sovereignty of the nation” (2002: 118). On the
competition over national law to legitimate state-building process, (Wilson, 2001: 128).
20
Abercrombie et al. speak of an adherence to the dominant value system not being consistent as
parallel forms are created which resist its hegemony (see Wilson, 2001: 151).

8
Bibliography:

Charles Taylor, “Modern Social Imaginings,” Public Culture 14 (1): 91-124 (2002).

Richard Wilson, The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation South Africa: Legitimizing the Post-
Apartheid State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

Partha Chatterjee, “Was there a Hegemonic Project of the Colonial State?” in Contesting Colonial
Hegemony, eds. D. Engels and S. Marks, pp. 79-84. London: British Academic Papers (1994).

Jonathan Hill, “Beyond The Other: A Postcolonial Critique of The Failed State Thesis,” African
Identities 3: 139- 154 (2005).

Rajan, The Scandal of the State: Women, Law and Citizenship in Postcolonial India (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2003).

Michel Foucault, “Proper Use of Criminals” in Power, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: The New Press,
1994).

Vena Das, “The Signature of the State: The Paradox of Illegibility” In Anthropology in the Margins of
the State, eds. Vena Das and Deborah Pools (Oxford: James Currey, 2004) pp. 225-252.

Ibid., Life and Words: Violence and Descent into the Ordinary (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2007).

Jean Francois Bayart, Beatrice Hibou and Stephen Ellis, The Criminalization of the State in Africa
(Oxford: International African Institute, 1999).

Pierre Bourdieu, “Rethinking the State,” in Practical Reason (Stanford: University of Stanford Press,
1998) pp. 35-63 (1998).

Philip Abrams, “Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State” Journal of Historical Sociology 1 (1):
58-89.

Mahmoud Mamdani, “Beyond Settler and Native as Political Identities: Overcoming the Political
Legacy of Colonialism” Comparative Studies in Society and History 43 (4): 651-664 (2001).

Beverley Milton-Edwards, Islamic Politics in Palestine (London: Tauris, 1996).

Khaled Hroub, Hamas: Political Though and Practice (Washington D.C.: Institute for Palestine
Studies, 2002).

Andrea Nuesse, Muslim Palestine- The Ideology of Hamas (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic
Publishers, 1998).

Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

Derek Gregory, The Colonial Present 2006.

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (New York: Verso, 2003).