Exres essagg ha aalzes o eelgs o dsaeo ad aleao has resoaed whore Aeras ree ears.
Despite being a airly constant eature o the domestic terrorism landscape since 2001, the number o
individuals in the United States identied as having been “radicalized” has always been, and remains,
It is important to note, however, that there has recently been a signicant increase in the
number o reported U.S. radicalization cases compared to prior years; 2009 saw 13 such cases, almost asmany as in the previous three years combined. Tough the mechanisms driving this phenomenon are varied and complex, increases in the number and variety o cases in which Americans are internalizingextremist ideology suggest that the jihadist message is resonating more widely than ever beore.
Some have identied the Internet as a major driver and accelerator of this phenomenon.
Increasingly since 9/11, the Internet and other orms o modern media have become some o the most eective vehicles through which extremist groups spread their ideology. Modern media provides them with themeans by which to make the jihadist message slick, appealing, and easily accessible to millions.
Tesegroups have ocused not only on spreading ideology or passive consumption, they also seek to usetechnology as a potent orce multiplier, extending their reach and destructive capability by encouragingindividuals living in the United States to conduct attacks in their home communities and abroad.
Tere s o learl defable deograh rofle or does radals.
Despite law enorcement and intelligence ocials’ best eorts to determine which individuals are most
vulnerable to becoming radicalized, there is no clear, workable demographic prole that can predict who
will internalize extremist ideology.Looking at U.S. radicalization cases across a number o demographic variables, including sex, age, race,national origin, economic status, criminal background and mental health status, a ew basic trends did
emerge. Radicalized individuals in the majority of cases, for example, were male, Muslim U.S. citizensor legal permanent residents. A relatively small number of domestic radicals had signicant criminal
backgrounds or histories o psychological disorders compared to those who did not. Most o the
radicals were from working or middle-class backgrounds; not many were poverty-stricken or nancially
destitute.Looking beyond these basic patterns, however, it becomes quickly apparent that or the majority
of variables upon which a workable homegrown terrorist prole might be based, there is a degree
o variation that renders generalizations nearly impossible to make. For example, though indictedhomegrown radicals’ average and median ages hovered in the late 20s and early 30s, respectively, some
cases involved individuals who were well into their 40s, 50s, and in at least two cases, 60s.