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French ground force organizational development for counterrevolutionary warfare between 1945 and 1962

French ground force organizational development for counterrevolutionary warfare between 1945 and 1962

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Published by Uncle Joffe
Evolving operations in the twenty-first century suggest a continued value for historical study of previous counterinsurgency operations. Study of such operations tends towards a degree of research into operational theory of security forces against insurgents. Application of counterinsurgency doctrinal guidance requires tailored organizational models for the participating ground forces. An example of an army which developed specific ground force organizational models in support of counterinsurgency is the French Army in the period between 1945 and 1962. This time frame includes the major counterinsurgent wars in Indochina and Algeria. The first facet of study is the French experience and organizational development up to the beginning of the Indochina War, during which many colonial concepts were applied to counterinsurgency operations. Next, a study of French adaptations for the Indochina War and lessons learned from that experience is presented which points out many lessons for counterinsurgency. Finally, the French organizational development in Algeria is studied as the penultimate example of the French model. Derived from previous colonial warfare experience, French organizations adapted to the modern counterinsurgency environment and ultimately could claim a military, if not political, success. Centered on the concept of the territorial organization of a theater, French organizational models for counterinsurgency possess enduring lessons for study and considered emulation.
Evolving operations in the twenty-first century suggest a continued value for historical study of previous counterinsurgency operations. Study of such operations tends towards a degree of research into operational theory of security forces against insurgents. Application of counterinsurgency doctrinal guidance requires tailored organizational models for the participating ground forces. An example of an army which developed specific ground force organizational models in support of counterinsurgency is the French Army in the period between 1945 and 1962. This time frame includes the major counterinsurgent wars in Indochina and Algeria. The first facet of study is the French experience and organizational development up to the beginning of the Indochina War, during which many colonial concepts were applied to counterinsurgency operations. Next, a study of French adaptations for the Indochina War and lessons learned from that experience is presented which points out many lessons for counterinsurgency. Finally, the French organizational development in Algeria is studied as the penultimate example of the French model. Derived from previous colonial warfare experience, French organizations adapted to the modern counterinsurgency environment and ultimately could claim a military, if not political, success. Centered on the concept of the territorial organization of a theater, French organizational models for counterinsurgency possess enduring lessons for study and considered emulation.

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Published by: Uncle Joffe on Nov 16, 2008
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 FRENCH GROUND FORCE ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENTFOR COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY WARFAREBETWEEN 1945 AND 1962A thesis presented to the Faculty of the US ArmyCommand and General Staff College in partialfulfillment of the requirements for thedegreeMASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCEMilitary HistorybyPeter Drake Jackson, MAJ, USAB.A., University of Rhode Island, Kingston, Rhode Island, 1992Fort Leavenworth, Kansas2005Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
 
 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining thedata needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducingthis burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currentlyvalid OMB control number.
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
 
1. REPORT DATE
(DD-MM-YYYY)
17-06-2005
2. REPORT TYPE
Master’s Thesis
3. DATES COVERED
(From - To)
Aug 2004 – Jun 2005
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
French Ground Force Organizational Development for
5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Counterrevolutionary Warfare between 1945 and 1962
5b. GRANT NUMBER5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER
Jackson, Peter Drake, MAJ, U.S. Army
5e. TASK NUMBER5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORTNUMBER
U.S. Army Command and General Staff CollegeATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD1 Reynolds Ave.Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)10. SPONSOR/MONITORS ACRONYM(S)
 
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORTNUMBER(S)
 
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
 
14. ABSTRACT
Evolving operations in the twenty-first century suggest a continued value for historical study of previous counterinsurgency operations.Study of such operations tends towards a degree of research into operational theory of security forces against insurgents. Application of counterinsurgency doctrinal guidance requires tailored organizational models for the participating ground forces. An example of an armywhich developed specific ground force organizational models in support of counterinsurgency is the French Army in the period between1945 and 1962. This time frame includes the major counterinsurgent wars in Indochina and Algeria. The first facet of study is the Frenchexperience and organizational development up to the beginning of the Indochina War, during which many colonial concepts were appliedto counterinsurgency operations. Next, a study of French adaptations for the Indochina War and lessons learned from that experience ispresented which points out many lessons for counterinsurgency. Finally, the French organizational development in Algeria is studied asthe penultimate example of the French model. Derived from previous colonial warfare experience, French organizations adapted to themodern counterinsurgency environment and ultimately could claim a military, if not political, success. Centered on the concept of theterritorial organization of a theater, French organizational models for counterinsurgency possess enduring lessons for study and consideredemulation..
15. SUBJECT TERMS
Counter insurgency, counter-revolutionary warfare, guerrilla warfare, Indochina War, Algerian War, French Army, Infantry, mobile groups, colonial warfare, quadrillage
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATIONOF ABSTRACT18. NUMBEROF PAGES19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLEPERSONa. REPORT
Unclassified
b. ABSTRACT
Unclassified
c. THIS PAGE
UnclassifiedUU 149
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(include area code)
 
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18
 
 iiMASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCETHESIS APPROVAL PAGEName of Candidate: MAJ Peter Drake JacksonThesis Title: French Ground Force Organizational Development for CounterrevolutionaryWarfare between 1945 and 1962Approved by:, Thesis Committee ChairLTC Louis A. DiMarco, M.A., MemberAlexander M. Bielakowski, Ph.D., MemberLTC (Ret.) Mark T. Gerges, M.A.Accepted this 17th day of June 2005 by:, Director, Graduate Degree ProgramsRobert F. Baumann, Ph.D.The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do notnecessarily represent the views of the US Army Command and General Staff College orany other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoingstatement.)

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