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Introduction
1.1 Decisions and Games
1.2 Previews
1.3 Example: Newcomb
1.4 Example: Voting
1.5 Dominance Reasoning
1.6 States and Choices
1.7 Maximin and Maximax
1.8 Ordinal and Cardinal Utilities
1.9 Regret
1.10 Likely Outcomes
1.11 Do What’s Likely to Work
1.12 Probability Deﬁned
1.13 Measures
1.14 Normalised Measures
1.15 Formalities
1.16 Possibility Space
Probability
2.1 Compound Sentences
2.3 Two Important Results
2.4 Axioms of Probability
2.5 Truth Tables and Possibilities
2.6 Propositions and Possibilities
2.7 Conditional Probability
2.8 Bayes Theorem
2.9 Conditionalisation
2.10 Conglomerability
2.11 Independence
2.12 Kinds of Independence
2.13 Gamblers’ Fallacy
Utility
3.1 Expected Values
3.2 Maximise Expected Utility Rule
3.3 Structural Features
3.4 Generalising Dominance
3.5 Sure Thing Principle
Working Out Probabilities
4.1 Frequency
4.2 Degrees of Belief
4.5 Objective Chances
4.6 The Principal Principle and Direct Inference
4.7 Money and Utility
4.8 Insurance
4.9 Diversiﬁcation
4.10 Selling Insurance
5.1 Utility and Welfare
5.2 Experiences and Welfare
5.3 Objective List Theories
5.4 Preference Based Theories
5.5 Interpersonal Comparisons
5.6 Which Desires Count
Newcomb’s Puzzle
6.1 Two Principles of Decision Theory
6.2 Arguments for Taking Both Boxes
6.3 Tickle Defence
6.4 Causal and Evidential Decision Theory
6.5 Weak Newcomb Problems
Introduction to Games
7.1 Prisoners’ Dilemma
7.2 Dominating Strategies
7.3 Iterated Dominance
7.4 Iteration and Knowledge
7.5 Strong and Weak Dominance
Games and Time
8.1 Normal Form and Extensive Form
8.2 Backwards Induction
8.3 Value of Games
Best Responses
9.1 Best Responses
9.2 Iterated Best Responses
9.5 What is a Mixed Strategy?
9.6 Nash, Best Response and Repeated Games
9.7 Equilibrium and Ratiﬁcation
9.8 Game Theory as Epistemology
Finding Equilibria
10.1 Finding Mixed Strategy Equilibria
10.2 Coordination Games
10.3 Mixed Strategies in Multiple Equilibrium Games
10.4 Value of Communication
Reﬁning Equilibria
11.1 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
11.2 Forward Induction
11.3 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
11.4 Signalling Games
11.5 Other Types of Constraint
Backward Induction and its Discontents
12.1 Problems with Backwards Induction
12.2 Money Burning Game
12.3 Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma
Group Decisions
13.1 Making a Decision
13.2 Desiderata for Preference Aggregation Mechanisms
13.3 Ranking Functions
13.4 Cyclic Preferences
13.5 Proofs of Arrow’s Theorem
Voting Systems
14.5 Approval Voting
14.6 Range Voting
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Decision Theory Notes

# Decision Theory Notes

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10/24/2012

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