VitImmune’s glutathione technology.
VitImmune argues that the Settlement Agreement “doesnot preclude VitImmune from directly
its glutathione technology to
person or entity;”
rather, VitImmune “is only restricted from
that technology toanother entity.”
VitImmune therefore argues that because it did not license its glutathionetechnology to another entity (instead, it simply sold the technology through a self-createdwebsite), Max’s claims are defeated as a matter of law.
The court agrees.“The court’s function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential evidence thatthe parties might present at trial, but to assess whether the plaintiff’s complaint alone is legallysufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted.”
“In doing so, all facts alleged inthe complaint are taken as true and all reasonable inferences are indulged in favor of theplaintiffs.”
However, “the complaint must give the court reason to believe that this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these claims.”
There is no factual support for Max’s first allegation that Max was the “exclusivelicensee” of VitImmune’s glutathione technology. While it is true that Max held exclusivelicense under the original License, the parties’ Settlement Agreement made clear that,“
[n]otwithstanding any term to the contrary in the License
, . . . Max’s license of Vitimmune’sGlutathione technology shall be
which meant that VitImmune was free to
[Defendant’s] Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss (Supporting Memorandum), docket no. 6, filedNovember 29, 2011, at 8.
Supporting Memorandum at 2 (emphasis in original).
(emphasis in original).
Tal v. Hogan
, 453 F.3d 1244, 1252 (10th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider
, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007) (emphasis omitted).
Settlement Agreement ¶ 3 (emphasis added).
Case 2:11-cv-00970-DN Document 21 Filed 02/02/12 Page 3 of 7