P
e r s P e c t i v e s
www.AmericanSecurityProject.org1100 New York Avenue, NW Suite 710W Washington, DC 20005
Germain Difo is an adjunct policy analyst at ASP. Te author would like to thank Ms. Melissa Foy for her research and assistance in preparing this report.
Eees Aog Us:Does Radalzao aer Seeber 11
Gera DoOober 2010
here has recently been a sharp uptick in reports o Americans gravitating towardand internalizing the violent, extremist interpretations o Islam espoused by alQaeda and other Islamic extremist groups. Tis spike in domestic radicalizationcases has produced considerable concern within the law enorcement and intelligencecommunities, and within the American public at large, that the United States could see agreater incidence o homegrown Islamic terrorism.
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Spurred by recent cases, U.S. counterterrorism authorities have redoubled their eorts totrack, arrest, and prosecute individuals within the United States thought to be planningor executing attacks on the U.S. homeland. Te cases have also led to an increasedocus on the mechanisms o the radicalization process—how, why, and under whatcircumstances individuals move rom the pre-radicalization or “normal” phase into onein which they conduct terrorist attacks motivated by extremist ideology.Despite being the subject o intense interest in law enorcement, intelligence, andpolicymaking circles, the domestic radicalization phenomenon in the U.S. contextremains largely misunderstood. Tis lack o understanding does not exist or wanto eort; several detailed and comprehensive reports have used modeling, small-sample case comparisons, and other methods in earnest attempts to map the path toradicalization and understand what actors underlie some radicalized individuals’decisions to conduct terrorist attacks.
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Tis report began in a similar vein, examining 132 cases o domestic radicalizationin the U.S. since September 11, 2001, in an eort to determine which demographicand circumstantial actors, i any, could help to explain how and why individuals arebecoming radicalized in the United States. Te report came to the ollowing conclusions:
• Extremist messaging that capitalizes on feelings of disaection and alienation
has resonated with more Americans in recent years.
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AmERicAn SEcURity pROjEct
• ere is no clear, identiable demographic prole by which to determine who is most vulnerable
to extremist ideology.
• ere is no clear means by which to determine what combination of events, inuences, or
“triggers” are most likely to lead to radicalization or homegrown terrorist violence.
ese ndings suggest that the homegrown terrorist threat is dynamic, evolving, and increasingly
dicult to pre-empt and counter. More importantly, however, they demonstrate that a shif in approach isneeded to meet and surmount these evolving threats with a more nuanced, balanced, and comprehensivestrategy than has been employed to date.In keeping with that act, the report makes the ollowing recommendations:
• We must recognize that the threat we face is immensely complex and that there is no “silver
bullet” with which to deeat domestic radicalization or homegrown terrorism.
• We must resist over-reliance on tactical approaches and focus on developing long-term
strategies to address the perceptions o exclusion and alienation on which extremism eeds.
• Recognizing that we cannot anticipate or prevent every individual move toward radicalization,
we must devise strategies to manage and minimize risk.
024681012142002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
N U M B E R O F C A S E S
DOMESTIC RADICALIZATION CASES IN THE U.S.
YEAR
Source: Brian Michael Jenkins, “Would-be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in theUnited States Since September 11, 2001,” (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation), 2010. e 6 cases, to date, for
2010 are drawn rom media reports.
3
Fdgs
Exres essagg ha aalzes o eelgs o dsaeo ad aleao has resoaed whore Aeras ree ears.
Despite being a airly constant eature o the domestic terrorism landscape since 2001, the number o
individuals in the United States identied as having been “radicalized” has always been, and remains,
relatively small.
3
It is important to note, however, that there has recently been a signicant increase in the
number o reported U.S. radicalization cases compared to prior years; 2009 saw 13 such cases, almost asmany as in the previous three years combined. Tough the mechanisms driving this phenomenon are varied and complex, increases in the number and variety o cases in which Americans are internalizingextremist ideology suggest that the jihadist message is resonating more widely than ever beore.
Some have identied the Internet as a major driver and accelerator of this phenomenon.
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Increasingly since 9/11, the Internet and other orms o modern media have become some o the most eective vehicles through which extremist groups spread their ideology. Modern media provides them with themeans by which to make the jihadist message slick, appealing, and easily accessible to millions.
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Tesegroups have ocused not only on spreading ideology or passive consumption, they also seek to usetechnology as a potent orce multiplier, extending their reach and destructive capability by encouragingindividuals living in the United States to conduct attacks in their home communities and abroad.
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Tere s o learl defable deograh rofle or does radals.
Despite law enorcement and intelligence ocials’ best eorts to determine which individuals are most
vulnerable to becoming radicalized, there is no clear, workable demographic prole that can predict who
will internalize extremist ideology.Looking at U.S. radicalization cases across a number o demographic variables, including sex, age, race,national origin, economic status, criminal background and mental health status, a ew basic trends did
emerge. Radicalized individuals in the majority of cases, for example, were male, Muslim U.S. citizensor legal permanent residents. A relatively small number of domestic radicals had signicant criminal
backgrounds or histories o psychological disorders compared to those who did not. Most o the
radicals were from working or middle-class backgrounds; not many were poverty-stricken or nancially
destitute.Looking beyond these basic patterns, however, it becomes quickly apparent that or the majority
of variables upon which a workable homegrown terrorist prole might be based, there is a degree
o variation that renders generalizations nearly impossible to make. For example, though indictedhomegrown radicals’ average and median ages hovered in the late 20s and early 30s, respectively, some
cases involved individuals who were well into their 40s, 50s, and in at least two cases, 60s.
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Similarly,
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