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Soviet Military Power 1987 - Forces For Nuclear Attack

Soviet Military Power 1987 - Forces For Nuclear Attack



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Published by jb2ookworm
Soviet Military Power was a publication of the United States Department of Defense which used to
provide an estimation of the military power and strategy of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Its purpose
was to provide an estimation of the capabilities of the Soviet Armed Forces.
Soviet Military Power was a publication of the United States Department of Defense which used to
provide an estimation of the military power and strategy of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Its purpose
was to provide an estimation of the capabilities of the Soviet Armed Forces.

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Published by: jb2ookworm on Nov 15, 2008
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SOVIET MILITARY POWER 1987Forces For Nuclear Attack 
Despite the USSR's recently renewed interest in and emphasis on arms control, Soviet production of newer, more lethal strategic nuclear weapons continues. Even as the Soviets proceed with deployment of the SS-25 mobile intercontinental ballistic missile(ICBM), two newstrategic ballistic missile submarines, and the flight-testing of a new strategic bomber, they aredeveloping another generation of air-, sea-, and ground-launched nuclear-capable cruise missiles.The AS-15 air launched cruise missile is already operational on over 50 BEAR H bombers, andthe SSC-X-4 ground-launched and SS-NX-21 sea-launched cruise missiles may becomeoperational this year. These developments, along with the greater improvements in the accuracy,survivability, and lethality of the USSR's short-range ballistic missile force, underscore theSoviet Union's commitment to modernizing its large nuclear arsenal.The overall direction of Soviet strategic nuclear force development and associatedcommand, control, and communications is toward a completely integrated force. All elements of their "triad" may eventually have a hard target-kill potential These developments are consistentwith Soviet military doctrine.The Soviet Union now has about 10,000 deployed intercontinental strategic nucleaweapons (missile warheads and bombs) and by 1990 is likely to have about 12,000. While theSoviets would not necessarily expand their intercontinental attack forces significantly in theabsence of arms control constraints, they have the potential to deploy between 16,000 and 20,000strategic nuclear weapons by 1996. Moreover, this force will be significantly more flexible,survivable, and effective. Thus, both quantitatively and qualitatively, the Soviets will enhancetheir first-strike capability and their ability to fight a protracted nuclear war through thedeployment of more accurate and survivable systems.In the land-based force, the development of the hard-target-kill SS-18 follow-on and asilo based SS-X-24, both probably more accurate and reliable than current systems, willsignificantly increase the lethality of the USSR's force. The rail-mobile SS-X-24 and the roadmobile SS-25 will provide the Soviets with highly survivable systems for protracted operations.Indeed, the SS-25 may be the perfect reserve weapon for such a war. It has a single reentryvehicle and is thus easily retargeted.Perhaps the most notable growth will take place in the submarine ballistic and cruisemissile force. By 1995, this force will grow from roughly 20 percent of today's Soviet strategicnuclear warheads to over 30 percent of an expanded force. This future submarine force will bequieter, more responsive because of better communications, and more effective. Supported by anextremely-low-frequency communications system, the DELTA IV could be almost as responsiveas an ICBM for destroying time-critical targets. Submarine-launched cruise missiles will providethe Soviets with yet another weapon for US early warning and command-and-control systems totrack.Strategic aviation is making a strong comeback in the Soviet Union. The BACKFIRE, theBEAR H, and in the near future, the BLACKJACK, will provide the Soviets with the ability toattack the US through multiple avenues. The Soviets will have the capability with the BEAR Hand the BLACKJACK to launch hundreds of difficult-to-detect, hard-target-kill AS-15 cruisemissiles. Moreover, the BLACKJACK will be able to conduct reconnaissance and strike
operations in a nuclear war lasting beyond an initial missile exchange. Additionally, the Sovietsare significantly upgrading the communications support to these forces.With the mobile SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missile, each with three independentlytargetable warheads, the Soviets have maintained their nuclear strike capability against both theEuropean and Asian theaters. At the same time, the mobility inherent in the SS-20 design hasafforded a level of undetectability and survivability unmatched in previous systems. The systemalso has an inherent refire capability. Of the 441 SS-20 launchers now operational in the force,approximately two-thirds face NATO from the western USSR, and the remainder are deployed inthe Soviet Far East. Instead of increasing the size of the already large SS-20 force, the Sovietswill quite likely strive for better accuracy, nuclear lethality, and survivability. These technicalimprovements are already being integrated in a new, improved version of the SS-20 that could become operational in 1987.In addition to the threat posed by the SS-20 ballistic missile force, the Soviets continuedevelopment of a new class of mobile land-attack cruise missile the SSC-X-4 ground-launchedcruise missile and the SS-NX-21 sea-launched version. When deployed later this decade, thesemissiles will add yet another dimension to the Soviet longer range intermediate-range nuclear forces (LRINF) threat to NATO and Asia. The new generation of cruise missiles will quite likelycomplement both Soviet bombers and SS-20s in the continental theaters surrounding the USSR,compounding an already difficult air defense environment in wartime target areas. Potentialaccuracy improvements in future cruise missile design will allow targets to be struck with greater  precision than ballistic missiles are currently capable of attaining. Cruise missile deployment willalso free a significant number of Soviet theater bombers now allocated for nuclear strikes tocarry out missions such as attacks with chemical and improved conventional munitions.The Soviet Union is also making substantial strides in improving its sizable shorter range ballistic missile force. This force, which numbers more than a thousand launchers, is expected togrow steadily in the near term. The implications for the US and its allies reside not only in thenumbers and the improvements that are forecast for missile accuracy and warhead options, butalso in the potential employment of these missiles. The Soviet commander will be able to launcha devastating attack to the depth of the theater rear. The accuracy of the missiles and the potentialof non-nuclear warheads will allow a reduced number of missiles to strike any single target withthe same confidence of destruction formerly associated with significantly larger numbers of theolder systems, and this combination could allow the Soviets to do so without crossing the nuclear threshold.Soviet literature reflects an understanding of the need for target acquisition, analysis, andstrike weapons to attack reserves; command, control, and communications structures; and thelogistics infrastructure in a highly responsive manner. The constantly improving accuracy andwarhead capability of the shorter range missile, its short flight time, and its relativeinvulnerability in flight make it an ideal strike weapon. The Soviets are expected to seek further refinements in targeting for these missiles. These weapons will remain a potentially devastatingforce against the West.

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